Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Response to Cyclone Nargis

OCHA on how to support MIMU caused some delay) MIMU was soon producing and disseminatinguseful materials including maps, meeting minutes, etc.At the time of the IA RTE visit to Myanmar, MIMU was still producing a range of products, manyof which were appreciated by agency staff, and all of the clusters at Yangon level were supported byinformation managers. However, many international and national agencies expressed concerns thatthe “who-what-where” (WWW) data was of only limited value as it often did not provide sufficientdetail for planning purposes and failed to differentiate between an organization with a significant,long-term presence and a one-off relief distribution. Many agency staff, particularly at hub level,felt overburdened with constant information demands while expressing doubts about the reliabilityof data being produced. The IA RTE team observed that a lack of credible data had both a negativeimpact on efficiency since agencies tended to conduct their own assessments rather than rely onWWW data, and on coverage, as the data did not adequately highlight the worst-affected areas inBogalay Township that remained underserved.As with the clusters more generally, agency staff at hub level have not been adequately involved inIM. Beyond the substantial investment of staff time in gathering data the IA RTE team observedlittle IM capacity at hub level. Information from national organizations and non-traditional actors(e.g. the private sector) appeared to be even more limited.3.7 PlanningHumanitarian strategic planning has not been particularly strong during the Nargis response.Interviewees indicated that this was hampered both by the lack of a completed contingency plan thatcould have provided greater guidance on activities and roles and also the high level of uncertainty(e.g. about access) that prevailed during the initial weeks. Planning that has occurred has mostlybeen ‘stove piped’ within clusters, but not necessarily within a coherent, holistic, view of what theinternational community was trying to achieve in the Delta.A contingency planning process had begun in Myanmar but was still incomplete when Nargis hit,but the process itself tangibly benefited a coordinated response, with the creation of a regional andin-country IASC as one striking example. Prior to Nargis, both the regional IASC in Bangkok andthe IASC in Myanmar was viewed by INGOs as having limited utility (“more UN meetings”). Butthere was broad acknowledgement amongst both UN and INGO interviewees that both IASCmechanisms more than proved their value-added once an emergency response was required. Thefact that the mechanism was already established and there were pre-existing relationships facilitatedtimely decision-making. Another example, already cited above, was the rapid appointment of clusterleads.3.8 Capacity BuildingAs described above, the response to Nargis has been predominantly a local one. Civil society cannothelp but be strengthened through the hands-on experience gained by literally thousands of nationalvolunteers and staff who, in most cases, are getting their first opportunity to manage projects,develop operational plans, and (one hopes) see the immediate impact of their work. Someinternational organizations have prioritized working directly with civil society groups at the villagelevel on humanitarian activities.23