La politique du dehors avec les raisons du - European University ...
La politique du dehors avec les raisons du - European University ...
La politique du dehors avec les raisons du - European University ...
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«<strong>La</strong> <strong>politique</strong> <strong>du</strong> <strong>dehors</strong> <strong>avec</strong> <strong>les</strong> <strong>raisons</strong> <strong>du</strong> dedans: can foreign policy be<br />
dictated by anti-immigrant attitudes?»<br />
Domestic explanations<br />
Raymond Taras<br />
Theories assigning primacy to external factors in the making of foreign<br />
policy hold that states are unitary actors behaving rationally and pursuing<br />
national interests. Internal theories point both to the existence of many<br />
different voices in the state and to deviations from rationality as leaders seek to<br />
satisfy domestic political goals by taking decisions that do not necessarily<br />
optimize state interests in international politics. “In contrast to the externally<br />
based theories, those who point to sources internal to the state expect<br />
differences across states’ foreign policies, despite the similar international<br />
circumstances. For these analysts, the great diversity of political systems,<br />
cultures, and leaders point states in different directions, even though they are<br />
facing the same external forces.” 1<br />
How attentive are leaders to public opinion, especially on issues related<br />
to international politics? On the one hand, “the conventional wisdom is that<br />
the public simply does not influence foreign policy…. It is not clear that leaders<br />
would follow the public’s opinion.” On the other is evidence that “there is some<br />
congruence between changes in public opinion and changes in foreign policy.” 2<br />
Ironically, the pathology of xenophobia can exert greater influence in a<br />
democratic system. “Demagoguery works best where the demos has some<br />
influence.” 3 The types of demagoguery that are likely to be most appealing are<br />
1
those targeting an unpopular foreign nation, or a disliked minority or migrant<br />
community at home. Projected to foreign policy, xenophobic demagoguery can<br />
heighten irrational security fears and a correspondingly hostile policy towards<br />
antipathetical nations.<br />
The primacy of rationally defined national interests has always been<br />
suspect. Anthropologist F.G. Bailey, author of the seminal book Strategems and<br />
Spoils, quoted a letter written in 1648 by Count Oxiensterna, a Swedish<br />
statesman, to his son: “You do not understand, my son, how small a part<br />
reason plays in governing the world.” 4 Bailey highlighted the lure of<br />
demagoguery and xenophobia for average citizens: “Ordinary Jane and<br />
Ordinary Joe are quicker to feel than they are to think; they respond more<br />
readily to a message that touches their emotions than to one that requires<br />
them to attend to a carefully reasoned argument. Reason does not mobilize<br />
support; slogans do. Reasoning is demanding; slogans are comfortably<br />
compelling.” 5<br />
Culture and foreign policy<br />
The study of culture and its linkage to international relations has been<br />
receiving greater attention in recent years. 6 Valerie Hudson succinctly captured<br />
one aspect in this linkage—between national identity and foreign policy--this<br />
way: “When we speak of culture and national identity as they relate to foreign<br />
policy, we are seeking the answers that the people of a nation-state would give<br />
to the following three questions: ‘Who are we?’, ‘What do ‘we’ do?’, and ‘Who are<br />
2
they?’” 7<br />
Culture organizes meaning for a society: “culture tells us what to want,<br />
to prefer, to desire, and thus to value.” It also “provides scripts and personae<br />
that are reenacted and subtly modified over time within a society.” 8 Culture<br />
shapes foreign policy, at least indirectly. 9 Shared systems of meaning become<br />
transferred to the foreign policy making process. For Hudson, “culture in and<br />
of itself is not a cause of anything in international relations…. It is in the ‘who<br />
draws what ideas’ and the ‘how the ideas are employed’ aspects that causes of<br />
events can be found.” 10<br />
Differences in the internal values found in states can become refracted<br />
onto foreign policy behavior. A good example is in the self-selected national role<br />
conception. Thus the Third Reich saw itself as preserver of the Caucasian race,<br />
the U.S. as champion of indivi<strong>du</strong>al enterprise, Sweden as mediator, and<br />
Canada as multicultural pioneer. 11 For Hudson, it may even be the case that<br />
“A nation’s leaders rise in part because they articulate a vision of the nation’s<br />
role in world affairs that corresponds to deep cultural beliefs about the<br />
nation.” 12 Accordingly national action scripts may profound shape a state’s<br />
international politics.<br />
Culture is regarded as a guarantor of continuity in a state’s foreign policy<br />
and it follows that cultural analysis can indicate which “Well-known and well-<br />
practiced options, preferably tied in to the nation’s heroic history, will be<br />
preferred over <strong>les</strong>s well-known and <strong>les</strong>s familiar options or options with<br />
traumatic track records—even if an objective cost-benefit analysis of the two<br />
3
options would suggest otherwise.” 13<br />
How power and national interests are understood and defined are often<br />
cultural constructs. Policy makers face a challenge: “to what myths, stories,<br />
heroic historical elements, contemporary cultural memes, or other elements do<br />
they refer?” 14 A culture that embodies a nation’s historical and normative<br />
pathways may become privileged in the formulation of foreign policy.<br />
Culturally-embedded values encompassing national biases, fears, and<br />
antipathies are regularly projected externally. Let us take one example. In his<br />
study of the Arab community in Canada and that country’s participation in the<br />
U.S.-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf war, a Canadian Arabist contended that<br />
race had been involved in judging who was an enemy and who a friend.<br />
“Canadians will never think of America as an enemy, and neither can they<br />
think of British or the French as enemies…. But it is so easy to think of Arabs<br />
as the enemy.” Pointing to Canada’s assertive multicultural, multiracial<br />
mosaic, the author inferred that “Since multiculturalism advocates celebrating<br />
the differences, allowing the traditions and cultures to coexist, the extension of<br />
that policy in foreign policy is a stance of neutrality.” 15<br />
Diaspora lobbies<br />
Especially in multicultural societies, diaspora groups may seek influence<br />
in the making of their adopted country’s foreign policy. 16 But this does not<br />
apply to all ethnic communities. After 9/11, Arab and Muslim community<br />
leaders in Western countries have had a difficult time exerting influence. There<br />
4
are a number of reasons for this. These community heads are up against the<br />
leading role played by the U.S.—whether led by Bush or Obama—in the global<br />
arena. Arab and Muslim groups are often poorly organized and, in contrast to<br />
many other diasporas, receive little support from their countries of origin.<br />
Finally, “The community has a hard time defending the interests of an Arab-<br />
Muslim world ruled by despotic, non-democratic, corrupt, and politically<br />
disabled regimes.” 17<br />
In the Canadian case, “An internalization of democratic Canadian values<br />
would be a necessary step to transcend any cultural cleavages and overcome<br />
contradictions between the original values of these diasporas and their newly<br />
acquired Canadian values.” 18 Even then, such normatively-assimilated groups<br />
are competing—in Europe and elsewhere—with the anti-immigrant backlash<br />
that has helped securitize the Muslim threat. Radical right-wing parties have<br />
articulated and aggregated this backlash. Accordingly, “the populist radical<br />
right portrays Islam as one of the greatest threats to Europe in the twenty-first<br />
century, replacing the old specter of communism across Europe.” 19<br />
Diasporas exhibit the national likes and antipathies of their places of<br />
origin; often, they amplify them. They attempt to influence the receiving<br />
country’s foreign policy in so far as it involves that country of origin. Yet<br />
historian Jack Granatstein stated bluntly that “No nation like Canada can do<br />
what its citizens of Sri <strong>La</strong>nkan or Pakistani or Somalian or Jewish or Muslim or<br />
Ukrainian origin want—all the time.” Instead, “A nation must do what its<br />
national interests determine it must.” 20 It was therefore desirable “if our<br />
5
leaders can focus on the aspects of foreign policy that are important to the<br />
nation as a whole and stop playing to the ethnicities that make up our<br />
population.” 21<br />
Migrants and security<br />
Identities, not ideologies, are the criterion by which most migrants are<br />
judged. The notion of the other has expanded as threats to security have<br />
become more palpable. Identities perceived as threatening are held suspect.<br />
Understanding how to protect a country’s security has shifted from “the<br />
absence of threats to acquired values” to “a low probability of damage to<br />
acquired values.” 22<br />
Identities threatening not just the internal cohesion of a state but its<br />
national security and national interests are identified as especially treacherous.<br />
Security has come to be redefined: “There has been a clear shift in emphasis in<br />
the perception of security away from what many would now see as the<br />
re<strong>du</strong>ndant nation-state to indivi<strong>du</strong>als and groups. Herein lies the paradox.<br />
How to reconcile the human right to move freely with the need to protect local<br />
cultures, economies, environments, health, and, in some cases, peace.” 23<br />
The traditional meaning of security has been weakened: “The term<br />
[security] as it has been traditionally used in international relations literature<br />
is based on two major assumptions: one, that threat to a state’s security<br />
principally arises from outside its borders, and two, that these threats are<br />
primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature.” 24 Today, in an era of<br />
6
unprecedented human migration, phobias—the natural and sometimes<br />
constructed fear of “foreigners”—have become more profoundly intertwined<br />
with security and foreign policy. The securitization of migration represents a<br />
synthesis of phobias and foreign policies. Fear of the loss of national<br />
sovereignty enjoins the two. As one academic noted, immigration phobia and<br />
threat perceptions have become fused in a “fear narrative.” 25<br />
On the one hand, that is a surprising conflation: “alarmism about<br />
national security arising from marginal migration is the principal paradox.” 26<br />
On the other, viewed through the lens of the security dilemma, migration—as<br />
cross-border movement of ethnically heterogeneous populations—is a process<br />
that makes different groups potentially insecure not because government<br />
authority suddenly declines, but because these groups become suddenly<br />
proximate:<br />
[B]ecause any influx of migrants may be ascribed to government failure,<br />
host populations are likely to develop a suspicion that their government<br />
becomes weaker, even though the opposite may be the case. The<br />
governments then face an immigrant policy dilemma in very much the<br />
same way they face the arms race dilemma. The appearance of being soft<br />
on immigration is likely to undermine domestic support for the<br />
government. But pursuing a tough restrictionist policy may result in<br />
economic costs, and it may criminalize immigration—exacerbating<br />
exactly the problems that need to be resolved. 27<br />
7
Domestic and foreign policies become locked in a dialectic. Although<br />
other aspects of globalization—unrestricted movement of capital, consumerism,<br />
cultural pro<strong>du</strong>ction—have also made governments seem “soft” on protecting<br />
their “borders,” it has been migration where norms of transnational activity<br />
have not taken root. Thus “Migration (especially illegal migration across state<br />
borders) is often perceived as a sign of declining state sovereignty. The very fact<br />
that ethnic ‘others’ are capable to cross state borders and are hard to control<br />
once inside the host state sets the stage for increasing concerns of the host<br />
populations about security.” 28<br />
The concept of anarchy, both in the international system and in the<br />
receiving society, becomes salient. “The weaker this perceived [government]<br />
capacity, the greater the likelihood that the incumbent groups will feel<br />
uncertain and fearful for their future. Drawing on the security-dilemma logic,<br />
the stronger the sense of anarchy, the stronger the likelihood that security will<br />
be the primary concern of indivi<strong>du</strong>als and groups.” 29 Formulating a tough state<br />
security policy becomes a priority for the anti-migrant constituency.<br />
Fear of approaching anarchy and fear of foreigners become interrelated.<br />
A consequence is the spread of resentment--an emotional response to the<br />
prospect that under anarchy social hierarchies may shift in favor of others. 30<br />
Most cases of ethnic targeting in the twentieth century involved such<br />
resentment, whether the regularity of pogroms against Jews in eastern Europe<br />
or the protracted economic subordination of Catholics in Northern Ireland. In<br />
8
short, shifting social hierarchies pro<strong>du</strong>ce the “sense of emerging anarchy and<br />
uncertainty about the future under weak ‘ru<strong>les</strong> of the game.’” 31<br />
Similar logic was employed by Bauman to associate the rise of<br />
xenophobia with the replacement of structures of solidarity by competition.<br />
“Xenophobia, the growing suspicion of a foreign plot and resentment of<br />
‘strangers’ (mostly of emigrants, those vivid and highly visible reminders that<br />
walls can be pierced and borders effaced, natural effigies, asking to be burned,<br />
of mysterious globalizing forces running out of control), can be seen as a<br />
perverse reflection of desperate attempts to salvage whatever remains of local<br />
solidarity.” 32<br />
In sum, “Immigration phobia in host societies is likely to be more<br />
intense, the more acute perceptions of emergent anarchy, the more ambiguous<br />
the sense of migrant intentions, and the more distinct and cohesive the<br />
perceived ‘groupness’ of migrants.” 33 The spread of Islamophobic attitudes is<br />
partly the pro<strong>du</strong>ct of popular perceptions in the host society of the strong sense<br />
of groupness that Muslim migrants preserve even as anarchic conditions<br />
prevail in transnational migration.<br />
The peril of securitizing migration is that it can bring about exactly that<br />
which it is intended to prevent. “As in the case of spiraling arms races,<br />
overrating of security threats arising from migration is likely to generate self-<br />
fulfilling prophecies: The more migration is feared as a security threat, the<br />
more of a security threat it becomes.” 34<br />
9
As EU policy makers concerned with managing immigration are aware of,<br />
coercive measures against migrants can lead to the spiraling of illegal activity<br />
and violence. The policy dilemma, then, that brings together domestic and<br />
international factors appears as easy to conceptualize as it is difficult to<br />
resolve: “the principal policy challenge is how to re<strong>du</strong>ce the temptation and the<br />
public pressure to ‘securitize’ immigration control while at the same time to<br />
effectively manage migrant flows and unlock the social and economic potential<br />
of migration.” 35<br />
A Case Study: the EU<br />
In his book on EU Foreign and Interior Policies, international relations<br />
expert Stephan Stetter was concerned with the question whether “the EU<br />
‘allocates’ values which construct an inside and an outside.” 36 He studied the<br />
ro<strong>les</strong> of three institutions—the <strong>European</strong> Commission, the EU Council<br />
Secretariat, and the <strong>European</strong> Parliament—in formulating both outside<br />
policies—towards the Middle East—and inside policies—on third country<br />
nationals in the EU. He concluded that there was a common pattern of<br />
evolution signaling that at the EU level international and domestic decision<br />
making patterns cross-fertilized.<br />
Stetter discovered that initially the <strong>European</strong> Commission’s policy<br />
preferences on the Middle East were politically ambitious. But they were reined<br />
in by political realities and in time replaced with a more technical, managerial<br />
approach. The Commission concluded that its economic involvement in the<br />
10
egion had had important political results—the survival of the Pa<strong>les</strong>tinian<br />
Authority and the modernization of some Arab countries. With regard to the<br />
Commission’s interior policy, “a similar adaptation process from an initially<br />
ambitious and political agenda, which was based on a functionally unified<br />
approach to migration policies, was replaced by a more managerial, issue-<br />
orientated attitude.” 37<br />
The visibility of the Council Secretariat in foreign policy increased after<br />
1996 with the activities of its Special Representative for the Middle East, then<br />
after 1999 with the appointment of a High Representative for Common Foreign<br />
and Security Policy. Similarly, in tandem with this, the Council Secretariat<br />
developed specific preferences on migration policies, taking on a more active,<br />
political role.<br />
Finally the <strong>European</strong> Parliament’s priority in its Middle East policy has<br />
traditionally been democracy promotion and human rights—areas of <strong>les</strong>s<br />
concern to the Commission and Secretariat. Stetter again found an apparent<br />
demonstration effect on interior policy making. “Turning to migration policies,<br />
Parliament’s preferences show a remarkable similarity to those outlined on<br />
foreign policies. The lack of direct influence over executive policy-making has<br />
led Parliament to adopt a general skepticism with regard to the overall policy<br />
agenda in migration policies.” 38<br />
From the outset, the <strong>European</strong> Parliament attached greater attention to<br />
serving as a platform for the perspective and interests of migrants. Whether on<br />
the Middle East or migrants, “In both areas Parliament perceives its own role<br />
11
as being a provider for alternative policy agendas to official EU policies as they<br />
are pursued by the EU executive.” 39 Stetter’s explanation for the uncanny<br />
convergence of decision ru<strong>les</strong> on interior and foreign policy by the EU’s three<br />
principal agents was not causality but cross-fertilization. At the EU level of<br />
governance, it appears that Stetter’s findings highlight the congruence between<br />
la <strong>politique</strong> <strong>du</strong> <strong>dehors</strong> <strong>avec</strong> <strong>les</strong> <strong>raisons</strong> <strong>du</strong> dedans. Can we go further and<br />
discover whether under certain conditions a state’s foreign policy may be<br />
dictated by religious and ethnic fears at home?<br />
The internal logic of French foreign policy<br />
For Jocelyn Evans, who employed the French expression above in his<br />
study of the influence of the Front National on France’s foreign policy, right-<br />
wing movements may target scapegoats who are simultaneously found abroad<br />
and at home. Muslim migrants and minorities at home are viewed by many FN<br />
supporters as mere extensions of Muslim states in the international arena.<br />
They are therefore seen as posing an equal threat to national cohesion,<br />
national security, and the national interest. 40<br />
Of course the opposite perspective—of a natural coa<strong>les</strong>cing of interests<br />
found at home and abroad—is just as plausible. Jacques Attali, special adviser<br />
to President Mitterand, remarked that “France may be Christian, Atlantic, and<br />
<strong>European</strong>, but it is also Muslim, Mediterranean and African. And its future—<br />
like that of every great power—resides in the multiplicity of its connections, in<br />
the resolute acceptance of its ambiguities.” 41 France’s special interest in the<br />
12
Muslim and Mediterranean worlds is a pro<strong>du</strong>ct of its geographic proximity to<br />
Arabic-speaking countries. Its extended period of contact with, and at times<br />
conquest of, these peop<strong>les</strong>, dating from the battle of Tours-Poitiers in 732 at<br />
which Franks defeated an army of the Umayyad Caliphate, has also had the<br />
effect of forging close links. Napoleon’s Egyptian Campaign (1798-1801) was<br />
the precursor for the military expedition to Algeria in 1830, setting the stage for<br />
l’Algérie française. Algeria became France’s “narrow door” to Africa. Based on<br />
an often wrenching history, France maintains an emotional attachment to the<br />
Arab world. It seems unlikely that a sudden rise in anti-Muslim attitudes<br />
directed at those of migrant background at home can undo the influence of<br />
France’s deep structures with the Islamic world.<br />
One comparative study contrasted the “quite different and somewhat<br />
incompatible foreign policy models” of France and Germany. “France’s <strong>politique</strong><br />
arabe sought to counter U.S. and Soviet influence in the region, showed a<br />
preference for Arab countries in the Middle East conflict, attempted to isolate<br />
Islamist movements and was guided by strategic considerations that gave little<br />
value to the promotion of democracy.” 42 By contrast, Germany’s ill-termed<br />
Politik der Ausgewogenheit [“balanced policy”] “promoted U.S. primacy in the<br />
region, strongly supported Israel, sought to engage with Islamist movements<br />
and emphasized a premium to civil society contacts and democracy<br />
promotion.” 43 French grand strategy was unlikely to be derailed by internal<br />
changes, whether in government or in public opinion.<br />
13
From pro-Israeli to pro-Arab foreign policy<br />
The history of France’s pro-Arab policy cannot be decoupled from an<br />
internal factor—the existence of anti-Semitism in the country through much of<br />
the twentieth century. The Dreyfus affair, sparked by the conviction in 1894 of<br />
Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French military, for treason, exposed the<br />
country’s anti-Semitism. French society divided over the question of the<br />
patriotism of French Jews, and the controversy left an en<strong>du</strong>ring mark on<br />
French conceptions of identity, belonging, and national security. In the 1940s,<br />
the Vichy regime’s collaboration with the Third Reich, including help with the<br />
deportation of French Jews to extermination camps in eastern Europe, raised<br />
new questions about the uncertain status of the Jewish minority in France.<br />
To be sure, France had thrown its support behind the 1924 Balfour<br />
Declaration which envisaged an independent Jewish state in the Middle East.<br />
France’s colonial policies in the Levant had alienated much of the Arab world.<br />
Its recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 won it few friends in the Middle<br />
East. If anti-Semitism remained a strong undercurrent in French society even<br />
after World War II, the country’s international politics were decidedly anti-Arab.<br />
“Coupled with its war in Algeria, the Fourth Republic’s close ties with Israel<br />
made it a pariah in the eyes of Arab nationalist leaders.” 44 French participation<br />
in the mismanaged 1956 invasion of Suez—an attempt to abort Arab<br />
nationalism as personified by Egyptian leader Gamul Abdel Nasser—furnished<br />
yet another example of Arabophobia in foreign policy.<br />
14
If France’s relations with Arab states were strained, between 1948 and<br />
1958 Fourth Republic governments embraced the new Israeli state, even<br />
transferring nuclear technology to it. At home the state made efforts to improve<br />
French attitudes towards its Jewish minority. Up to the 1960s, enthusiasm for<br />
“Franco-Israeli relations were one of the few foreign policy issues with a strong<br />
domestic resonance—both because of their implications for domestic attitudes<br />
to French Jews, and because of the existence of relatively well organized<br />
lobbies.” 45<br />
France’s close relationship with Israel was weakened by the Evian<br />
agreement of 1962, under which France ended its occupation of Algeria and<br />
granted it independence. The withdrawal was used by President Char<strong>les</strong> de<br />
Gaulle to generally shift foreign policy priorities towards the non-aligned world<br />
and away from Europe, the Atlantic, and Israel. The end of the cordial Franco-<br />
Israeli relationship came in 1967 following Israel’s rout of Arab states’ armies<br />
and the beginning of its occupation of Arab lands in the aftermath of the Six-<br />
Day war. In response, President de Gaulle imposed an arms embargo on Israel.<br />
It carried huge symbolic importance as well: “An undeniable by-pro<strong>du</strong>ct of de<br />
Gaulle’s criticism of Israel in 1967 was the perception among many Arab<br />
leaders that this marked a decisive tilt in policy towards a ‘pro-Arab’ stance by<br />
France.” De Gaulle’s “criticism of Israel provided French diplomats with both<br />
political capital and commercial leverage within the Arab world.” 46 <strong>La</strong> <strong>politique</strong><br />
arabe was to remain the cornerstone of French Middle East policy up until<br />
15
2007. It preceded large-scale Muslim migration into the country. It ended<br />
shortly after French Islamophobia began to make a mark in national politics.<br />
There were always limits to France’s support for secular republics in the<br />
Arab world as well as a theocratic one in Iran. Affection for Saddam Hussein’s<br />
secular Iraqi state vanished when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991. President<br />
Mitterand joined the U.S.-led coalition in driving the Iraqi military out of that<br />
Gulf state. In addition, the French preference for laïcité at home was<br />
transplanted to the international arena and led to a repudiation of Iran after its<br />
1979 revolution. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, defense minister in the late 1980s<br />
in a socialist government, had been a leading strategist behind the approach to<br />
back secular governments in Muslim states: “One of Chevènement’s<br />
longstanding central arguments has been for the need for French foreign policy<br />
to combat religious revivalism in the Maghreb and Middle East—not as an end<br />
in itself, but as a bulwark against the influence of Islamist groups within<br />
France’s own population.” 47<br />
This approach was not yet a turning point in policy towards the Middle<br />
East. After 1996 France expressed opposition to continued sanctions against<br />
Saddam’s regime and President Chirac returned to a more traditional Gaullist<br />
foreign policy. He became one of the most outspoken critics of the U.S. invasion<br />
of Iraq in 2003 and was supported by major French enterprises, the upper civil<br />
service, and the vast majority of French citizens. Chirac contributed to the<br />
conceptualization of France as une puissance musulmane, earning him the<br />
nickname Chirac d’Arabie. The Maghreb in particular became the primary<br />
16
destination for French aid, investment, and cooperation on military and<br />
counterterrorism operations.<br />
The Sarkozy shift<br />
As presidential candidate in 2007, Sarkozy styled himself l’homme de<br />
rupture—the leader who would break with the country’s past foreign policy. His<br />
electoral campaign borrowed ideas from the Front National, notably promises of<br />
harsher crackdowns on those involved in urban violence and deportation of<br />
greater numbers of illegal immigrants. Such electoral rhetoric has not actually<br />
been reflected in policy initiatives, however.<br />
This has much to do with the way foreign policy is made. As in other<br />
democratic states, different groups close to the president compete for influence.<br />
The most influential group in the first years of the Sarkozy presidency was<br />
made up of intellectuals, journalists, and business leaders who were pro-<br />
American. Most were drawn from the ranks of the center-right party that<br />
backed Sarkozy, Union pour la majorité présidentielle (UMP). Many of their ideas<br />
were based on a book written by former UMP prime minister Edouard<br />
Balla<strong>du</strong>r. 48 Thus France, like Israel, was defined as an axis of the Western<br />
world facing the same threats: Russia, China, and Islam. France’s <strong>politique</strong><br />
arabe was a sellout of Western ideals. In order to face these threats squarely,<br />
the French state had to stop promoting the interests of large corporations like<br />
carmakers Peugeot-Citroën and Renault and oil companies like Total. But<br />
another plausible consideration was to overhaul a culture in which “Arabs have<br />
17
een accustomed to the cajolery of the French state, and the expected privilege<br />
that goes with it.” 49<br />
This new strategic blueprint shared several features with the<br />
longstanding strategic thought of the Front National. One analyst summarized<br />
the FN view: “Muslim fundamentalism in North Africa and the Middle East is<br />
seen as a new strategic threat—missile launchers along the southern<br />
Mediterranean coast could reach France, and proto-nuclear power Iran and<br />
illegal arms trading from the ex-Soviet Republics could supply weaponry to<br />
these countries.” 50 Such strategic interests overrode domestic discontent with<br />
growing Muslim communities, though “securitizing” them was the one way that<br />
fears could have foreign policy resonance.<br />
Strategic thinking was the purview of the foreign policy establishment.<br />
The dominant group in Sarkozy’s presidency was what Hubert Védrine, former<br />
socialist foreign affairs minister, <strong>du</strong>bbed occidentalo-atlantiste. Until Sarkozy’s<br />
election, the term “Occidental” was prohibited from use in official reports. It<br />
was a watershed, then, that in his first major speech on foreign policy in<br />
August 2007, Sarkozy invoked the term seven times, including to warn about a<br />
conflict with the Occident’s other, Islam. In the “White Book on Defense and<br />
National Security” published in Sarkozy’s first year as president, Occident was<br />
used 18 times, though it was not defined. 51<br />
Apart from closer ties with Washington, the second main axis of<br />
Occidentalist policy involves changed relations with the Muslim world. To<br />
some, Sarkozy embarked on reversing the policies of his Fifth Republic<br />
18
predecessors. In a speech to French troops in Afghanistan in late 2007, for<br />
example, he described the war in that country as the front line of a global war<br />
on terror waged by the Occident. One writer noted how “For the first time, an<br />
openly pro-Israeli presidential candidate made it to the Élysée…, making a<br />
mockery of old conjectures about the communitarian electoral breakdown in<br />
France: 6 million Muslims versus 600,000 Jews!” 52<br />
Under Sarkozy bilateral relations with Israel were strengthened. In late<br />
2007 a Sarkozy aide met with leaders of Le Conseil représentatif des institutions<br />
juives de France (CRIF) and announced that a Franco-Israeli alliance would be<br />
“at the heart of the Mediterranean Union.” Sarkozy, whose grandfather was<br />
Jewish, visited Israel in 2008 and expressed his sympathy for the suffering of<br />
Israelis--without saying a word about Pa<strong>les</strong>tinians or occupation. Israel and<br />
France were in the same democratic camp, he emphasized. He even “forgot” to<br />
read the phrase in his speech referring to a return to Israel’s pre-1967 borders.<br />
Sarkozy also supported Israel’s bid to have closer relations with the EU,<br />
including having an annual meeting with the EU Council of Ministers as great<br />
powers like the U.S., Russia, and China enjoy. Arab states threatened to<br />
boycott the upcoming Mediterranean Union summit in retaliation. Shortly<br />
afterwards, an EU meeting diplomatically turned down the initiative to hold<br />
EU-Israel annual meetings. 53<br />
In sum, President Sarkozy, who came in for increasing criticism of<br />
con<strong>du</strong>cting “Glampolitics,” made inroads in breaking with traditional Fifth<br />
Republic foreign policy. But they should not be overestimated. The<br />
19
Mediterranean Union may have been his most high profile achievement, but it<br />
was essentially an extension of existing French policy: “the Maghreb policy<br />
means essentially, for France, the management of immigration, the<br />
francophonie policy, the tolerance of human rights violations, and the defense<br />
of French economic interests.” 54<br />
Inflating the importance of Islamophobia<br />
Much conventional thinking about French foreign policy priorities has it<br />
that both a phobia—anti-Israeli views—and a philia—pro-Arabism—have long<br />
been embraced by French political elites, if not necessarily by French society:<br />
“In contrast to the foreign policy establishment and its determination to act<br />
and speak as though the national interest demanded siding with the Muslim<br />
Middle East in all its issues and prejudices, public opinion in France has been<br />
in the main supportive of Israel and Jews generally, while wary of a ‘France<br />
musulmane.’” 55 If the foreign policy elite has pursued la <strong>politique</strong> arabe—and<br />
we have identified the many caveats to it—then the Sarkozy shift may<br />
represent, among other things, a closer realignment with citizens’ political<br />
orientations.<br />
Let us not overlook the indivi<strong>du</strong>al level of analysis. The president is said<br />
to be sensitive to the interests of minorities and disadvantaged groups. Of<br />
Hungarian origin with a Jewish background, Sarkozy was described by a<br />
Senega<strong>les</strong>e Muslim woman appointed to his first cabinet this way: “He has<br />
always thought like someone from a minority. So that's why he understands<br />
20
minorities so well: he thinks of himself as not completely French. He has a<br />
particular sensitivity about that.” 56 This may be reflected in his embrace of the<br />
Mediterranean Union and even of a cultural Islam. At a ceremony at which he<br />
laid the cornerstone for an Islamic arts addition to the Louvre (financed largely<br />
by Saudi Arabia0, the president proclaimed that “Islam represents progress,<br />
science, finesse, modernity.” 57<br />
Personnel selection for his first cabinet—they were more conventional in<br />
subsequent changes—also seemed to reflect his personal sensibilities. Half of<br />
the appointments were women including several from minority background.<br />
The Justice Minister became Rachida Dati, a Muslim Moroccan citizen. The<br />
Urban Affairs Secretary was Fadela Amara, an Arab-rights activist and feminist<br />
who belonged to the Socialist Party. The national secretary of the UMP was<br />
Kacim Kellal, of Maghrebi ancestry, who was then appointed Deputy Minister<br />
for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Development Partnership.<br />
His reason for accepting an appointment in a conservative party was revealing:<br />
“Muslims are sick of having a dialogue only with the ministry of police.” 58<br />
The empirical basis for claiming a link between “Islamicization” of French<br />
society and la <strong>politique</strong> arabe is flimsy. First, pro-Arab foreign policy predates<br />
the arrival of millions of Muslims to France. Second, these Muslims do not vote<br />
as a bloc. Third, Muslim communities are diverse in terms of their level of<br />
assimilation into French society and their political orientations. In their<br />
analysis of a possible Muslim domestic-foreign policy linkage, <strong>La</strong>wrence and<br />
Vaisse claimed that “The political impact of the Muslim population is very<br />
21
minimal on foreign policy or the fight against terrorism.” 59 Among reasons cited<br />
are that only about three of five Muslims in France are voting citizens. The<br />
issues they are interested in are employment, the economy, e<strong>du</strong>cation, and<br />
discrimination.<br />
The Muslim fact in France, then, has at most an impact on the margins<br />
of foreign policy. <strong>La</strong>urence and Vaisse hypothesized that “The historical record<br />
of French policy in the Arab world since Char<strong>les</strong> de Gaulle suggests that<br />
France’s position on international affairs would not look much different even if<br />
there were no Muslim minority in France.” 60 We can add that it would not be<br />
much different if there were no politically influential Islamophobes in the<br />
country. To be sure, “While there is no evidence of the Muslim minority’s direct<br />
influence on French foreign policy, the presence of five million Muslims does<br />
have an indirect impact on diplomacy with respect to the Middle East. But it<br />
seems mostly to confirm France’s preexisting policies toward this region.” 61<br />
On the big issues, French Muslims and the French population at large<br />
have usually been in agreement. More than 70 per cent of both groups said<br />
that they worried about Islamism and that they believed there is no “conflict<br />
between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.” The two<br />
populations also expressed mutual respect: in 2004 close to two-thirds of all<br />
French people thought favorably of Muslims—the highest such proportion of<br />
any of the western countries polled. Reciprocally, more Muslims had favorable<br />
views of Christians and Jews (91 per cent and 71 per cent, respectively) in<br />
22
France than anywhere else. Mutual respect was slightly lower in a 2008 survey<br />
but it had fallen <strong>les</strong>s in France than other <strong>European</strong> countries polled. 62<br />
Rejoining NATO’s military structure and fighting a war of attrition in<br />
Afghanistan are Sarkozy’s policies that may split the Muslim minority from the<br />
French mainstream. French sociologist Emmanuel Todd was especially critical<br />
of these initiatives and attributed them directly to Islamophobia. President<br />
Sarkozy was joining the U.S. on a “mission of conquest” against Islam. France<br />
was<br />
positioning [itself] in an ideological construction against the Muslim<br />
world. This posture is also very much of a piece with Sarkozy's interior<br />
politics.... The search for scapegoats, the emergence of an Islamophobic<br />
ideology hostile to immigrant children...this is not in France's character.<br />
In the final analysis, the French always prefer decapitating noblemen to<br />
decapitating foreigners. 63<br />
This <strong>du</strong>bious hypothesized connection is as close as we have come to<br />
learning that French Islamophobes have hijacked French foreign policy. That is<br />
no more supported than the proposition that Muslim communities in the<br />
country have (a separate research question). At the same time, this does not<br />
discount the importance of exploring the domestic-international policy<br />
connection. “[D]omestic factors deserve a special attention in the study of world<br />
politics, as they influence national foreign-policy making….domestic factors<br />
often impact on whether the incentives, policies, and values promoted by the<br />
‘West’ are acceptable. In other words, domestic factors related to political<br />
23
identity may be decisive for the success of the EU’s normative power in world<br />
politics.” 64<br />
Among the many subtle influences of domestic structures on foreign<br />
policy is one in which not just systemic models—democracy or the free<br />
market—make an impact on other actors in the international system. The<br />
existence of harmonious relations between majority and Muslim populations at<br />
home can have a demonstration effect and be more meaningful to enhancing<br />
French influence abroad than many forms of traditional diplomacy. Conversely,<br />
French Islamophobia, such as it is, may not be an influential factor in shaping<br />
a country’s international politics, but it can have a spoiler effect.<br />
Notes<br />
1 Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. <strong>La</strong>ntis, and Ryan K. Beasley, “The Analysis of Foreign Policy<br />
in Comparative Perspective,” in Beasley, Kaarbo, <strong>La</strong>ntis, and Michael T. Snarr (eds.),<br />
Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on<br />
State Behavior (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002), 13.<br />
2 Kaarbo, <strong>La</strong>ntis, and Beasley, “The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative<br />
Perspective,” 14.<br />
3 Ronald Rogowski, “Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice,” in David A. <strong>La</strong>ke<br />
and Robert Powell (eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ:<br />
Princeton <strong>University</strong> Press, 1999), 133.<br />
4 F.G. Bailey, Treasons, Strategems, and Spoils: How Leaders Make Practical Use of<br />
Beliefs and Values (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 9.<br />
5 Bailey, Treasons, Strategems, and Spoils, 8.<br />
6 The most recent major study is by Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of<br />
International Relations (New York: Cambridge <strong>University</strong> Press, 2009).<br />
7 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory<br />
(<strong>La</strong>nham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 104.<br />
8 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 109-110.<br />
9 As with the semantics of rendering Marx’s statement that the economic base<br />
determines/shapes/conditions the ideological superstructure, so too culture’s impact<br />
on foreign policy can be that of determining, shaping, or conditioning—depending on<br />
how much causality we choose to impute.<br />
10 K.F. Wilkening, “Culture and Japanese Citizen Influence on the Transboundary Air<br />
Pollution Issue in Northeast Asia,” Political Psychology 20, no. 4 (1999), 8.<br />
24
11 Kal J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,”<br />
International Studies Quarterly 14 (1970), 233-309.<br />
12 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 116.<br />
13 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 120-21.<br />
14 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 122.<br />
15 Zuhair Kashmeri, The Gulf Within: Canadian Arabs, Racism and the Gulf War<br />
(Toronto: Lorimer, 1991), 126ff.<br />
16 See Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,”<br />
International Organization, 57, no. 3 (2003), 449-479.<br />
17 Sami Aoun, “Muslim Communities: The Pitfalls of Decision-Making in Canadian<br />
Foreign Policy,” in David Carment and David Bercuson (eds.), The World in Canada:<br />
Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s <strong>University</strong><br />
Press, 2008), 116.<br />
18 Aoun, “Muslim Communities,” 121.<br />
19 Christina Schori Liang, “Europe for the <strong>European</strong>s: The Foreign and Security Policy<br />
of the Populist Radical Right,” in Liang (ed.), Europe for the <strong>European</strong>s: The Foreign<br />
and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 20.<br />
20 J.L. Granatstein, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Carment and<br />
Bercuson, The World in Canada, 79.<br />
21 James Travers, “Underscoring a Message of Zero Tolerance,” Toronto Star (14 July<br />
2005. Quoted by Granatstein, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy,” 90.<br />
22 D.A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, 23, no. 1<br />
(2005), 5-26.<br />
23 Nana Poku and David T. Graham (eds.), Redefining Security: Population Movements<br />
and National Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), xv.<br />
24 Mohammed Ayoob, “The International Security System and the Third World,” in<br />
William C. Olson (ed.), Theory and Practice of International Relations, 9th edn.<br />
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 225.<br />
25 Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in<br />
Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge <strong>University</strong> Press, 2002).<br />
26 Mikhail A. Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe,<br />
and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge <strong>University</strong> Press, 2006), 20.<br />
27 Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, 38.<br />
28 Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, 40.<br />
29 Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, 41.<br />
30 Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence, 56.<br />
31 Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, 43.<br />
32 Zygmunt Bauman, Europe: An Unfinished Adventure (New York: Polity Press, 2004),<br />
99.<br />
33 Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, 69.<br />
34 Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, 227-28.<br />
35 Alexseev, Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, 233.<br />
36 Stephan Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies: Cross-pillar Politics and the Social<br />
Construction of Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2007), 37.<br />
37 Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies, 148.<br />
38 Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies, 163.<br />
39 Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies, 168.<br />
40 Jocelyn Evans, “‘<strong>La</strong> <strong>politique</strong> <strong>du</strong> <strong>dehors</strong> <strong>avec</strong> <strong>les</strong> <strong>raisons</strong> <strong>du</strong> dedans:’ foreign and<br />
defence policy of the French Front National,” in Philippe Burrin and Christina Schori-<br />
25
Liang (eds.), <strong>European</strong> Right-Wing Populism and Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate,<br />
2007).<br />
41 Jacques Attali, “A Continental Architecture,” in Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson<br />
(eds.), The Question of Europe (London: Verso, 1997), 355.<br />
42 Timo Behr, “En<strong>du</strong>ring Differences? France, Germany and Europe’s Middle East<br />
Dilemma,” Journal of <strong>European</strong> Integration, 30, no. 1 (March 2008), 83.<br />
43 Behr, “En<strong>du</strong>ring Differences?” 83.<br />
44 David Styan, France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East<br />
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 31.<br />
45 Styan, France and Iraq, 34.<br />
46 Styan, France and Iraq, 46, 50.<br />
47 Styan, France and Iraq, 199. See Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Le vert et le noir:<br />
intégrisme, pétrole, dollar (Paris: B. Grasset, 1995). He was close to leading French<br />
Orientalist Jacques Berque.<br />
48 Edouard Balla<strong>du</strong>r, Pour une Union occidentale entre l’Europe et <strong>les</strong> Etats-Unis<br />
(Fayard, Paris, 2007).<br />
49 David Pryce-Jones, Betrayal: France, the Arabs, and the Jews (New York: Encounter<br />
Books, 2006), 151.<br />
50 Jocelyn A.J. Evans, “‘<strong>La</strong> <strong>politique</strong> <strong>du</strong> <strong>dehors</strong> <strong>avec</strong> <strong>les</strong> <strong>raisons</strong> <strong>du</strong> dedans:’ Foreign<br />
and Defense Policy of the French Front National,” in Liang, Europe for the <strong>European</strong>s,<br />
135.<br />
51 Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale (Paris: Odile Jacob—<strong>La</strong><br />
Documentation française, Juin 2008).<br />
52 Frédéric Encel, “France-Israël: Passé et present d’une relation spéciale,” l’Essentiel<br />
des relations internationals, (Juin-Juillet 2008), 79.<br />
53 Alain Gresh, “OTAN, Proche-Orient, Afrique... Enquête sur le virage de la diplomatie<br />
française,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Juillet 2008), 1, 8-9, http://www.mondediplomatique.fr/2008/07/GRESH/16104.<br />
54 Jean-François Daguzan, “France and the Maghreb: The End of the Special<br />
Relationship?” in Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernández, North Africa:<br />
Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (London: Routledge, 2008), 335.<br />
55 Pryce-Jones, Betrayal, 132-33.<br />
56 Doug Sanders, “Five women and 365 days,” Globe and Mail (May 9, 2008).<br />
57 Cited in Ivan Rioufol, “‘<strong>La</strong> France veut la paix’ (mais à quell prix?),” Le Figaro (18<br />
July 2008).<br />
58 Quoted in “Allocution de M. Brice Hortefeux, ministre de l’immigration, de<br />
l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et <strong>du</strong> développement solidaire lors des Journées de<br />
la Coopération internationale et <strong>du</strong> développement,” Maison de la Mutualité, Paris (25-<br />
26 août 2008), at<br />
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/article_imprim.php3?id_article=65683<br />
59 Jonathan <strong>La</strong>urence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious<br />
Challenges in Contemporary France (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,<br />
2008), 218.<br />
60 <strong>La</strong>urence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam, 219.<br />
61 <strong>La</strong>urence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam, 221.<br />
62 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the<br />
Increase in Europe” (17 September 2008), at<br />
http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/262.pdf<br />
26
63 From Emmanuel Todd interview in Marianne2.fr (3 April 2008). For an English<br />
summary, see Alex <strong>La</strong>ntier, “France moves towards reintegration into NATO,” Global<br />
Research (19 March 2009), at<br />
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12801<br />
64 Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Contested State Identities and Regional Security in the Euro-<br />
Mediterranean Area (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), 233.<br />
27