Economic Science and the Austrian Method_3

Recommendations

Info

Hans-Hennann Hoppenow turn to my second goal: the explanation of why andhow praxeology also provides the foundation for e_pistemolo~Mises had been aware ofthis and he was convinced ofthegreat importance ofthis insight for rationalist philosophy: YetMises did not treat the matter in a systematic fashion. Thereare no more than a few briefremarks concerning this problem,interspersed throughout his massive body ofwriting.53 Thus,in the following I must try to break new ground.I shall begin my explanation by introducing a second apriori axiom and clarifying its relation to the axiom ofaction. Such an understanding is the key to solving ourproblem. The second axiom is the so-called "a priori ofargumentation," which states that humans are capable ofargumentation and hence know the meaning of truth andvalidity:54 As in the case of the action axiom, this knowledgeis not derived from observation: there is only verbal behaviorto be observed and prior reflective cognition is required inorder to interpret such behavior as meaningful arguments.And the validity ofthe axiom, like that ofthe action axiom,is indisputable. It is impossible to deny that one can argue,as the very denial would itself be an argument. In fact, one53Mises writes: "Knowledge is a tool of action. Its function is to advise manhow to proceed in his endeavor to remove uneasiness.... The category ofactionis the fundamental category of human knowledge. It implies all the categories oflogic and the category of regularity and causality. It implies the category of timeand that of value.... In acting, the mind ofthe individual sees itself as differentfrom its environment, the external world, and tries to study this environment inorder to influence the course ofevents happening in it" (The Ultimate FoundationofEconomic Science, pp. 35-36). Or: "Both, apriori thinking and reasoning on theone hand and human action on the other, are manifestations of the mind....Reason and action are congeneric and homogeneous, two aspects of the samephenomenon" (ibid., p.42). Yet he leaves the matter more or less at this andconcludes that "it is not the scope of praxeology to investigate the relation ofthinking and action" (Human Action, p. 25).540n the a priori of argumentation see also K. O. Apel, 1Yansfonnation derPhilosophie, vol. 2.The Ludwig von Mises Institute • 65
Economic Science and the Austrian Methodcould not even silently say to oneself "1 cannot argue"without thereby contradicting oneself. One cannot arguethat one cannot argue. Nor can one dispute knowing whatit means to make a truth or validity claim without implicitlyclaiming the negation of this proposition to be true.It is not difficult to detect that both a priori axioms-ofaction and argumentation-are intimately related. On theone hand, actions are more fundamental than argumentationswith whose existence the idea of validity emerges, asargumentation is only a subclass of action. On the otherhand, to recognize what has just been recognized regardingaction and argumentation and their relation to each otherrequires argumentation, and so, in this sense, argumentationmust be considered more fundamental than action: withoutargumentation nothing could be said to be known aboutaction. But then, as it is in argumentation that the insightis revealed that-while it might not be known to be so priorto any argumentation-in fact the possibility ofargumentationpresupposes action in that validity claims can only beexplicitly discussed in the course ofan argumentation iftheindividuals doing so already know what it means to act andto have knowledge implied in action-both the meaning ofaction in general and argumentation in particular must bethought of as logically necessary interwoven strands of apriori knowledge.What this insight into the interrelation between the apriori ofaction and the a priori ofargumentation suggests isthe following: Traditionall)', the task ofepistemology has beenconceived of as that of formulating what can be known tobe true a priori and also what can be known a priori not tobe the subject ofa priori knowledge. Recognizing, as we havejust done, that knowledge claims are raised and decided uponin the course of argumentation and that this is undeni~bly66 • The Ludwig von Mises Institute
Page 2:
ECONOMIC SCIENCEAND THEAUSTRIAN MET
Page 5 and 6:
All rights reserved. Written permis
Page 8:
PREFACEIt was a tragic day when eco
Page 11 and 12:
Economic Science and the Austrian M
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18: Economic Science and the Austrian M
Page 67: Economic Science and the Austrian M
Page 90 and 91: INDEXAlbert, H., 10Andreski, St., 5
Page 92: ABOUT THE AUTHORHans..Hermann Hoppe
show all

Economic Science and the Austrian Method_3

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?