SECURING FIBRE CHANNEL FABRICS - Brocade

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Chapter 8: Securing FOS-Based FabricsThe following is an important distinction: placing a switch in FIPS modeis not the same as making the switch FIPS-compliant. Placing a switchin FIPS mode enhances the security level of the switch according tothe compliance requirements specified by FIPS 140-2 Level 2.Enabling FIPS mode is a disruptive action, since it requires a reboot ofthe switch to take effect.FIPS mode is enabled and configured using the fipsCfg command.CAUTION: FIPS mode is disruptive and may have unexpected implicationsif you are not familiar with this mode of operation. For example, ifyou lose the admin password on a switch running in FIPS mode, therewill be no way to regain management control of that switch. FIPS modeshould be used only if there is a mandatory operational requirement todo so. Again, operating a switch in FIP mode does not imply that theswitch is FIPS 140-2 compliant.When a <strong>Brocade</strong> switch is in FIPS mode, the following occur:• Root account disabled• Telnet disabled, only SSH can be used• HTTP disabled, only HTTPS can be used• RPC disabled, only secure RPC can be used• Only TLS-AES128 cipher suite used with secure RPC• SNMP read-only operations exclusively, SNMP write operationsdisabled• DH-CHAP/FCAP hashing performed only using SHA-256• Mandatory firmware signature validation• SCP used exclusively (no FTP) for configUpload, configDownload,supportSave, and firmwareDownload commands• IPSec usage of AES-XCBC, MD5, and DH group 1 blocked• RADIUS uses only PEAP or MSCHAPv2, CHAP and PAP disallowed• Only the following encryption algorithms functional: HMAC-SHA1,3DES-CBC, AES128-CBC, AES192-CBC, and AES256-CBCStarting in FOS 6.2.0, the following steps are required to prepare aswitch to run in FIPS mode:1. (Optional) Configure RADIUS or LDAP server.2. (Optional) Configure authentication protocols.150 Securing Fibre Channel Fabrics
Fabric-Based Encryption3. (LDAP only) Install SSL certificate on a Microsoft Active Directory(AD) server and CA certificate on the switch for using LDAPauthentication.4. Block telnet, HTTP, and RPC (using IP filters).5. Disable boot PROM access.6. Configure the switch for signed firmware.7. Disable root access.8. Enable FIPS mode (using fipsCfg command).Refer to the Fabric OS Administrator's Guide for the version of firmwareyou are using before performing the procedure to make sure thatyou have the most complete and current information. Once FIPS modeis enabled, then several other steps are required to reset and zeroizecertain switch parameters.Other FC Security FeaturesA few other security features are available in FOS that have not beencovered in previous sections and that are worthy of mention.RSCN SuppressionIt was explained earlier that RSCNs are contained to the devices withina FOS-based zone. It is also possible to explicitly suppress RSCNs atthe port level. Some specialized applications are very sensitive andcan be affected by an RSCN. If the environment is static and neverchanges once it is installed, RSCNs can be disabled to prevent interruptions.RSCN suppression can be configured using the portCfgrscnsupr command.Signed FirmwareFirmware can be tampered with and a modified version of the firmwareinstalled on a switch. This type of attack, although unlikely on a<strong>Brocade</strong> switch, is usually performed by modifying the code to addinga “back door,” or malicious code known only by the author of the modifiedcode. To ensure that the code being installed on a switch is in factthe authorized version and has not been modified by a third party, ahash value of the firmware is calculated. This hash value is then digitallysigned with a private key at the source using the RSA algorithmand 1024-bit keys. The public key of the source is included in the firmwarepackage to allow the switch to authenticate the firmware. Thisfeature, called signed firmware, was introduced in FOS 6.1.0.Securing Fibre Channel Fabrics 151
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© 2012 Brocade Communications Syst
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viSecuring Fibre Channel Fabrics
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viiiSecuring Fibre Channel Fabrics
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ContentsChapter 4: Security Basics
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ContentsIsolation and Separation ..
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ContentsxivSecuring Fibre Channel F
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Chapter 1: Introduction• The Euro
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Chapter 1: IntroductionThe SAN Secu
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Chapter 1: IntroductionInternet sta
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Chapter 1: Introductionoften, the s
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Chapter 2: SAN Security MythsSAN Se
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SAN Security Myth Number 5SAN Test
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SAN Security Myth Number 6To demons
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SAN Security Myth Number 7SAN Secur
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SAN Basics for SecurityProfessional
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Evolution of the FC ProtocolTable 1
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Fibre Channel BasicsTable 2. FC pro
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Fibre Channel BasicsFC FabricsFC fa
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Fibre Channel BasicsType Category N
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesAn F
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FC Fabric Features and Servicesing
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesWhen
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesAnd
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesSwit
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesAs c
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FC Fabric Features and ServicesSwit
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FC Fabric Features and Servicesothe
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Security Basics forStorage Professi
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Security Modelshave enacted such le
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Security Modelssures must be taken
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Types of ThreatsTypes of ThreatsA t
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Types of ThreatsOne significant thr
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Types of Threatsside attacks such t
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Types of Threatsences from previous
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AttacksAttacksAttackers have many o
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Attackstion between the two parties
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Identification and AuthenticationBi
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Physical SecurityOne challenge with
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Physical SecurityPhysical access co
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Information Disposal and Sanitizati
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Chapter SummaryAlgorithm Passes Des
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Elementary Cryptography5This chapte
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Common Cryptography TermsHere are s
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Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptograp
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Cryptographic Algorithms• Range o
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Cryptographic AlgorithmsHashing alg
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Modes of Operationencryption proces
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Modes of OperationRSAAt around the
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Key ManagementSSL can be used with
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Key ManagementBrocade Encryption De
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FC Security Best Practices6In previ
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelThe m
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelStora
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The Brocade SAN Security ModelChann
Page 115 and 116: The Brocade SAN Security Modelrestr
Page 117 and 118: The Brocade SAN Security Modeltem a
Page 119 and 120: The Brocade SAN Security ModelPassw
Page 121 and 122: The Brocade SAN Security ModelData
Page 123 and 124: The Brocade SAN Security ModelWith
Page 125 and 126: Encrypting Data-in-FlightEncrypting
Page 127 and 128: Encrypting Data-at-RestEncrypting D
Page 129 and 130: Encrypting Data-at-Restand disk dev
Page 131 and 132: Encrypting Data-at-RestPhysical Sec
Page 133 and 134: Encrypting Data-at-RestTraining and
Page 135 and 136: Chapter SummaryChapter SummaryAltho
Page 137 and 138: Deploying SAN-AttachedDevices in a
Page 139 and 140: Securing the Servers in the DMZpoli
Page 141 and 142: Securing the Storage DevicesFor exa
Page 143 and 144: Securing the Storage DevicesInterne
Page 145 and 146: Auditing and Assessing the SANAudit
Page 147 and 148: Securing FOS-Based Fabrics8When it
Page 149 and 150: Securing Management InterfacesThe f
Page 151 and 152: Securing Management InterfacesThe t
Page 153 and 154: Securing Management InterfacesFilte
Page 155 and 156: Securing Management InterfacesThe f
Page 157 and 158: Securing Management Interfacesadmin
Page 159 and 160: FC-Specific SecurityFC-Specific Sec
Page 161 and 162: FC-Specific SecurityBrocade-support
Page 163 and 164: FC-Specific SecurityTo prevent this
Page 165: Fabric-Based Encryptionthe Brocade
Page 169 and 170: Chapter SummaryInsistent Domain IDI
Page 171 and 172: Compliance and Storage9Certainly, m
Page 173 and 174: Payment Card Industry Data Security
Page 175 and 176: Breach Disclosure LawsThe precedent
Page 177 and 178: Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)vides
Page 179 and 180: Federal Information Processing Stan
Page 181 and 182: Common Criteria (CC)allow different
Page 183 and 184: Defense Information Systems Agency
Page 185 and 186: Other SAN Security Topics10SAN secu
Page 187 and 188: The Future of Key ManagementThe Fut
Page 189 and 190: Brocade Data EncryptionProducts11Br
Page 191 and 192: Brocade Encryption for Data-At-Rest
Page 193 and 194: Brocade Encryption for Data-At-Rest
Page 195 and 196: Brocade Encryption Features• Data
Page 197 and 198: Brocade Encryption FeaturesThe next
Page 199 and 200: Brocade Encryption FeaturesDEK clus
Page 201 and 202: Brocade Encryption Featuresthe DEK
Page 203 and 204: Brocade Encryption FeaturesThe foll
Page 205 and 206: Brocade Encryption InternalsFigure
Page 207 and 208: Design and Implementation Best Prac
Page 209 and 210: Design and Implementation Best Prac
Page 211 and 212: Brocade Encryption for Data-In-Flig
Page 213 and 214: Chapter SummarySite ACiphertextSite
Page 215 and 216: Fabric OS SecurityFeatures MatrixAL
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Security FeatureFOS2.xFOS3.xFOS4.x+
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Security FeatureFOS2.xFOS3.xFOS4.x+
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Standards Bodies andOther Organizat
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IETFSpecifically, the SNIA Security
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IndexNumerics3DES 4Aaccess control
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Indexhuman threat 9Iidentification
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