Third Benchmarking Report on Quality of Electricity Supply

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In Sweden, a quality of supply index is calculated for every company using a network performanceassessment model (see Additional Information 2.4). The regulator observes the change in thisindex from year to year and investigates any companies that present a persistently low quality ofsupply over a period of few years. Companies below the lower quality boundary can be checkedfor quality issues, regardless of the company’s performance from a tariff regulation point of view.Spain does not have an incentive/penalty regime yet, but it has set system-level continuity standards,which are not only evaluated as average levels in a given territory but aimed at identifyingworst-served areas in that region. Standards are set on TIEPI, 80th percentile TIEPI, and NIEPI,and differentiated by density areas. Distribution companies experiencing difficulties in maintainingthe quality required in certain areas are given the opportunity to submit, to the competent administration,a temporary action programme describing the problems that need to be corrected. Thoseprogrammes will be included in a quality improvement plan financed through the tariff. Specialplans have been implemented since 2004 and the amount of expenses recovered through thismechanism has been quite large so far: for 2004 special plans received a budget of 50 million,increased to 80 million for 2005.Incentive/penalty schemes have in most cases the same duration as the price control period (4 or5 years) and in a few cases have no predetermined duration. All schemes are periodicallyreviewed: in the first case, with the same frequency as the tariff, in the second at the regulator’sdiscretion. When the review is performed at the same time as the tariff adjustment it should beeasier to separate the expected level of continuity (remunerated via the base tariff) from theimprovements, financed via the incentive scheme.2.3.2 Indicators used for incentive/penalty regimesThe indicators included in the incentive schemes are usually one or two (in some cases SAIDIonly; in other cases both SAIDI and SAIFI; occasionally ENS, Energy Not Supplied) and concernlong interruptions. Until 2005, Hungary monitored several indicators, but it is planning to use onlythree starting in 2006 (Table 2.7).In some cases the indicator includes only unplanned interruptions, in others also planned ones.In the latter case, planned interruptions are usually not given the same weight as unplanned ones.In Great Britain, where the regulator found evidence from a customer survey that their impact isabout half that of unplanned interruptions, they have been counted with a 0.5 discount factorsince 2005. In Norway their reduced impact on consumers is taken into account in the incentiverate, which is lower than the incentive rate for unplanned outages (but more than half of it).Planned interruptions in Norway were evaluated using data from a customer survey (i.e. in thesame manner as unplanned interruptions, see paragraph 2.3.4). In any case is important to beaware of the fact that a scheme that allows companies to gain higher revenues by reducingplanned interruptions, on the one hand, can induce companies to adopt a more efficient maintenanceprogram or, on the other hand, may create a long term risk due to insufficient maintenanceof the network. This may be especially true if the company is close to its target halfway or threequartersof the way through the year: the company may choose to defer planned work.41<strong>Third</strong> <strong>Benchmarking</strong> <strong>Report</strong> on Quality of Electricity Supply – 2005 · Chapter 2
TABLE 2.7INDICATORS USED FOR INCENTIVE/PENALTY SCHEMESIndicatorsPlannedExclusionsRolling averageGBCIs: number of customers interruptedper 100 customers,CML: average number of customerminutes lost per customerIncluded in CML and CIs with 50%weighting from 2005exceptional events; separateregulatory mechanism(see Additional information 2.6)NoHUNetwork Security (NS) indicators:Outage rate, Number of MV faults pergrid length, Average repair time of MVnetwork, Average number of LVgrouped faults. Continuity of Supply(CS) indicators, SAIDI, SAIFI,Percentage of interruptions restoredwithin 3 and within 24 hrsExcludedNS: noCS: yesYes: threeyear rollingaverageIESAIDI and Losses (SAIFI being addedfrom 2006)Includeddays with daily SAIDI with deviationlarger than twice the standarddeviation from the meanNoITSAIDIExcludedforce majeure and externalcauses; Statistical methodYes: two yearrolling averageNOENS Energy Not SuppliedIncluded in the incentive regulation(evaluated separately)Yes (exceptional events can beevaluated upon request by thecompany)NoPTENS Energy Not Supplied, which isdetermined on the basis of TIEPI(indicator of frequency of interruptionweighted with the installed power in MV)Excludedforce majeure, public interest,service reasons, safety reasons,agreements with the customer,facts attributable to the customer.NoSESAIDI, SAIFIIncluded in the incentive(evaluated separately)Force majeureNoAs far as exclusions are concerned, all countries have a criterion for excluding events due to“force majeure”, or exceptional events however defined. In Sweden the regulator used to includethe events caused by faults on the transmission system. The interruptions due to the Swedishblackout of 2003 were removed on an exceptional basis. A law is currently under discussion thatwould eventually lead to exclusion of events due to the transmission system. In Norway, NVE may(based on applications from the network companies) find acceptable reasons for exemptions fromthe incentive regime (for instance, extremely bad weather), but this has not happened in the period2001-2005. In Italy and Portugal, consumers’ damages are excluded from the company’s liability(although, in Italy, from 2005 distribution companies are free to choose to include them in theregulation and in this case targets are reviewed accordingly). It should be clear that all approachesare acceptable as long as the causes of interruptions that are included in the regulated indicatorare included also in the calculation of the target chosen for the incentive scheme, otherwisethere is a risk of misjudging the difference between actual quality levels and quality standards.42Council of European Energy Regulators – Ref: C05-QOS-01-03
Page 1: Council ofEuropeanEnergyRegulatorsT
Page 4: Council ofEuropeanEnergyRegulatorsE
Page 10: CHAPTER 1 - Continuity of SupplyCON
Page 13 and 14: ··utes are defined as “short in
Page 15 and 16: interruptions is very small. AIT is
Page 17 and 18: Interruptions shorter than three mi
Page 19 and 20: 1.6.1 Weighting methods used for co
Page 21 and 22: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.3 - NOTICE
Page 23 and 24: and in Italy the integration of the
Page 25 and 26: 1.6.3 Rules for recording short int
Page 27 and 28: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.8 - AUDITS
Page 29: SAIDI1.7.1 Unplanned SAIDI not attr
Page 34 and 35: FIG 1.7 UNPLANNED INTERRUPTIONS Sho
Page 36: ···There is some evidence to sup
Page 40 and 41: THE USE OF STANDARDS AND INCENTIVES
Page 42 and 43: 2.2.1 Continuity measurement system
Page 44 and 45: Almost all countries having adopted
Page 46 and 47: 2.2.3 Findings I: Quality measureme
Page 48 and 49: The incentive is symmetric and rela
Page 52 and 53: Regulators’ concern with the vola
Page 54 and 55: In Great Britain the regulator (Ofg
Page 56 and 57: ··A regime to avoid overquality i
Page 58 and 59: ··gets”; introduction of an upp
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Page 72: introduce single-customer standards
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Page 82 and 83: TABLE 3.5MOST FREQUENTLY USED COMME
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step. CEER recommends that member s
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CHAPTER 4 - Voltage Quality Monitor
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For the rest of the voltage quality
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·In Czech Republic a monitoring sy
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tion point of single customers: in
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 4.2 - POWER
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ator must advise clients connected
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 4.3 - CUSTOM
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mandatory such values are applicabl
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ANNEXES - ANNEX TO CHAPTER 1.Sectio
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Appendix - BELGIUM - Wallonia1. Acc
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(CONTINUE) SECTION 2 - PLANNED INTE
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TABLE 3.4 - UNPLANNED INTERRUPTIONS
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TABLE 3.10 - ENERGY NOT SUPPLIED AS
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TABLE 4.2 - VOLTAGE LEVEL ANALYSIS
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The classification of continuity da
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The same pattern emerges with the i
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2.Annex 2.1 - Comp
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Quest.2.1.18Supp.0Recomm.✰✰DSO5
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Quest.1.1.9Supp.0Recomm.✰✰✰DS
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3.3.10.4 HungarySupply level in the
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TABLE 3.2INDICATORS1.1.1. Average w
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TABLE 3.3.AINDICATORS2.1.1. Respond
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TABLE 3.3.BINDICATORS2.1.1.Respondi
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TABLE 3.4INDICATORSAustriaBg Flande
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TABLE 3.6 ESTIMATING CHARGES (WORKI
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TABLE 3.10 CONNECTING (SUPPLY AND M
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TABLE 3.14 AVERAGE TIME TO PROVIDE
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TABLE 3.18 METER PROBLEMS (WORKING
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TABLE 3.22 RESPONSE TO CUSTOMER LET
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TABLE 3.27 AVERAGE WAITING TIME IN
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TABLE 3.32 NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS PER
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TABLE 3.38PREPAYMENT METER FAULT (W
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TABLE 3.43NUMBER OF REVISED BILLS P
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 4.ANNEX 4.1 Voltag
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TABLE 2: NORWAY: Flicker severity l
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TABLE 5: PORTUGAL: for EHV and HV,
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