SECURING FIBRE CHANNEL FABRICS - Brocade

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Chapter 3: SAN Basics for Security ProfessionalsWhy Are Zoning Terms Confusing?In the early days of switched fabrics, hardware-enforced zone memberswere assigned by the physical port on a switch to which thedevice was connected. This was defined using the switch domain ID(DID) and the port ID (PID) on the switch. Software-enforced zonemembers were assigned using the WWN of the device. In this case,the software enforcing the zoning rules is the SNS. For this reason,zoning using the WWN was sometimes called soft zoning and zoningusing the DID/PID was sometimes called hard zoning. One ofthe advantages of zoning by WWN was the flexibility of movingdevices to any other port within a fabric without incurring zoningchanges. On the other hand, zones defined with DID/PID would notrequire a zoning change when a faulty device was replaced by anew one with a different WWN. This was particularly useful for tapedrives which have a tendency to fail more frequently than otherdevices such as HBAs.In 2001, Brocade introduced a technology in the Bloom ASIC, whichenabled the ASIC to enforce zoning based on the device WWN, notonly the DID/PID. (Although “Bloom” was initially an internal codname, it is now used externally to identify this generation of ASIC.)Hardware-enforced zoning could now include member definitionsusing the WWN. This was a significant enhancement from a securityperspective. Although Brocade was the first to implement hardware-enforcedzoning, most FC switch vendors today enforce zoningthrough hardware.For example, with software-enforced zoning, some hosts may cachethe WWN of the devices in the zone with which it communicates. If astorage device is removed from the zone and placed in a differentzone, the host could still access the storage device even though it is nolonger in the same zone. If the WWN in the cache is removed eitherthrough a power cycle or cache timeout, the host would not be able toobtain the WWN from the SNS since it is now in a different zone. This iscomparable to unlisted telephone numbers. Even though a person deliststheir phone number, someone who knows their phone number canstill call them. If the caller loses the number, however, they would notbe able to get if from directory assistance.With hardware-enforced zoning in Brocade switches, although the hostmay cache the WWN, the ASIC will block access to the device if it is notin the same zone as the host. This is equivalent to using the call-block-30 Securing Fibre Channel Fabrics
FC Fabric Features and Servicesing feature on a telephone. Even though someone has a person’sunlisted phone number, if the caller’s number is blocked at the centraloffice (CO), then the call would not be allowed.As a best practice, it is also recommended that you define zones usingthe pWWN instead of the DID/PID Organizations that implementedWWN zoning definitions were very pleased with their choice when theymigrated the SAN from a fabric consisting of several 16-port switchesto a single director. The migration is quite simple and involves copyingthe zoning database to the new director. Those organizations thatused DID/PID definitions had to convert all zone definitions manually,since the DIDs and port numbers on 16-port switches did not map tothe 256-port director.Path SelectionPath selection refers to the algorithm for selecting the path frames willfollow, given a possible choice. To avoid confusion, this is not the sameas FC routing, which is discussed in the routed fabrics section.There are several types of path selection protocols in FC.• Fabric Shortest Path First (FSPF)• Dynamic Path Selection (DPS)• TrunkingFSPFFabric Shortest Path First was invented by Brocade and is now anaccepted standard. It is a link-state path selection protocol similar tothe TCP/IP Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) routing protocol. FSPFdoes two things:• It keeps track of the state of all the links in a fabric• It calculates a cost to each pathIn FSPF, paths are calculated by summing the cost of all the links traversedby the path. Each time a switch is traversed, it is called a hop.Only the lowest-cost path between a source and destination is kept inthe routing table. The routing table contains information about whichswitch port to use when forwarding a frame to its final destination.Table 4 lists the default path costs for the different link speeds.Securing Fibre Channel Fabrics 31
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Page 8 and 9: viSecuring Fibre Channel Fabrics
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Page 12 and 13: ContentsChapter 4: Security Basics
Page 14 and 15: ContentsIsolation and Separation ..
Page 16 and 17: ContentsxivSecuring Fibre Channel F
Page 18 and 19: Chapter 1: Introduction• The Euro
Page 20 and 21: Chapter 1: IntroductionThe SAN Secu
Page 22 and 23: Chapter 1: IntroductionInternet sta
Page 24 and 25: Chapter 1: Introductionoften, the s
Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2: SAN Security MythsSAN Se
Page 29 and 30: SAN Security Myth Number 5SAN Test
Page 31 and 32: SAN Security Myth Number 6To demons
Page 33 and 34: SAN Security Myth Number 7SAN Secur
Page 35 and 36: SAN Basics for SecurityProfessional
Page 37 and 38: Evolution of the FC ProtocolTable 1
Page 39 and 40: Fibre Channel BasicsTable 2. FC pro
Page 41 and 42: Fibre Channel BasicsFC FabricsFC fa
Page 43 and 44: Fibre Channel BasicsType Category N
Page 45: FC Fabric Features and ServicesAn F
Page 49 and 50: FC Fabric Features and ServicesWhen
Page 51 and 52: FC Fabric Features and ServicesAnd
Page 53 and 54: FC Fabric Features and ServicesSwit
Page 55 and 56: FC Fabric Features and ServicesAs c
Page 57 and 58: FC Fabric Features and ServicesSwit
Page 59 and 60: FC Fabric Features and Servicesothe
Page 61 and 62: Security Basics forStorage Professi
Page 63 and 64: Security Modelshave enacted such le
Page 65 and 66: Security Modelssures must be taken
Page 67 and 68: Types of ThreatsTypes of ThreatsA t
Page 69 and 70: Types of ThreatsOne significant thr
Page 71 and 72: Types of Threatsside attacks such t
Page 73 and 74: Types of Threatsences from previous
Page 75 and 76: AttacksAttacksAttackers have many o
Page 77 and 78: Attackstion between the two parties
Page 79 and 80: Identification and AuthenticationBi
Page 81 and 82: Physical SecurityOne challenge with
Page 83 and 84: Physical SecurityPhysical access co
Page 85 and 86: Information Disposal and Sanitizati
Page 87 and 88: Chapter SummaryAlgorithm Passes Des
Page 89 and 90: Elementary Cryptography5This chapte
Page 91 and 92: Common Cryptography TermsHere are s
Page 93 and 94: Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptograp
Page 95 and 96: Cryptographic Algorithms• Range o
Page 97 and 98:
Cryptographic AlgorithmsHashing alg
Page 99 and 100:
Modes of Operationencryption proces
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Modes of OperationRSAAt around the
Page 103 and 104:
Key ManagementSSL can be used with
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Key ManagementBrocade Encryption De
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FC Security Best Practices6In previ
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelThe m
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelStora
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelChann
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The Brocade SAN Security Modelrestr
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The Brocade SAN Security Modeltem a
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelPassw
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelData
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelWith
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Encrypting Data-in-FlightEncrypting
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Encrypting Data-at-RestEncrypting D
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Encrypting Data-at-Restand disk dev
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Encrypting Data-at-RestPhysical Sec
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Encrypting Data-at-RestTraining and
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Chapter SummaryChapter SummaryAltho
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Deploying SAN-AttachedDevices in a
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Securing the Servers in the DMZpoli
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Securing the Storage DevicesFor exa
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Securing the Storage DevicesInterne
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Auditing and Assessing the SANAudit
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Securing FOS-Based Fabrics8When it
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Securing Management InterfacesThe f
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Securing Management InterfacesThe t
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Securing Management InterfacesFilte
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Securing Management InterfacesThe f
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Securing Management Interfacesadmin
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FC-Specific SecurityFC-Specific Sec
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FC-Specific SecurityBrocade-support
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FC-Specific SecurityTo prevent this
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Fabric-Based Encryptionthe Brocade
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Fabric-Based Encryption3. (LDAP onl
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Chapter SummaryInsistent Domain IDI
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Compliance and Storage9Certainly, m
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Payment Card Industry Data Security
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Breach Disclosure LawsThe precedent
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)vides
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Federal Information Processing Stan
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Common Criteria (CC)allow different
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Defense Information Systems Agency
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Other SAN Security Topics10SAN secu
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The Future of Key ManagementThe Fut
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Brocade Data EncryptionProducts11Br
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Brocade Encryption for Data-At-Rest
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Brocade Encryption for Data-At-Rest
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Brocade Encryption Features• Data
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Brocade Encryption FeaturesThe next
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Brocade Encryption FeaturesDEK clus
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Brocade Encryption Featuresthe DEK
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Brocade Encryption FeaturesThe foll
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Brocade Encryption InternalsFigure
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Design and Implementation Best Prac
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Design and Implementation Best Prac
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Brocade Encryption for Data-In-Flig
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Chapter SummarySite ACiphertextSite
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Fabric OS SecurityFeatures MatrixAL
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Security FeatureFOS2.xFOS3.xFOS4.x+
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Security FeatureFOS2.xFOS3.xFOS4.x+
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Standards Bodies andOther Organizat
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IETFSpecifically, the SNIA Security
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IndexNumerics3DES 4Aaccess control
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Indexhuman threat 9Iidentification
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