Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons - Federation of American Scientists

Conclusions and Recommendations
and credible way. Extending old nuclear postures will not help and may even undermine
the process.
It is unfortunate that NATO and the United States, after two decades of conducting
unilateral reductions, have now adopted a policy that “any further reductions” must take
into account the disparity between Russian and U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces. The
policy formally links the non-strategic nuclear postures of Russia and NATO, even
though NATO has insisted for the past two decades that the U.S. non-strategic nuclear
weapons in Europe were not directed at Russia.
While it is necessary to seek reductions in Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons,
reinstating disparity now as a condition for further reductions seems to turn back the
clock to the 1980s. Disparity can become a roadblock to further progress, perpetuate the
role of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and deepen the “us versus them” mentality that is
increasingly polluting Russian-NATO relations.
For some, the linking of the two postures reflects unease about Russian intentions in
general. For others, disparity is a tactic to use promises of further reductions in NATO’s
forces as a card to play to get something in return from Russia. Others see disparity as a
convenient roadblock to prevent further reductions – certainly withdrawal – of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe.
But what does it mean to take into account the disparity with Russian non-strategic
nuclear weapons? Does it mean that parity needs to be established before NATO can
reduce further, or how much must disparity be reduced before it is no longer an issue?
More than falling back on non-strategic nuclear weapons issues, NATO needs to have
serious and sustained discussions with its eastern European member countries about what
their security concerns are about and provide primarily non-nuclear means to reassure
them. The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which is expected to be
approved by NATO at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, will be an important opportunity
to clarify the nuclear policy.
Based on the principles in the Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in
2010, the DDPR is intended to determine NATO’s mix of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities
for the next decade. But an unfortunate decision at the Lisbon Summit to limit
the review to those nuclear forces that are “assigned to NATO” – the U.S. nuclear weapons
in Europe and the portion of the British Trident force that might still have a substrategic
mission – means that the review will not examine the contribution of the vast
majority of the nuclear arsenals of the alliance’s three nuclear weapon states in deterring
potential adversaries. As a result, the review could end up overemphasizing the importance
of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
A DDPR that reaffirms the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
would – especially if it is accompanied by decisions to strengthen missile defense and
conventional forces – likely embolden Russian opposition to NATO and reliance on nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. Ironically, that would undermine the security of the same
countries that say that deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is necessary to ensure
their safety.
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