Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons - Federation of American Scientists

The Mission
Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
The mission of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons has been debated extensively
since the end of the Cold War. But it is often unclear whether the debate is about nonstrategic
nuclear weapons or the mission of nuclear weapons in general. The public version
of Russia’s latest military doctrine is not clear about the role of non-strategic nuclear
weapons. 183
Nonetheless, statements made by Russian officials and assessments published by the
U.S. intelligence community seems to agree that the demise of general purpose military
forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted the Russian military to see
nuclear weapons, and perhaps particularly non-strategic nuclear forces, as an equalizer
against NATO — and to some extent China’s — conventional forces.
The U.S. intelligence community concluded in 2002 that “Moscow – because of its
concern over deteriorating conventional capabilities – probably will retain several thousand
non-strategic nuclear warheads through at least 2015.” 184
A Russian defense white paper published in October 2003, officially known as “Immediate
Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” indirectly
acknowledged that Russia’s weak conventional forces meant that it would not be
able to face an advanced adversary or a coalition of adversaries without resorting to use of
nuclear weapons. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reportedly stated that Russia might
have to revise its military planning, including nuclear weapons, if NATO retained an offensive
doctrine. Russia would not rule out a pre-emptive attack anywhere if national interests
demanded it, he allegedly said. 185
The statements coincided with a NATO meeting and created an uproar that Defense
Minister Ivanov had to quell. NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington said that Ivanov
had been “at pains to say that some of the reports bore no relation to what the reality
was,” 186 and that “Russia does not have or does not seek to have a pre-emptive strategy in
183 For studies on the role of Russian nuclear weapons, see papers from National Defense University symposium Strategy
and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy, June 2010,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/2010%20Russia%20Security%20Workshop/References.htm; Keir Giles, The Military
Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010, Research Review February 2010, National Defense College,
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=170
184 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military
Forces, February 2002, p. 6, http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/russiannucfac.pdf
185 Paul Ames, “NATO to Quiz Russian Minister Over Threat,” Associated Press, October 9, 2003; David Holley, “Russia
Sees U.S. NATO Actions as Reasons to Watch Its Back,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2004.
The two sources differ on the wording of Defense Minister Ivanov’s statement. According to the Associated Press story,
he said: “If NATO is preserved as a military alliance with its existing offensive military doctrine, this will demand a radical
reconstruction of Russian military planning…including changes in Russia nuclear strategy.” The Los Angeles Times story
quoted Ivanov saying that, “if NATO remains a military alliance with an offensive military doctrine, Russia will have to
adequately revise its military planning and principles regarding the development of its armed forces, including its nuclear
forces.”
186 Paul Ames, “NATO to Quiz Russian Minister Over Threat,” Associated Press, October 9, 2003.
76 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org