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community a potential laboratory in<br />
which to study the techniques and<br />
equipment of likely enemies. This was<br />
not lost on <strong>Air</strong> Intelligence. Within<br />
a month of the Spanish Civil War<br />
starting, Goddard had supplied the<br />
Deputy Chief of the <strong>Air</strong> Staff (DCAS)<br />
with details of aerial fi ghting and<br />
foreign participation. By October<br />
1936, he was counselling that reliable<br />
data would be hard to obtain. 27 He<br />
informed <strong>Air</strong> Plans that ‘The enclosed<br />
papers do not provide what you<br />
want…but you will see the nakedness<br />
of the hand of intelligence…’ 28<br />
However, by February 1937, a stream<br />
of intelligence had replaced ‘the<br />
nakedness’ and <strong>Air</strong> Intelligence<br />
were convinced of the importance of<br />
studying the Spanish Civil War:<br />
…The amount of information is already<br />
more than the section – AI3d – can<br />
deal with… certain foreign countries<br />
are employing their aircraft and war<br />
material…as a means of trying them<br />
out for fi tness for war, and since the<br />
tactics being employed by the air forces<br />
will undoubtedly have much to do with<br />
the tactics adopted in their respective<br />
countries, it is essential that a thorough<br />
investigation should be made… 29<br />
The Admiralty sought to persuade<br />
the Joint Intelligence Committee to<br />
formally study the Spanish Civil War.<br />
Surprisingly, Admiral S. H. Philips<br />
advocated a special sub-committee<br />
to study air warfare alone. He argued<br />
that the only information available on<br />
air warfare derived from 1914 – 1918<br />
and was both limited and potentially<br />
misleading when applied to modern<br />
war. In the fi rst use of a caveat that<br />
became much applied, he argued<br />
that ‘...this warfare may not be as<br />
intensive or as highly technical as<br />
that which may be visualised in a<br />
future war between fi rst-class European<br />
powers…’. 30 Instead of welcoming<br />
Admiralty support, the <strong>Air</strong> Ministry<br />
reacted with a mix of anger and<br />
suspicion. One offi cer minuted ‘…the<br />
Admiralty may be seeking support<br />
for a theory that the effect of bombing<br />
operations is exaggerated.’ 31<br />
In Joint Intelligence Committee<br />
debate, the Deputy Director of<br />
Intelligence (DDI), Group Captain<br />
Medhurst, was unyielding. He stated<br />
that three offi cers were already<br />
engaged in sifting and collating<br />
Spanish Civil War information; he<br />
couldn’t envisage ‘...what functions<br />
the Sub-Committee could usefully<br />
perform over and above the<br />
investigations now in progress in<br />
the <strong>Air</strong> Ministry.’ He was prepared<br />
to let the Sub-Committee look at the<br />
accumulated detail, but was certain<br />
that ‘…it was undesirable that this<br />
work should be side-tracked.’ 32 This<br />
is a clear example of ‘collegiality’- the<br />
practice of intelligence assessments<br />
being made on the unchallenged<br />
37
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