Soft Power of Defence Diplomacy: A New Approach ... - ISIS Malaysia

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10also highly specialized in civilian professions. In the long run, this development holdthe possibility of undermining institutional coherence since specialization usuallyaccentuate tensions between different professional objectives and demands that couldlead to an opening up of the military. 33The age of Hybrid Wars is creating a Hybrid Officer who is a soldier-diplomat. In thedomain of security cooperation, just as the State Department has increased its corps ofPolitical Advisers (POLAD) to regional combatant commanders (for diplomaticcontrol of the military), the military services have increased their Foreign AreaOfficers (FAO) programs in embassies. 34 In conflict zones, the soldier-diplomat isalso referred to as the guerrilla diplomats. 35The second feature is the enlargement of the battlefield into a broader battlespace orbattlesphere which involved “the judicialization of war and the weaponization of law”with law now shaping the institutional, logistical and physical landscape of war. Lawcan often accomplish what was once achieved through the use of physical force:seizure and securing of territory, sending a message about resolve and politicalseriousness, even break the will of a political opponent. The US military lawyers havebecome an increasingly importance player in the planning and conduct of war at thetactical, operational and strategic levels through strategic lawyering. 36 Meanwhile, theMyanmar military junta is trying to achieve such objectives with its adoption of a newstate constitution and the restricted election laws promulgated for holding theupcoming elections in 2010 which is to legitimize military control under the guise ofcivilian rule and keep the opposition democratic groups, especially the NationalLeague of Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi in check. 37The increasing political literacy of US officer corps at large in the form of militarygovernance or strategic lawyering is being acquired through a haphazard selfeducationand against the backdrop of increasing frustration against the political class.In the current context marked by a deepening financial crisis and two never-endingwars, the possibility of a coup by the military cannot be ruled out. 38Engaging Myanmar Through Defence Diplomacy33 Nyein, Susanne Prager, Expanding Military, Shrinking Citizenry and the New Constitution in Burma,Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 39, No. 4, November 2009, pp. 645-646.34 Corn, Tony, From War Manager to Soldier Diplomats: The Coming Revolution in Civil MilitaryRelations, Small Wars Journal, June 30, 2009., 12 June 201035 Copeland, Daryl, Evan H. Potter, Public Diplomacy in Conflict Zones: Military InformationOperations Meet Political Counter-Insurgency, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 3, No.3, October2008.36 Corn, Tony, From War Manager to Soldier Diplomats: The Coming Revolution in Civil MilitaryRelations, Small Wars Journal, June 30, 2009., 12 June 2010.37 McCartan, Brian, Decision time for Myanmar’s opposition, Asia Times Online, March 27, 2010., 12 June 2010.38 Corn, Tony, From War Manager to Soldier Diplomats: The Coming Revolution in Civil MilitaryRelations, Small Wars Journal, June 30, 2009., 12 June 2010.
11The United StatesThe US has in fact maintained military ties with the Myanmar regime since 1988through its defence attaches at the embassy, though without giving aid. 39 Recentmilitary-to-military engagement with Myanmar was limited to facilitating delivery ofaid to the Myanmar people in response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. The recentlycompleted US government policy review and subsequent high level visits have notaltered US PACOM military engagement with Myanmar and it remains non-existentas a matter of policy. However, whenever US policy allow, US PACOM is preparedto reengage in a military-to-military dialogue with the Myanmar military junta. 40 TheUS Department of Defence is looking at the possibility of resuming InternationalMilitary Education and Training (IMET) programs with Myanmar if circumstancesimprove to the degree this is feasible and desirable. 41 A more realistic policy is toadopt a non-provocative defence policy which encourage a high degree of peacetimemilitary cooperation and confidence building by relying more on perceptions tocommunicate benign intent. 42ASEANMilitary IMET training via proxy through an ASEAN partner which in turn holdsclose ties with the US and the West using the strategy of indirect approach to affectthe mentality and professionalism of the Myanmar military elite is another viableoption. An Indonesian initiative of taking responsibility in training the Myanmar army,the Tatmadaw to establish a higher level of professionalism, is an alternative to directbilateral defence diplomacy between the US and the West with Myanmar due to thepolitical sensitivity involved. It would be less sensitive for the military of a SoutheastAsian country to conduct such training and also in their interest due to the objective ofthe ASEAN Charter to increase regional cooperation, especially with the formation ofthe ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM). Training the trainers (TenteraNasional Indonesia (TNI)) who in turn will be conducting training for the Tatmadawwould see the US and the West acting via proxy with ASEAN as the channel ofinfluence in promoting gradual reform through defence diplomacy. This is because it39 International Crisis Group, Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World, Asia Report No.28, December 7, 2001, p. 14.40 Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, US Navy Commander US Pacific Command Before theSenate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture, March 19, 2009., 12 June 2010;Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, US Navy Commander US Pacific Command Before theSenate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture, March 24, 2010.,12 June 2010.41 Kingston, Jeff, After the Whirlwind: Post-Nargis Burma, the 2010 Elections and Prospects forReform, Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 10-1-09, March 4, 2009.42 Roggeveen, Sam, A Non-Provocative Defence Posture for Australia. Lowy Institute Perspective,December 2008., 12 June 2010.
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