On the Hoof - Livestock Trade in Darfur

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continuing to function relatively unchangedcompared with the pre-conflict years: Markundiand Rahed El Birdi in Rahed El Birdi locality.This area has generally remained calmer and moresecure than most other parts of South Darfursince 2003.The reasons for the shifts in market activitybetween secondary markets in Darfur’s three statescan be summarized as:(1) insecurity in certain areas affecting thesupply of livestock to the market and thewillingness of traders to trek livestock out ofthe area, for example, affecting Ed Daien;(2) greater security in other areas wherepastoralists and agro-pastoralists can grazetheir livestock more securely. This hasboosted market activity in some placessuch as Tomat in South Darfur;(3) certain ethnic groups not having access tocertain markets due to tribal conflict. This isa particular feature of livestock trading inSouth Darfur, affecting many markets,including Assalaya near Ed Daien, AbuMutarig, and Rajaj markets (see Table 2). In2011, during the period of field work, itwas striking that the Habbaniya had lostaccess to many markets that they wouldhave used before the conflict because oftribal hostilities; they no longer had accessto markets in Rizeigat or Fellata territoryand were using Gareida market instead. Atthe time of writing in 2012, access to somemarkets had improved due to localagreements between different ethnic groups,but these are constantly shifting dynamics;(4) small rural markets collapsing and allmarket activity shifting to one secondarymarket, for example to Seraf Omra inNorth Darfur;(5) some localities charging high rates oftaxation, driving traders to markets wheretaxes are lower, for example from AbuMatarig market (Abu Matarig locality) inSouth Darfur to El Meiram in SouthKordofan.For some markets, trading activity has waxedand waned according to fluctuating conflictdynamics. (See Box 3 for an overview of theDarfur conflict). This may be the result of localconflict dynamics as hostilities between ethnicgroups intensify or subside. For example, inAssalaya market, some 40 km west of Ed Daien,the livestock trade declined in 2004 when theBirgid–Rizeigat conflict was at its height and theBirgid no longer brought their animals to themarket. It was again negatively affected in 2006when the Rizeigat–Habbaniya conflict meant thatthe Habbaniya stopped using the market.However, reconciliation between the Rizeigat andBirgid, and between the Rizeigat and Habbaniyain 2008 triggered a revival in market activity as allthree groups used the market once again.Fluctuating trading activity may also be affectedby higher-level political and conflict dynamics atthe national or regional level. See Box 6 on ForaBoranga market, where trading activity has waxedand waned according to the state of relationsbetween the Sudanese government in Khartoumand the Chadian government in N’Djamena.Table 2. Shifts in market activity in Darfur’s secondary livestock markets during the conflictyears, until 2011Change in Name of marketmarketContracting El Fasher, N. DarfurmarketsMellit, N. DarfurMalha, N. DarfurReason for change during the conflict yearsReduced supply of livestock and fall in export trade.Limited access for certain ethnic groups supplying livestock.Very high taxes. No banking facilities. Kordofan marketsreplacing Mellit.Groups that used to supply the market have stopped eg.,Zayadia, Kababish. Omdurman traders withdrew.Continued on next page30
Continued from previous pageChange in Name of marketmarketNyala, S. DarfurEd Daien, S. DarfurAssalaya, S. DarfurReason for change during the conflict yearsReduced supply of livestock. Insecurity around Nyala townsince 2007/08. Withdrawal of Omdurman traders.Most Omdurman traders withdrew in 2004, and avoided EdDaien completely after a well-known livestock trader who hadsupplied much capital to Ed Daien market was killed in 2008.From 2004 affected by Birgid-Rizeigat conflict and Birgidstopped using the market.From 2006/07 affected by Rizeigat-Habbaniya conflict, so noHabbaniya cattle brought to the market. Tribal reconciliationbetween the three ethnic groups led to some recovery of themarket after 2008.Abu Matarig, S. Darfur From 2007/08 affected by Rizeigat-Habbaniya conflict, alsoincreases in taxes have encouraged pastoralists from Bahr ElArab to use El Meiram market in West Kordofan instead.Omdurman traders withdrew.Rajaj, S. DarfurUm Labasa, S. DarfurGeneina, W. DarfurInsecurity. From 2006 affected by Fellata-Habbaniya conflict.Reduced supply of livestock due to insecurity and displacement,although some recovery in recent years.Reduced supply and quality of livestock. Decline in the exporttrade.Fora Boranga, W. Darfur Reduced supply of livestock, although evidence of somerecent recovery in the livestock trade.Zalingei, W. DarfurExpanding Seraf Omra, N. DarfurmarketsSaiyah, N. DarfurTomat, S. DarfurReduced supply of livestock because areas of production are farfrom Zalingei and the routes are insecure.As nearby markets have declined or closed, market activity incattle and camels has shifted to Seraf Omra. Trade agreementsbetween Arab and Zaghawa traders.Trade shifted from Mellit and Malha to Saiyah. Reconciliationbetween Meidob, Zayadia, and Berti.Shift of market activity from Rajat to Tomat, which is moresecure and unaffected by tribal conflict.Markets Markundi, S. Darfur Security and good pasture.that havechanged lessRahed El Birdi, More secure, supplied by surrounding area. Small decrease inS. Darfur volume of livestock traded and cross-border trade with CARsuspended until 2010.Source: field work in March to May 2011June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 31
Page 1 and 2: On the HoofLivestock Trade in Darfu
Page 3 and 4: On the HoofLivestock Trade in Darfu
Page 6 and 7: 9. Trade in hides and skins........
Page 8 and 9: major grievance amongst livestock t
Page 10 and 11: 1. Introduction1.1 Why this study?L
Page 12 and 13: 3. A review of official statistics
Page 14 and 15: 2. An overview of Sudan’s livesto
Page 16 and 17: The main methods for exporting live
Page 18 and 19: as other exporting countries with m
Page 20 and 21: mandate for promoting the livestock
Page 22 and 23: (6) Limited or no access by livesto
Page 24 and 25: Figure 8. The livestock marketing c
Page 26 and 27: Box 3.A brief overview of the confl
Page 28 and 29: particularly badly hit by the confl
Page 32 and 33: Box 5.A case study of Tomat, an exp
Page 34 and 35: 34cash, which leaves them vulnerabl
Page 36 and 37: 5. The changing profile of livestoc
Page 38 and 39: years—see section 3.2 above—thi
Page 40 and 41: 6. The costs of trading and access
Page 42 and 43: checkpoints were the number one cos
Page 44 and 45: 7. Livestock production and market
Page 46 and 47: 46Nyala area has increased the supp
Page 48 and 49: capital each requires (Young et al.
Page 50 and 51: 9.Trade in hides and skinsTrade in
Page 52 and 53: 10. Conclusions and recommendations
Page 55 and 56: with a longer-term perspective. For
Page 57 and 58: ACRONYMSABSAMISARBARPCAPECARCBOCBSD
Page 59 and 60: Fahey, D. and D. K. Leonard. 2007.
Page 61 and 62: Annex 1. Research team carrying out
Page 63 and 64: Annex 2. Analysis of trading costs
Page 65 and 66: 5. Trading costs for cattle traded
Page 67 and 68: Further technical information may b

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