Economic Science and the Austrian Method_3

Hans-Hermann Hoppepropositions are not, and cannot be, categoricall~ or a prioritrue, as our intuition informs us they are. If, however, thebasic empiricist premise were assumed to be categoricallytrue itself, i.e., if we assume that one could say somethinga priori true about the way events are related, then thiswould belie its very own thesis that empirical knowledgemust invariably be hypothetical knowledge, thus makingroom for a discipline such as economics claiming to producea priori valid empirical knowledge. Further, the empiricistthesis that economic phenomena must be conceived of asobservable and measurable magnitudes-analogous tothose ofthe natural sciences-is rendered inconclusive, too,on its own account: For, obviousl~ empiricism wants toprovide us with meaningful empirical knowledge when itinforms us that our economic concepts are grounded inobservations. And yet, the concepts of observation andmeasurement themselves, which empiricism must employ inclaiming what it does, are both obviously not derived fromobservational experience in the sense that concepts such ashens and eggs or apples and pears are. One cannot observesomeone making an observation or measurement. Rather,one must first understand what observations and measurementsare in order to then be able to interpret certainobservable phenomena as the making of an observation orthe taking of a measurement. Thus, contrary to its owndoctrine, empiricism is compelled to admit that there isempirical knowledge which is based on understanding-justas according to our intuitions economic propositions claimto be based on understanding-rather than on observations.4747For an elaborate defense of epistemological dualism see also Apel, 1Yansformationdcr Philosophic) 2 vals. and Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften.The Ludwig van Mises Institute • 57