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Stephan Götzl, Jürgen Gros, Steffen Jahn<br />

The Importance<br />

of Cooperative Banks<br />

for Bavaria


Stephan Götzl · Jürgen Gros · Steffen Jahn<br />

The Importance of Cooperative Banks<br />

for Bavaria


For further and detailed information visit our homepage:<br />

http://www.gv-bayern.de<br />

First edition 2008<br />

© Deutscher Genossenschafts-Verlag eG, Wiesbaden, Germany<br />

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any<br />

form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying,<br />

recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission.<br />

Layout: Deutscher Genossenschafts-Verlag eG, Wiesbaden, Germany<br />

Production: Raiffeisendruckerei GmbH, Neuwied, Germany


Contents<br />

<strong>Introduction</strong> .......................................................................................... 5<br />

I Foundation motivation .................................................................. 9<br />

1 Market failure in the financial market ................................... 9<br />

2 Self-help of the middle class ................................................. 12<br />

3 Summary ................................................................................. 14<br />

II Development stages .................................................................... 15<br />

1 Cooperative banks until 1945 ............................................... 15<br />

2 Cooperative banks 1945–1960 .............................................. 17<br />

3 Cooperative banks since the 1960s ....................................... 20<br />

4 Summary ................................................................................. 22<br />

III Business principles ....................................................................... 23<br />

1 Promotion of members .......................................................... 23<br />

2 Promotion of small and medium-sized business .................. 24<br />

3 Financial supply across the board ......................................... 25<br />

4 Corporate citizenship ............................................................. 26<br />

5 Summary ................................................................................. 27<br />

IV Economic contribution ................................................................. 29<br />

1 Stabilising the Bavarian economy ......................................... 29<br />

2 State-wide supplier of private and corporate customers .... 31<br />

3 Credit lender .......................................................................... 32<br />

4 Financier of the SME sector ................................................... 34<br />

5 Creator of wealth ................................................................... 37<br />

6 Employer ................................................................................. 38<br />

7 Tax payer ................................................................................ 39<br />

8 Investor ................................................................................... 40<br />

9 Summary ................................................................................. 41<br />

3


V Competitive environment ........................................................... 43<br />

1 Overall situation ..................................................................... 43<br />

2 Savings banks ......................................................................... 44<br />

3 Private full banks ................................................................... 45<br />

4 Direct banks ............................................................................ 47<br />

5 Austrian banks in the Bavarian market ................................ 48<br />

6 Autobanks .............................................................................. 49<br />

7 Consumer loan specialists ...................................................... 50<br />

8 Non-banks .............................................................................. 51<br />

9 Summary ................................................................................. 51<br />

VI Trends ............................................................................................ 53<br />

1 Consolidation of the banking market .................................. 53<br />

2 Market pressure of suppliers from outside the industry ..... 54<br />

3 Change in the demand of financial services ........................ 55<br />

4 Demographic development ................................................... 57<br />

5 Summary ................................................................................. 58<br />

Conclusion ........................................................................................... 59<br />

Bibliography ........................................................................................ 61<br />

Authors ................................................................................................ 65<br />

4


<strong>Introduction</strong><br />

In its study of the European retail banking sector, the European Commission<br />

expresses explicit criticism of regionally organised networks.<br />

The criticism basically aims at the business model of savings banks and<br />

cooperative banks.<br />

Specific criticism is aimed at:<br />

– the regional self-restraint of the cooperative banks,<br />

– the possible market dominating position of these banks and<br />

– the alleged policy of savings banks and cooperative banks of<br />

restricting market access.<br />

The above-mentioned study and further inquiries announced by<br />

the EU Commission prompted this paper. The assumptions and allegations<br />

of the EU Commission shall be analysed and examined with special<br />

regard to the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks in their<br />

line of business. The subsequent analysis is based on the following<br />

five principal questions:<br />

1. What characterises the business philosophy of the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks?<br />

2. What are the main business segments of the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks?<br />

3. What relevance do the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

have for the Bavarian banking sector?<br />

4. What characterises the competitive environment of the Bavarian<br />

Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks?<br />

5. In what way do the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks contribute<br />

to the economy of the Free State of Bavaria?<br />

These principal questions form the framework of this paper and<br />

determine the structure of the different chapters. The final chapter<br />

<strong>Introduction</strong><br />

5


(conclusion) provides detailed answers based on the findings of this<br />

analysis.<br />

The study consists of six chapters. At the end of each chapter,<br />

there is an explicit summary of the central statements. The first chapter<br />

deals with the motives for founding the cooperative banks. Economic<br />

and social aspects having contributed to the establishment of<br />

cooperative banks shall be analysed and checked for today’s relevance.<br />

In the second chapter, the development of the Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks is described starting at their foundation up to the present<br />

with particular reference to the importance of the cooperative banks<br />

for the development of the Bavarian economy.<br />

The current business philosophy of the Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks is the central point of the third chapter. Specifically, the consistency<br />

and clearness of the cooperative business policy shall be<br />

analysed. It shall be examined what consequences and effects can be<br />

expected for the current and future situation of the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks.<br />

In the fourth chapter, the macroeconomic – and the cross-sector –<br />

aspects of the business activities of the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks shall be examined, in particular the economic impact<br />

of cooperative banks on employment, private demand as well as tax<br />

and investment volume in the Free State of Bavaria.<br />

In the fifth chapter, the current market environment of the Bavarian<br />

cooperative banks shall be examined. Special consideration is<br />

given to market development by traditional competitors and new<br />

market participants and its effects on the financial market. Based on<br />

these findings, insight into market position and relevance of the<br />

respective banking pillars for the Bavarian banking market shall be<br />

gained.<br />

6 <strong>Introduction</strong>


The sixth chapter deals with future aspects of the Bavarian banking<br />

market. It describes and analyses future development and possible<br />

trends, both concerning the banks and the customers. The results<br />

shall be evaluated with regard to the Bavarian cooperative banks.<br />

<strong>Introduction</strong><br />

7


I Foundation motivation<br />

1 Market failure in the financial market<br />

In the 19 th century, a fundamental structural change was induced<br />

through progressive industrialisation. As a result, members of the<br />

middle class, consisting of farmers, tradespeople and merchants, saw<br />

their means of existence jeopardised and risked descending into the<br />

fourth class of workers and paid labour. The middle class lacked<br />

resources and investment capital. In order to prevent social descent,<br />

secure their livelihood as well as to become and stay competitive, the<br />

commercial and agrarian middle class needed to manufacture more<br />

and cheaper goods. In particular, they needed to produce high-quality<br />

goods in order to defend their market position against local and<br />

foreign competitors. To reach this goal, sufficient financing of small<br />

and medium-sized businesses (SMEs or SME sector) was required.<br />

Unfortunately, however, this was not the case in the economy of the<br />

19 th century.<br />

At that time, the existing big banks were not interested in financing<br />

SMEs. The reason: processing the credit applications of these customers<br />

would have required much work but little profit. The commercial<br />

banks of that time were mostly interested in implementing<br />

major projects. Accordingly, big banks financed industries, the construction<br />

of factories, railways, ships and fleets. Furthermore, foreign<br />

trade was the first and foremost foundation motive. The following<br />

quote is found in the Foundation Statute of Deutsche Bank of the<br />

year 1870: “The company’s purpose is to conduct banking activities of<br />

all kinds, especially in order to promote and facilitate trade relations<br />

between Germany and the other European countries and overseas<br />

markets.“ (Deutsche Bank: Meilensteine/Chronik – Kaiserreich, 2007<br />

(Milestones/Chronicle – German Empire)) This orientation was meant<br />

to put an end to the English dominance in financing the German foreign<br />

trade. Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank, too, devoted them-<br />

1 Market failure in the financial market<br />

9


selves to foreign trade on a large scale. These banking institutes did<br />

not feel any responsibility for the finance problems of the middle<br />

class. At that time, they considered labour input and costs as being<br />

much too high in relation to earnings and profits.<br />

Neither were the savings banks of that time able to remedy the<br />

finance dilemma of the middle class. The purpose of the savings<br />

banks at the end of the 19 th and the beginning of the 20 th century<br />

was primarily to accept, pay interest and manage the saving deposits<br />

of the ordinary people earmarked for elementary requirements (sickness,<br />

accidents, old age and retirement). Loans were exclusively<br />

granted against hypothecary security (secured credit). Therefore, savings<br />

banks served to encourage savings and social safeguard as well<br />

as to finance community projects. However, they did not provide the<br />

necessary personal loans for the middle class.<br />

Furthermore, the small and medium-sized, mostly regionally<br />

active private bankers, who usually granted short-term personal<br />

loans, decreased in importance due to the concentration process<br />

within the credit business during the last third of the 19 th century.<br />

They were not able to offer region-wide sufficient business finance to<br />

the middle class.<br />

Hence, the existing banks and savings banks were not or not sufficiently<br />

able to serve the SME sector. Businesspeople looking for loans<br />

often turned to private individuals, e. g. relatives or acquaintances,<br />

tradespeople, innkeepers or private moneylenders. These credit<br />

transactions often had very different lending periods. Interest rates<br />

were at will of the respective moneylender opening the floodgates to<br />

usury and profiteering. Moneylenders had a dominant position in the<br />

market. Due to their one-sided market power, there was no fair competition<br />

in the area of finance for the middle class. As a result, the<br />

market mechanism failed. The strong market position of the moneylenders<br />

had dramatic consequences: after the member states of the<br />

Norddeutscher Bund (Northern German Confederation) in 1867 abolished<br />

all interest restrictions customary since the 17 th century and<br />

10 I Foundation motivation


therefore put the height of the interest rates totally at will, interest<br />

rates rose of up to 80 per cent and sometimes even up to 100 per<br />

cent. Furthermore, private moneylenders were able to terminate<br />

loans or ask for immediate repayment anytime. Thus, debtors were<br />

forced to take new loans at even worse terms to be able to repay<br />

their original loan. If the borrowers could not repay the loan due to<br />

an excessive debt burden, their property was auctioned off. Mostly<br />

tradesmen’s workshops and farms were affected. After the German<br />

Usury Laws of 1890 and 1893, valid for all member states of the German<br />

Empire, these grievances were only partly abolished. The ongoing<br />

problem of market failure, however, was not resolved.<br />

In the 19 th century, the financing problem still was unsolved. For<br />

the middle class, it turned out to be a question of survival since grievances<br />

were no isolated cases but were prevalent. It was never about<br />

financing consumer loans, but it was a matter bare survival to find<br />

loans for tradesmen’s businesses and farms. Workshops, farm buildings<br />

and stables were usually available. But there was a lack of liquid<br />

funds to buy operating resources like seeds, fertiliser, machines for<br />

workshops and farms, as well a funds for refurbishment or for marketing<br />

the harvest.<br />

In view of these adverse conditions, gradually since 1850, in all<br />

German state savings and credit associations (= Volksbanks) modelled<br />

on Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch’s concept and loan associations<br />

(= Raiffeisenbanks) after Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen were founded.<br />

Since the middle of the 19 th century cooperative banks gradually took<br />

over the task of closing the big gap between the required capital<br />

demand and its supply. The founding of cooperative banks resulted<br />

out of economic and social necessity. It not only served to temporarily,<br />

but much more so permanently secure the existence of the middle<br />

class.<br />

Cooperative banks were exclusively founded as a voluntary network<br />

of equal partners based on self-help, self-responsibility and selfmanagement.<br />

Self-responsibility and self-management mean that<br />

1 Market failure in the financial market<br />

11


members headed the cooperatives. Self-help signifies that the members<br />

of a cooperative join forces in order to pursue common economic<br />

goals. In the case of cooperative banks, it means creating a capital<br />

market for small and medium-sized enterprises. The economic<br />

advancement of the members should come out of their own powers<br />

and not through public or other support.<br />

2 Self-help of the middle class<br />

Cooperative banks were founded by the commercial and agrarian<br />

middle class. The founders were members and partners at the same<br />

time. In the 19 th century, members of various professions were<br />

involved. They intended to create a permanent financial system adequate<br />

to their economic interests and needs. It aimed at securing<br />

their existence and promoting their business activities. This process<br />

developed gradually over decades. In other words, cooperative banks<br />

originated as an act of self-help foremost by the tradespeople and<br />

farmers.<br />

The founders of cooperatives were anxious – as Raiffeisen<br />

describes their motivation – to better the economic circumstances of<br />

the agrarian and urban middle class and overcome the class barriers<br />

prevalent at that time. All cooperative members became shareholders<br />

to raise the necessary equity. Their savings deposits created the financial<br />

basis for granting loans. Cooperative banks were, as Raiffeisen<br />

states, able “to bring about a change to the better” for the middle<br />

class. Thus, material wealth was promoted, the purchase of real<br />

estate made possible. The wealth of the members grew and, at the<br />

same time, the trades and small businesses advanced and agricultural<br />

production increased. These achievements were made possible<br />

through short-, middle- and long-term, easily calculable lending periods,<br />

which were cut short only in extreme exceptions. The monetary<br />

demand of the members could be met at adequate terms. The mutually<br />

supportive group of the cooperative partners took the place of<br />

the former, often disadvantageous dependence on private lenders.<br />

12 I Foundation motivation


From the beginning, the cooperative banks granted personal loans.<br />

These loans were exclusively granted on the basis of the sound credit<br />

rating of the loan applicant. Different from real-estate loans, the personal<br />

loan was rarely secured through mortgages. This form of loan<br />

also enabled the non-property owner to establish his own business<br />

and prosper. Furthermore, in order to meet the demand of real-estate<br />

loans, the Bayerische Landwirtschaftsbank (Bavarian Agricultural<br />

Bank) was founded in 1896 under the legal form of a registered cooperative.<br />

The cooperative partners themselves, to quote Schulze-Delitzsch,<br />

“always support the institute aiming at meeting the credit demand”.<br />

Thus, they equally shared success and risk. Monetary transactions<br />

were no longer based on goodwill, arbitrariness and happenstance,<br />

but, to quote Schulze-Delitzsch, “regulated on a commercial basis<br />

(quid pro quo)”. The (unlimited or limited) joint liability of all members<br />

opened up the way for cooperative banks to acquire outside capital,<br />

thus “opening up the same money and loan sources for small<br />

transactions as so far were exclusively open for big transactions”.<br />

(Schulze-Delitzsch)<br />

Through the solidary system, independent of governmental or<br />

political influence, the cooperatives and their members weathered<br />

many crises and changes of the 19 th century successfully: beginning<br />

with the after-effects of the revolution of 1848/49, the Bavarian<br />

defeat in the Deutscher Krieg (German War) of 1866 up to the Economic<br />

Crisis of 1873 (Founders’ Crash) in the young German Empire.<br />

The cooperatives remained stable and successful, not at least thanks<br />

to their independent financial system that catered to the well-being<br />

of the members and the SME sector.<br />

This approach was successful as proved by the rapid spread of<br />

cooperative banks in the cities as well as the countryside. The number<br />

of Volksbanks alone increased in the German states between 1859<br />

and 1866 from 80 to 532, the number of members grew from 18,600<br />

to 193,700. Loans granted increased from 4.1 million Thaler to 85 mil-<br />

2 Self-help of the middle class<br />

13


lion Thaler, cooperative shares from 246,000 to 5.7 million Thaler, the<br />

reserve funds from 30,000 to 556,300 Thaler, saving deposits from<br />

512,300 to 8.72 million Thaler. In the same period, the equity ratio<br />

increased from 19.5 per cent to 31.8 per cent.<br />

Also in Bavaria, the number of Raiffeisenbanks grew from 438 in<br />

1891 to 790 in 1895. In the year 1900, loan associations modelled<br />

after Raiffeisen’s concept numbered 1,900 with roughly 160,000<br />

members.<br />

During their development, the Bavarian cooperative banks supplied<br />

financial services across the board to the commercial and agrarian<br />

middle class. Cooperative banks on their part, in their function as<br />

disseminators, have since the second half of the 19 th century offered<br />

financial services to various kinds of commercial and agricultural<br />

cooperatives, e.g. trades, condominium and housing cooperatives as<br />

well as dairy cooperatives. At the beginning of the 1930s, roughly<br />

7,200 cooperatives existed in Bavaria, among them about 4,400 cooperative<br />

banks of different size providing funds for many commercial<br />

and agricultural cooperatives.<br />

3 Summary<br />

The foundation of cooperative banks occurred as a consequence of a<br />

market failure in the banking market of the 19 th century. Big banks<br />

did not consider it their purpose to supply financial services to the<br />

middle class. There was no adequate supply of banks for the credit<br />

demand of the middle class. Self-employed businessmen as tradespeople,<br />

farmers or professionals founded cooperative banks that, in<br />

turn, filled the financial needs of the middle class. By establishing<br />

cooperative banks, the middle class was able to shoulder investments<br />

securing its future.<br />

14 I Foundation motivation


II Development stages<br />

1 Cooperative banks until 1945<br />

At the beginning of the 19 th and 20 th century, cooperative banks were<br />

important because they opened access to banking and financial services<br />

for members of the middle class, who in the course of the industrialisation<br />

of Germany saw their existence jeopardised and feared<br />

social descent. This process happened gradually. At first, cooperative<br />

banks limited themselves to accepting and paying interest on savings<br />

deposits and granting loans. These were not consumer loans but<br />

working capital and investment loans, which served to secure the<br />

existence of the middle class. In addition, the loans covered rationalisation<br />

and expansion investment of SMEs. Cooperative banks established<br />

themselves as developers of SME structures in Germany.<br />

After 1862, Volksbanks established themselves in all regions of<br />

Bavaria. They were mostly located in the cities and surrounding areas<br />

and were based on the principle of self-help of the middle class. They<br />

supplied the financial means for commerce and trade of their members.<br />

In 1902, 122 Volksbanks existed in Bavaria. Their number<br />

increased to a maximum of 150 in 1927. Through mergers and stateenforced<br />

concentration of banks since 1943, the number of Volksbanks<br />

in Bavaria dropped to 122 (plus 60 branch offices) by 1945. In<br />

1932, the 144 Bavarian Volksbanks had a total of 51,616 members.<br />

The balance sheet total amounted to 112.7 million Reichsmark. Loans<br />

amounting to 94 million Reichsmark were granted to roughly 50,000<br />

self-employed Bavarian small and medium-sized entrepreneurs and<br />

enterprises, among them 30,000 cases of personal loans.<br />

Volksbanks were banking institutes of mainly the self-employed<br />

commercial middle class, especially self-employed tradespeople<br />

(35 per cent), self-employed merchants and manufacturers (18 per<br />

cent), self-employed farmers (25 per cent), governmental and com-<br />

1 Cooperative banks until 1945<br />

15


munal civil servants (7 per cent), employees and workers (9 per cent)<br />

and others (6 per cent). Their purpose was to supply the members<br />

with cheap loans, pay interest on savings deposits, promote the savings<br />

propensity of the citizens and conduct money transactions. In<br />

1945, the balance sheet total of the 122 Bavarian Volksbanks amounted<br />

to roughly 840 million Reichsmark.<br />

From 1877 onwards – i. e. later than the Volksbanks – Raiffeisen<br />

cooperative banks were founded in Bavaria. In the year 1900, 1,823<br />

Raiffeisenbanks existed in Bavaria with 122,061 members, mainly<br />

from rural areas. Deposits amounted to 118 million Marks, loans<br />

totalled 112 million Marks.<br />

The years of depression and banking crisis did not affect cooperative<br />

banks. On the contrary, the number of Raiffeisenbanks in Bavaria<br />

grew from 3,495 in 1929 to 3,657 at the end of 1931. So, the Bavarian<br />

Raiffeisenbanks turned out to be a refuge of stability in economically<br />

difficult times. The main reason was their focus on local and regional<br />

markets. They were active in areas where they were well familiar.<br />

Their deposits originated in the vicinity and their loans went to the<br />

vicinity. Due to the cooperative safety net, the deposits of the citizens<br />

were well taken care of by the Bavarian cooperative banks. That distinguishes<br />

them from commercial banks. Different from cooperative<br />

banks, many commercial banks became insolvent during these times<br />

because of their dependence on foreign lenders.<br />

The highest number of Raiffeisenbanks in Bavaria was reached in<br />

1936, namely 4,211 Raiffeisenbanks with 391,486 members. The balance<br />

sheet total amounted to 577 million Reichsmark, deposits<br />

reached 401 million Reichsmark, loans 299 million Reichsmark. The<br />

total loan volume consisted of 338,283 single loans, among them<br />

246,176, or almost 73 per cent, small loans up to 1,000 Reichsmark. At<br />

that time, cooperative banks were the most important financier of<br />

the Bavarian agricultural businesses.<br />

16 II Development stages


The major part of the Raiffeisenbanks (90 per cent) also conducted<br />

commodities transactions besides money transactions. This was characteristic<br />

for their line of business. Commodities sales (machines, fertiliser<br />

and feedstuff, seeds, fuels and other commodities) amounted<br />

to 36 million Reichsmark in 1936.<br />

From 1936 onwards, a slow merger wave started. In 1945, there<br />

only were 3,940 Raiffeisen cooperative banks left. Nevertheless, they<br />

were present across the board. Of the 560,000 members, two thirds<br />

were farmers, 14 per cent tradespeople, 13 per cent, workers and<br />

employees, and 6 per cent had other occupations. Deposits amounted<br />

to 2,000 million Reichsmark (an increase of 55 per cent compared to<br />

1943), a very high level indeed, though during World War II the purchase<br />

of goods was controlled. The total volume of outstanding debits<br />

decreased by roughly 51 per cent between 1943 (126 million<br />

Reichsmark) and 1945 (61 million Reichsmark). This decrease was primarily<br />

due to the general lack of liquidity and the extremely limited<br />

range of consumer goods.<br />

2 Cooperative banks 1945–1960<br />

Cooperative banks contributed greatly to financing the reconstruction<br />

of the destroyed infrastructure, dwellings and flats after World<br />

War II. They either supplied financial means themselves or arranged<br />

loans with the help of special institutes, e. g. Bayerische Landesbank/Münchener<br />

Hypothekenbank (Bavarian State Bank/Munich<br />

Mortgage Bank).<br />

High investment needs of expanding SMEs after the currency<br />

reform of 1948 prompted the cooperative banks to strengthen their<br />

medium and long-term loan commitment and grant such loans in cooperation<br />

with their central bank. From the end of 1948 to the end of<br />

1950, the volume of granted loans by the member cooperatives of<br />

the Bavarian Raiffeisen Association rose from 17.4 million Marks to<br />

85.7 million Marks and increased to as much as 134.2 million Marks in<br />

1 Cooperative banks until 1945<br />

17


the midyear of 1952. Thus, the Bavarian cooperative banks made a<br />

valuable contribution to implementing the so-called Economic Miracle<br />

also in the Free State.<br />

Besides building up the SME sector, the structure of cooperative<br />

banks also helped to strengthen democratisation of the young republic.<br />

For since their foundation, cooperatives have cultivated the democratic<br />

principle of “one man, one vote”. Cooperatives were always<br />

organisations of democratic decision-making structures. This focus<br />

turned cooperatives and their members into true pillars of democracy<br />

in Bavaria.<br />

The political parties recognised early on the importance of the<br />

Bavarian cooperative banks as well as the whole cooperative movement<br />

for the build-up of democratic and SME structures in Bavaria.<br />

This became apparent during the passage of the Bavarian Constitution<br />

in December of 1946. To quote Article 153: “The independent<br />

small and medium-sized businesses in agriculture, trades, trade, commerce<br />

and industry shall be promoted by legislature and administration<br />

and shall be protected against overwork and absorption. They<br />

shall be supported by government in their efforts to ensure their economic<br />

freedom and independence and to secure their development<br />

through cooperative self-help. The promotion of capable workers<br />

from employed work to self-employed living shall be aided.” Cooperative<br />

networks are characterised by a view of humankind that is<br />

based on the concepts of self-responsibility and self-reliance away<br />

from governmental support.<br />

With the continually positive development of the German economy<br />

after 1948 and growing wealth, the image of cooperative banks<br />

began to change. They became full banks catering to a broad clientele<br />

of customers. Growing segments of the population opened bank<br />

accounts because they needed a bank to manage their wage and<br />

salary accounts, their money transfers and cheque transactions. In<br />

addition, they requested consumer loans, house building loans, travel<br />

funds and well-grounded advice on asset management including a<br />

18 II Development stages


wide range of savings plans as well as investment in securities and<br />

precious metals. Asset management and investment counselling took<br />

the place of the former small savings transactions. Commodity transactions<br />

of the rural cooperative banks included supplying the nonagricultural<br />

customers with goods for house and garden.<br />

The reason for the great importance cooperative banks had for<br />

the Bavarian economy after World War II was that most of them (i. e.<br />

93 per cent in 1969) executed monetary transactions as well as commodities<br />

transactions for their rural members. This was a distinguishing<br />

characteristic of Raiffeisenbanks designed to suit the needs of<br />

their rural clientele. It was not just about granting loans for seeds and<br />

harvesting. But more so, by bundling the resources, they ensured the<br />

purchase of seeds and fertiliser at adequate prices and the successful<br />

marketing of the harvest. This was done directly by the Raiffeisenbanks<br />

themselves. No other type of bank was willing and able to<br />

ensure the orderly purchase and sale in one stop and – usually together<br />

with BayWa AG – by joining money and commodity, create an<br />

instrument for moderating prices in favour of agricultural businesses.<br />

Often, also machinery pools were affiliated with rural cooperative<br />

banks since the 1920s, so that mechanisation of agricultural operations<br />

was aided and facilitated. Without that, some outfits would not<br />

have been able to raise the money for the purchase of required<br />

machines. Here, too, the Raiffeisen motto applied: “One for all – all<br />

for one”. It corresponded to the principle of subsidiary help from the<br />

medium-sized Raiffeisenbanks for their small and medium-sized<br />

agrarian clientele. Insofar, the idea of the cooperative foundation still<br />

worked perfectly well.<br />

The immense importance and merit of the rural cooperative banks<br />

of that time lay in the fact that they supplied the major part of the<br />

funds required for modernisation and mechanisation of agricultural<br />

businesses. Thus, Bavarian cooperative banks contributed greatly to<br />

securing the livelihood of many farmers and making Bavarian agricultural<br />

businesses competitive versus competitors from at home and<br />

abroad. By cooperating, the Raiffeisenbanks and agriculture secured<br />

2 Cooperative banks 1945–1960<br />

19


and improved the food supply after World War II. In a second step,<br />

cooperative banks also supplied the necessary funds and arranged<br />

government subsidies earmarked to strengthen the competitiveness<br />

of Bavarian agriculture in the framework of the European unification<br />

movement. Therefore, also the rural population benefited from economic<br />

progress.<br />

This positive impact of cooperatives on the development of rural<br />

areas was also seen and appreciated by the founding fathers of the<br />

European Community. With the Treaties of Rome of 1957 they not<br />

only created the foundation of today’s European Union, but simultaneously<br />

anchored the cooperative as legal corporate form in the<br />

European treaties. This is still the case today and was consistently continued<br />

by implementing the European cooperative in the EU in 2003<br />

and three years later in Germany.<br />

3 Cooperative banks since the 1960s<br />

Since the 1960s, cooperative banks thought of themselves as banks<br />

for everybody. The number of customers of Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

grew from 2.1 million in 1965 to 7 million in 2006. The<br />

highest level of 7.45 million customers was reached in 1995. This<br />

development was also reflected in the balance sheet. Since 1965, the<br />

balance sheet total has increased from the equivalent of 3,500 million<br />

Euro to 58,200 million Euro in 1990 and finally reached 103,800 million<br />

Euro in 2006. In addition, the volume of loans granted grew continuously.<br />

After 2,300 million Euro in 1965, it increased to 64,600 million<br />

Euro in the year 2000. Then, a small setback followed due to a<br />

few years of weak economic activity before it went up again after<br />

2005. At the end of 2006, the volume of loans granted by the Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks including sureties amounted to 62,700<br />

million Euro. The increase is partly due to fact that since the early<br />

1970s cooperative banks were permitted to grant loans to non-members.<br />

That opened up a new segment of customers since their previous<br />

discrimination as compared to competing institutes was abol-<br />

20 II Development stages


ished through changes in the Cooperative and Corporate Income Tax<br />

Laws.<br />

That Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks enjoyed full confidence<br />

of the Bavarian population becomes apparent by two other<br />

parameters: the number of members and the deposit volume.<br />

Deposits amounted to 3,000 million Euro in 1965, increased to 48,900<br />

million Euro already in 1990 and reached 82,600 million Euro at the<br />

end of 2006. During the same period, there was a distinct increase in<br />

membership. In 1965, Bavarian cooperative banks had 751,000 members<br />

but in 1990 already 1.9 million. Currently, roughly 2.4 million<br />

Bavarian citizens are members of a cooperative bank.<br />

During the whole development process, Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks benefited from their regional orientation though there was a<br />

clear shift. Originally, the principle “one location, one cooperative”<br />

applied. But from the late 1950s onwards, the system changed. The<br />

number of independent cooperative banks decreased over the<br />

decades and branch networks gained proportionate importance.<br />

That caused many territorial overlappings. Therefore, often branch<br />

offices of several cooperative banks exist in one location. It happens<br />

quite frequently that the keenest competitors of cooperative banks<br />

are the cooperative banks themselves. At the same time, the following<br />

applied and applies: the Bavarian cooperative banks set a high<br />

value on being present all over the Free State. The following data<br />

underline that: in 1936, 4,480 Bavarian cooperative banks existed. In<br />

1965, there were 3,152 cooperative banks with 4,420 branch offices.<br />

In 1990, there were 893 cooperative banks with 4,760 branch offices<br />

present in Bavaria. By the end of the year 2000, the number of Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks amounted to 481 with 3,918 branch<br />

offices. At the end of 2006, 336 Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

operated 3,275 branch offices.<br />

Despite many changes over the decades in the 20 th century as well<br />

as today, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks possess the<br />

densest branch network of all bank groups in Bavaria. Supplying the<br />

3 Cooperative banks since the 1960s<br />

21


Bavarian population with banking and financial services across the<br />

board has developed gradually from the founding days until today.<br />

4 Summary<br />

In the 20 th century, too, the Bavarian cooperative banks put the focus<br />

mainly on promoting SME businesses. By supplying the necessary<br />

funds, the Bavarian cooperative banks supported the reconstruction<br />

of Bavaria after World War II. The democratic structures of cooperatives<br />

helped to further the democratisation process of society after<br />

1945. Through their presence in rural areas, Raiffeisenbanks supported<br />

the economic development and the structural change of the<br />

agricultural sector. The Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks also<br />

benefited from the economic recovery in West Germany through an<br />

increase of membership and customers as well as a growth of balance<br />

sheet totals, deposits and loans granted. The Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks gradually changed into banks for everybody and are today fullservice<br />

banks offering the complete range of financial services. Historically<br />

developed, the Bavaria cooperative banks today own the<br />

densest branch network in the Free State ensuring the state-wide<br />

supply of the population and SME businesses with financial services.<br />

22 II Development stages


III Business principles<br />

1 Promotion of members<br />

The principles of self-help, self-responsibility and self-management<br />

are the foundation of the daily work of the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks. This focus enables the cooperative banks to implement<br />

the economic goals of their members that one member alone<br />

would not be able to achieve. Cooperative banks have the purpose of<br />

promoting the business of their members. Therefore, the cooperative<br />

principle is in the centre of their business activities, not reaching a<br />

high profit margin. Cooperatives are oriented along long-term goals<br />

like continuity, security and reliability. Therefore, they could be called<br />

a synonym for stakeholder value. This constitutes the elementary difference<br />

to purely capital market-oriented and therefore stock<br />

exchange-driven institutes.<br />

The society-oriented approach of the cooperative banks found<br />

ready acceptance in the Bavarian population. At the end of 2006,<br />

over 2.4 million Bavarians were members of a Volksbank or Raiffeisenbank.<br />

Therefore, every fifth inhabitant of Bavaria – 20 per cent<br />

of the population – is co-owner of a cooperative bank. Only about 5<br />

per cent of all citizens hold securities (Deutsches Aktieninstitut (German<br />

Stock Institute): Zahl der Aktionäre in Deutschland (Number of<br />

Shareholders in Germany), 2007).<br />

Registered capital of the Bavarian cooperative banks raised from<br />

their members amounted to just under 1,500 million Euro. During the<br />

last years, it bore an average interest of about 5 per cent. In comparison:<br />

at the end of 2006, the subscribed capital of BMW AG amounted<br />

to 654 million Euro (BMW: Geschäftsbericht 2006 (Annual Report),<br />

p. 55), of Commerzbank (worldwide) 1,700 million Euro (Commerzbank:<br />

Geschäftsbericht 2006 (Annual Report), p. 26).<br />

1 Promotion of members<br />

23


The provision of capital and the resulting participation of the<br />

Bavarian population reveal the trust and the close relationship<br />

between the Bavarian cooperative banks and the people of the Free<br />

State. The Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks are the banks of<br />

the Bavarians.<br />

Expression of the close relationship between the Bavarian population<br />

and the cooperative banks are the supervisory boards of the<br />

Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks. They consist of members from all<br />

strata of the Bavarian society. From the beginning, supervisory board<br />

members were elected from the midst of the membership and supervise<br />

the business policy of the banks. Over 50 per cent are selfemployed<br />

or professionals, the largest groups being farmers, retailers<br />

and tradespeople. Also employed and retired people are strongly<br />

represented with over 40 per cent. On the one hand this shows that<br />

Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks represent the majority of<br />

society, on the other hand the composition of the supervisory bodies<br />

signifies the close connection to SME businesses that originated in the<br />

founding stages of the cooperatives.<br />

2 Promotion of small and medium-sized business<br />

One third of all SMEs currently name the Southern German Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks as their main bank, among them the<br />

Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks with currently 600,000 corporate<br />

customers. In contrast, only 13 per cent of the SMEs name one<br />

of the big banks as their main bank. In financing, as many as 55 per<br />

cent and for money transactions 57 per cent of all SMEs work with<br />

cooperative banks in Southern Germany. In the area of foreign transactions<br />

they are market leader ahead of big banks and savings banks.<br />

Concerning government support loans granted by the LfA Förderbank<br />

<strong>Bayern</strong> (LfA Development Bank), Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

also hold a leading position. Bavarian cooperative banks<br />

arranged over 20,500 loan agreements between 2000 and 2006. In<br />

24<br />

III Business principles


comparison: big banks, private and other banks only concluded<br />

roughly 4,800 agreements during the same period. This reveals clearly,<br />

which banks attend intensively to the rather small-scale SME business<br />

and which do not. At any rate, without the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks the allocation of LfA support loans to SMEs<br />

would be massively jeopardised.<br />

The SME-oriented business policy of the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks cannot only be explained with their historical roots.<br />

Until today, Bavarian cooperative banks were able to keep up their<br />

competence and their understanding of SMEs because, as mid-sized<br />

banks, they themselves were part of the SME sector. The number of<br />

employees of a Bavarian Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank averaged<br />

about 100 in 2006. According to the definition of the Institut für Mittelstandsforschung,<br />

Bonn, (Institute of SME Research) enterprises up<br />

to 500 employees belong to the SME sector. As they are SMEs themselves,<br />

the Bavarian cooperative banks are the natural partner of<br />

SMEs.<br />

3 Financial supply across the board<br />

Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks attend to a total of 7 million customers<br />

with 12.9 million accounts through 3,275 branch offices in all<br />

regions of Bavaria and with the help of 34,000 employees. The Bavarian<br />

cooperative banks thus count 56 per cent of the Bavarian population<br />

among their customers. According to a representative state-wide<br />

survey of the <strong>Genossenschaftsverband</strong> <strong>Bayern</strong> (Association of Cooperatives<br />

in Bavaria) of May 2007, 25 per cent of the Bavarians over 18<br />

years of age have an account with a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank.<br />

However, the same survey shows that only 15 per cent of the adult<br />

Bavarians have their main bank account with a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank.<br />

The Bavarian cooperative banks have the densest branch network<br />

of all banks in Bavaria. Statistically, a customer only has to cover 2.5<br />

2 Promotion of small and medium-sized business<br />

25


kilometres to the next branch office of a Bavarian Volksbank and<br />

Raiffeisenbank. For big banks, it is more than six kilometres. The<br />

Bavarian cooperative banks ensure the supply of the population and<br />

SMEs with banking and financial services in cities as well as in rural<br />

areas. Over 70 per cent of the customers appreciate branch office<br />

banking. For them, personal advice and guidance is elementary in<br />

their relationship to their bank.<br />

Different from the branch offices of bank groups, cooperative<br />

banks act locally autonomous as independent enterprises that are not<br />

subject to directives from a central institute. Therefore, they are able<br />

to adapt well to local conditions and requirements of their region.<br />

This is reflected in the business strategy and service range specifically<br />

designed to suit the market. Local and regionally-rooted business<br />

structures ensure the state-wide supply of all parts of the population<br />

with financial services.<br />

4 Corporate citizenship<br />

Through their socio-political orientation as branch offices in the<br />

region for the region, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

play a central role for the economic development and stability of the<br />

rural areas in Bavaria. Combining the cooperative support mandate<br />

and the membership-oriented business principle, human beings are in<br />

the centre of business activities. The Bavarian cooperative banks<br />

show this also by their engagement for charity, sports and non-profit<br />

purposes. Since the year 2000, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

have allocated about 21 million Euro for social purposes.<br />

Another 660,000 Euro were allocated by the Raiffeisen/Schulze-<br />

Delitzsch Foundation for the upkeep of Bavarian cultural assets. The<br />

payout of the Gewinnsparverein <strong>Bayern</strong> e.V. serves non-profit, social<br />

and charitable purposes. The Gewinnsparverein, which is the lottery<br />

of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks, has the ambition to<br />

promote the savings propensity of the people by selling lottery<br />

tickets and simultaneously act for the public interest. Between the<br />

26 III Business principles


year 2000 and 2006, moneys amounting to 23 million Euro were<br />

donated to charity. Altogether, the Bavarian cooperative banks<br />

directly or indirectly spent about 45 million Euro for non-profit, social<br />

and charitable purposes between 2000 and 2006. From 2007<br />

onwards, due to the change of the Lottery Law, at least 10 million<br />

Euro annually will be added out of the payout of the<br />

Gewinnsparverein. The donations of the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks are of elementary importance for the social and<br />

socio-economic landscape in the Free State of Bavaria. Their business<br />

orientation, which goes far beyond the purely profit-making<br />

approach, is the success story of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks.<br />

5 Summary<br />

Cooperative banks pursue a long-term business policy that caters to<br />

the advancement of their 2.4 million members. Short-term high-yield<br />

thinking is foreign to them. SMEs are a central part of the socio-economic<br />

orientation of the cooperative banks. The Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks themselves belong to the SME sector. Proximity to their<br />

customers is important for the Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks.<br />

Bavarian cooperative banks have the densest branch network of all<br />

Bavarian banks and therefore ensure the supply of the population<br />

with financial services across the board. Corporate citizenship is a<br />

basic element of the cooperative philosophy. Through their donations,<br />

the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks contribute greatly<br />

to the stability of the rural areas.<br />

4 Corporate citizenship<br />

27


IV Economic contribution<br />

1 Stabilising the Bavarian economy<br />

In order to evaluate the economic impact of the Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks, it is necessary to consider the special Bavarian structures: on<br />

the one hand, Bavaria is characterised by its rural areas, which cover<br />

80 per cent of its total area. With 7 million inhabitants, more people<br />

live in rural areas than in the big cities. On the other hand, Bavaria’s<br />

economic structures are particularly small-scale and SME-oriented. In<br />

no other German state with large territory is the self-employed rate<br />

as high as here. More than 99 per cent of all Bavarian enterprises<br />

belong to the SME sector. These enterprises supply more than three<br />

fourth of all jobs and over 80 per cent of all trainee jobs. (Bayerisches<br />

Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie<br />

(Bavarian State Ministry of Economy, Infrastructure, Transportation<br />

and Technology): Mittelstandsbericht 2005 (SME Report))<br />

Together, rural areas and the SME sector constitute the nucleus of the<br />

Bavarian economy. But different from the big industries, SMEs often<br />

have insufficient equity and a lack of financial power. Therefore, the<br />

SME sector has to rely on a strong and stable banking partner.<br />

The Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks have operated the<br />

banking business since their foundation with the goal of promoting<br />

their members, the SME sector and rural areas. Different from big<br />

banks, their business orientation shows hardly any fluctuations. Not<br />

at least because of that, customers consider “reliability and<br />

respectability” a strong characteristic of cooperative banks. Continuity<br />

and reliability in business relationships are elementary for cooperative<br />

banks. That has an impact on the trust of the customers in their<br />

bank. Until today, not a single customer has lost deposits because of a<br />

cooperative bank becoming insolvent. This is also ensured by the solidarity<br />

between the German cooperative banks. Every cooperative<br />

bank is a member of the reserve fund system of the German Volks-<br />

1 Stabilising the Bavarian economy<br />

29


anks and Raiffeisenbanks that protects the deposits of the customers<br />

during crises. Moneys paid into a pool serve to secure the survival<br />

of the bank in times of business problems. Insolvency of a bank<br />

cannot happen. Customers can always rely on the existence of their<br />

bank and on the safety of their deposits. Bavarian cooperative banks<br />

offer absolutely reliable partnership to their customers and thereby<br />

stand for continuity. Continuity, reliability and trust are the fundamental<br />

building blocks of a positive macroeconomic development.<br />

The individual bank benefits from this development. Stable customer<br />

relations resulting from a clear market strategy have a positive<br />

influence on the earnings of a bank. This is shown in research paper<br />

of the IMF. (Hesse, H.; Cihak, M.: Cooperative Banks and Financial Stability,<br />

2007) In the medium and long run, the development of cooperative<br />

banks is much more stable than of commercial banks. To quote<br />

the IMF study mentioned above on page 12: “We are (…) observing a<br />

lower variability of returns in cooperative banks than in commercial<br />

banks.” This stability is another effect of the flexible payout policy of<br />

the cooperative banks to their members. It contributes to the solidity<br />

of cooperative banks that members support their cooperative banks<br />

as shareholders in their long-term business orientation. It should be<br />

mentioned in particular that the cooperative shareholders would in<br />

economically difficult times also accept lower interest payments on<br />

their cooperative shares.<br />

The continuity-oriented business strategy of the Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks is also confirmed by Standard & Poor’s rating. The<br />

Bavarian cooperative banks were first rated in December 2006 with<br />

a rating of “A positive” and have a current rating of “A+ stable”.<br />

A total of 7 million Bavarian customers today put their trust in the<br />

Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks.<br />

30 IV Economic contribution


2 State-wide supplier of private and<br />

corporate customers<br />

Among seven million customers, the roughly 6.4 million private customers<br />

and the SMEs form the central business clientele of the Bavarian<br />

cooperative banks. The supply of these customers is ensured<br />

through a state-wide branch network. The principle of branch office<br />

banking with its consulting and service approach is macro-economically<br />

of eminent importance.<br />

Only about 40 per cent of the population consider themselves<br />

“well informed” about financial investment. The remaining part<br />

requires extensive advice to ensure efficient utilisation of their funds.<br />

With their branch network providing proximity to their customers<br />

and advice, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks contribute<br />

greatly to consumer protection. Since at the same time only every<br />

fifth bank customer could imagine to conduct all bank transactions<br />

with a direct bank, i.e. consultation in their own home is not important<br />

for two thirds of the people; the existence of branch offices is<br />

indispensable especially in sparsely populated areas. Among commercial<br />

banking institutes, only the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

guarantee a dense branch network.<br />

For commercial customers, too, proximity to a branch office is<br />

important. Two thirds of the commercial customers in Southern Germany<br />

named the proximity of the branch office as important criterion<br />

when choosing a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank as their main bank.<br />

That shows: proximity is an indispensable prerequisite for processing<br />

financial transactions and financial services.<br />

Deliberately, the Bavarian and German Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

have kept the number of branch offices on a very high level. In<br />

2006, the existing 3,275 branch offices constituted 75 per cent of the<br />

branch network of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks of<br />

1995. In all of Germany, the Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks operated<br />

2 State-wide supplier of private and corporate customers<br />

31


13,765 branch offices in 2006, still 70 per cent of their branch offices<br />

of 1995. In comparison, other banking institutes reduced their branch<br />

network much more massively. The number of their branch offices<br />

decreased by over 45 per cent during the period 1995 to 2006. The –<br />

compared to other banks moderate – decrease auf branch offices of<br />

the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks shows how important<br />

they deem the state-wide and gapless supply of the rural areas in particular<br />

despite the high infrastructure costs of a branch network.<br />

The branch banking concept of the Bavarian cooperative banks<br />

offers not only quantity but above all quality. A survey of the Bund<br />

der Selbständigen (Federation of the Self-Employed) in Bavaria<br />

among their members in 2007 shows that 45 per cent of the members<br />

mainly co-operate with a Bavarian Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank.<br />

More importantly: 75 per cent of these members are “wholeheartedly”<br />

or “predominantly” satisfied. (Bund der Selbständigen/Deutscher<br />

Gewerbeverband in <strong>Bayern</strong>: Mittelstand will wieder investieren –<br />

gute Noten für <strong>Bayern</strong>s Banken (SMEs ready to invest again – good<br />

marks for Bavaria’s banks), 2007) This quality evaluation is noteworthy.<br />

For according to Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank),<br />

the quality of financial services is of high importance for economic<br />

growth. (Deutsche Bundesbank (Ed.): Finance and growth in a bankbased<br />

economy: Is it quantity or quality that matters?, 2006) In other<br />

words: the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks as the only<br />

banking group organised under private law offer high-quality financial<br />

services across the board. They thus provide a basis to generate<br />

economic growth in all of Bavaria and secure development opportunities<br />

for the rural areas. Without the service of the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks, the economic development in rural areas<br />

would be worse.<br />

3 Credit lender<br />

Macro-economically eminently important is the supply of the population<br />

with sufficient funds. Here, the banks have a special function<br />

32 IV Economic contribution


granting loans. At the end of 2006, the total volume of loans granted<br />

by the Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks amounted to 71,400 million<br />

Euro. With on-balance sheet lendings of 60,000 million Euro, they<br />

reached a market share volume-wise of 13.6 per cent in the Bavarian<br />

banking market. Savings banks attained 21.5 per cent, the roughly<br />

50 credit banks together 35.2 per cent and the around 30 other banks<br />

27.2 per cent. 10.6 per cent of the loans granted by the Bavarian<br />

cooperative banks were short-term, 8.1 per cent medium-term and<br />

81.3 per cent long-term. 11.7 per cent of the loan volume went to<br />

enterprises (7,000 million Euro), 32.1 per cent to self-employed individuals<br />

(19,200 million Euro) and roughly 55 per cent to employed<br />

individuals (33,000 million Euro). Around 1 per cent of all loans was<br />

granted to public budgets (500 million Euro) (Source: Deutsche Bundesbank).<br />

These figures show the importance of the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks as financier of the SME sector and professionals.<br />

Among the loans granted to individuals of over 33,000 million<br />

Euro, housing loans amounting to 24,600 million Euro played a decisive<br />

role. To own real estate is valuated highly by the majority of the<br />

population: two thirds consider real estate their most valuable investment.<br />

And three fourth of the people prefer their private home as<br />

safe retirement provision. The Bavarian cooperative banks are an<br />

important financier of real estate in the Free State: more than one<br />

fourth of all loan applicants contact a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank<br />

as possible real estate financier. More than one fifth decides on real<br />

estate financing with a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank.<br />

Especially for small and medium-sized construction companies<br />

obtaining credit is eminently important. Investing 1,000 million Euro<br />

in the building industry will generate a macroeconomic demand of<br />

2,500 million Euro and thereby secure 25,500 jobs for one year.<br />

(Baulinks.de: “Bauen jetzt” (Construction today): Investitionen<br />

beschleunigen und Gelder zielgenau einsetzen (Accelerating investment<br />

and placing funds precisely), 2001) Granting loans amounting<br />

to 24,600 million Euro, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

3 Credit lender<br />

33


provided for a macroeconomic demand of almost 62,000 million Euro<br />

in Bavaria. Dividing this sum over ten years and adding the building<br />

loans of 6,500 million Euro, annually paid out by their associated<br />

partner Schwäbisch Hall, 80,000 jobs annually were secured for<br />

10 years in Bavaria. Loans granted to commercial customers for building<br />

measures amounting to 6,500 million Euro have to be taken into<br />

account. Beside the 88,000 job resulting from private building loans,<br />

another 17,000 jobs are annually secured in Bavaria. Thus, the building<br />

loans of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks and their<br />

associate partner alone secure some 105,000 jobs annually, almost<br />

2.5 per cent of all employment liable for social insurance in Bavaria.<br />

That shows: the loan policy of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

has an important labour market and therefore social<br />

dimension. Incidentally, this can be observed in a very different policy<br />

field. The Bavarian cooperative banks recognize the importance of<br />

education – especially in our knowledge-based society. Sometime<br />

ago, the Bavarian cooperative banks started granting loans to college<br />

students. The volume of these student loans almost doubled to<br />

2.3 million Euro between September 2006 and the end of January<br />

2007.<br />

4 Financier of the SME sector<br />

As clear as in the case of private loans the business policy of the cooperative<br />

banks is concerning loans to commercial customers. At the<br />

end of 2006, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks had granted<br />

commercial loans amounting to 26,200 million Euro corresponding<br />

to a market share of 11.9 per cent. Therefore, compared to 2000, they<br />

were able to maintain their market position. Savings banks increased<br />

their market share by almost 2 per cent to 20 per cent in the same<br />

period. With a market share of almost 38 per cent, credit banks were<br />

three percentage points below the value of the year 2000. Other<br />

banks held their share at 30 per cent.<br />

34 IV Economic contribution


It is interesting to note that more than half of all SMEs cooperate<br />

with a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank as far as financing is concerned.<br />

Compared to the volume-wise market share of 11.9 per cent, it shows<br />

that the Bavarian cooperative banks mostly grant smaller loans typical<br />

of SMEs. The average commercial loan of the Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks currently amounts to some 40,000 Euro. This is a clear<br />

indication of an SME customer structure. Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks attend to a customer segment, which is evidently not<br />

of interest to commercial banks, but is elementary for the functioning<br />

of the Bavarian economy.<br />

This customer structure is also promoted by the business model of<br />

local proximity. For it bears advantages in the business relationship<br />

for both the SME customers and the bank. This is underlined by a<br />

publication of the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (German<br />

Institute of Economic Research) Baas, T.; Schrooten, M.: Theoretische<br />

Analyse der Gewinnsituation im deutschen Bankensektor,<br />

2005 (Theoretical Analysis of the Profit Situation in the German Banking<br />

Sector)). The SME sector benefits from the proximity to local<br />

cooperative banks for several reasons. Firstly, Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks know their customers because of the mostly<br />

long-term business relationship. Secondly, the bank officer knows the<br />

regional environment and is able to evaluate success and perspectives<br />

of local enterprises. Therefore, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

do not have to depend on getting information from a<br />

third, more expensive source. Especially in the case of limited companies<br />

and small enterprises, this would be particularly expensive<br />

because they have to follow fewer disclosure and accounting requirements<br />

than e. g. stock corporations do. Therefore, it is of advantage<br />

that there is usually no asymmetry of information between the cooperative<br />

banks and their customers. The unspent costs of obtaining<br />

information may – thanks to the locally oriented business model of<br />

the cooperative banks – be utilised to offer better credit terms to the<br />

customers.<br />

4 Financier of the SME sector<br />

35


Decentral and regionally rooted business structures ensure the<br />

favourable credit supply of SMEs and the economic development of<br />

the rural areas. This orientation on the SME sector is underlined by<br />

additional figures. The market share of the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks as to the loan volume granted to the agriculture and<br />

forestry sector amounts to roughly 57 per cent. Credit banks achieve<br />

values of 10 per cent. Concerning the trades, the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks and the credit banks are almost equal with<br />

21 and 24 per cent respectively. Compared to the total market share<br />

of 11.9 per cent of the Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks in Bavaria it is<br />

evident that they still play a major role in their traditional and SME<br />

structured business fields. One reason is that commercial banks simply<br />

were not interested in this business segment. Still considered symptomatic<br />

today is the quote of the former CEO of Deutsche Bank, Rolf<br />

Breuer: “Deutsche Bank has never been a bank for the trades as are<br />

the savings banks and the cooperative banks.” (Der Tagesspiegel:<br />

Deutsche Bank: “Die Deutsche Bank ist nicht national”, May 8 th , 2002<br />

(Daily Mirror: Deutsche Bank is not national))<br />

The SME oriented business policy of the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks finds approval in politics. This is underlined exemplarily<br />

by the appreciation of the Bavarian State Government: “Especially<br />

in economically underdeveloped areas do SMEs need a better<br />

supply of investment funds, e. g. through equity capital and through<br />

the constructive credit policy of the savings banks and cooperative<br />

banks.” (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur,<br />

Verkehr und Technologie: <strong>Bayern</strong>s ländlicher Raum, 2007 (Bavaria’s<br />

Rural Areas), p. 28)<br />

In addition to granting loans, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

are particularly active in the support of government loan<br />

programmes. This is demonstrated by the data of LfA support loans<br />

of the past years. Since the year 2000, Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

have arranged loan commitments amounting to 2,000<br />

million Euro via the LfA support loan programme. The individual loan<br />

averaged just under 100,000 Euro. That has direct effects on employ-<br />

36 IV Economic contribution


ment. For, according to calculations of KfW concerning the employment<br />

effect of KfW support loan programmes, enterprises on average<br />

hired seven employees for every million Euro of investment. (KfW<br />

Bankengruppe (KfW Banking Group): KfW-Research, Wirtschaftsobserver<br />

Nr. 3, 2002). So, only through the LfA support loans arranged<br />

by the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks since the year 2000,<br />

14,000 new jobs were created in Bavaria.<br />

5 Creator of wealth<br />

The Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks are among the most<br />

important banks as far as deposit banking in the Free State of Bavaria<br />

is concerned. At the end of 2006, the volume of managed customer<br />

deposits amounted to 131,000 million Euro. Thereof, 82,600 million<br />

Euro were on-balance sheet deposits. That means that every fifth<br />

Euro deposited in Bavaria went to a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank.<br />

Among them, money deposits of 77.7 million Euro had the largest<br />

share. Accordingly, 18 per cent of all deposits amounting to 433,000<br />

million Euro in Bavaria were placed with a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank.<br />

In comparison: in deposit banking, savings banks had a market<br />

share of just under 26 per cent, credit banks over 34 per cent and<br />

other banks 19 per cent.<br />

Compared to the 18 per cent market share in deposit banking, the<br />

Bavaria Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks have a market share of<br />

32 per cent concerning market penetration of savings products.<br />

Accordingly, their market penetration lies far above their market<br />

share volume-wise. That shows: Bavarian Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank<br />

are active along the whole spectrum of banking services for private<br />

customers. They focus not just on the wealthy segment of society,<br />

but through their policy, they contribute to making formation of<br />

wealth possible across all social strata. They thus promote a basic concept<br />

of Erhard’s Social Market Economy and take over an important<br />

supportive function for private retirement accounts.<br />

4 Financier of the SME sector<br />

37


The Bavarian cooperative banks offer extensive opportunities for<br />

the build-up of retirement accounts and the formation of wealth.<br />

Here, selling life insurance is a major aspect. In this area, the Bavarian<br />

Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks acquired special expertise. They<br />

belong to the strongest sales organisations in Bavaria. In 2005 and<br />

2006, they sold just under 90,000 life insurance policies a year. With<br />

their total portfolio of 1.8 million policies, they insure the life of every<br />

seventh inhabitant of Bavaria. At the end of 2006, the cash value of<br />

all life insurance policies arranged by the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks reached almost 10,000 million Euro.<br />

6 Employer<br />

With over 34,000 employees in the banking business alone, the Bavarian<br />

Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks are among the biggest private<br />

employers in the Free State. Because of their regional presence, they<br />

offer jobs where people live. They contribute to maintaining traditional<br />

family and social structures. They create and secure jobs in the<br />

rural areas and thereby add to their stability.<br />

The jobs of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks belong<br />

to the most secure ones of the sector. In the year 2000, 36,102<br />

employees worked in the banking business of the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks. In 2006, there still were 34,100 employees.<br />

That shows that almost 95 per cent of the employees were maintained.<br />

Additionally, about 2,000 employees work in the commodity<br />

business. In comparison: in the total financial business the number of<br />

employees decreased by over 10 per cent between 2000 and 2005, in<br />

private banks even by more than 20 per cent. The Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks give trust and security to their employees<br />

and their families as well as the Bavarian regions. This is a prerequisite<br />

for individual plans, for active private consumer demand and<br />

therefore for a positive development of the regional and local economy.<br />

38 IV Economic contribution


Responsibility for their home country is in the centre of cooperative<br />

activities. Therefore, each year, cooperative banks train young<br />

people and offer them a future-oriented job. In 2006, the Bavarian<br />

Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks employed over 2,200 trainees. This<br />

equals a training rate of 6.7 per cent, 0.3 percentage points more<br />

than the federal average of 6.4 per cent. (Bundesministerium für Bildung<br />

und Forschung (Federal Ministry of Education and Research):<br />

Berufsbildungsbericht 2006 (Vocational Training Report), p. 25)<br />

Also the remuneration of the employees was above-average. Their<br />

gross annual salary averaged 35,000 Euro or almost 25,000 Euro net<br />

(assumption: tax class III, one child). Accordingly, the 36,000 employees<br />

of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks (including commodity<br />

business) had a disposable income of about 900 million Euro.<br />

Calculations of the Federal Statistics Office (Statistisches Bundesamt:<br />

Einkommens- und Verbraucherstichprobe (Income and Consumer<br />

Sample) 2003, Ü3) show that around 10.3 per cent of the disposable<br />

income plus income from the sale of assets go into savings<br />

and 55 per cent into consumption. On this assumption, it is calculated<br />

that the employees of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

each year spend roughly 495 million Euro of their disposable income<br />

on consumption, among others 65 million Euro on food, 150 million<br />

Euro on housing and utilities and 58 million Euro on leisure, cultural<br />

events and entertainment. The major part of consumption expenditures<br />

flows back into the local Bavarian economic cycles. The Bavarian<br />

Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks therefore contribute noticeably to<br />

the demand behaviour of the population in their home markets and<br />

thus secure jobs in the regional economy.<br />

7 Tax payer<br />

Not only by offering secure jobs, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbank<br />

provide stability to the Bavarian economy. They are among<br />

the biggest local tax payers. In the years 2000 to 2006 alone, they<br />

6 Employer<br />

39


paid local and federal corporate taxes amounting to 1,400 million<br />

Euro, among them over 565 million Euro of community trade tax. On<br />

average, a Bavarian Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank paid a trade tax<br />

amount of roughly 305,000 Euro in 2005. All Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks together paid 108 million Euro. This is almost equal<br />

to the combined trade tax revenue of the cities of Würzburg and<br />

Schweinfurt totalling 115 million Euro in 2005 (IHK Würzburg-<br />

Schweinfurt (Chamber of Commerce of: Würzburg-Schweinfurt):<br />

Gewerbesteuereinnahmen nochmals gestiegen (Trade tax revenue up<br />

again), Oct. 18 th , 2006). That makes the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks some of the biggest tax payers in the Free State. For<br />

the communities in particular, they are a reliable and sound tax<br />

payers without major fluctuations in tax revenue. This, however, cannot<br />

be said of large German corporations. For instance in 2002, seven<br />

DAX corporations located in Munich did not pay trade tax at all. But<br />

especially communal treasurers require reliable and steady revenues<br />

to be able to execute the needed regular investments into infrastructure,<br />

as roads, kindergartens or schools. They can however rely<br />

on the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks.<br />

8 Investor<br />

Between 2000 and 2006, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

invested a total of 1,200 million Euro into their business locations.<br />

That makes them a potent investor. With their investment into<br />

buildings and real estate amounting to 625 million Euro, they secure<br />

annually about 2,000 jobs in Bavaria. Especially local SMEs benefit<br />

from it. For they are usually the ones receiving the orders of the cooperative<br />

banks.<br />

40 IV Economic contribution


9 Summary<br />

The Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks stabilise the SME sector.<br />

By granting private and commercial loans as well as arranging government<br />

support loans the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

support investment and therefore create demand and jobs in rural<br />

areas. With over 34,000 employees in the banking business alone,<br />

they are among the biggest private employers in the Free State. They<br />

not only offer secure jobs but also provide an important private<br />

demand impetus within the regional business cycles. With their<br />

above-average training rate of 6.7 per cent, they offer future perspectives<br />

for young people even in economically less developed areas.<br />

With a yearly triple-digit million Euro sum the Bavarian Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks are among the big tax payers in the Free State.<br />

Their stable business development provides planning reliability to the<br />

communities for their investment into business, infrastructure and<br />

education. Each year, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

invest a mid-sized triple-digit million Euro sum, thus providing orders<br />

to local enterprises and contributing to secure jobs in the regional<br />

economy. All in all, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

secure annually 105,000 jobs in the Free State with their building<br />

loans. They help create new jobs in the SME sector by arranging LfA<br />

support loans. Between 2000 and 2006 alone, 14,000 new jobs were<br />

created this way. The business activities of the Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks constitute a vital part of the regional business cycles.<br />

9 Summary<br />

41


V Competitive environment<br />

1 Overall situation<br />

Competition in the German banking market has clearly intensified<br />

during the past years. New players entered the market and sped up<br />

the fight for customers. Furthermore, due to the increase in competition,<br />

efficiency gains of several years had mostly to be passed on to<br />

the customers. They, in turn, benefited through lower fees and<br />

charges. This is reflected in a study of KfW. (KfW: Das deutsche<br />

Kreditgewerbe im internationalen Vergleich: Betriebswirtschaftlich<br />

wenig rentabel, volkswirtschaftlich hoch produktiv, 2005 (The German<br />

credit sector in international comparison: micro economically<br />

low profitability, macro economically highly productive)<br />

In Germany, more than three million people annually open, close<br />

or move their account. In Bavaria alone, more than 150 banks together<br />

with the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks fight for<br />

customers. Especially in Bavaria, bank customers tend to move<br />

accounts more often than the German average. Whereas the change<br />

ratio is 27 per cent nation-wide, the ratio of people having moved<br />

their accounts at least once or more often is 35 per cent in Bavaria.<br />

This is reflected in a representative survey of GVB of May 2007. To<br />

state it clearly: the Bavarian banking market is highly mobile. Customers<br />

are open to competition.<br />

This is also revealed by the development of customer relations in<br />

retail banking between 1995 and 2005. During this period, the number<br />

of accounts in Germany grew by 2 per cent from 150 million to<br />

176 million. At the same time, the market share of savings banks in<br />

this segment decreased from 33 per cent to 28 per cent. Cooperative<br />

banks, too, lost three percentage points and currently stand at 17 per<br />

cent. The big banks remained relatively constant at 13 per cent, building<br />

societies at 16 per cent. The big winners are the direct banks that<br />

1 Overall situation<br />

43


increased their market share from zero to 17 per cent. That underlines:<br />

the market is mobile. Competition is severe, as can be seen from<br />

the competitive environment of the Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks,<br />

their business policies and their marketing techniques.<br />

2 Savings banks<br />

At the end of 2006, there were 77 savings banks in Bavaria with 2,600<br />

branch offices. Their balance sheet total amounted to 156,000 million<br />

Euro. They employed 47,000 people in Bavaria. Their customer<br />

deposits amounted to 119,000 million Euro. Loans granted totalled<br />

95,000 million Euro. They supplied roughly 40 per cent of SMEs and<br />

two thirds of the trades with financial services. They managed around<br />

18.7 million customer accounts. In the private customer segment,<br />

they have a market penetration of around 56 per cent and therefore<br />

are market leader.<br />

Despite being rooted in all regions, the savings banks, too, have<br />

come under pressure through increased competition. Their reactions<br />

aim at the private customer segment. In the area of financial provisions<br />

for college students, the savings banks created a special educational<br />

loan in addition to savings products. Furthermore, they offer<br />

special terms for specifically selected products (beacon projects) in<br />

order to keep up with offers of the competition (e. g. instalment savings<br />

or building loans). Moreover, the savings banks push forward<br />

into the business with wealthy private customers. In Bavaria,<br />

<strong>Bayern</strong>LB (Bavarian State Bank) supplies the savings banks with private<br />

banking products “Asset Management made in Bavaria” within<br />

the framework of the concept “Cooperative Market Cultivation”.<br />

These may be offered under their own or under the logo of <strong>Bayern</strong>LB.<br />

However, customers may keep their portfolio and their account with<br />

the respective savings bank. Furthermore, savings banks utilise their<br />

relations to communal institutions: for instance, the Stadtsparkasse<br />

München (Munich Municipal Savings Bank) cooperates with<br />

44 V Competitive environment


Stadtwerke München (Munich Municipal Utility) and the municipal<br />

hospitals in order to offer provision products through them.<br />

Savings banks recognise their own weakness in marketing. Therefore,<br />

they look for better sales personnel. Existing customer contacts<br />

are not utilised sufficiently to sell additional products. Marketing<br />

staff shall be trained gradually to become full-blooded salespersons.<br />

Savings banks consider their holistic approach an advantage in comparison<br />

to e. g. direct banks. They offer products for all customer<br />

groups for all circumstances and situations. This encompasses both<br />

private and commercial customers. With this approach, they hope to<br />

increase sales of all products distinctly during the coming years.<br />

3 Private full banks<br />

The following big German banks are counted among the most important<br />

full banks: Deutsche Bank, HypoVereinsbank, Dresdner Bank,<br />

Commerzbank and Postbank. As in the past, their business focus<br />

(except Postbank) is set on the high-margin clientele as can be shown<br />

from the following statistics.<br />

About 28 per cent of all higher-income households (net income<br />

per household around 85,000 Euro) in Southern Germany keep their<br />

main account with one of the big German banks. Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks reach a lower level of only one fourth. The same is<br />

reflected by market penetration. In the higher-income customer segment,<br />

big banks have a market penetration of 70 per cent. Cooperative<br />

banks reach about 40 per cent. When looking at market penetration<br />

of the whole private customer segment, the tendency is<br />

reversed. Here, big banks only have about 22 per cent whereas cooperative<br />

banks reach a value of one third. That shows: big banks put<br />

special attention on wealthier customers. Another indication is their<br />

over proportional market share of more than 34 per cent of the customer<br />

deposit volume in Bavaria, which is higher than of savings<br />

banks and cooperative banks.<br />

2 Savings banks<br />

45


It can also be deduced from the structure of commercial loans that<br />

big banks are not interested in the SME sector. While their share of<br />

the total volume of commercial loans lies just under 38 per cent, their<br />

market share in the segment of transportation and communication<br />

reaches 47 per cent. This is a market segment where mostly higher<br />

loans are granted. Commercial banks tend to engage themselves<br />

more in the high-volume credit business. This tendency is confirmed<br />

by contracts concluded in the LfA business. The average LfA support<br />

loan arranged by the big banks amounted to roughly 250,000 Euro<br />

between 2004 and 2006. That was more than double the amount of<br />

the average support loan arranged by the Bavarian cooperative<br />

banks in the same period. No wonder that only 13 per cent of all<br />

SMEs name a big bank as their main bank, but as many as 34 per cent<br />

name a Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank. The situation is reversed looking<br />

at enterprises with sales of more than 25 million Euro. There, big<br />

banks have a market share of 42 per cent whereas the Volksbanks<br />

and Raiffeisenbanks only reach 24 per cent.<br />

The low shares of commercial banks in the segment of households<br />

and SMEs are homemade. From the beginning, big banks set their<br />

attention on big corporations and wealthier customer segments that<br />

primarily can be found in big cities and urban environments. Symptomatic<br />

of it is the sparse branch network of commercial banks. On<br />

average, a customer has to cover 6 kilometres in order to find a<br />

branch office of a big bank. Since these are mainly located in the<br />

proximity of cities, it signifies a low density of branch offices of big<br />

banks in rural areas. Furthermore, the frequent change of strategies<br />

of these banks during the past years led to a loss of trust and credibility<br />

by the customers. This is also reflected in a survey among the<br />

members of the Bund der Selbständigen (Federation of the Self-<br />

Employed) in Bavaria. For instance, since 1995 market penetration of<br />

HypoVereinsbank has decreased in Bavaria by one third to just under<br />

10 per cent. Furthermore, more customers closed their accounts with<br />

the big banks between 2004 and 2005 than opened a new one.<br />

46 V Competitive environment


Big banks intend to reverse this trend by way of marketing campaigns<br />

in the segment of private customers and SMEs by starting new<br />

product lines, among them free cheque accounts as well as special<br />

terms for consumer and student loans. Also the marketing system will<br />

be changed. More and more, products will be sold through third parties:<br />

automobile clubs, retail or internet platforms. These measures<br />

are supported by higher marketing capacities meaning more employees,<br />

new branch offices, longer business hours or mobile banking<br />

through agents. Big banks have set high objectives for themselves.<br />

Postbank for instance wants to gain one million new customers in<br />

2007. This serves to put pressure on the current regional market<br />

leaders – savings banks and cooperative banks. But private customers<br />

and SMEs are a “sideline” at the most for the majority of the big<br />

banks. If one looks at Deutsche Bank, around 50 per cent of its bank<br />

earnings stem from the segment Global Markets, i. e. investment<br />

banking, in London. (Student, D.; von Papendick, U.: Deutsche Bank:<br />

Goldfinger, 2006)<br />

Aside from the big German banks, more and more foreign big<br />

banks are active in the German banking market. Among them are<br />

e. g. the subsidiaries of Citibank, GE Money Bank or the Swedish SEB.<br />

From the beginning, these banks focussed on the private customer<br />

segment and tried to enter the market offering favourable terms.<br />

This includes a free cheque account as well as favourable consumer<br />

loan terms. Usually these institutes limit their branch network to<br />

urban areas. The financial power of the parent company enables<br />

them to work the markets extensively and pursue a long-term strategy.<br />

This also makes them interesting for German customers. For this<br />

reason, these banks add to competitive pressure in the German market.<br />

4 Direct banks<br />

Among the banks with new distribution channels are internet banks,<br />

mostly offering a limited product range without much explanatory<br />

3 Private full banks<br />

47


needs. Examples are DiBa or ComDirect. Both achieved high increases<br />

in the number of customers and deposit volume in the past years.<br />

Their importance in certain areas, e. g. capital investments, has clearly<br />

grown at the expense of the established market participants. This is<br />

also felt by the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks. Market statistics<br />

of deposits show that the products offered by direct banks are<br />

effective. Since the year 2000, the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

have lost a market share in deposit banking of around 1.5<br />

percentage points. These decreases are most apparent concerning<br />

savings deposits and savings certificates. Credit banks (direct banks<br />

are counted among them) gained almost three percentage points in<br />

deposit banking during the same period – proof that competition in<br />

the banking market functions well with new products and new distribution<br />

channels.<br />

Direct banks primarily address customers in the traditional private<br />

customer segment of savings banks and cooperative banks. Especially<br />

young, higher-income earners as well as higher qualified customers<br />

feel attracted to direct banks. Almost one quarter of these customers<br />

is willing to have all their banking transactions executed by a direct<br />

bank. That proves that in the banking market there is a high potential<br />

for customer mobility.<br />

5 Austrian banks in the Bavarian market<br />

Besides the German private banks, mostly Austrian banks are among<br />

the group of banks specialising in the segment of wealthy private customers.<br />

They try to attract German customers with country-specific<br />

competitive advantages. Examples are the Bank für Tirol and Vorarlberg,<br />

Oberbank or Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberösterreich that actively<br />

work the Southern Bavarian market. These banks do not keep their<br />

intentions hidden and make aggressive use of the Austrian location<br />

advantages (constitutionally guaranteed banking secret, inheritance<br />

tax regulation, final withholding tax) for their marketing. In its Annual<br />

Report 2006, Oberbank documents its success in Bavaria. Bavaria is<br />

48 V Competitive environment


explicitly called a “growth market”. This is also shown by the branch<br />

network development since Oberbank entered the market in 1990.<br />

At the end of 2006, after opening another two branches in 2006,<br />

Oberbank had over ten branch offices in Bavaria. With the planned<br />

opening of two more branch offices, Oberbank will be present in all<br />

Bavarian administrative districts. The Bank für Tirol und Vorarlberg<br />

also explicitly calls Bavaria a growth market in its Quarterly Report<br />

(2 nd quarter, 2006). Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberösterreich has been<br />

active in Germany since 1991. It exclusively attends to customers “in<br />

need of special discretion” and works this market segment aggressively<br />

offering certain exclusiveness to its customers by decidedly<br />

relinquishing the classic retail banking. Between the end of 2004 and<br />

January of 2006, at least 434 million Euro were moved from accounts<br />

kept at Bavarian cooperative banks mainly to Austrian.<br />

6 Autobanks<br />

More and more banks can be found in the Bavarian market, which<br />

were founded as subsidiaries of industrial corporations. In first place<br />

autobanks should be mentioned, which were able to attain a strong<br />

market position in the traditional automotive financing business.<br />

Gradually, their activities have extended to other bank products, too.<br />

Autobanks penetrate the market of regular banks systematically.<br />

Besides auto financing and leasing, they now offer a number of traditional<br />

bank products as savings plans, cheque accounts, call money<br />

accounts, investment funds and insurance. Daimler-Chrysler-Bank has<br />

acquired over one million customers and holds deposits of more than<br />

3,000 million Euro. Volkswagenbank administrated customer deposits<br />

amounting to 8,800 million Euro at the end of 2006 and had a<br />

balance sheet total of just under 44,000 million Euro. Autobanks<br />

often benefit from their parent company that subsidises financial<br />

products in order to push automobiles into the market. Furthermore,<br />

the internal rate of refinancing is often lower than in the banking<br />

market. These advantages can be passed to the customers. With their<br />

reasonable terms, autobanks steadily achieve higher shares of the<br />

5 Austrian banks in the Bavarian market<br />

49


auto financing market. Daimler-Chrysler-Bank nowadays finances or<br />

leases every second Mercedes. In total, 60 per cent of all new auto<br />

loans are granted by autobanks. Also to the benefit of auto manufacturers:<br />

according to BMW, new cars financed with loans are usually<br />

ordered with more extras than those paid for with cash.<br />

Typical autobanks look for distribution channels other than their<br />

own dealers. So, Daimler-Chrysler and BMW Banks also finance<br />

brands other than their own. As does VW Bank offering financing<br />

through the autoclub ADAC (market potential 15.5 million members).<br />

Furthermore, autobanks offer new models of their own brand at<br />

favourable financing terms to customers who drive cars of another<br />

brand. Thus, there is no need for the expensive acquisition of customer<br />

data. In the coming years – as can be observed already now –<br />

autobanks will try to extend their holistic approach i.e. on top of<br />

financing also sell liability, collision and residual debt insurance.<br />

7 Consumer loan specialists<br />

More and more banks enter the market specialising on one or few<br />

products and selling them in their own shops or branch offices. That<br />

applies to consumer loan specialists like Fortis. This specialisation of<br />

some institutes on consumer loans is also reflected in the changed<br />

market share of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks. In the<br />

year 2000, they held over 36 per cent of the volume market share in<br />

the instalment credit business, in 2006 it was only 9 per cent. During<br />

the same period, the volume of loans granted in Bavaria increased<br />

from just under 14,000 million Euro to 18,400 million Euro whereas<br />

the loans granted by the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

amounting to 5,000 million Euro decreased by 3,400 million Euro. This<br />

is a direct effect of the new market and competition structures.<br />

50 V Competitive environment


8 Non-banks<br />

Increasingly, cooperations with non-banks, i. e. enterprises not<br />

belonging to the banking sector, are utilised to sell products, among<br />

them auto clubs and retailers. Examples are Tchibo, ADAC, drugstore<br />

chains or Ebay, which currently cooperates with Commerzbank.<br />

They use their high profile and busy customer traffic in the retail<br />

business to sell their products. The coffee roaster’s name recognition<br />

rate of 99 per cent and the many non-food products in their product<br />

range also provide a high marketing potential for finance products.<br />

The retail group C&A has such a potential, too. With one million customers<br />

a day, there are excellent sales opportunities for finance products<br />

as well, especially since these products are advertised in their<br />

department stores. This new distribution channel of the non-banks<br />

further heightens competitive pressure for branch banks.<br />

9 Summary<br />

Consolidation and entrance of new competitors into the banking<br />

market have massively intensified competition and the fight for customers.<br />

The big German banks have rediscovered SME financing and<br />

the business with the average private customer in Bavaria. With their<br />

marketing campaigns aimed at this customer segment, they try to put<br />

pressure on the regional banks. Foreign full banks directly approach<br />

private customers and increasingly commercial customers. Therefore,<br />

they directly compete with big German banks, savings banks and<br />

cooperative banks. New distribution channels, as the internet and the<br />

sale of finance products via retailers, heighten pressure for the traditional<br />

branch banks. Niche suppliers as consumer loan specialists or<br />

autobanks use their exceptional position to be successful in the market.<br />

That forces the hand of the traditional market participants. With<br />

the help of tax and constitutional advantages, Austrian banks aim for<br />

V Competitive environment<br />

51


the wealthy and profitable private customer segment thus siphoning<br />

off deposits from Bavarian banks.<br />

52 V Competitive environment


VI Trends<br />

1 Consolidation of the banking market<br />

During the last decade, the German banking market was marked by<br />

different developments. Firstly, the number of banks in Germany<br />

(here: suppliers of capital transaction services for non-banks)<br />

decreased distinctly. Between 2001 and 2005, the number of domestic<br />

credit banks was reduced by 445 to 2,000. Secondly, the number of<br />

foreign suppliers in Germany grew continuously. During the same<br />

period, the number of banks from countries of the Euro zone went<br />

up 20 per cent to 52 institutes whereas the number of banks originating<br />

from the European Economic Area (without the Euro zone)<br />

increased by around 12 per cent to 18 institutes. This is an indication<br />

that ever more foreign credit institutes push into the German market<br />

and put pressure on the domestic suppliers. Competition increases.<br />

That offers the following future prospects: the present consolidation<br />

of domestic institutes in the German and Bavarian banking market<br />

will continue further. This trend is supported by rumours of a<br />

take-over of Postbank and the sale of Landesbank Berlin (Berlin State<br />

Bank) in June of 2007, as well as the acquisitions of Norisbank branches<br />

and Berliner Bank by Deutsche Bank. So far, small and medium<br />

regional suppliers have been particularly affected by the consolidation<br />

wave. The number of German Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

dropped by around 62 per cent between 1990 and 2006, as was the<br />

case in Bavaria.<br />

According to some forecasts, only half of the currently 1,200 German<br />

cooperative banks will remain in 25 years from now. Also in<br />

Bavaria, the number will decrease. There are conservative forecasts<br />

that in the year 2003 only about 200 cooperative banks will do business<br />

in Bavaria. In the public banking sector, too, consolidation pressure<br />

will increase. More savings banks and state banks will merge<br />

1 Consolidation of the banking market<br />

53


educing their total number. Over the coming years and decades, in<br />

all likelihood private banks and financial service suppliers will take<br />

over savings banks or merge with them. Against this background, the<br />

legal form of the savings banks might become obsolete in the medium<br />

term. Developments in other European countries as Italy and<br />

France seem to supply serious evidence. To state it clearly: banks that<br />

do not get a grip on their cost structures that have a narrow market<br />

environment and a weak distribution system will get under acquisition<br />

and merger pressure.<br />

2 Market pressure of suppliers from outside the<br />

industry<br />

The tendency of market displacement does not solely originate within<br />

the banks themselves. Even today, non- and near-banks (enterprises<br />

that do not directly belong to the banking sector but execute<br />

quasi-banking business, e. g. finance institutes of the auto manufacturers)<br />

are active in the financial service market. This tendency will<br />

continue. Especially products with little explanatory requirements can<br />

be sold easily through the distribution channels of non- or nearbanks.<br />

One reason is that in retail there is higher customer traffic<br />

compared to traditional banks and longer, consumer-friendly opening<br />

hours. In the future, more non- and near-banks will enter the<br />

financial service market using their special customer contacts and<br />

package deals (e. g. automobile purchase and favourable financing<br />

terms).<br />

The distribution side presents just one dimension of the change of<br />

the traditional banking business. The other dimension is number and<br />

quality of the players. Especially industrial corporations will become<br />

increasingly interested in the banking market. GE Money Bank and<br />

the autobanks are just the first protagonists. They will be followed by<br />

enterprises with high capital reserves and excellent customer data –<br />

the ideal preconditions to build up a financial service organisation.<br />

54 VI Trends


Such potential financial service suppliers could well be recruited from<br />

the utilities or telecommunication sectors.<br />

New suppliers will probably utilise their existing distribution channels<br />

and their well-established brand image to compete with the traditional<br />

bank branch. Banks will be forced to optimise costs and customer<br />

proximity of their branch services. The result will be the growing<br />

importance of the group-wide standardisation of products and<br />

services. The power of groups and networks will depend on their ability<br />

to bundle their internal services, e. g. in the area of IT or risk management.<br />

Furthermore, branch locations and business hours have to<br />

become better adapted to the requirements of the market. It will be<br />

crucial to attract customers into the branch office in order to cancel<br />

out the point-of-sale disadvantages as compared to retailing. The Saturday<br />

openings of several banks are early indications that they have<br />

started to adapt to changed customer behaviour. The same goes for<br />

the plans of the savings banks to integrate post offices into their<br />

branches. The currently practised concept of an isolated branch office<br />

with strictly limited opening hours can hardly be maintained in the<br />

future.<br />

3 Change in the demand of financial services<br />

Demand for banking products is also undergoing a steady process of<br />

change. This applies especially to the customer business. On the one<br />

hand, the internationalisation of the economy will continue affecting<br />

not only big industries and commercial banks. The SMEs, too, look for<br />

business opportunities in foreign countries. In the meantime, SMEs in<br />

the manufacturing sector earn just under 30 per cent of their earnings<br />

in foreign countries – with growing tendency. That indicates that<br />

the increasing economic interdependence affects more and more<br />

SMEs and in its wake their main banks in the region. Regional banks<br />

that are not competent in foreign business or do not make this competence<br />

visible rob themselves of their market potential.<br />

2 Market pressure of suppliers from outside the industry<br />

55


Besides the internationalisation of the traditional SME sector,<br />

there is another trend affecting enterprises. Not at least due to the<br />

gradual loss of importance of the permanent employment relationship<br />

customary until now, more and more SMEs will be founded. They<br />

are active in their local and regional markets and mostly have insufficient<br />

financial means. They constitute the counterpart of internationally<br />

active enterprises and require special attention in their<br />

regions. A new customer segment grows for local financial service<br />

providers with branches across the board and know-how of the SME<br />

business.<br />

In addition to changes on the side of commercial customers, also<br />

changes concerning private customers can be observed: the mainstream<br />

centre of society common in Germany will thin out. This is<br />

mainly caused by more competition in the economic system. In an<br />

open, knowledge-based economy wage differentials, at present<br />

guaranteed by labour agreements, will level out. The society will be<br />

divided into less skilled people with low incomes and highly qualified<br />

people with higher incomes. This can be seen already now. According<br />

to a new study of the Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for the<br />

Study of Labor (Dustmann, C.; Ludsteck, J.; Schönber, U.: Revisiting<br />

the German Wage Structure, 2007) wage differentials have accelerated<br />

massively over the past years. For example, the real income of<br />

the top 15 per cent of the high-income group grew by more than<br />

15 per cent between 1991 and 2001. The bottom 5 per cent of lowincome<br />

group in Germany had to accept a real wage loss of up to<br />

12 per cent. This is also going to affect suppliers of financial services<br />

because demands and requirements of the customers will differ more<br />

in future. Like in the manufacturing sector, more and more low-cost<br />

suppliers and service-oriented premium suppliers will appear in the<br />

banking market. Banking business across all social strata will thin out.<br />

56 VI Trends


4 Demographic development<br />

The shifts in demographics will affect the banking market dramatically.<br />

The 2007 population forecast for Bavaria indicates that. (Bayerisches<br />

Landesamt für Statistik und Datenerhebung (Bavarian State<br />

Office of Statistics and Data Ascertainment): Bevölkerungsentwicklung<br />

in <strong>Bayern</strong> (Population development in Bavaria), 2007) In the<br />

coming ten to twenty years, the population of Bavaria will increase<br />

slightly by up to 300,000 people. That will mostly be felt in economically<br />

strong and urban areas. The percentage of aged people will rise<br />

especially in rural areas that are not located in affluent suburbs.<br />

Therefore, banks in rural areas will be greatly affected and forced to<br />

change their distribution and products early on. An ageing society<br />

has different requirements than a growing society. The areas of private<br />

provisions, the building and melt-off of wealth will gain importance.<br />

The ageing of society will also bring changes in the distribution<br />

that go far beyond the technical content. Customers will no longer be<br />

able to reach the branch offices by themselves. Therefore, a mobile<br />

distribution system will become more important. On the other hand,<br />

this age group is available for contacts all day, different from working<br />

people. Banks that adapt their whole distribution system – from<br />

product to sale – to the changing environment in customer business<br />

will be successful in future.<br />

Because of the dwindling number of young people, it will be of<br />

growing importance to tie in this group. After they finish school, they<br />

tend to move into urban areas to study or to work. Therefore, the<br />

sustainability of this customer segment is at risk. This is also a new<br />

challenge for the suppliers. The consumer market power of the<br />

young people is high. They demand higher efforts. Only those who<br />

satisfy young customers as to products, distribution and image can<br />

maintain them as customers.<br />

4 Demographic development<br />

57


5 Summary<br />

The consolidation pressure among the traditional bank institutes in<br />

the Bavarian financial market will not lessen in the future. The number<br />

of regionally active bank institutes will further decrease. At the<br />

same time, the distribution channels outside of the traditional branch<br />

business will gain importance. Enterprises from outside the industry<br />

will enter the banking market to do business. The internationalisation<br />

of the economy results in changes of what is required from the<br />

banks. Customers will be more price-conscious and therefore more<br />

motivated to change to another bank. The continuity of customer<br />

relationships will decrease. Furthermore, inequalities and desires to<br />

be different will increase in society and so will the individual needs<br />

and requirements of the customers versus their bank. The demographic<br />

development especially in rural areas calls for changes of<br />

products and customer contacts on the part of the banks. Young people<br />

will move into the centre of attention of financial service<br />

providers. That will result in a growing number of suppliers fighting<br />

for a dwindling group of customers.<br />

58 VI Trends


Conclusion<br />

Based on the catalogue of questions in the introduction, the economic,<br />

societal and cultural importance of the cooperative banks in<br />

Bavaria is documented in ten central points.<br />

1. The first cooperative banks were founded as a reaction to a malfunctioning<br />

financial market. This characteristic still applies today.<br />

In the 21 st century, too, they are present in regions where other<br />

banking groups withdrew. The Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks in<br />

Bavaria thus provide financial services across the board.<br />

2. Cooperative banks originated in the SME sector. Until the present,<br />

they are the most important financier of agricultural, commercial<br />

and trades SMEs.<br />

3. Cooperative banks are not committed to anonymous stock<br />

exchange powers but are only responsible to their members. They<br />

are the banks of the Bavarian population. 20 per cent of all Bavarians<br />

hold cooperative shares.<br />

4. Cooperative banks are open to all customer groups. They offer all<br />

financial services to all customers. Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks<br />

provide access to monetary transactions as well as investment and<br />

credit products for broad customer segments. Cooperative banks<br />

thus enable the Bavarian population to participate in social life.<br />

5. Cooperative banks with their deposit policies contribute to the<br />

building of wealth and private old-age provisions in rural areas.<br />

They thus ensure the people’s future independence.<br />

6. Cooperative banks contribute to the future prospects of rural<br />

areas as employers, trainers, investors and tax payers. People find<br />

Conclusion<br />

59


employment close to their homes, SMEs receive orders, and communities<br />

are able to invest.<br />

7. Cooperative banks and their business, their social and charitable<br />

activities contribute to the vitality of the rural areas of Bavaria.<br />

They create regional demand with their credit policy and secure<br />

employment. They provide new jobs in many sectors. Through corporate<br />

citizenship, they cement social ties in the Bavarian society.<br />

8. Cooperative banks stand for stability. Through their regional and<br />

local orientation, they do not face unforeseeable risks: They know<br />

their markets. They stand as financial rocks in the regions, especially<br />

in times of economic change.<br />

9. Cooperative banks have always had democratic structures. In their<br />

governing bodies, each vote counts equally regardless of social<br />

origin. Cooperative banks therefore are trailblazers, supporters<br />

and guarantors for a Bavaria that is bound by democratic principles.<br />

10.Cooperative banks in Bavaria move in a highly competitive environment<br />

with over 150 competitors. Irrespectively, also in the<br />

future they will follow a business policy following the key philosophy<br />

“Closer to the people”.<br />

60 Conclusion


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64 Bibliography


Authors<br />

Stephan Götzl is President and CEO of the <strong>Genossenschaftsverband</strong> <strong>Bayern</strong> e.V.<br />

(Association of Cooperatives in Bavaria)<br />

Dr. Jürgen Gros is Head of the Board of Director’s Staff and Communication<br />

Department of the <strong>Genossenschaftsverband</strong> <strong>Bayern</strong> e.V.<br />

Steffen Jahn is Section Head of Political Contacts and Economic Analysis of the<br />

<strong>Genossenschaftsverband</strong> <strong>Bayern</strong> e.V.<br />

Authors 65


This detailed analysis of the importance of coope-<br />

rative banks for the economic, sociopolitical and<br />

cultural development of Bavaria provides answers<br />

to the following questions:<br />

• What characterises the business philosophy of<br />

the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks?<br />

• What are the main business segments of the<br />

Bavarian Volksbanks and Raiffeisenbanks?<br />

• What relevance do the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks have for the Bavarian banking<br />

sector?<br />

• What characterises the competitive environment<br />

of the Bavarian Volksbanks and Raifeisenbanks?<br />

• In what way do the Bavarian Volksbanks and<br />

Raiffeisenbanks contribute to the economy of the<br />

Free State of Bavaria?<br />

www.gv-bayern.de<br />

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