Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons - Federation of American Scientists

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012
The SS-21 is being replaced with the SS-26 Stone (Iskander). The new missile might
be nuclear-capable but the status is uncertain. Back in the late-1990s, various reports circulated
that President Boris Yeltsin had signed several decrees regarding nuclear weapons,
one of which allegedly concerned operationalizing the SS-26 with a nuclear warhead. 153
These decrees have widely been interpreted since as showing an increased Russian reliance
on nuclear weapons. 154
There are no signs from commercial satellite images that SS-26 deployment has begun
in Kaliningrad, but the weapon system is being deployed in western Russia, starting with
the 26 th Missile Brigade base (58°44'56.23"N, 29°49'21.66"E) outside Luga some 130 km
south of Saint Petersburg. The base is being upgraded from SS-21 to support the SS-26
and a satellite image from May 12, 2010, shows what might be a shipment of mobile
launches at a nearby rail station.
The chief of Russia’s ground forces, Colonel General Alexander Postnikov, said in
February 2010 that it was “planned to equip a brigade of the Leningrad Military District
with the Iskander advanced missile systems this year.” But he insisted that the deployment
was not linked to the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland. 155
Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites
According to the Russian government, “all Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons are
concentrated in centralized storage bases exclusively ob [sic] the national territory.” 156
The U.S. intelligence community agrees: “In peacetime all nuclear munitions except those
on ICBMs and SLBMs in alert status are stored in nuclear weapons storage sites.” 157
The Russian government has not defined what types of facilities constitute “centralized
storage bases,” and the assertion by the U.S. intelligence community that “most” of
Russia’s non-strategic nuclear warheads are in “central depots” suggests that some weapons
153 For sources on a nuclear capability for the SS-26, see: Alexei Arbatov, “A Russian Perspective o the Challenge of
U.S., NATO and Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (ed.),
Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations,
Swedish Research Defense Agency, FOI-R—1588—SE, February 2005, p. 50.
[Indent] Other sources do not agree the Iskander-M has been equipped with nuclear capability. Jane’s Strategic Weapons
Systems, states that the Iskander-M “has been considered to have the potential to carry a tactual nuclear warhead,
or a chemical warhead, but there are no reports about these options being developed.” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems,
2010-2011 (Jane’s Information Group, 2010).
154 The reports about a nuclear capability for the Iskander appear to be based on a small number of newspaper articles
and interviews. For description, see: Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Technical
Issues and Policy Recommendations, Swedish Research Defense Agency, FOI-R—1588—SE, February 2005, pp. 2, 14, 25,
44, 50, 51, and 52.
155 “Iskander plan in NW Russia not linked to U.S. deployment in Europe,” RIA Novosti, February 25, 2010,
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100225/158004472.html
156 President of the Russian Federation, Practical Steps of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear disarmament, May 2010, p. 8.
157 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military
Forces, April 2006, p. 5,
http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/AnnualReportOnSafetyAndSecurityOfRussionNuclearFacilitiesAndMilita
ryForces.pdf
65 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org