Almost all countries having adopted incentive/penalty schemes regularly audit data provided bycompanies. The variety <strong>of</strong> auditing systems (audits can be carried out by regulators themselves, byc<strong>on</strong>sultants, or even by the companies according to procedures set by the regulator) should facilitatethe diffusi<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> such important measures in other countries, especially those interested in implementinga financial incentive scheme. It is important that audits be carried out more frequently whenthe incentive/penalty regime is first introduced. Frequency <strong>of</strong> audits can then be relaxed over time.2.2.2 Customer surveysCustomer surveys are an additi<strong>on</strong>al, important form <strong>of</strong> “measuring” quality, complementary toc<strong>on</strong>tinuity measurement systems. Even if customer surveys are not widely used by regulators,customer research can provide useful informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> customer satisfacti<strong>on</strong>, expectati<strong>on</strong>s andWillingness To Pay (WTP) for quality. This informati<strong>on</strong> is useful in regulatory decisi<strong>on</strong>s regardingthe choice <strong>of</strong> quality factors and services to be m<strong>on</strong>itored and given the presence <strong>of</strong> incentives.For this reas<strong>on</strong>, regulators who do carry out customer research usually find them extremelyimportant and use the results in various matters <strong>of</strong> regulati<strong>on</strong>.The most frequent issues explored through customer research are (see Table 2.3):· Customer satisfacti<strong>on</strong>: this is the typical subject <strong>of</strong> customer research, either occasi<strong>on</strong>ally(like in Portugal) or periodically (like in Hungary, Italy, Great Britain); acccording to the separati<strong>on</strong>between network operator and energy supplier, the comm<strong>on</strong> quality factors <strong>on</strong> whichcustomers are requested to express their satisfacti<strong>on</strong> are:· regarding the network operator: c<strong>on</strong>tinuity <strong>of</strong> supply, troubleshooting, voltage fluctuati<strong>on</strong>,staff behaviour, informati<strong>on</strong> provided;· regarding the supplier: punctuality <strong>of</strong> bills, details <strong>of</strong> bills, complaints handling, informati<strong>on</strong>provided, billing adjustments in case <strong>of</strong> errors.· Customer expectati<strong>on</strong>s and importance <strong>of</strong> quality factors: this is a more sophisticatedmatter that can provide regulators with useful informati<strong>on</strong> for standard setting and for identifyingnew areas <strong>of</strong> regulatory interventi<strong>on</strong>. Often, c<strong>on</strong>tinuity <strong>of</strong> supply is felt as the most importantquality factor (for instance in Portugal and in Italy), but more focused research can uncovernew areas <strong>of</strong> great interest to c<strong>on</strong>sumers. For instance, Ofgem’s latest study, published <strong>on</strong>Ofgem’s website in June 2004, suggests that British customers’ main priorities are:· improving restorati<strong>on</strong> times following storms;· receiving accurate informati<strong>on</strong> during power cuts;· reducing the number and frequency <strong>of</strong> power cuts;· carrying out some degree <strong>of</strong> undergrounding in nati<strong>on</strong>al parks and areas <strong>of</strong> outstandingnatural beauty.· Customer willingness to pay: this type <strong>of</strong> quantitative research is d<strong>on</strong>e by many <strong>of</strong> the regulatorsthat introduced incentive regulati<strong>on</strong> for c<strong>on</strong>tinuity <strong>of</strong> supply and is used by them,together with cost and performance informati<strong>on</strong>, to get informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> incentive rates and costallowances <strong>of</strong> the incentive schemes. This kind <strong>of</strong> research is based <strong>on</strong> “c<strong>on</strong>tingent valuati<strong>on</strong>”:this means that, in order to quantify the valuati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> ec<strong>on</strong>omic damage ensuing from interrupti<strong>on</strong>s,generally <strong>on</strong>e or more “interrupti<strong>on</strong> scenarios” are proposed to the interviewee. WTP35<str<strong>on</strong>g>Third</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Benchmarking</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Report</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Electricity</strong> <strong>Supply</strong> – 2005 · Chapter 2
esearch is the most difficult to carry out and can lead to results that are hard to interpret; forinstance, both in Italy and in Great Britain, WTP studies have shown higher than expected willingnessto pay, even if the vast majority <strong>of</strong> both household and business c<strong>on</strong>sumers feel thatthe price they pay to electricity suppliers is c<strong>on</strong>sistent with the value they receive (e.g., inHungary 84.4 % <strong>of</strong> household customers and 77.8 % <strong>of</strong> business customers declare that theprice they pay to electricity suppliers is perfect, mostly or fairly in harm<strong>on</strong>y with its value).TABLE 2.3CUSTOMER SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY REGULATORSOther specific mattersCustomer surveys <strong>on</strong> willingness to pay (WTP)Customer surveys <strong>on</strong> expectati<strong>on</strong>s and importance<strong>of</strong> quality factorsCustomer surveys <strong>on</strong> satisfacti<strong>on</strong>Customer surveys under preparati<strong>on</strong>N<strong>on</strong>eGB (quality <strong>of</strong> teleph<strong>on</strong>e resp<strong>on</strong>se, m<strong>on</strong>thly)NO (2001), IT (2003), GB (2004), SE (2003)HU (annually), IT (1998)HU (annually), IT (annually), GB (every 5 years),PT (occasi<strong>on</strong>ally)GRAT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, LV, LT, PL, SIADDITIONAL INFORMATION 2.1 – INCENTIVES FOR QUALITY OF TELEPHONE RESPONSE THROUGHCUSTOMER SURVEYS IN GREAT BRITAINThe case <strong>of</strong> Great Britain is probably the most innovative as regards the use <strong>of</strong> customer surveys.Results from customer satisfacti<strong>on</strong> become, in fact, an indicator in the incentive/penalty regime,even if with a weight that is largely lower than the c<strong>on</strong>tinuity-based indicators. The regulator(Ofgem) carries out m<strong>on</strong>thly surveys <strong>of</strong> the quality <strong>of</strong> teleph<strong>on</strong>e resp<strong>on</strong>se. The regulator commissi<strong>on</strong>smarket research c<strong>on</strong>sultants to call back customers who have c<strong>on</strong>tacted their distributi<strong>on</strong>business in relati<strong>on</strong> to an emergency or power cut. The customers are asked to rank the companyfrom 1 to 5 where 1 is very dissatisfied and 5 is satisfied in four key areas:politeness <strong>of</strong> staff;willingness <strong>of</strong> staff to help;accuracy <strong>of</strong> informati<strong>on</strong> provided;· usefulness <strong>of</strong> informati<strong>on</strong> provided.Nine hundred customers are interviewed each year for each distributi<strong>on</strong> company. Companies arethen incentivised <strong>on</strong> the basis <strong>of</strong> their annual mean score. Companies are subject to a sliding-scalepenalty if their annual mean performance deteriorates below 4.1. If their annual mean scores fall below3.6, companies will be liable for the full penalty <strong>of</strong> 0.25 per cent <strong>of</strong> revenue. There will be a smallreward <strong>of</strong> 0.05 per cent <strong>of</strong> revenue for those companies with annual mean scores greater than 4.5.36Council <strong>of</strong> European Energy Regulators – Ref: C05-QOS-01-03