Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Response to Cyclone Nargis

3.10 CommunicationsLargely due to restricted access, public communications by the international community in the earlydays of the response was based on incomplete information. One result was that a number ofinternational organizations rang the alarm about the threat of a massive second wave of deaths 12without a sufficient appreciation of the significance and effectiveness of the local response. Themedia spotlight has long since moved onto other news stories, but another unfortunate result is thatthe prevailing erroneous perception outside the country continues to be that survivors were notreceiving humanitarian aid although, as described above, it is now clear this was not the case.One particular weakness of communications has been the lack of visibility of local efforts. Asrecommended in Aceh by the TEC studies, more prominence to local efforts in publiccommunications would have been, and continues to be, useful. However, at this point it is not clearthat sufficient media interest still exists outside of Myanmar to make such accounts newsworthy.3.11 PartnershipsOnce the IA RTE team had acquired a good understanding of the context, it was difficult to imaginehow international agencies could have mounted a humanitarian response of such a scale in theabsence of ASEAN and the TCG. While a handful of international organizations were alreadyoperating in the Delta within days, the sustained large-scale response that unfolded requiredsignificant changes in government policy and attitudes for which ASEAN’s role, supported by theUN and other agencies, was perceived by virtually all international stakeholders as critical inbringing about this transformation .From meeting minutes and interviews it is clear that the TCG continues to play a vital facilitationrole in maintaining humanitarian space, a role appreciated by all international agencies. Since itsestablishment on 31 May, the TCG has emphasized this facilitation role and has minimizedinvolvement in policy issues, an approach which appeared to be one of the keys to its success. Asdescribed above, the PONJA (and presumably the upcoming Periodic Review) not only resulted inuseful assessment data, but had the effect of strengthening relationships between the government,ASEAN and international agencies.While the TCG and PONJA process were effective at building bridges with the government,international agencies have been facing a number of challenges with building partnerships with localorganizations. Minutes from a national NGO “reflections” meeting held during October note thatcoordination mechanisms set up by the international community are not meeting the objective ofworking better together. Particular obstacles to full participation cited by local agencies included theuse of English as the almost the sole way of communicating, facilitation style, meeting structures,and the way agendas are established. A recommendation targeted at international agencieschallenged them to explore different ways of partnering with local groups and communities so thatlocal capacity can be supported and built without making such heavy demands on their time. Thiswas consistent with a number of interviews of national NGO staff who referred to the relatively‘unfriendly’ cluster system, along with the opinion that many national actors (particularly NGOs)have been left out of important planning processes.12 See, for example, the 10 may 2008 Reuters release entitled, “Slow Myanmar aid raises health risks for survivors”available via http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EVOD-7EHGQA?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=mmr.25