Kuhn vs Popper - About James H. Collier

say something similar in the case of today’sHeideggerian and Kuhnian rain dances. After all, aswe saw in Rorty’s protestations against evaluatingideas by their origins and consequences, those whotake seriously Heidegger’s and Kuhn’s ideas claim todo so because of the light those ideas shed on achosen aspect of reality. In that case, the Popperianconcern with measuring up the means against theends they purport to serve would seem to beespecially apposite, perhaps more so than in thecase of the native rain dances. Thus, we may ask: areKuhn’s ideas sufficiently powerful for understandingthe nature of science to justify thedisproportionate attention given to them? If, after acomparison with the ideas of relevant alternatives(e.g. Feyerabend, Lakatos, Toulmin, Hanson), theanswer turns out to be no, then we need to find outwhy Kuhn has nevertheless received such attention.The hint of irrationality in the mass adoptionof Kuhn is heightened by Kuhn’s own failure toparticipate in – and, if anything, to disavow – thespread of the ideas associated with him.At the very least, Kuhn’s reclusiveness goesagainst the sense of social responsibility thatintellectuals have traditionally felt for their work.While it is quite natural for people to feelresponsible for their actions, which of course areinformed by ideas, the mark of the intellectual is to199