REVIEW - Air Power Studies

More documents

Recommendations

Info

14 The Myths and Realities of Air Anti- Submarine Warfare during the Great War By Col John Abbatiello Although the historical record often got it wrong, the efforts of Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Air Force anti-submarine aviators met with varying degrees of success during the Great War. Anti-submarine missions fell into three categories: bombing German U-boat bases in Flanders, patrolling the sea lanes around Britain, and escorting convoys. Though bombing and patrolling certainly contributed to the failure of the unrestricted U-boat campaign, convoys served as the ultimate antidote and were made even more effective by the contribution of aircraft. First World War naval aviators did not enjoy guidance from existing doctrine; they invented it in the field. This essay highlights inaccuracies in the historical record and explains the challenges, successes, and failures of early air anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The author concludes that command and organizational constraints were the root cause of inconsistent employment techniques.
On 22 September 1917, a Royal Naval Air Service flying boat destroyed a small German Uboat in the English Channel. The Dunkirk-based flying boat despatched UB32 with two 230lb bombs, striking the submarine behind the conning tower as the U-boat tried to dive for safety. Flying boat crewmembers and escorting Sopwith pilots confirmed that a mass of oil and wreckage resulted from the explosions. 1 This engagement was the only confirmed case during World War One of a U-boat being destroyed by a British aircraft on its own, that is without the aid of surface vessels. There were at least five, and perhaps six, additional instances where British aircraft working with destroyers or patrol boats sank U-boats. However, if one considers that the Germans lost 178 submarines to all causes during the Great War, it is obvious that aircraft played a minimal role in thwarting their operations. 2 At least, that is what much of the literature of World War One has led us to believe. In reality, aircraft served an important function in trade defence during World War One. Airplanes, seaplanes, and flying boats, as well as non-rigid airships and kite balloons, performed three anti-submarine roles during the Great War. First, RNAS and (from 1 April 1918) RAF bombers raided German U-boat bases in Belgium, damaging only a few Uboats, but forcing the Germans to invest heavily in defending their facilities and naval units from air attack. Secondly, aircraft patrolled the waters surrounding the British Isles, contributing to anti-submarine warfare by hunting and attacking U-boats and then using wireless, or other signalling techniques, to call in supporting naval forces. The third and final anti-submarine role for aircraft was convoy escort work. From the earliest days of convoy until the end of the First World War, U-boats were able to sink only five convoyed vessels when the convoy enjoyed both air and surface escort. In fact, Uboats did not attack an air-escorted convoy until December 1917, and there were only eight occasions when U-boats even attempted such attacks in home waters during the entire war. 3 Since the end of the Great War, historians generally recognised this important contribution of aircraft to the U-boat war, but the details of this issue have remained clouded for a number of reasons. One of the primary causes is the simple fact that naval aviation did not fall neatly into aviation history on the one hand, or naval history on the other, meriting only secondary coverage in these sorts of studies. With the exception of the British and Canadian official air histories, pertinent details of the campaign are widely scattered across a range of texts. Air and naval general histories of the Great War see the campaign as only a minor issue in a greater conflict and offer only a few paragraphs, or at best a chapter, to explain it. 4 Likewise, the numerous extant surveys of naval aviation tend to view the RNAS’s air campaign against U-boats simply as a forerunner to operations in World War Two. These brief treatments do not adequately explain this campaign and over-generalise the key issues. This essay will examine some of the misunderstandings surrounding 15
Page 1 and 2: AIR POWER REVIEW Volume 12 Number 1
Page 3 and 4: ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER REVIEW Th
Page 5 and 6: 1 France and the Development of Bri
Page 7 and 8: omber, fighter, close-support and w
Page 9 and 10: any service or nationality, and was
Page 11 and 12: As a consequence, governments and t
Page 13 and 14: Doctor Christian F. Anrig is a King
Page 15 and 16: Introduction There was no European
Page 17 and 18: had been greatly impressed by the p
Page 19 and 20: anch of aviation.’ 13 It was not
Page 21 and 22: photography and map making. By Dece
Page 23 and 24: Lacking both equipment and experien
Page 25 and 26: of blue, white and red since 1912.
Page 30 and 31: 16 these innovative roles - again,
Page 32 and 33: 18 that these ‘indiscriminate bom
Page 34 and 35: 20 forces. Except for a very brief
Page 36 and 37: 22 memo planted the seed which grew
Page 38 and 39: 24 and small patrol craft to mines
Page 40 and 41: 26 are based on information provide
Page 42 and 43: 28 intended to highlight the Admira
Page 44: 30 RNAS, 3 Mar 1916, TNA AIR 1/2319
Page 47 and 48: ‘For now we see through a glass d
Page 49 and 50: of the Air War Spain and China Comm
Page 51 and 52: community a potential laboratory in
Page 53 and 54: attempted to make up for the loss b
Page 55 and 56: of ‘détente’ between the RAF a
Page 57 and 58: Deputy Director of Intelligence, pr
Page 59 and 60: The American Army Air Corps shared
Page 61 and 62: Air War Spain and China Committees
Page 63 and 64: Hewitt was anxious to use the weapo
Page 65 and 66: to appease army sensitivities. A tw
Page 67 and 68: 35 TNA-AIR/2/2022 - Joint Intellige
Page 69 and 70: 119 TNA-AIR/2/3345 - 14 October 193
Page 71 and 72: “They [the USAF Doctrine Center]
Page 73 and 74: comment and with a far wider distri
Page 75 and 76: the generation of national air powe
Page 77 and 78:
warfare with the aim of exploring w
Page 79 and 80:
the constraints of the Central Regi
Page 81 and 82:
October 2002. 14 Correspondence bet
Page 83 and 84:
In the course of operation Desert S
Page 85 and 86:
Between 24 March and 9 June 1999, N
Page 87 and 88:
Kyrgyzstan, on 27 February 2002. On
Page 89 and 90:
open a new front for air operations
Page 91 and 92:
into the EU’s CFSP. 45 These incl
Page 93 and 94:
Capabilities not only have to exist
Page 95 and 96:
spear still remains problematic. Re
Page 97 and 98:
it seems to be unnoticed that the S
Page 99 and 100:
French Air Force was in charge of t
Page 101 and 102:
capabilities will be coherent and w
Page 103 and 104:
d’aujourd’hui, No. 208 hors sé
Page 105 and 106:
Conference 2005 (London, 25-27 Janu
Page 107 and 108:
The August 2008 military conflict b
Page 109 and 110:
ceasefi re regime in place. 7 Addin
Page 111 and 112:
spectrum air defences Georgian pers
Page 113 and 114:
186 military personnel, although it
Page 115 and 116:
the multi-tiered system. Moreover,
Page 117 and 118:
to invest in new procurement plans
Page 119 and 120:
without a father or a mother, while
Page 121 and 122:
Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Khrulev
Page 123 and 124:
4 ‘Georgia: Sliding Towards Autho
Page 125 and 126:
35 Twelve Tu-22M3R are believed to
Page 127 and 128:
113
Page 129 and 130:
On October 29 2008, the New York Ti
Page 131 and 132:
‘We need a new model for deterren
Page 133 and 134:
It is not that it is difficult, the
Page 135 and 136:
we might hold at risk. It is very r
Page 137 and 138:
Gen (ret’d) Hayden (Director CIA)
Page 139 and 140:
clear academic aptitude, and libera
Page 141 and 142:
in the form of the Malcolm Clubs, w
Page 143 and 144:
say I “thought” and “felt”
Page 145 and 146:
of an air force in counter-insurgen
Page 147 and 148:
133
Page 149 and 150:
from complimentary. There are broad
Page 151 and 152:
‘…and with the dangers of infil
Page 153 and 154:
the book: ‘At each sunset the for
Page 155 and 156:
and saw years of research, and mill
Page 157 and 158:
Notes 143
Page 159 and 160:
Notes 145
Page 161 and 162:
Notes 147
Page 164:
Centre for Air Power Studies www.ai
show all

REVIEW - Air Power Studies

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?