The Association of Chief Police Officers - Parliament

David Anderson QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation –Written evidenceMember States to introduce laws equivalent to some of those established in theUK’s Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006 (albeit that UK influence was in part diffusedvia the Council of Europe’s 2005 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism).(b) The EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, first drafted during the UKpresidency in the second half of 2005, is closely modelled on the UK’s ownCONTEST strategy. An indicator of the high degree of UK influence may be seenfrom the fact that the four elements of the CONTEST strategy, which governsthe entirety of UK counter-terrorism policy (Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare)were translated into four equivalent and only slightly less alliterative EU elements:Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Respond.(c) The UK was described to me by the Commission as “very active” in developing EUpolicies for counter-radicalisation both internally and in third countries; foraviation security; and for the risk and threat analysis. I was told that if the UKsupports a Commission initiative, that initiative is immediately given credibility;and that other large Member States have been won over in the EU setting to theUK approach, for example as regards the assessment of risk.(d) It was explained to me at the Council that the UK has been exceptionally usefulin managing the relationship between the USA and the EU. UK influence hasbeen decisive in the negotiation of a number of specific measures, including theEU-US Agreements on Passenger Name Records and Terrorist Finance TrackingProvisions (TFTP). It has also enabled the EU more effectively to defend itscitizens’ interests on domestic US issues such as the manner in which theNational Defense Authorization Act is interpreted by the US Administration.(e) Europol, up to 10% of whose cases concern counter-terrorism, has developedunder UK leadership as an effective information hub.7. This degree of influence of course did not happen by chance, but because of a desireon the part of the UK to encourage other Member States to take the threat ofterrorism as seriously as it is taken here. While international terrorism retains a highpublic profile in countries affected by it in the recent past (e.g. UK, Spain, theNetherlands, Denmark), it is almost invisible as a public concern in some othercountries, for example in Eastern Europe. Bilateral contacts continue, and are useful.Equally, however, it is evident that EU mechanisms have been productive both as amethod of spreading UK thinking and good practice in the field of counter-terrorismacross the continent and beyond, and in defending the interests of the UK and otherMember States in dealings with third countries.Measures of practical utility8. The police will no doubt identify to the Committee those measures into which theyconsider it necessary or desirable to opt back in; and the Committee will test theirassertions.9. My own confidential briefings have indicated that there are a number of measuresrelevant to counter-terrorism that are considered by SO15 to be essential tools.These are not, of course, limited to terrorism-specific measures: provisions of a2