REVIEW - Air Power Studies

More documents

Recommendations

Info

68 The Quest for Relevant Air Power - Continental Europe By Dr Christian Anrig Due to limited resources, no single European air force has been able to acquire the full spectrum of air power. Against the backdrop of American air power dominance, this situation led to a transatlantic air power capability gap. While much has been said about this capability gap and continental European reluctance to make meaningful contributions to allied military operations, the actual achievements and distinct features of continental European air forces have been neglected. This article attempts to address this neglect by scrutinising continental European contributions to deployed operations, by examining European alliance frameworks, and by analysing air power deficiencies and remedies. In its conclusion, the article highlights four potential guidelines for the development of relevant and flexible European air power.
In the course of operation Desert Storm, the dominance of American air power manifested itself in a way that could not have been anticipated. Against this backdrop, a prominent British air power scholar and practitioner coined the term ‘differential air power’, referring to a transatlantic air power capability gap. 1 In addition to this gap, American airmen began to consider continental Europe, particularly France, as obstacles to the ‘proper’ application of American air power. In a hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services in October 1999, the American Air Component Commander of Allied Force, Lieutenant General Michael Short, argued that France should not have been allowed to restrict American aviators, who had borne 70 per cent of the air campaign over Serbia and Kosovo. 2 The Iraq crisis in early 2003 reinforced this negative image of ‘Old Europe’. While much has been said about a transatlantic air power capability gap and continental European reluctance to make meaningful contributions to allied military operations, the actual achievements and distinct features of continental European air forces have been neglected. Seeking to address this neglect, this article will scrutinise the contributions of continental European air powers to deployed operations. It will continue to examine European alliance frameworks and their repercussions for air power. Thereafter, the need to develop European air power, deficiencies in air power capabilities, and remedies will be examined. The article will conclude by highlighting four potential guidelines for developing relevant and flexible European air power. Deployed operations The title The Quest for Relevant Air Power implies that the purpose of European air power first has to be established. Air power, like all forms of military power, in essence is subservient to politics. The relationship between the military and politics is best expressed by Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum: ‘War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.’ 3 Hence, despite the fact that air power came to the fore almost a century after Clausewitz’s statement, the relevance of modern air power still has to be assessed in Clausewitzian terms. Since the demise of the bipolar ideological and nuclear confrontation between the West and the East, and since operation Desert Storm, the successful liberation of Kuwait in early 1991, continental European air power has generally served two purposes in deployed operations – humanitarian relief and combating terrorism. Operations conducted for humanitarian purposes and air operations against the backdrop of the ‘War on Terror’ form the basis for critically examining European air power. Balkan air campaigns In the first half of the 1990s, the United States and Europe were confronted with internal, ethnically motivated conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere. The most predominant of these was the Bosnian Civil War, lasting from 1992 to 1995. As a response to this conflict, the West launched a UN operation on the ground, and in the air, NATO conducted its first air campaign, 69
Page 1 and 2:
AIR POWER REVIEW Volume 12 Number 1
Page 3 and 4:
ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER REVIEW Th
Page 5 and 6:
1 France and the Development of Bri
Page 7 and 8:
omber, fighter, close-support and w
Page 9 and 10:
any service or nationality, and was
Page 11 and 12:
As a consequence, governments and t
Page 13 and 14:
Doctor Christian F. Anrig is a King
Page 15 and 16:
Introduction There was no European
Page 17 and 18:
had been greatly impressed by the p
Page 19 and 20:
anch of aviation.’ 13 It was not
Page 21 and 22:
photography and map making. By Dece
Page 23 and 24:
Lacking both equipment and experien
Page 25 and 26:
of blue, white and red since 1912.
Page 28 and 29:
14 The Myths and Realities of Air A
Page 30 and 31:
16 these innovative roles - again,
Page 32 and 33: 18 that these ‘indiscriminate bom
Page 34 and 35: 20 forces. Except for a very brief
Page 36 and 37: 22 memo planted the seed which grew
Page 38 and 39: 24 and small patrol craft to mines
Page 40 and 41: 26 are based on information provide
Page 42 and 43: 28 intended to highlight the Admira
Page 44: 30 RNAS, 3 Mar 1916, TNA AIR 1/2319
Page 47 and 48: ‘For now we see through a glass d
Page 49 and 50: of the Air War Spain and China Comm
Page 51 and 52: community a potential laboratory in
Page 53 and 54: attempted to make up for the loss b
Page 55 and 56: of ‘détente’ between the RAF a
Page 57 and 58: Deputy Director of Intelligence, pr
Page 59 and 60: The American Army Air Corps shared
Page 61 and 62: Air War Spain and China Committees
Page 63 and 64: Hewitt was anxious to use the weapo
Page 65 and 66: to appease army sensitivities. A tw
Page 67 and 68: 35 TNA-AIR/2/2022 - Joint Intellige
Page 69 and 70: 119 TNA-AIR/2/3345 - 14 October 193
Page 71 and 72: “They [the USAF Doctrine Center]
Page 73 and 74: comment and with a far wider distri
Page 75 and 76: the generation of national air powe
Page 77 and 78: warfare with the aim of exploring w
Page 79 and 80: the constraints of the Central Regi
Page 81: October 2002. 14 Correspondence bet
Page 85 and 86: Between 24 March and 9 June 1999, N
Page 87 and 88: Kyrgyzstan, on 27 February 2002. On
Page 89 and 90: open a new front for air operations
Page 91 and 92: into the EU’s CFSP. 45 These incl
Page 93 and 94: Capabilities not only have to exist
Page 95 and 96: spear still remains problematic. Re
Page 97 and 98: it seems to be unnoticed that the S
Page 99 and 100: French Air Force was in charge of t
Page 101 and 102: capabilities will be coherent and w
Page 103 and 104: d’aujourd’hui, No. 208 hors sé
Page 105 and 106: Conference 2005 (London, 25-27 Janu
Page 107 and 108: The August 2008 military conflict b
Page 109 and 110: ceasefi re regime in place. 7 Addin
Page 111 and 112: spectrum air defences Georgian pers
Page 113 and 114: 186 military personnel, although it
Page 115 and 116: the multi-tiered system. Moreover,
Page 117 and 118: to invest in new procurement plans
Page 119 and 120: without a father or a mother, while
Page 121 and 122: Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Khrulev
Page 123 and 124: 4 ‘Georgia: Sliding Towards Autho
Page 125 and 126: 35 Twelve Tu-22M3R are believed to
Page 127 and 128: 113
Page 129 and 130: On October 29 2008, the New York Ti
Page 131 and 132: ‘We need a new model for deterren
Page 133 and 134:
It is not that it is difficult, the
Page 135 and 136:
we might hold at risk. It is very r
Page 137 and 138:
Gen (ret’d) Hayden (Director CIA)
Page 139 and 140:
clear academic aptitude, and libera
Page 141 and 142:
in the form of the Malcolm Clubs, w
Page 143 and 144:
say I “thought” and “felt”
Page 145 and 146:
of an air force in counter-insurgen
Page 147 and 148:
133
Page 149 and 150:
from complimentary. There are broad
Page 151 and 152:
‘…and with the dangers of infil
Page 153 and 154:
the book: ‘At each sunset the for
Page 155 and 156:
and saw years of research, and mill
Page 157 and 158:
Notes 143
Page 159 and 160:
Notes 145
Page 161 and 162:
Notes 147
Page 164:
Centre for Air Power Studies www.ai
show all

REVIEW - Air Power Studies

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?