Economic Science and the Austrian Method_3

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Hans-Hermann Hoppelight of the recognition of praxeological constraints on thestructure of knowledge these various rationalist endeavorsbecome systematically integrated into one, unified body ofrationalist philosophy;In explicitly understanding knowledge as displayed inargumentation as a peculiar category of action, it becomesclear immediately why the perennial rationalist claim thatthe laws oflogic-beginning here with the most fundamentalones, i.e., ofpropositional logic and ofJunctors ("and," "or,""if-then," "not") and Quantors ("there is," "all," "some")-area priori true propositions about reality and not mere verbalstipulations regarding the transformation rules of arbitrarilychosen signs, as empiricist-formalists would have it, is indeedcorrect. They are as much laws of thinking as of reality;because they are laws that have their ultimate foundation inaction and could not be undone by any actor. Ineach and everyaction, an actor identifies some specific situation and categorizesit one way rather than another in order to be able to makea choice. It is this which ultimately explains the structure ofeven the most elementary propositions (like "Socrates is aman") consisting ofa proper name or some identifying expressionfor the naming or identifying ofsomething, and a predicateto assert or deny some specific property of the named oridentified object; and which explains the cornerstones oflogic:the laws of identity and contradiction. And it is this universalfeature of action and choosing which also explains our understandingof the categories "there is," "all" and, by implication,"some," as well as "and," "or," "if.then" and "not."S8 One can say,580n rationalist interpretations of logic see Blanshard, Reason and Analysis,chapters 6, 10; P. Lorenzen, Einfuhrung in die operative Logik und Mathematik(Frankfun/M.: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1970); K. Lorenz, Elemente derSprachkritik (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1970); idem, "Diedialogische Rechtfertigungder effektiven Logik," in: E Kambartel and ]. Mittelstrass, eds., Zum normativenFundament der Wissenschaft (Frankfurt/M.: Athenaum, 1973).The Ludwig von Mises Institute • 71
Economic Science and the Austrian Methodofcourse, that something can be "a" and "non-a" at the sametime, or that "and" means this rather than something else. Butone cannot undo the law of contradiction; and one cannotundo the real definition of "and." For simply by virtue ofacting with a physical body in physical space we invariablyaffirm the law of contradiction and invariably display ourtrue constructive knowledge of the meaning of "and" and"or."Similarly; the ultimate reason for arithmetic's being ana priori and yet empirical discipline, as rationalists haveOn the propositional character oflanguage and experience, in particular, seeW KamIah and P. Lorenzen, Logische Propiideutik, chapter 1; P. Lorenzen, NormativeLogic and Ethics, chapter 1. Lorenzen writes: "I call a usage a convention if Iknow ofanother usage which 1 could accept instead.·... However, I do not knowofanother behavior which could replace the use ofelementary sentences. IfI didnot accept proper names and predicators, I would not know how to speak at all.. . . Each proper name is a convention ... but to use proper names at all is nota convention: it is a unique pattern oflinguistic behavior. Therefore, I am goingto call it 'logical'. The same is true with predicators. Each predicator is aconvention. This is shown by the existence of more than one natural language.But all languages use predicators" (ibid., p. 16). See also J. Mittelstrass, "DieWiederkehr des Gleichen," Ratio (1966).On the law of identity and contradiction, in particular, see B. Blanshard,Reason and Analysis, pp. 276ff, 423ff.On a critical evaluation of 3- or more-valued logics as either meaninglesssymbolic formalisms or as logically presupposing an understanding of the traditionaltwo-valued logic see W Stegmiiller, HauptstrOmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophievol. 2 (Stuttgart: Kroner, 1975), pp. 182-91; B. Blanshard, Reason and Analysis,pp. 269-75. Regarding, for instance, the many-valued or open-textured logic,proposed by E Waismann, Blanshard notes: "We can only agree with Dr. Waismann-andwith Hegel-that the black-and-white distinctions offormal logic arequite inadequate to living thought. But why should one say, as Dr.Waismann does,that in adopting a more differentiated logic one is adopting an alternative systemwhich is incompatible with black-and-white logic? What he has actually done isto recognize a number of gradations within the older meaning ofthe word 'not'.We do not doubt that such gradations are there, and indeed as many more as hecares to distinguish. But a refinement ofthe older logic is not an abandonment ofit. It is still true that the colour I saw yesterday was either a determinate shade ofyellow or not, even though the 'not' may cover a multitude of approximations,and even though I shall never know which was the shade I saw" (ibid., pp.273-74).72 • The Ludwig von Mises Institute
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ECONOMIC SCIENCEAND THEAUSTRIAN MET
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PREFACEIt was a tragic day when eco
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Economic Science and the Austrian M
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Page 92: ABOUT THE AUTHORHans..Hermann Hoppe
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Economic Science and the Austrian Method_3

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