Soft Power of Defence Diplomacy: A New Approach ... - ISIS Malaysia

More documents

Recommendations

Info

2The Myanmar ImpasseHistorically, political development and democracy in Myanmar have been held backby a tendency for the country to dissolve into chaos and confusion when it is not heldtogether by a firm rule. The abolition or collapse of Burma’s military forces wouldcertainly lead to chaos and anarchy, ceding power to a variety of militias andorganized banditry. Therefore, it should be a fundamental objective of transition inMyanmar to retain as much as centrally controlled military and police force asnecessary to maintain law and order. This is why the military must participate inreform for it to succeed. 1The political problem was how to organize time to yield will. Greatness of a policy ismeasured by the mastery of the chronopolitical dimension in the course of policyimplementation instead of by the breadth of a geopolitical vision or the boldness of itsgoal or objectives. Time, the most neglected strategic dimension involving duration,sequencing, timing, tempo, and also memory have eluded politicians andpolicymakers whose timelines rarely extend beyond the 24/7 news cycle, quarterlyreports and elections cycle. 2 This can be seen in the context of Myanmar with theimpatience for change among the US and its Western allies. Therefore, reform has tobe based on gradualism emphasizing staying power rather than speed as an approachfocusing on: 3• Reform through relief• Democracy through development• Change through continuityThree variables related to the rogue states theory in international relations 4 are crucialto the better understanding of the protracted impasse in Myanmar’s current politicalsituation which has dragged on for over 20 years since 1988.First, why do rogues resist the actions of the world community and maintain theirrogue behavior? Rogues resist the various efforts at compellence imposed by the greatpower because they perceive a high threat from a more powerful other with imperialambitions to control and dominate. There is a need to recognize that the implicitassumption in much of the international relations literature that so-called "status quo"powers are conservative, non-threatening, states may not be shared by leaders aroundthe world. Diplomatic isolation, economic embargoes, attempted subversion andmilitary conflict are common elements in the compellence strategies of status quostates. Such behaviors are readily perceived by many leaders and citizens throughoutthe Third World, including the rogue states, as the threatening acts of a state intent onimperial control.1 Clapp, Priscilla, Burma’s Long Road to Democracy, Special Report No. 193. Washington D.C.:United States Institute of Peace, 2007.2 Corn, Tony, World War IV as Fourth-Generation Warfare, Policy Review, No. 000, Web Special,January 2006., 12 June 2010.3 Len, Christopher, Johan Alvin, Burma/Myanmar’s Ailments: Searching for the Right Remedy.Washington D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2007, p. 93.4 Hoyt, Paul D., Rogue States and International Relations Theory, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 20,No. 2, Fall 2000., 12 June 2010.
3In this circumstance the extent of public involvement is generally very high and thetone is hostile. Seeking to create public support for resistance to the perceivedimperial state, the leaders create a strategic culture based on demonizing the externalthreat. Resistance by the rogue to the imperial state is thus seen as the only availableoption. Capitulation is portrayed as tantamount to national suicide given the perceivedthreat posed by the imperial state. It is also politically untenable domestically giventhe embedded strategic culture within the rogue state. This situation leads to acontinuance of previous policies, including efforts to acquire more sophisticatedweapons systems and support for those seen as challenging the dominance of the greatpower and its allies.Second, why do stronger states desist from removing the rogue? The imperial statefaces a different environment. While the rogue state may pose a danger to valuedinterests, it is not an existential threat and thus is scored as a low threat. Also therelative power capabilities is advantageous. Thus while the great power may have thecapacity to eliminate the rogue, there is no strong motivation for undertaking such aforceful action. Should the rogue, at some time, enhance their capability to a pointwhere the threat perception becomes acute, there should be a strong reaction due tothe altered strategic environment and the subsequent expression of public concern.Yet, even at low levels of perceived threat, the great power often maintains amoderately coercive strategy vis-ˆ-vis the rogue states. The critical question here iswhy is Cuba, for example, treated differently (as a rogue requiring sanctions) thanother states in the world which possess similar relative capabilities? This is where therole of the attentive public is crucial. Certain sectors of the domestic population arehighly engaged regarding policy toward particular states. Their influence isheightened during periods of low perceived threat because there are fewer counterinfluences operating. In response to the political power and influence of this attentivepublic the government takes a mid-range policy stance, more coercive than in mostlow threat circumstances, but not at a level of devoting the political and economiccapital necessary to eliminate the rogue.Finally, why does this relationship persist so long? Rogues maintain their resistanceto the imperial state because their perception of high threat from the great power, theyfeel, necessitates resistance. The continued efforts at compellence on the part of theimperial state are taken as incontrovertible evidence of its unending hostility.Accommodation with such a power is unthinkable. Also, the creation of a strategicculture of resistance to the imperialist power limits the political options available tothe leadership even if they came to believe accommodation wise. Confrontationbecomes ingrained.From the great power side, the unwillingness of the rogue to yield is taken as evidenceof their unalterable hostility and aggressive intent, feeding the threat perception.Efforts by the rogue to enhance their power capability are also taken as evidence ofaggressive intent and not as defensive reactionism. However, as long as there is littleexistential threat, there is little governmental or public support for decisive action.The attentive public exerts enough influence to maintain a moderate compellencestance but moves beyond this level are not sanctioned. Thus the actions of both partiescreate a cycle of mistrust and hostility which both sides, perhaps unwittingly,maintain.
Page 1: 1Soft Power of Defence Diplomacy: A
Page 5 and 6: 5unlikely. Since the fall of Presid
Page 7 and 8: 7The activities include programs su
Page 9 and 10: 9development and extremism challeng
Page 11 and 12: 11The United StatesThe US has in fa
Page 13 and 14: 13condone terrorist gatherings on t
Page 15 and 16: 15Appendix 2: US military cooperati
Page 17 and 18: 17Appendix 4: Framework for Analysi
Page 19 and 20: 19BibliographyAlvin, Johan, Democra
Page 21: 21Soe Tin, Policy Dilemmas and Econ

Soft Power of Defence Diplomacy: A New Approach ... - ISIS Malaysia

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?