Economic Science and the Austrian Method_3

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Hans-Hermann Hoppeto the empiricistmodelofa passive, mirror-like mind in thetradition of Locke and Hume. According to rationalist philosoph~a priori true propositions had their foundation in theoperation of principles of thinking which one could not possiblyconceive ofas operating otherwise; they were grounded incategories ofan act;ive mind. No\\) as empiricists were only tooeager to point out, the obvious critique of such a position is,that ifthis were indeed the case, it could not be explained whysuch mental categories should fit realit¥ Rather, one would beforced to accept the absurd idealistic assumption that realitywould have to be conceived of as a creation of the mind, inorder to claim that a priori knowledge could incorporate anyinformation about the structure of reali~ And clearl~ such anassertion seemed to be justified when faced with programmaticstatements of rationalist philosophers such as the followingby Kant: "Sofar ithas been assumed thatourknowledgehad to conform to realit:)r," instead it should be assumed "thatobservational reality should conform to our mind."s6Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrainedby its role in the framework of action categoriesprovides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon asthis is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist phi10sophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that apriori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemologyinstead. Understood as constrained by action categories,the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mentalon the one hand and the real, outside physical world on theother is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must56Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen vernunft, p. 25. Whether or not such aninterpretation ofKant's epistemology is indeed correct is, ofcourse, a very differentmatter. Clarifying this problem is, however, of no concern here. For an activist orconstructivist interpretation ofKantian philosophy see E Kambartel, Erfahrung undStruktur, chapter 3; also Hoppe, Handeln und Erkennen (Bern: Lang, 1976).The Ludwig von Mises Institute • 69
Economic Science and the Austrian Methodbe as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure ofreali~ since it is only through actions that the mind comesinto contact with reality; so to speak. Acting is a cognitivelyguided adjustment ofa physical body in physical realit)T. Andthus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceivedof as an insight into the structural constraints imposedon knowledge qua knowledge ofactors, must indeedcorrespond to the nature of things. The realistic characterofsuch knowledge would manifest itselfnot only in the factthat one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the factthat one could not undo its truth.Yet there are more specific implications involved in recognizingthe praxeological foundations ofepistemology-apartfrom the general one that in substituting the model of themind of an actor acting by means of a physical body for thetraditional rationalist model ofan active mind a priori knowledgeimmediately becomes realistic knowledge (so realisticindeed that it can be understood as being literally notundoable). More specificall)T, in light of this insight decisivesupport is given to those deplorably few rationalist philosopherswho-against the empiricist Zeitgeist-stubbornlymaintain on various philosophical fronts that a priori truepropositions about the real world are possible. 57 Moreover, in571n addition to the works mentioned in note 46 see Brand Blanshard, TheNature-of Thought (London: Allen and Unwin, 1921); M. Cohen, Reason andNature (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1931); idem, Preface to Logic (New York:Holt, 1944); A. Pap, Semantics and Necessary Jruth (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1958); S. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in D. Davidson and G. Harman,eds., Semantics ofNatural Language (New York: Reidel, 1972); H. Dingler, DieErgreifung des Wirklichen (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1969); idem, Aufbau derexakten Fundamentalwissenschaft (Munich: Eidos, 1964); W KamIah and P. Lorenzen,Logische Propiideutik Mannheim: (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut,1968); P. Lorenzen, Methodisches Denken (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1968); idem,Nonnative Logic and Ethics (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1969); K. O.Apel, Transformation der Philosophie.70 • The Ludwig von Mises Institute
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ECONOMIC SCIENCEAND THEAUSTRIAN MET
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PREFACEIt was a tragic day when eco
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Economic Science and the Austrian M
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Page 92: ABOUT THE AUTHORHans..Hermann Hoppe
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Economic Science and the Austrian Method_3

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