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and saw years of research, and<br />
millions of pounds of investment,<br />
wiped out by a 14 year old in flip<br />
flops with a mobile phone, internet<br />
access and an axe to grind. Where is<br />
airpower’s decisive effect in the face<br />
of these threats? We hit the target on<br />
time, at range and with immaculate<br />
precision, but in doing so miss the<br />
point entirely.<br />
Perceiving air power as anything<br />
other than another tool of the trade of<br />
warfare – albeit a remarkably<br />
adaptable and capable tool – does it<br />
an injustice and has the potential to<br />
undermine its particular strengths<br />
and capabilities in the eyes of<br />
decision makers and our colleagues<br />
on the ground. Every man who<br />
has tried to use a knife instead of a<br />
screwdriver to fix a plug, a chair<br />
instead of a stepladder to reach the<br />
attic, or a conventionally orbatted and<br />
doctrined military to fight an<br />
insurgency, will know that even the<br />
best tools can lead to failure when<br />
applied to the wrong task.<br />
Advocating air power is one thing,<br />
but spinning its strengths, its<br />
potential and genuine contributions<br />
as something other than as a useful<br />
tool to be used as part of a broader,<br />
joined up operational/strategic plan<br />
is a dangerous fallacy; one that has<br />
the potential to undermine the hard<br />
won operational relevance air power<br />
has secured in its 100ish years. Just<br />
as economic sanctions became an<br />
‘attractive compromise between<br />
doing nothing and sending in the<br />
Marines’ 4 and our ‘statesmens’<br />
affection for [them] has not been<br />
matched by a similar interest in<br />
analysis’ 5 , there is a danger that air<br />
power advocates will see it deployed<br />
as a Blood and Treasure-lite option<br />
inappropriately and ineffectively<br />
as, some might argue, NATO did in<br />
Kosovo, and continued to do<br />
so in Afghanistan and Iraq 6 .<br />
<strong>Air</strong> power is a marvellous tool that<br />
brings a plethora of advantages for<br />
war fighters and policy makers, but<br />
its advocates must be cautious in<br />
their claims and must ensure that<br />
air power research and publications<br />
such as this, place air power in the<br />
broader context of war, strategy and<br />
international relations.<br />
Notes<br />
1 Viewed relatively, these cuts are even<br />
greater. UK Defence Statistics 2006 –<br />
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/<br />
ukds/2006/c2/table27.html<br />
2 General Mosely, then head of the<br />
United States <strong>Air</strong> Force (USAF), used this<br />
example during CAS <strong>Air</strong> power<br />
Conference in summer 2006.<br />
3 There is much debate on the nature,<br />
relevance and, even, existence of 4GW,<br />
which is the subject of other research by<br />
the author.<br />
4 Haass R – Sanctions – With Care -<br />
Washington Post 27 July 1997<br />
5 Forland T – The History of Economic War<br />
- Journal of Peace Research Vol 30<br />
No 2 1993.<br />
6 Yes, air power’s contribution to the<br />
initial operational battles was impressive,<br />
even decisive, but not so in the broader<br />
strategic campaign, where the West, as a<br />
whole, has been unable to act decisively.<br />
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