JSOU Report 12-5In May 1967, Gowon’s adm<strong>in</strong>istration unveiled a plan to create a new12-state structure for <strong>Nigeria</strong>. Among <strong>the</strong> most significant changes was that<strong>the</strong> eastern region would be divided <strong>in</strong>to three states, two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m dom<strong>in</strong>atedby non-Igbo groups, ensur<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Igbo would not dom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong> oil-richNiger Delta region. The Igbo rejected <strong>the</strong>se proposed constitutional revisionsand <strong>in</strong>sisted on full autonomy for <strong>the</strong> east. Then on 27 May 1967, LieutenantColonel Emeka Ojukwu—<strong>the</strong> military governor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eastern region anda leader <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Igbo secessionist movement—declared <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> region, which adopted as its new name <strong>the</strong> “Republic <strong>of</strong> Biafra,” and aviolent civil war ensued. Biafran forces crossed <strong>the</strong> Niger River, mov<strong>in</strong>gwest <strong>in</strong> an effort to capture Lagos, <strong>the</strong> capital <strong>of</strong> <strong>Nigeria</strong> at <strong>the</strong> time. Gowon’smilitary drove <strong>the</strong>m back, imposed a naval blockade, and launched its own<strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Biafra. Although France granted formal recognitionto <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Republic <strong>of</strong> Biafra and provided military support to <strong>the</strong>rebels, <strong>the</strong> United K<strong>in</strong>gdom backed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Nigeria</strong>n federal government, andby January 1970 <strong>the</strong> Biafran revolt had been crushed and <strong>Nigeria</strong>n forcesdeclared victory <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> civil war.More than 2 million <strong>Nigeria</strong>ns died <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict, which formally endedon 12 January 1970 with a declaration <strong>of</strong> surrender over Biafran radio byMajor General Philip Effiong. <strong>Nigeria</strong>n President Gowon announced hewould rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> power for six more years to ensure a peaceful transitionto democracy. However, <strong>in</strong> 1974 Gowon announced that <strong>the</strong> return to civilianrule would be postponed <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>itely. His tim<strong>in</strong>g was poor: high prices,chronic shortages <strong>of</strong> food and necessities, grow<strong>in</strong>g corruption, and <strong>the</strong> failure<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government to address several regional issues had already createda restless mood.As a result, on 29 July 1975, Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed overthrewGowon <strong>in</strong> a bloodless coup. Muhammed moved quickly to addressissues that Gowon had avoided. He replaced corrupt state governors, purged<strong>in</strong>competent and corrupt members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public services, and <strong>in</strong>stigated aplan to move <strong>the</strong> national capital from <strong>in</strong>dustrial, coastal Lagos to neglected,<strong>in</strong>terior Abuja. Civilian rule, he declared, would be restored by 1979, andhe began a five-stage process <strong>of</strong> transition. However, subsequent politicaland economic reforms made Muhammed extremely unpopular with many<strong>Nigeria</strong>ns, and on 13 February 1976, he was assass<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> a coup attempt,although his adm<strong>in</strong>istration rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> power. His successor, LieutenantGeneral Olusegun Obasanjo, cont<strong>in</strong>ued Muhammed’s reforms, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g22
Forest: <strong>Boko</strong> <strong>Haram</strong><strong>the</strong> move toward civilian rule. Obasanjo also created seven new states tohelp redistribute wealth and began a massive reform <strong>of</strong> local government. In1977, he convened a constitutional assembly, which recommended replac<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> British-style parliamentary system with an American-style presidentialsystem <strong>of</strong> separate executive and legislative branches. To ensure thatcandidates would appeal to ethnic groups beyond <strong>the</strong>ir own, <strong>the</strong> presidentand vice president were required to w<strong>in</strong> at least 25 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> vote <strong>in</strong> atleast two-thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 19 states. The new constitution took effect <strong>in</strong> 1979.The restructured adm<strong>in</strong>istration was called <strong>Nigeria</strong>’s Second Republic, anda subsequent presidential election that year was won by Shehu Shagari. Forhis part, Obasanjo won considerable acclaim when he became <strong>Nigeria</strong>’s firstmilitary leader to voluntarily surrender power to a civilian adm<strong>in</strong>istration<strong>in</strong> 1979.Unfortunately, a few years later <strong>Nigeria</strong> experienced yet ano<strong>the</strong>r militarycoup. The collapse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world oil market left <strong>Nigeria</strong> unable to pay itsshort-term debts, much less f<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>the</strong> projects to which it was committed.Eventually, <strong>the</strong> country was also unable to import essential goods. In January1983, <strong>the</strong> government ordered <strong>the</strong> expulsion <strong>of</strong> all unskilled foreigners,claim<strong>in</strong>g that immigrants who had overstayed <strong>the</strong>ir visas were heavily<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> crime and were tak<strong>in</strong>g jobs from <strong>Nigeria</strong>ns. In <strong>the</strong> elections <strong>of</strong>1983, <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party claimed a decisive victory over several oppositionparties, while observers cited widespread <strong>in</strong>stances <strong>of</strong> fraud and <strong>in</strong>timidation.F<strong>in</strong>ally, on New Year’s Eve 1983, army <strong>of</strong>ficers led by Major GeneralMuhammadu Buhari overthrew <strong>the</strong> Shagari government <strong>in</strong> a bloodlesscoup. Buhari’s government enjoyed widespread public support for its condemnation<strong>of</strong> economic mismanagement, <strong>of</strong> government corruption, and <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> rigged 1983 elections. This support waned, however, as <strong>the</strong> governmentadopted a rigid program <strong>of</strong> economic austerity and <strong>in</strong>stituted repressivepolicies that <strong>in</strong>cluded a sweep<strong>in</strong>g campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st “<strong>in</strong>discipl<strong>in</strong>e,” a prohibitionaga<strong>in</strong>st discuss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> country’s political future, and <strong>the</strong> detention<strong>of</strong> journalists and o<strong>the</strong>rs critical <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government.Buhari’s support wi<strong>the</strong>red and <strong>in</strong> August 1985, Major General IbrahimBabangida overthrew him, resc<strong>in</strong>ded several <strong>of</strong> Buhari’s most unpopulardecrees, <strong>in</strong>itiated a public debate on <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy, and easedcontrols over bus<strong>in</strong>ess. These actions set <strong>the</strong> stage for negotiations with<strong>the</strong> International Monetary Fund (IMF) for aid, a new round <strong>of</strong> austeritymeasures, and better relations with <strong>the</strong> country’s creditors. For a time,23
- Page 3: On the cover: Residents inspect a p
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- Page 13 and 14: About the AuthorJames J.F. Forest,
- Page 15 and 16: PrefaceThe Islamic sect Boko Haram
- Page 17: AcknowledgmentsProducing this resea
- Page 21 and 22: Forest: Boko Haramfactions as “ev
- Page 23 and 24: Forest: Boko Haramdescribes grievan
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JSOU Report 12-5devotees remain com
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JSOU Report 12-5governance by Shari
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JSOU Report 12-5Coordinator, noted
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JSOU Report 12-5Given the statement
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JSOU Report 12-5In truth, most Nige
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JSOU Report 12-5to AQIM, was a spli
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JSOU Report 12-5must also address t
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JSOU Report 12-5Nigeria’s future
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JSOU Report 12-5Networks news servi
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JSOU Report 12-5Haram and disrupt i
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JSOU Report 12-5officials, a writte
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JSOU Report 12-5electricity—and m
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JSOU Report 12-5the amnesty are:
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JSOU Report 12-5state and nonstate
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JSOU Report 12-5who have come befor
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JSOU Report 12-5or religious commun
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JSOU Report 12-5understand the beha
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Forest: Boko HaramBibliographyAdeso
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Forest: Boko HaramCragin, Kim and S
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Forest: Boko HaramHamill, Todd J. R
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Forest: Boko HaramLast, Murray. 200
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Forest: Boko HaramOsaghae, Eghosa.
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Forest: Boko HaramTerrorism: Psycho
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Forest: Boko HaramAppendix A: Recen
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Forest: Boko Haram----------April 9
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Forest: Boko Haram-------------mili
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Forest: Boko Haram----------October
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Forest: Boko HaramAppendix B: Addit
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Forest: Boko HaramU.S. House of Rep
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Forest: Boko HaramConflict Studies
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Forest: Boko HaramOdinkalu, Chidi A
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Forest: Boko HaramEndnotes1. Mike O
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Forest: Boko Haram25. John Horgan,
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Forest: Boko Haram58. John Campbell
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Forest: Boko Haram100.101.102.103.I
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Forest: Boko Haram131. Portions of
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Forest: Boko Haram162.edited by Waf
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Forest: Boko Haramphp?option=com_co
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Forest: Boko Haram214. Atika Balal,
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Forest: Boko Haram248.Paul Ohia, Mi
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Forest: Boko Haram273. UN Office fo
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Forest: Boko Haram312. Eric Rosand,
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Forest: Boko Haram339. Jessica Glic
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Forest: Boko Haramafrica-13724349;
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Forest: Boko Haram388. “Nigerian