SECURING FIBRE CHANNEL FABRICS - Brocade

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Chapter 6: FC Security Best Practicesports remain disabled following a reboot or power off cycle. Otherwise,an attacker could simply cause a power failure on a switch to enablethe unused ports.The next line of defense could be to prevent ports from becomingE_Ports. In the event that an unused port is enabled, a switch wouldstill be unable to join the fabric since the port will not be allowed tobecome an E_Port.The next line of defense could be the creation of an ACL, specifying byWWN and/or switch port which devices are allowed to join the fabric.In Brocade fabrics, ACLs are used to control device access to a fabric:• The Switch Connection Control (SCC) policy is used to specify theWWN of the switches allowed to join the fabric.• The Device Connection Control (DCC) policy is used to specifywhich hosts and storage devices are allowed to join the fabric. TheDCC policy can specify members by WWN but it can also lockdown a WWN to a physical port on a switch so that only a specificWWN can connect to a specific port in the fabric, and all otherdevices connecting to that port will not be authorized. This couldbe considered a WWN anti-spoofing countermeasure.The Brocade DCC and SCC policies are also known as fabric-wide consistencypolicies, since they can be distributed throughout an entirefabric and used in two different modes:• In strict mode, all devices participating in the fabric must bedefined in the DCC or SCC policy.• The tolerant mode allows some switches to join the fabric withoutrequiring them to be defined in the ACL. This is useful when thefabric contains switches running older versions of firmware (priorto FOS 5.2.0), which cannot use the FOS DCC and SCC policies.As a best practice, it is advisable to use the strict policy as much aspossible. A fabric is only as secure as its weakest link, and if oneswitch does not participate in an SCC policy then that would be theweak link and easiest target for an attacker.The final and most sophisticated line of defense to prevent deviceaccess is to use a device authentication mechanism. The ANSI T11standard FC-SP (FC security protocol) defines the DH-CHAP protocol forthis purpose. Devices supporting DH-CHAP can be configured with ashared secret between the device and the switch, and only the devicewith the corresponding shared secret will be allowed to join the fabric.(see “Diffie-Hellman” on page 84). On Brocade FC switches, Fibre96 Securing Fibre Channel Fabrics
The Brocade SAN Security ModelChannel Authentication Protocol (FCAP) may also be used but it is notpart of the defined FC standards. FCAP is considered more securethan DH-CHAP since it uses a stronger digital certificate instead of theshared secret used in DH-CHAP.Clearly, it is not necessary to implement every one of these lines ofdefense to prevent FC device access to a fabric. The number of layersan organization decides to implement will depend on their businessrequirements, the sensitivity of the environment, and amount of riskaccepted as tolerable. In reality, very few organizations implement allof these proposed levels of security. It is up to each organization toestablish the risk and decide which features should be implemented.FC Devices Best Practices Summary• Persistently disable unused ports• Prevent switch ports from becoming E_Ports• Use the SCC and DCC policies to restrict device access by WWNand/or by a physical port on a switch• For more sensitive environments, use DH-CHAP to authenticatedevices joining a fabric• Use a strict fabric-wide consistency policy where possible• Distributed/fabric-wide consistency policies: strict vs. tolerantSeparation of DutiesThe principle of separation of duties is used to restrict individuals toperforming only the tasks necessary to perform their work-relatedactivities and nothing more. When a backup administrator is givenadmin privileges on the backup and restore system, this does notimply that he or she should also have the same privileges on other systems.In some cases, a single task requires two or more people tocomplete it (similar to co-signing a check). An extreme example of thisis nuclear missile launch codes, which must be entered by two differentindividuals to launch a nuclear missile. In a less extreme but stillpertinent case in the storage world, requiring more than one person todestroy all of the keys on a key vault would be another example of separationof duties through the use of quorum. Quorum occurs when apre-established consensus from a pool of individuals is required toaccept or perform a task. A typical quorum would be two out of threeor three out of five required persons to authorize a task.Securing Fibre Channel Fabrics 97
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SECURINGFIBRECHANNELFABRICSSECOND E
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SECURINGFIBRECHANNELFABRICSSECOND E
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© 2012 Brocade Communications Syst
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viSecuring Fibre Channel Fabrics
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viiiSecuring Fibre Channel Fabrics
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ContentsChapter 4: Security Basics
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ContentsIsolation and Separation ..
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ContentsxivSecuring Fibre Channel F
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Chapter 1: Introduction• The Euro
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Chapter 1: IntroductionThe SAN Secu
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Chapter 1: IntroductionInternet sta
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Chapter 1: Introductionoften, the s
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Chapter 2: SAN Security MythsSAN Se
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SAN Security Myth Number 5SAN Test
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SAN Security Myth Number 6To demons
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SAN Security Myth Number 7SAN Secur
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SAN Basics for SecurityProfessional
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Evolution of the FC ProtocolTable 1
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Fibre Channel BasicsTable 2. FC pro
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Fibre Channel BasicsFC FabricsFC fa
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Fibre Channel BasicsType Category N
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesAn F
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FC Fabric Features and Servicesing
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesWhen
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesAnd
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesSwit
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesAs c
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesSwit
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FC Fabric Features and Servicesothe
Page 61 and 62: Security Basics forStorage Professi
Page 63 and 64: Security Modelshave enacted such le
Page 65 and 66: Security Modelssures must be taken
Page 67 and 68: Types of ThreatsTypes of ThreatsA t
Page 69 and 70: Types of ThreatsOne significant thr
Page 71 and 72: Types of Threatsside attacks such t
Page 73 and 74: Types of Threatsences from previous
Page 75 and 76: AttacksAttacksAttackers have many o
Page 77 and 78: Attackstion between the two parties
Page 79 and 80: Identification and AuthenticationBi
Page 81 and 82: Physical SecurityOne challenge with
Page 83 and 84: Physical SecurityPhysical access co
Page 85 and 86: Information Disposal and Sanitizati
Page 87 and 88: Chapter SummaryAlgorithm Passes Des
Page 89 and 90: Elementary Cryptography5This chapte
Page 91 and 92: Common Cryptography TermsHere are s
Page 93 and 94: Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptograp
Page 95 and 96: Cryptographic Algorithms• Range o
Page 97 and 98: Cryptographic AlgorithmsHashing alg
Page 99 and 100: Modes of Operationencryption proces
Page 101 and 102: Modes of OperationRSAAt around the
Page 103 and 104: Key ManagementSSL can be used with
Page 105 and 106: Key ManagementBrocade Encryption De
Page 107 and 108: FC Security Best Practices6In previ
Page 109 and 110: The Brocade SAN Security ModelThe m
Page 111: The Brocade SAN Security ModelStora
Page 115 and 116: The Brocade SAN Security Modelrestr
Page 117 and 118: The Brocade SAN Security Modeltem a
Page 119 and 120: The Brocade SAN Security ModelPassw
Page 121 and 122: The Brocade SAN Security ModelData
Page 123 and 124: The Brocade SAN Security ModelWith
Page 125 and 126: Encrypting Data-in-FlightEncrypting
Page 127 and 128: Encrypting Data-at-RestEncrypting D
Page 129 and 130: Encrypting Data-at-Restand disk dev
Page 131 and 132: Encrypting Data-at-RestPhysical Sec
Page 133 and 134: Encrypting Data-at-RestTraining and
Page 135 and 136: Chapter SummaryChapter SummaryAltho
Page 137 and 138: Deploying SAN-AttachedDevices in a
Page 139 and 140: Securing the Servers in the DMZpoli
Page 141 and 142: Securing the Storage DevicesFor exa
Page 143 and 144: Securing the Storage DevicesInterne
Page 145 and 146: Auditing and Assessing the SANAudit
Page 147 and 148: Securing FOS-Based Fabrics8When it
Page 149 and 150: Securing Management InterfacesThe f
Page 151 and 152: Securing Management InterfacesThe t
Page 153 and 154: Securing Management InterfacesFilte
Page 155 and 156: Securing Management InterfacesThe f
Page 157 and 158: Securing Management Interfacesadmin
Page 159 and 160: FC-Specific SecurityFC-Specific Sec
Page 161 and 162: FC-Specific SecurityBrocade-support
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FC-Specific SecurityTo prevent this
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Fabric-Based Encryptionthe Brocade
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Fabric-Based Encryption3. (LDAP onl
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Chapter SummaryInsistent Domain IDI
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Compliance and Storage9Certainly, m
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Payment Card Industry Data Security
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Breach Disclosure LawsThe precedent
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)vides
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Federal Information Processing Stan
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Common Criteria (CC)allow different
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Defense Information Systems Agency
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Other SAN Security Topics10SAN secu
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The Future of Key ManagementThe Fut
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Brocade Data EncryptionProducts11Br
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Brocade Encryption for Data-At-Rest
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Brocade Encryption for Data-At-Rest
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Brocade Encryption Features• Data
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Brocade Encryption FeaturesThe next
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Brocade Encryption FeaturesDEK clus
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Brocade Encryption Featuresthe DEK
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Brocade Encryption FeaturesThe foll
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Brocade Encryption InternalsFigure
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Design and Implementation Best Prac
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Design and Implementation Best Prac
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Brocade Encryption for Data-In-Flig
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Chapter SummarySite ACiphertextSite
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Fabric OS SecurityFeatures MatrixAL
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Security FeatureFOS2.xFOS3.xFOS4.x+
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Security FeatureFOS2.xFOS3.xFOS4.x+
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Standards Bodies andOther Organizat
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IETFSpecifically, the SNIA Security
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IndexNumerics3DES 4Aaccess control
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Indexhuman threat 9Iidentification
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