guideline on anti-money laundering and the combating of terrorist ...

Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of Terrorist FinancingExample 4: Diamond trading company possibly linked to terrorist funding operationThe financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Country C received several suspicious transaction reports from different banks concerning two personsand a diamond trading company. The individuals and the company in question were account holders at the various banks.In the space of a few months, a large number of fund transfers to and from overseas were made from the accounts of the two individuals.Moreover, soon after the account was opened, one of the individuals received several USD cheques for large amounts.According to information obtained by the FIU, one of the accounts held by the company appeared to have received large US dollar depositoriginating from companies active in the diamond industry. One of the directors of the company, a citizen of Country C but residing in Africa,maintained an account at another bank in Country C. Several transfers had been carried out to and from overseas using this account. Thetransfers from foreign countries were mainly in US dollars. They were converted into the local currency and were then transferred to foreigncountries and to accounts in the Country C belonging to one of the two subjects of the suspicious transaction report.Police information obtained by the FIU revealed that an investigation had already been initiated relating to these individuals and the traffickingof diamonds originating from Africa. The large funds transfers by the diamond trading company were mainly sent to the same person residing inanother region. Police sources revealed that this person and the individual that had cashed the cheques were suspected of buying diamondsfrom the rebel army of an African country and then smuggling them into Country C on behalf of a terrorist organisation. Further research by theFIU also revealed links between the subjects of the suspicious transaction report and individuals and companies already tied to the launderingof funds for organised crime. This case is currently under investigation.Example 5: Frequent cash deposits, mingling, wire transfers and structuringA subject opened two accounts in different branch offices of the same bank, in Country A where he had no official links. The first account wasopened in the name of company X, established in North America, and the second one was opened in the name of company Y, established inanother jurisdiction.Both companies were active in the catering supplies sector and their accounts were mainly credited by significant cash deposits (often forround figures) and to a lesser extent by transfers from abroad by order of companies also active in the catering supplies sector.The funds were then transferred to other European companies in the same sector.No business rationale or economic justification could be found for performing these transactions in this manner.Further enquiries found that the individual concerned was the subject of a terrorism investigation in another jurisdiction. It is suspected that thecatering supplies business and the co-mingling may have been a cover for his criminal activities.Example 6:Use of nominees, trusts, family members or third partiesA political refugee resident in a European country held power of attorney over two accounts (at a bank in that country) in the names of hisfamily members. He did not hold any accounts of his own. One of the accounts exclusively received state assistance benefit payments as thesubject was unemployed and had no independent income. The other account was credited by cash deposits. All of the credits were withdrawnvia cash machines, thus preventing the identification of the final beneficiary of the money.Open source checks revealed that the subject had links to a terrorist organisation and further analysis suggested that he was a fund raiser forthat organisation.Page 63 of 75