Kuhn vs Popper - About James H. Collier

already doing, not over whether they shouldbe doing it.But even granting Planck’s point – that scienceshould be pursued for its own sake – a new versionof Mach’s original problem suggested itself: Canscientists be trusted to uphold their own scientificideals? Mach, always suspicious of the selfregardingcharacter of scientific élites, found a newchampion in Popper, who held that science is muchtoo important to be left to scientific discretion. Thegrowing authority of scientists in society offerstoo many opportunities for the corruption ofscience. Philosophers are thus needed to ensurethat scientists remain true to the normative ideal,‘Science’ with a capital ‘S’, a stern taskmaster whodemands that scientists be critical of even theirmost cherished beliefs. From this impulse camePopper’s falsifiability principle as the scientificethic.Kuhn’s sensibility could not be more different.For him, an activity is not a proper science, unlessthe community of inquirers can set its ownstandards for recruiting colleagues and evaluatingtheir work. Just as public oversight had no role inPlanck’s science policy, philosophical oversightcannot be found in Kuhn’s theory of scientificchange. One might think that such an élitist visionwould have no place in today’s world, where the45