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92<br />
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> and the Russian-<br />
Georgian conflict of 2008:<br />
lessons learned and<br />
Russian military reforms<br />
By Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger McDermott<br />
Russia’s short war with Georgia, in August 2008, resulted in a rapid military<br />
victory, which surprised many observers and experts. Russia’s use of airpower<br />
proved a significant factor in achieving its operational goals in what the<br />
Russian government described as its ‘peace enforcement operation,’ including<br />
driving Georgia’s armed forces from South Ossetia and simultaneously<br />
securing Abkhazia. Nevertheless, within only two months Russia had<br />
elaborated a far reaching and ambitious military reform and modernization<br />
agenda partly reflecting its ‘lessons learned’ from the campaign in the South<br />
Caucasus. The authors examine Russian airpower in the Georgia war in<br />
the context of reform plans that also have implications for Russia’s future<br />
use of airpower in conflict. It highlights some of the operational failings of<br />
Russian airpower, what air force commanders identified as the most pressing<br />
priorities in enhancing air capabilities, and questions some of the underlying<br />
assumptions in this reform process.
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