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ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTREVIEW OFTHE GA PILA AND MOTLHOTLO RESETTLEMENT PROCESSESAGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION’SPERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR RESETTLEMENTIndependent Review of the Physical ResettlementUndertaken at Anglo Platinum’sMogalakwena Platinum MineMarch 2010www.erm.com

Independent Reviewof the Physical ResettlementUndertaken at Anglo Platinum’sMogalakwena Platinum MineReference Number: 0093128Prepared by Alison McCallum, Belinda Ridley and Lisa van DongenFor and on behalf of Environmental Resources ManagementApproved by David ShandlerSigned:Position: PartnerDate: March 2010This report has been prepared by Environmental Resources Management the trading name of Environmental ResourcesManagement Limited, with all reasonable skill, care and diligence within the terms of the Contract with the client,incorporating our General Terms and Conditions of Business and taking account of the resources devoted to it byagreement with the client.We disclaim any responsibility to the client and others in respect of any matters outside the scope of the above.This report is confidential to the client and we accept no responsibility of whatsoever nature to third parties to whomthis report, or any part thereof, is made known. Any such party relies on the report at their own risk.

ContentsGlossaryA Ga Pila Executive SummaryB Motlhotlo Executive SummaryC‘Looking Forward’ Executive SummaryPart OneIntroduction and MethodologyLOOKING BACKPart TwoGa Pila ReviewPart Three Motlhotlo ReviewLOOKING FORWARDPart FourPart FiveLooking Forward ReportConclusionAnnexuresABCDEFGHMaps of the Relocation AreaList of Questions for InterviewsList of Consultation ActivitiesPhotologDesign CriteriaReferencesNon-Technical SummariesList of Tables and Boxes

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTExecutive SummariesA: GA PILA RESETTLEMENTB: MOTLHOTLO RESETTLEMENTC: LOOKING FORWARD

A: EXECUTIVE SUMMARYA.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE GA PILARESETTLEMENT REVIEWAnglo Platinum (Corporate Affairs) has appointed ERM Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereafterreferred to as ERM) to conduct a review of the resettlement processes undertaken at two sitesnear their Mogalakwena Section (formerly known as Potgietersrust Platinum Mine). These arereferred to as the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo resettlement processes, respectively.It is within the context of contention over the performance of Anglo Platinum (AP) in theseresettlement processes that AP Corporate Affairs was prompted to conduct its own detailed,internal, technical investigation of the activities undertaken. In this regard, AP has requestedthat ERM conduct a review of the resettlement processes. The primary objective of this review isto highlight that which AP succeeded in accomplishing and those areas where it did not.The key international standard used as the basis for this review is the International FinanceCorporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (2006), inparticular Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement.The outcome of the resettlement review will be two-pronged, where the final product will focusboth on ‘looking back’ at resettlement activities carried out to date and on ‘looking forward’ toways in which to improve relations between AP and the resettled communities, and to deriveappropriate development benefits to improve community livelihoods and quality of life in theaffected settlements.This Executive Summary serves as an overview of the outcomes of the ‘looking back’ phase ofthe Ga Pila review.i

A.2 KEY POINTS IN THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESSIn 1995, in addition to the urgent need for additional storage site forwaste rock, safety concerns were raised at AP’s already operationalMogalakwena Section Mine. These concerns related to incidencesof fly rock from the Sandsloot open pit, which were landing in theadjacent Ga Pila village. This precipitated the decision to resettlethe community in 2001. This was following the realisation thatevacuation measures that had been conducted, as and whenrequired up until 1996, were no longer deemed sufficient toguarantee the safety and quality of life of the affected residents.The overall driver for the resettlement however was that the site ofGa Pila village was urgently needed as an additional storage site forwaste rock.Negotiations between AP and the traditional authority regardingland acquisition had already been initiated in 1991, when APapproached the Mapela Tribal Authority (MTA) to procure theVaalkop and Sandlsoot farms. There was high level Governmentand political involvement in these early discussions including:the South African Communist Party, South African National CivicOrganisation (SANCO,) and various representatives of the NorthernProvince Government, and the Department of Land Affairs (DLA).Once the previously unanticipated requirement to relocate thecommunity was recognised in 1995, a community consultationprocess was initiated by Kgoshigadi Langa. Approval to proceedwith consulting the community on resettlement was obtainedfrom both the Premier of the Northern Province and the Minister ofLand Affairs. This process culminated, in 1997, in the election of aRelocation Steering Committee (RSC), the purpose of which was torepresent the interests of the community in the relocation process.A communications task team was established as a sub-committee ofthe RSC, with the function of facilitating communications betweenthe RSC and the people of Ga Pila village. At this stage a provincialrepresentative was appointed and tasked with ensuring the deliveryof the resettlement from the Provincial Government’s point of view.Between May and August 1997, AP facilitated a site selection processduring which Ga Pila residents were presented with two alternativesites for relocation, namely Sterkwater farm and Armoede farm. TheRSC requested that Blinkwater farm also be offered as an option butthis was not available for selection because of a pending land claimby the Mokopane Tribe. The community was given the opportunityto select appropriate alternatives but none were found. Sterkwaterfarm was finally selected by the Ga Pila community at publicmeetings held on 25 th -27 th July 1997. This was further ratified on 15 thAugust 1997 by the RSC as the more suitable of the two sites.In September 1997, AP recognised that the selection of the chosensite would require an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) tobe undertaken. This was carried out by SRK Consulting. The termsof reference for this study were limited to the area of the new site,namely, Sterkwater farm and its surrounds. It did not assess theimpact of relocation on the existing Ga Pila village.In 1997, local architects and consulting engineers TPC/SibanyeArchitects were employed to begin a technical audit or householdsurvey for the purposes of creating an inventory of assets. Mosthouseholds in Ga Pila took part in this, save for 32 which refused.The need for a social and institutional audit was also recognised asimportant in establishing the characteristics of the Ga Pila village.An external social scientist was introduced to the community at thispoint, from Resource Development Consultants (RDC) and a socialaudit was conducted by them between August and September1997. The intention of the social and institutional audit was to:obtain an understanding of the social and economic characteristicsof households and institutions in Ga Pila village; to investigate social,cultural, economic and political relationships within Ga Pila Villageand surrounding villages; and to obtain an indication of the potentialimpacts of the relocation on internal and external relationships. Thefindings from it were reportedly fed into the EIA for Sterkwater.During the technical audit (in December 1997), the communitymembers were shown three show houses or ‘mock-ups’ of the typesof houses that they could expect to receive. These were built at theentrance to the Sterkwater site but were later destroyed by AP atthe request of the S21. At the conclusion of the audit process, 100percent of householders who participated reportedly signed off onthe audit results and associated compensation measures with theexception of one individual. As part of the identified compensationpackage residents were to be provided with new houses and a cashamount of R5,000 per household, intended as an ‘upset’ or ‘settlingin’ allowance. In addition, communal land was compensated withreplacement agricultural land.In 1998, owing to internal disputes over choice of site andcompensation amounts, the RSC was dissolved and reformed intothe self-named Ga Pila Relocation Management Team (GRMT). Thecommunity, through the GRMT, appointed legal advisors in 1998 torepresent them in the relocation process. This was partly motivatedby the need to resolve ongoing internal disputes between GRMTmembers, but also to assist them in their negotiations with AP.ii

The GRMT committee was transformed into a S21 Committee andfurther registered as a S21 Company. This was done under theadvice and with the assistance of the community legal advisors. Thiscreated the legal entity necessary for AP to sub-lease the land fromthe S21 Company, rather than directly from the Minister of LandAffairs. This lease arrangement reportedly reflected the preferenceof the DLA. It also allowed AP to recover tax on the land transaction.The S21 Company and/or its associated Committee will hereafter bereferred to as the ‘S21’.The S21 henceforth became the designated legal lessor of theland under the sub-lease agreement. Their role was also to serveas a consultative feedback mechanism for the community, andto provide community leadership on all relocation matters, untilcompletion of the resettlement process.In 1998, there was a community resolution, undertaken at theMTA offices, agreeing to relocate. This was signed by all of thosecommunity members in attendance and witnessed by the thenMinister of Land Affairs, Derek Hannekom. The resettlement was tobe the first of its kind undertaken in a democratic South Africa.The construction contract was awarded to a joint venture betweenGroup 5 and Ubuntu/Stock Housing. Around 300 communitymembers were employed during the construction process,amounting to approximately 35 percent of the Ga Pila workforce.Some form of inspection process took place during the constructionprocess, whereby some community members were able to monitorthe progress of the building process and raise issues regarding thehouses. The extent, scope and inclusivity of this process is unclear.Relatively late in the construction process, AP decided to offerthose with as yet unfinished larger houses, the option of receivinga smaller house with a choice from a range of better quality fixturesand fittings to ‘offset’ the lost square metres from the original plans.It was explained that this would allow people to receive theirfinished houses more quickly. For those who opted for this choicethe architectural plans were redrawn and smaller houses werecompleted.During the construction process, divisions and jealousies reportedlyemerged between community members (particularly amongstsubsections of the youth) over competition for jobs. In addition,there were claims made about S21 members receiving preferentialtreatment in the form of access to jobs and larger houses.S21 and its effectiveness and accountability began to be called intoquestion. At this stage, a further split emerged in the community.The increase in unemployment due to a sudden drop in numbers ofconstruction related jobs may have further amplified jealousies overstipends received by the S21 members.Serious resistance to the relocation process surfaced at the end ofthe construction process, stemming from community members’disappointment and anger when they saw the completed houses.Many felt the house they had been given did not match up to thepromises that had been made by AP during the audit process. Inaddition they felt unable to compare them with the ‘mock-ups’which had already been demolished due to infighting between thevarious factions as to who would own these homes. The variousparties were trying to lay claim to them which was resulting inserious tension within the community. A significant faction of thecommunity became unwilling to relocate.On 9th July 2001, the physical relocation process commencedwith community members being assisted by reputable removalcontractors. An angry faction of community members attemptedto blockade the first willing homeowner to be relocated by meansof protest. This protest became violent, leading to the injury of oneman. This resulted in police intervention and, by some accounts,further injuries to community members. Arrests were made of someof the leaders of the resistance, after which the situation reportedlybecame calmer. The relocation recommenced on 10th August2001 and continued, unopposed until 2003 with an average of sixto ten houses being relocated per day at one stage. Much later inthe relocation process, AP’s Project Manager was held hostage oneevening by disgruntled relocation resistance community members.A total of 706 households were relocated and bulk infrastructurewas supplied for over 828 hectares of land. Services, includingwater reticulation supply, electricity, new schools, roads, eightshops, a clinic, a crèche and two churches were also provided.The households that relocated eventually included many of thosewho physically resisted in 2001. Twenty-six households, however,did not move. These individuals are generally those who resistedresettlement from an early stage in the process. They continue toremain at the old Ga Pila site. At the time of writing this report, only12 households physically remain on the Sandsloot mining lease area.Up until the point when construction of the village was completedin around 2000, the S21 had, by all reports, worked relativelyeffectively as a feedback mechanism. As the time of the actualrelocation drew closer, however, the representative nature of theiii

A.3 OVERVIEW OF KEY STRENGTHSAND WEAKNESSES IN THE GA PILARESETTLEMENT PROCESSThe review acknowledges that in the resettlement process at Ga Pila,the best practice resettlement outlined in today’s IFC PerformanceStandards were not in currency or as widely recognised or employedas they are now. In this way, the review is effectively assessing AP’sperformance against today’s standard, and one which did not existat the time. A review against these standards shows that the processfollowed at Ga Pila was broadly not aligned with the IFC standards.Overall, AP’s performance reflects a reactive approach, indicatinga lack of forward planning and of proactive risk management, aswell as a largely technical approach. There was a focus on the‘technical’ aspects of resettlement, but inadequate identificationand management of a wider set of non-physical and socio-culturalimpacts and risks. These weaknesses are discussed in Section 1.5and Section 1.6 respectively.This overview will outline the key findings of ERM’s review of theresettlement at Ga Pila. It will first highlight strengths – namelythose aspects of AP’s performance which show evidence ofalignment with the core tenets of an IFC compliant approach. It willthen identify and discuss the weaknesses of the process at Ga Pila.A.4 KEY STRENGTHSThe key strengths in AP’s approach are reflected in the fact thatalthough it was far from an example of best practice by today’sstandards, the Ga Pila process still had its foundations in some of thecore principles of the IFC standards. This was evidenced in that itsought to achieve, at least in basic form:• land acquisition by fair and legal means;• a degree of consultation and participation of affectedparties;• the provision of adequate replacement of property;• land based compensation and, associated with this, securityof tenure;• the provision of physical support with the actual move; and• the objective of seeking to improve living conditions.AP also recognised the need to undertake resettlement as astandalone process, separately resourced but integrated into thewider Project. These strengths are described further below.A.4.1Negotiated Settlement to Acquire LandRightsThe study shows that a negotiated approach to acquisition of landrights did take place, where negotiations were conducted withthe Kgoshigadi (chief ) who served as the custodian of customarycommunal land rights and was therefore, at least in terms of the lawand accepted traditional protocols of the time, the rights holder.There is some contestation, however, over the fairness of thenegotiated settlement, particularly in relation to the extent to whichcommunity members were adequately consulted and included inthe negotiations. This is addressed in Section A.5.1.A.4.2Consultation and Participation inDecision MakingAP ensured that the community set up a consultation structure (acommunity relocation committee) to represent its interests andmanage the relocation process on its behalf. This began as theRelocation Steering Committee (RSC) and was later establishedas the S21 Company and associate S21 Committee (S21). TheS21 gathered and gave responses to grievances raised by thecommunity. AP also ensured that it consulted the communityiteratively and at various key stages in the process, namely inthe selection of an appropriate host site and on the subject ofcompensation during the households audit and inventory of assets.There is some contestation, however, over the appropriateness andeffectiveness of these consultation efforts and of the consultationstructure itself. Issues have also been raised about what action APtook to remedy these problems when they arose. This is discussedfurther in Section A.6.1.A.4.3Inventory and Valuation of AssetsIn terms of IFC Performance Standard 5, AP appears to have met thebasic requirement to implement an audit of affected households.All affected structures were audited, including houses and somephysical assets. Communal land was also included in the audit,although its value was not measured on an individual or householdbasis.It should, however, be noted that concerns have been raised aboutboth the scope and communication process around the audit. Thereare claims that not all those affected fully understood the process.This issue is discussed in more detail later in Section A.5.2.A.4.4Physical Support During the MoveConsiderable effort was put into assisting the community withthe actual physical relocation. A reputable moving contractor wasiv

appointed by AP (in consultation with community representatives)to move all household items and salvage teams were arrangedto assist community members with salvaging valuable raw andrecyclable materials such as corrugated iron from their properties.This assistance was, however, limited to the physical move itselfand did not constitute any additional support during the transitionperiod after the actual resettlement.A.4.5Security of Tenure for the NewHomesteadsConsiderable efforts were reportedly made by AP at the time tocreate the option of granting the individual householder a right tothe land that could be mortgaged, so that they could improve theirfinancial status – these ranged from trusts to communal propertyassociations. The various options were presented to the RSC/S21and debated. Ultimately however, within the existing regulatorycontext, under both statutory and customary law, ensuring titledeeds to individual homeowners was not an option open to AP. Thiswas because the land is owned by the State and is also communalproperty under the custodianship of the Kgoshigadi, who wasfirm at the time that no individual rights to land ownership couldbe granted, only rights to homestead ownership. AP is howeverconsidered aligned with the IFC in terms of ensuring security ofhomestead ownership at the new village through the provision ofoccupational certificates.Perceptions exist amongst Ga Pila residents that overall securityof tenure for was not provided for. This is despite the granting ofhomestead ownership certificates, and the compensation packageproviding three times the extent of land that was occupied in theoriginal village. This perception is partly fuelled by the complicationsof an ancestral land claim by another Induna (on behalf of theMatlou Communal Property Association (CPA)) for which theGovernment granted a 350ha portion of the Sterkwater farm. This350ha was a portion of land that had already been leased to AP bythe Government and subsequently given to the Ga Pila communityas part of their resettlement compensation package. This hascreated the perception in the community that the land awarded aspart of the compensation package was not secure. Questions andconcerns relating to AP’s performance and responsibility as wellas the Government’s responsibility in relation to the land claim arediscussed in Section A.6.3.was of at least equal value. Whether the value of new houses wasgreater than those lived in previously is, however, shown to becontested in this study. The quality and adequacy of houses appearsto have been the source of significant grievances, which are in someways at the root of the resistance at Ga Pila. AP’s alignment in thisregard is discussed further in Section A.5.2.Photographs of the structures from the old village suggest that thenew houses provided have resulted in an overall improvement inliving conditions. Those community members who lived in shacksin the old village, for instance, received permanent structures oncethey relocated to Sterkwater. Similarly, in spite of complaints aboutthe quality and reliability of infrastructure and services provided,they were at least restored and, in many respects, improved.Challenges with handing over services to the Municipality werea contributing factor to disrupting the quality and continuity ofservices.From the perspective of the IFC Performance Standard 5, and basedon ERM’s observations, the degree of overall improvement to housesand living conditions is noticeable. Measuring improvements toliving conditions and houses is subjective however, and requiresa significant value judgment. The perception of the majority ofcommunity members at Ga Pila is that their living conditions havenot been improved. This is discussed in Section A.6.3.A.5 KEY WEAKNESSES:REACTIVE APPROACHAP’s reactive approach to resettlement planning is illustratedby weaknesses in performance in the following aspects of theresettlement:• the consideration of alternatives and negotiation for land;• the lack of adequate consultation, including the ongoingmanagement of expectations;• the lack of adequate implementation planning; and• the lack of responsiveness to both a changingenvironment and grievances.These are discussed in more detail below.A.4.6Compensation of Equal or GreaterValue and Restoration and Improvementof Living ConditionsAP ensured that all houses and structures at Ga Pila were measuredin the audit and that replacement property provided to householdsv

A.5.1Consideration of Alternatives andNegotiation for LandAvoid or Minimise ResettlementThe relocation of Ga Pila was motivated by incidences of fly rocklanding in the village from the operational Sandsloot pit, as well asthe need to extend the Mine’s life by creating additional space tostore waste rock (with the Ga Pila village presenting an ideal site).The fact that there was already an active pit and blasting activitiesonly 250 metres from inhabited settlements, would seem to indicatethat either the likelihood of potential resettlement was not identifiedat the time of mine design, or that alternative designs were nowconsidered and reflected further economic value in the open pit.The need for resettlement does not appear to have been identifiedas part of an early impact assessment for the Ga Pila site. Rather,the relocation was a reactive measure implemented by AP on thebasis of both safety concerns and requirements for storage of wasterock once mining was underway. An IFC aligned process wouldhave conducted an impact assessment up front and put measuresin place to mitigate impacts on affected communities prior to thecommencement of operations.Consultation on Land Rights, the EIA and other DecisionsAffecting the CommunityAP’s first point of contact in 1991 regarding the acquisition/lease ofVaalkop and Sandsloot farms, was the MTA, under the leadershipof Kgoshigadi Langa. Doing so was in keeping with acceptedtraditional authority protocols, whereby the Kgoshigadi and herCouncil are the highest authority and have the right to speak onbehalf of their communities. From this evidence it would seem thata negotiated approach to acquisition of land rights did take place, atleast in terms of accepted traditional authority protocol at the time.It is arguable that having agreement from the MTA, AP rightfullyinterpreted this to mean that the transaction was endorsed, or atleast not challenged, by the affected communities. A more criticalanalysis, however might argue that by negotiating with only thetraditional authorities and the Government, AP failed to recognisethe potential for this transaction to be disputed by communitymembers who had customary rights to the land as a communalresource even under the custodianship of the chief. Under the IFCstandards, this consultation with the Kgosigadi on land acquisition‘on behalf of the community’ raises questions about the inclusivity ofthe negotiated settlement, which ideally should have consulted withmembers of the community itself.mitigation findings of an EIA, but rather motivated by safety andother concerns around maintaining the viability of an alreadyoperational mine. These imperatives meant relocation had becomeinevitable, thereby giving the community no real choice in thematter. This means that, although community members wereincluded through an iterative process of consultation during latterphases of the resettlement process, AP did not achieve ‘Free PriorInformed Consultation’ on the critical decisions around the transferof the land and decision to relocate.Some accounts suggest that Ga Pila community members feltpowerless and not properly informed from the point of very firstcontact on the subject of the relocation. One could argue that thesecircumstances fostered mistrust between the community and APand, in many ways, set the tone for a reactive process right from thestart.A.5.2Inadequate Consultation andManagement of ExpectationsManaging ExpectationsA further critical weakness in the Ga Pila process was a continuedfailure to manage community expectations through theconsultation process. There is much evidence of AP attemptingto manage expectations but experiencing serious challenges.However, there are a number of issues around which information onexpected benefits was not clear enough, with AP failing to managethe associated risks and anticipate the full extent of communitydisappointment when they did not receive what they had hoped for.Community expectations must be understood in the contextof a newly democratic South Africa, however. Ga Pila was thefirst negotiated resettlement of its kind in the country. It quicklybecame a high politicised process where the stakes were high and,encouraged by regularly visiting politicians, community expectationsfor a bright future brought by the Mine were raised significantly. Thecommunity agreed as a collective to relocate partly because theyhoped for better lives. However, evidence during the review pointsto a lack of acceptance or understanding of information on certaincritical issues and poor communication of what the full impactsand implications of relocation would be. This was evident in theinadequate consultation relating to:• the audit and compensation, including on houses received;• inadequate house inspection process; and• expectations for employment.The study has shown, as previously discussed, that the actualdecision to relocate was similarly not based on consultation aroundvi

Consultation during the AuditThe study has flagged major community concerns around theapproach to, and perceived integrity of, the audit. In particular,community members reported a lot of confusion and a lack ofunderstanding around the audit. For example, many claimed theydid not fully understand what they were signing or the implicationsof signing. This suggests the need for clearer communication andawareness raising by AP, even beyond efforts that were made. Itmust be acknowledged, however, that the audits were co-signedby the community legal advisors as a protection mechanism forcommunity members. Many accounts suggest, however, that thelegal advisors to the communities were given too much authorityand control as go betweens in the Ga Pila process, thus underminingtheir intended role as community ‘safeguards’.Consultation on CompensationEvidence suggests that consultation around compensation was alsosomewhat weak. Transparent standards were not communicated,and AP does not appear to have helped the community to interpretand understand the compensation-related implications of theaudit findings sufficiently, especially where these were in the formof technical house plans, pictures and diagrams. These reportsare despite accounts from AP of undertaking comprehensiveconsultation on the ‘product offering’ of the new houses witheach householder, which was to be tailored to their needs. Thecommunity members’ inability to fully comprehend what was beingoffered does not appear to have been identified as a risk to theProject, and as a result, was not adequately managed through asuitable intensive and accessible education and capacity buildingprogramme to support the compensation process.Consultation on HousesThere were a number of critical decisions regarding the new houseswhich appear to have been poorly communicated to affectedresidents. This severely reduced the community’s trust in AP. Theseincluded:• A weak explanation around replacement houses and theexact purpose of the show houses (mock-ups) or the reasonsfor demolishing these prior to the completion of construction.The mock ups actually became redundant because they hadbeen rejected by the community and new house designswere redrawn. Despite the consultation process around newdrawings, this does not seem to have been fully understood.Confusion remained around the mock ups when they weredestroyed because some community members felt they hadnothing to compare their new houses with, leaving themfeeling misled and deceived.• There was a failure to properly communicate, explain andobtain full agreement on the process by which lost squaremetres in unfinished larger houses would be offset by betterfixtures and fittings in smaller complete houses which wouldreplace them. This provides an example of weak expectationmanagement.Inadequate House Inspection ProcessThere was no systematic process to facilitate the community’smonitoring of houses during construction. This contributedto the disappointment felt when people first saw their houses.The evidence shows differing points of view between AP, theconstruction contractors and the community around the scope andextent of any such an inspection process. The many grievances thatarose once houses were completed and shown to the communitysuggest that if inspections of houses took place, they were nominaland ineffective and not extended to include all members of thecommunity.High expectations around replacement houses were furtherundermined by the overall quality of the final structures, which alarge proportion of community members interviewed have reportedto be poor, citing cracks in walls and other structural flaws anddesign faults.Expectations for EmploymentAP was generally not successful in managing expectations aroundjob creation. In addition, they did not appear to put in placemeasures to create additional employment opportunities at the timeconstruction-related jobs associated with the relocation had cometo an end.The disjuncture between the high level of expectation forpermanent jobs, and the lack of measures to manage thetermination of the temporary jobs, has both created a degreeof dependency and led to conflict and resistance. This furtherexacerbated tensions and jealousies between the community andthe S21 over competition for the monthly stipends paid by AP to theS21.In general, AP’s failure to manage expectations seems to have beensymptomatic of their reactive approach to risk management, andof insufficient specilist resources allocated to consultation andcapacity building around compensation packages and house plans.Unmet expectations, particularly around quality and size of houses,were one of the key ‘triggers’ of the resistance to relocation whichemerged at Ga Pila.vii

A.5.3Lack of Adequate ImplementationPlanningImplementation appears to have been partly ad hoc and to someextent a process of ‘learning-by-doing’. The expectation of a singleintegrated planning document to guide a resettlement processonly came into currency in the mining sector in the early 2000s.AP’s more piecemeal approach at Ga Pila is probably characteristicof relocation processes conducted at the time, when companieswere less experienced in resettlement processes. It is arguablethat, as AP was undertaking the first planned large scale negotiatedresettlement of its kind in post-Apartheid South Africa, they did nothave the benefit of access to local examples of planning tools andreports from which to learn or the information sharing resourceswhich are widely available in the public domain today.According to AP, systematic documentation of the resettlementprocess was undertaken. This, however was not fully availableto ERM at the time of writing this report, meaning the extent andquality of these records has not been reviewed.A.5.4Responding to Change and GrievancesThe review has shown a pattern of unresponsiveness to change andgrievances by AP in the following examples:• failing to manage resistance;• not implementing an inclusive grievance mechanismappropriately scaled to the risks and impacts of the project;and• not sufficiently monitoring and putting in place correctiveactions where necessary.Managing ResistanceAP’s failure to recognise, acknowledge and address the grievances ofresistant minorities during the relocation process has emerged as acritical weakness; again one symptomatic of a reactive approach.AP did not manage their relationship with resistant minorities assuch groups emerged. They therefore failed to create a platformfor open and fair discussion of the concerns and demands of thesegroups. The report points to numerous examples where AP wereaware of the resistant or dissident voices but allowed them ‘to bedrowned out’ by the majority. AP does not appear to have activelysought out and engaged these groups. In addition, evidence fromcommunities suggests a lack of willingness by AP to engage directly,instead engaging through agents and contractors. This furtheralienated and aggrieved resistant individuals, deepening theirconcerns about the resettlement process. AP have reported thattheir ability and right to engage directly with the communities wasseverely restricted if not refused by the community legal advisorsfrom early on in the process, making it difficult to manage the risk ofmiscommunication.Because consultation was reliant on one formal channel ofcommunication (i.e., the S21s), the process appeared to lackconsideration and inclusion of vulnerable or marginalised groupswithin the communities. AP did not anticipate this or manage theoutcome by recognising that such groups were being excludedfrom the consultation process and were forming resistance to theProject .Implementing an Inclusive Grievance Mechanism,Appropriately Scaled to the Risks and Impacts of the ProjectThe neglect by AP to manage its relationship with resistant groupsforms part of a wider failure to design, implement and clearlycommunicate a grievance management mechanism which wasadequate both in terms of its accessibility and its appropriateness foruse by all affected parties. The fact that the grievance mechanismwas largely subsumed within the S21 structure, compromisedits effectiveness, particularly because community concerns werenot only about households defects but also about the integrity,accountability and effectiveness of the S21 entity as a feedbackmechanism.The use of the S21 in the grievance procedure seems to haveworked initially but later failed or lost momentum and accountabilityat the time of the resettlement. This resulted in growing mistrustamongst the community. Evidence suggests that AP did notrecognise or address the need for an alternative channel forgrievances. In addition, they did not institute a formal system fortracking and communicating responses to assure accountability.Critically this coincided with a period of growing resistance as aresult of unhappiness over houses and lack of employment.In addition, no adequate, independent mechanism was put in placefor the impartial management of disputes and conflict relatingto the relocation process. This can be considered a critical flawin the Ga Pila relocation since, in the absence of an independentmediation process, some factions of the community chose protest(sometimes violent) as a vehicle for voicing their concerns. Othersformed resistance groups, while still others chose the media or legalchannels initiated through external lawyers. All of the above, it couldbe argued, results from a failure on the part of AP to implement agrievance mechanism which could adequately address the concernsof all.viii

Lack of Monitoring and Corrective ActionsWhen measured against the IFC requirements, it is clear that nooverall, systematic monitoring and evaluation process was putin place at Ga Pila for the resettlement process. This resulted in afailure to identify and respond to the emergence of resistant groups,as well as a failure to identify and address the inadequacies andweaknesses of both the consultation and grievance managementprocedures. There is also no evidence of monitoring or evaluationhaving been put in place to assess livelihoods in a post resettlementcontext. A ‘lessons learned’ exercise was reportedly carried out byAP and their consultants SRK Consulting but there does not seemto have been any systematic attempt to apply the learnings in orderto inform future planning at Motlhotlo across all key aspects of theresettlement process.Evidence of monitoring and evaluation and of the implementationof corrective actions would normally be expected as a criticalcomponent of the management of such a large, complex project.A.6 KEY WEAKNESSES:LARGELY TECHNICALAPPROACHAP’s focus on the more technical and physical aspects ofresettlement, to the relative exclusion of the ‘softer’ and ultimatelymore complex aspects of resettlement, are illustrated in theirapproach to the following aspects of the process:• inappropriate institutional capacity, both internal andexternal;• limited inclusivity of the consultation and participatoryprocesses;• failure to recognise or address the overarching emotionalor non-physical impacts of resettlement;• approaches to eligibility and compensation; and• failure to recognise and address the need for postresettlementdevelopment.These are discussed in more depth below.A.6.1Lack of Appropriate InstitutionalCapacity: Internal and ExternalWhen measured against the IFC standards, the team charged withthe resettlement at Ga Pila seems to have lacked the requiredspecialist input necessary to direct a resettlement process of this sizeand complexity. This is especially the case with respect to expertsin the fields of community relations, dispute resolution, livelihoodsanalysis, and social and community development. Rather, thereappears to have been a relatively small, technical team of projectmanagers, engineers, human resource professionals and constructioncontractors tasked with handling all elements of the process. Thisincludes grievance management and dispute resolution, as well ascommunication and stakeholder engagement. Moreover, there isno evidence of a trained community relations or communicationsspecialist being brought in to support the team, even once disputesbegan to arise.AP allowed the role of community liaison and grievance feedback tobe filled by a community-appointed legal advisor, when this wouldhave been best filled by someone who represented the Mine itself.Although this reportedly occurred at the community’s request, APshould have recognised the limitations and potential risks of thisarrangement, and provided an alternative parallel mechanism.Although a social consultant was hired to inform the early phases ofthe process, there was no long term social or community relationsspecialist built into the Project Management team. The inclusion ofsuch a resource would have added significant value and would haveaffected positive change in the ongoing post-resettlement planningprocess.In terms of external capacity, institutional capacity was identified asa risk and potential constraint in the EIA at a very early stage in theprocess. The need for capacity building and focused engagementwith key government stakeholders on the relocation process wasidentified as important in the EIA carried out by SRK, as was carefulconsideration of the proposed role of Government institutions.Discussions with AP have not provided ERM with any clarity onwhether or how these recommendations were implemented, if at all.The noticeable lack of regular Provincial Government involvementin the long term delivery and implementation of the Ga Pilaresettlement process beyond the initial land and compensationnegotiations, and or support in the post resettlement period,suggests that this issue was never properly addressed.A.6.2Limited Inclusiveness of the ConsultationProcessAn assessment of the consultation procedure and grievancemechanism suggests that they were ultimately inappropriate for thepurpose. The benefits of adopting a consultative and participatoryapproach was severely undermined by the fact that the mainrepresentative structure used for communication, namely the S21,became ineffective at ensuring adequate disclosure of informationor in soliciting feedback from all those it was elected to represent.ix

Although the S21 was arguably more effective in its role at Ga Pilathan were the S21s in Motlhotlo, the reliance on only the S21 as theprimary channel for consultation and grievance collection meant theprocess was ultimately not inclusive of all resistant and vulnerablegroups as well as of those householders absent from the area at thetime of the relocation. Critically, AP failed to adjust the approach toconsultation and communication on perceiving the ineffectivenessof the S21 mechanism.The criticism most often heard of AP was its lack of directinvolvement in the management of the resettlement process. Inparticular, this was evident in their failure to consult directly withcommunities and critics. Evidence suggests that AP consistentlyfailed to meet the community in person. AP’s detachment hasbeen interpreted by many as insensitive, and as a failure to respectand acknowledge the fundamental psycho-social and emotionalimpacts of the relocation. AP claim to have been forced by thecommunity’s legal advisors to conduct consultation through themonly and or other agents and contractors. Regardless of the reasonsfor this perceived ‘arms length approach’, it has severely weakenedAP’s relationship and long term social licence to operate in thesecommunities.A.6.3Recognising and Addressing the NonphysicalImpacts of ResettlementAP seems to have failed to sufficiently acknowledge or address thepotential emotional, psycho-social or non-physical impacts of theresettlement. These include the intangible, qualitative social effectsof displacement which stem from the upheaval associated with theloss of land, home and sense of place and community, as well as thelong term damage to social cohesion associated with conflict andthe factionalism which arose in the community. Whilst effort wasput into short term, physical interventions, it would seem that thelong term psycho-social impacts and associated losses were neverproperly addressed or acknowledged by AP.Divisions in the community have formed or become moreentrenched as a result of the resettlement process. Manycommunity respondents stressed that there are cases of familiesbeing divided by the disputes. The process can therefore be shownto have seriously and negatively affected the social fabric of thiscommunity.A.6.4 Approaches to Eligibility and CompensationVulnerabilityThe review points to a failure on the part of AP to recognise thatresettlement impacts some more seriously than others becauseof vulnerabilities or differing needs. As a result, AP has not putmeasures in place to address these vulnerabilities. The evidencesuggests that different categories of affected people were notidentified, with the community at Ga Pila treated rather as ahomogenous group where all individuals were considered to haveequal needs. For instance, a notion of differing vulnerabilities didnot inform AP’s specific approach to establishing entitlements ona household-to-household basis, other than size/quality of originaldwelling.A more thorough understanding of the differing needs of individualhouseholds could have helped AP to identify some of thedifferences and inequalities which exacerbated tensions that aroseand became the source of challenges to the resettlement process,such as, those concerning proportional benefits.Inadequate CompensationCompensation at Ga Pila seems to have been generally insufficientgiven the scale of the impacts and upheaval caused by relocationon the community. For example, an amount provided as a settlingin allowance was R5,000 where figures of between R100,000 andR250,000 were initially being discussed amongst the communityand their legal advisors. Many at Ga Pila feel strongly that AP shouldbe prepared to renegotiate the terms of relocation due to thesignificant discrepancy between compensation packages offered atMotlhotlo and Ga Pila. The community at Ga Pila is highly aggrievedthat the cash component they received is a significant order ofmagnitude less than the amount offered at Motlhotlo, whereR20,000 was provided to each homestead in addition to the houseand cash compensation provided for other lost assets. AP report thatthe full resettlement package ended up amounting to a figure sixtimes in excess of the budget that the team was originally providedwith.ERM cannot comment on the adequacy of the ‘settling in’ allowanceagainst today’s standards as this was negotiated by the S21 andlegal advisors at the time, and presumably benchmarked in someway. This review does, however, raise the question of whetherthe resettlement package offered at Ga Pila fairly reflected thefull spectrum of resettlement impacts and losses experienced bythis community: crops and graves were compensated on requestbut only later in the process; land loss was not measured andcompensated at an individual/household level; and inadequateefforts were made to identify, measure and compensate thelivelihoods impacts of displacement.Replacement Land and Security of TenureThe reportedly inadequate replacement of communal farm landemerged as a major grievance and significant criticism of AP’sx

process. This does not appear to have been managed sensitively,and points to a lack of recognition of the importance of land basedlivelihoods for the impacted community. The issue around theloss of a 350 ha portion of land which was included in the originalcompensation package at Sterkwater was raised repeatedly byconcerned community members. This land (originally leased by theGovernment to AP) was given to the Ga Pila community as part ofthe compensation package from AP. The same portion of land wassubsequently retracted and awarded by the Government to MatloluCPA as a result of successful ancestral land claim. Neither theGovernment nor AP has yet compensated Ga Pila for this lost land.The community was adamant that AP have made promises inthe past to compensate this loss but has failed to deliver. Despitethe account from AP that land received at Sterkwater in thecompensation package was three times what was held by thecommunity in the old village, the 350 ha issue has still led to angeramongst the community about being ‘short-changed’ in termsof the total land area promised. All community groups at Ga Pilareported that the loss of the 350 ha of communal land has had adetrimental effect on their livelihoods.Moreover, the granting of this land claim has significantlyundermined the Ga Pila community’s sense of belonging andsecurity on the land. They repeatedly expressed concerns that theywere living on another Induna’s land to which they feel they do nothave rights. This appears to have escalated the stress and anxietyassociated with the relocation. Several community members havenoted that they will never be ‘at home’ in Sterkwater as a result.Lack of Focus on Restoration of LivelihoodsThe longer term livelihoods impacts of resettlement were not welladdressed at Ga Pila. While it can be argued that living conditionshave been improved in the new village in a physical sense, thestudy raises questions around whether the improvement isholistically experienced. AP failed to supplement the physicalimprovements with socio-economic improvements. For instance,AP did not undertake, as an integrated component of theresettlement, to provide targeted assistance to sufficiently addressincome earning capacity, production levels and standards of living.No financial or other compensation appears to have beencalculated per household for loss of access to and use of grazingland (which although communal, is allocated on an individualbasis by the Induna). There also appears to have been limitedconsideration of transition support to facilitate full restoration oflivelihoods.From the perspective of the IFC standards, not all assets werecompensated at full replacement cost; AP in turn did not attempt toaccount for the effects of these losses on long term livelihoods at ahousehold level.A.6.5Identifying Appropriate DevelopmentBenefitsAt the time of undertaking this review, there was little evidenceof any coordinated and planned development initiatives havingbeen undertaken at Ga Pila since resettlement was completed.Those projects that have been undertaken seem to have been adhoc and not designed with sustainability in mind. Job creation,beyond the 300 community members temporarily employedduring the construction of the new village, appears to have beenlimited. The majority of community respondents cited very highunemployment as one of the most significant challenges nowfacing the community. All those interviewed at Ga Pila have veryhigh expectations that the Mine should help create jobs in thearea. It was also widely felt that tertiary education bursaries andeducation initiatives for skills and capacity building should havebeen a bigger part of AP’s legacy.Had a RAP or planning instrument been developed for Ga Pila, itwould have ensured inclusion of some form of livelihoods analysisto assess and manage the impacts of the relocation. This in turnwould have informed a detailed post-resettlement developmentplanning exercise. Instead, only two development initiatives havereportedly been offered and only one, the development of avegetable garden at Groenfontein, is targeted exclusively at Ga Pila.There are also concerns about the viability of the project related toan outstanding land claim on the area.It is, however, acknowledged that conditions within the receivingenvironment are likely to have posed significant challengesregardless of efforts made. One of these challenges related toapparent lack of external and Government capacity to effectivelypartner with AP in livelihood restoration and communitydevelopment projects. In terms of creating an enablingenvironment for development, there have reportedly been noefforts from Government to support income generating activitiesin the Ga Pila community. There has also been limited assistancein this regard from external NGOs. Apparently only one NGO hasbeen operating in Ga Pila. Others who were previously interestedin becoming active in the area were deterred by the conflict andresettlement fall-outs.Although this is likely to have been a limiting factor, it canbe argued that AP should have carried out an assessment ofGovernment’s capacity to play an effective role in communityxi

development initiatives, as well as more generally to take a rolein the whole resettlement process. Whilst such an investigationis likely to have revealed a lack of capacity (as admitted by localGovernment officials interviewed), such knowledge would haveenabled AP to either engage in suitable skills enhancement activitiesor to have found alternative capacity to meet the post-resettlementrequirements of the Ga Pila village to ensure development.Another constraining factor in the implementation of successfuldevelopment programmes is the psycho-social conditions withinthe receiving environment and, in particular, the current perceptionsof community members about the future. The climate at the timeof undertaking this review was characterised by deep mistrust felttowards AP as well as high expectations for a renegotiation of theresettlement terms. This is not conducive to the uptake of newdevelopment programmes. Such initiatives are likely to be furtherconstrained by weak capacity and poor educational standardsamongst the community. There is an acute need for capacitybuilding and empowerment, particularly amongst the youngermembers of these communities, in order to facilitate effective, andappropriate sustainable development interventions. Conversationswith some young community respondents indicated a willingnessto participate in capacity building initiatives, should they be madeavailable.A.7 SUMMARY OFALIGNMENT FINDINGSERM has categorised the IFC Performance Standards pertaining toresettlement into nine topics related to key chronological phases ofactivity important in any IFC aligned relocation process. The topicsare:• Topic 1: Avoid or Minimise Resettlement;• Topic 2: Land Acquisition and Land Rights;• Topic 3: Identifying Affected People, Assessing Eligibilityand Establishing Cut-Off Dates;• Topic 4: Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation;• Topic 5: Compensation;• Topic 6: Grievance Management;• Topic 7: Provide Relocation Assistance and TransitionSupport;• Topic 8: Improve / Restore Living Conditions andLivelihoods, and Address Post-Resettlement DevelopmentNeeds;• Topic 9: Implementation Planning, Ensuring InstitutionalCapacity and Transparency.The table below provides a summary of the alignment ratings against these IFC requirements:Table 1.1 Summary of Performance Assessment FindingsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)Topic 1: Avoid or Minimise ResettlementPS 5, Section 7A project should consider feasiblealternative project designs to avoidor at least minimise physical oreconomic displacement.Topic 2: Land Acquisition and Land RightsNon-alignmentInadequate prior identification of safety risks and impactsof mining and design of appropriate measures tomitigate these, e.g. relocation.No evidence or consideration of alternatives to avoidor minimise resettlement prior to commencement ofmining activities.PS 5, Section 3Projects are encouraged to acquireland rights through negotiatedsettlements whenever possible.Partial alignmentTraditional protocols were followed. The land acquisitionnegotiation process did however, exclude the broadercommunity.PS 5, Section 12Document all transactions to acquireland rights.Non-alignmentNot formally documenting the decision’s historically‘unique’ sub-lease arrangement was a critical omissionon the part of the legal advisors, AP and the DLA giventhe significance of the issues at hand.xii

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 1, Section20, 21 & 22PS 1, Section21; PS 5,Section 8 & 9PS 5, Section8 & 9PS 5, Section 16PS 1, Section22; PS 5,Section 8 & 9Topic 5: CompensationPS5, Section 16PS 5, Section 17PS 5, Section 8PS 5, Section 8& 18Consultation should focus on socialand environmental risks and adverseimpacts, and proposed measures toaddress them.Consultation to be iterative and tobe carried out on an on-going basis.Communities to be included inconsultation on compensationpayment.Displaced people to be offered achoice of new host site.Views of the affected communityto be incorporated into decisionswhich affect their lives.Provide resettlement options,including adequate replacementhousing or cash compensationwhere appropriate.Provide replacement property ofequal or higher value.Where livelihoods are land-based,preference to be given for landbased compensation.Provide compensation for all lostassets at full replacement cost.Non-alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentAlignment -Non-alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentOnce the resettlement process commenced,consultation focused predominantly on terms andconditions of relocation rather than on social andenvironmental impacts (such as on livelihoods) and theirmitigation.AP did put considerable effort into consulting atcertain key points in the relocation. However, AP wassignificantly less successful in ensuring opportunities foron-going consultation in a post-resettlement context.AP did carry out consultation on compensationpayment. However, concerns remain regarding theextent to which people fully understood audit andcompensation process. Gaps in the process led to poorlymanaged expectations and violent resistance.Ultimately free prior and informed consultation was notachieved on decision to relocate and later consultationdid not sufficiently incorporate views of all affectedpeople into the decision making process. The exceptionto this is site selection.A choice of different host sites was offered but nooptions or choice in type of compensation wasoffered; only replacement housing plus fixed settling inallowance.Some houses lack full replacement square metre floorarea because plans for larger unfinished houses wereredrawn to complete them more quickly. This wasconsulted on and AP did offset ‘lost square metres’with additional fixtures and fittings. However, this wasreported as being poorly explained and resulted ingrievances. Standard of finish in many houses was alsoreported to be poor.Ploughing and grazing land was replaced, over andabove original amounts. However, loss of 350 ha due tothe land claim significantly decreased the total amountof land given. This was not replaced. Impacts of loss ofland per household was not measured or compensated.Assets other than houses were not fully compensated.PS 5, Section 18Provide compensation for assetsother than land.Partial alignmentLost crops, boreholes and graves were not initiallycompensated, only later in the process if requested. Nocompensation was paid for fruit trees.PS 5, Section 18PS 5, Section 20Compensation costs to be paid inlieu of cash compensation wherefeasible.Compensate for loss of commercialstructures or provide replacementproperty, of equal or greater value.Partial alignmentAlignment -Cash compensation paid later for crops and graves.xiv

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section 16Compensation to be supplied priorto resettlement.Non-alignmentPaid R5 000 settling in allowance only after they hadmoved.Topic 6: Grievance ManagementPS5 Section 10 Develop a grievance mechanism. Partial alignmentPS 1 Section 23PS 1 Section 23PS 1 Section 23PS5, Section 10PS 1 Section 23Communities to be informed aboutthe grievance mechanism and anunderstandable process to be used.Ensure grievance mechanism isculturally appropriate and readilyaccessible to all segments of theaffected communities.Ensure grievance mechanism isscaled to the risks and adverseimpacts of the project.Grievance mechanism to establishand maintain a constructiverelationship with affectedcommunities over the life of theproject.Ensure grievance mechanismaddresses concerns promptly.Partial alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentNon– alignmentNon-alignmentStandalone grievance mechanism not formallyestablished and transparently communicated. The S21was used for all communication and grievance purposes,but had a conflict of interest because of its multiplefunctions.Although the S21 mechanism existed, it role as agrievance mechanism appears not to have been formallyadvertised or communicated.Resistance groups (and potentially other vulnerablegroups) did not use it or feel able to use the mechanismin place and resorted instead to violence, protest andmedia to get their grievances heard.Lack of standalone grievance mechanism includingimpartial/independent mechanism for dispute resolutionWhen trust in the S21 mechanism broke down this wasnot corrected and no other mechanisms put in place.The relationship with communities was thus damagedand not suitably repaired.There is no evidence of a structured approach by AP tocategorising and prioritising issues or committing toa timescale for their resolution. Most reports receivedindicate an overall slow and ad hoc response togrievances.PS 1 Section 23Grievance mechanism to betransparent.Non-alignmentS21 mechanism failed at feeding back transparently tothe community and AP; this was not corrected.PS5 Section 10Grievance mechanism to includerecourse mechanism designed toresolve disputes in impartial manner.Non-alignmentNo independent recourse mechanism for disputeresolution was in place – the community were reliant onthe S21 and community lawyers to resolve any disputes.Both were inherently involved in the resettlementprocess and therefore had a conflict of interest.PS 1 Section 23PS 1 Section 23Ensure grievance mechanism comesat no cost and without retribution.Ensure grievance mechanism doesnot impede access to judicial oradministrative remedies.Alignment -Alignment -Topic 7: Provide Relocation Assistance and Transition SupportPS 5, Section 20Provide relocation assistance todisplaced persons, and with particularattention to the needs of thevulnerable and poor.Alignment -xv

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section 20Provide transition support forlost income and costs associatedwith reinstallation of plant andequipment. Transition supportshould be provided for a reasonableperiod of time until the incomeearning capacity, production levels,and standards of living have beenrestored.Non-alignmentNo support beyond the physical moving process wasoffered.Topic 8: Improve/restore living conditions and livelihoods & address post-resettlement development needsPS5, Section 8PS5, Section 8PS 5, Section 20PS 5, Section 8PS 5, Section 12Living conditions at the newresettlement site should be thesame as or an improvement overconditions at the site from which thedisplaced persons were resettled.Compensation for loss of assetsto ensure improvement or at leastrestoration of livelihoods.For those that are economicallydisplaced, a project is required toprovide additional targeted assistanceand opportunities to improve or atleast restore livelihoods or incomelevels.Project should provide opportunitiesto displaced persons andcommunities to derive appropriatedevelopment benefits from theproject.Resettlement complete when theadverse impacts of resettlement havebeen addressed.Partial alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentTopic 9: Implementation Planning, Ensuring Institutional Capacity and TransparencyOverall improved living conditions were underminedby problems with infrastructure and service provision(especially water and drainage) and challenges withhandover to Municipality.Poor and deteriorating living conditions and apparentneglect of those families that did not relocate detractedfrom efforts made.No planned or systematic attempt to address impacts tolivelihoods on a household by household basis as a resultof the resettlement. Replacement of shops and smallbusinesses did take place however.No evidence of attempts to measure or address impactsto economically displaced to restore livelihoods/incomelevels.Very limited evidence of systematic, effective postresettlementdevelopment planning.The livelihood and intangible, psycho-social impacts ofthe resettlement remain unaddressed.PS 5, Section 12Develop appropriate RAP instrumentor implementation plan.Non-alignmentSome components in place but no dedicatedimplementation planning document/ central RAPinstrumentPS 5, Section 2Appropriate measures to mitigateadverse impacts on displaced personsand host communities should becarefully planned and implemented.Non-alignmentMining already underway once decision to resettle wastaken. ERM not aware of any prior impact assessmentundertaken leading to identification of mitigation/management measures including resettlement.PS 1, Section 17Ensure adequate capacity forimplementation.Partial alignmentInadequate social/community relations and conflictresolution capacity to deal with the social and communitydevelopment complexities inherent in a relocationprocess.PS 5, Section 12Develop monitoring and evaluationplan.Non-alignmentNo project specific monitoring and evaluationprogramme developed and implemented.xvi

B: EXECUTIVE SUMMARYB.1 Introduction to the Motlhotlo ResettlementReviewAnglo Platinum (Corporate Affairs) has appointed ERM Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereafterreferred to as ERM) to conduct a review of the resettlement processes undertaken at two sitesnear their Mogalakwena Section (formerly known as Potgietersrust Platinum Mine). These arereferred to as the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo resettlement processes, respectively.It is within the context of contention over the performance of Anglo Platinum (AP) in theseresettlement processes that AP Corporate Affairs was prompted to conduct its own detailedinternal technical investigation of the activities undertaken. In this regard, AP has requestedthat ERM conduct a review of the resettlement processes. The primary objective of this review isto highlight the strengths and weaknesses in AP’s performance in these resettlements.The key international standard used as the basis for this review is the International FinanceCorporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards (PS) on Social and Environmental Sustainability(2006), in particular Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement.The outcome of the resettlement review is two-pronged, with a focus on both a ‘looking back’at resettlement activities carried out to date and on ‘looking forward’ to ways in which relationsbetween AP and the affected communities can be improved, and to ways in which communitylivelihoods and quality of life in the affected settlements can be enhanced.i

B.2 KEY EVENTS IN THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESSExpansions at AP’s Mogalakwena Section necessitated theresettlement of the adjacent villages of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo(jointly referred to as Motlhotlo) in 2007. This followed theresettlement of the Ga Pila village in 2001.Negotiations toward land acquisition were initiated in 1998, whenAP approached the Mapela Tribal Authority (MTA) regarding thefarms Zwartfontein and Overysel. These initial discussions werefollowed by a community consultation process, initiated byKgoshigadi Langa in that same year. This culminated in the electionof two Relocation Steering Committees (RSCs), for Ga Puka and GaSekhaolelo villages, respectively. The purpose of the RSC was torepresent the community in the relocation process.In 1999, soon after the establishment of the RSCs, the communityappointed legal advisors to represent them in the relocation process.Based on progress made in negotiations between AP, the MTA andthe RSC, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the relocationwas initiated. Shortly after the initiation of the EIA in September2002, the Kgoshigadi called a community meeting to discuss therelocation, the outcome of which was a community resolution torelocate.A site selection process was initiated in 2002, during which Ga Pukaand Ga Sekhaolelo residents expressed their preferences for thefarms Armoede and Rooibokfontein. Neither of these farms wasamongst the five sites originally identified by AP as being suitable forrelocation due to water scarcity issues.The year 2002 also saw the implementation of two householdaudits, involving an inventory and valuation of assets. This audit wasundertaken of each of the 957 homesteads in Motlhotlo, includingthe additional structures erected by a sector of the youth from theaffected communities. These youth erected such structures in orderto claim compensation, where ordinarily they would only havebeen granted rights to communal land by the Induna/Headmanupon reaching a certain age or when married. An Operational teamwas established, comprised of local community residents, whowere trained to assist in the household audit process. Grave andagricultural audits were also carried out.At the conclusion of the audit process, 100 percent of homeownersreportedly signed off on the audit results and associatedcompensation measures. Residents were to be provided with newhouses, compensation for non-physical assets, a cash amount perhousehold (R20, 000), communal access to replacement agriculturalland, and a R25 million development fund per community, held intrust. This has not yet been released as it’s contingent on total vacantoccupation of the original village sites.In parallel to the audit process, the development of a resettlementaction plan was initiated, although for various reasons, this planwas never completed or adopted. The 2004 draft remains the mostrecent version.As part of the agreement to relocate and the associated lease of landto AP, two Section 21 Companies and associated S21 Committees(S21s) were established in 2003 (one for Ga Puka, another forGa Sekhaolelo). This created the legal entity necessary for AP tosub-lease the land directly from the S21 Companies, rather thanfrom the Minister of Land Affairs. This was done on the advice ofthe community legal advisors and reflected the preference of theNational Department of Land Affairs (DLA) during both MinistersDerrick Hanekom (1994 -1999) and Thoko Didiza (1999 – 2004)’sterms respectively. The existing RSCs were essentially transformedinto committees for these S21 Companies. The S21 Committees willhereafter be referred to as the ‘S21s’.These S21s became the designated legal lessor of the land underthe sub-lease agreement. Their role was to serve as a consultativefeedback mechanism for the community, and provide communityleadership on all relocation matters, until completion of theresettlement process.On 17th July 2005, a community meeting was held, attended byAP and overseen by officials of the DLA. It was at this meeting thatauthorised community representatives signed the Communal LegalAgreements (i.e., the draft lease agreements, Relocation Agreements,Donation Agreements, and a Master Agreement with AP). Villageconstruction was initiated in September 2005.In 2007, a breakaway group formed: the Motlhotlo DevelopmentCommittee (MDC). This was largely a result of the perceived failingsof the S21s to fulfil their role, as well as an effort to challenge the ‘oldorder’, and ensure better representation of the youth’s needs andconcerns in the relocation process.At the time of the resettlement commencing (29 May 2007),the MDC blockaded the move in protest. This resulted in policeaction following sometimes violent protest actions and associatedcommunity casualties and arrests. At this point, the Office of thePremier intervened, resulting in the formation of a Task Team.Members of the MDC were invited to participate in the TaskTeam along with members of the S21s and other Governmentstakeholders.ii

After the formation and early progress of the Task Team, theresettlement process recommenced. However, a faction within theMDC broke away from the group, forming another resistance group:the Motlhotlo Relocation Resistance Committee (MRRC). The MRRCclaim they formed in protest against the compromises the MDCwere making on behalf of the community since joining the TaskTeam.One hundred percent vacant occupation has not been secured atold Motlhotlo. Sixty four houses still remain; these are represented bythe MRRC. These households cannot be evicted until such time thatthe DLA ( 1 ) awards AP with their surface lease agreement for this land.The provincial DLA are, however, withholding this lease agreement.This is because the DLA is not happy with the S21’s being a lessor(‘middleman’) as originally contemplated during the former MinisterDidiza’s term. Instead, they want the direct leases with themselvesas owners of Overysel Farm and with MTA as owner of SwartfonteinFarm. To this end, engagement with all stakeholders is underwaythrough a task team led by the Department of Mineral Resourcesand the DLA. In the interim, AP has submitted their applicationfor the surface lease agreement with the national DLA. AP is stillawaiting their response.In the interim, the village construction was completed in December2008, and 893 households were relocated. Albeit that not allhouseholds have moved, AP considers that all its commitmentsin terms of the relocation agreements have been met – with theexception of some outstanding grievances associated with thehomesteads, infrastructure and services at the new site. The majorityof these were due to have been addressed by mid December 2009.Given the ineffectiveness of the sanitation system (Enviro-loos), APhas committed to providing an alternative solution in the form oflined Ventilation Improved Pots (VIPs) s in each homestead, at AP’sadditional cost. This is due to be rolled out in early 2010.AP is currently awaiting hand-over of services to the MogalakwenaMunicipality.In parallel to the above, the S21s have recently been dissolved,and consultation on an alternative structure is currently underway.It is conceived that this alternative structure will be the vehiclethrough which AP will engage the communities during the postresettlementphase, and administer the R25 million developmentfund per community.The leases (surface rights) are currently being renegotiated directlywith the landowners being Government (DLA) and the MTA to theexclusion of the erstwhile representative bodies (S21’s).1 Now Department of Rural Development or DRDB.3 Overview of Key Strengths andWeaknesses in the MotlhotloResettlement ProcessThis section provides an overview of key strengths and weaknessescharacterising the Motlhotlo resettlement process, as identifiedthrough ERM’s resettlement review. These cover a range of topics,although strengths and weaknesses relating to the consultationprocess are discussed separately in Section B.3.3.B.3.1 Key StrengthsThe greatest strength of the Motlhotlo resettlement process lies inthe ‘physical aspects’ of the resettlement process. This is reflected, inparticular, in the success of their overall approach to:• household audits and valuation of assets;• compensation for loss of assets;• grievance procedure put in place for compensationand household defects;• overall quality of the replacement houses;• key aspects of service provision;• physical support provided during the actual move;and• security of tenure for the new homesteads.Successes in these areas would seem to draw on AP’s internaltechnical capacity to coordinate and manage large scale projects.These key strengths are elaborated on below.Inventory and Valuation of AssetsOn the whole, the inventory and valuation of assets at Motlhotloappears to have been well implemented and show considerableeffort towards implementing the lessons learnt at Ga Pila. Interms of IFC Performance Standard 5, AP met the requirement ofimplementing an audit of all affected households. A comprehensiveauditing process was undertaken to ensure all assets were measured,including trees, crops and external structures.One could deduce that the benefit of the efforts put into the auditprocess is reflected in the fact that 100 percent of homeownerssigned off on the audit results. This includes key individuals who laterchanged their minds about relocating. It should, however, be notedthat concerns have subsequently been raised regarding the extentto which residents fully understood what they were signing. Thisissue is discussed in more detail later in Section B.3.2.iii

Compensation for Loss of AssetsMuch of the evidence from interviews suggests that in generalthe compensation process was handled fairly and transparently atMotlhotlo. Compensation was provided within the following broadcategories: (a) individual homesteads; (b) commercial structures;(c) grave relocations; (d) communal crop and grazing land; and(e) village infrastructure and services. Resettlement options wereoffered in terms of the sites to which communities could beresettled.As might be expected, there were cases where assets were not allfully recorded, or where omissions were made. These seem to havebeen addressed via the grievance mechanism in place. There arealso a number of informants who were simply unhappy in principlewith the compensation amount offered, and who had substantiallylarger expectations for compensation, such as wanting benefitshares in the Mine.From ERM’s observations, replacement household structures appear,across the board, to have been of equal or higher value to what waslived in prior to the relocation – although there are concerns aroundresident’s ability to maintain the houses in the long term.The standards for compensation were made transparent duringthis process, although there were cases of misunderstanding,communication challenges and unmet expectations, which resultedin people being unhappy with what they received.Grievance Procedure for Compensation and HouseholdDefectsThe mechanism for the resolution of grievances and complaintsrelating to household defects and compensation packages appearsto have been largely effective. It appears to have been widelyused by the relocated residents, thus indicating a mechanismthat was suitably accessible for the intended users. It is contestedby a number of those interviewed as to whether all grievanceslodged were responded to; AP can, however, provide documentaryevidence of responses in the form of a grievance log. The log relatesto those grievances lodged with the project office during and afterthe construction process and shows a clear and effective process forresolution of complaints. For compensation and household defects,the grievance mechanism seems by and large to have been trusted.Overall Quality of Replacement HousesIn terms of meeting IFC requirements, the standards of the housesof the overwhelming majority of resettled residents have beensubstantially improved, when compared with their old dwellingsand environment. This assessment is, however, not shared by allthose affected, with a number of community respondents (relocatedand resistant members) indicating a preference for their originalhomesteads versus the modern replacements (which they see asbeing of a poorer quality), and the lack of character of the newsettlement. These matters are difficult to comment on since theyare founded in differing notions of what is valuable. However, thesecomments point to the fact that an improved structure is not in itselfenough to counter the impacts associated with loss of land, homeand sense of place and community (see Section B.3.2).Whilst many concerns have been expressed about varioushousehold defects, discussions with AP and a review of projectdocumentation and grievance management procedures showedthat AP were actively responding to and managing these concerns.At the time of writing this report, the Project Management team wasactively working towards ensuring that, where relevant, the snaglistson all houses are addressed.It should be noted, however, that in the absence of suitablecommunity development initiatives and wage earning opportunities(considered a weakness of this resettlement process), local residentswill not be able to afford the upkeep of the replacement housesthat AP have provided, resulting in the inevitable deterioration ofthese homesteads. This is likely to cause on-going tension betweenthe two parties, as residents continue to blame AP for householddefects which typically occur in the life of any home, and for whichhomeowners themselves are responsible in the long term.Key Aspects of Service ProvisionAP’s plans for improved service provision shows an intention tosignificantly improve the quality and availability of services in GaPuka and Ga Sekhaolelo. The baseline of public services provisionin the old communities was very poor. In contrast, AP has madespecific provision for water supply, sewerage (Enviro-loos),electrification of homesteads and installation of street lighting,a formalised system of roads, waste removal, and provision ofreplacement schools and clinic, plus nurses’ accommodation.In terms of improved living conditions, the provision of services hasnot been entirely successful. This pertains in particular to sanitationprovision, the inadequacy of which has become a source of mistrustwithin the relocated communities. Measures have been put inplace to address all identified defects. In the case of the Enviroloos,AP has committed to providing an alternative solution in theform of lined VIP toilets in each homestead, at AP’s additional cost.Authorisation for this has been granted by the Department of Waterand Environmental Affairs, although according to AP, full agreementhas not yet been reached with the Mogalakwena Municipality.iv

AP are however hoping to install the VIPs in early 2010. Rentedportable toilets are being provided as in interim measure.Previous problems were also experienced with the access roadto Ga Puka, storm water erosion and water provision. These havesince been addressed (e.g., the access road to Ga Puka has beenre-tarred), and AP is currently awaiting hand-over of services to theMogalakwena Municipality, as per the Services Agreement. Thisagreement stipulates that the Municipality will take responsibility forall services at the completion of construction. At the time of writingthis report, the Municipality had only accepted responsibility forwaste removal.Provision of Relocation AssistanceThe evidence indicates that relocation assistance was providedto communities, but that this was focused predominantly on thephysical moving process itself. No provision was made for assessingand addressing the need for targeted assistance to vulnerablegroups during this process.This aside, a lot of effort was put into the actual physical relocation,as captured within the Relocation Project Plan (May 2007), whichcovers key aspects such as: the scope and anticipated timingof phased handover of houses; a profile of the key affectedstakeholders; requirements, constraints and obligations in termsof the handover; an assessment of risks and a description of theenvisaged process for handover. It also provides some detailson the relocation management structure, resources, roles andresponsibilities, dispute resolution processes, structures andresources, and a communication strategy.Removal contractors were appointed by AP to move all householditems, and salvage teams were arranged to assist communitymembers with salvaging valuable raw and recyclable materials suchas corrugated iron from their properties.Security of Homestead TenureWithin the existing regulatory context, ensuring title deeds toindividual homeowners was not an option open to AP, where theland is owned communally and under the custodianship of theKgoshigadi (chief ). AP is considered compliant in terms of ensuringsecurity of homestead ownership at the new village. At the time ofwriting the report, 76 percent of all homeowners had received theirsigned-off building plans and occupational certificates. These serveas proof of homestead ownership.B.3.2 Key WeaknessesThe key weaknesses of the Motlhotlo resettlement process include:• lack of integrated resettlement planning;• lack of consideration of vulnerable groups;• inadequate livelihood restoration and post developmentplanning;• lack of systematic monitoring and evaluationprocedures;• lack of mechanisms to resolve disputes in an impartialmanner; and• lack of consideration of the psycho-social impacts ofresettlement.These reflect a weakness in process related aspects of the relocation,including a planning approach which didn’t take full cognisanceof the full range of impacts associated with resettlement, andinadequate monitoring and evaluation. There are also concerns withAP’s approach to several of the ‘non-physical aspects’ of relocation,including managing resistance, disputes, and vulnerable groupsThese are discussed in more detail below.Lack of Integrated Resettlement PlanningWhilst the above efforts are acknowledged in this review, AP’s rolein managing the impacts of resettlement was undermined by thelack of an overall planning approach suitable for a resettlementprocess. This short-coming is demonstrated in the lack of an overallplanning document, most notably, the absence of a completedand implemented Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). Although adraft RAP was developed by a consulting firm, the 2004 draft wasnever finalised, and subsequently never applied to the Motlhotloresettlement. Instead, it served more as a record of what took placeduring the Scoping Phase of the EIA, and not as an action plan forthe management of impacts associated with resettlement.AP explained that further development of the RAP was resisted bythe community through the S21s and their legal advisors. In theabsence of an integrated RAP document, a number of activityfocussedrelocation planning documents were developed andutilised in its place by AP. These included separate action plandocuments for: (a) the construction of the new villages; (b) physicalrelocation of the communities; and (c) weekly progress reports andrisk assessments.v

During the review, ERM had sight of a number of documents (e.g.,the Project Relocation Record [May 2007], Relocation Project Plan[May 2007], EIA documentation and the draft RAP), which indicatedsensible approaches to various elements of the resettlementplanning process. However, these were captured in a range ofseparate documents, and not in a single management plan oroverarching process. ERM believes that the lack of a single planningprocess and associated systems and documentation, suitable forthe scale and complexity of such a process, undermined AP’s abilityto proactively identify and manage the risks and impacts of theresettlement process. Typically, a RAP document would fulfil thisneed by serving as a risk management tool.The failure to complete and implement the RAP meant that anumber of key risks typically addressed within a RAP were not takeninto account or managed in an integrated, systematic manner. Themost noticeable gaps in this regard are:• a failure to translate the impacts identified in the Socio-Economic Assessment Report (2004) into appropriatemanagement measures;• inadequate consideration of vulnerable groups, andits implications for differential compensation andentitlements;• inadequate systematic livelihoods and capacity analysisat household level to inform the baseline prior to theresettlement, and inform focused livelihood restorationmeasures and post-development planning; and• lack of a systematic monitoring and evaluationprocedure.Whilst it could be argued that abiding by IFC requirements forresettlement planning were only emerging at the time of theresettlement, and were thus not part of popular thinking, the factthat AP had recent experience with the Ga Pila resettlement shouldhave resulted in greater emphasis on the need for more systematicand integrated approach to resettlement planning.The gaps identified above are discussed in more detail below.Consideration of Vulnerable Groups and Links to the EIAProcessThe evidence suggests that different categories of affectedpeople were not identified, with the communities at Ga Puka andGa Sekhaolelo treated as a homogenous groups and where allindividuals were considered to have equal needs for the purposesof resettlement. Although the EIA process identified some generalvulnerabilities within the affected communities, these did notinform AP’s specific approach to establishing the entitlementson a household-to-household basis beyond size of replacementhouse and cash compensation for non-structural assets. As a result,interventions were not targeted for specific ‘need groups’. A reviewof the evidence provided indicates that the following are likely tobe/ have been the key vulnerable groups: youth, female headedhouseholds, the elderly, and the illiterate.A more thorough understanding of the respective and differingneeds of individual households could have helped AP to identifysome of the inequalities and disputes that later became the sourceof serious challenges to the resettlement process.When questioned about the approach taken towards vulnerablegroups, AP explained that their approach was to try to mitigatethe impacts/ vulnerabilities as they arose. This reflects a reactiveversus a proactive approach to risk management. According to AP,the challenge of applying differential treatment (based on varyingvulnerability) was that they would then immediately be chargedwith allowing disproportional benefits to one group versus another.Inadequate Post-Resettlement DevelopmentIn spite of the overall success of efforts to improve people’s livingconditions (particularly, homesteads and service provision), APappears to have had less success with systematic post-resettlementdevelopment. A review of existing measures also shows thatinadequate attention has been put into the creation of sustainablelong term development benefits for the relocated villages. Thosethat have been developed have been met with limited success.Concerns were also raised by AP regarding internal capacity tosuccessfully meet the requirements of post-resettlement planning.Had the RAP been completed, and to the required standards, itwould have ensured consideration of a livelihoods analysis whenassessing and managing the impacts on people’s lives. This wouldhave moved AP well beyond a focus on re-establishing existinglivelihoods (e.g., preparation of fields outside of the homestead andre-establishing business enterprises); rather, it would have ensuredthat AP went through a detailed planning exercise for the setting upof post-resettlement development initiatives. Awareness of theserequirements is evident in the table of contents of the draft RAP(2004). Unfortunately, the fact that the RAP was never completed isreflected in the largely unsuccessful livelihoods restoration measures.It is, however, acknowledged that conditions within the receivingenvironment are likely to pose significant challenges regardlessof efforts made. One of these challenges relates to the lack ofGovernment capacity to effectively partner with AP in livelihoodsdevelopment projects. An assessment of Government capacity tovi

play an effective role in livelihoods development initiatives (and inthe overall resettlement process), would have enabled AP to eitherengage in suitable skills enhancement or to find alternative capacityto meet the requirements of the Motlhotlo resettlement – in thisinstance, those related to community development initiatives.Another constraining factor is the psycho-social conditions withinthe resettled communities. Comments made by Governmentstakeholders, and by community residents themselves, pointto a climate of dependency on AP for on-going provision ofemployment, services and general assistance. An attitude ofdependency (to whatever degree) can severely hamper thedevelopment of sustainable development initiatives, which require apartnering approach, underpinned by a vision for self-dependence.Whilst this attitude of dependency is certainly not the only realitywithin the resettled communities – one need only reflect on thelevel of mobilisation against the resettlement as evidence – therewere community comments made which pointed to a belief thatsolutions for improving their future do not lie in their own handsbut should come solely from AP. Whilst it is beyond the remit of thisreview to analyse the causal factors behind such attitudes, it is notedthat such expectations present an extremely difficult environmentfor the implementation of development initiatives.The inclusion of a social specialist on the Project Management Team,namely, someone with experience and knowledge of the planningand implementation of community development initiatives, wouldhave added significant value to this aspect of the post-resettlementplanning process. In spite of AP’s efforts to include the services of aSocial Specialist Consultant, this was declined by the S21s and theirlegal advisors.AP’s relative poor performance with post-resettlement developmenthas had implications across the resettlement process – in termsof unmet community expectations around employment andbenefits associated with the Mine, and the impact this hashad on community relations; in terms of on-going grievancesregarding conditions of their houses, fuelled in part by an inabilityof homeowners to pay for the upkeep of individual homesteads,and the apportioning of blame to AP; the likelihood of long termcommunity dependence on the Mine, and linked to this, thepotential for community reluctance to concede any ‘compliance’ orgood performance on AP’s part, lest this weaken their bargainingposition.Lack of a Systematic Monitoring and Evaluation ProcedureWhen measured against the IFC requirements for monitoring, it isclear that no systematic monitoring and evaluation process wasput in place for the resettlement process – this is in spite of thefact that the draft RAP made some progress towards developingthese measures. One could argue that the strong managementand supervision function carried out by the Project ManagementTeam served as something of an informal monitoring function. Thisoversight role was carried out, in particular, by the assistant projectmanagers and the ‘community liaison and social services’ team, whomanaged the grievance office and interacted on a regular basiswith the community residents, and the Operational and CommunityLiaison Officer (CLO) teams.During the audit and compensation process, AP ensured thatthe audit team were supported by 14 assistants (known as theOperational Team). These comprised seven people each from GaPuka and Ga Sekhaolelo. This team was recruited and trained bythe Project Management Team. CLOs, two from each community,were also appointed by the community and were employed tohandle the grievances being lodged during the audit and householdconstruction phase.The regular interaction of these teams with local residents, andoversight of the audit, construction and compensation process, willhave given them the opportunity to informally monitor the situationon the ground, and identify issues as they arose. Where complaintsor issues were raised, these would be recorded in the grievance logand signed off once corrective action had been taken.However, an integrated monitoring and evaluation plan andassociated programme of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) andtargets were not developed and applied to all areas of resettlementactivity in the planning, implementation and post-resettlementstages. Performance was not routinely tracked against targetsto establish relevant operational controls/ checks and balances.Evidence of such an approach is seen in the HomeownerQueries and Defects procedure, but less in the areas of social riskmanagement, and community liaison. The monitoring measuresused are therefore not considered an adequate substitute for thesystematic and regular monitoring of performance, and associatedcorrective action, both of which are key when managing thecomplexities inherent to resettlement. This is considered a significantgap in the Motlhotlo resettlement process.Concerns regarding the lack of capacity of these teams (assistantproject managers, ‘community liaison and social services’ team andthe CLOs) were also raised as a concern, as discussed in Section B.3.3.Lack of Mechanism to Resolve Disputes in ImpartialMannerIn spite of key strengths within the grievance procedure (notably,those relating to the household audit, compensation andvii

construction process), no adequate, independent mechanism wasput in place for the impartial management of disputes and conflictrelating to the Motlhotlo relocation process. In the draft RAP (2004),mention is made of bringing in ‘external expertise’ but only in seriouscases. Ideally, this would include external mediation, an ombudsmanor another independent process.In spite of the high level of conflict experienced as a result of therelocation, there are no records of such a party being approachedfor assistance. Instead, grievances which were not easily addressedby the assistant project managers were referred to the ExecutiveCommittee (ExCo) of the Project for resolution ( 2 ) . Given that themembers of the ExCo were, in some instances, at the heart ofthe concerns raised by community members, this forum has notprovided for the impartial management of disputes required underthe IFC Performance Standards.This is considered a critical flaw in the Motlhotlo relocation. In theabsence of an independent mediation process, some communitymembers chose protest as a vehicle for voicing their concerns,others joined resistance groups, and still others chose representationof external lawyers – all of which, it could be argued, result fromthe fundamental failure of the grievance mechanism to adequatelyaddress community concerns about the relocation process.Understanding the Psycho-Social Impacts of ResettlementIn its dealings with the relocated communities, AP seems tohave failed to sufficiently acknowledge or address the potentialemotional, cultural or psycho-social impacts of the resettlement.These are the intangible, qualitative social effects of displacementwhich stem from the upheaval associated with the loss of land,home and sense of place and community, as well as the long termdamage to social cohesion through conflict and divisions whichoccurred.The issue is therefore not just about the quality/size of thereplacement structures and services, and the compensationamounts provided, but equally about whether or not the full extentof the community’s loss was truly appreciated and respected. Wherethe resettlement process has allegedly undermined the communityfabric and traditional structures, or where the emotional impacts ofresettlement has been difficult to bear, this appears never to havebeen openly acknowledged and addressed by AP.In spite of AP’s efforts around consultation, the ultimate failureof established structures to provide a mouth piece for suchconcerns and grievances meant that many people were denied anopportunity to voice and address the deeper, more emotional andpsycho-social impacts of resettlement. Solutions for these impacts2 The Exco is made up of senior representatives from the sponsor andthe two S21 Companies, represented by their legal representatives and twoex-officio project managers, namely, Greg Morris and Nalen Padayachee.aren’t easy to come by, but at a basic level, they start with lines ofopen communication and trusting relationships, both between andwithin communities, and between AP and the affected residents.B.3.3 Effectiveness of the Consultation ProcessIn addition to the key strengths and weaknesses listed above,the review highlighted several key themes with respect to theconsultation process. These include questions on:• the effectiveness and inclusivity of the consultation processes;• the outcomes associated with disclosure of information; and• the inclusivity and cultural appropriateness of the process.The strengths and weaknesses associated with AP’s approach toconsultation are described below.Efforts Made Towards Effective and Inclusive ConsultationThe key strengths in AP’s approach to consultation are evident atspecific points in the resettlement process, in particular, the siteselection process, identifying eligibility and the personnel secured toprovide consultation support during the audit, compensation andconstruction process.Site selection: A review of evidence indicates that the host siteselection was driven by a consultative process, and was largelycommunity driven. AP went to considerable efforts to consult onthe available options, including bussing residents out to see theidentified farms. Evidence of a community empowered process isabundant in the fact that the communities themselves ultimatelychose a site which went against the advice of AP.Identifying eligibility: Stakeholder testimonies confirm thatAP adopted a very inclusive approach to eligibility, and that allhomesteads, regardless of land rights, were included in the auditand compensation process. This is evident in AP’s inclusion of theadditional structures erected by a sector of the youth in order toclaim compensation. This was done in spite of advice from theInduna and members of the community to ignore their claims.Appointment of consultation personnel: As part of the overallProject Management Team, AP appointed a number of personnelto address the consultation requirements of the resettlementprocess. This included the appointment of a Community Liaison,Social Services and Dispute Resolution Management team,staffed jointly by an AP staff member and a staff member of theProject Management consultants: Hararo Project Management.Both interfaced with the communities and their representativeson community project issues, addressing social issues andresolving disputes where necessary. In anticipation of communityviii

difficulties in understanding the audit and compensation process,AP appointed the Operational Team (as previously discussed), andthen, in support of grievance management, two CLOs from eachcommunity.In spite of these efforts, it is the finding of this review that overall,the Motlhotlo consultation process falls short of IFC performancestandards for consultation, in particular with regards to therequirement for free, prior and informed consultation, and for aconsultation process that is inclusive and appropriate to affectedresidents. These weaknesses are outlined below.Consultation to be Based on Prior Disclosure of Relevant andAdequate Information, thus Enabling Informed Participation andConsentAgreement to relocateConcerns around free, prior and informed consultation go as farback as the community agreement to relocate in 1992. Althoughthe decision to relocate was a negotiated process, involving theMapela Tribal Authority (MTA) and the community appointed RSCs,and culminating in a community resolution to relocate, concernshave emerged as to whether this was done with a full understandingof the implications of this decision. The Municipality commentedthat the communities could never have understood the scale ofthe resettlement in terms of the impacts on their lives, when firstpresented with the idea. A hope for a better quality of life andfinancial reward may have overshadowed any possibility of criticalthinking about what it meant to resettle.In this regard, it is unclear whether the Kgoshigadi was either willingor had sufficient knowledge to be able to facilitate discussionsand raise awareness among community residents on the potentialnegative impacts of resettlement. ERM are also uncertain regardingthe extent to which AP raised awareness about the negativeimpacts of resettlement, based on their recent experience with GaPila. Typically, an EIA should provide an education function in thisregard. However, the timing of the EIA (starting in September 2002)meant that the findings of the impact assessment and associatedidentification of the impacts of resettlement were not fed back to thecommunity residents in time to inform their decision to move (firsttaken in October 2002). The extent to which informed consent wasfully given to the relocation is thus uncertain.Weaknesses in the audit and compensation processIn spite of the successes of some parts of the audit andcompensation process, concerns remain regarding the extentto which people fully understood the audit and associatedcompensation process. This is certainly reflected in the frequentlyheard claim among community respondents that ‘they didn’t knowwhat they were signing’ (in reference to the signing off on auditfindings). In fact, the perception that AP exploited the illiterateand those with a lack of educational capacity to understand thecompensation process, is at the root of many of the allegations madeby certain of the community residents and resistance groups towardAP. Notwithstanding these allegations, it is recognised that extensiveefforts were made by AP, and within a challenging context of highlevels of illiteracyBoth the Project Management Team and the construction contractoridentified illiteracy of community residents and competency of theOperational and Community Relations Teams as major obstaclesin the translation of the results of the household audits into houseplans. This resulted in unmanaged expectations around how theplans translated into built physical structures. These expectationsresulted in disappointment, frustration and even resistance.These misunderstandings and unmet expectations could perhapshave been avoided with better community education priorto starting the audit, and by the use of community relations/communications specialists in roles that were being filled by nonsocialspecialists, (i.e., architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, localresidents etc). Feedback received from the construction contractorwas that the Operational Team and the Community Relations Teamstruggled to translate the technical information relevant to theaudit and compensation process into a form understandable for thecommunity residents.Given the widespread illiteracy and low levels of education in thesecommunities, ERM are of the opinion that a more systematic preeducationprogramme for the Operational Team, the CommunityRelations Team, and the community should have been considered,facilitated by the required social specialists.Effectiveness of the S21sThe consultative and participatory approach adopted by APwas undermined by the fact that the main vehicle used forcommunication (i.e., the S21) was not appropriate or effective inensuring adequate disclosure of information to the majority ofcommunity residents they were elected to represent. The reasonsfor this failure would appear to be due to the S21s’ reported poorperformance as a consultative body, linked in part, to an apparentlack of capacity amongst its members.In spite of the S21’s intended role as a feedback mechanism, it hasbeen widely criticised for its failure to serve as an accountable,consultative and transparent communication structure.Conversations held with community respondents, the communitylegal advisors and the construction contractors indicate that theix

S21’s failure to report back effectively to the community was a keyfactor in their loss of authority and community trust, fuelling theresulting splits that emerged within the community.The fact that no provision for re-election of the S21 was writteninto the terms of the S21 agreement, meant that poor performancecould not be addressed through the replacement of Committeemembers. Community members thus felt locked into beingrepresented by a structure which many perceived to havefailed them in terms of ensuring access to information amongstcommunity members.All evidence clearly suggests that the S21s were, or quicklybecame, an inappropriate structure through which to consult thecommunities on the resettlement. Given the degree to which thechosen structure was failing as a representative forum and feedbackmechanism, AP had a responsibility (as the Project Sponsor) to seekto address this - if not by changing the S21 itself, then by workingwith the community to identify alternative mechanisms to addressthe needs of those who had become unsatisfied. There appearto have been repeated inabilities or delays by AP to manage thisissue, and the associated risks to the Project and progress of theresettlement. The outcome of this was that, in spite of the lengthsthat AP went to, particularly during consultation for the householdaudit and construction process, the consultation process did not, onbalance, allow for adequate disclosure of information to the majorityof community residents. Indeed, with the establishment of the MDCand the Task Team in 2007, one of their roles was to address thisperceived community feedback deficiency.Consultation to be Inclusive and Culturally Appropriate,and to Include Disadvantaged or Vulnerable Groups, andHost CommunitiesAs mentioned, the S21 was intended to be the main mechanismfor consultation for the resettlement process. These committeesare largely comprised of the older generation, many of whomare illiterate but in positions of power conferred by traditionalstructures. The entrenched generational divisions in the Motlhotlocommunity, and the characteristically weaker voice of youth undera traditional authority system, meant that in some cases the youthmay have come to feel excluded from the formal consultationprocess from the outset. Not surprisingly therefore, the splits andfactions at Motlhotlo have formed clearly around a generational andeducational divide, with sectors of the youth driving the resistanceat Motlhotlo.In Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo, structures of traditional authority areincreasingly questioned by a strong minority of younger communitymembers whose resistance to AP has strengthened and gainedmomentum as they have gained increasing access to information,education, resources and support. This has empowered sectors ofthe youth against AP and the older established hierarchies.These kinds of social changes are not necessarily specific to theMotlhotlo community, or directly a result of the presence of AP.Instead, they may be conceived as part of a wider shift taking placein rural communities in a globalising, democratic South Africa.Notwithstanding this, specific vulnerabilities and inequalities do notappear to have been identified or addressed early by AP in orderto manage potential risks associated with splits in the community.The result of this may have been to exacerbate already entrencheddivisions (i.e., between the youth and their elders), which fuelledan undermining of the social structures and fabric of thesecommunities.AP’s approach to consultation, notably, to use community legaladvisors as key go-betweens, rather than to address concernsindividually at the community level, has resulted in failedopportunities to build direct, trust based relationships with them.This appears to have been particularly true of the resistant minoritieswho seem to have been largely neglected from the time thatthey decided not to relocate. The outcome of not engaging them,was to alienate them even further and exacerbate their feelingsof resentment towards AP. Using community legal advisors asgo-betweens may have been a critical mistake in this regard as itappeared, from the perspective of resisting households, to indicatean abdication of responsibility on AP’s part as well as a co-option ofthe community legal advisor to the interests of AP.B.4 SUMMARY OFALIGNMENT FINDINGSERM has categorised the IFC Performance Standards pertaining toresettlement into nine topics related to key chronological phases ofactivity important in any IFC aligned relocation process. The topicsare:Topic 1: Avoid or Minimise Resettlement;Topic 2: Land Acquisition and Land Rights;Topic 3:Identifying Affected People, Assessing Eligibility andEstablishing Cut-Off Dates;Topic 4: Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation;Topic 5: Compensation;Topic 6: Grievance Management;Topic 7: Provide Relocation Assistance and Transition Support;Topic 8: Improve/ Restore Living Conditions and Livelihoods,and Address Post-Resettlement Development Needs;Topic 9: Implementation Planning, Ensuring InstitutionalCapacity and Transparency.x

The table below provides a summary of the alignment ratings against these IFC requirements:Table 1.1 Summary of Performance Assessment FindingsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)Topic 1: Avoid or Minimise ResettlementPS 5, Section2 & 7A client should consider feasiblealternative project designs to avoid orat least minimise physical or economicdisplacement.Non-alignmentBased on evidence provided in the PPRust EMPR amendment,there is no indication of efforts made to minimise theresettlement of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo through feasibleproject design. The ‘no- go’ or ‘no project’ alternative did nothave the minimisation of resettlement as a key consideration.Topic 2: Land Acquisition And Land RightsPS 5, Section 3Projects are encouraged to acquireland rights through negotiatedsettlements whenever possible.Partial alignmentAlthough community resolution was signed to relocate,insufficient evidence that this was fully inclusive. Eventhough 100 percent of homeowners signed their one-ononeagreements, uncertainty exists regarding the extent towhich the community fully understood the implications of theresettlement prior to agreeing to move.PS 5, Section12Document all transactions to acquireland rightsNon-alignmentNot formally recording the historically ‘unique’ sub-leasearrangement between the S21 and AP seems to have been acritical omission on the part of the community legal advisors, APand the DLA given the significance of the issues at hand.PS 5, Section14PS 5, Section18Ensure those with formal and informalrights are eligibleProvide security of homesteadownership tenure for new housingAlignment -Alignment -PS 5, Section18Provide security of land tenureNot applicable forindividual titleWithin the existing regulatory context, ensuring household titledeeds to land was not an option open to AP.Topic 3: Identifying Affected People, Assessing Eligibility and Establishing a Cut-off DatePS 5, Section11Identification of people to be displacedby resettlementAlignment -PS 5, Section11Undertake inventory and valuation ofassetsAlignmentThe household audit/inventory of assets was well planned andexecuted but could have been supported by an earlier andimproved education campaign to help manage expectationsand improve community understanding of the audit process.PS 5, Section12Establish entitlements for all categoriesof affected people (with particularattention to vulnerable groups)Partial alignmentThe audit lacked a needs and vulnerabilities assessmentcomponent at household level to proactively identify risks andvulnerable households to inform entitlements, compensationmeasures or facilitate planning of adequate and appropriatelivelihood restoration measures.PS 5, Section11Cut off date to be established,documented and communicatedNon-alignmentA cut off date should have been applied and communicated inorder to manage establishment of illegal structures by a groupof young people.Topic 4: Effective Consultation and Informed ParticipationPS 1, Section20, 21 & 22; PS5, Objectives;PS 5, Section8 & 9Consultation to be based on priordisclosure of relevant and adequateinformation, thus enabling informedparticipation and consentPartial alignmentS21s not effective in ensuring adequate disclosure ofinformation to the majority of community residents. Whilst APcannot necessarily be blamed for the short-comings of the S21s,AP failed (as project sponsors) at either assisting in remedying orcreating viable alternatives for on-going consultation.xi

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 1, Section21; PS 5,Section 8 & 9Consultation to be inclusive andculturally appropriate, and to includedisadvantaged or vulnerable groups,and host communitiesNon-alignmentS21s membership too heavily dominated by older generation,who failed to represent needs of wider community, especiallythe youth.Failure by AP to identify and address risks of low literacy ratesaffecting communication process with communities.Inadequate specific focus on vulnerable groups and hostcommunity in the resettlement process.On the whole, the early disclosure process relating to the EIAappears to have been well executed.Methodology described for the EIA indicates that consultationon likely impacts of resettlement did take place. However,discussions with AP reveal that consideration of impacts was nota key focus of the resettlement planning process; rather, thesewere ‘managed as they arose’.Failure of S21s as an effective consultation mechanismundermined any attempts at involving community consultationin a participatory approach to impact management.AP has put significant effort into consulting iteratively and atkey points in the Motlhotlo relocation. They have been lesssuccessful, however, in ensuring opportunities for on-goingconsultation in a post resettlement context.AP did carry out consultation on compensation measures.Concerns remain, however, regarding the extent to whichpeople fully understood audit and associated compensationprocess.Evidence that the site selection process was fully communitydriven is reflected in fact that communities chose a site(Armoede) which went against the advice of AP.Overall, due to weaknesses in the system and failure toaddress these, the Motlhotlo consultation did not sufficientlyincorporate views of affected people into the decision makingprocess. The exception to this would be site selection.PS 1, Section21Consultation to begin early in the EIAprocessAlignmentPS 1, Section20, 21 & 22Consultation should focus on socialand environmental risks and adverseimpacts, and proposed measures toaddress themNon- alignmentPS 1, Section21; PS 5,Section 8 & 9Consultation to be iterative and to becarried out on an on-going basisPartial alignmentPS 5, Section8 & 9Communities to be included inconsultation on compensationpaymentPartial alignmentPS 5, Section16Displaced people to be offered achoice of new host siteAlignmentPS 1, Section22; PS 5,Section 8 & 9Views of the affected community tobe incorporated into decisions whichaffect their livesNon-alignmentTopic 5: CompensationPS 5, Section16PS 5, Section17PS 5, Section 8PS 5, Section 8PS 5, Section18PS 5, Section 18Provide resettlement options, includingadequate replacement housing or cashcompensation where appropriate.Provide replacement property of equalor higher value.Where livelihoods are land-based,preference to be given for land basedcompensation/ replacement, wherefeasible.Provide compensation for all lost assetsat full replacement cost.Provide compensation for assets otherthan landCompensation costs to be paid in lieuof cash compensation where feasible.Alignment -Alignment -Alignment -Partial alignmentAlignment -Alignment -In spite of significant effort made by AP regarding the cultivatedfields (outside of the homestead), the final outcome did notsee full replacement of these fields. This was not due to lackof effort on AP’s part, but rather due to the breakdown in trustbetween AP and affected residents; the legacy of the 1993lease agreement (no provision for compensation for loss ofagricultural land); and the influence that poverty and lack oflong term economic prospects is likely to have on communityneed and demand for improved compensation.xii

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section 20PS 5, Section 16Compensate for loss of commercialstructures or provide replacementproperty, or equal or greater value.Compensation to be supplied prior toresettlement.Alignment -Non- alignmentCompensation amounts were not fully paid prior to peoplebeing moved, and agricultural fields were not ready prior toresettlement taking place.Topic 6: Managing GrievancesPs1, Section 23 Develop a grievance mechanism Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects.PS 1, Section 23S21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Communities to be informed aboutthe grievance mechanism and anunderstandable process to be used Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects.AlignmentPartial alignmentAlignmentAlthough S21 was intended as the official channel for grievances,in effect it never really fulfulled its purposes, due to the fact thatmany factions within the community did not trust it to feedback concerns. The S21 itself also had a confilct of interest in itsmultiple functions.S21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Partial alignmentThere appeared to be lack of clarity on where and how to submitgrievances about the S21 as a grievance mechanism.PS 1, Section 23PS 1, Section 23PS 5, Section 10Grievance mechanism to be readilyaccessible and culturally appropriate Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects.S21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Grievance mechanism to be scaled tothe risks and adverse impacts of theproject.Grievance mechanism to establish andmaintain a constructive relationshipwith affected communities over the lifeof the project.AlignmentNon- alignmentNon- alignmentNon- alignmentThe failings of the S21s alienated many people from using it asthe formal grievance mechanism. This left many without recoursefor addressing their concerns with the relocation process.Failure of AP to address the weakness of the S21 as a grievancemechanism, and the resultant poor community relations thatensued is indicative of an inadequate grievance mechanism.The breakdown in relations between AP and factions withinMotlhotlo and the community in general points to a failure ofthe grievance mechanism to adequately manage disputes andconflict.PS 1, Section 23Grievance mechanism to addressconcerns promptly: Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefectsS21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievancesAlignment -Partial alignmentNo evidence of a structured approach by AP to categorisingand prioritising issues or committing to a time scale for theirresolution.PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism to betransparent.Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefectsAlignmentS21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievancesNon-alignmentEvidence points to lack of transparency and accountability ofS21s and of grievances being selectively communicated to APand vice versa which led to a lack of trust in the mechanism.xiii

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section10Grievance mechanism to includerecourse mechanism designed toresolve disputes in impartial mannerNon-alignmentNo independent mechanism was put in place for the impartialmanagement of disputes and conflict relating to the Motlhotlorelocation. The Task Team was formed but this was not initiatedby AP, was rapidly dissolved and not effective at resolvingdisputes. Government and Municipality Task Team membersalso had potential conflicts of interest which compromised theindependence of this mechanism.PS 1, Section23PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism to be accessibleat no cost and without retributionGrievance mechanism shouldnot impede access to judicial oradministrative remediesAlignment -Alignment -Topic 7: Provide Relocation Assistance and Transition SupportPS 5, Section16Provide relocation assistance todisplaced persons, with particularattention on the needs of the poor andvulnerablePartial alignmentAP delivered comprehensive support during the actual move,but failed to assess the need for or provide targeted assistanceto vulnerable groups.PS 5, Section20Provide transition support for lostincome and costs associated withreinstallation of plant and equipment.Alignment -PS 5, Section20Transition support should be providedfor a reasonable period of time, untilthe affected parties’ income-earningcapacity, production levels, andstandards of living have been restored. Homesteads Partial alignmentAgricultural fields outside of thehomesteadPartial alignmentTopic 8: Improve/Restore Living Conditions and Livelihoods and Address Post-Resettlement Development NeedsPS 5, Section 8Living conditions at the newresettlement site should be the sameas or an improvement over conditionsat the site from which the displacedpersons were resettled.AlignmentWhilst ERM are cognisant of stakeholder contestation of thisrating, it is our professional opinion that considerable effortwent into ensuring that living conditions were the same as or animprovement on baseline conditions.Compensation for loss of assetsto ensure improvement or at leastrestoration of livelihoods. Small businesses AlignmentPS 5, Section 8Agricultural fields outside of thehomesteadPartial alignmentIn spite of significant effort made by AP regarding thecultivated fields (outside of the homestead), the finaloutcome did not see full replacement of these fields. Thiswas not due to lack of effort on AP’s part, but rather due tothe breakdown in trust between AP and affected residents;the legacy of the 1993 lease agreement (no provision forcompensation for loss of agricultural land); and the influencethat poverty and lack of long term economic prospectsis likely to have on community need and demand forimproved compensation. However, the relocation has notleft people worse off in terms of livelihoods.xiv

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section20For those that are economicallydisplaced, a project is required toprovide additional targeted assistanceand opportunities to improve or atleast restore livelihoods or incomelevels.Partial alignmentInsufficient assistance provided to displaced residents to ensuresufficient restoration or improvement of livelihoods or incomelevels. Standards of living and livelihoods were, however, verypoor in the first instance and so arguably have been improvedfrom such a baseline.PS 5, Section 8Project should provide opportunitiesto displaced persons and communitiesto derive appropriate developmentbenefits from the projectNon-alignmentVery limited evidence of effective sustainable post-resettlementplanning.PS 5, Section12Resettlement complete when theadverse impacts of resettlement havebeen addressedPartial alignmentAlthough AP are making significant efforts towards successfulhand-over of households and services in full working order,required efforts towards livelihoods development and psychosocialimpacts of resettlement remain unaddressed.Topic 9: Implementation Planning and Institutional CapacityPS 5, Section12Develop appropriate RAP instrumentor implementation planNon-alignmentRAP document never finalised or used as an action plan for RAPimplementation.PS 5, Section 2Appropriate measures to mitigateadverse impacts on displaced personsand host communities should becarefully planned and implementedNon-alignmentImpacts identified during the EIA process, but their analysis andsuggested management was very cursory and high level. Noclear evidence of identified impacts/ management measuresbeing fed into the resettlement process.PS 1, Section17Ensure adequate capacity forimplementationPartial alignmentGood technical project management team but lacking social/community relations and conflict resolution capacity todeal with the specific social and community developmentcomplexities inherent in a relocation process.PS 5, Section12; PS 1,Section 24Develop monitoring and evaluationplanNon-alignmentNo project specific monitoring programme was developed.xv

C: EXECUTIVE SUMMARYLOOKING FORWARDThe ‘Looking Forward’ report is the culmination of the resettlement review, carried out by ERM,of the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo resettlement processes. Drawing on the findings of the review,this report seeks to translate lessons learnt into key themes and recommendations for movingforward.At the heart of these recommendations is a vision for improved relations and building of trustbetween AP and its stakeholders, and importantly, to improve livelihoods and quality of life inthe affected settlements - both in the short and medium term, but also with a view towards apost mine-closure context.The following key themes were identified by ERM, and subsequently reviewed and confirmedby AP as necessarily for their future relationship with the Mogalakwena communities:Trust and relationship building;Stakeholder engagement;Integrated resettlement planning;Compensation; andPost-resettlement development.Using these themes as a foundation, the ‘Looking Forward’ report gives a definition of each theme;describes potential obstacles to realising the objectives associated with that theme; and then provides alist of key recommendations for focused action by AP, in order to move forward.This summary briefly outlines the themes and the headline recommendations for each.i

THEME 1: TRUST ANDRELATIONSHIP BUILDINGThis theme reflects an acknowledgement that trust between thevarious affected parties involved in the resettlement processes hasfundamentally broken down, and that the re-establishment of trustis essential to improving relations with associated stakeholders,and securing AP’s social licence to operate in Mogalakwena. Thisincludes trust between AP and local communities, includingthose communities not necessarily resettled; between and withincommunities; between AP and their critics; and trust between APand their would-be partners. The key recommendations in thisregard involve:• AP publically accepting the findings of the review;• Efforts towards improving relationships with communities ingeneral;• The importance of building relationships with critics andresistant communities; and• A re-starting of the negotiating process between resistantcommunities and AP.THEME 2: STAKEHOLDERENGAGEMENTThis theme responds to the need for an improved and bettercoordinated stakeholder communication and engagement. Thereare two aspects to this requirement, namely:• unity structure/s to replace the existing Section 21 Committees(S21s).The key recommendations for improved stakeholder engagementinvolve the drafting of a coordinated stakeholder engagementstrategy for the Mine; and the establishment of a new communitystructure/s with whom and through whom the Mine andcommunities can engage with one another.THEME 3: INTEGRATEDPOST RESETTLEMENTPLANNINGWhilst the opportunity for implementation of an integratedresettlement action plan (RAP) has passed, there are key aspects ofthe underlying resettlement risk management approach that can stillbe adopted both within a post-resettlement context and throughthe life of the mining operations in the affected communities.The key recommendations relating to Integrated Post ResettlementPlanning include:• Applying the findings of this resettlement review into lessonslearned;• Reviewing and addressing social management systemrequirements in line with best practice requirements andsuitable to AP’s operating contexts;• Ensuring appropriate staffing at Operations, Project andCorporate level;• Strengthening the grievance mechanism for the postresettlement phase; and• Developing and implementing an effective monitoring andevaluation programme.THEME 4: COMPENSATIONThere is an acknowledgement within AP that some elements ofcompensation may need to be revisited in the interests of improvedrelations with both the resettled and non-resettled communities.These can be divided into:• Those items that legally fall outside of the audit andcompensation process (i.e. not necessarily AP’s responsibility),but which would contribute to improved community relations;• Any compensation for small scale material loss / or perceivedshort changing from the audit process, including any overduehouse related defects/grievances;• Addressing outstanding grievances associated with theresettlement process; and• Longer term issues around community benefit sharing in theMine and management of the R25 million development fundfor each community.THEME 5: POST-RESETTLEMENTLIVELIHOODSDEVELOPMENTThe IFC requires that project proponents not only strive to restorelivelihoods and living conditions, but also to improve them.Developing sustainable communities is an imperative that APstrives towards for all communities in which they work, regardless ofwhether physical resettlement has been conducted or not. Specialemphasis needs to be given, however, to livelihoods developmentin resettled communities due to their increased vulnerability as aconsequence of the relocation process.Livelihoods development is an academic and technical field inits own right and requires specialist guidance in the design andii

implementation of any such intervention. The focus in the ‘LookingForward’ report is to highlight the key challenges and principlesfor livelihoods development with the Mogalakwena context, suchthat appointed specialists can use this as a base and guide forappropriate planning and project execution.ChallengesThe Resettlement Review has highlighted two main sets ofchallenges for sustainable livelihoods development: namely,those amongst the local stakeholders (resettled communitiesand Government), and internally within AP (at a Corporateand Operations level). The challenges that exist amongst localstakeholders can be divided into those that are generic to poor, ruralcommunities in South Africa, and others which are specific to Ga Pilaand Motlhotlo and their unique history.These obstacles range from poverty, high levels of dependency andsense of entitlement within the local communities, to poor relationswith and lack of suitable partners within Government, to limitedlivelihoods development skills amongst CED staff, and a currentlack of an integrated and coordinated approach to livelihoodsdevelopment within AP.Recommended PrinciplesRegardless of the interventions that are designed, ERM wouldrecommend that the following principles be considered andadopted when crafting an implementation plan for livelihoodsdevelopment:• Ensure all interventions are community focused, or have thepotential to provide spin-off benefits from the individual tocommunity level;• Involve stakeholders in decision-making;• Address the existing sense of entitlement to manageexpectations;Concluding ThoughtsIf any progress is to be made towards improved stakeholderrelations and sustainable livelihoods development, it is essentialthat the themes outlined in this report are seen as part of an overall,integrated response. Each ‘action theme’ is interconnected and needto be pursued together.For instance, for trust and relationship building to take place, thestakeholder engagement structures and processes need to bedemocratically elected and trusted. Similarly, achieving closure onoutstanding compensation issues is linked to issues of trust andto the creation of a vision for a sustainable community post theresettlement and post mine closure. Underpinning all of this, is aneed to implement sensible aspects of integrated resettlementplanning. In particular, there is a need to ensure adequate skills tomanage community relations within such a complex environment.Moving forward, there is also a need to ensure that the requiredgrievance and monitoring procedures are in place, such that issuescan be proactively responded to, and lessons learnt and applied. Itis this responsiveness to concerns that plays a key role in buildingtrust and securing AP’s long term invitation to operate within theMogalakwena communities.Fulfilling the intentions of these themes will also require significantshifts within AP. This includes, for example, repositioning themselvesas guests in the local communities, and wider municipality; beingwilling to accept criticism and engage in respectful debate with theircritics; a prioritisation of investment at the Operations level, and amore bottom-up approach to how community issues are managedwithin CED; and lastly, for AP to remember that their primarystakeholders are the community, and that all engagements witheither Government or community leaders (traditional or elected)are merely channels through which to improve relations andcommunication with the affected communities.• Align interventions with other livelihoods developmentinterventions that are taking place within the Mine’s broaderradius of influence and responsibility; and• Align interventions with other ‘Looking Forward’ interventions.iii

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTPART ONEINTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

PART ONEIntroduction to the Resettlement ReviewAnglo Platinum (Corporate Affairs) has appointed ERM Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereafter referred to asERM) to conduct a review of the resettlement processes undertaken at two sites near their RustenburgPlatinum Mine (Mogalakwena Section) - formerly known as Potgietersrust Platinum Mine. See AnnexureA: Maps of the Relocation Area. These are referred to as the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo resettlement processes,respectively.The community at Ga Pila village were moved from Vaalkop farm to Sterkwater farm between 2001and 2003. This relocation was required due to the village’s proximity to mining operations, and resultantsafety concerns including dangers associated with fly-rock from blasting in the nearby Sandsloot pit. Inparticular, the decision to resettle was taken when regular evacuation measures were no longer deemedadequate to ensure the safety and quality of life of the affected communities.The communities of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo, which together form the area known as Motlhotlo,were required to relocate due to the North Expansion Project. The Environmental Impact Assessment(EIA) for the proposed expanded open cast mine showed that potential impacts associated with miningactivities included increased dust pollution, damage to houses due to blast vibrations, potential groundwater pollution, and noise levels which would exceed limits outlined by World Bank standards. In 2007,the Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo communities began moving from Overysel and Zwartfontein farms toRooibokfontein and Armoede, respectively.While the majority of households in each of these three villages have relocated, the processes havebeen marked with dissatisfaction, resistance and even violence. In principle, the Ga Pila relocation wascompleted eight years ago; however a group of 28 households who resisted resettlement at the timeremain at the old site. The Motlholto relocation remains incomplete, with 64 households also resistingresettlement and residing at the old site. Both this group and members of those who have relocated arenow contesting the original terms of the relocation agreement and calling for a complete renegotiation.In addition, several reports have been written by external opinion formers criticising Anglo Platinum fortheir approach to these resettlement processes, namely: Action Aid’s Precious Metals: The Impact of AngloPlatinum on Poor Communities in Limpopo, South Africa (March 2008) which called for a investigation intoallegations of potential human rights abuses by Anglo Platinum during these resettlement processes;and, in response to this the South African Human Rights Commission’s Mining-Related Observations andRecommendations: Anglo Platinum, Affected Communities and Other Stakeholders, in and around the PPL Mine,Limpopo (November 2008).1

1.1 THE BRIEFIt is within the context of contention over the performance ofAnglo Platinum (AP) in these resettlement processes that APCorporate Affairs was prompted to conduct it own detailed internaltechnical investigation of the activities undertaken. In this regard,AP has requested that ERM adopt an ‘action review’ approach tothe resettlement review. The primary objective of this review is tohighlight the strengths and weaknesses in AP’s performance in theseresettlements.The term ‘action review’ is used to reflect the need to both reviewthe resettlement activities carried out to date, as well as to laythe foundations for sustainable solutions and informed actionmoving forward. The review therefore serves to guide futureactions in order to meet one of the key aspects of the InternationalFinance Corporation (IFC) principle on resettlement, namely, thatresettlement should be used as an opportunity for improving thelivelihoods of all affected people.The outcome of the resettlement review is two-pronged, with afocus on both a ‘looking back’ at resettlement activities carried outto date and on ‘looking forward’ to ways in which relations betweenAP and the affected communities can be improved, and to waysin which community livelihoods and quality of life in the affectedsettlements can be enhanced.1.2 THE APPROACHFulfilling the brief requires that an assessment be undertaken of therelocation processes. This needs to be done in terms of a recognisedframework or benchmark standard for the successful delivery of suchrelocation processes. AP Corporate Affairs has requested that ERMconduct this review in terms of the IFC’s Performance Standard (PS)on Resettlement. Measuring AP’s actions according to this standardwill allow the review to determine whether resettlement-inducedrisks and impacts were identified and addressed (compensated)in a systematic way, and whether opportunities for restoring andimproving livelihoods were successfully implemented.The key international standard used as the basis for this reviewis the IFC Performance Standards on Social and EnvironmentalSustainability (2006), in particular Performance Starndard 5: LandAcquisition and Involuntary Resettlement. The PerformanceStandard 5 has its origin in the World Bank’s Safeguard Policy onInvoluntary Resettlement (Operational Policy [OP] 4.12: 2001).IFC Performance Standard 5 was chosen to frame this review eventhough the relocation processes at Ga Pila and Motlhotlo were notformally required to be undertaken according to this standard. Thereasons for adopting the IFC standard as a benchmark for the reviewis as follows: Anglo Platinum has made several claims that theirrelocation processes were ‘aligned’ to World BankStandards; The World Bank Standards are more appropriatelyapplied to public sector development projects,whereas the Performance Standards developed bythe IFC, the private sector arm of the World Bank,are more commonly applied to private sectordevelopment projects; and The IFC Performance Standards are informed by,and founded in, the World Bank Standards. Bothcontain the same level of detail and reflect thesame core principles.These reasons have led ERM to believe that the IFC PerformanceStandard 5 on Involuntary Resettlement is the more relevantframework to use for the purposes of the resettlement review.Furthermore, the IFC Performance Standard has also been morerecently revised to reflect latest international best practice.2

It should be noted that the IFC Performance Standard 5 as it isapplied in this review was not in existence in its current form atthe time that the relocation was undertaken. It is also true thatthese standards were far more rigorous and demanding than thebenchmark for relocation processes at the time these resettlementswere conducted. ERM has rated AP’s actions according totoday’s benchmark (the IFC Performance Standard 5) for severalreasons:1.3 METHODOLOGYA participatory approach to research was adopted for this study,where information for the resettlement review was garneredthrough interviews with stakeholders affected by or associatedwith the resettlement. There are a number of core principles whichunderpin ERM’s methodological approach to the resettlementreview. These are presented in Box 1.1. as a way in which to highlight where problems aroseand successes achieved in the process against clearimplementation requirements; to measure the actions undertaken against thebest practice benchmark with which Anglo Grouppublically associates itself; and to identify lessons learnt to inform improvedperformance in future resettlement processes.The IFC requirements and their application in this review aredescribed in more detail in Section 1.3.3, as well as in Part Two andPart Three of the review.BOX 1.1 CORE PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNINGTHE RESETTLEMENT REVIEW ERM’s independence, which will facilitate broadbuy-in from stakeholders and objective advice toAP; Participatory stakeholder involvement in thedesign of, and participation in, the resettlementreview, and in the verification of its findings; Broad stakeholder participation, ensuring that thefull spectrum of voices is heard; An incremental approach to facilitate participationand to build as much agreement as possible; An approach guided by international best practiceon stakeholder engagement, resettlementpractices and sustainable livelihood creation; and Involvement of local partners in the resettlementreview.This section of the introduction gives more detail on the scope ofthe study as well as the methodology employed for the review.1.3.1 Scope of the Resettlement ReviewThis review will assess the resettlement processes conducted at GaPila and Motlhotlo. These villages were selected on the basis of theirhaving undergone a physical resettlement process, where physicaldisplacement is defined by the IFC as the ‘actual physical relocationof people resulting in a loss of shelter, productive assets or access toproductive assets’.There are several other villages that have reportedly been impactedby relocation. Ga Chaba and Sekuruwe, for instance, claim tohave experienced economic displacement, where the IFC defineseconomic displacement as ‘resulting from an action that interruptsor eliminates people’s access to productive assets without physicallyrelocating the people themselves’. Sekuruwe also experienced aprocess of relocating graves.3

There were also several other villages that have been impacted, notthrough relocation, but rather through impacts associated with theexpansion to the Mine. Leroleng, Skimming and Ga Molekane haveall reportedly experienced negative impacts in this regard. The scopeof this report will focus neither on those villages solely experiencingeconomic displacement nor on those villages experiencing negativeimpacts associated with the Mine. Instead, it focuses exclusively onthe villages which experienced physical displacement.1.3.2 ResearchThe primary approach to collecting data for the review was throughconducting interviews with a wide range of stakeholders associatedwith the relocation process. This was supplemented by a desktopstudy of primary and secondary data made available by AP, as wellas data included in other external commentaries reviews such as theAction Aid and South African Human Rights Commission reports.The Study TeamA large team was involved in conducting the research. This teamincluded both consultants from ERM and external consultants whoprovided facilitation and interpretation services, and advice on ruraland traditional protocol. This support came from Ben Moshwana(Phambili Skills Network) and Jimmy Mnisi (Di-idea Communication).Since the team was often divided into small groups whenconducting interviews, it was important to ensure consistency. Thiswas done through the issuing of a set of broad questions to guideinterviews, based on the core IFC requirements and how communitymembers and other stakeholders may have experienced them.These questions (Annex 1A) were developed to serve as a looseguide for the interviews. It was, however, felt to be important thatan open-ended approach be adopted to these interviews in orderto ensure that the issues raised were those considered importantby interviewees and discussion was not limited solely to the IFCframework.Designing the ProcessPrior to designing the research process, ERM interviewed a set ofexternal stakeholders and opinion formers who were not directlyinvolved with the relocation processes, but were able to give a ‘bird’seye view’ of these processes. Such engagements were undertakenboth to scope the set of key issues of relevance for the review andto identify which stakeholders were important to include in theengagement process. These included: Action Aid; The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC); Dr Ramphela Mamphele; David Langa (son of Kgoshigadi Langa); and Richard Spoor (attorney acting on behalf of the resistantcommunities).Engaging StakeholdersThe core set of stakeholders interviewed for the review were thosethat had been directly involved in the resettlement, includingrepresentatives of the following: AP’s Project’s Team, and associated consultants andcontractors implementing the relocation; The communities who were subject to the relocation (aswell as those who resisted physical relocation and remainin the old settlements); and Government role-players who were directly associated withthe relocation.A three-tiered approach was adopted to engaging communitystakeholders. For each of the identified factions or sub-groups, thestudy team engaged at the following levels: Community leaders, including traditional and electedleaders; Community gatherings; and A sample of individual households.A list of all those interviewed is included in Annexure C.Selecting Stakeholders to EngageERM followed the advice of AP Corporate Affairs with respectto which Mine-related stakeholders to engage. These includedmembers of the teams responsible for the relocation as well as keyconsultants who supported this team through the process.When selecting who to engage for the community perspectiveon relocation, ERM was guided by the community. The study teamwent on an initial, introductory visit to the respective Headmen(Indunas) to introduce the study and seek advice on how bestto proceed with engaging the community through this review.Based on the outcomes of this visit, ERM designed an engagementplan which recognised and respected the numerous factions thathad developed in each of the communities. Meetings with thecommunity were convened with each of the factions that presentedthemselves. This amounted to three separate groups at Ga Pila, andfour at Motlhotlo. These were:Ga Pila A faction of the community at Sterkwater, the site ofthe relocated village, who are aligned with the IndunaReconciliation Committee;4

A faction of the community at Sterkwater, alignedwith the Section 21 Committee (S21) (formed forthe purposes of facilitating communication on therelocation); and A group of households at the old Ga Pila village whorefer to themselves as the Resistance Group.The IFC Performance Standard 5 on relocation has been interpretedinto nine topics for the purposes of this review. ERM categorisedthe standard into these topics, where they are broadly related tokey chronological phases of activity important in any IFC compliantrelocation process. The topics are:Motlhotlo The Ga Puka community at the new, Rooibokfonteinsite, including community members aligned with theNduna/ S21 and community members aligned with theMotlhotlo Development Committee (MDC) for Ga Puka; A faction of the Ga Sekhaolelo community at Armoedeassociated with the S21; A faction of the Ga Sekhaolelo community aligned withthe Nduna/ MDC for Ga Sekhaolelo; and The resistance group who remained at the old site,aligned with the Motlhotlo Relocation ResistanceCommittee (MRRC).These groups are described in more detail in the stakeholder analysisin Section 1.5 of the report.A sample of between six and eight households was selected fromeach of the seven community groupings. These households wereselected at random (1) during the community meetings, except theGa Sekhaolelo Nduna/MDC aligned meeting. This Ga Sekhaolelogroup was unhappy with the process of selecting householdrespondents at random and chose rather to nominate householdsfor inclusion into the review. In this case, members of thecommunity were given the opportunity to nominate households forinclusion into the study. In all cases, the selection of households wasconducted as part of the community meeting and in full view andacceptance of the broader community.Topic 1Topic 2Topic 3Topic 4Topic 5Topic 6Topic 7Topic 8Topic 9Avoid or Minimise Resettlement;Land Acquisition and Land Rights;Identifying Affected People, AssessingEligibility and Establishing Cut-OffDates;Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation;Compensation;Grievance Management;Provide Relocation Assistance andTransition Support;Improve/ Restore Living ConditionsAnd Livelihoods, and address Post-Resettlement Development Needs;Implementation Planning,Ensuring Institutional Capacity andTransparency.The key determinant in selecting which Government stakeholders toengage, related to the nature of their involvement in the relocationprocess. The review did not, therefore, interview those who arecurrently responsible for a certain portfolio, for example, but ratherchose to focus on those who were in positions of responsibility atthe time of the relocation.1.3.3 AnalysisERM analysed the information attained through the research processin terms of IFC Performance Standard 5. This was done for thepurposes of reviewing weaknesses and strengths in performancewith respect to both the Ga Pila and the Motlhotlo processes.1All those who attended the community meetings were asked to put theirname into a hat, from where the names were chosen. Those not interestedin being involved were asked to indicate this and were not selected.The interpretation of the standard was undertaken withtwo principles in mind: (a) that the interpretation shouldcomprehensively cover all aspects of the standard; and (b) thatit should be relatively easy to understand for the cross section ofstakeholders involved in this review, even where they may not befamiliar with the IFC’s Performance Standards.The findings and observations made through the stakeholder anddesktop research process served as inputs into the analysis, wherethey provided the necessary information to allow ERM to analyse theactions taken by AP and apply an alignment rating for each of thetopics.5

ERM has applied four types of ratings:Alignmentwhere AP has fulfilled most, if not all, of the requirementsset by the IFC for this topic;Partial alignmentwhere AP has fulfilled only certain key requirements butnot all;Non-alignmentwhere AP appears not to have complied with most of theIFC requirements for this topic; andNot applicable/ Not possible to assesswhere the IFC requirements were not applicable inthe case of these relocation processes, or where notenough information was available upon which to base anassessment.1.4 LIMITATIONSThere are certain limitations associated with the methodologyadopted in this review. These include constraints associated withthe approach to research, and the approach to analysis.1.4.1 Constraints Associated with theResearchThere were a number of constraints associated with the researchprocess, both in terms of the data gathered and to the set ofstakeholders interviewed.Data-Related ConstraintsThere are several data related constraints:• Access to information: There was a lack of documentationavailable, in particular for the Ga Pila resettlement process.Review of such documentation would have served to verifystakeholder testimonies and provide more specific detail on theresettlement process. Moreover, many of the AP staff who wereinvolved in implementing the Ga Pila relocation are no longeremployed at the Mine or within AP. This has resulted in the GaPila review being noticeably less detailed than the Motlhotloreview.• Reliability of information: A considerable amount oftime has passed between specific aspects of the relocationprocesses and the research undertaken for this review. Sincethe key source of information was stakeholder interviews, theaccuracy of the information is only as reliable as the memoriesof the respondents. In Ga Pila in particular, the accuracy of theinformation gathered is open to question since it was based onthe memory of details often seven to ten years old.In both Ga Pila and Motlhotlo there is a sense that people havebeen sharing stories amongst one another and allowing thedetails to be re-remembered. Due to the ways in which thecommunities have been factionalised, it is often very difficultto get a personal account. In this regard, the stories have beenstandardised into positions held by the collective in eachfaction. This is further complicated by the notion that the termsfor the relocation are not yet finalised and that the re-tellingof the story may yield a change to the outcome. The hopethat this review would result in some form of benefit to thecommunity may have impacted the account of the story told tothe study team.Notwithstanding this, the information told has value beyondmere accuracy. The way in which the community tells their storyreflects their reality and the way in which they perceive theevents. Whether this is true reflection of the events or not, thesestories have taken on a life of their own. It is thus important tounderstand the way in which people remember the relocationprocesses, since it is these memories and perceptions whichshape the way in which they currently act.Stakeholder Related ConstraintsIn addition, the research was constrained by the availability andwillingness of stakeholders to be involved in the process. Several keyGovernment stakeholders were unavailable to meet, in particular theex-Head of the Task Team established for the Motlhotlo relocationprocess, and current Head of the Working Group established by thePremier’s Office for the purposes of determining the way forward forestablishing new community structures. Their lack of availability waslargely due to the timing of our process alongside the 2009 nationalelection and associated constraints and sensitivities.It was also not possible to meet with all households selectedduring the random sampling. This was related to problemsaround arranging fixed meeting times in advance, only to findthat householders were no longer present or available to meet.Rescheduling meetings was difficult because of people’s limitedaccess to cell phones. This was particularly problematic in thenew Ga Puka village. ERM made repeated attempts to contactthese individuals and reschedule meetings, but efforts were largelyunsuccessful.6

The voice of those community members who did not attend thecommunity meetings will not have been captured in this report. Thismay include several of the more marginalised, vulnerable membersof the community, such as those working away from the area, orthose homebound due to illness or disability.The content of this report is limited to the information accessibleto the study team during the period of their research, field tripsand writing up of the documentation. No information has beendeliberately overlooked or omitted. Any omissions are unintended.1.4.2 Constraints Associated with theAnalysisThe approach to this review has meant that the broad set of findingsand observations heard through the course of the research hasbeen analysed according to the IFC Performance Standards and, inparticular, according to ERM’s interpretation of the standards. Thisinterpretation will be subjective to some extent and can thus beseen as a limitation to the objectivity of the analysis. ERM feels thatthis is not a significant constraint due to the principles that guidedthe interpretation as described in Box 1.1.Analysing the relocation processes through the IFC framework does,however, limit and shape the findings of the report. The frameworkresults in a certain amount of repetition, as one set of resettlementactivities serves to meet requirements in several of the topicheadings. Analysing in terms of the IFC framework will also excludethose themes and observations which aren’t considered within theperformance standards.In particular, the IFC framework focuses on the relocation and doesnot, therefore, create a platform to investigate cases where somehouseholds chose not to relocate. ERM has tried to overcome thisby constantly referring to the resistance groups who chose notto relocate. However, such stories and themes do not naturallyfilter out of an analysis according to the IFC. This implies that thisreview should not be read as a comprehensive and definitivereview of the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo relocation processes. ERM has,however, included commentary on the implications of a particular‘resettlement topic’ for the resistant communities. This is provided atthe end of each Topic, if relevant.1.5 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSISThere are five categories of stakeholders directly associated withboth the Ga Pila and the Motlhotlo relocation processes. These are:AP and associated consultants and contractors;Leadership structures representing factions withinthe community;Community members;Government role-players; andOther external stakeholders (e.g. NGOs).This section in the report will briefly introduce the key stakeholdersinvolved. For more information on these role-players, theirestablishment and mandates, see Topic 4: Effective Consultation andInformed Participation in both the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo reports.1.5.1 Ga Pila Stakeholder AnalysisThe following were the key stakeholders associated with the Ga Pilarelocation process:Anglo Platinum and Associated Consultants andConstruction ContractorThe AP team mandated with the relocation process fallswithin Anglo Platinum’s Projects Division. The planning andimplementation of the relocation was carried out by a ProjectManagement team, also referred to as AP throughout this report.This was a small team consisting of a Project Manager, variouslySteven O’Brien and Herman Steyn, who received support fromwithin the Mine’s Human Resources Department.Somewhat discrete from this Project Management Team was abigger team operating the PPRust Mine itself (hereafter referredto as the Mine). Those working for the Mine were not generallydirectly involved in the process of engagement around relocation.They did, however, have an important impact on the process itself,as the continuation of mining activities and the relocation activitiesoverlapped.The Mine and the Project Management Team worked together onthe relocation project, for instance where grievances received wereprocessed by the Project Management Team but escalated for theattention of senior Mine staff. There has been limited evidencegathered by ERM to date of any direct involvement in the processfrom AP’s Corporate Head Office (hereafter referred to as APCorporate) or Anglo Group.7

AP was supported through the relocation process by a team oftechnical and professional consultants including:• Project managers (Nortier and Associates);• EIA specialists/Social Development Consultants (SRKConsulting and Research Development Consultants);• Architects (TPC);• Surveyors (Turner and Townsend);• Engineers (Sibanye); and• Construction contractors (Group Five/Stocks Housing /Ubuntu project management).These consultants were tasked with implementing elements ofthe relocation process, including planning, communication andconstruction.Leaderships Structures Representing the CommunityThe community of Ga Pila are represented first and foremost bythe Mapela Traditional Authority (MTA). The MTA (comprised ofKgoshigadi and the Mapela Royal Council) acts as custodian ina communal and traditional community where land rights, forinstance, are held in trust by the MTA on behalf of the community.Each village in the MTA area is headed by an Induna (Nduna Pilain the case of Ga Pila). The Indunas also have councillors whosupport them in their leadership role in the community. Indunas aresubordinate to and report to the MTA via the Kgoshigadi and theRoyal Council.In addition to these traditional structures, several other leadershipstructures have also emerged as being important through thecourse of the resettlement process. From early in the resettlementprocess there has been a community committee which wasestablished on the advice of the Kgoshigadi for the purposes offacilitating the community’s involvement in the process. Initially,the community elected a committee called the Relocation SteeringCommittee (RSC). Following a challenge to the authority of thisCommittee from a faction within the community, the RSC wasdissolved and a new committee was formed known as the Ga PilaRelocation Management Team (GRMT). Even though both factionsin the community were represented through the GRMT, there werestill significant divisions within it. In 1998, the GRMT was transformedinto a Section 21 Committee (later registered as a S21 Company)(S21) on the advice of, and with assistance from, the communitylegal advisors. Despite losing its legitimacy in the eyes of somefactions in the community, the S21 has maintained its position asthe primary point of contact between AP and the community onrelocation matters.In addition, there are two important committees still active andrepresenting resettlement interests in the community. The first is theReconciliation Committee which operates in the new Ga Pila villageat Sterkwater. This Committee is small and appeared to have beenrelatively recently established. It has aligned itself with the Ndunaalignedcommunity that are in opposition to the S21.The Ga Pila Resistance Committee was formed from amongstthose households who chose to, and continue to, remain at the oldvillage which resisted relocation. There were also reports of an adhoc committee that was formed at the time of the relocation andassociated resistance in 2001.It should be noted that both the S21s and the resistance committeeshave appointed legal advisors. The former have worked very closelywith and through Advocate Seth Nthai and instructing attorneyBhadrish Daya (2) . The resistance groups (both the Ga Pila ResistanceCommittee and the Reconciliation Committee) have respondedthrough procuring the services of attorney Richard Spoor. Theselegal advisors have played an important role in the actions andapproaches adopted by these representative structures. In the caseof Adv. Nthai and Daya, these advisors have also become one of theprimary go-betweens for AP and the communities, for the task ofboth community liaison and grievance feedback.Community MembersThere are two distinct communities associated with the Ga Pilarelocation, one who live at the site of the old village and one whomoved to Sterkwater, the new site. The resistant community iscomprised of about 28 households.With respect to the community in Sterkwater, there are two broadfactions within this community: the one set is aligned to the S21while the other set shows dissatisfaction toward the S21, AP andthe Mine. Members of the community aligned to this latter groupassociate themselves either with the Induna or the ReconciliationCommittee. At the time of the research, the perceived split in thecommunity between the S21 aligned and Induna/ReconciliationCommittee aligned groups were not significant.It should be noted that Nduna Pila was initially aligned with the S21and in opposition to the Reconciliation Committee. Nduna Pila has,since the time of the relocation, realigned his allegiances.2 Advocate Seth Nthai and instructing attorney Daya are referred to as thecommunity legal advisors’ in this report.8

Government Role-playersThe Government’s involvement in the Ga Pila relocation was verylimited. Two sets of authorities became active in the process atdifferent times, but only once conflict and disputes had arisen.The provincial Department of Economic Affairs was brought in tofacilitate between the factions within the GRMT. At a later point,the Premier’s Office was called upon to step in at the time ofviolent community protest about the move and the associatedcompensation. The Mogalakwena Municipality also becameinvolved in Ga Pila, following AP’s handing over of responsibility forthe provision of services to the Municipality, post the relocation.Otherwise, there has been limited involvement or even recollectionof the Ga Pila resettlement process amongst Governmentstakeholders.1.5.2 Motlhotlo Stakeholder AnalysisThe following are the key stakeholders associated with the Motlhotlorelocation process.The Mine and Associated Consultants and ContractorsAs with Ga Pila, the Motlhotlo relocation was driven by AP’s Project’sDivision. For the purposes of implementation of relocation, a Joint-Venture (JV) project management structure was set up betweenAP and Focus Project Management (FPM) and Hararo ProjectManagement (HPM).At the highest level within this structure is the Project ExecutiveCommittee (ExCo), made up of senior representatives from AP andthe two S21s, represented by their legal representatives and two exofficioproject managers, namely, Greg Morris and Nalen Padayachee.Greg Morris reported, and was accountable, to the Project Exco,and was charged with the responsibility of day to day projectmanagement. An organogram of the full Project Management teamis provided in Topic 9: Implementation Plan and Institutional Capacity.Similar to the Ga Pila case, there was limited evidence of involvementfrom AP Corporate or Anglo Group.As in the case of Ga Pila, AP appointed a large number of technicaland professional consultants to help them implement theresettlement including:• Project managers (Focus/ Hararo);• EIA specialists (SRK Consulting);• Resettlement specialists (Wates, Meiring and Barnard/Golder Associates Africa (Ptd) Limited);• Architects (TPC/ Prism);• Surveyors (Maesela, and Turner and Townsend/ BA Hassim);• Engineers (various, including PD Naidoo and Association/Tri-M Town Planners, and Maxim Planning Solutions/Mahapa and Associates);• Grave removals experts (Tshepho Funerals); and• Construction contractors (Group Five).These consultants were tasked with implementing elements ofthe relocation process, including planning, communication andconstruction.Leaderships Structures Representing the CommunityThe MTA, through the Kgoshigadi, the Royal Council and the affectedIndunas, played a similar role in the Motlhotlo community as in theGa Pila community. Motlhotlo is comprised of two villages, Ga Pukaand Ga Sekhaolelo, both of which are lead by their own Indunas andassociated Councils. In addition, S21s were formed in each of thesecommunities for the purposes of the relocation. In response to theperceived failings of these S21s, a faction within the communitiesdecided to establish a new committee, to become known as theMotlhotlo Development Committee (MDC). There were two sectionswithin the MDC, namely, one for each village. The MTA and Indunashave not, however, recognised the MDC as legitimate leaders of thecommunity.The community who resisted relocation are represented by theMotlhotlo Relocation Resistance Committee (MRRC). This is acommittee that formed out of, but in opposition to, the MDC atthe time of the relocation. The MRRC became a leadership bodyfollowing disappointment at the compromises the MDC wereperceived to be making on behalf of the community once it joinedthe Task Team. Those choosing to resist relocation therefore elected anew committee to represent their interests: the MRRC.9

As at Ga Pila, both the S21s and the resistance committees haveappointed legal advisors. Adv. Seth Nthai and his colleague,instructing attorney Bhadrish Daya worked with and mediatedbetween the S21, the community and AP. Attorney Richard Spoorreportedly became active in the area at the direct request of theresistance groups.Community MembersIt is estimated that approximately 495 households in Ga Puka and462 households in Ga Sekhaolelo were identified for relocation, asper the EIA undertaken by SRK Consulting. To date, 64 householdshave not relocated.There are two key factions within the community at the new GaPuka village in Rooibokfontein: one set aligned to the Induna andthe other to the MDC (Ga Puka). From ERM’s observations, the S21at Ga Puka does not seem to have a broader community following.The S21s are, however, aligned to Nduna Puka, where he previouslyserved as a member of the S21.In the new Ga Sekhaolelo village in Armoede, there is less clarity onthe number of active factions. All three sets of leaders, the Induna,the S21 and the MDC (Sekhaolelo), claim to represent factions withinthe community. Unlike at Ga Puka, Nduna Sekhaolelo is not alignedto the S21. Rather he is aligned with the MDC for Sekhaolelo. ThisNduna/ MDC faction stands in opposition to the S21.The vast majority of those who resisted relocation were from theGa Puka village. The resistant community is united, where they allrecognise the leadership of the MRRC. Even so, ERM met with threetypes of respondents when discussing the reasons for resisting: One set were prepared to relocate, but chose not tobecause promises made were not fulfilled. The second are a group who noted that they hadalways been, and would continue to remain resistant toresettlement, regardless of what was promised by AP. A third set are people indicated that they would beprepared to move, but only under certain more favourableconditions. Interestingly, it would seem that the thirdset have been successful in convincing the secondset to adjust their position to include the possibility ofrelocating if the terms were right. This second group doseem, however, to take both positions, albeit that they aremutually exclusive.In addition, a Task Team was established in 2007 by the Premier’sOffice. The purpose of this Task Team was to play a mediation roleand help resolve grievances within the community. Members ofboth the S21 and the MDC were invited to participate in this TaskTeam along with provincial and local Government stakeholders.The Municipality has also been more actively and directly involvedthrough negotiations over the Services Agreement defining theterms for handover of responsibility for service provision from AP tothe Municipality.1.5.3 External StakeholdersIn addition to stakeholders who have been directly involved, thereare also a number of stakeholders and opinion formers that havebecome involved indirectly through voicing concerns or criticismsregarding the resettlement processes and their impacts. Theseinclude (but may not be limited to): Action Aid; The South African Human Rights Commission; and Jubilee South Africa.1.6 OUTLINE OF THE REPORTThis report is divided into five parts:Part One The Introduction and Methodology;Part Two The Ga Pila Review;Part Three The Motlhotlo Review; andPart Four The ‘Looking Forward’ report.Part Five The Conclusion.Each review will be structured around an analysis and rating of AP’sperformance against the nine identified IFC topics from PerformanceStandard 5 on Involuntary Resettlement. Elements of the IFCPerformance Standard 1: Social and Environmental Assessment andManagement Systems have also been included as part of the review.In addition, there are annexes appended to the full report, providingfurther detail of both the process followed and the findingsdiscovered through the review.Government Role-playersThe Government was more involved in the Motlhotlo relocationthan in the Ga Pila one. Government officials were, for instance,invited to the signing of the community resolution in 2005.10

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTLOOKING BACKPART TWO : GA PILAPART THREE : MOTLHOTLO

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTPAR T T WOGA PILA RESETTLEMENTReview

PART TWO Table of Contents1 Topic 1: Avoid or Minimise Resettlement 11.1 What the IFC requires 11.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 11.3 Performance Assessment 22 Topic 2: Land Acquisition and Land Rights 32.1 What the IFC requires: 32.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 32.2.1 Negotiated Settlement and Document all Transactions to AcquireLand Rights 32.2.2 Ensure those with Formal and Informal Rights are Eligible forResettlement 52.2.3 Provide Adequate Housing with Security of Tenure 52.3 Performance Assessment 63 Topic 3: Identifying Affected People, Assessing Eligibility andEstablishing Cut Off Date 73.1 What the IFC requires: 73.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 73.2.1 Identification of People to Be Displaced by Resettlement 73.2.2 Undertake Inventory and Valuation of Assets 73.2.3 Establish Entitlements for all Categories of Affected People(with Particular Attention to Vulnerable Groups) 83.2.4 Cut off Date to be Established, Documented and Communicated 93.3 Performance Assessment 104 Topic 4: Effective Consultation and Informed Participation 114.1 What the IFC Requires 114.2 Overview of Consultation for Ga Pila Resettlement 124.2.1 Overview of Consultation Structures Established for the Ga PilaRelocation 124.2.2 Consultation Timing and Duration 154.3 Summary Findings and Analysis 184.3.1 Analysis of Consultation Structures and their Effectiveness 184.3.2 Analysis of Consultation Timing and Duration 214.4 Performance Assessment 225 Topic 5: Compensation 235.1 What the IFC requires: 235.2 Summary Findings And Analysis 235.2.1 Provide Resettlement Options 235.2.2 Provide Replacement Property of Equal or Higher Value 245.2.3 Preference for Land Based Compensation/ Replacement 245.2.4 Provide Compensation for All Lost Assets at Full Replacement Costand Provide Compensation for Assets Other Than Land 255.2.5 Compensation Costs to be Paid in lieu of Cash Compensation WhereFeasible 265.2.6 Compensate for Loss of Commercial Structures or Provide ReplacementProperty of Equal or Greater Value 265.2.7 Compensation to be Supplied Prior to Resettlement 265.3 Performance Assessment 26

6 Topic 6: Grievance Management 286.1 What the IFC requires: 286.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 286.2.1 Establish a Grievance Mechanism to Receive and Address Concerns 286.2.2 Effectiveness and Implementation of the Grievance Mechanism 296.3 Performance Assessment 317 Topic 7: Provide Relocation Assistance and Transition Support 327.1 What the IFC requires: 327.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 327.2.1 Provide Relocation Assistance to Displaced Persons 337.2.2 Provide Transition Support (of Reasonable Duration) for Lost Income andCosts Associated with Reinstallation of Plant and Equipment 327.3 Performance Assessment 338 Topic 8: Improve/restore living conditions and livelihoods & addresspost-resettlement development needs 348.1 What the IFC Requires 348.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 348.2.1 Improve Living Conditions 348.2.2 Livelihoods Restoration and Post-Resettlement Development 378.3 Performance Assessment 399 Topic 9: Implementation Planning, Ensuring Institutional Capacity and Transparency 409.1 What the IFC requires: 409.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 409.2.1 Develop Appropriate Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) Instrument or Implementation Plan 409.2.2 Develop Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 419.2.3 Document all Transactions and Activities 419.2.4 Ensure Adequate Capacity for Implementation 429.3 Performance Assessment 43

TOPIC 11 Avoid or Minimise Resettlement1.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES:• Avoid or minimise resettlement: In accordance with IFC Performance Standard 5,involuntary resettlement should be avoided or at least minimised (PS 5, Section 2). Aproject should therefore consider feasible alternative project designs to avoid or at leastminimize physical or economic displacement, (PS 5, Section 7).1.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSISIn respect of Ga Pila, the location of the mining activities and the Sandsloot Pit were physically constrainedby the location of the resource and the infrastructure of the already operational mine. Households inparts of Ga Pila village were 250 to 500 m from the Sandsloot pit – well within AP’s declared 1000 m safetyboundary.According to the EIA for the Relocation of Ga Pila village to Sterkwater Farm, Potgietersrus (SRK, February 1998),the relocation of Ga Pila was motivated in 1995 by a number of incidences of fly rock from the blastingoperations in the Sandsloot pit landing in the village. Regular short term evacuation measures, which werebeing implemented (and financially compensated) until 1996 for households within 500 m of blasting,were no longer considered sufficient to ensure the safety of the residents and mitigate ‘apparent socialdiscomfort’ to the village inhabitants. Resettlement was identified as the only acceptable solution. Thisrealisation coincided with an increasingly urgent need for additional space to store waste rock in orderto keep the operation viable. The proximity of Ga Pila village to the pit made it the ideal location to site awaste rock dump. In addition, the cost of the relocation could be offset by the cost savings made by nothaving to identify and sterilise another site for the purpose. (One other site had been identified but was 30km distance away and would result in high transport costs).The fact that there were already active mining operations within such close proximity to inhabitedsettlements and that resettlement was motivated as a reactive measure, by safety concerns and costsavings, indicates that alternative designs were not considered for the original pit/mining activities by APto completely avoid or minimise resettlement prior to their commencement. This is further supported bythe fact that the EIA concerns the environmental impacts of the relocation of the village on Sterkwaterfarm, and not on the social and environmental impacts of the mining activities, or of the resettlementprocess itself, on the affected communities at Ga Pila village.Given that the EIA for the Sterkwater Farm was started well after any decision on alternative sites for themining operation had been taken, it considers only the no-go project alternative for the resettlement toSterkwater. These are dealt with cursorily in the EIA as follows:• to stop mining the Sandsloot Pit;• to continue mining with ongoing village repairs ; and• to mine underground.1

The EIA goes on to state that none of the above are viewed by APas acceptable alternatives to relocating Ga Pila to Sterkwater Farm,because of the financial and strategic implications associated withthem. These, it suggests, could seriously affect the economic viabilityof the mining operation and in turn negatively affect the prosperityof the then Northern Province (now Limpopo).the findings of a proactive impact assessment for the Ga Pila site. AnIFC aligned process would have conducted an impact assessmentwhich would have included consideration of design alternativesto avoid resettlement, and or put in place measures to mitigatethe impacts on affected communities, including the impacts ofresettlement, prior to the commencement of operations.In conclusion, the relocation of Ga Pila village was a reactive measureimplemented by AP to maintain project economic viability and toaddress critical safety impacts already occurring because of ongoingblasting activities. The need for resettlement was not identified in1.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of AP’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 1.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFC PerformanceStandard andSection (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)Inadequate prior identification of safety risks and impactsPS 5, Section 7A project should consider feasiblealternative project designs to avoidor at least minimise physical oreconomic displacement.Non-alignmentof mining and design of appropriate measures to mitigatethese, e.g. relocation.No evidence of consideration of alternatives to avoid orminimise resettlement prior to commencement of miningactivities.2

TOPIC 22 Land Acquisition and Land Rights2.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES:• Negotiated settlement: Projects are encouraged to acquire land rights throughnegotiated settlements whenever possible, even if they have the legal means to gainaccess to the land without the seller’s consent, (PS 5, Section 3).• Document all transactions to acquire land rights: (PS 5, Section 12).• Ensure those with formal and informal rights are eligible for resettlement:IFC Performance Standard 5 defines displaced persons as those (i) who have formal legalrights to the land they occupy; (ii) who do not have formal legal rights to land, but have aclaim to land that is recognised or recognisable under the national law; or (iii) who haveno recognisable legal right or claim to the land they occupy, (PS 5, Section 14).• Provide security of tenure for new housing: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires thatthe project offers a choice of options for adequate housing with security of tenure so thataffected people can resettle legally without having to face the risk of forced eviction. Inparticular, informal settlers without security of tenure should be provided with adequatehousing and security of tenure in the new resettlement sites, (PS 5, Section 18).2.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS2.2.1 Negotiate Settlement and Document all Transactions to AcquireLand RightsAcquisition of Land Rights‘Rights’ to land can be understood at three levels in relation to the affected communities in thisresettlement process:• Property Rights – an individual householder’s right to own and use structures and property in whichthey live on the land;• Communal Land Rights (customary or traditional) – the right to use the land that is lived on. At GaPila the traditional authority or chief is the custodian of these rights on behalf of the community; and• Land Ownership Rights – rights conferred by legal ownership of land. In this case the land is ownedby the State and rights to it are held in trust by the Government on behalf of the Mapela Tribe.The land needed by AP for mining at Ga Pila, comprising Vaalkop 819 LR and Sandsloot 236 KR farms, isowned by the State. None of the individual community members who lived on these farms had legalownership rights to the land. All however had property rights to their homes and structures as well astraditional rights to use the land which is recognised under customary law. Since the site of the old GaPila village falls within the traditional jurisdiction of Mapela Tribal Authority (MTA), the Kgoshigadi was thecustodian of these customary or communal land rights on behalf of the community and was thereforeparty to the agreement with the Government to lease the land to AP in 1991.3

It was thus appropriate that AP’s first point of contact in thecommunities in 1991 regarding the lease of Vaalkop and Sandslootfarms was the MTA, under the leadership of Kgoshigadi Langa. Thisapproach was in keeping with accepted traditional authority (TA)protocols, whereby the Kgoshigadi and her Council are the highestauthority and have the right to speak on behalf of their communities.It is also arguable that AP rightfully interpreted having agreementfrom the MTA to lease the land, to mean that the transaction wasendorsed, or at least not challenged by, the affected communities.A more critical analysis, however might argue that by negotiatingwith only the traditional authorities and the Government, AP failed torecognise the potential for this transaction to be disputed by thoseindividuals who had customary rights to the land as a communalresource under the custodianship the Kgoshigadi. Under the IFCPerformance Standards, consulting only with the MTA/Kgosigadi onland acquisition ‘on behalf of the community’ raises questions aboutthe fairness of the negotiated settlement, which ideally should haveconsulted directly with members of the community itself.Overall, however, although a modern standard for resettlement andcurrent law in South Africa under IPILRA (the Interim Protection ofInformal Land Rights Act, 1996) would require consultation with allaffected persons on the lease and on the decision to relocate, thiswas not a requirement of AP by law in the early 1990s. Therefore, atleast in terms of the law and accepted traditional authority protocolat the time, it must be considered that a negotiated approach toacquisition of land rights did take place.In spite of questions being raised by some dissident voices in thecommunity, over the Kgoshigadi’s involvement in the transaction,as well as over the choice of site, in 1998 there was a communityresolution undertaken at the MTA offices signed by all of those inattendance from the community. This was witnessed by the thenMinister of Land Affairs, Derek Hannekom. AP report that this ransmoothly and there was no open resistance from the community atthis time.The land acquisition for the host site at Sterkwater Farm appears tohave been a private transaction between AP and the respective farmowners. Community respondents did not raise queries or concernsabout land rights with respect to Sterkwater, with the exception ofthe issue of the 350 ha land claim by the Matlou Communal PropertyAssociation (CPA). This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3.Land Lease ArrangementsThe community legal advisors explained that initially the land leasearrangements were to be drawn up in accordance with the lawand accepted structures at that time, whereby the Minister of LandAffairs would lease the land to AP on behalf of the community. Itis understood by ERM that the conditions of the lease required APto have 100 percent vacant occupation in order to operate on theland; the Government would therefore have been required to evictany community members who resisted the relocation. Accordingto the community legal advisors, the Government, in an attempt toavoid being directly involved with potential forced evictions, insteadrequested that a sub-lease arrangement be drawn up to shift thisresponsibility for the transaction and any potential need to evict,to a legal entity within the community itself. This entity was thusestablished as the Section 21 Company (S21) as the designated legallessor under a sub-lease agreement (see Topic 4: Consultation andInformed Participation for more information on their establishment).It should be noted that the S21 and sub-lease model was theGovernment’s preferred approach. An additional consideration for APwas the recovery of VAT, which upon advice from a tax specialist, waspossible through the establishment of the S21 as a company andlegal vehicle for the transaction.A number of key concerns were raised by external stakeholdersregarding this approach.The validity of the terms of the Master Lease Agreement for bothGa Pila and much later at Motlhotlo have been called into question(in particular by the Motlhotlo Development Committee, given thatit was in contrast to all other traditional land lease arrangementsbetween the Government and communities in South Africa at thetime. In the opinion of the community legal advisors, however,this new lease arrangement was forward thinking, and offered analternative to the Apartheid model of the communities as powerlesssubjects to the Government. It was therefore in fact in line with thethen emerging Communal Land Rights Bill, 2003.• It is noted as a major concern that there is no documentaryevidence of the conversation between the communitylegal advisors and the Minister of Land Affairs regarding thedecision to transfer sub-lease responsibility to the S21s.• It is also perceived as highly problematic that the S21Chairpersons signed a Special Power of Attorney to BhadrishDaya to undertake all negotiations, settle terms, make, signand execute all or any of the lease agreements and anyrelated agreements in relation to the farms in question. Theamount of power given to the legal advisors, particularlyin light of the failings of the S21s which the legal advisorsrepresent, is seen by many external stakeholders as a majorflaw in the relocation process.4

Documentation of TransactionsThe EIA (SRK, February 1998) makes reference to the process aroundland acquisition process for Vaalkop, Sandsloot and Sterkwaterfarms. However, it is not clear from community respondentswhether the transactions that took place between AP and theKgoshigadi were transparently communicated to the affectedpopulations. Community members do recall taking an active partin site selection, however. This relative lack of documentation andtransparency around land acquisition seems to have later causeddistrust of both AP and the Kgoshigadi by some members of thecommunity. Complaints around this issue seem to have becomemore vocal after questions over the lease agreement at Motlhotlobegan to arise in 2001.The closed or private approach to land acquisition via the traditionalauthorities, or at least the lack of transparent documentationrelating to this process, does not demonstrate good riskmanagement on the part of AP. Recent negative media attention(late 2009) concerning the acquisition of the Sterkwater Farm by APmay have exacerbated suspicion and lack of trust around this issue.2.2.2 Ensure those with Formal and InformalRights are Eligible for ResettlementThe EIA identified the project affected community as ‘all residentsand agencies (formal and informal) of Ga Pila village and within thevicinity of Sterkwater Farm’. Stakeholder reports serve to confirmthat AP included all those from Ga Pila village in the audit for therelocation process, whether their claim to the land was recognisedby law or not. All structures and properties identified in the areaand falling under the authority of the MTA were considered eligiblefor relocation and were included in the audit. This included thosewho had previously lived in temporary or informal structures.Given that none of the individuals/households in thesecommunities had formal ownership rights (as discussed in Topic1: Avoid or Minimise Resettlement) it can be argued that AP, byidentifying all residents as eligible for relocation, was recognisingand addressing informal and or communal rights to the land.AP is thus considered aligned with the IFC in this regard. Morediscussion of the process by which people were identified aseligible for resettlement is provided in Topic 3: Identifying AffectedPeople, Assessing Eligibility and Establishing a Cut-Off Date.2.2.3 Provide Adequate Housing with Security ofTenureMuch of the physical evidence points to the fact that AP is alignedin terms of the IFC requirement to provide adequate housing fordisplaced people. A visit to site at Sterkwater and a large sampleof properties, along with extensive photographic evidence inthe ‘green files’ suggest to ERM that the overwhelming majorityof replacement houses is not only adequate but in most casesa structural improvement on the houses people occupied inthe old Ga Pila. It is important to note however that this point isheavily contested by the communities. In fact, there are significantnumbers of grievances about the standards of building, the qualityof the finishes and concerns about the size of houses comparedto properties that they replaced. These grievances were in manyways at the root of the resistance to the relocation at Ga Pila (SeeTopic 5: Compensation). Thus, whilst the houses appear to be animprovement on the originals, the widespread dissatisfaction of thecommunity about what they received raises questions about theirperceived adequacy.Security of Tenure: Individual RightsOwnership certificates or certificates of occupation were givento householders at Ga Pila as they were later at Motlhotlo, butindividual title to the land was not secured.The current land law under IPILRA provides for the protection ofinformal rights to land (including rights to communal land use, andsurface property rights to the structures in which people live), butdoes not provide for ownership rights to the land, only rights tohomestead ownership. IPILRA in fact only became law 5 years afterGa Pila relocation commenced, but the legal situation was the sameat the time. Ultimately therefore, within the existing regulatorycontext, under both statutory and customary law, ensuring titledeeds to individual homeowners was not an option open to AP.AP report that despite this, they still made considerable efforts tocreate the option of granting the individual householder a right tothe land that could be mortgaged, so that they could improve theirfinancial status – these ranged from trusts to communal propertyassociations. The various options were presented to the RelocationSteering Committee/S21 and debated upon. Ultimately though,the Kgoshigadi was firm at the time that no individual rights to landownership of any kind could be granted, only rights to homesteadownership.AP also report that the Ga Pila Reconciliation Management Team(GRMT) initially suggested pursuing individual title holding forresidential sites but the older community members who were thehouse owners felt they were going to be governed by a townshipand would be removed from the domain of the MTA. They wereunhappy about this so individual title holding was not pursued anyfurther by the community.5

Security of Tenure: Communal RightsSecuring rights to communal land at Sterkwater to replace that lostat old Ga Pila was however a key commitment for AP. AP providedreplacement communal land which was reported to be three timesthe land they had previously had access to at the old Ga Pila village.Serious concerns were raised by community respondents regardingthe security of communal land tenure of those who resettled tothe new village. This relates to the approximately 350ha of grazingland allocated to the Ga Pila community as part of the resettlementprocess, which was later claimed by and returned to another Induna(Koka-Matlou CPA). According to AP, the 350 ha of land referred tohad always formed part of the mine land, up until it was claimedunder an ancestral land claim by the Koka-Matlou CPA. Ga-Pilapeople at Sterkwater were allowed free access to this land until thispoint.The loss of this land left the Ga Pila community feeling that they donot have secure rights to use of the land within the compensationpackage or security of communal tenure. It also left the Ga Pilaresidents with decreased access to grazing land, which led tosubsequent claims for additional grazing land to make up thisdifference.AP have suggested that the claim for additional grazing land by GaPila originally arose from the addendum of the EIA report whichmentioned that Sterkwater Farm did not provide enough grazingfor the Ga Pila livestock. The success of the Matlou land claim, thenadded further impetus to this claim for additional grazing landbecause it meant the free use of the 350ha portion was withdrawn.Overall AP is considered aligned with IFC in terms of providingadequate housing and ensuring security of homestead ownershipat the new village through the provision of occupational certificates.Security of tenure for individual rights to land was not possible underlaw at the time. Alignment with IFC is therefore not applicable in thecase of individual land tenure. AP attempted to secure communalland tenure at Ga Pila by giving communal grazing land as part ofthe compensation package. The loss of 350 ha portion of land toan ancestral land claim however, has thrown security of communaltenure at Ga Pila into question in the eyes of the community, whofeel their rights to the land given is in jeopardy. The Government’srole in awarding this claim must, however, be acknowledged (i.e.,Government had initially made the land available to AP, but thenlater awarded the same land to the Koka-Matlou CPA). This created acontestation over the land.2.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of AP’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 2.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFC PerformanceStandards andSection (#)IFC Performance StandardsRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS 5, Section 3Projects are encouraged to acquireland rights through negotiatedsettlements whenever possible.Partial alignmentTraditional protocols were followed. The process didhowever, appear to exclude the broader community.PS 5, Section 12Document all transactions to acquireland rights.Non-alignmentNot formally documenting the decision’s historically‘unique’ sub-lease arrangement was a critical omission onthe part of the legal advisors, AP and the Department ofLand Affairs (DLA) given the significance of the issues athand.PS 5, Section 14Ensure those with formal and informalrights are eligible.Alignment-PS 5, Section 18Provide security of homesteadownership tenure for new housing.Alignment-PS 5, Section 18Provide security of land tenure.Within the existing regulatory context, ensuring titledeeds to land was not an option open to AP.However, issues around the Matlou CPA land claim andthe consequent transfer of land rights has raised concernsaround both the real and perceived security of communalland tenure for the Ga Pila community at Sterkwater.The Government’s role in this transaction must also beacknowledged.Not applicablefor individualtitle6

TOPIC 33 Identifying Affected People, AssessingEligibility and Establishing Cut Off Date3.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES:• Undertake socio-economic census and valuation of assets: IFC PerformanceStandard 5 requires that in developing a resettlement plan, the project will carry out acensus with appropriate socio-economic data to identify the persons who will be displacedby the project, to determine who will be eligible for compensation and assistance, and todiscourage inflow of people who are ineligible for these benefits, (PS5, Section 11).• Cut off date to be established, documented and communicated: The date ofcompletion of the census (see above) and associated assets inventory represents a cut-offdate for the resettlement. In the absence of host government procedures, the client willestablish a cut-off date for eligibility. Individuals taking up residence in the project areaafter the cut-off date are not eligible for compensation or resettlement assistance providedthat notification of the cut-off date is well documented and disseminated, (PS5, Section11).• Establish entitlements for all categories of affected people (with particularattention to vulnerable groups): IFC Performance Standard 5 states that aresettlement plan establish the entitlements of all categories of affected persons (includinghost communities), with particular attention paid to the needs of the poor and thevulnerable’, (PS5, Section 12).3.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS3.2.1 Identification of People to be Displaced by ResettlementTypically, in a resettlement process, a socio-economic census or survey is carried out to identify who will beresettled, and to determine who is eligible for compensation and assistance. The completion of this censuscoincides with the cut-off date for the identification of affected residents; any one who moves into theproject area after this date is not considered eligible.In the views expressed by respondents from the resettled community there is a lack of clarity around thespecific process employed by AP for identifying affected and eligible people. Most accounts suggestthat it was assumed that all those that fell under the authority of Nduna Pila and lived in the villagewere affected. The Kgoshigadi produced a list of names to identify affected households. This list wouldhave been verified and supplemented at a later point in time by the outcome of the household surveyundertaken as part of the inventory of assets process.There was a suggestion by some of the respondents at old Ga Pila that a specific baseline assessment wasdone, which identified seven affected households. These were reported by some to be the only housesin the community that originally needed to be physically moved. AP recalls that once the rest of the GaPila community realised what the benefits of resettlement might be, they nominated themselves to be7

esettled as a whole village. This aligns with AP’s account in the EIAthat the community ‘self-identified’ themselves, requesting relocationas a solution to safety concerns related to blasting activities and flyrock.In terms of the self-nomination of the village for resettlement, itwas suggested by community respondents, and acknowledgedby AP, that the majority voice may have drowned out the resistantminority who were not heard at this stage. This was exacerbated bythe fact that all engagements to identify individuals were conductedthrough leadership and collective structures and not directly withhouseholds. It may have been difficult at the time of first contactto consult directly with individual households as this would havebeen seen as challenging the authority of the Kgoshigadi todecide the future of the community. The historical context andtraditional structures may have meant that AP was obliged to treatthe community as a homogenous group. However, it is arguablethat there are ways in which to approach this challenge so asnot to undermine the Traditional Authority and yet still make theconsultation more inclusive (See Topic 4: Effective Consultation andInformed Participation).The EIA (February 1998) indicates that the closest to any kind ofsocial baseline survey to identify a project affected communitywas a ‘Social and Institutional Audit’ undertaken by ResourceDevelopment Consultants (RDC) in September 1997. This study wasreportedly completed at the same time as the technical audit byTPC/ Sibanye Architects to determine compensation. The findingsof the RDC report were fed into the EIA. It was intended to “obtainan understanding of the social and economic characteristics ofhouseholds and institutions in Ga Pila village and to investigatesocial, cultural, economic and political relationships within Ga Pilavillage and surrounding villages, and to obtain an indication ofthe potential impacts of the relocation on internal and externalrelationships” (SRK, February 1998).Community respondents at Ga Pila only recalled individually takingpart in one audit process and certainly could not distinguish theRDC social and institutional audit from a technical audit (describedbelow). It is not clear from evidence given if the findings of the RDCaudit were applied in a systematic way to inform the resettlementprocess.3.2.2 Undertake Inventory and Valuation ofAssetsTPC/ Sibanye hired assistants from the community to work withthem in gathering data for each household. Community membershave speculated that these assistants were chosen on the basis oftheir political affiliation to the African National Congress (ANC) orPan-African Congress (PAC) which were active in the community atthe time. One community respondent suggested that the use oflocal community members may have impacted negatively on theaccuracy of the audit. Respondents also remember that the S21played a role in the audit.It was confirmed by community members that the audit wasundertaken on a one-to–one basis with each household and that thehomestead owners were required to sign the inventory to indicatetheir agreement with what had been measured. Each householdreceived a folder, known as the ‘green file’, which contained thesigned and witnessed documents detailing the property and assetsinventory as well as the floor plan. AP retained a copy, known as the‘red file’. The green files were seen at almost all of the householdsvisited.The scope of the audit was, however limited to major structures, landand crops in the homestead. At a household level it also includedother assets such as boreholes, but not perennials such as fruit treeswhich yielded a livelihood value. Graves and other crops were notincluded in the audit and were reportedly compensated for lateron in the process. Communal grazing and ploughing fields werereported by AP to have been included in the audit but their valuewas not calculated and factored into compensation packages on anindividual or household level.Concerns were raised around the way in which the audit wasconducted and, in particular, around whether it was adequatelyparticipatory and consultative. This is discussed further under Topic 4:Effective Consultation and Informed Participation. In addition, a furtherconcern was raised around the integrity of the outcome. A numberof respondents of one faction in the community claim that theydid not sign off on the contents of the file at the time of measuring.They allege that they were provided with the ‘green files’ onlyonce the audit had been completed and compensation had beencalculated. This is significant in that it resulted in suspicions that,during the period between the audit taking place and the files beingreturned to the community, figures could have been manipulatedand tampered with by AP without the community’s knowledge. Thisraised questions around whether the valuation for compensationpurposes was fair and accurate.There is a gap in detailed information available during the researchfrom AP around the audit and valuation process at Ga Pila, andon how this information was translated into the compensationpackages received. AP did later report working closely with eachindividual householder to explain the ‘product offering’ in terms ofhouse and compensation package they would receive.8

Concerns around the approach to, and integrity of, the audit,although unsubstantiated, reflect a lot of confusion around theprocess adopted. This apparent lack of understanding wouldsuggest a need for clearer communication and awareness raising byAP. Moreover, support in helping the community interpret technicalplans, pictures and diagrams, would have played an important rolein helping to manage expectations. Weaknesses in communicationand educating householders in terms of what they would receiveseems to have contributed to the conflict and resistance that arosewhen people first got sight of their new homes, as discussed furtherin Section 4.2.2.3.2.3 Establish Entitlements for all Categoriesof Affected People (with ParticularAttention to Vulnerable Groups)The household audit/ asset inventory undertaken at Ga Pila appearsto have focused solely on measuring physical assets in order toreplace them. It did not formally attempt to distinguish betweendifferent categories of affected people or groups with contrastingneeds or entitlements, to determine different compensationpackages or options.More systematic profiling and analysis at the household levelwould have allowed AP to identify vulnerable groups (e.g., theundereducated/ illiterate/ youth/ female headed households). Ahigh level assessment of socio-economic vulnerabilities may havebeen included in the 1997 RDC audit, but as discussed, there is noevidence that any findings from this study were used to make anassessment of individual entitlements.Evidence from the community respondents suggests that a morethorough understanding of the differing needs of individuallyaffected households could have helped AP to better identify theexisting inequalities and disputes that later became the source ofserious challenges to resettlement process (e.g., amongst the youth,illiterate and unemployed). If these groups had been identifiedearly on as vulnerable, they could potentially have been consultedseparately, or been encouraged to participate in specific waysand given more support through the process. By not giving thisdiscrete attention, the process has potentially contributed to theentrenchment of generational divisions and power inequalities,as discussed further in Topic 4: Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation.While such a survey would have been best practice from a riskmanagement perspective, it is arguable that an in-depth needs andvulnerabilities assessment was not in currency at the time and ismuch more than could have been expected of AP in implementinga resettlement process at that time.3.2.4 Cut off Date to be Established,Documented and CommunicatedAP confirms that no formal cut-off date was applied andcommunicated to the community. No influx occurred at the old GaPila site, however.9

3.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of AP’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 3.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandards andSection (#)IFC PerformanceStandardsRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS 5, Section11Identification of peopleto be displaced byresettlement.AlignmentNo individual engagements were undertaken to identify affectedhouseholds.The household audit/inventory of assets was adequately planned andexecuted but could have been supported by an earlier and improvededucation campaign to help manage expectations and improvePS 5, Section11Undertake inventoryand valuation of assets.Partialalignmentcommunity understanding of the audit process. The scope of the auditincluded houses, livestock and crops in the homestead but failed to includegraves or fruit trees. Graves and were compensated individually later in theprocess. Value of land at an individual/ household level was not measuredin the audit.PS 5, Section12Establish entitlementsfor all categories ofaffected people (withparticular attention tovulnerable groups).NonalignmentThe audit lacked a needs and vulnerabilities assessment component athousehold level to proactively identify risks and vulnerable households,and facilitate planning of adequate and appropriate livelihood restorationmeasures.PS 5, Section11Cut off date to beestablished,documented andcommunicated.NonalignmentA cut off date was not applied and communicated.10

TOPIC 44 Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation4.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES:• Implementation of effective consultatio:n: IFC Performance Standard 1 spells out therequirements for consultation in detail, specifically that effective consultation: (i) should be basedon the prior disclosure of relevant and adequate information, including draft documents andplans; (ii) should begin early in the Social and Environmental Assessment process; (iii) shouldfocus on the social and environmental risks and adverse impacts, and the proposed measuresand actions to address these; and (iv) will be carried out on an ongoing basis as risks and impactsarise. The consultation process will be undertaken in a manner that is inclusive and culturallyappropriate. The client will tailor its consultation process to the language preferences of theaffected communities, their decision-making processes, and the needs of disadvantaged orvulnerable groups, (PS 1, Section 21).• Free, prior and informed consultation: For projects with significant adverse impacts onaffected communities, the consultation process will ensure their free, prior and informedconsultation and facilitate their informed participation. Informed participation involvesorganised and iterative consultation, leading to the client’s incorporating into their decisionmakingprocess the views of the affected communities on matters that affect them directly, suchas proposed mitigation measures, the sharing of development benefits and opportunities, andimplementation issues. The client will document the process, in particular the measures taken toavoid or minimize risks to and adverse impacts on the affected communities, (PS 1, Section 22).• Appropriate level of consultation: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that the projectensures that resettlement activities are implemented with appropriate disclosure of information,consultation, and the informed participation of those affected, (PS 5, Objectives).• Disclosure: If communities may be affected by risks or adverse impacts from the project, theclient will provide such communities with access to information on the purpose, nature and scaleof the project, the duration of proposed project activities, and any risks to and potential impactson such communities. For projects with adverse social or environmental impacts, disclosureshould occur early in the Social and Environmental Assessment process and in any event beforethe project construction commences, and on an ongoing basis, (PS 1, Section 20).• Choice of new site: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that a project offers displaced peoplechoices among feasible resettlement options, (PS5, Section 16).• Ensure appropriate consultation including transparent standards for compensation:IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that a project consults with and facilitates the informedparticipation of affected persons and communities, including host communities, in decisionmaking processes related to resettlement – during implementation, monitoring, and evaluation ofcompensation payment and resettlement to achieve outcomes consistent with PS5, (PS5, Section8 and 9).11

4.2 OVERVIEW OF CONSULTATION FOR GA PILA RESETTLEMENTGiven the complexity of Topic 4, ERM has presented thisdiscussion in the following format:• An outline of the different consultation structuresthat were established for the purposes of the Ga Pilaresettlement, including a discussion of their role and keychallenges faced; and• An overview of the key points at which consultation tookplace during the course of the resettlement process.Having discussed each of the above, the consultationprocess is then assessed against the IFC requirementsoutlined in Section 4.1. This is done in two parts:• firstly, an assessment against the IFC requirements thatrelate to when consultation should take place; and• secondly, an assessment against the IFC requirementsthat relate to how consultation should take place.4.2.1 Overview of Consultation StructuresEstablished for the Ga Pila RelocationThe Establishment of Representative Committees for theRelocationThe Relocation Steering Committee (RSC)When making initial contact with communities regarding theresettlement, AP advised that the Ga Pila community establish acommunity based representative group or structure. The functionof this group was to manage and facilitate communication andconsultation between the community and AP. The RSC wasestablished at a Kgoro convened by Nduna Pila in June 1997.According to the EIA report (SRK, February 1998), it was formedfollowing discussions between AP, Northern Province governmentofficials and Ga Pila village representatives. Some communityrespondents recalled that members were elected at the meetingthrough a process of open selection, where a number of selfnominatedpersons were voted on by a show of hands. Othersclaimed that there was no voting system, but rather that the RSCwas comprised of certain trusted figures who were nominated atthe meeting by the community as a collective. There was, however,a widely held view amongst the Ga Pila community that the electionprocess was fair, transparent and understood by the community, orat least by all those who attended community meetings.The RSC was reportedly made up of members of two pre-existinggroups: the Civic Group and the Concerned Group. The Civic Groupplayed an important role in empowering the community duringthe Apartheid period, and was made up of older, predominantlyilliterate members, with a strong political voice. It was clearlyaligned with the ANC at the time. The Concerned Group emergedin opposition to the Civic Group as a kind of pressure group againstthe growing power of the latter. Concerned Group memberswere characteristically younger, more educated and broadlypolitically aligned with the PAC. They did not take part in Kgorosor acknowledge traditional structures. They did, however, becomemore active in the resettlement process over time. The two groupsdiffered over key issues, in particular over compensation. Due toinfighting, the groups often held separate meetings. Civic Groupmembers sought replacement houses whereas the ConcernedGroup made demands for R 250,000 per household as compensationfor resettling. This claim was later reduced to R100,000 and thenabandoned.The EIA report (SRK, 1998) states that the RSC membership alsocomprised both community and non-community stakeholders,including 16 to 30 representatives from Ga Pila village, the MTA,Backenberg Transitional Local Council and the Bosveld DistrictCouncil, 11 representatives of the Provincial Government, five to sixrepresentatives of AP, two representatives of Sterkwater communityand two Project Managers.This shows a good and balanced cross section of stakeholders in theoriginal RSC, assuming they all participated in the structure. The RSCwas to be dissolved and replaced by a new structure, as describedbelow.The Communication Task TeamThe EIA report also states that in 1997 a Communication TaskTeam was formed as a sub-committee of the RSC to facilitatecommunication between the RSC and the people of Ga Pila village.The team comprised the leaders of Ga Pila village, both traditionaland civic, who were also members of the RSC. Public meetings werereported to be the main mechanism for facilitating communication.An office was established by the RSC in Ga Pila village in January1998 to further assist the Task Team to undertake communication.ERM have assumed that this entity was dissolved along with the RSC,since no further reference or recollection of the CommunicationTask Team was made during interviews with AP or by any of thecommunity respondents.The Minerals CommitteeThe Minerals Committee was made up of community members whoassisted AP in implementing the day to day relocation activities. Theywere rarely mentioned in discussions with community members for12

this review and therefore their role was unclear as compared withthe role of the S21 for example. AP maintain that these individualsplayed a vital role in helping AP to provide services (water, feeding,maize fields, transport from and to the new village as well asassisting with evacuations during blasting). The Minerals Committeeis still in existence today and serves all the communities (not onlythose affected by the resettlement) in the MTA area.The Ga Pila Reconciliation Management Team (GRMT)Following infighting in the RSC on several issues, particularlyregarding compensation, the Concerned Group-linked membersmotivated for the two groups to merge into a different entity. Thecommunity endorsed this proposal due to their realisation thatthe RSC was ineffective as a result of the divisions. This led to theformation of a new committee to replace it: the self-named GRMT.In establishing the GRMT, the RSC was formally dissolved.The GRMT was apparently also comprised of the original membersof the RSC affiliated to the Civic and Concerned Groups. This meantthat although now formally a united group, the GRMT was stillhampered by internal conflicts. Increasingly these became focusedon the chosen site for relocation. The Provincial Department ofEconomic Affairs was reportedly called on at one point to try tomediate the ongoing disputes, with little success.The introduction of legal advisors and the establishment of theSection 21In 1998, in the context of these ongoing disputes, it was reportedby some respondents that the community contacted a lawyer,Advocate Seth Nthai, to represent them to help them manage theresettlement process. Other accounts contest this, claiming that APapproached external role players to ask advice on how to managethe situation.In either case, the reasons given for seeking legal support atthis time were agreed: that community members needed helpdealing with continual infighting as well as with handling theirnegotiations and conversations with AP, which were ‘becomingdifficult’. When probed on what this meant respondents could giveno further explanation. The communities chose Advocate Nthaifrom a selected number of lawyers recommended by the NationalDepartment of Land Affairs. Nthai was known to communitiesbecause of his previous role as the MEC for Safety and Security inLimpopo.It was upon the advice and with the assistance of the newlyappointed community legal advisors that the GRMT was transformedinto the Section 21 Committee. As with previous committees,the S21 membership at Ga Pila was comprised of already electedmembers of the GRMT, plus a few additional members selected bythe community legal advisors, including the Kgoshigadi and NdunaPila.As previously discussed, the Section 21 Committee was laterregistered as a Section 21 Company - a trust and not-for profitorganisation, purposefully structured as a formal and legallyrecognised entity through which to manage the resettlementtransaction on behalf of the communities. This model was reportedlychosen partly as a result of agreements reached with the thenMinister of Land Affairs, who recognised the need for a legal entitythrough which to sublease the land to AP. Creating such an entityalso allowed AP to recover VAT on the land transaction. The S21Committee thus became the Section 21 Company’s board of electedrepresentatives.Unlike the committees before it, however, the S21 Committee’srole, mandate and membership structure would be formalised in acontract. The terms of this contract or Articles of Association werelegally binding for the fixed term of the relocation process. Oneof the important implications of this was that the S21 governancestructure did not consequently allow for the re-election andchange of representatives. Once the committee members hadbeen formally selected, they became responsible for managing theresettlement process through to completion. This meant that therewas effectively no recourse to remove and re-elect members ongrounds of poor performance. According to the community legaladvisors the motivation for not including a provision for re-electionwas to prevent the constant turnover of members and reduce theassociated risk of having to renegotiate agreements with each newcommittee, resulting in delays.A key provision in the agreement was also that AP would pay amonthly stipend to all S21 members. This was intended to cover thecosts and time required to support and represent the community inthe relocation process.Many non-S21 aligned community respondents speculated that theS21 members had, as a result, benefitted disproportionately from theresettlement process at the expense of the community.The community legal advisors maintain that the terms of the Articlesof Association and role and mandate of the S21 was transparentlycommunicated and accepted by the community members at thetime. It is not clear from the evidence seen whether there was acommunity resolution on this subject and agreement to the terms.13

It is also not clear whether the formal constitution and Articles ofAssociation of the S21 were ever properly documented and madeavailable to community members at Ga Pila in accessible writtenform, or whether it was communicated using appropriate methodsto illiterate community members in order to ensure that the roleof the S21 was fully understood. A copy of such a contract ordocument was never made available to ERM.Community responses in many cases show a very limitedunderstanding of the S21 entity or even of the legal advisors’respective roles in the process. The lack of information andeducation on this sensitive subject seems to have led to suspicionsand jealousies amongst community members. It contributed to thebreakdown of trust with led to resistance and conflict later in theprocess. See further discussion of this in Section 4.2.2.Emergence of Resistance GroupsAs discussed above, whilst several community members had beenresistant to the relocation process from the outset, most of thesplits and factions at Ga Pila emerged in resistance to AP and to theresettlement at two key points. Initially it arose from a subsectionof the youth and community over competition for jobs andopportunities for Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME’s)during the construction phase. Subsequently, serious resistancearose when people saw the completed houses they had beenallocated and realised that they did not meet their expectations. Atthis time, people also became suspicious of the S21s and began tospeculate that they had received preferential benefits in jobs andhouses during the construction process. When the constructionended these jealousies were further aggravated for many by suddenunemployment.Certain of these resistant individuals became organised into formaland semi-formal organisations. The Ga Pila Resistance Committeewas formed from amongst those households who chose to, andstill continue to, remain at the old village. An ad hoc committee wasformed at the time of the relocation and associated resistance. Thisad hoc committee became engaged at one point in violent protestand members were arrested. Later, members of this committeeformed a group, now known as the Reconciliation Committee, whichfunctions in opposition to the S21 Committee.Involvement of the MTAThe relationship between AP and the Kgoshigadi was initiallyamicable, where the Kgoshigadi was co-operative regarding theresettlement. The MTA and the associated Kgoshigadi were the firstpoint of contact in the consultation process over land acquisitionby AP. Nduna Pila was seen to have co-operated with AP at firstbut less so later on. The Kgoshigadi and Nduna Pila were bothmembers of the S21 for some time. As mentioned briefly in Topic 2:Land Acquisition and Land Rights, some community respondentsand their legal advisors have suggested that there was very earlyresistance to the Kgoshigadi being directly involved in the S21, sincethere were suspicions about her private involvement in the landacquisition transaction. The community legal advisors claim theyhad to push the communities quite hard to accept the Kgoshigadi’sinclusion in the S21 membership. This suggests that the integrity ofthe traditional leadership structures was being called into questionby the communities at Ga Pila at an early stage.Most responses suggest that this disintegration of trust between thecommunity and the TA has continued and worsened over the lifeof the process. The response has been for both the Kgoshigadi andNduna Pila to subsequently distance themselves from the process.At the time of the review, the Induna has switched allegiance to theGa Pila Reconciliation Committee in opposition to the S21.Involvement of the GovernmentGovernment seem to have been only actively involved in therelocation process once conflict and disputes arose, with theexception of early involvement in land acquisition, site selectionand compensation negotiations at the time of the original RSC. Asalready indicated, the Provincial Department of Economic Affairsmediated between the Civic Group and the Concerned Groupduring the time of the GRMT. At a later point, the Premier’s Officewas called upon to step in at the time of violent communityprotest about the relocation and the associated compensation.The Municipality also became involved at Ga Pila, although onlylate in the process, following the handover of services from APto the Municipality. At the inception of the Ga Pila relocation, therelevant existing authorities were the Bosveld District Council andthe Backenberg Transitional Local Council as well as provincialauthorities of the then Northern Province. These District andTransitional Councils no longer exist. Due to the time that haspassed since the relocation at Ga Pila, the Mogalakwena Municipalityrepresentatives interviewed by ERM, although directly involved inMotlhotlo, had had very little direct involvement in Ga Pila and hadlimited memory of the Ga Pila process.Based on the relatively limited evidence available, there was anapparent lack of Provincial Government/Municipality involvementbeyond the initial negotiations. The regular, formal involvement ofGovernment in the mid to long term delivery of the resettlementprocess at Ga Pila may be better documented in archive files heldby AP but these were not available to ERM at the time of the review.Interestingly, the EIA report (SRK, 1998) flags the need for greaterand more coordinated involvement of Government in the relocationprocess. The issue of government institutional capacity in the14

elocation is discussed further in Topic 9: Implementation Planning,Ensuring Institutional Capacity and Transparency.4.2.2 Consultation Timing and DurationThis section looks at consultation at a number of different stagesincluding:• initial contact;• consultation during the EIA;• consultation and participation in the site selection process;• consultation and participation during the household audit/inventory of assets and construction phase; and• consultation with host communities.Consultation, as it relates to the grievance mechanism, is discussedseparately in Topic 5: Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation.Initial ContactIt appears from the evidence seen that the decision to relocate GaPila took place well in advance of any notification or participationof communities. Community respondents noted that their firstknowledge of the resettlement was not received as a proposalbut rather as a decision already taken. This supports evidence inthe EIA showing that the decision to relocate was taken withoutthe informed consultation of the community for reasons of safetyassociated with existing fly rock incidents and the urgent need touse the Ga Pila area as a waste rock dump.All accounts including that of the MTA itself confirm that the firstpoint of contact on the subject of relocation was the Kgoshigadiand her Council. Following this, the MTA and AP representativeswent to the community through the kgoros convened by NdunaPila. The process of first contact is discussed in detail in Topic 2: LandAcquisition and Land Rights.In 1998, a community resolution was adopted agreeing to theresettlement. This was signed by all present, in the presence ofthe then Minister of Land Affairs, Derek Hannekom, at the MapelaTribal Office. AP recalls that there was no open resistance to thisresolution by the community at the time. Some of the communitycontest whether this resolution amounted to full consent from thewhole community. According to the Ga Pila Resistance Committeemembers, there was resistance to the relocation from the veryearliest stages – it is thus possible that those who had alreadydecided they did not want to move did not attend the meeting.Absent community members may not have been captured by thisprocess. The inclusiveness of the consultation process is discussedfurther later in this Topic.Consultation During the EIA ProcessThe EIA report identifies, as a key limitation, the fact that it was notan assessment of impacts of the relocation on the original Ga Pilacommunity but rather of the environmental and social impacts onthe Sterkwater farm. As a result it did not include in its scope anydirect consultation with the Ga Pila communities regarding theeffects of the blasting activities at Sandsloot and of the relocationprocess itself. This was clearly an omission and area of nonalignmentwith regard to the IFC standards, which requires thatconsultation on the impact of the resettlement be included in theEIA process. This would have undermined the extent to which thedecision to resettle was based on Free Prior Informed Consultationwith all affected parties. This is analysed further below in this Topic.Site SelectionSeveral alternative sites were tabled by AP as possible sites for theresettled village. For instance, there was apparently a possibility thatthe community might move to Armoede farm (to where Motlhotlocommunities would later resettle), before Sterkwater was chosen asthe host site for the resettled village. Communities were involvedin the site selection process through the RSC. These consultationactivities are well documented in the EIA report. The process ofchoosing a site was apparently a contentious one which causeddivisions in the RSC where factions differed in their opinions aboutthe preferred site.Even though alternatives were provided, certain communityrespondents remain of the view that they were not able toparticipate sufficiently in the site selection process which resulted inthem moving to a site they were unhappy with. There were manyreasons for this unhappiness such as it being both isolated andmountainous, which was considered a distinct disadvantage. There isalso a commonly held perception that the site has a negative impacton the health of residents. These concerns are discussed in moredepth in Topic 8: Improve Living Conditions and Livelihoods. Somerespondents suggest that there were flaws in the inclusivenessof the site selection process and that the whole community hadnot bought into the choice of site, although this position was notcommonly supported in interviews. It should be noted, however,that it is possible that their opinion of the site may have changed tobecome negative over time.15

Consultation and Participation during the Household Auditand Construction PhaseHousehold auditDiscussions with community respondents highlight that thosewho took part in the household audit did not necessarilyclearly understand the process or its implications. AP maintainthat, although there were some dissenting voices, all but onehouseholder signed off on the ‘green files’ containing the auditfindings. Many community respondents contested this, although itseemed the main point of contention was not whether they signedbut rather whether they understood what they were signing. In fact,suggestions were made that people had felt the auditing process‘happened to them, not with them’.AP explained that community members were trained as assistantsand were involved in the audit to help those who were illiteratein understanding and signing off their audit files. Even thoughcommunity members confirmed this, some respondents suggestedthat they were put under pressure to sign the audit form withoutreally understanding its content or its significance.Several householders claimed they were absent during thehousehold audit (most commonly working over long periods inJohannesburg), and that as a result family members had to sign ontheir behalf. In a number of examples these family members werean elderly parent or adolescent child. In a few cases wives hadsigned on behalf of their husbands but their signatures had laterbeen retracted and the husbands’ signatures obtained upon theirreturn to the village. It was explained by respondents that this wasbecause women do not have recognised rights to property underthe traditional structures in such communities, and consequentlytheir signatures were not adequate proof of the householders’acceptance of the audit findings. Signatures of family membersmade ‘on behalf of’ householders were shown to ERM in manyof the households concerned, which verified these claims. Noneof the respondents for this review recalled receiving any formof communication by AP to contact them whilst away working,either in order to notify them of any developments relating to theresettlement or in order to obtain their sign off on audit files. The APProject Manager conversely reported meeting absent homeownersin Johannesburg as a routine part of consulting on the audit andsign off process.Formulation and explanation of compensationAccording to AP, consultation on standards for compensation wasundertaken in the following ways:• Individuals were consulted in a one-on-one fashion byarchitects’ assistants on what they could expect to receiveat the final stage of the audit process.• There was extensive consultation on the type of housespeople would receive to replace their old ones. This wasdone in 1998 through bussing community membersto see three demonstration or ‘mock up’ houses, andaccompanying models and drawings, built at the entranceto Sterkwater.• All community members recalled the mock ups, yet severalrespondents noted that they did not really understandhow the size of their new house was determined or whatthey could expect to receive upon moving. Many alsocomplained that this process was flawed and misleading,because the mock-ups were destroyed by AP before thefinal houses were completed. This they felt meant thatthey were not able to physically compare what they finallyreceived with what they were promised. As a result, somebelieved that AP did not deliver what was promised. Thislater became a major source of grievance. AP reportconversely that the mock-up houses, which were built inan RDP format were demolished partly because they hadbeen rejected by the community as a result of concernsover finishes and building standards. They thereforebecame redundant as mock ups. Other reports from APsuggest they were becoming a source of conflict becausecommunity members had begun fighting over who wouldeventually live in them. The land on which they were builtalso needed to be prepared for grazing. When the mockupswere rejected, the house plans were completely redrawnby TPC, resulting in a much larger range of sizes andnumber of possible designs. AP report that the redrawingprocess was consulted upon extensively over six weeks atthe school, and that all changes were ultimately agreedformally through the RSC.These events seem to have been differently rememberedby some community members who remained confusedabout the purpose of the mock-ups, some claiming theyfelt the Mine’s motivation for destroying them was todeceive them into accepting less than they were promised.For some respondents in the community it is clear thatthe process of consulting on new house drawings was noteffective or transparent enough, or that many in thecommunity were not in fact happy with the new designs.16

This reaction was very surprising to AP who felt confidentthat the new plans had been widely accepted at the time,and reported a 95 percent sign off by householders onthe new drawings with only 47 persons not signing due toillness, absence or disputes.• There was a R5,000 ‘settling in’ allowance, or ‘money forcurtains’ as the communities recalled it. This was a fixedamount received by every household who relocated.There was also no clarity on the process of consultationaround how this amount was decided upon and agreed to,especially considering that amounts of between R100,000and R250,000 had been mooted in the past accordingto AP and some community accounts. It appeared fromsome respondents that the community legal advisorsmanaged the negotiations of the compensation amountsthrough the S21 mechanism.Consultation during constructionThere are considerable differences in view around the adequacy ofconsultation specific to the construction process, in particular tofacilitate the community in monitoring the house building progress.AP maintain there was a process of checking at each distinct stage ofconstruction, namely, foundations, window level and roof level. Theconstruction contractor has no recollection of such an inspectionvisit for householders at Ga Pila. It was suggested by the contractor,rather, that the construction phase was in many ways a periodof trying to keep community members away so as not to disruptthe building process. Some community respondents did recall a‘foundations party’, but said it was not possible to identify whichhouse was whose at this stage. Others claimed they only saw theirnew homes once they were completed. Much of the evidence heardfrom communities suggests that, if any kind of inspection processdid take place, it was nominal and ineffective.The construction contractors have supported this by suggestingthat the need for a comprehensive inspection and snagging processbecame a key learning which informed the more detailed approachadopted at Motlhotlo. The snagging process or the lack thereof inthe context of managing grievances, is discussed further in Topic 5:Grievance Management.Regarding the role of the S21 in consultation during construction,accounts from AP and the construction contractor suggest thatin the early stages of the process the authority of the S21 seemedto be well recognised and respected. The S21 worked well as ageneral consultative feedback mechanism during the constructionprocess in particular. For example, if anything was happening inthe communities or there were grievances regarding the buildingprocess, the construction contractors reported that they would hearabout these well in advance through the S21.It seems that it was only once the construction process wasalmost complete that larger numbers of people began to resistthe resettlement and serious problems between the communityand the S21 reportedly arose. Community members started tocriticise the S21 for ignoring and even repressing complaints andconcerns about the new houses. Community respondents andAP noted that the S21 did not function effectively in that it neithertook community grievances to AP nor reported back on responsesto the community. Members of the S21 conversely report that APundermined the mechanism by not responding to the grievanceswhich had been submitted.The failure of this feedback mechanism resulted in the communitybecoming suspicious and losing trust in the S21s. At the timeof conducting research for this review, a large proportion of thecommunity no longer associated itself with the S21.17

4.3 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS4.3.1 Analysis of Consultation Structures andtheir EffectivenessThis analysis is carried out against the following IFC PerformanceStandard requirements:• Consultation to be based on prior disclosure of relevantand adequate information, thus enabling informedparticipation and consent (PS 1, Section 20, 21 & 22; PS 5,Objectives; PS 5, Section 8 & 9); and• Consultation to be inclusive and culturally appropriate, andto include disadvantaged or vulnerable groups, and hostcommunities (PS 1, Section 21; PS 5, Section 8 & 9).Consultation to be Based on Prior Disclosure of Relevantand Adequate Information, thus Enabling InformedParticipationThe achievement of Free Prior Informed Consultation appears tohave been flawed at the outset of the Ga Pila relocation process. Asdiscussed above and in Topic 1:Avoid or Minimise Resettlement, thiswas due to the lack of an EIA and accompanying consultation andinformation disclosure on the impacts of mine expansion on GaPila. Instead the decision to relocate was taken by AP once miningactivities were already underway, and in such close proximity tothese communities that safety impacts were at the time alreadybeing mitigated by regular (bi weekly) evacuation of affected housesto allow blasting. If an adequate EIA had been undertaken prior tothe expansion/commencement of operations, the need to resettlecommunities within AP’s 1000 m safety boundary and environswould have been identified prior to the commencement of blastingactivities. Alternatively, the inadequacy of evacuation as a mitigationmeasure for noise and safety impacts would have been identified ata far earlier stage, through a risk assessment. As it stood, AP seemsto have allowed for safety issues associated with fly rock in thecommunities to reach unmanageable levels, and simultaneouslyfor the Mine’s requirement for additional storage for waste rock tobecome financially critical before taking action. This resulted in arushed relocation process, based on an EIA focused only on impactsto the host site, and with inadequate consultation with householdsactually affected on the decision to resettle.Consultation to be Inclusive and Culturally Appropriate,and to Include Disadvantaged or Vulnerable Groups, andHost CommunitiesEnsuring AppropriatenessAn overall assessment of the evidence suggests that systems forongoing consultation even once the decision to relocate hadbeen taken, were weak in terms of inclusivity and as a result notfully appropriate for their purpose. The benefits of adopting aconsultative and participatory approach in the later stages ofthe project were severely undermined by the fact that the mainrepresentative structure used for communication, namely the S21was not effective in ensuring adequate disclosure of information andsoliciting feedback from all those it was elected to represent. This isexpanded on below.• Poor performance as a feedback mechanism: A number ofreasons were cited for this failure, the most frequently heardbeing the S21’s failure as a transparent and reliable feedbackmechanism. This was reported to have become especially acuteonce the construction process was completed and significantnumbers of community members began to raise grievancesabout their new houses. This coupled with concerns aroundtransparency and accountability in general, as well as suspicionsand jealousies related to the S21 stipends paid, led to a situationwhere people felt that the S21 members were co-opted by APand were deliberately withholding information from them.S21 members themselves confirmed this gradual breakdownof trust in the S21 structure. They reported experiencing illtreatment at the hands of the wider community as a result oftheir cooperation with AP. A number of committee memberssaid they now felt ostracised and marginalised, even by theirown family members in some cases, and regretted beingassociated with AP or the S21 at all because of the negativeaffects it has had on their lives and on their community. Indefence of the accusations against them, the S21 membersreported that they worked hard in difficult circumstances tocommunicate problems back to AP and to the community.They, in turn, claim that they were undermined by AP’s slownessto respond to grievances. See Topic 6: Grievance Management forfurther discussion of this.The poor performance of the S21 as a feedback mechanism hasalso been attributed by some external observers to low levelsof literacy amongst its members, and an associated lack ofappropriate skills to enable the S21 members to comprehendand communicate technical information regarding the audit18

and compensation process to the community. It is suggestedthat this may have contributed to the poor management ofexpectations by AP with regards the new houses.• Poor performance as a representative body Therepresentativeness of the S21 and the lack of provision forthe election of new committee members did not seem tobe a major concern earlier on in the Ga Pila process; this onlyseems to have become a point of contention more recently.Community opinions on the issue of the effectiveness ofthe S21 at Ga Pila may have been influenced by learningfrom events taking place in Motlhotlo. The inclusion of someunelected members in the S21 at Ga Pila at an early stage wasraised as problematic by a number of respondents, especiallyconsidering that the Kgoshigadi and Nduna Pila were twoof those included by the legal advisors, and not as part of anelection process.Although the decision to include the Kgoshigadi and theInduna was intended by the community legal advisors to keepthese ‘critical centres of power’ close to the decision makingprocess so as not to alienate them from their communities,it may also have served to compromise the independence,objectivity, and accountability of what should have been ademocratically elected, representative body. This approach torecruitment of S21 members by the community legal advisorsappears to have been a critical point at which the S21’sintegrity and value was called into question.It was reported that the S21’s poor performance could not beaddressed and corrected through re-election. This meant thatcommunity members were locked into being represented by astructure that they felt did not (or was unable to) ensure they hadaccess to adequate information associated with the relocationprocess.The perceived continued failure to feed back appears to havefuelled deep mistrust towards the S21s, and many respondentsin the community were explicit in stating their belief that the S21had never legitimately represented their interests. As previouslymentioned in this Topic, this mistrust may have been based partlyon a fundamental lack of understanding amongst the communityof the purpose and role of the S21 Committee and Company in therelocation process. It was further aggravated by the perceived lack oftransparency and good governance in the formation and day to dayrunning of the S21s. Having no Government or external stakeholderrepresentatives involved in the establishment and monitoring ofthe S21 structure may have been a critical flaw in this regard. BothAP and Government stakeholders, when questioned on this issue,maintain that the community legal advisor actively restricted themfrom playing a role in general community consultation, arguing thatthe S21 should be a wholly community managed structure.Ensuring inclusivityPartly because of the failure of the S21 structure, but also forreasons beyond this, there are considerable differences of view overwhether the consultation process was adequately inclusive. Severalrespondents, including certain factions within the community, havesuggested that, for those it did represent, the S21 at Ga Pila was anappropriate and effective consultation structure whose authoritywas well recognised and respected until the late stages in theprocess. Others, particularly those resistant to the relocation, paint avery different picture. Their perspectives are set out below.• Resistance Committee (non-resettled households):The Resistance Committee claims that their very existenceraises the question of whether the S21 structure was everappropriate and truly accessible to all categories of potentiallyaffected people, since they had to form a resistance group inorder to be heard. These households claim that right from thestart of the process they had very little to do with any of theearly committees, the S21, or the consultation process, notingthat since they had never wanted to relocate, they chosenot to attend the RSC/GRMT/ S21 meetings. These meetingswere, however, the primary source of communication andinformation for community members on the resettlementprocess.Some S21 members noted that householders that did notwant to resettle were not excluded from meetings and recallconversely that, in some cases, they continued to attendmeetings even trying to disrupt them at times.• Absent householders: A number of informants interviewedin households at Ga Pila said they had been working inJohannesburg or other parts of the country at the time ofthe relocation process. They gave little evidence to suggestthat AP made specific efforts to identify and consult directlywith those who were not actively participating in the localprocess, due to their absence from the study area. Some ofthese individuals claim to have been absent for much of theearly part of the resettlement process. They were reportedlyonly kept informed about developments by word-of-mouththrough family members or neighbours. This applied to anumber of householders mentioned previously whose auditpapers were signed on their behalf by an elderly parent orsibling on account of their absence. Other respondents wereabsent simply because they refused to attend the meetingsand said that as a result they only heard about details of thephysical moving process via the Ga Pila newsletter. This again19

differed markedly to AP’s recollection of the process where AP’sProject Manager describes actively arranging to meet absenthouseholders in Johannesburg if they could not return to thevillage in order to keep them informed and obtain sign off oftheir ‘green file’.• Vulnerable groups Related to the above was a failure by APto identify and recognise potentially vulnerable householdsin consultation processes in a systematic way. As discussedin Topic 3: Identifying Affected People and Assessing Eligibilityand Cut-Off Date, it would have been necessary to identifythese households individually in order to understand andaddress their specific concerns and build direct, trust-basedrelationships with them. Provision for this does not appear tohave been made by AP at Ga Pila.Engaging Directly with the CommunityAP was criticised broadly by all respondents for not engagingdirectly with the community, but relying almost solely on thecommunity representative structure (S21) and legal advisors, andcontinuing to do so even when the mechanism began to fail.AP responded that informal interaction and communication wasmaintained directly with community members about the relocation,in particular through the construction period. AP’s Project Managerreported that early in the process he knew most of the villagers byname and spent a lot of time in and around the community. Hedescribed communication as open, very regular and informal untilthe mechanism became more formalised through the engagementof legal advisors and as a result less frequent and open. AP alsocited numerous occasions where project and senior managementrepresentatives of the Project formally engaged the communitydirectly through kgoros convened by Nduna Pila. Evidence wasalso seen of written correspondence between AP and a numberof households/individuals, addressing queries raised about thehousehold audit findings, and with the community collectively,notifying them of move dates.Several community respondents remained adamant, even whenERM pointed out apparent contradictions in their own accounts,that they did not recall any direct communication or engagementwith the AP in any form. While such community accounts may notbe entirely accurate, they reflect a perception that the attemptsmade by AP to interact directly with the community were rareand inadequate, or that if they took place, they were not reachingeverybody concerned.This was acknowledged by AP and attributed in part to beingrestricted by the community legal advisors and in part to relativelyweak ad hoc community relations management, owing to a lackof a dedicated in-house communications specialist focusingon this project. It points also to overall weak integration andcoordination between AP’s corporate communications agendaand risk management surrounding its operational activities. SeeTopic 9: Implementation Planning, Ensuring Institutional Capacity andTransparency for more discussion of these capacity issues.The lack of direct involvement from AP, perceived by communitymembers because of poor direct communication, has emerged asa critical shortcoming of both the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo process,and has been raised by almost all stakeholders interviewed as partof this study. Many see AP’s apparently consistent failure to meetcommunity members in person, choosing instead to conductengagement on difficult issues through agents, contractors and thecommunity legal advisors, as a key reason for the growing anger anddeepening mistrust felt towards AP.AP has challenged this criticism as misleading, suggesting that ithas been adopted partly as rhetoric amongst community members.Despite proof of regular efforts by the Project and senior APmanagement to engage directly at the request of the communities,they argue that these attempts have been repeatedly rejected orsimply not acknowledged by the communities.Whichever account is accurate, what is evident is that efforts madewere either ineffectual because they were not reaching all, orrejected for more fundamental reasons around a lack of trust, andthat this breakdown of trust was not well addressed by AP at thetime.Capacity Building/Education as a Foundation for EffectiveConsultationAs noted above and in Topic 3, AP was not actively involvedin identifying vulnerabilities and inequalities which may haveaffected peoples’ ability to understand and effectively engage inthe relocation process. Similarly AP did not respond appropriatelyto facilitate their informed participation. For instance, there was afailure by AP to identify and properly address risks of low literacyrates affecting the communication process with communities,resulting in unclear messages and raising expectations that couldnot be managed. This, in turn, left room for blame and additionalcompensation claims.Monitoring and corrective actionsWhen the S21 began to fail as a representative structure andfeedback mechanism, with evidence of this in the form of grievancesand emerging resistance to the relocation, it is arguable that AP hada responsibility (as the Project Sponsor) to try to address the issue inorder to manage risks to the resettlement process.20

The question raised here is whether AP should either have madestronger attempts to intervene to improve the S21’s capacityfor its role, or tried to design alternative, additional consultationmechanisms to act as a safety net when the S21 began to fail. Thelatter would have constituted an open acknowledgement by APthat vulnerable or marginalised groups existed and were beingexcluded from, or chose to exclude themselves from the process.This may have improved AP’s relationship with those minorities atan earlier stage and created a platform for open and fair discussionof their concerns and demands. Neglecting to recognise andaddress the needs and concerns of those who were peripheral to ormarginalised from the formal consultation process, served only toalienate and anger these individuals further.The failure to monitor the effectiveness of the structures forconsultation over time and implement corrective actions was notonly a key weakness in AP’s approach to consultation but was, inturn, a major failing in the Project grievance mechanism. This isdiscussed in more detail in Topic 6: Grievance Management. Theoutcome of this was that once the decision to relocate had beentaken, AP’s consultation at Ga Pila still did not allow for adequatedisclosure of information to all community residents and thereforedid not allow for their informed and meaningful involvement in therelocation process.4.3.2 Analysis of Consultation Timing andDurationThis analysis is carried out against the following IFC PerformanceStandard requirements:• consultation to begin early in the EIA process (PS 1, Section21);• consultation should focus on social and environmentalrisks and adverse impacts, and proposed measures toaddress them (PS 1, Section 20, 21 & 22);• consultation to be iterative and to be carried out on an ongoingbasis (PS 1, Section 21; PS 5, Section 8 & 9);• communities to be included in consultation oncompensation payment (PS 5, Section 8 & 9);• displaced people to be offered a choice of new host site(PS 5, Section 16); and• views of the affected community to be incorporated intodecisions which affect their lives (PS 1, Section 22; PS 5,Section 8 & 9).Consultation to Begin Early in the EIA ProcessEvidence in the EIA suggests AP was not aligned in this regard. SeeSection 4.2.2 above in this Topic.Consultation Should Focus on Social and EnvironmentalRisks/Impacts, and Management MeasuresAs discussed in Topic 1: Land Acquisition and Land Rights, andabove, the decision to relocate Ga Pila was taken without thebroader community’s full engagement and consent and was notbased explicitly on the mitigation findings of an EIA but motivatedby safety and other concerns around maintaining the viability ofan already operational mine. Evidence suggests that as a result ofthis, consultation undertaken from that point onwards seems tohave focused mainly on the compensation terms and conditions ofthe relocation. It did not focus more broadly on the managementof social and environmental risks and impacts, such as impacts onlivelihoods that would result from the move.Consultation to be Iterative and to be Carried Out on anOn-Going BasisAs is clear from evidence in this Topic, that despite some criticalflaws in the structures and methods used, AP put effort intoconsulting iteratively and at several key points in the relocationprocess itself. Where they have been significantly less successfulhowever is in facilitating on-going consultation post-completion ofthe resettlement. This shortcoming is partly rooted in the failure ofthe S21, and an apparent loss of momentum and withdrawal fromengaging regularly with the communities once the constructionwas completed and new houses handed over. Whilst AP cannotnecessarily take responsibility for all the short-comings of the S21model chosen, they did fail to meet the responsibility (as ProjectSponsors) of either assisting in remedying or creating viablealternatives for on-going consultation in a post resettlement context.Displaced People to be Offered a Choice of New Host SiteThe site selection process was consultative to an extent throughthe RSC, although its inclusiveness is contested and communityinvolvement in this process appears to have been hampered bycontestation on the choice of site. See Topic 2: Section 2.2.1 andSection 4.2.2 above for more discussion of this process.Views of the Affected Community to be Incorporated intoDecisions which Affect their LivesWeakness in the overall consultation structures/approach meanthat ultimately community views were not fully incorporated intoall decisions which affected their lives. This is particularly true of21

the early decision to relocate the village, where it is contested as towhether Free Prior Informed Consultation was truly achieved.In the eyes of many critics and resistant community respondentsthis constitutes a fundamental non-alignment with one of the coreprinciples underlying the IFC Standards, and lies at the root of AP’sfailure to obtain and maintain its social licence to operate in this andthe surrounding communities.4.4 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 4.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandardsand Section(#)PS 1, Section20, 21 &22; PS 5,Objectives;PS 5, Section8 & 9PS 1, Section21; PS 5,Section 8 & 9IFC Performance StandardsRequirementConsultation to be based onprior disclosure of relevantand adequate information,thus enabling informedparticipation.Consultation to beinclusive and culturallyappropriate, and toinclude disadvantaged orvulnerable groups, and hostcommunities.PerformanceAssessmentPartialalignmentNonalignmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )S21s not effective in ensuring adequate disclosure of informationto the majority of community residents. Whilst AP cannotnecessarily be blamed for the short-comings of the S21s, AP failed(as Project Sponsors) in either assisting in remedying or creatingviable alternatives for on-going consultation.S21s not appropriate, representative or inclusive structuresthrough which to consult all parties. Inadequate specific focuson vulnerable, resistant and absent groups in the resettlementprocess.Failure by AP to identify and address risks of their approach toconsulting through S21/ community legal advisors.PS 1, Section21Consultation to begin early inthe EIA process.NonalignmentThis was not achieved because no evidence of an EIA undertakenfor the Mine expansion and associated relocation prior to thedecision to relocate. The EIA for host site did not include anyconsultation with affected communities on risks and impacts of therelocation in its scope.PS 1, Section20, 21 & 22PS 1, Section21; PS 5,Section 8 & 9PS 5, Section8 & 9PS 5, Section16PS 1, Section22; PS 5,Section 8 & 9Consultation should focuson social and environmentalrisks and adverse impacts,and proposed measures toaddress them.Consultation to be iterativeand to be carried out on anon-going basis.Communities to beincluded in consultation oncompensation payment.Displaced people to beoffered a choice of new hostsite.Views of the affectedcommunity to beincorporated into decisionswhich affect their lives.NonalignmentPartialalignmentPartialalignmentAlignment -NonalignmentOnce the resettlement process commenced, consultation focusedpredominantly on terms and conditions of relocation ratherthan on social and environmental risks and impacts (such as onlivelihoods) and their mitigation.AP did put effort into consulting at key points in the relocationprocess itself. However, AP was significantly less successful inensuring opportunities for on-going consultation in a postresettlementcontext.AP did carry out consultation on compensation payment. However,concerns remain regarding the extent to which people fullyunderstood the audit and compensation process. Gaps in theprocess led to poorly managed expectations and violent resistance.Ultimately free prior and informed consultation was not achievedon the decision to relocate and problems with the S21 mechanismmeant later consultation did not sufficiently incorporate views of allaffected people into the decision making process. The exception tothis is site selection.22

TOPIC 55 Compensation5.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Provide resettlement options, including adequate replacement housing or cashcompensation where appropriate: Performance Standard 5 requires that displaced personsshould be provided with choices among feasible resettlement options, including adequatereplacement housing or cash compensation where appropriate, (PS5, Section 16).• Provide replacement property of equal or higher value: In the case of physically displacedpersons, the project will offer the choice of replacement property of equal or higher value,equivalent or better characteristics and advantages of location, or cash compensation at fullreplacement value where appropriate, (PS 5, Section 17).• Preference for land based compensation/ replacement: IFC Performance Standard 5 statesthat where livelihoods or displaced persons are land based, or where land is collectively owned,the client will offer land based compensation, where feasible, (PS 5, Section 8).• Provide compensation for all lost assets at full replacement cost: In accordance withPerformance Standard 5, a project needs to offer displaced persons and communitiescompensation for loss of assets at full replacement cost, (PS 5, Section 8).• Provide compensation for assets other than land: Where displaced persons own and occupystructures, the project will compensate them for assets other than land, such as dwellings andother improvements to the land, at full replacement cost, provided that these people occupy theland prior to the cut-off date, (PS 5, Section 18).• Compensation costs to be paid in lieu of cash compensation where feasible, (PS 5, Section 18).• Compensate for loss of commercial structures or provide replacement property, or equalor greater value: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that the project compensates the affectedbusiness owner for the cost of re-establishing commercial activities elsewhere, for lost net incomeduring the period of transition, and for the costs of the transfer and reinstallation of the plant,machinery or other equipment, (PS 5, Section 20).• Compensation to be supplied prior to resettlement: IFC Performance Standard 5 requiresthat alternative housing and/or cash compensation will be made available prior to relocation, (PS5, Section 16).5.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS5.2.1 Provide Resettlement OptionsAlthough a choice of different host sites was offered, no options or choice in type of compensationwas offered. Instead, only the following resettlement ‘option’ was provided: a replacement house plusa standard amount of compensation (also referred to as a settling-in allowance). No other options orcombinations of options were offered.23

5.2.2 Provide Replacement Property of Equal orHigher ValueThe primary form of compensation was in the form of new,replacement houses. AP promised that these houses would beidentical to or better than previous houses. Photographs of thestructures from the old village suggest that the new housesprovided have resulted in improved living conditions, where thesephotographs were viewed by ERM as evidence contained within the‘green files’ from the audit. Those community members that lived inshacks in the old village received permanent structures once theyrelocated to Sterkwater.Even given this evidence of a comparative improvement inliving conditions, there was widespread agreement amongstthe community that AP did not deliver on the promise to deliveridentical or better structures. This is largely because, despite theoverall improvement in the nature of the structure, there werequestions around the quality of the new structures. Issues aroundthe quality of the replacement houses are described in more detailin Topic 8: Improve/ restore Living Conditions and Livelihoods andAddress Post-resettlement Development Needs.Notwithstanding these complaints, the degree of overallimprovement to houses, and the associated increase in value, mustnot be ignored. It seemed at times during interviews that there is adeep sense of antipathy towards AP regarding the outcome of theresettlement. This overshadows any positive recognition towardsAP for the relative improvements in the replacement structures.5.2.3 Preference for Land Based Compensation/ReplacementIt would seem that on a household basis only nominal efforts weremade to calculate the livelihood value of lost communal land andto replace or compensate it fully. Communal grazing and ploughinglands were reportedly measured as part of the audit process but donot appear to have been accounted for in the compensation processas an individual loss. This land, although communal, was dividedup and allocated per household by the Induna, so its loss couldin fact have been measured on an individual basis. It is not clearfrom discussions with AP as to how the replacement value for landcompensation was calculated. AP did provide the community withsome communal land for ploughing and grazing. AP state that thisland amounted to three times what the community originally hadaccess to in the old village. However, all community respondentsreported that this land was an inadequate replacement. This was amajor grievance and one that was raised repeatedly.A significant issue voiced by all groups, and which supportsthe above concern, relates to a specific portion of land whichthe community described as ‘the 350 hectares’. This issue isalso discussed in Topic 2: Land Acquisition and Land Rights (seeSection 2.2.3). The claim emerged, post the resettlement, that thereplacement land given to the Ga Pila community fell short by 350ha. This was as a result of the loss of this portion of the land to asuccessful ancestral land claim by Nduna Matlou (Koka-MatlouCPA). It is alleged that the consequence of this land claim was toundermine the Ga Pila community’s sense of belonging and security,leaving them feeling as though they are living on another Induna’sland to which they do not have rights. This has added to the stressand anxiety since the move and contributed to a feeling that theywill never be ‘at home’ in Sterkwater. It also led to anger amongst thecommunity that they were short-changed in total land area agreedto during the resettlement negotiations.The Nduna Matlou land claim has become the central focus ofcriticism against AP for inadequately compensating lost land. Theland was claimed via a CPA which bypassed AP and the Kgoshigadi,and went straight to the DLA who consequently granted the claim.As a result it could be argued that this situation was partly out of AP’scontrol. As suggested in Section 2.2.3, the role and responsibility ofthe Government in this transaction must certainly be acknowledged.The Ga Pila Reconciliation Committee reportedly took this land issueinto their own hands. Feeling that there was a lack of space for theirchildren to build plots on, the group found some additional landwhich they started clearing in 2006. Although they had agreed thiswith Nduna Pila, they allegedly experienced police intimidation inresponse to this action, with the police allegedly forcing them offthe land in question.All community groups at Ga Pila reported that the loss of the350 ha of communal land has had a detrimental effect on theirlivelihoods, where 270 families were reportedly not able to ploughin 2009 - allegedly due to inadequate land being available. Thecommunity was adamant that there had been no compensation forassociated livelihood losses, even though undertakings of providingcompensation had reportedly been made by AP in this regard.In terms of taking responsibility for replacing this land, AP hassuggested that they have been constrained by the lack of suitablefarm land in the surrounding area and within the jurisdiction ofthe MTA. AP appeared not to have actively responded to concernsaround security of land tenure as a result of this land claim.24

5.2.4 Provide Compensation for All Lost Assetsat Full Replacement Cost & ProvideCompensation for Assets Other Than LandAt the outset, assets other than houses at Ga Pila, were notsystematically compensated at full replacement cost. As discussedabove, land was compensated with replacement land, althoughmany argue inadequately and not at full replacement cost.The community experienced a loss of significant assets otherthan houses and land, for example, graves, fruit trees, boreholesand informal backyard structures. Initially, no additional financialcompensation appears to have been calculated per household tocompensate for such assets. Moreover, some respondents suggestthat these assets were not always systematically included in theaudit.However, AP report that boreholes, crops and graves were latercompensated and financial compensation was eventually paid onrequest from the community through the Minerals Committee.These were reportedly valued by an independent surveyor/valuatorand paid for in December 2006. This form of compensation was notreported to ERM by community members.While houses and most structures were usually counted andcompensated for, several community respondents reported thatsome of their informal, backyard structures were not replaced evenin cases where they were recognised in the audit. In some cases,AP offered an ad hoc form of compensation. This offsetting wasachieved neither through ‘in-kind’ or monetary compensation.Rather, one household, for instance, was offered a ceiling in theirgarage as a form of compensation for their borehole not beingreplaced.A particular issue was raised quite frequently by respondentsaround allegedly inadequate compensation for so called ‘lostsquare meters’. AP explained this, stating that because of delaysrelating to challenges in the construction process, they decidedto offer those with as yet unfinished larger houses the option ofreceiving a smaller house with a choice from a range of betterquality fixtures and fittings to ‘offset’ the lost square metres fromthe original plans. It was explained that this would allow people toreceive their finished houses more quickly. For those who optedfor this choice, the architectural plans were redrawn and smallerhouses were completed. The ‘lost square metres’ seem to havebecome the source of one of the more significant disputes betweenthe community and AP. It appears that this offsetting process wasnot fully and clearly understood or agreed to by the community.This led to confusion and people feeling short-changed. This wasexacerbated by the fact that several of the community membersultimately received larger houses built at the beginning of theprocess while others only benefitted from smaller houses.Compensation was eventually provided for the relocation of somegraves, but not for all of them. No specific dates were provided forwhen this took place or what motivated it. The process of resettlinggraves was contentious as graves were relocated to a site across theriver from the new village, which reportedly made it very difficult forpeople to tend to the graves. Some respondents suggested this hasupset the community’s spiritual and cultural well-being. There werealso complaints about the fact that graves were exhumed withoutcompensation. These focused both on the exhumation processitself, and for the associated loss and disturbance. There was furtherconcern raised around the fact that the graves of some childrenwere not relocated, in particular where these children were buried inthe back yards of their parents’ houses.Some members of the community have suggested that the entirecompensation process was flawed at Ga Pila. These allegations aremade due to the fact that there was no consultative agreementreached between AP and the communities on what amountwould be sufficient, or the reasoning behind this. In the eyes of thecommunity, the monetary compensation provided was nominaland far less than what was hoped for and expected. While figuresof between R100,000 and R250,000 were initially being discussedamongst the community and their legal advisors, AP finally onlyoffered a replacement house plus a non-negotiable R5,000 perhousehold (referred to by the Kgoshigadi and the community as‘curtain money’). The community was also aggrieved that the cashcomponent they received is significantly less than the amountoffered at Motlhotlo (R20,000 per homestead). All communitymembers received this same amount, apparently on the basis thateveryone should be compensated equally for the inconvenienceand incidental extra costs of moving.Grievances around the inadequacy of compensation at Ga Pila haveheightened in the knowledge that Motlhotlo residents receivedfuller compensation for assets and settling in. The community atGa Pila reported feeling that they have been used as ‘guinea pigs’for the later resettlement process at Motlhotlo. The process atMotlhotlo was perceived by community members at Ga Pila to havebeen fairer. Many feel strongly that AP should be prepared to reopennegotiations on what was offered because of the significantdiscrepancy between compensation packages offered at Ga Pila andMotlhotlo.25

5.2.5 Compensation Costs to be Paid in Lieu ofCash Compensation Where FeasibleThe fixed settling in allowance as discussed was paid in cash andgiven to all households alike; however, the bulk of compensationwas in the form of replacement houses and land and not in cash.5.2.6 Compensate for Loss of CommercialStructures or Provide ReplacementProperty of Equal or Greater ValueBusiness assets were reported to have been compensated. Theowner of a spaza shop in the old village, for example, had a newshop built for him by AP at the new site. Some respondents did,however, complain that the sizes of the new shops were inadequate.5.2.7 Compensation to be Supplied Prior toResettlementBeyond the R 5,000 settling-in allowance, no other cashcompensation was initially provided until the compensation forgraves and crops in 2006. The settling-in allowance was paidafter the move was completed. Most members of the communityremember receiving this money through the removals company.It has been alleged that at first, payments were staggered orpromised only once everyone had moved. AP has been criticised inthis regard for essentially pressurising community members to movein return for payment. AP suggests this was more of a cash flow issuerelated to the logistics of paying a large number of people lumpsums in a short period of time. Although changes were made to thispayment system, payment was still only made after the move, notbefore, as required by the IFC standard.5.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of AP’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 4.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandards andSection (#)IFC Performance StandardsRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS5, Section16Provide resettlementoptions, including adequatereplacement housing orcash compensation whereappropriate.PartialalignmentA choice of different host sites was offered but no choice in typeor combination of compensation was offered; only replacementhousing plus fixed settling in allowance.PS 5, Section17Provide replacement propertyof equal or higher value.PartialalignmentSome houses lack full replacement square metre floor area becauseplans for larger unfinished houses were redrawn to completethem more quickly. This was consulted on and AP did offset ‘lostsquare metres’ with additional fixtures and fittings; however thiswas reported as being poorly explained and resulted in grievances.Standard of finish in many houses was also reported to be poor.PS 5, Section 8Where livelihoods are landbased,preference to be givenfor land based compensation.PartialalignmentPloughing and grazing land was replaced, over and above originalamounts. However, loss of 350 ha due to the land claim significantlydecreased the total amount of land given. This was not replaced.Impacts of loss of land per household was not measured orcompensated.26

IFCPerformanceStandards andSection (#)IFC Performance StandardsRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS 5, Section 8Provide compensation for alllost assets at full replacementcost.Partial alignmentAssets other than houses were not compensated.Lost crops, boreholes and graves were not initiallycompensated, only later in the process. No compensationwas paid for fruit trees.PS 5, Section18Provide compensation forassets other than land.Partial alignmentLost crops, boreholes and graves were not initiallycompensated, only later in the process if requested. Nocompensation was paid for fruit trees.PS 5, Section18Compensation costs tobe paid in lieu of cashcompensation where feasible.Partial alignmentCash compensation paid later for crops and graves.PS 5, Section20Compensate for loss ofcommercial structuresor provide replacementproperty, or equal or greatervalue.Alignment -PS 5, Section16Compensation to be suppliedprior to resettlement.Non-alignmentPaid R5,000 settling in allowance only after they had moved.

TOPIC 66 Grievance Management6.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Develop grievance mechanism IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that a project establishesa grievance mechanism to receive and address specific concerns about compensation andrelocation that are raised by displaced persons or members of host communities, includinga recourse mechanism designed to resolve disputes in an impartial manner. The grievancemechanism should be linked to the environmental and social impact assessment processes, asoutlined in IFC Performance Standard 1, the purpose of which is to ‘establish and maintain aconstructive relationship with affected communities over the life of the project’, (PS 5, Section 10).IFC Performance Standard 1 spells out the requirements for a grievance mechanism in moredetail, namely: The grievance mechanism should be scaled to the risks and adverse impacts of theproject. It should address concerns promptly, using an understandable and transparent processthat is culturally appropriate and readily accessible to all segments of the affected communities,and at no cost and without retribution. The mechanism should not impede access to judicial oradministrative remedies. The client will inform the affected communities about the mechanism inthe course of its community engagement process, (PS 1, Section 23).6.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS6.2.1 Establish a Grievance Mechanism to Receive and Address ConcernsThe S21 (and the Relocation Steering Committee before it) was intended from its conception to act as theprimary mechanism through which grievances were communicated to AP and in turn, through whichresponses were communicated back to communities. The S21 members describe their key activity in themechanism as being regular weekly community meetings with the legal advisor and AP, during whichgrievances were discussedIn addition to the S21, AP reported that there were two project/site offices for the construction contractorthroughout the construction period; one situated near the entrance to Sterkwater village and one locatedat the site of the old village. Community members were allowed to lodge written or verbal complaints atthese offices, in particular where these complaints related to the houses and the construction process.These offices were reportedly staffed by four local women from the community whose job was to collectcomplaints and send them to AP for resolution. These staff members were not perceived as CommunityLiaison Officers (CLOs) by the community.To manage potential grievances related to the houses themselves, AP also made efforts during theconstruction period to facilitate participation and awareness of community members through consultingthem on the design through the mock-up houses (discussed further in Topic 4: Effective Consultationand Informed Participation,). AP also reports to have facilitated a process of inspection of the houses byresidents during the construction process. However, several community members suggest that only S21members or those involved in building the houses were able to go to the site to check on progress in thebuilding of houses. A comprehensive and inclusive inspection process during construction would havebeen an important way in which to manage grievances related to construction. Some ad hoc inspection28

y some community members does seem to have been facilitatedor allowed, but the nature and scope of this is contested (see Topic 4,Section 4.2.2). There was no detailed ‘snagging’ or homeowner queriesand defects process, as was later developed at Motlhotlo.In terms of staffing, no one person or resource appears to have beenassigned the dedicated responsibility to manage resettlementrelatedgrievances. Rather, these were handled by the ProjectManagement team along with the many other matters they hadto deal with. In general, the relocation Project Manager dealt withthe more minor grievances himself and made a call as to when totake more serious complaints to senior Mine management. This isdiscussed further in Topic 9: Implementation Plan and InstitutionalCapacity.The lack of dedicated resources for community level grievancemanagement and community relations management, and therepeated failure by AP to meet with communities in personto acknowledge and address their demands and grievancescreated increasing distrust and eventually a total breakdown ofcommunication at Ga Pila.6.2.2 Effectiveness and Implementation of theGrievance MechanismGrievance Mechanism Should be Communicated Clearly inthe Course of its Community Engagement ProcessAP report that the process for taking concerns to the Project teamthrough the RSC was communicated verbally to the communityin the original meetings when the RSC was set up. AP claims thatfrom this point the mechanism simply became ‘common knowledge’amongst community residents.It is not clear whether specific efforts were made to communicatefurther on the workings of this mechanism, be it the S21 that waslater established or the site office mechanism. Similarly, it does notseem that AP monitored the effectiveness of these mechanisms oridentified ways in which they could be improved.Grievance Mechanism Should be an Understandable andTransparent ProcessThe community is split on the matter of whether the grievancemechanism was understandable and transparent. S21 memberscorroborated AP’s claims that a system had always been in place forthe receipt and resolution of grievances and that the communitywas aware of the mechanisms available to them. Several membersof the non-S21 aligned community disputed this, claiming theywere not aware of a formal means by which they could access APfor resolution of grievances. This marked difference in perceptionreflects (and contributed to) the climate of distrust and conflictwhich existed within the Ga Pila community.Grievance Mechanism Should Addresses Concerns PromptlyMany of the community respondents were of the view that,despite the existence of a grievance mechanism, grievances wereconsistently not heard and most often inadequately addressed byAP, particularly with regard to household defects. While AP’s allegedunresponsiveness to grievances was commonly recognised by thewhole community, it was those who refused to relocate that wereaffected most acutely. This appears to be due to the fact that byrefusing to liaise via the S21s, they effectively excluded themselvesfrom the grievance procedure. However, those that refused torelocate insist that AP consciously ignored or repressed theirgrievances and claims.In an apparent attempt to be heard by AP, members of the Ga PilaResistance Committee resorted to protest action such as trespassingon AP property, organising protest marches to the Mine office, orspeaking through the media to try to elicit a response from AP.When asked why they felt AP had been unresponsive to grievancesraised, a S21 member suggested that staff turnover at AP was high,resulting in an unresponsiveness from AP since the S21 did notalways get to speak to the same responsible person and becauseAP representatives were never around long enough to meet thepromises they were making.Whether the above is an entirely accurate assessment or not, itseems the process for responding to grievances by AP was ad hocand not visible enough (e.g., through regular reporting and routinefeedback or even in terms of the acknowledgement of grievances),to yield tangible, measurable results and to assure the communitythat this grievance process was working and was accountable.There is no evidence of a formal structured approach by AP tocategorising and prioritising issues or committing to a timescale fortheir resolution. There is also no evidence of a system for trackinghow AP responded to grievances. As a result the process must havebeen perceived as somewhat open-ended and unreliable in the eyesof the community.It was apparently AP’s failure to manage serious grievances aroundcompensation and the quality of replacement houses that marked acritical turning point in the relocation process, as resistance in Ga Pilaonly really began after people saw their homes for the first time. Itwas the perceived unresponsiveness by AP to the grievances aboutthe new houses that triggered a larger subsection of the communityto physically resist the whole relocation process. At its peak, thistook the form of violent protest and blockading of the move bycommunity members. This resulted in the involvement of police,alerted by the Mine management when the safety of members ofthe Project Team was seriously threatened, notably when the ProjectManager was reportedly held hostage. During this period of violentresistance, the alleged police intimidation of certain membersof the community and alleged forced removals of others, furthercontributed to disintegration of trust between the community andAP.Where grievances were responded to, even the S21 were inagreement with the community that the system for grievanceredress was not effective in addressing concerns promptly. There29

are reportedly still a large number of outstanding and unresolvedgrievances, many of which were apparently lodged with AP as farback as the start of resettlement in 2001. This, members of thecommunity claim, includes a memo of formal complaint submitted,approximately eight years ago, directly to the former LimpopoPremier and to AP. The group responsible for this memo still claim tobe waiting for a response. It is significant that there still seems to bea widespread perception and expectation at Ga Pila that AP shouldhear and address their grievances, in spite of the length of time thathas passed since the relocation.AP has reported a number of challenges at the point of handover ofhouses, with what they describe as ‘copycat’ household grievancesand a floodgate of similar issues arising. This reportedly occurredwhen the legal advisors conceded extra compensation for certainclaims, leading to difficulty in managing the high volume of claims.The failure of the existing grievance mechanism, and AP, to addressthese household defects and other complaints is said to be one ofthe major reasons that the community lost faith in the S21. Thishas resulted in the S21 feeling aggrieved that their integrity and thecommunity’s trust in them was undermined by AP’s failure to addresscommunity concerns.Grievance Mechanism Should Be Culturally Appropriateand Readily AccessibleAs the above accounts reflect, the question of whether the grievancemechanism was appropriate and accessible to all segments of theaffected population is contested. A few of the S21 members suggestthat the mechanism was accessible to all, but that those who resistedresettlement may have actively chosen to protest the project bynot recognising or using the formal avenues for logging grievances.Conversely, the Resistance Committee alleges that, from the timethey decided not to resettle, their concerns and grievances were notheard or responded to. They claim no attempt was made by AP toaddress them on an individual level or to hear their specific claimsand concerns. Moreover, they cite numerous examples of wherethey tried to contact AP representatives directly to no avail.What is clear is that the mechanism was not used by all in thecommunity. In addition, AP appears to have allowed the views of theresistance groups to be ‘drowned out’ by the majority voice.In this way, AP’s grievance management processes appears to havebeen wholly inadequate to accommodate or address the concernsof those groups or individuals whose grievances were to becomethe most critical in affecting the progress and success of the project.This has presented a very real challenge to the resettlement process.It points clearly to the need for a system that was better able toaccommodate the community’s varying needs, in particular theviews of vulnerable and resistant groups.Grievance Mechanism to be Scaled to the Risks and AdverseImpacts of the Project and Include an Impartial RecourseMechanismIn a resettlement process of this complexity and scale, there shouldideally have been a recognisably separate mechanism for disputeresolution in addition to the standard grievance procedure. Sucha standalone process would have offered a greater degree ofobjectivity, and served as an independent body to resolve especiallydifficult or contentious disputes.There was no separate process for dispute resolution for theresettlement process at Ga Pila. Government authorities did playa limited role in dispute resolution at certain points in the process,for instance mediating between the Civic and Concerned Groupsprior to the formation of the Ga Pila GRMT. There was, however, noregular systematic involvement of key authorities in the resettlementprocess. Rather, the mechanism placed responsibility for grievanceson a body, namely the S21, that was partisan in the process. The S21was compromised in its role as a channel for grievances due to itsother consultation and sub-lessor functions. As such it had a conflictof interest. Moreover, the S21 was itself often the main ‘source’ ofgrievances. This created a fatal flaw in the feedback loop becausecommunity members had nowhere to air grievances about theS21 itself, when they felt it was failing them. The process served toalienate and exclude certain groups as a result.Some community respondents claimed that the S21 would eitherignore or fail to report their grievances to AP. When problems andgrievances about the S21 itself were not properly heard by AP oraddressed, they became self-perpetuating. The S21 was perceivedto fail to report back adequately to AP and communities. Thisundermined its legitimacy, and meant that community trust in thesystem and AP was eroded. As a result, the aggrieved sub-sectionsof the community stopped using the system. A lack of adequategovernance mechanisms, including the inability to re-elect theS21 membership as discussed in Topic 4: Effective Consultation andInformed Participation, was at the core of this problem. The failureof this structure in its intended roles has still not been properlyaddressed, constituting an overall failure by AP to monitor theeffectiveness and appropriateness of its procedures for grievancemanagement.Members of the resistant community also allege that their attemptsto air their views to AP resulted only in AP sending the community’slegal advisor on their behalf. This was seen to compromise theadvisor’s position in the eyes of the community. Using agents tomanage grievances denied the community the opportunity to meetwith AP face to face, leaving them feeling angry that AP was notprepared to accept responsibility for addressing their grievancesdirectly.Given the scale of the project, and the complexity and the emotivenature of resettlement, a fully transparent and accountable recoursemechanism and dedicated resources for its management shouldhave been considered essential.30

Be Accessible at No Cost and Without RetributionThe grievance mechanisms in place (namely the S21) was free ofcharge and people expressed feeling free to use it - except in so faras the community felt unable to lodge complaints about the S21with the S21.Not Impede Access to Judicial or Administrative RemediesA number of legal actions have been taken against AP in the periodsince the relocation. This demonstrates that the use or not by thecommunities of the grievance mechanisms has not in any wayaffected people’s ability or right to challenge the project on legal orother grounds.6.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 6.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandards andSection (#)IFC Performance StandardsRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS5 Section 10 Develop a grievance mechanism. Partial alignmentPS 1 Section 23PS 1 Section 23PS 1 Section 23PS5, Section 10PS 1 Section 23PS 1 Section 23PS5 Section 10PS 1 Section 23PS 1 Section 23Communities to be informed aboutthe grievance mechanism and anunderstandable process to be used.Ensure grievance mechanism isculturally appropriate and readilyaccessible to all segments of theaffected communities.Ensure grievance mechanism is scaledto the risks and adverse impacts ofthe project.Grievance mechanism to establishand maintain a constructiverelationship with affectedcommunities over the life of theproject.Ensure grievance mechanismaddresses concerns promptly.Grievance mechanism to betransparent.Grievance mechanism to includerecourse mechanism designed toresolve disputes in impartial manner.Ensure grievance mechanism comesat no cost and without retribution.Ensure grievance mechanism doesnot impede access to judicial oradministrative remedies.Partial alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentNon– alignmentNon-alignmentNon alignmentNon-alignmentAlignment -Alignment -Standalone grievance mechanism not formally establishedand transparently communicated. The S21 was used for allcommunication and grievance purposes, but had a conflictof interest because of its multiple functions.Although the S21 mechanism existed, its role as a grievancemechanism appears not to have been formally advertised orcommunicated.Resistance groups (and potentially other vulnerable groups)did not use it or want/feel able to use the mechanism inplace and resorted instead to violence, protest and media toget their grievances heard.Lack of standalone grievance mechanism includingimpartial/independent mechanism for dispute resolutionWhen trust in the S21 mechanism broke down this wasnot corrected and no other mechanisms put in place. Therelationship with communities was thus damaged and notsuitably repaired.There is no evidence of a structured approach by AP tocategorising and prioritising issues or committing to atimescale for their resolution. Most reports received indicatean overall slow and ad hoc response to grievances.There was no systematic and detailed ‘snagging’ process tomanage complaints about household defects – this was tobe a learning at Motlhotlo.S21 mechanism failed at feeding back transparently to thecommunity and AP; this was not corrected.No independent recourse mechanism for dispute resolutionwas in place – the community were reliant on S21 andlawyers to resolve any disputes. Both were inherentlyinvolved in the resettlement process and therefore had aconflict of interest.31

TOPIC 77 Provide Relocation Assistance andTransition Support7.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Provide relocation assistance to displaced persons IFC Performance Standard 5 requiresthat relocation assistance should be suited to the needs of each group of displaced persons, withparticular attention on the needs of the poor and vulnerable, (PS 5, Section 20).• Provide transition support for lost income and costs associated with reinstallation of plantand equipment IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that the client compensates the affectedbusiness owner for the cost of re-establishing commercial activities elsewhere, for lost net incomeduring the period of transition, and for the costs of the transfer and reinstallation of the plant,machinery or other equipment, (PS 5, Section 20).• Transition support should be provided for a reasonable period of time IFC PerformanceStandard 5 requires that transitional support be provided until such time as the affected parties’income-earning capacity, production levels, and standards of living have been restored, (PS 5,Section 20).7.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS7.2.1 Provide Relocation Assistance to Displaced PersonsAdequate support seems to have been provided during the physical relocation process itself. AP hired areputable moving contractor to help community members pack their belongings. However, they had tounpack their belongings themselves upon arrival at the new village.Salvage teams from AP led by the Project Management team also assisted householders with thedismantling of old house roofs, windows and collecting recyclable building materials to take to their newsites.There was a plan and system in place for implementing the physical move, and training was given to APstaff on the steps for assisting community members. Once in situ in their new houses, most communitymembers signed a ‘Happy Letter’ indicating their agreement and acceptance with the handover of theproperty and what they saw in it. It is not clear how many people did, in fact, sign this letter. Someclaim not to have signed. Some examples of signed ‘Happy Letters’ were seen by ERM; however, acomprehensive list of all householders who signed these letters was not available.At one point the contractors were relocating between six and ten houses per day. A log/databaseshowing the number of houses moved with the dates and details is available on record.The contractors have suggested that one of the important learnings from Ga-Pila was that AP rushedthe relocation process, by trying to move too many households in a very short period of time. This didnot allow them the time to deal with each household individually or to carefully ensure that householdscompletely understood the handover process and were happy with what they were receiving.32

Although the communities confirmed that assistance was givento them by AP during the physical removals process, some wereaggrieved that not enough notice had been given to allow for thetraditional rituals and customary practices which would normallyhave been performed to mark such a transition, such as theslaughtering of a goat. The traditional leaders’ sense of authority andcontrol was undermined by this and the community felt they werenot given adequate time and help with preparing for the move.In addition, it was claimed by some that the huts of traditionalhealers were not rebuilt/replaced after relocation, which it wassuggested served to further disturb and undermine the traditionaland cultural fabric of these communities.Overall it seems that the focus of support from AP for communitieswas limited to the process of the physical move and wasconcentrated into a relatively short period of time. Little or noassistance seems to have been offered or deemed necessary eitherin preparation for the move or in helping the community cope withthe longer term impacts of the move and settling in to the newarea. In terms of the latter, it should be noted that the climate ofresistance and violent protest is likely to have created an atmosphereof fear and tension which was not conducive to AP staff and theProject Management team offering assistance, or to the communitywelcoming it. In this way the resistance of a vocal discontentedsubsection of the community, the poor handling of their grievancesin relation to the houses and the violence that resulted, therefore,had knock-on effects for the whole community in the way in whichthey experienced the relocation and in terms of assistance theyreceived.In terms of transition support for farming, AP reported thatreplacement farm land was prepared for families at Ga Pila but notas extensively as it was at Motlhotlo and an agriculture and cattleowners project was initiated, although it was unsuccessful. Theseinitiatives are discussed further in Topic 8: Improve/restore LivingConditions and Livelihoods & Address Post-resettlement DevelopmentNeeds below.It is clear that if any transition support was offered by AP, it wasad hoc and not planned. Similarly, no systematic monitoringof how people were settling in was undertaken. The lack ofadequate baseline data gathered on household livelihoods andincome earning capacity prior to the relocation would have mademonitoring the impacts of the move very difficult. This point linksclearly to the issue of restoration of livelihoods discussed in7.2.2 Provide Transition Support (of ReasonableDuration) for Lost Income and CostsAssociated with Reinstallation of Plantand EquipmentAP could give no examples of providing specific transition supportfor lost income and costs associated with the reinstallation of plantand equipment for local enterprises. The community did not raiseany concerns about this issue.It cannot be confirmed whether there were any cases of localenterprises which would have required this type of transitionsupport. When interviewed, AP did not describe offering orproviding transition support to businesses.7.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 7.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFC PS andSection (#)IFC PS RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS 5, Section 20Provide relocation assistance to displacedpersons, and with particularattention to the needs of the vulnerableand poor.Alignment-PS 5, Section 20Provide transition support for lostincome and costs associated with reinstallationof plant and equipment.Transition support should be providedfor a reasonable period of timeuntil the income earning capacity,production levels, and standards ofliving have been restored.Non-alignmentNo support beyond the physical moving process wasoffered.33

TOPIC 88 Improve/Restore Living Conditions andLivelihoods & Address Post-ResettlementDevelopment Needs8.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Improve living conditions: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that living conditions at thenew resettlement site should be the same as or an improvement over conditions at the site fromwhich the displaced persons were resettled, (PS5, Section 8).• Improve or at least restore livelihoods: When displacement cannot be avoided, the clientwill offer displaced persons and communities compensation for loss of assets at full replacementcost and other assistance to help them improve or at least restore their standards of living orlivelihoods, (PS5, Section 8).• Economically displaced: For those that are economically displaced, a project is required toprovide additional targeted assistance and opportunities to improve or at least restore theincome-earning capacity, production levels, and standards of living to economically displacedpersons whose livelihoods or income levels are adversely affected, (PS 5, Section 20).• Identify development benefits: Under IFC Performance Standard 5, a Project should provideopportunities to displaced persons and communities to derive appropriate development benefitsfrom the project, (PS 5, Section 8).• Post-resettlement responsibilities: A resettlement will be considered complete when theadverse impacts of resettlement have been addressed in a manner that is consistent with theobjectives stated in the resettlement plan or framework, and with the objectives of PerformanceStandard 5, (PS 5, Section 12).8.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS8.2.1 Improve Living ConditionsAP is of the view that the new village at Sterkwater, when compared to the old settlement, providedfor a marked improvement in living conditions for the majority of those who resettled. This pertains toimproved homesteads, improved services and overall improvements in quality of life.HomesteadsThe replacement houses were designed and built to be of equal or higher value than those ownedpreviously, which for the most part was achieved (also discussed in Topic 5: Compensation). This was not,however, widely agreed on by the community. Two concerns with respect to the houses were raised: thefirst relates to the quality of houses provided, and the second relates to the compensation and relativehomestead improvement received.34

QualityAlmost 100 percent of those interviewed noted concerns about thequality of the new homes. A long list of complaints about defects inthe houses was presented by all respondents in ERM’s review. Theseranged from cracks in the walls, to poorly fitted fixtures and fittings,in particular leaking and rattling window frames. There were alsocomplaints of very bad quality roofing/tiles. The quality of the fencesand gates was also considered poor. Some had concerns about thefoundations of the houses which were perceived as not being deepenough.A health and safety concern was also raised repeatedly concerningthe location of the septic tanks in the house layouts. Septic tankswere buried in the yard with their lid/opening placed immediatelyoutside the kitchen door. This reportedly results in serious odourproblems. There were also concerns that this creates a dangerto small children playing in the area. Many householders wereembarrassed to explain this issue at first and were clearly highlyaggrieved and angry about the problem, which they suggest has noobvious solution. It is an example of a relatively small possible faultin (or misunderstanding about) the design which results in a majornegative impact on people’s perceptions of their quality of life andwellbeing.A few S21 members reported registering a grievance at the ProjectOffice about cracks in the walls, with AP responding promptly tothese. Aside from this, very few positive reports were received of APresponding to concerns about quality, even from members of theS21, who were typically supportive of AP during discussion of otherresettlement topics.The majority of community respondents did not seem to make adistinction between those issues that were associated with originaldefects and those associated with wear-and-tear, and the long termupkeep of houses. Most community members still perceived that APwas responsible for the structural maintenance and repair of theirhouses, even though, at the time of the interviews being conducted,the resettlement had taken place eight years prior.Proportional benefitsSome community respondents noted that they were unhappyabout the size of their new houses. People were meant to havebeen compensated in accordance with the size and type of theirhomes in the old site. In some cases people received smaller housesthan those they had lived in before, although these were theexceptional cases and, as described in Topic 5: Compensation, theywere compensated in the form of additional fixtures and fittingsto offset this discrepancy. The perceived unfair allocation of housesizes as compensation is one of the most regularly cited causes ofdisputes and splits between community members. Very few of therespondents reported being satisfied with the process of allocatinghouses.Service ProvisionA few S21 members at Ga Pila stated that, compared to previousconditions, their lives had improved a great deal in the new villagewith better houses and schools, as well as new community facilities.These facilities include:• a new community clinic;• a crèche, although this was not yet functioning at the time ofERM’s review;• a new hall (although at the time of writing, was not used bythose who are not aligned to the S21);• sports facilities, including a tennis court; and• all houses equipped with flushing toilets and piped water.A minority of community members indicated their satisfaction thatthese services have resulted in an improvement in their quality oflife. Instead, the majority of community respondents were negativein outlook and appeared to be demoralised about their future. Thesepeople did not perceive an improvement in their quality of life as aresult of the resettlement.Water supply was consistently cited as a problem by the majorityof community respondents. All households interviewed complainedthat the water often gets discontinued at unpredictable times andsometimes for days without notice. There were also concerns raisedabout the quality of the water at Sterkwater, with two respondentsnoting that they were no longer prepared to drink the water.However, when probed, they could not give a clear motivation forthis decision.The electricity reportedly also gets discontinued on a regular basiswithout notice. Some people were discontented about the fact thatthey had had to connect their own electricity once the houses werecompleted. This was the case even for those households who hadelectricity connections in their previous houses. It was not possibleto establish how many were affected in this way. In a number of thehouses visited, electricity wires were seen hanging from walls in ahaphazard, potentially dangerous way.The drainage on the roads is reportedly problematic especiallywhere these roads are not paved. This reportedly makes gainingaccess to several of the houses difficult at times. In addition,35

community members complained that there is no street lighting,and that the darkness of the village at night posed security concerns.This is in spite of the fact that residents did not previously have streetlighting in the old Ga Pila.Concerns were also raised regarding waste removal. Thecommunity acknowledges that rubbish bins provided by AP werestolen, thus hampering proper litter collection. There were alsocomplaints that septic tanks are not emptied or serviced oftenenough.There were also concerns raised regarding the appropriatenessof certain of the recreational facilities provided. Many communityrespondents refuse to make use of the large community hall,partially because they were reportedly not consulted on the need forits development. Similarly, the tennis court is not utilised and seemsto have been an inappropriate initiative, given that residents can notafford the equipment or instruction necessary to make use of it.AP acknowledged the historical problems with the originalinfrastructure at the Sterkwater site. They reported significantchallenges around water service provision in particular, butexplained the ways in which they had worked to overcome these.They conceded that storm water drainage was badly designed atthe outset and had to be rebuilt. The system is still maintained andcleaned by AP today.The handover of services to the Municipality at Ga Pila presenteda serious challenge for AP. Whilst it is acknowledged by someresidents that service delivery now falls within the domain ofthe Municipality, there is still an expectation from the majority ofstakeholders interviewed that AP should solve what they see as‘legacy’ problems related to AP’s original service provision at thetime of construction. The Municipality claims that, following thehandover, it was forced to incur high engineering costs of someR40 million for improving poor infrastructure for drainage and watersystems. This is strongly disputed by AP’s account of the handoveraccording to which, despite a service agreement being in place since1996, the Municipality only accepted the handover long after theagreed 2001 date and then failed to maintain services. As a result theinfrastructure collapsed. AP bore the cost of fixing the whole systemand then contractually handed it over to the Municipality.Both AP and the Municipality agreed that the Municipality hasstruggled to maintain the new village because of the costs involved,and cannot really afford to run services for a community which in themajority is unable to pay for them.ERM is not in a position to comment on issues regarding theresponsibilities for, and constraints in, service delivery experiencedby the Municipality, as this was not specifically investigated as part ofthe review.Although there are significant and valid grievances relating topresent living conditions and quality of life, these issues do notdetract from the fact that there appears to have been an overallimprovement in living conditions for community members whoresettled. AP appears to have been less successful, however, inintegrating its infrastructure design and planning efforts withthose of the Municipality to ensure better coordination and jointresponsibility for continuity in the supply of services at the pointof handover. The extent and nature of engagement between APand the Municipality in clearly negotiating the terms and roles andresponsibilities outlined in the service agreement and/or assessingthe Municipality’s capacity to receive handover remains unclear.As noted in Topic 4: Effective Consultation and Informed Participation,it has been difficult to assess whether there was regular, systematicengagement with the Municipality during the planning andimplementation of the Ga Pila resettlement.Engagement and integration with the Municipality may have beenconstrained by a relative lack of institutional capacity in Governmentwhere a reported high staff turnover was especially problematic inthe Municipality. Lack of effective Government support throughoutthe process and weak institutional capacity has emerged as a limitingfactor for AP in the implementation of the Ga Pila resettlement. Sotoo has the failure of AP to adequately identify and manage thiscapacity gap as a risk to the project.Quality of Life of those that RelocatedA number of issues were raised in relation to living conditions atSterkwater, the original site of the Ga Pila village. These are discussedbelow.Isolated locationCommunity concerns were raised about the location of the newvillage, in particular that it was in the ‘shadow of a mountain’ (withassociated damp, cold conditions, and poor cell phone reception),as well as being remote from other major centres. The distance ofSterkwater from the town of Mokopane, compared to the previoussite, was said to make it especially hard for people to seek work oraccess shops and services in the town.HealthConcerns about increasingly poor health of community memberswere raised on a number of occasions and linked to the relocation.Some speculated that this trend relates to the air, water andmountains around Sterkwater.36

Erosion of social capital and networksAll stakeholders interviewed (community and other) agreed thatthe community has become sharply divided as a result of theresettlement process, or at least that already existing divisions wereexacerbated by jealousies and unequal treatment arising from theresettlement. Many community respondents stressed that thereare cases of families being divided by the disputes. The ResistanceCommittee who remained at old Ga Pila stated that they no longersee or speak to family members and friends that have moved.Both the Municipality and DLA perceive the resettlement process tohave damaged the social fabric of this community and to have upsetthe traditional structures and balance of power that existed.Quality of Life of those who Resisted RelocationRepresentatives of the resistant 26 households who have remainedat old Ga Pila made allegations about AP’s and the Government’sneglect of their welfare, starting from the time they chose not torelocate. Members of these households have raised issues abouttheir freedom of choice being taken away and of violations to theirbasic human rights, such as the right to basic living conditions suchas access to electricity and water.Their electricity was reportedly cut off two years prior to thetiming of this review. Evidence suggests that the electricity wascut by Eskom when the power line was re-routed for the Mine toestablish the waste rock dump on the old Ga-Pila property. Somehouseholders alleged that Eskom had failed to reconnect them forpolitical reasons due to associations between Eskom and the S21Committee at Ga Pila. ERM is not in a position to comment on thevalidity of these allegations. Since then the old Ga Pila communityhas been in direct communication with Eskom, who reportedlystated that they would only reconnect the houses once they hadreceived direct instruction from Mogalakwena Municipality. TheMunicipality did provide ERM with evidence of a written request thatit had issued to Eskom in April 2009 to reconnect these households.At the time of writing, the residents at old Ga Pila had not beenreconnected to the electricity supply.Although Eskom is responsible for the electricity supply to thesecommunities, the householders still associate its loss with theactivities of the Mine. They hold AP responsible for the health, safetyand other quality of life issues which have arisen from having losttheir electricity supply. At the community level, there appears tobe an overall lack of clarity around responsibility for this issue, withthe non-relocated communities maintaining that there has been noattempt by AP to engage with them directly to try to resolve it.The non-relocated community has no piped water supply. Therewere serious allegations made by them that AP was involved incutting the community’s access to water. It has been noted inexternal reports that there are several parties who have gone onrecord in court papers declaring that there had previously not beena water supply into the village, and thus it could not consequentlyhave been cut off. There were also some householders who hadprivate boreholes on their stands and who were compensatedfor these when they relocated. In lieu of a piped supply, water isdelivered door-to-door by the Municipality in 200 litre drums oncea week. This supply was observed by ERM and confirmed by theMunicipality. The households at the old Ga Pila, however, report thatthis is insufficient to meet their needs.In the opinions of the resistant group, their freedom of choice hasbeen limited. Some claim to have been pressured and intimidatedto move by direct visits to their houses by AP Project Managementstaff. This, however, contradicts claims that AP has failed to directlycommunicate with these households from the time when theychose not to relocate. Members of the Ga Pila resistant communityhave also suggested that their lives have been made unbearableby harassment from S21 members who have pressured them torelocate. It was, however, unclear why the S21 would take theseactions against them. No further clarity could be provided on this.ERM is not in a position to comment on the validity of suchallegations. It can be argued, however, that allegations of thisseriousness, even if not accurate, reflect a deep mistrust of AP,and detract seriously from AP’s positive efforts to improve livingconditions amongst those that did relocate.8.2.2 Livelihoods Restoration and Post-Resettlement DevelopmentAP did not undertake to provide any specific targeted assistance toimprove or restore income earning capacity, production levels andstandards of living as an integrated component of the resettlementprocess at Ga Pila. With the exception of preparation of farmland,any livelihood assistance given was implemented later as part ofbroader community development efforts within the Mine’s 50kmradius. This was not part of a targeted livelihood restoration exercise.The only exception to this is the Groenfontein project, discussedin the next section. The broad community development effortsundertaken in the area are outlined below.Land Use and LivestockAP assisted with the preparation of land for cultivation/ grazing.There have, however, been concerns raised by all relocated factionswith respect to the adequacy of the land provided. This relates37

in particular to a portion of the land being returned to NdunaMatlou (Koka-Matlou CPA), following his successful land claim. Theremaining portion is considered too small, as discussed in Topic 2,Section 2.2.3 and Topic 5, Section 5.2.3.Two other initiatives were reportedly offered at the time of initialresettlement, namely the establishment of a vegetable garden and ofa game farm.The development of a vegetable garden at Groenfontein is the onlypost resettlement development initiative targeted exclusively atGa Pila. This project was initiated in August 2008. AP has providedall of the capital and is paying management fees until the firstcrop is reaped for commercial purposes. The intention is that thereshould be a fifty-fifty shareholding between the lead farmer and thecommunity. A market has already been identified for the growingof vegetables. This project is set to employ 60 people from Ga-Pila,although it is envisaged that the project could employ 600 peopleat full capacity. However, according to AP, there is a land claim onGroenfontein. It is not clear what the effects of this might be on theviability of the project.In addition to the Groenfontein initiative, there are suggestions by APof a game farm being developed by AP, in partnership with Ga Pila.This will include a component that seeks to train locals to operate alodge to be built on the property. The development of the lodge hadbeen postponed to 2010. ERM understands that no consultation hasyet been held with communities on this idea.Finally, AP report that at Ga Pila a cattle owners project was initiatedto try and assist land owners with managing their livestock moresustainably. The take up for this initiative was however poor. APclaims that this was because the project required that participantsregister their cattle. This was unpopular since it would requirecompliance with the restricted numbers of cattle to preventovergrazing. AP argue that because many cattle owners had morethan the number of cattle officially allowed, there was little incentivefor them to participate for fear of losing cattle.Employment, Skills and EducationThere was a broad level of agreement among the Ga Pila communitythat there have been far too few initiatives put in place by AP withrespect to education provision or employment creation.It was noted that several members (total unknown) of thecommunity were engaged in bricklaying, glass work and electricalskills training at the time of the construction of the new settlement.This training was established to enable them to assist in the buildingof the new houses. Interestingly, amongst the community membersthat ERM spoke to, this was not perceived as a benefit.At the peak of the construction process for the new village, around300 local construction jobs were created for Ga Pila community. Thisamounted to around 35 percent of the workforce procured locally.According to the community a small number of people were lateremployed on the Mine in permanent roles (exact numbers couldnot be confirmed for this), but this was not considered sufficient.In about three to four of the households visited, young male familymembers were currently employed as contractors at the Mine. Thisamounted to only a few individuals however. Two of these youngmen volunteered the information that their jobs were very soughtafter, and, in their opinion, led to jealousy amongst their peers in thecommunity.The majority of community respondents cited very highunemployment as one of the biggest problems in this area and themost significant challenge now facing the community. All thoseinterviewed at Ga Pila, including the S21 members, had very highexpectations that the Mine should continue to help create jobs inthe area.It was also widely felt that tertiary education bursaries and educationinitiatives for skills and capacity building should have been a biggerpart of AP’s legacy. Community respondents pointed out that theconstruction contractor had donated more in this regard than APthemselves.According to AP, there have reportedly been no efforts fromGovernment to support income generating activities. In addition,there has been limited help in this regard from external not-forprofit entities. Apparently only one NGO has been operating in GaPila, teaching women how to sew. According to AP, others whohad previously been interested in becoming active in the area werescared off by the conflict and resettlement fall-outs.Community Perceptions about Development InitiativesGenerally, there was a lack of willingness amongst the communityrespondents to discuss future development initiatives with ERM.Rather, talk on such initiatives was perceived as a distraction fromthe grievances not yet perceived to be satisfactorily resolved by AP.Respondents who were prepared to discuss the future suggestedthat the best course of action would be to relocate the communityto a new site. Others felt that the terms of resettlement shouldbe completely renegotiated prior to any future developmentinitiatives being put in place or even being tabled by AP. One ofthe respondents also suggested that there was no hope until thecommunity unified. He felt that AP had a key role to play in helpingresolve the divisions and reunite the communities. He felt that thiscould partially be achieved through AP proactively approaching thecommunity to hear and address their grievances.38

The current climate, with the deep levels of mistrust towards APand high expectations for a renegotiation of the resettlement terms,is potentially not conducive to the uptake of new developmentprogrammes. Such initiatives are likely to be further constrained byweak local institutional capacity and poor educational standards.There is an acute need for capacity building and empowerment,particularly amongst younger people and women in order tofacilitate effective and appropriate sustainable developmentinterventions. Conversations with some young communityrespondents indicated a willingness to participate in capacitybuilding initiatives, should they be made available.Certain community members and S21 members claim they are inneed of computing equipment, and associated skills training to useit. Apparently such facilities were promised as part of the communityhall complex but have not been delivered. AP report that they haveundertaken to supply this equipment as soon as the community hasfully accepted the community hall, for fear of vandalism by thosewho remain aggrieved.8.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 8.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFC PS andSection (#)IFC PS RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS5, Section 8Living conditions at the new resettlementsite should be the same asor an improvement over conditionsat the site from which the displacedpersons were resettled.PartialalignmentOverall improved living conditions were underminedby problems with infrastructure and service provision(especially water and drainage) and challenges withhandover to Municipality.Poor and deteriorating living conditions and apparentneglect of those families that did not relocate detractedfrom efforts made.PS5, Section 8Compensation for loss of assetsto ensure improvement or at leastrestoration of livelihoods.PartialalignmentNo planned or systematic attempt to address impactsto livelihoods on a household by household basis as aresult of the resettlement. Replacement of shops andsmall businesses did take place however.PS 5, Section 20For those that are economicallydisplaced, a project is required toprovide additional targeted assistanceand opportunities to improveor at least restore livelihoods orincome levels.Non-alignmentNo evidence of attempts to measure or address impactsrelating to economic displacement or to restoreassociated livelihoods/income levels.PS 5, Section 8Project should provide opportunitiesto displaced persons and communitiesto derive appropriate developmentbenefits from the project.Non-alignmentVery limited evidence of systematic, effective postresettlementdevelopment planning.PS 5, Section 12Resettlement complete when theadverse impacts of resettlementhave been addressed.Non-alignmentThe livelihood and psycho-social impacts of theresettlement remain inadequately addressed.39

TOPIC 99 Implementation Planning, EnsuringInstitutional Capacity and Transparency9.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Management of impacts: Where resettlement is unavoidable, appropriate measures to mitigateadverse impacts on displaced persons and host communities should be carefully planned andimplemented, (PS 5, Section 2).• Develop appropriate RAP instrument or implementation plan: To adhere to PerformanceStandard 5, the project will develop a resettlement action plan or a resettlement framework(based on the results of the Social and Environmental Impact Assessment). The plan or frameworkmust be designed to mitigate the negative impacts of displacement, identify developmentopportunities, and establish entitlements of all categories of affected people (including hostcommunities), with particular attention on the needs of the poor and vulnerable groups, (PS 5,Section 12).• Develop monitoring and evaluation plan: A resettlement plan is required to provide details ofthe arrangements for monitoring and evaluation of the resettlement process, including correctiveaction, if necessary, (PS 5, Section 12).• Document all transactions and activities: Performance Standard 5 requires that a projectdocument all transactions to acquire land rights, as well as compensation measures andrelocation activities. This should be recorded in the plan or framework, (PS 5, Section 12).• Ensure adequate capacity for implementation: Performance Standard 1 requires that theproject should establish, maintain, and strengthen as necessary an organisational structure thatdefines roles, responsibilities, and authority to implement the management program, includingthe (Resettlement) Action Plan. Specific personnel, including management representative(s), withclear lines of responsibility and authority should be designated. Key social and environmentalresponsibilities should be well defined and communicated to the relevant personnel and tothe rest of the organization. Sufficient management sponsorship and human and financialresources will be provided on an ongoing basis to achieve effective and continuous social andenvironmental performance, (PS 1, Section 17).9.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS9.2.1 Develop Appropriate Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) Instrument orImplementation PlanNo formal strategy or integrated planning document was developed or could be shown to ERM as amanagement tool for the delivery of the resettlement process at Ga Pila. There was, however, evidence ofcertain of the key components of a Resettlement Action plan (RAP) as required under IFC. Implementationappears to have been partly ad hoc and to some extent a process of learning-by-doing. The expectationof a single integrated planning document to guide a resettlement process only came into currency inthe mining sector in the early 2000s. AP’s more piecemeal approach at Ga Pila was fairly characteristic of40

elocation processes of the time. It is also arguable that, as AP wasundertaking the first planned large scale involuntary resettlementof its kind in South Africa, they did not have the benefit of localexamples of planning tools and reports to learn from.The World Bank Standard guideline (Safeguard Policy) onresettlement (OP 4.12) was redrafted in 2001, while its predecessor(OP 4.30) had existed since 1999. The 2001 version includedthe specific requirement to prepare a resettlement plan/policyframework. At the time of the resettlement at Ga Pila, however,World Bank Standards may not have been recognised as a toolof relevance in the private sector for independently fundeddevelopments (unlike the current IFC Performance Standards whichnow serve this purpose). The World Bank standard was also a highlevel policy document, not a tool to inform practical implementationand guide management planning in the ways that the newerPerformance Standards are designed to do.9.2.2 Develop Monitoring and Evaluation PlanJust as no integrated resettlement plan was developed at Ga Pila,systematic monitoring and evaluation does not appear to have beenbuilt into the process and any internal monitoring was ad hoc andinformal.There is no evidence of monitoring or evaluation in place to assesslivelihoods in a post resettlement context. A lessons learnedanalysis generated during a one day workshop between AP andSRK once the resettlement was complete does not seem to havebeen formally applied to the Motlhotlo process. The AP ProjectManager also suggested that the two year delay in commencing theMotlhotlo process, as well as staff turnover, meant that the transfer ofinformation and skills from one process to the next was not smoothand there may have been a loss of institutional knowledge.Some community members from Ga Pila are, however, employedby AP and could thus have provided a vast resource of culturaland social knowledge and expertise for input into the Motlhotloresettlement process. However, the community respondents at GaPila do not recall being involved in, or consulted on, the processtaking place at Motlhotlo despite their experiences and the fact thatsimilar issues were arising in the latter process. Their knowledgeof the Motlhotlo resettlement and the terms of relocation andcompensation has been gleaned through informal communicationwith community members, through the media and through theirlegal advisors.Irrespective of the non-existence of a dedicated RAP document,evidence of monitoring and evaluation and implementationof corrective actions would normally be expected as a criticalcomponent of complex project management. It is arguable that theapparent lack thereof, or the existence of only rudimentary checksand progress reporting at Ga Pila, has led to a failed feedback loopand grievance management mechanism and thus a breakdown oftrust between AP, the S21 and the communities being resettled.9.2.3 Document all Transactions and ActivitiesFrom the documentation seen, as well as from discussions held withAP, it is apparent that critical transactions and correspondence, aswell as regular reporting of key project activities were documentedand recorded, and are kept on hard copy file. In addition, a largeamount of hard copy information is reported to be in archivesbut was not accessible at the time of writing. This meant thatfor the purposes of the Ga Pila review there was significantly lessdocumentation available than for Motlhotlo.Apparent gaps in the documentation mean a complete record ofthe key events and timeline indicating milestones in the processis relatively difficult to produce and was not immediately availablefrom AP upon request. From what was seen handwritten logs andsome electronic databases were kept to record the audit findingsand track the relocation process, along with written proof oftransactions with community members (e.g. receipts for the R 5,000settling in allowance and signed ‘Happy Letters’). Only a sample ofthese was seen, so a complete record cannot be verified.A sample of AP copies of the ‘red files’ for the household audits wasalso seen. It does not seem, from the documentation providedto date, that all community engagements were recorded withattendance records and detailed minutes to track agreements madein these meetings. A rudimentary log of the major communitygrievances raised through the S21 and Project Office was kept, butthis did not appear to include a procedure for issue / grievancetracking and resolution by AP.Many of the personnel who were directly involved in theresettlement process are no longer in the employment of AP. Acomprehensive verbal account of events was thus not obtainablefrom all those in key roles, reflecting a loss in knowledge of whatoccurred. Two key informants, who were in many ways central tothe process, however, do still work for AP at the Mine and wereinterviewed.Importantly, from evidence heard, the community was not givenaccess to records of meetings held between AP and the S21 andlegal advisors, or the Kgoshigadi. This meant that communities wereonly able to speculate about the nature of decisions being made.41

9.2.4 Ensure Adequate Capacity forImplementationThe team mandated with the delivery of the resettlement processat Ga Pila consisted of a Project Manager supported by HumanResources managers.There seems to have been a relatively small, technical team ofproject managers, engineers, human resources professionals andconstruction contractors tasked with handling all elements of theprocess. Their responsibilities included all aspects of communicationand stakeholder engagement with communities, their legal advisors,Government stakeholders and other external stakeholders, as well asgrievance management and dispute resolution.There is no evidence of a trained community relations orcommunications specialist being used at any time, even laterin the process when disputes began to arise. Such individualsshould ideally have been tasked to manage direct communication,consultation and liaison with the communities.The Project Manager confirmed that the resettlement at Ga Pilawas approached as a technical project and that roles for socialdevelopment or community relations experts were not specificallyidentified. He explained that these roles had been considered at anearly stage for the team, but that the recruitment of social resourceswas not ultimately pursued because of relationship difficultiesbetween the community and the current subcontractors, leadingthe RSC and the community to reject the idea.The Project Management team responsible seemed therefore to lacksupport from community relations specialists at a local level. Ideally,such a specialist would have contributed knowledge of the locallanguages, customs, culture and political dynamics.The role of locally based CLOs with community knowledge and skillsin community relations does not appear to have ever been filled atGa Pila. Community representatives did not recall a CLO role, andthe four community members working in the Project Office duringthe construction process were not understood to have had a formalliaison function. Respondents recalled the names of various ProjectManagers and indicated that their direct contact with the ProjectManagement team was relatively limited and sporadic, and evennon existent for some. Within AP, the responsibility for liaising withthe RSC/GRMT/ S21 members fell to the community legal advisorsand general Project Management team, with priority issues beingreported to senior Mine Management when necessary.As discussed in Topic 5: Compensation, no independent resource ormechanism for dispute resolution was established, although towardsthe end of the construction process, Government bodies were askedto step in to mediate some of the disputes over compensation andthe quality of houses.Overall at Ga Pila, AP seems to have relied heavily on the skillsof generalist project managers, predominantly not local to thearea. Their task was to implement a highly complex, emotive andpolitically sensitive resettlement in a poor rural community withoutany of the specific skills and qualifications which would be requiredin delivering a present day resettlement process. Some specialisttechnical resources such as architects and surveyors were used tocommunicate with community members, accompanied by a smallgroup of trained architect’s assistants recruited from the community,but only for the duration of the audit process.By default, AP allowed a central community liaison and grievancefeedback role to be filled by a community-appointed lawyer, whenthis would have been best filled by someone who representedAP. Although this was at the community’s request, AP should haverecognised the limitations of this arrangement, and provided analternative, in the interests of effective relationship building betweenitself and the affected communities.Although the community legal advisor worked directly at thecommunity’s service and met with them fairly regularly, heessentially played a middle-man role which ultimately reduced theface-to-face time between AP and the community. This arrangementseems to have distanced and alienated the communities from AP sothat, according to some respondents, AP became an almost facelessentity. The lack of visibility and direct contact by AP appeared tosome as an abdication of responsibility.The gaps and shortfalls of this resourcing model were apparentlynot properly addressed even when the process became fraught withconflict and disputes and the communities became heavily divided.Capacity of Supporting InstitutionsThe EIA raised the issue of increased pressure on local governmentinstitutions as a key anticipated impact of relocating the Ga Pilacommunity to Sterkwater Farm. It also points to concerns overlack of institutional capacity in the relevant institutions at the timeas a likely constraint in successfully mitigating this impact. Thislack of capacity was reported to be most acute at a local municipallevel. The need for capacity building and focused engagementwith key Government stakeholders on the relocation process andthe proposed role of Government institutions is central to therecommendations made by SRK in the outline social managementplan for the EIA. Discussions with AP have suggested there wasconsiderable Government involvement in early negotiations onland acquisition and site selection at Ga Pila; however, the role of theGovernment is not clear later in the process in supporting longerterm delivery of the resettlement and in a post-resettlement context.42

9.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 9.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsIFC PS andSection (#)IFC PS RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment )PS 5, Section 12Develop appropriate RAP instrumentor implementation plan.Non-alignmentSome components in place but no dedicatedimplementation planning document/ RAP instrumentPS 5, Section 2Appropriate measures to mitigateadverse impacts on displacedpersons and host communitiesshould be carefully planned andimplemented.Non-alignmentMining already underway once decision to resettle wastaken. ERM not aware of any prior impact assessmentundertaken leading to identification of mitigation/management measures including resettlement.PS 1, Section 17Ensure adequate capacity forimplementation.PartialalignmentInadequate social/community relations and conflictresolution capacity to deal with the social andcommunity development complexities inherent in arelocation process.PS 5, Section 12Develop monitoring and evaluationplan.Non-alignmentNo project specific monitoring and evaluationprogramme developed.43

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTPART THREEMOTLHOTLO RESETTLEMENTReview

PART THREE Table of Contents1 Topic 1: Avoid or Minimise Resettlement 11.1 What the IFC requires: 11.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 11.3 Performance Assessment 22 Topic 2: Land Acquisition And Land Rights 32.1 What the IFC requires: 32.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 32.2.1 Negotiated Settlement and Document all Transactions to Acquire Land Rights 32.2.2 Ensure those with Formal and Informal Rights are Eligible for Compensation 62.2.3 Provide Adequate Housing with Security of Tenure 72.2.4 Land Acquisition, Land Rights and Resistant Communities 72.3 Performance Assessment 83 Topic 3: Identifying Affected People, Assessing Eligibilityand Establishing a Cut-off Date 93.1 What the IFC requires: 93.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 93.2.1 Identification of People to Be Displaced by Resettlement 93.2.2 Undertake Inventory and Valuation of Assets 103.2.3 Establish Entitlements for all Categories of Affected People (with Particular Attention toVulnerable Groups) 113.2.4 Cut off Date to be Established, Documented and Communicated 113.3 Performance Assessment 124 Topic 4: Effective Consultation and Informed Participation 134.1 What the IFC Requires 134.2 Overview of Consultation for Motlhotlo Relocation 144.2.1 Overview of Consultation Structures Established for the Motlhotlo Relocation 144.2.2 Consultation Timing and Duration 184.3 Summary Findings and Analysis 204.3.1 Analysis of Consultation Structures and their Effectiveness 204.3.2 Analysis of Consultation Timing and Duration 234.3.3 Consultation and Resistant Communities 254.4 Performance Assessment 255 Topic 5: Compensation 275.1 What the IFC Requires 275.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 275.2.1 Individual Homesteads and Commercial Structures 285.2.2 Grave Relocation 295.2.3 Agricultural Land 295.2.4 Grazing Land 32

5.2.5 Village Infrastructure and Services 335.2.6 Concluding Remark 335.3 Performance Assessment 346 Topic 6: Managing Grievances 356.1 What the IFC requires: 356.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 356.2.1 Establish a Grievance Mechanism to Receive and Address Concerns 356.2.2 Effectiveness and Implementation of the Grievance Mechanism 376.2.3 Managing Grievances and Resistant Communities 396.3 Performance Assessment 397 Topic 7: Provide Relocation Assistance and Transition Support 417.1 What the IFC requires: 417.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 417.3 Performance Assessment 428 Topic 8: Improve/restore living conditions and livelihoodsand address post-resettlement development needs 438.1 What the IFC Requires 438.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 438.2.1 Improve Living Conditions 438.2.2 Livelihoods Restoration and Post-Resettlement Development 478.2.3 Living Conditions and Livelihoods amongst the Resistant Communities 508.3 Performance Assessment 519 Topic 9: Implementation Planning and Institutional Capacity 529.1 What the IFC Requires 529.2 Summary Findings and Analysis 539.2.1 Develop Appropriate RAP Instrument or Implementation Plan 539.2.2 Ensure Adequate Capacity for Implementation 549.2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 569.3 Performance Assessment 57

TOPIC 11 Avoid or Minimise Resettlement1.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES:• Avoid or minimise resettlement: In accordance with IFC Performance Standard 5, involuntaryresettlement should be avoided or at least minimised (PS 5, Section 2). A project should thereforeconsider feasible alternative project designs to avoid or at least minimise physical or economicdisplacement, (PS 5, Section 7).1.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSISA review of the addendum to PPRust’s environmental management programme report (EMPR) for theproposed PPRust North Mine, does not show any evidence of efforts made to minimise physical oreconomic displacement within the villages of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo.In terms of alternative project designs, two options are cited: (a) backfilling of the open pits; and (b) the ‘nogo’ alternative. Neither of these ‘alternatives’ have the minimisation of resettlement as a key consideration.In fact, the backfilling alternative relates solely to rehabilitation options for the open pit, while the ‘no go’alternative does not mention the avoidance of resettlement as a key factor or inherent outcome of theno-go option. Instead, it concludes that ‘Given the context of poverty and underdevelopment, [the no-goalternative] would be a significance loss of [economic] opportunity to the area’ (EMPR Addendum, SRK,2002, pp 9).The main driver for the specific mine design and lay-out was the location of the resource, which forsafety reasons in turn required the relocation of Motlhotlo village. Potential impacts included increaseddust pollution, damage to houses due to blast vibrations, and potential groundwater pollution. Areas ofMotlhotlo were also deemed the only viable location for the dumping of waste rock.As cited in the EMPR Addendum (2002), it is PPRust’s (and Anglo Platinum’s) safety policy not toaccommodate dwellings within 1000 m of an open pit. Thus, with the optimal location of the Mineselected, the resettlement became unavoidable.With parts of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo villages falling within 1000 m of the proposed open pit, anumber of affected dwellings therefore needed to be moved. The affected communities, through theirrepresentative structures, however indicated their preference for the entire villages to be relocated. Thiswas not necessarily the view of the majority. See Topic 4: Effective Consultation and Informed Participation forfurther discussion of this issue.During discussions with ERM, Anglo Platinum (AP) indicated that the project was guided by World Bankstandards relating to noise levels in its decision to relocate the community at Motlhotlo. In 1998, theEnvironmental Impact Assessment (EIA) carried out by SRK included noise studies, with the resultantnoise contours showing that two thirds of the settlements of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo were likely to beimpacted by unacceptable night time noise levels. According to AP, there were two options for mitigatingthese noise impacts: either make the operation a sunrise to sunset business, or undertake to resettle thevillages of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo. The former would have made the project financially unviable; thus,the resettlement option was chosen.1

AP also looked at the settlements of Ga Chaba and Leroleng, butdecided not to move them as they did not fall within the high noiseexposure contours identified in the EIA, and any potential safety andenvironmental impacts could be mitigated through managementcontrols. AP also had no need to access the surface area of these twosettlements.An assessment of AP’s performance against IFC standards is providedin the table below.1.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in Table 1.1 below.Table 1.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)Based on evidence provided in the PPRust EMPRPS 5, Section2 & 7A client should consider feasiblealternative project designs to avoidor at least minimise physical oreconomic displacement.Non-alignmentamendment, there is no indication of efforts made tominimise the resettlement of Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelothrough feasible project design. The ‘no- go’ or ‘no project’alternative did not have the minimisation of resettlementas a key consideration.2

TOPIC 22 Land Acquisition and Land Rights2.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Negotiated settlement: Projects are encouraged to acquire land rights through negotiatedsettlements whenever possible, even if they have the legal means to gain access to the landwithout the seller’s consent (PS 5, Section 3).• Document all transactions to acquire land rights (PS 5, Section 12).• Ensure those with formal and informal rights are eligible for compensation: IFCPerformance Standard 5 defines displaced persons as those (i) who have formal legal rights tothe land they occupy; (ii) who do not have formal legal rights to land, but have a claim to landthat is recognised or recognisable under the national law; or (iii) who have no recognisablelegal right or claim to the land they occupy (PS 5, Section 14).• Provide security of tenure for new housing: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that theproject offers a choice of options for adequate housing with security of tenure so that affectedpeople can resettle legally without having to face the risk of forced eviction. In particular,informal settlers without security of tenure should be provided with adequate housing andsecurity of tenure in the new resettlement sites (PS 5, Section 18).2.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS2.2.1 Negotiated Settlement and Document all Transactions to AcquireLand RightsAcquisition of Land RightsIn 1993, AP signed a lease agreement with the Mapela Tribal Authority (MTA) for the farms of Zwartfonteinand Overysel. These farms included land used for farming by the Motlhotlo communities. Compensationfor agricultural fields was not a condition of the lease (see Topic 5: Compensation, for more discussion onthis topic).The acquired land is owned by the State (administered by the Minister of Land Affairs), and falls within thejurisdiction of the MTA. The Kgoshigadi of the MTA holds the land in trust on the communities’ behalf, andis thus considered the custodian of these land rights.However, none of the community members have legal tenure of this land in their individual capacities.Individual community members were thus not recognised as legal parties to this transaction and weretherefore not consulted on the matter. All, however, have traditional rights to the land, which arerecognised and upheld under South African law.Within this legal framework, it would have been considered appropriate that AP’s first point of contactregarding the acquisition/ lease of farms Zwartfontein and Overysel for mining was the MTA. Since theMTA falls under the leadership of Kgoshigadi Langa it was also in keeping with accepted traditionalprotocols to address her first on the subject, since the Kgoshigadi and her Royal Council are the highestauthority and have the right to speak on behalf of their communities.3

The evidence suggests therefore that a negotiated approach to theacquisition of land rights did take place, at least in terms of acceptedtribal authority protocol at the time.It should, however, be noted that in terms of the later InterimProtection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) (No 31 of 1996),the Kgoshigadi legally requires the consent of her community indecisions taken regarding the land. Any decisions taken now alsoneed to protect people’s rights to and interests in land, which are nototherwise protected by law.The farms eventually chosen as host sites for the relocation(Armoede and Rooibokfontein) were purchased privately fromthe Government after a lengthy process of consultation over siteselection (See Section 4.2.2 Consultation Timing and Duration). Thesefarms were owned by the Government but fell under the jurisdictionof the Department of Land Affaris (DLA). No concerns were raised bystakeholders relating to this transaction.Decision to RelocateThis section looks at the extent to which the decision to resettle wasshared by the community. It does so by considering communityinvolvement and levels of awareness in the decision-making process.Although the actual lease of the farms was not consulted upon,feedback from all stakeholder groups confirms that there was aform of community consultation, through the Kgoshigadi, on theactual decision whether or not to be relocated (see Topic 4: EffectiveConsultation and Informed Participation) – although concerns werelater to arise regarding the extent to which the community were ableto meaningfully participate in this decision.The community were also unhappy that AP and the Kgoshigadiseemed to be unable to answer certain questions regarding theland and the proposed process. In the records of consultation fromthe EIA process, a comment was made by various communityrespondents that ‘The communities were not provided withfeedback on the agreements reached between AP and the TribalAuthorities regarding the relocation’. AP’s response to this wasthat while this concern was noted, it was ‘an issue that also needsto be resolved between the community and the MTA (MotlhotloResettlement, Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, 2002).In discussions with AP regarding community agreement to relocate,they site the fact that a resolution was taken by the communitywherein they agreed to resettle. In terms of community agreementsto relocate, there are two key dates:• On 13 th October 2002, the Kgoshigadi called a communitymeeting to discuss the relocation, the outcome of which was acommunity resolution to relocate; and• On 17 th July 2005, there was another community meeting,attended by AP and overseen by officials of the DLA. It wasat this meeting that authorised community representatives( 2 ) signed the actual Communal Legal Agreements (i.e. thedraft lease agreements, Relocation Agreements, DonationAgreements, and a Master Agreement with AP). Box 2.1 providesa summary of the Relocation Agreement, as subsequentlyfinalised. The specifics of this agreement will be discussed in therelevant sections of this report.As a first step towards a consultative approach, the Kgoshigadi (on 24October 1998) requested that two Relocation Steering Committees(RSCs) be formed to deal with the relocation of the Motlhotlo village.The election of these committees was facilitated shortly thereafterat a community meeting convened by the local Indunas (NdunaPuka and Nduna Sekhaolelo). The task of these committees wasto negotiate with AP, on behalf of the community, regarding theresettlement.Subsequent to the establishment of the RSCs, the community legaladvisors (1 ) report that they were approached for assistance by theGa Puka RSC (in 1999) and the Ga Sekhaolelo RSC (in 2001) becauseboth groups felt the decision to relocate had already been taken ontheir behalf, following assumed private negotiations between AP andthe Kgoshigadi.1 This refers to Advocate Seth Nthai and instructing attorney, BhadrishDaya.2 The authorised community representatives are understood to be NdunaGa Puka and Nduna Ga Sekhaolelo, Advocate Seth Nthai (on behalf of thecommunity), and the two S21 chairs. Roland Van Kerckhoven and DeanPelser (the latter as a witness) signed the agreement on AP’s behalf.4

BOX 2.1 SUMMARY OF RELOCATIONAGREEMENT• New village development at Armoede andRooibokfontein.• Houses built to Government standards, with floor arearounded up to next 5m 2 .• R20,000 compensation to be paid to each homeowner(in two tranches).• Compensation payments made for the areas’ (host sites)inefficiencies.• Compensation payments made for incomplete structuresand associated items.• Two additional farms to be donated to communities.• Compensation for upset caused by grave relocation(R1,500 per grave).• R50 million committed by Anglo Platinum to Ga Pukaand Ga Sekhaolelo (R25 million each). Includes an upfrontpayment of R10 million on completion of relocation(vacant occupation) plus R2 million to each of the twocommunities per year over a 10-year period.• 24 student bursaries for tertiary studies operational from2003.• Full-time classes towards N3 mining, metallurgy orengineering qualifications provided.• Mining process and engineering learnerships providedfrom 2003.• 30 percent preferential employment opportunitiesprovided for these affected communities.AP suggests that there was majority community support for therelocation, and cite that they were in fact approached by theMotlhotlo residents with a request to be relocated. In AP’s opinionthis means that the relocation was both entirely voluntary and thusfreely negotiated. This notion is, however, contested by a legaladvisor representing some of the community respondents as wellas certain factions within the community.In spite of the community resolution signed, there is contestationby both communities and community legal advisors regardingthe extent to which the relocation was in fact fully supported byall community members. Some community respondents claimthat the resolution to relocate – signed on the 17 th July 2005 – didnot have a quorum of community members, and does not thusrepresent full community consensus to relocate. No records ofprotest or objections from the time of this meeting were presentedto ERM to allow them to verify this claim.Some community respondents claimed that a platform to tablegrievances or disagreements was never provided, and furthermore,that the option of not resettling was not offered by AP or tabledwith the community. Others suggested that they ended up movingbecause ‘everybody else moved’ and they feared being left behindwithout support.It could also be argued that although community support wasgiven by a majority, and 100 percent of residents went on to signtheir individual ‘one-on-one compensation agreements’ (1 ) byend 2005, both may have been done without full knowledge orunderstanding of the implications of this decision.The Mogalakwena Municipality commented that the communitiescould never have understood the scale of the resettlement in termsof the impacts on their lives when first presented with the idea.Community residents are quoted as saying ‘they wanted what GaPila residents had got’. In this way, hope for a better quality of lifeand financial reward may understandably have overshadowed anypossibility of critical thinking about what it meant to resettle.In terms of supporting the communities in making an informeddecision to move, it is unclear whether the Kgoshigadi waseither willing or had sufficient knowledge to be able to facilitatediscussions and raise awareness among community residentson the potential negative impacts of resettlement. ERM arealso uncertain on the extent to which AP, based on their recentexperience with Ga Pila, raised awareness about the negativeimpacts of resettlement. Typically, an EIA should provide aneducation function in this regard. However, the timing of theEIA (starting in September 2002) meant that the findings of theimpact assessment and associated identification of the impactsof resettlement were not fed back to the community residents intime to inform their decision to move (taken initially in October2002). The extent to which informed consent was fully given to therelocation is thus uncertain. This is discussed more fully in Topic 4:Effective Consultation and Informed Participation.1 The one-on-one agreements (captured in the ‘green files’) spell outdetails re compensation for lost assets on a household basis. (See Topic 5for more detail on this).5

Land Lease Arrangements and DocumentationThe community legal advisors explained that, as in the case ofGa Pila, the land lease arrangements were initially to be drawnup in accordance with the law and accepted structures at thattime, whereby the Minister of Land Affairs would lease the landto AP on behalf of the community. Since AP would require 100percent vacant occupation to operate on the land, the Governmentwould then have had to evict any community members whoresisted the relocation. According to the community legaladvisors, the Government, in an attempt to avoid being directlyinvolved with potential forced evictions, instead requested thata sub-lease arrangement be drawn up to shift this responsibilityfor the transaction and any potential need to evict, to a legalentity within the community itself. This entity was to become theSection 21 Company (S21) (see Topic 4: Effective Consultation andInformed Participation for more information on their establishment)established as the designated legal lessor of the land under a subleaseagreement. The S21 operates independently from AP, with aMemorandum and Articles of Association. The S21’s main functionwas to ensure that the relocation process ran smoothly and that thecommunity received regular information in this regard.It should be noted that the S21 model and associated sub-lease wasthe Government’s preferred approach at the time, and had alreadybeen used at Ga Pila without apparent incident or communitycomplaint. Additional considerations for AP were the deductibility ofthe rental amount from Income Tax and recovery of VAT, which uponadvice from a tax specialist, was possible through the establishmentof the S21 as a company and legal vehicle for the transaction.A number of concerns were raised by stakeholders regarding thisapproach:• The validity of the terms of the Master Agreements for bothGa Pila and later Motlhotlo have been called into question bythe Motlhotlo Development Committee (MDC) as well as theMotlhotlo Relocation Resistance Committee (MRRC), giventhat they were in contrast to all other traditional land leasearrangements between the Government and communitiesin South Africa at the time. However, in the opinion of thecommunity legal advisors, these new lease arrangements(used at both Ga Pila and Motlhotlo) were forward thinking,and offered an alternative to the Apartheid model wherecommunities were powerless subjects to the Government.This solution was therefore argued to be in line with the thenemerging Communal Land Rights Bill (now the CommunalLand Rights Act [Act 11 of 2004])• It is noted as a major concern by the MDC, MRRC and othercommunity members that there is no documentary evidenceof the conversation between the community legal advisorsand the Minister of Land Affairs regarding the decision tostructure the transaction using a sub-lease arrangement (i.e.,Government leases land to S21 who then sub-leases to AP).• It is also perceived as highly problematic that the S21Chairpersons signed a Special Power of Attorney to AttorneyBhadrish Daya to undertake all negotiations, settle terms,make, sign and execute all or any of the lease agreements andany related agreements in relation to the farms in question.The amount of power given to the community legal advisors,particularly in light of the reported failings of the S21s whichthey represent (1 ) is seen by many external stakeholders as amajor flaw in the relocation process.Concerns around the terms of the legal documentation relating tothe resettlement including the draft leases, Relocation Agreement,Donation Agreement and the Master Agreement have beenexacerbated by an apparent lack of transparency around thesedocuments.In particular, not formally recording or providing transparentexplanation of the historically ‘unique’ sub-lease arrangementbetween the S21s and AP seems to have been a critical omission onthe part of the community legal advisors, AP and the DLA given thesignificance of the issues at hand.ERM was not able to obtain a copy of the draft lease, relocationagreement, donation agreements or Master Agreement during thisstudy.2.2.2 Ensure those with Formal and InformalRights are Eligible for CompensationStakeholder testimonies confirm that there is no evidence tosuggest that AP excluded any person from the resettlement processregardless of whether their claim to the land was recognised by lawor not. All structures and properties identified in the area and fallingunder the authority of the MTA were considered eligible and wereincluded in the household audit (see Topic 3: Identifying AffectedPeople, Assessing Eligibility and Establishing a Cut-off Date, Section 3.2.2).In fact, after the first audit (see Topic 3: Identifying Affected People,Assessing Eligibility and Establishing a Cut-off Date, Section 3.2.1), anumber of youths, (81 in total) in their early 20s starting puttingup informal structures in protest at not being identified as eligiblefor housing in the new settlement. This event occurred outside1 Most notably, criticisms regarding the S21’s inability to serve as aneffective consultative mechanism between AP and community residents.6

of the official land allocation process, which is usually facilitatedand authorised by the Induna, when the need for land arises. APwere advised by others in the community not to acknowledgethese structures as the people concerned, were seen as having notraditional land rights because they were young and unmarried.However, AP eventually agreed to include the informal structuresin the second audit and make these households eligible forresettlement and compensation, as they needed 100 percent vacantoccupation of the land in order to use it.A full description of the process by which people were identified aseligible for resettlement is provided in Topic 3: Identifying AffectedPeople, Assessing Eligibility and Establishing a Cut-off Date, Section3.2.1.2.2.3 Provide Adequate Housing with Security ofTenureMuch of the evidence points to the fact that AP was aligned in termsof the IFC requirement to provide adequate housing for displacedpeople. A visit to site and a large sample of properties, suggestthat the overwhelming majority of houses provided is a noticeableimprovement on the structures people occupied in the oldMotlhotlo, both in terms of the quality of the structure and fixtures,and total floor space (floor areas were rounded up to the next 5 m 2 ).Annex D: Photolog, provides a useful comparison of the old versusnew structures. A total of 42 different house designs were provided,depending on the size of one’s original structure. The smallest housewas 30 m 2 , provided in response to the additional structures put upby a group of youths (see Topic 3: Identifying Affected People, AssessingEligibility and Establishing a Cut-off Date, Section 3.2.2).At the time of writing the report, all household owners were in theprocess of receiving their signed-off building plans and occupationalcertificates. These serve as proof of homestead ownership.Importantly, there is a perception amongst the faction resisting therelocation that they will not receive an occupational certificate uponrelocating to the new site. This has been cited by some as one of thereasons that they are not prepared to relocate.In terms of security of tenure of the land itself, none of thecommunity members hold individual title deeds to the land. Giventhat both Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo are still under MTA jurisdiction,security of land tenure cannot be provided to the individual. Instead,the title deed sits with the Minister of Land Affairs, but held intrust on the communities’ behalf by the Kgoshigadi. In terms ofthe IPILRA(Act 31 of 1996), community residents who have beenallocated portions of land are, however, protected from eviction.Within the existing regulatory context, ensuring title deeds to landwas not an option open to AP.2.2.4 Land Acquisition, Land Rights andResistant CommunitiesDuring the course of ERM’s investigations, claims have been heard ofAP attempts to forcibly evict members of the resistant community.There were also allegations of police intimidation in response to theresistant communities protesting at Old Motlhotlo. These allegationscannot be verified by ERM.7

2.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in Table 2.1 below.Table 2.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section3Projects are encouraged toacquire land rights throughnegotiated settlementswhenever possible.Partial alignmentAlthough community resolution was signed to relocate,insufficient evidence that this was fully inclusive. Eventhough 100 percent of homeowners signed their one-ononeagreements, uncertainty exists regarding the extent towhich the community fully understood the implications of theresettlement prior to agreeing to move.PS 5, Section12Document all transactions toacquire land rightsNon-alignmentNot formally recording the historically ‘unique’ sub-leasearrangement between the S21 and AP seems to have been acritical omission on the part of the community legal advisors,AP and the DLA given the significance of the issues at hand.PS 5, Section14Ensure those with formal andinformal rights are eligible Alignment -PS 5, Section18Provide security of homesteadownership tenure for newhousingAlignment -PS 5, Section18Provide security of land tenureNot applicable forindividual titleWithin the existing regulatory context, ensuring household titledeeds to land was not an option open to AP.8

TOPIC 33 Identifying Affected People, AssessingEligibility and Establishing a Cut-off Date3.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Undertake socio-economic census and valuation of assets: IFC Performance Standard 5requires that in developing a resettlement plan, the project will carry out a census with appropriatesocio-economic data to identify the persons who will be displaced by the project, to determinewho will be eligible for compensation and assistance, and to discourage inflow of people who areineligible for these benefits, (PS 5, Section 11).• Cut off date to be established, documented and communicated: The date of completion of thecensus (see above) and associated assets inventory represents a cut-off date for the resettlement.In the absence of host Government procedures, the client will establish a cut-off date for eligibility.Individuals taking up residence in the project area after the cut-off date are not eligible forcompensation or resettlement assistance provided that notification of the cut-off date is welldocumented and disseminated, (PS 5, Section 11).• Establish entitlements for all categories of affected people (with particular attention tovulnerable groups): IFC Performance Standard 5 states that a resettlement plan shall ‘establishthe entitlements of all categories of affected persons (including host communities), with particularattention paid to the needs of the poor and the vulnerable,’ (PS 5, Section 12).3.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS3.2.1 Identification of People to Be Displaced by ResettlementTypically in a resettlement process, a socio-economic census or survey is carried out to identify who will beresettled, and to determine who is eligible for compensation and assistance. The completion of this censuscoincides with the cut-off date for the identification of affected residents, and anyone who moves into theproject area after this date, is not considered eligible.According to AP, the identification of affected residents was in fact carried out by the communities of GaPuka and Ga Sekhaolelo, who through the MTA, identified themselves to AP. The implication is thereforethat a formal census to identify affected residents was not considered to be necessary. AP also carried outan aerial survey to assist with the conceptual understanding of the settlement layout and identification ofnumber of households affected.Any errors (in terms of number of affected households) that may have existed on the MTA list, and whichmight not have been picked up during the aerial survey, are likely to have been picked up during the twohousehold audits (May and September 2002) and EIA process (and associated socio-economic surveyin 2002) that subsequently took place. As previously discussed, the second audit was to allow for theinclusion of the additional structures that had been erected by a group of young people, as well as toverify the accuracy of the first audit. Following the second audit, there has been no contestation of thesefigures. Table 3.1 provides a list of all assets audited in Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo.9

Table 3.1 List of Assets Audited (September 2002)DescriptionGa PukaGaSekhaoleloResidential stands 495 462 957Church 6 4 10Creche 1 1 2Community office 2 1 3Clinic 1 shared 1Business 9 12 21Primary school 1 1 2Senior Primary school 1 shared 1Secondary school 1 shared 1Burial society building 4 9 13Municipal office 1 shared 1Graveyard 1 1 2Waste sites 1 1 2Total 527 505 1, 029TotalWhilst AP are considered to be aligned with the IFC in terms ofprocesses for identification of the number of affected residents,what appears lacking is consideration of different categories ofaffected people, with particular attention to vulnerable groups. Inthis regard, AP appears to have treated the Motlhotlo community asa homogenous entity, with no consideration for vulnerabilities anddifferences that may exist in the way individuals or households willexperience the resettlement (see Section 3.2.3).3.2.2 Undertake Inventory and Valuation ofAssetsOn the whole, the inventory and valuation of assets at Motlhotloappears to have been well implemented and to have madeconsiderable effort towards implementing the lessons learntat Ga Pila. In terms of IFC Performance Standard 5, AP met therequirement of implementing an audit of all affected households.In fact, as already discussed, two asset audits were undertaken forGa Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo. The first asset audit was undertaken inMay 2002, the second in September 2002. The second audit waspartly to capture the structures established by the group of youths,and to validate the accuracy of the first. An audit of graves was alsoundertaken in 2003. A full photolog of these activities is available(Annex D: Photolog). All houses, plus the contents of the yard, andinfrastructural assets belonging to the community as a whole, wereaudited.In order to address concerns around a lack of understanding of theaudit process amongst affected residents, the audit team (comprisedof architects) were supported by 14 ‘architectural assistants’ (knownas the Operational Team (1) ). These comprised seven people fromeach community, who were recruited and trained up by the ProjectManagement Team. They were tasked with helping the communitymembers to understand the audit process (see Topic 4: EffectiveConsultation and Informed Participation, Section 4.2 for an assessmentof this model). They were each paid a monthly stipend by AP, upuntil January 2009, when their services were no longer needed.Oversight of the audit process was carried out by members of theProject Management Team (Focus PM and Hararo PM) (2) , who werealso tasked with securing appointments for the architects. Membersof the S21s also oversaw the audit process, making sure that thearchitects and Operational Team had access to the households.Each audit was then signed off by the homeowner, the Induna, twocommunity representatives and an independent surveyor. The keydocumentation produced during the audit was a compensationsheet, a ‘red file’ (detailing the first proposal to be presentedto homeowners), and a ‘green file’ (incorporating homeownercomments and sign-off ). Copies of all this documentation areavailable from AP, homeowners or their legal representatives in thecase of some of the resistance groups.On completion of the audit, the value of the structure and nonstructuralproperty (e.g., trees and crops) within the homesteadboundary were determined by an independent surveyor. Thesevalues were then translated into a house plan (i.e., like-for-like) andcash compensation for non-structural assets.An enormous amount of effort seems to have been put into theaudit process by AP, and measures put in place to improve on theprocess undertaken at Ga Pila. The benefits of this is reflected inthe fact that at the conclusion of the household audit/ inventoryof assets, 100 percent of homeowners, Indunas, S21 members andthe Project Manager signed off on the audit. This includes some keyindividuals who later changed their minds about relocating. Theyare currently resisting relocation and requesting a renegotiation ofthe terms of resettlement.Notwithstanding the 100 percent sign-off on the audits by affectedresidents, concerns have subsequently been raised regarding1 The Operational Team worked for one year doing the household audits,and were then brought on board again in February 2006 when theconstruction of the houses began. They were disbanded in January 2009.2 Now merged to form PM Africa.10

the extent to which the homeowners fully understood the auditprocess, and what they were signing off. See Topic 4: EffectiveConsultation and Informed Participation, Section 4.2 for a discussionof these concerns. The resistant faction of the community alsoraised concerns that the process for determining valuations andcash compensation packages was not transparent, where therewere reports that different people received different compensationamounts for similar assets. ERM did not see any evidence of thisallegation; instead, our overall impression is one of a fair process fordetermining valuations.3.2.3 Establish Entitlements for all Categoriesof Affected People (with ParticularAttention to Vulnerable Groups)Entitlements for compensation in the form of replacement housingwere developed based on a fixed design criteria package, inaccordance with the National Building Regulations (SABS 400), andwith the key objective of ensuring all home owners ‘will receivemore than they currently have’. These design criteria specified thestandards and materials for the housing units, business premises,schools, churches and clinics. The detailed Design Criteria Packagecan be found in Annex E: Design Criteria. Some 42 different housedesigns were eventually drawn up based on the design criteria, andin order to address specific homeowner requirements identifiedduring the household/asset audit.Beyond this however, the evidence suggests that the process ofestablishing entitlements was not informed by the identification ofbroader needs of different categories of affected people or of thosehouseholds with potential vulnerabilities (such as the ill, elderly,illiterate, or female headed households). Although some generalcharacteristics associated with overall socio-economic vulnerabilityof the communities were identified at the scoping and assessmentphase of the EIA, this analysis did not inform the Project’s approachto determining entitlements on a household to household basis.As a result (beyond variations in size and finishes of houses)compensation packages were not tailored or designed with specific‘need groups’ in mind.Evidence from the community suggests that a more thoroughunderstanding of the respective and differing needs of affectedhouseholds at an individual level could have helped AP to identifysome of the inequalities which led to disputes that later becamethe source of serious challenges to the process. Younger people, forexample, who were often excluded from decision making by theirelders, and considered not to have property rights, were thus notconsidered entitled to property in the resettled sites. This exclusionled to a mobilised resistance amongst the youth, which becamekey to the resistance during the resettlement. If identified early onas an emerging vulnerable group, they could potentially have beenconsulted and encouraged to participate in a specific way. This is inspite of the fact that socio-economic component of the EIA (2002)recommended that ‘the group of particularly young men aged15 – 19 needs to be considered for space to be provided for familyexpansion’.The challenges for the process resulting from already existentgenerational divisions and power inequalities are discussed furtherin the context of the effectiveness of the S21s as a representativestructure (see Topic 4: Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation, Section 4.2).As discussed previously, illiteracy has also been identified as a keyarea of vulnerability in these communities.When questioned about the approach taken towards vulnerablegroups, AP acknowledged that vulnerabilities were not formallyidentified and addressed, and did not inform entitlements; thecalculation of compensation measures; or the design of livelihoodsrestoration measures. AP explained this by expressing concernabout the challenges of differentiating between groups: definingsome categories of person as ‘vulnerable’, they argue, is subjectiveand risked creating or exacerbating community divisions aroundperceived inequalities and disproportionate benefits.AP explained that their approach was to try to mitigate the impacts/vulnerabilities as they arose. This reflects a reactive versus a proactiveapproach to risk management. It is arguable, however, that therequirement for an in-depth needs and vulnerabilities assessmentwas not in currency at the time and is more rigorous methodologythan could or would have been expected as part of a socioeconomicimpact assessment or Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) atthat time.3.2.4 Cut off Date to be Established,Documented and CommunicatedThe ‘influx’ incident involving the establishment of additionalstructures by a group of young people (see Section 3.2.2) isindicative of a failure on AP’s behalf to clearly communicate a cut offdate for the census. After the second audit, however, the number ofaffected residents remained stable and no further informal structuresappeared until after the relocation had started. At this point informalstructures did begin to appear in the old Motlhotlo however.The absence of a cut off date seems to be symptomatic of alack of proactive risk management through proper education ofcommunities at all levels on the process. The influx response alsohighlights a failure to identify the youth as a potentially vulnerablegroup with different concerns or demands from those of theirparents/traditional leadership.11

3.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 3.2 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFC PerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC PerformanceStandard RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section 11Identification of peopleto be displaced byresettlement.Alignment -PS 5, Section 11Undertake inventory andvaluation of assets.AlignmentThe household audit/inventory of assets was well planned andexecuted but could have been supported by an earlier and improvededucation campaign to help manage expectations and improvecommunity understanding of the audit process.PS 5, Section 12Establish entitlements forall categories of affectedpeople (with particularattention to vulnerablegroups).PartialalignmentThe audit lacked a needs and vulnerabilities assessment componentat household level to proactively identify risks and vulnerablehouseholds to inform entitlements; compensation measures; orfacilitate planning of adequate and appropriate livelihood restorationmeasures.PS 5, Section 11Cut off date to beestablished, documentedand communicated.NonalignmentA cut off date should have been applied and communicated in orderto manage establishment of additional structures by a group ofyoung people.12

TOPIC 44 Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation4.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Implementation of effective consultation: IFC Performance Standard 1 spells out therequirements for consultation in detail, specifically that effective consultation: (i) should be basedon the prior disclosure of relevant and adequate information, including draft documents andplans; (ii) should begin early in the Social and Environmental Assessment process; (iii) shouldfocus on the social and environmental risks and adverse impacts, and the proposed measures andactions to address these; and (iv) be carried out on an ongoing basis as risks and impacts arise. Theconsultation process will be undertaken in a manner that is inclusive and culturally appropriate.The client will tailor its consultation process to the language preferences of the affectedcommunities, their decision-making processes, and the needs of disadvantaged or vulnerablegroups, (PS 1, Section 21).• Free, prior and informed consultation: For projects with significant adverse impacts on affectedcommunities, the consultation process will ensure their free, prior and informed consultationand facilitate their informed participation. Informed participation involves organised and iterativeconsultation, leading to the client’s incorporating into their decision-making process the viewsof the affected communities on matters that affect them directly, such as proposed mitigationmeasures, the sharing of development benefits and opportunities, and implementation issues. Theclient will document the process, in particular the measures taken to avoid or minimise risks to andadverse impacts on the affected communities, (PS 1, Section 22).• Appropriate level of consultation: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that the projectensures that resettlement activities are implemented with appropriate disclosure of information,consultation, and the informed participation of those affected, (PS 5, Objectives).• Disclosure: If communities may be affected by risks or adverse impacts from the project, the clientwill provide such communities with access to information on the purpose, nature and scale of theproject, the duration of proposed project activities, and any risks to and potential impacts on suchcommunities. For projects with adverse social or environmental impacts, disclosure should occurearly in the Social and Environmental Assessment process and in any event before the projectconstruction commences, and on an ongoing basis (PS 1, Section 20).• Choice of new site: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that a project offers displaced peoplechoices among feasible resettlement options, (PS 5, Section 16).• Ensure appropriate consultation including transparent standards for compensation:IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that a project consults with and facilitates the informedparticipation of affected persons and communities, including host communities, in decisionmaking processes related to resettlement – during implementation, monitoring, and evaluationof compensation payment and resettlement to achieve outcomes consistent with PerformanceStandard 5, (PS 5, Section 8 and 9).13

4.2 OVERVIEW OF CONSULTATION FOR MOTLHOTLO RESETTLEMENTGiven the complexity of Topic 4: Effective Consultation, and InformPartiipation, ERM has presented this discussion in the followingformat:• an outline of the different consultation structures thatwere established for the purposes of the Motlhotloresettlement, including a discussion of their role and keychallenges faced; and• an overview of the key points at which consultation tookplace during the course of the resettlement process.Having discussed each of the above, the consultation processis then assessed against the IFC requirements outlined inSection 4.1. This is done in two parts:• firstly, an assessment against the IFC requirements thatrelate to when consultation should take place; and• secondly, an assessment against the IFC requirementsthat relate to how consultation should take place.4.2.1 Overview of Consultation StructuresEstablished for the Motlhotlo RelocationThis section will look at the establishment or emergence of thefollowing structures for consultation:• The Relocation Committees and S21s (this includes adiscussion of key problems associated with the S21s);• The Motlhotlo Development Committee (MDC);• The Motlhotlo Relocation Resistance Committee (MRRC);and• The Task Team.Establishment of Relocation Committees and Section 21CommitteesOverviewSoon after AP first approached the Kgoshigadi and her Council, theKgoshigadi requested that two Relocation Steering Committees(RSCs) be formed to deal with the relocation of the Mothlothovillage (refers to Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo). The local Indunas (Pukaand Sekhaolelo) issued a public notice inviting the community to ameeting in order to elect 10 people for Ga Sekhaolelo and 16 peoplefor Ga Puka. A community meeting was duly convened on the 24October 1998, and the above RSCs were formed. The main role ofthese committees was to negotiate with AP regarding the relocation,and to facilitate communication between the community and AP.The RSCs were described by the majority of community respondentsas having been democratically elected. Some did, however,question the integrity of the election process.Some community respondents reported that, soon after theestablishment of the RSCs, the Kgoshigadi suggested that theyappoint an attorney to advise them on the relocation process – thiswas advised on the basis that since AP had a large legal team, itwould be wise for the community to also seek legal advice. TheKgoshigadi reportedly recommended a lawyer but the communityrejected the suggestion in favour of Advocate Seth Nthai, who hadbeen working for Ga Pila, and furthermore, came recommended bythe Premier’s Office. Worth noting is that Adv. Nthai was reportedlyapproached by the community and not by AP. Given that thecommunity could not pay for Adv. Nthai’s services, it was agreedthat AP would do so, on a monthly retainer basis. This payment ofa retainer by AP, although initially approved by the community, hassince come to indicate (at least among resistance groups), a loyaltyto the interests of AP versus that of the community.At some point, the RSCs made a decision to add additional membersto its committees. From feedback received it would appear thatthese new members were younger people, intended to representthe youth who had come to feel marginalised from the decisionmakingand communication process relating to the resettlement.The effectiveness of this attempt is somewhat contested, with theMRRC arguing that the code of conduct of the RSC meant thatinformation about resettlement could only be provided throughofficial channels (i.e., the Committee Chair). As a result, the newmembers reportedly failed to bring the voice of the youth into thisstructure. In terms of final numbers, it would seem that there were21 members in each RSC. In 2003, these RSCs, under the guidanceof Adv. Nthai, became the S21 Committees (later registered as aS21 Company). The S21 Company was a not-for profit organisation,purposefully structured as a formal and legally recognised entitythrough which to manage the resettlement transaction andsub-lease agreement on behalf of the communities. As previouslymentioned, creating such an entity also allowed AP to recover VATon the land transaction.The S21 was intended to work as a consultative feedbackmechanism and to provide community leadership on all relocationmatters. AP reported that there were monthly project progressand technical meetings between the S21s and the ProfessionalTeam; bi-weekly meetings between the S21 and the communitylegal advisors; and weekly communication meetings with thecommunity (kgoro’s). The intention was that the issues raised by14

community members at the kgoro would then be taken back by theS21 members to the community legal advisors for clarification/reply.Where necessary, certain queries would then be forwarded to theProject Executive Committee (ExCo) for resolution.Information from the MTA suggests that the S21 membershipincluded representatives of the local municipality, ProvincialGovernment and the Traditional Authority (ex officio); however thiscontradicts evidence from these stakeholders themselves, a numberof whom claim that they were actively excluded (i.e., asked to leave)from the meeting arranged for the selection of the members of theS21s, which was held with the then RSCs and their lawyer, Adv. Nthai,in 2002. They argue that this selection process was thus not fair ortransparent, and suggested that by law, as custodians of the landin question, the DLA and other authority bodies should have beenparty to these discussions and decisions. They also commentedthat Municipality and other Government and NGO bodies shouldhave been closely involved in the process from the outset, incooperation with AP and the community legal advisors, in order toimprove governance in the setting up of the S21s. This reported lackof transparency with regards the formation of the S21s was raisedrepeatedly by external stakeholders as a critical stumbling block forthe Motlhotlo relocation process.Of particular concern is the fact that from evidence seen thereappear to be no formal constitutive documents for the S21 - a factthat was later confirmed by the community legal advisors. ERM didnot see any written memorandum and Articles of Association orformal terms of reference of the S21 during this review.Further to this, AP’s own internal lawyers have also stated that theyhave never seen a resolution which authorises the Motlhotlo S21sto act for the Motlhotlo communities; this is despite numerousrequests for copies thereof.A key criticism of the S21s (as with Ga Pila S21’s) raised bystakeholders during the review was that the lack of a formalgovernance structure meant a corresponding lack of accountabilityfrom the S21. The S21 model did not include a mechanism for there-election and change of the representatives. When the committeemembers had been formally selected, they were held responsiblefor managing the resettlement process through to completion. Thismeant that there was effectively no recourse in the event of the nonperformanceof members, or for the S21 model as a whole.It is reported however by AP that there have in fact been somechanges to the S21 membership since its establishment but nofurther details on how these took place were elaborated. AP’slawyers assert that the issue of election of directors/membersis governed by the Companies Act and the constitutivedocuments. The fact that people were not aware of their statutoryentitlements does not mean that election provisions were nonexistent.There is an overall lack of transparency around the governancestructure and internal workings of the S21 vehicle.According to the community legal advisors the argument fornot formalising the S21 structure in a Terms of Reference orMemorandum or Articles of Association, including a provision to reelectmembers was that: (a) the S21 model had worked successfullyat Ga Pila; and, (b) that it protected against constant changing ofmembers and associated renegotiation of agreements and processdelays.When the S21 was established it was agreed that AP would pay amonthly stipend to all S21 members. This was intended to cover theamount of time required to support and represent the community inthe relocation process.Resistant factions tabled that, while stipends started at about R300per month, by 2005 they were closer to R4,000 per month fornormal members and about R6,000 per month for executives. Somecommunity members claim that they were not made aware of theseincreases.Emergence of the Motlhotlo Development Committee(MDC)In 2006, a breakaway group formed: first the ‘concerned group’which became the Motlhotlo Development Committee (MDC). Theyformed largely around unhappiness with the existing communityrelocation leadership (the S21s) and certain perceived problemswith the relocation project and agreements. These concerns werereportedly raised by community members during the kgoros.The formation of the MDC has been observed by some externalobservers as an effort to challenge the ‘old order’, and ensure betterrepresentation of the needs and concerns of sections of the youthin the relocation process. Most of the MDC members were in theirtwenties, and were the children of the original Motlhotlo residents.This was the group who had felt excluded at the outset and hadstaged the erection of the additional structures after the first audit.During its establishment, the group requested the intervention andadvice of the Independent Electoral Commissions (IEC), followingwhich an election process was attended by the Municipality andPremier’s Office. Both community respondents and authoritystakeholders present reported the election of the MDC to be fair andrepresentative. The MDC was elected to consist of a ‘top six’ group ofexecutive committee members and an additional 14 members from15

oth Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo. The MDC has a formal constitutionand declares itself to be apolitical.According to the community legal advisors, the MDC approachedthem requesting an election of a new representative group toreplace the S21s. Due to the conditions of the sub-lease agreement(see Topic 2: Land Acquisition and Land Rights, Section 2.2.1), however,the MDC were unable to replace the S21s. They indicated that theirprimary function was ‘looking more closely and critically at the termsof the lease agreement’.The MDC were the key instigator in protests at the onset of thephysical resettlement (29 May 2007) which tried to block themove. The resulting incident led to police action and some allegedcommunity injuries.It was suggested by critics that AP did not do anything specific inresponse to the emergence of the MDC, and instead continued toengage with the S21s, via the community legal advisors. AP howeverreport meeting regularly with the MDC to hear their concerns. Thiswas partly through the meetings of the Task Team (see below). TheS21 remained in its central role, however.The community legal advisors also reported meeting on a numberof occasions with the resistance groups (MDC and MRRC) untilthey were directly instructed by these groups themselves to stopconsulting with them. Since receiving this instruction, no furtherinteraction with the resistance groups has been undertaken by thecommunity legal advisors.At the time of writing, the MDC continues to exist in opposition tothe S21 and continues to question the terms of the lease agreement.Its members apparently no longer meet regularly except as requiredaround specific issues or attending major meetings concerning theresettlement.Establishment of the Task TeamAccording to AP, in 2007 various external stakeholders intervenedin order to try and amicably resolve the issues raised by MDCand in response to the protest action of 29 May 2007. A TaskTeam was established by the Premier’s Office, including membersfrom a number of Provincial Government bodies and NGOs, aswell as community factions, including Municipal officials andcouncillors, Premier’s Office and National Council of Provinces.From the community, both the MDC and S21s agreed to establisha participating group of 10 members. It was decided that thecommunity Task Team members would receive stipends, on thesame basis as the S21 members prior to this. It was stated asa common objective (of both the S21 and the MDC), that therelocation should proceed for the benefit of the community.AP has stated that the Task Team was set up specifically to provide aformal and ‘legitimate’ structure to deal with the general grievancesand concerns being raised by stakeholders in relation to theresettlement process itself. Minutes of the first meeting show that itwas agreed that:(a) the Task Team should continue for the remainder ofthe relocation process as the entity which represents thecommunity on relocation issues;(b) that it should address both short term and long termissues;(c) that it should be bolstered by external stakeholders whowould be able to mediate between the community factions;(d) that the S21s should not be disbanded;(e) that the Task Team should provide a date for therelocation process to recommence given the needs of thecommunity; and (f ) that the Task Team would need to be disbanded oncerelocation was complete. Thereafter a different postrelocationstructure was to be constituted.From interviews held, it was agreed that the Task Team cameinto being at the behest of the Premier’s Office, in response tocommunity members blockading the physical resettlement processin June 2007. Its self-appointed mandate was to: (a) ‘calm thesituation’ and resolve the grievances of the community stakeholdersaffected by the resettlement at Motlhotlo; and (b) to facilitate theongoing resettlement consultation process by acting as a mediatorbetween the different community factions and AP. Box 4.1 providesan outline of the short and long term objectives of the Task Team.The Task Team was , however, quickly plagued by problems. Inparticular, ongoing conflict between the S21 and MDC members ofthe Task Team over leadership and stipend jealousies (S21 membersfelt their role was being usurped), which resulted in S21 membersboycotting meetings and calling for the Task Team to be disbanded.Later, the availability of the Government and NGO representativesto attend the meetings reportedly dwindled, with a number ofmeetings only being attended AP Project Management, and theS21 and MDC members. These meetings became unmanageablewithout external parties to act as mediators.16

BOX 4.1SHORT AND LONG TERMOBJECTIVES OF THE TASK TEAMShort Term Objectives• Grave compensation and process explanation.• Ploughing field compensation and process explanation.• Blasting compensation and process explanation.• Crack remediation.• Legal representatives.• Legal agreements – provision and explanation.• Incomplete structure compensation.• Jv agreement with construction contractor.• Construction and relocation sequence and programme.• Snagging process and green file / building plan queries.• Process of achieving financial compensation.• Land for land / areas.Long Term Objectives• Settling-in allowance.• Village infrastructure.• Shares / equity in Mine.AP felt that the Task Team did not ‘step up’ to its role and failed,after the first few meetings, to meet regularly and quickly becameineffective as a consultative body/grievance managementmechanism.Other stakeholders confirmed that there were a number ofchallenges faced by the Task Team in fulfilling its purpose. Forexternal and internal observers these included:• the lack of a clear Terms of Reference (TOR) - a draft TOR wasdrawn up by AP for the Task Team, but was never formallyagreed upon and tended to shift;• linked to the above, an apparent lack of commitmentamongst Task Team members to the mandate of the TaskTeam, resulting in inconsistent attendance at meetings anddwindling motivation;• conflicting opinions on the key issues for attentionbetween the Task Team members themselves (some feltthe focus of its TOR should be specific to the issues relatingto the Motlhotlo relocation process, while others wishedto shift the agenda to the wider mineral rights debateand to addressing concerns relating to the economicempowerment of mining communities in South Africa); and• a tendency of the representatives of the respectivecommunity factions to change their minds on subjectsalready discussed and agreed upon in previous meetings,making it difficult to progress on certain issues.There also seemed to be a perception amongst Task Team membersthat AP was being unresponsive to its recommendations. TheTask Team was intended to feed back regularly to AP and makerecommendations, but this did not become an established practice.AP reported that the Task Team did result in some significant positiveoutcomes including: for a period of time, improved communicationbetween S21 and broader community (especially MDC); theexplanation and resolution of a number of short term issues(compensation for graves, settling in allowance); explanation andresolution of longer term issues (e.g., providing clarity to all partieson the relocation agreements which led ultimately to AP concedingto the establishment of the post-relocation Community Trust[addendums to the Legal Agreements]); and finally, it allowed for thecontinuation of relocations and dissipation of some conflict.The Task Team effectively dissolved during the last quarter of 2007.The Emergence of the Motlhotlo Relocation ResistanceCommitteeFollowing the MDC’s involvement in the Task Team, and associatedreceipt of stipends for their services, other community members(original members of ‘concerned group’) accused the MDC of having‘sold out’ and felt it no longer represented the community. Thisresulted in internal splits within the MDC and the formation of afurther resistance group, the MRRC. The MRRC represents many ofthose resistant households that remain in the old Motlhotlo todayand are challenging the terms of the relocation agreement.Beyond the 2007 dissolution of the Premier’s Task Team, there wereother attempts by external stakeholders to take up the mantel ofproviding an external mechanism for consultation and resolution ofcommunity concerns, namely a Working Group for the re-election ofthe S21s.Working Group for the Re-election of the S21In early 2009 a Working Group or further higher level Task Team, ledthis time by the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), was alsoestablished. This was made up of key Government stakeholdersto try to address complaints and concerns and resolve the conflictbetween S21 and MDC by facilitating the establishment of analternative structure to the S21s.17

At the time of writing this report, this Working Group had metmost recently in April 2009, prior to the General Election, but hadnot made significant progress. The next meeting had not yet beenscheduled. The distraction of the national elections was cited as themain reason for this. Despite repeated attempts between March andMay 2009, ERM has been unable to secure further meetings with thecurrent Head of this Working Group.4.2.2 Consultation Timing and DurationThis section looks at consultation activities undertaken at a numberof stages in the process including:• consultation during the EIA;• consultation and participation in site selection process;• consultation and participation during the household audit/inventory of assets and construction phase; and• consultation with host communities.Consultation, as it relates to the grievance mechanism, is discussedseparately in Topic 5: Compensation.Consultation During the EIA ProcessThe early disclosure process relating to the EIA for the Motlhotlorelocation took place in two parts: during the Scoping Phase, andassociated public participation process (which started in September2002); and during the subsequent Social Impact Assessment (SIA)process, which took place towards the end of that same year.The public participation process during Scoping provided more than270 stakeholders with the opportunity to participate. A list of thestakeholder groups that were involved is provided in Box 4.2.BOX 4.2 STAKEHOLDER GROUPSINVOLVED IN SCOPING• National, provincial and local Government• Agriculture, including local landowners• Industry and mining in the area• Commerce and business• Environmental bodies, both as authorities and NGOs• Labour unions and the unemployed• Community representatives, Tribal Authority, CBOs,development bodies in the immediate vicinity• Local groupings in the vicinity, including church groups,women’s groups, youth groups, schools, voluntaryassociations, and others• Health, both as authorities and local health services• Media• TourismAccording to the Scoping Report (2002), several small groupmeetings were arranged with representatives of the Ga Puka and GaSekhaolelo communities, as well as with local councillors, and theRSCs representing the two communities. Although the stakeholdersconsulted appear to be sufficiently representative, concerns existregarding the opportunities that were given to comment on theDraft Scoping Report in order to verify the concerns raised. Giventhe high levels of illiteracy in the study area, it would seem thatthe opportunities provided (i.e., placing of the Scoping Report inthe library or emailing it to key stakeholders), did not facilitate theparticipation of all groups, or leaned too heavily in favour of thosethat were literate and/or had the funds available to get to keylocations in Mokopane (e.g., Mokopane Public Library).18

During the SIA, a total of 12 focus group meetings were held, sixwith each community. The focus groups consisted of:• Youth below 20 (both genders);• Adults 21 –50 (both genders);• Relocation Steering Committee members;• Professionals (such as teachers, nurses, other Governmentemployees);• Pensioners (both genders); and• People from the respective host communities at Armoedeand Rooibokfontein.The above list would seem to present a diverse range of interestgroups within the respective communities, as well as the inclusion ofvulnerable groups (i.e. youth, women, and pensioners).Concerns, however, exist regarding the start date of the EIA for theresettlement (September 2002), and the timing of people’s decisionto relocate (October 2002). Given that the EIA had only just startedat the time the resolution to relocate was signed, the EIA was unableto play a key role in raising awareness about the potential impact ofresettlement and thus informing people’s decision whether or not toagree to the relocation.It could be argued that the EIA had a role to play in identifying theimpacts of the relocation, which could in turn be fed into the RAPand its implementation. However, as discussed in Topic 9 (Section9.2.1), the RAP was never completed or used as an action plan toinform the resettlement process.Consultation During Site SelectionThe summary below (regarding consultation during site selection)has been taken from the draft RAP (2004), and added to from inputreceived from interviewees. This version of events tends to beagreed upon by all stakeholders interviewed on this topic, includingcommunity respondents.AP commenced with the consideration of alternative host sitesin 1997. Based on discussions at that time with the affectedcommunities and the MTA, AP acquired five farms that wereconsidered to be suitable as potential host sites. The farms wereBlinkwater (244KR), De Hoogedoorns (233KR), Sterkwater (229KR),Groenfontein (227KR) and Mooihoek (226KR). (See Annex A: Maps ofRelocation Area).Considerable discussion between AP, the communities, the MTAand relevant Government authorities ensued, as well as a formal sitevisit at which the communities were provided with the opportunityto see and experience each of the properties. As part of theselection process, the community members were bussed to theidentified farms and then provided feedback through the relocationcommittee to AP about which farms each community wanted.From these discussions and site visit, a signed agreementbetween the MTA and AP was concluded for Groenfontein andDe Hoogedoorns as an acceptable host site. The communitiessubsequently became disenchanted with the agreed host siteand showed an interest in the farms Armoede (823 LR) andRooibokfontein (821 LR) – this seems to be primarily based on theirhistorical connection with the farms, following forced removals bythe Apartheid Government in the 1940s. AP was not comfortable,however, with the selection of Armoede due to water scarcity.According to AP, extensive efforts were made to warn people aboutthe problems with their selected site, including sharing the results ofland and water quality assessments that had been carried out. Thiswas not successful in persuading the community otherwise andeventually AP proceeded according to the community’s preferencefor Armoede and Rooibokfontein.The Government also played a role in the final decision sinceArmoede and Rooibokfontein were owned by the Governmentunder the jurisdiction of the DLA. As AP had no control over theseproperties, the DLA became the key player in the allocation of thehost site. It was ultimately agreed by the DLA that Armoede andRooibokfontein would be allocated to the affected communitiesfor the establishment of their new townships, together with theallocation of portions 8 (Bultongfontein) and 9 (Rietfontein).Consultation and Participation during the Household Auditand Construction PhaseAs already discussed in Topic 3 Identifying Affected People, AssessingEligibility and a Cut-off Date, significant effort was made by AP andthe PM Team to ensure that people were consulted during thehousehold audit, during the process of explaining compensationand during household construction. It was hoped that this processwould help to manage expectations and avoid dissatisfaction aftercompletion, as had been experienced at Ga Pila. These consultationactivities are summarised below.Household auditDuring the household audit, consultation was carried out by the‘Operational Team’ comprised of 14 locally recruited assistants whoserole it was to facilitate understanding of the audit process and the19

esults thereof. The explanation of the audit process and associatedresults were done on a one-to-one basis with the respectiveresidents (See Topic 3: Identifying Affected People, Assessing Eligibilityand a Cut-0ff Date, Section 3.2.2 for further detail on the householdaudit).AP facilitated a six day training course for the Operational Team inorder to enable them to present and clearly explain the individualhousing packages offered. This took place in September 2003.Formulation and explanation of compensationAccording to AP, the 32 host community households were providedwith new RDP houses (in addition to their existing homes whichremained). This compensation was based upon the findings of directconsultation with these households and the Municipality aroundwhat would be appropriate as compensation. AP pointed out thatthese households were not affected by the resettlement in thesame way as the relocating community, and that they enjoyed theadditional benefits of the amenities and infrastructure of the newvillages.Consultation regarding compensation appears to have taken placein three ways.• Firstly, through the mock-ups (1 ) built by AP to helpcommunicate the types of household fixtures due tohomeowners – this was dependent on what their originalhouse contained. This consultation was facilitated by theOperational Team and carried out in groups, dependingon the mock-up that applied to the affected resident.• Secondly, through ‘compensation meetings’ held betweenAP and the community that took place at Motlhotlo on 17May 2005 and 10 July 2005. The resolution reached wasthat each household would be compensated R20,000,over and above the replacement of their homesteads.• Thirdly, through one-to-one explanation and discussion ofa resident’s particular household plan by a member of theOperational Team. This entailed explaining how the resultsof the audit translated into each specific household plan.Consultation during constructionThere was a systematic inspection and consultation process duringthe construction phase, with home owners encouraged andfacilitated in closely monitoring progress during construction. Thiswas done through the arranging of transport for home owners(organised by the PM Team), thus enabling them to inspect theirnew houses in relation to the plans at three points: at foundationlevel, at window level, and when the houses were completed.The architects and Operational Team took the lead in the aboveconsultation, excluding the resolution of grievances that arose. Thiswas the role of the Project Managers (see Topic 5: Compensation).Both the Project Management Team and construction contractoridentified illiteracy as one of the major obstacles in the translationof the results of the household audits into house plans, andsubsequently managing expectations around how these in turntranslated into built physical structures.In the opinion of the construction contractor, the misunderstandingsand unmet expectations could perhaps have been avoided withbetter community education prior to starting the audit, and by theuse of community relations/communications specialists in roles thatwere being filled by non-social specialists, (i.e., architects, engineers,quantity surveyors, local residents etc). Feedback received fromthe construction contractor was that the Operational Team andthe Community Relations Team struggled to translate the technicalinformation relevant to the audit and compensation process into aform understandable to the community residents.Given the widespread illiteracy and low levels of education inthese communities, ERM are of the opinion that a more systematicpre-education programme for the Operational Team, theCommunity Relations Team, and the community should have beenconsidered, facilitated by the required social specialists (see Topic 9:Implementation Planning and Ensuring Institutional Capacity).4.3 SUMMARY FINDINGSAND ANALYSIS4.3.1 Analysis of Consultation Structures andtheir EffectivenessThis analysis is carried out against the following IFC PerformanceStandards requirements:1 ‘Mock-ups’ refers to the temporary structures (not full houses) built by APto demonstrate the range of household fixtures that homeowners wereentitled to. These fixtures include light fittings, types of window panes,door style etc.• Consultation to be based on prior disclosure of relevant andadequate information, thus enabling informed participationand consent (PS 1, Section 20, 21 and 22; PS 5, Objectives; PS5, Section 8 and 9); and20

• Consultation to be inclusive and culturally appropriate, andto include disadvantaged or vulnerable groups, and hostcommunities (PS 1, Section 21; PS 5, Section 8 and 9).Consultation to be Based on Prior Disclosure of Relevantand Adequate Information, thus Enabling InformedParticipation and ConsentThe benefits of the consultative and participatory approach adoptedby AP were undermined by the fact that the main vehicle usedfor communication (i.e., the S21) was not sufficiently appropriateor effective in ensuring adequate disclosure of information to themajority of community residents they were elected to represent.The reasons for this would appear to be the S21s’ weak performanceas an accountable, consultative body, linked in part to an apparentlack of necessary skills for fulfilling its role amongst its members.• Weak performance as consultative body: In spite of theS21’s intended role as a feedback mechanism, the model hasbeen widely criticised for creating a structure which failedto serve as an accountable, consultative and transparentcommunication mechanism. Some community membersexpressed suspicion towards the S21’s, suggesting it disallowedthe voicing of community dissent at the kgoros. Others fearedthat the S21s had been making agreements with AP and thecommunity legal advisors on behalf of the community, butwithout their consent and support. This was made worseby the concern that the S21s did not always make availablerecords of meetings held between the S21 and AP. As a result,people (in particular, sectors of the youth) felt as if the S21members were hiding information from them.In defence of these accusations, the S21s reported tryinghard to do a difficult job. They felt that many communitymeetings were held, after which they did communicatethe community’s responses to AP. Members of the S21srecalled regular meetings on Saturdays and Sundays, as wellas ad hoc ‘emergency’ meetings. Registers were offeredby Ga Sekhaolelo S21s as evidence that the majority in thecommunity took part in these meetings.In spite of this defence, conversations held with communityrespondents, the community legal advisors and theconstruction contractors indicate that the S21’s did not alwaysreport back effectively to the community and that this wasa key factor in their loss of authority and community trust,and the resulting splits that emerged. The community legaladvisors argue that they heard these concerns and urgedthe S21s on a number of occasions to make sure they werereporting fully and accurately back to communities, but thatsuch efforts were unsuccessful.• Lack of required skills for role amongst S21 members: Theproblems with performance of the S21 mechanism mentionedabove is partially explained by a suggested lack of requiredtechnical skills for the role among the S21 members (1 ) (lowrates of literacy amongst the S21 membership) to fulfil theirrole as a feedback mechanism to the communities. Commentsreceived (from the construction contractor and members ofthe PM Team) imply that the S21 members were not alwaysable to grasp the technical nature of the resettlement process(e.g., audits, compensation, house plans) and were perhaps notalways able to adequately relay/communicate this informationto the community, or negotiate effectively on its behalf.In 2003, AP, in response to concerns regarding a lack ofrequired skills and/or weak performance amongst the S21s,provided communication training to the S21s in order to buildtheir capacity to fulfil their role in the resettlement process.The training covered the following areas: meeting procedures,definition of responsibilities, and recording of meeting notes.Neither this training nor the effect of these measures wascommented on by any of the respondents.The fact that no provision was made for the re-election of the S21meant that the community’s unhappiness at the performance ofthe S21s could not be addressed. Community members were thuslocked into being represented by a structure which many perceivedto have failed in terms of ensuring access to information amongstcommunity members.These failings appear to have fuelled mistrust towards the S21s,aggravated by the lack of transparency and good governance intheir establishment, and dissatisfaction about the monthly stipendspaid to the S21s, in spite of weak performance. Several factions inthe community felt strongly that the S21s were co-opted throughthe payment of stipends and, as a result of being paid by AP, wereunable to act objectively. AP identified the problems associatedwith the payment of stipends as a key learning from the Motlhotlorelocation process, and given the option, should be avoided infuture projects. In their opinion, in a context of high unemploymentand poverty, the payment of stipends resulted in jealousies andwrangles for power, and was a key factor in the breakdown of theeffectiveness of the S21 structure. The community legal advisors,however, suggest that stipends are the only way to ensure acommunity representative structure is incentivised to undertakesuch a time consuming and relatively difficult job on behalf of thesponsor. To not pay them or expect them to work for nothing wouldrisk being exploitative.1 As suggested by the construction contractor, members of the PM Team,and recorded in the draft RAP (2004).21

All evidence clearly suggests that the S21s were, or quickly becameperceived as an ineffective structure through which to consult thecommunities on the resettlement. Given the degree to which thechosen structure was failing as a representative forum and feedbackmechanism, AP had a responsibility (as the Project Sponsor) to seekto address this - if not by changing the S21 itself, then by workingwith the community to identify alternative mechanisms to addressthe needs of those who had become unsatisfied. There appearto have been repeated inabilities or delays by AP to manage thisissue, and the associated risks to the Project and progress of theresettlement. The outcome of this was that, in spite of the lengthsthat AP went to, particularly during consultation for the householdaudit and construction process, the consultation process did not, onbalance, allow for adequate disclosure of information to the majorityof community residents.Consultation to be Inclusive and Culturally Appropriate,and to Include Disadvantaged or Vulnerable Groups, andHost CommunitiesGenerational divisions and power inequalities in the Motlhotlocommunity, and the initially weaker voice of youth, meant that insome cases the younger people may have come to feel excludedfrom the formal consultation process from the outset. The splitsand factions at Motlhotlo have formed clearly around a generationaland sometimes educational divide. The differing needs of dissidentor disenfranchised groups (some of which formed factions such asthe MDC and MRRC) has not been well addressed through use ofa single S21 mechanism for consultation whose membership wasoften older and linked to the traditional leadership.Some community members argued that structures of traditionalauthority have been increasingly questioned and some sayundermined by a strong minority of younger community memberswhose resistance to AP has strengthened and gained momentumas they have obtained increasing access to information, education,resources and external support. This has empowered them againstAP and the older established hierarchies.It could also be argued that these kinds of social changes arenot necessarily specific to this community, or directly a result ofthe presence of AP or the Mine. Instead, they are part of a widershift taking place in rural communities in an evolving, globalisingdemocratic South Africa.Notwithstanding the above, specific vulnerabilities and inequalitiesdo not appear to have been identified or addressed early by APin order to manage potential risks associated with splits in thecommunity. The result of this may have been to exacerbate alreadyentrenched divisions (i.e., between the youth and their elders), whichsome argue has fuelled an undermining of the social structures andfabric of these communities.There was also a failure by AP to identify and address risks of lowliteracy rates affecting communication processes with communities.This resulted in unclear messages and unmanaged expectations.The capacity, skills and education gap in communities seems tohave been a significant limitation or delay factor in the effectivenessof AP’s consultation efforts, particularly during the audits, theconstruction process and in creating transparent standards forcompensation. There was a weakness on AP’s part in planningan adequate and culturally appropriate education and capacitybuilding programme for communities to lay the foundations for theresettlement consultation process. Lessons learned from Ga Pilacould have been more systematically applied in this regard.Related to this was a failure by AP to actively identify andaccommodate the needs of potentially vulnerable households inconsultation processes, or to address their concerns individuallyin order to build direct, trust-based relationships with them. Thisappears to have been particularly true of the groups resisting themove who seem to have been largely neglected from the timethat they decided not to relocate. The outcome of not engagingthem regularly outside of the formal consultation mechanism hasbeen to alienate them even further and exacerbate their feelingsof resentment towards AP. Using community legal advisors asgo-betweens may have been a critical mistake in this regard as itappeared, from the perspective of resisting households, to indicatean abdication of responsibility on AP’s part.A criticism heard regularly during the study from the majorityof stakeholder groups related to AP’s perceived lack of directaccountability with regards to the management of the resettlementprocess. In the eyes of critics, AP consistently failed and continuesrepeatedly to fail to meet the community in person, choosing toconduct consultation through its agents, contractors and throughthe community legal advisors.This detached approached was attributed by some to poorcommunity relations management, worsened by a lack of adedicated in-house communications specialist focusing on thisproject, and overall weak coordination and alignment between AP’scorporate community relations agenda and activities at operation’slevel.AP, when questioned on this, felt strongly that this criticism isunjustified and gave numerous examples of engagements wheresenior AP management have been present at the request of22

communities, and even examples of meetings where membersof community factions have walked out on meetings or refusedto engage those present, claiming they were not senior enough.AP felt that often efforts made to improve relationships throughdirect engagement and presence of those in senior positions, wererepeatedly rejected.Regardless of this, communities still reported what they perceivedas ‘arms length approach’ to engaging them by AP, and as a resultis that AP has become, for many, a faceless entity. This perception,based apparently in a fundamental breakdown in trust, has severelyweakened AP’s relationship and long term social licence to operatein these communities.Consultation with host communitiesAccording to the draft RAP (2004), a sample socio-economic surveyand focus group discussions were conducted in the host community(i.e., the original residents of Armoede and Rooibokfontein) as partof the Socio-Economic Impact Assessment (2002). The assessmentnotes, however, that the data gathered only provides an indicationof the population structures and community characteristics, andthat a detailed audit on this community would still need to beconducted prior to project implementation as part of the overallRAP. In support of this, the RAP identifies as a key gap, the need tocarry out a detailed consultation and participation programme withthe host community. According to AP, a programme for integrationwas implemented, but no details were provided.Although the host community have been accommodated withinthe new settlements, it would seem that no targeted consultationtook place with the host community, apart from initial consultationduring the EIA process.4.3.2 Analysis of Consultation Timing andDurationThis analysis is carried out against the following IFC PerformanceStandard requirements:• consultation to begin early in the EIA process (PS 1, Section21);• consultation should focus on social and environmental risksand adverse impacts, and proposed measures to addressthem (PS 1, Section 20, 21 and 22);• consultation to be iterative and to be carried out on an ongoingbasis (PS 1, Section 21; PS 5, Section 8 and 9);• communities to be included in consultation oncompensation payment (PS 5, Section 8 and 9);• displaced people to be offered a choice of new host site (PS5, Section 16); and• views of the affected community to be incorporated intodecisions which affect their lives (PS 1, Section 22; PS 5,Section 8 and 9).Consultation to Begin Early in the EIA ProcessThe early disclosure process relating to the EIA appears to havebeen well executed. It has been noted that the approach adoptedwas sufficiently inclusive of a broad range of stakeholders, includingvulnerable groups (youth, women, elderly and illiterate) and thehost community. Opportunities to comment on the Scoping Report(2002) may have been weighted too heavily in the favour of literatestakeholders and those that had the money to get to the locationswhere the report was available for review.Consultation Should Focus on Social and EnvironmentalRisks/Impacts, and Management MeasuresThe methodology described for the EIA indicates that consultationon the likely impacts of resettlement did take place. What is lesscertain, however, is how well these impacts were understood.During the resettlement review, comments from respondentsseemed to indicate a lack of understanding about the full magnitudeof what it meant to relocate, particularly at the time when thedecision was taken to relocate (see Topic 2: Land Acquisition and LandRights, Section 2.2.1).Whilst management measures are included in the Socio-EconomicImpact Assessment (2002), it is uncertain whether stakeholders23

were provided with opportunities to participate in their formulation.Discussions with AP reveal that consideration of impacts was not akey focus of the resettlement planning process, but rather that thesewere ‘managed as they arose’. This would suggest that consultationon impacts and their management, particularly as part of the initialformulation of the draft RAP, is likely to have been weak.In any event, the failure of the S21s to be an effective consultationmechanism is likely to have undermined any attempts at involvinglocal community members in consultation in a participatoryapproach to impact management. This of course, will not have beenhelped by the fact that the draft RAP was never completed. Hadit been completed, and to IFC standards, consultation on impactmanagement would have been inherent.Consultation to be Iterative and to be Carried Out on anOn-Going BasisAs is evident in Topic 4: Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation, Section 4.2.2, AP have put significant effort intoconsulting at key points in the Motlhotlo relocation (e.g., at siteselection, audit, inspection during construction). They have beensignificantly less successful however in ensuring opportunities foron-going consultation as evidenced by the current breakdown oftrust and communication. This shortcoming is rooted in the failureof the S21 mechanism, which was the selected forum for on-goingdialogue with AP. Whilst AP cannot necessarily be blamed for theshort-comings of the S21s, AP did not fulfil its responsibility (asProject Sponsors) of either assisting in remedying or creating viablealternatives for on-going consultation.Communities to be Included in Consultation onCompensation PaymentAs already discussed within this Topic, AP did carry out consultationon compensation payment. However, in spite of the efforts madeby AP, concerns remain regarding the extent to which people fullyunderstood the audit and associated compensation process. This iscertainly reflected in the frequently heard claim among communityrespondents that “they didn’t know what they were signing” (inreference to the ‘green files’). More serious allegations were madeto suggest that that AP exploited the illiterate and those less welleducated community members by not adequately explaining thecompensation process, but these could not be substantiated uponfurther questioning. Regardless of unhappiness about the processfrom some stakeholders it cannot be disputed that extensiveefforts were made by AP, working within the particular constraintsof high rates of illiteracy in the affected communities. Significantimprovements were also achieved in comparison with consultationon compensation which was undertaken at Ga Pila.Members of the resistant community strongly argued that therehad not, however, been sufficient consultation on compensation,either with the community or the Government (both DME and thePremier’s Office, where the latter is perceived as a champion forthe rights of this community). It was also noted that there was notransparency in the compensation process and that their concernsaround inadequate compensation were not given voice.Displaced People to be Offered a Choice of New Host SiteThere is clear evidence to support the argument that the siteselection process in particular was community driven, in the factthat the communities themselves ultimately chose a site (Armoede)choosing to ignore the advice of AP about the potential watershortages there. The communities confirmed they selected thesite, but suggest that they were not given a broad range of options.Some respondents felt they would like to have seen several moreand significantly different options being proposed, for example, theoption to be resettled in Mokopane. Others suggested that theyhad to resettle at Armoede and Rooibokfontein because it is whatthe majority selected, not because it is what they personally wanted.Views of the Affected Community to be Incorporated intoDecisions which Affect their LivesTypically, the EIA and RAP process are designed and implementedto provide the forum for affected parties to participate in thedecision-making process. At Motlhotlo, however the specificimpacts identified in the EIA consultation process were not carriedthrough in a systematic way to inform the entitlements andcompensation framework, or on-going monitoring measures (seeTopic 9: Implementation Planning and Institutional Capacity , Section9.2.1). This was then compounded by the fact that a RAP was nevercompleted as a management plan, and the S21 mechanism didnot function well (by most accounts) as a conduit for informationbetween the community and AP. In addition, it should be notedthat the resistant community in particular felt that their views werenot sufficiently considered during decision making. Specifically, theywere concerned that, while there were instances where they wereconsulted on options, they were not involved in setting the agendaof topics around which they were to be engaged.The above evidence suggests that overall the Motlhotlo consultationdid not successfully incorporate the views of the affectedcommunity into the decision making process. However, this is not tosay that attempts were not made by AP to do so and in some areasof the process such as site selection, views were more effectivelyaccounted for than in others.24

4.3.3 Consultation and Resistant CommunitiesNo measures have been put in place to ensure adequate andsystematic consultation with those that continue to live in the oldMotlhotlo village. This lack of continued engagement with thisgroup has exacerbated and perpetuated certain of their issues.4.4 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in Table 4.1Table 4.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIt should also be recognised, however, that when attempts havebeen made to engage this community, they have often notwelcomed AP staff into the community. While this communityclaims to desire further engagement, they only want to meet withsufficiently senior members of the Anglo Group and only on theirown terms.IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC PerformanceStandard RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 1, Section20, 21 & 22; PS5, Objectives;PS 5, Section8 & 9PS 1, Section21; PS 5,Section 8 & 9PS 1, Section 21PS 1, Section20, 21 & 22Consultation to be basedon prior disclosure ofrelevant and adequateinformation, thusenabling informedparticipation andconsent.Consultation to beinclusive and culturallyappropriate, and toinclude disadvantaged orvulnerable groups, andhost communities.Consultation to beginearly in the EIA process.Consultation shouldfocus on social andenvironmental risks andadverse impacts, andproposed measures toaddress them.PartialalignmentNonalignmentAlignmentNonalignmentS21s not effective in ensuring adequate disclosure of information tothe majority of community residents. Whilst AP cannot necessarilybe blamed for the short-comings of the S21s, AP failed (as projectsponsors) at either assisting in remedying or creating viable alternativesfor on-going consultation.S21s membership too heavily dominated by older generation, whofailed to represent needs of wider community, especially the youth.Failure by AP to identify and address risks of low literacy rates affectingcommunication process with communities.Inadequate specific focus on vulnerable groups and host community inthe resettlement process.On the whole, the early disclosure process relating to the EIA appears tohave been well executed.Methodology described for the EIA indicates that consultation onlikely impacts of resettlement did take place. However, discussionswith AP reveal that consideration of impacts was not a key focus of theresettlement planning process; rather, these were ‘managed as theyarose’.Failure of S21s as an effective consultation mechanism underminedany attempts at involving community consultation in a participatoryapproach to impact management.PS 1, Section21; PS 5,Section 8 & 9PS 5, Section8 & 9PS 5, Section 16Consultation to beiterative and to becarried out on an ongoingbasis.Communities to beincluded in consultationon compensationpayment. .Displaced people to beoffered a choice of newhost site.PartialalignmentPartialalignmentAlignmentAP has put significant effort into consulting iteratively and at key pointsin the Motlhotlo relocation. They have been less successful, however, inensuring opportunities for on-going consultation in a post resettlementcontext.AP did carry out consultation on compensation measures. Concernsremain, however, regarding the extent to which people fullyunderstood audit and associated compensation process.Evidence that the site selection process was fully community driven isreflected in fact that communities chose a site (Armoede) which wentagainst the advice of AP.PS 1, Section22; PS 5,Section 8 & 9Views of the affectedcommunity to beincorporated intodecisions which affecttheir lives.NonalignmentOverall, due to weaknesses in the system and failure to address these,the Motlhotlo consultation did not sufficiently incorporate views ofaffected people into the decision making process. The exception to thiswould be site selection.25

TOPIC 55 Compensation5.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Provide resettlement options, including adequate replacement housing or cashcompensation where appropriate: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that displaced personsshould be provided with choices among feasible resettlement options, including adequatereplacement housing or cash compensation where appropriate, (PS 5, Section 16).• Provide replacement property of equal or higher value: In the case of physically displacedpersons, the project will offer the choice of replacement property of equal or higher value,equivalent or better characteristics and advantages of location, or cash compensation at fullreplacement value where appropriate, (PS 5, Section 17).• Preference for land based compensation/ replacement: IFC Performance Standard 5 statesthat where livelihoods or displaced persons are land based, or where land is collectively owned, theclient will offer land based compensation, where feasible, (PS 5, Section 8).• Provide compensation for all lost assets at full replacement cost: In accordance withIFC Performance Standard 5, a project needs to offer displaced persons and communitiescompensation for loss of assets at full replacement cost, (PS 5, Section 8).• Provide compensation for assets other than land: Where displaced persons own and occupystructures, the project will compensate them for assets other than land, such as dwellings and otherimprovements to the land, at full replacement cost, provided that these people occupy the landprior to the cut-off date, (PS 5, Section 18).• Compensation costs to be paid in lieu of cash compensation where feasible, (PS 5, Section 18).• Compensate for loss of commercial structures or provide replacement property, of equalor greater value: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that the project compensates the affectedbusiness owner for the cost of re-establishing commercial activities elsewhere, for lost net incomeduring the period of transition, and for the costs of the transfer and reinstallation of the plant,machinery or other equipment, (PS 5, Section 20).• Compensation to be supplied prior to resettlement: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires thatalternative housing and/or cash compensation will be made available prior to relocation, (PS 5,Section 16).5.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSISMuch of the evidence from interviews suggests that in general the compensation process was handledfairly and transparently at Motlhotlo. As might be expected there were exceptions or cases where assetswere not all fully recorded, or omissions made, but these seem to have been addressed via the grievancemechanism described in Topic 4: Effective Consultation and Informed Participation. There are also anumber of informants who were simply unhappy with the compensation amount offered.Resistant factions argued that compensation amounts should be derived from a proportional calculationbased on the expected profits of the mine expansion which caused the resettlement, rather thanon the findings of the household audit. It was requested that AP should disclose these figures to thecommunities and their community legal advisors, so that an appropriate figure can be calculated. There is27

an expectation in many of the resistant households, but also fromsome of those who did not resist, that the terms of relocation berenegotiated. Demands as of November 2009 (from the MRRC),were for “equitable benefits accruing to Anglo Platinum from theirmining operations on community’s land”. An amount of 26 percentwas mentioned.Some community respondents requested that this benefit share bepaid on a monthly basis, backdated to the first point of handoverof land and associated mining activities. Whilst this share in profitsisn’t directly linked to compensation for resettlement, it is clear thatthis demand/ expectation has significantly shaped the relationshipbetween AP and the affected communities. This includes both theresettled and resistant communities.For the majority who did move, reports indicate a largely compliantprocess. Replacement household structures appear, across theboard, to have been of equal or higher value to what was livedin prior to the relocation – although there are concerns aroundresidents’ ability to maintain the houses in the long term. (This isdiscussed in more detail in Topic 8: Improve/ Restore Living Conditions).A comprehensive auditing process was undertaken to ensure all lostassets were measured and compensated at full replacement costincluding assets other than land such as trees, crops and externalstructures (see Topic 3:Identifying people, assessing eligibility andestablishing a cut-off date, Section 3). The standards for compensationwere made transparent during this process, although there werecases of misunderstanding, communication challenges and unmetexpectations, which resulted in people being unhappy with whatthey received. According to the Project Management Team, this wasnot helped by frequent claims by some of the S21 leadership that APhad promised them ‘that they’d get whatever they wanted’. It wouldseem that this was a misinterpretation, unconscious or otherwise, ofa statement made by Tony Trahar (ex-CEO for Anglo American) at a1998/99 community meeting, that the communities ‘would be leftbetter off than before resettlement’ (as per IFC requirements).Compensation was provided within the following broadcategories:• individual homesteads;• commercial structures;• grave relocations;• communal crop and grazing land; and• village infrastructure and services.These are outlined in more detail below.5.2.1 Individual Homesteads and CommercialStructuresIndividual homesteads received the following compensation:• replacement of homestead structure;• cash payment for non-structural items within the yard; and• a R20,000 ‘upset’ allowance or settling-in allowance.Included in the compensation packages is provision for thefollowing:• unfinished structures;• miscellaneous structures, such as chicken coops and car ports;• loss of fruit and shade trees;• vegetable and flower gardens; and• equipment, such as boreholes, tank stands and animal troughs.As already discussed in Section 2.2.3, on average, the new housingprovided appears to reflect a significant improvement on thestructures people occupied in the old Motlhotlo, both in terms ofthe quality of the structure and fixtures, and in terms of total floorspace (all floor areas were rounded up to the next 5m 2 ). It shouldbe noted that those who are resisting resettlement contest thisassessment. Annex D: Photolog provides a useful comparison ofthe old versus new structures. Annex E: Design Criteria provides anoutline of the design criteria that were approved for the replacementhouses. A total of 42 different house designs were provided,depending on the size of one’s original structure. The smallest housewas 30m 2 , provided in response to the additional structures put upby a group of youth.Some complaints were received regarding the replacementstructures, but these were logged and are reportedly beingaddressed (where relevant) as part of the grievance mechanism forcompensation and household defects (see Topic 5: Compensation).Complaints which were more difficult to address, were those relatingto the way in which new houses were designed and allocated.According to community respondents, it was agreed with AP thatthe replacement houses should all be a ‘one level improvement’on their original homes (see Annex D: Photolog). Complaints were,however, made that the criteria for determining these upgradeswere inconsistent. For example, some made claims that a shack withelectricity might have been replaced by a 50m 2 home, whereas abetter quality home with no electricity may have been replacedwith a 30m 2 home. This was considered inconsistent with the notionof proportional benefits. This issue was especially contentious andcaused disputes. These complaints seemed to be in the minority28

however and may be linked more to the challenges for AP ofcommunicating ‘proportional benefits’ and less about inconsistentcompensation on AP’s part.Cash received for compensation was paid directly into bankaccounts. In terms of the inconvenience allowance, payment wasmade in two tranches comprising R12, 000 just after the move, andR8, 000 three months later. According to AP, this was intended as‘cash flow assistance’ because these were relatively large amounts ofmoney, and the logistics of paying a large number of people lumpsums of R20,000 upfront were reportedly too complex.The fact that compensation amounts were not fully paid prior topeople moving does not adhere to the principles of IFC PerformanceStandard 5. Furthermore, an initial approach saw the secondpayment to be offered only once everyone had moved. Thisapproach has been heavily criticised by external observers such asSouth African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and Action Aidwho claim this amounted to bribery. This practice was stopped andthe second payment was made to each household three monthsafter the move.Where relevant, commercial structures were compensated orreplacement property provided of equal or greater value.It is worth noting that those that have not moved, have not claimedtheir compensation. This amounts to residents of 64 houses awaitingoccupation in Ga Puka, and three in Ga Sekhaolelo.5.2.2 Grave RelocationThere were reportedly about 2, 500 graves associated with the twosettlements. Since there were ‘no strict legal guidelines’ on graverelocation, an agreement was made between AP and the next-ofkinto pay R1, 500 per family grave. AP understood this to allowthem to bypass the usual cultural protocols for grave relocation, andavoid significant time delays. In addition, all costs (exhumation, newcoffins, reburial, transport of family, and so on) were paid by AP, andtwo new cemeteries were developed at Project cost. All reburialswere undertaken by official funeral undertakers, appointed by AP.)5.2.3 Agricultural LandFinancial CompensationIn 2002, physical audits were undertaken by professional auditors,in consultation with the Motlhotlo Minerals Committee ( 1 ) andthe affected communities, to identify and record the extentof developed or utilised agricultural land on the Overysel andZwartfontein farms. Two categories of assets were considered:• Crops growing within each homestead; and• Maize fields growing immediately outside the villages andhomesteads. These were fields allocated to some homeownersby the Induna of each village.The crops growing within each homestead were reportedlymeasured and valued by a specialist valuator in order to ensure thatthe full compensation could be paid for at the time of relocation.The maize fields that were growing immediately outside andadjacent to the village were measured by way of aerial photographyand plans from the Department of Agriculture and EnvironmentalConservation. The Government records reportedly showed thatthere were some 324ha of maize fields under cultivation (168haat Ga Sekhaelelo and 156ha at Ga Puka). According to AP, an aerialphotograph of the same area confirmed that there were some 238distinct cultivated fields covering just over 300ha. An agreementwas made between AP and the community that compensationwould be paid for the loss of these fields during actual relocation,and that new fields of similar size would be prepared on the newresettlement farms of Armoede and Rooibokfontein, with all costsbeing borne by AP. The compensation amount for these fields wasR2, 544 per hectare, as advised by a professional valuator. All claimsthat were made by homeowners were verified by the Indunas andMinerals Committee.There is, however, a point of contestation around whether or not APasked the community to stop ploughing their fields in 2002 – andif so, why compensation was not provided from 2002 onwards -remembering that compensation was paid for fields affected bythe 2007 relocation, and not before that. Discussions with AP anda community legal representative (for the resistant community)imply that discontent on this issue go back to the initial 1993 leaseagreements for Overysel and Zwaartfontein, as agreed between1 A Minerals Committee was established by the Mine (versus the Project),with representatives from seven surrounding villages, each of which wererecognised to be affected by the mining operations in some way. ThisCommittee, comprised of approximately 20 people, were paid a stipendfor their services, and were represented by Advocate Seth Nthai andInstructing Attorney Bhadrish Daya. The Motlhotlo Minerals Committeewas comprised of those representatives that sat on the wider MineralsCommittee for all seven villages.29

Kgoshigadi Langa and AP. For reasons not understood by ERM, thelease agreement never stipulated compensation as a condition ofthe lease.Following its signing, the Kgoshigadi herself reportedly requestedthat residents stop using the farm land. This request was reportedlynot heeded. In 2001, the Kgoshigadi repeated this request, afterwhich a handful of residents did stop farming. According to AP,a scrutiny of aerial photos show that following the conclusionof the communities’ resolution to relocate in 2002, many of thehomeowners themselves decided to stop farming maize on thesefields – although this was apparently not a stipulation by AP. In 2007,AP fenced off the farming area, thus forcing the remaining farmersto cease their farming activities on the communal lands. Accordingto AP, this is the first time that they actively restricted residents fromusing the communal farming areas.It is clear, however, that: (a) compensation was only provided forthe loss of communal farming activities after the fencing off of themining area in 2007; and (b) that those who ignored the Kgoshigadi’scall to cease farming (in 1993 and again in 2001) benefited from thefinancial compensation measures that AP provided for all 2007 cropson communal land.In terms of the asset audit of agricultural activities on land outside ofthe village, AP noted the following weakness:• The asset audits that were done did not include establishinga detailed record of which homeowners were allocated whatsize fields. Thus, when it came to compensating and replacingthe fields at the new resettlement farms, the Project had to relyon the claims of individual homeowners. To verify these claimsthe Project Team had to rely on the records and recollectionof the Indunas and the Minerals Committee, who signed offon the claims. At the end of September 2008, some 799 claimshad been made by Homeowners for some 938ha – more thandouble what had been under cultivation at the old villages(342 ha) at peak in 2002.AP’s explanation for this discrepancy is that: (a) either people weremaking claims for fields that might have been timeshared; or (b)that the overall increase in hectares was the result of opportunismand/or illegitimate claims. Without accurate records, AP were notin a position to refute any claims that they saw to be illegitimate.ERM is not in a position to comment on the validity of any so-called“illegitimate claims”.Replacement of the Maize FieldsBesides financially compensating maize field owners for loss ofproduction during the relocation process, the Project also undertookto establish and hand over to the community new replacementmaize fields on the farms of Armoede and Rooibokfontein. Theprocess of establishing and handing over these new maize fieldsinvolved the following steps:• Identification of suitable farming lands;• Development of new maize fields; and• Allocation of numbered plots to homeowners.Each of these steps is described in more detail below.• Identification of suitable farming lands: At the end of2006 and start of 2007, the S21s from both communities, andthe Maize Committees (1 ) , met AP and indicated where theywould like to have replacement fields prepared on Armoedeand Rooibokfontein. According to AP, the Ga Sekhaoleloleadership pointed out approximately 200ha on Armoede,whilst at Rooibokfontein the Ga Puka leadership pointed outapproximately 100ha.• An assessment of the suitability of this land was carried outby a specialist consultant to determine which areas had thebest agricultural characteristics and viability for maize fieldcultivation. This work was completed between July andOctober 2007. The viable area measured a total of 10, 000ha.Of this amount, the Project undertook to cultivate 700ha(350ha per village). This was more than double what had beenunder cultivation at the Old Motlhotlo village at peak in 2002(342ha).• Development of new maize fields: In September 2007, theProject put out a tender for farming services to prepare andcultivate the planned 700ha of new maize fields. The tenderwas awarded and included the following scope of work: (a) siteclearance; (b) ripping and disc ploughing; (c) ploughing andfertilisation; (d) planting of maize; and (e) demarcation of landinto numbered plots (see Annex D: Photolog).According to AP, the intention was that the new maize fieldswould be developed and handed over before the end ofthe summer farming season in 2007/2008. Unfortunately, anumber of difficulties seem to have been encountered, andas a result, the work was only completed during February2009 (i.e. the following summer farming season of 2008/2009).These difficulties are summarised in Box 5.1.1 The Maize Committee was comprised of people that were involved inmaize farming outside of their homestead. They assisted the S21s inidentifying suitable farming land on the new site. They were not paid astipend for their role in this.30

BOX 5.1DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTEREDDURING DEVELOPMENT OFMAIZE FIELDSDifficulties encountered during site clearance:• According to AP, there was an under-estimation bythe contractor of the challenges associated with thethickness and resilience of the prevailing vegetation(particularly Sickle Bush), as well as the groundconditions which became impassable in some areaswhen wet, due to thick heavy clay conditions. Thisrequired the contractor to use quite heavy duty farmingand earth-moving mechanical equipment in order tomake reasonable progress in this activity. Even so, thecontractor fell well behind the original. Rubber tiredvehicles, including tractors, also reportedly experiencedan inordinate and totally unexpected number ofpunctures from the Sickel Bush stems – in the regionof some 100 punctures had to be repaired. Full siteclearance of the total 700ha was thus only completedmid 2008 (versus March 2008).Difficulties encountered during planting of maize:• In terms of planting method, the contractor adopted a“spread” rather than “row” method of planting the maizeseeds. The spread method, which is used on largecommercial farms in some areas, involves spraying theseeds onto the prepared ground from behind a tractorwhich drags a row of tyres behind it in order to cover orbed the seeds in the ground.• The row method of planting, which the Ga Sekhaoleloand Ga Puka community were familiar with, involvesseeding the maize whilst turning the soil with ploughsaligned in rows behind the tractor. The reason thecontractor adopted the spread method was reportedlybecause the lands were not sufficiently level in allareas for effective row ploughing using his equipment.Unevenness in the ground meant the row plough oftenturned the soil in some areas whilst others not.• Many in the community were not happy with theunfamiliar spread method of planting and suspectedthat the seeds would not be sufficiently well bedded.This concern was raised by the Project Managers withthe contractor who then undertook to replant any areaswhere the specified density of maize did not germinate.This was done, and by February-2009 substantial areas,where planting had not been sufficiently successful,were replanted using the row method.Allocation of cultivated plots to homeowners: After the maizeseeding was complete, the prepared and planted maize fields werethen divided up into approximately 1,200 numbered plots, peggedand numbered. Each plot was approximately 5,000m 2 in area.Following several consultations towards the end of 2008 with thevarious community structures (including S21s, MDC and MineralsCommittee), it was reportedly agreed that every homeowner wouldbe assigned one of the numbered 5,000m 2 fields. This was regardlessof whether or not they had had fields previously. Followingassignment of the fields, each homeowner was expected to takefull responsibility for its upkeep in terms of weeding, preventingcattle grazing, guarding, and ultimately harvesting. The maize fieldallocation process started in November 2008, and was carried outby the Project Managers. According to AP, a number of substantialobstacles were met during this process (see Box 5.2).During the Christmas break (16 Dec 2008 to 09 January 2009)those fields that were not yet allocated were guarded by 20 localsemployed from the community. Their job was to prevent cattlegrazing on the germinating or young maize plants. According toAP, in many instances these guards were not effective, and in someinstances they were reportedly threatened by livestock owners.During ad hoc visits to the site during this period, the Project andcontractor management found that livestock was being allowed tograze the young maize plants.The net effect of the above obstacles was that the Project Managerswere only able to achieve some 91 formal handovers by March2009. Further efforts were deemed fruitless given the extent of theobstacles, and the handover process was terminated by AP.During discussions with community residents regarding the maizefields, one is met with a variety of interpretations on this topic – allof which are underpinned by a general dissatisfaction on the issue.Some say that the fields were prepared, but not using appropriatetechnologies and techniques; others say they were not prepared atall; and still others make claims about AP ‘stealing the top-soil’ fromthe fields and using it to build the houses. Regardless of the validity,or not, of these claims, it is clear that in spite of AP’s apparent effortsto prepare the land for cultivation, that any such measures have beensignificantly undermined by:• A lack of trust between AP and the community (where effortsto use suitable ploughing methods to improve yield are metwith distrust);• The influence that poverty and lack of long term economicprospects is likely to have on community need and demand forimproved compensation; and• The legacy (and associated inadequacies) of the 1993 leaseagreement which made no provision for compensation for lossof agricultural land.31

BOX 5.2OBSTACLES EXPERIENCED DURING THE LAND ALLOCATION PROCESS• Demand for financial compensation rather than replacement: According to AP, a collective action was instigated by factionswithin the community to refuse hand-over of the maize fields, in favour of on-going, in perpetuity financial compensation for loss oftheir original fields.• Disinterest in farming beyond homestead: Many of the homeowners have never farmed beyond the extent of their fencedyard – this is supported by the findings of the Socio-Economic Assessment Report (2004) and Department of Agriculture andEnvironmental Conservation. Sustained efforts on ploughing land outside of the homestead are thus unlikely in terms of existingpreferences.• Unhappiness over method of maize planting: The dissatisfaction regarding the “spread” rather than “row” method of plantingthe maize seeds (see Box 5.1) remained a key point of concern, and some homeowners (number unknown) refused hand-over of thefields on this basis.• Border dispute between Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaelelo: The 700ha of cultivated land was not evenly split between the twocommunities, with significantly more on Rooibokfontein (Ga Puka). This was due to availability of suitable land. As a solution, APallocated some of the Ga Puka land to Ga Sekhaelelo (in particular, an area of land that borders both villages). Unfortunately, thissolution was met with resistance from Ga Puka, and was reportedly used as a reason for blockading the field allocation process.• Grazing, lack of tending and harvesting of maize by illegitimate parties: Many of the cultivated fields that were not yetallocated were grazed by livestock (in spite of locals employed to oversee the fields). During the on-going contestation regardinghand-over, the fields were not tended by the associated homeowners, causing fields to be invaded by grasses and shrubs, andsuffocating out the young maize plants. As a result, the state of the fields invariably deteriorated. In some cases, this was reportedlyused as a further argument to refuse handover.• Removal of field boundary pegs: In order to demarcate and identify the individual fields, the contractor pegged the corners ofthe fields and posted a number on each. According to AP, many of these pegs were removed by unknown people, in some instancesrepeatedly, before the fields could be allocated.• Community leadership discouraging hand-over of fields: According to AP, the community leadership actively discouragedhomeowners from taking hand-over of the fields, on the basis that the allocated fields were not suitable and therefore should notbe accepted. During ERM’sdiscussions with community residents, some community respondents recalled resistant youth groupspressuring others and preventing people from using the prepared land.Attempts to seemingly sabotage AP’s efforts to hand-over thecultivated fields need to be understood within this context.5.2.4 Grazing LandGrievances were also raised by community respondents aboutinadequate replacement of grazing land within the newsettlements. In response to concerns raised, AP donated anadditional two farms for grazing purposes at Mooihoek andDehoogedorings. Table 5.1 below provides a summary of the totalreplacement land received by Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo, with thegrazing land included.Whilst the size of the actual host sites for the new townships isfairly similar to the old Motlhotlo, the additional farms provided forgrazing significantly increase the total area of land now available toeach community.However, in spite of the increased hectarage, the distance ofthese farms from Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo (75-95 km away) areconsidered by many within the community to be too far away to beuseful (see Annex A: Regional Overview Map). The offer of the grazingland was thus not accepted as a reasonable compensation.It was also argued by community respondents that simply handingover this land, without capacity building and skill enhancement inagriculture, would not enable community members to use the landproductively or to its full potential.32

Complaints were also raised by traditional healers, who noted thatthey had lost access to certain plants and trees that they needed formedicinal purposes. Apparently these trees were on the land thatAP took possession of and not within access of the host site. AP hasreported that as part of one-on-one agreements medicinal plantswere compensated or where requested or possible were relocated.Table 5.1 Total Amount of Replacement LandFarm NameGa PukaOriginal FarmSize (ha)Replacement LandSize (ha)Zwartfontein 1, 729 ha -Rooibookfontein - 1, 876 haDe Hoogedoorns - 2, 400Total 1, 729 ha 4, 276 haGa SekhaoleloOverysel 1, 851 ha -Armoede - 1, 915Mooihoek - 2, 611Total 1, 851 ha 4, 526 ha5.2.5 Village Infrastructure and ServicesAP made specific provision for water supply, sanitation (Enviro-Loos), electrification of homesteads and installation of streetlighting, formalised roads system, waste removal, and provision ofreplacement schools and clinic, as well as nurses’ accommodation.This is discussed and AP’s performance evaluated in detail in Topic 7:Improve/restore Living Conditions and Livelihoods and Address PostresettlementDevelopment Needs.5.2.6 Concluding RemarkIn discussion with AP on whether the compensation measureswere successful or not, it is clear that they feel very strongly that thequality of the houses, and the total amount of land handed over tothe community, more than adequately satisfies the IFC requirementto leave a relocated community better off than they were beforeresettlement. Whilst this does appear true based on the physicalevidence (i.e., significantly improved housing, improved communityservices and infrastructure, and a larger total land area), thesemeasures do not account for or address the potential emotional,cultural or psycho-social impacts of the resettlement. These are theintangible, qualitative social effects of displacement which stemfrom the upheaval associated with the loss of land, home and senseof place and community, as well as the long term damage to socialcohesion through conflict and divisions which occurred.The issue is therefore not just about the quality/size of thereplacement structures and services, and the compensationamounts provided, but equally about whether or not the full extentof the community’s loss was truly appreciated and respected. Wherethe resettlement process has allegedly undermined the communityfabric and traditional structures, or where the emotional impacts ofresettlement have been difficult to bear, this appears never to havebeen openly acknowledged and addressed by AP.In spite of efforts made around consultation, the ultimate failureof established structures to provide a mouthpiece for suchconcerns and grievances meant that many people were denied anopportunity to voice and address the deeper, more emotional andpsycho-social impacts of resettlement. Solutions for these impactsaren’t easy to come by, but at a basic level, they start with lines ofopen communication and trusting relationships, both between andwithin communities, and between AP and the affected residents.33

5.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 5.2 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance Standard RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section16Provide resettlement options, includingadequate replacement housing or cashcompensation where appropriate.Alignment -PS 5, Section17Provide replacement property of equal orhigher value.Alignment -PS 5, Section8Where livelihoods are land-based, preferenceto be given for land based compensation/replacement, where feasible.Alignment -PS 5, Section8Provide compensation for all lost assets atfull replacement cost.Partial alignmentIn spite of significant effort made by AP regardingthe cultivated fields (outside of the homestead),the final outcome did not see full replacementof these fields. This was not due to lack of efforton AP’s part, but rather due to the breakdownin trust between AP and affected residents; thelegacy of the 1993 lease agreement (no provisionfor compensation for loss of agricultural land);and the influence that poverty and lack of longterm economic prospects is likely to have oncommunity need and demand for improvedcompensation.PS 5, Section18PS 5, Section18PS 5, Section20Provide compensation for assets other thanlandCompensation costs to be paid in lieu ofcash compensation where feasible.Compensate for loss of commercialstructures or provide replacement property,or equal or greater value.Alignment -Alignment -Alignment -PS 5, Section16Compensation to be supplied prior toresettlementNon- alignmentCompensation amounts were not fully paid priorto people being moved, and agricultural fieldswere not ready prior to resettlement taking place.34

TOPIC 66 Managing Grievances6.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES:• Develop grievance mechanism: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that a projectestablishes a grievance mechanism to receive and address specific concerns aboutcompensation and relocation that are raised by displaced persons or members of hostcommunities, including a recourse mechanism designed to resolve disputes in an impartialmanner. The grievance mechanism should be linked to the environmental and social impactassessment processes, as outlined in IFC Performance Standard 1, the purpose of which is to‘establish and maintain a constructive relationship with affected communities over the life ofthe project’, (PS 5, Section 10).• IFC Performance Standard 1 spells out the requirements for a grievance mechanism in moredetail, namely: The grievance mechanism should be scaled to the risks and adverse impactsof the project. It should address concerns promptly, using an understandable and transparentprocess that is culturally appropriate and readily accessible to all segments of the affectedcommunities, and at no cost and without retribution. The mechanism should not impede accessto judicial or administrative remedies. The client will inform the affected communities about themechanism in the course of its community engagement process, (PS 1, Section 23).6.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSISSection 6.2.1 below provides an overview of the mechanisms put in place for handling grievancesassociated with the relocation. The effectiveness and implementation of these mechanisms are thenassessed in Section 6.2.2 according to the requirements of IFC Performance Standard 5, Section 10 and IFCPerformance Standard 1, Section 23.6.2.1 Establish a Grievance Mechanism to Receive and Address ConcernsThere appear to be three main mechanisms for the handling of grievances associated with the Motlhotlorelocation:• The S21s;• The homeowner queries and defects procedure relating to compensation and household defects;and• The appointment of Community Liaison Offers (CLOs) from within the community.These are described in more detail below:Section 21 Committees (S21s)The S21s were intended to serve as the main formal mechanism for receiving and feeding back generalcommunity grievances relating to the relocation. The plan was for the community to register theirconcerns with the S21s during the weekly communication meetings (kgoros). The concerns raised would35

then be taken up by the committee members, and forwarded tothe community legal advisors, the construction contractor and, theProject Management Team, for resolution.Tabling of these concerns by the S21s was intended to take placeduring the bi-weekly meetings with the community legal advisorsand AP Project Management Team, and during monthly projectprogress and technical meetings with the AP Project ManagementTeam. Where issues and grievances were forwarded by the S21s,these would then be recorded by the Project Management Teamand responded to / acted upon within practical timeframes. Whereissues remained unresolved to the dissatisfaction of the S21s, theS21s were then required to discuss these same issues with their legaladvisors, who in turn would then raise the issue/s at the Project Excomeetings. Final decisions were then taken by the Exco. Feedback toS21s from Exco was provided by the legal advisors and/or ProjectManagers at their meetings.The effectiveness of these procedures is, however, contested – seeSection 6.2.2 for further detail.Homeowner Queries and Defects Procedure Relating toCompensation and Household DefectsThe key components of the grievance procedure relating tocompensation and household defects included:• An extensive process developed for registration of homeownerqueries and household defects. During the implementationphase, homeowners were able to review the project’sprogress and raise any issues or ‘queries’ that they may haverelating to the deliverables which had been agreed in theone-on-one agreements. E.g., they may question size orlayout of the house, the standard of finishes, or the level ofcompensation. During the relocation phase, homeownerswere also given the opportunity to identify any patent or latentconstruction defects in their houses. The Project ManagementTeam recorded all these homeowner queries or defects oninspection forms, and or on the green file cover, and capturedthem in a master spreadsheet (‘Query Database’). These werethen investigated and responded to as appropriate.• As discussed in detail in Topic 3: Identifying Affected People,Assessing Eligibility and Establishing a Cut-Off Date and Topic4: Effective Consultation and Informed Participation, as part ofthis process a number of opportunities were provided to allhousehold owners:- To physically inspect their houses at foundations level,during construction as well as just prior to taking handoverand to lodge any queries or complaints with the OperationalTeam.- To submit compensation related complaints on Fridays,at the Project Office. Community members could bringtheir concerns directly to the assistant Project Managers,who would then record the complaints, and resolvethem immediately, where possible. Initially transport wasprovided for those wanting to log grievances, but this hadbeen discontinued at the time of writing.During the building process there was an office on the constructionsite staffed by an architect from AP. He would accept grievancesrelating to households defects in writing and/or deal withthem immediately, where possible or pass them to the ProjectManagement Team for resolutionAccording to AP, most grievances could be dealt with by the ProjectManagers and assistant Project Managers (see Topic 9, Box 9.1 foran organogram of the Project Management Team). If grievancescould not be resolved, these were forwarded to the Project ExCo,who would then advise on how to proceed on a particular issue.The Project ExCo met every two weeks, and was made up of seniorrepresentatives from the AP, the two S21s (represented by their legalrepresentatives), and two ex-officio project managers.Community Liaison OfficersThe community liaison officers (CLOs) played a key role in grievancemanagement. The CLOs, two from each community, were alsoappointed by the community and were employed to handle thehomeowner queries or grievances being lodged during the auditand household construction phase. They reportedly filled in formsfor each grievance and then lodged them at the Project Office.Grievances, once logged, were then forwarded to the assistantProject Managers, who would respond to the complainant, addressthe grievance, or forward it to the Project ExCo if not resolved as perthe process described above.From documentation reviewed, it would seem that the CLOs weresupported by a Community Liaison, Social Services and DisputeResolution Management Team. Two individuals (one from APand the other from Hararo PM) were tasked, amongst others,with resolving disputes where necessary. Little of the communitytestimony recalled such a dispute resolution function and if it existedit is uncertain how this function aligned with the other parallelprocesses for grievance redress.36

6.2.2 Effectiveness and Implementation of theGrievance MechanismCommunities to be Informed about the GrievanceMechanism and an Understandable Process to be UsedEvidence suggests that the communities were informed of,and knowledgeable about, the grievance mechanisms in place.According to AP, the process was communicated to communitiesvia the S21s. Discussions with community respondents did notreveal any confusion about the nature and structure of the grievancemechanism itself – instead, comments pointed to dissatisfactionwith the actual implementation of the grievance mechanism,particularly as it related to the role of the S21s in this process.Grievance Mechanism to be Readily AccessibleGrievance procedure relating to homeowner queries,defects and compensationThe mechanism for the resolution of grievances and complaintsrelating to homeowner queries and households defects andcompensation packages appears to have been well designed andlargely effective. From the large numbers of queries being handled(AP report an average of 6.5 queries per day at one stage) it appearsto have been widely used by the relocated residents, thus indicatinga mechanism that was suitably accessible for the intended users (seeBox 6.1).BOX 6.1 ANALYSIS OF GA PUKAGRIEVANCE• Of the approximately 2,400 issues/ grievances registeredby Ga Puka residents with the Project (by end November2009):• approximately 1, 700 were snag defects (and thus theconstruction contractor’s responsibility);• approximately 332 were variations (i.e. falling short ofrequired like-for-like compensation);• approximately 170 were declined (i.e. not consideredvalid);• with the balance being either ‘under investigation’ ordeclined).It is contested by a number of those interviewed as to whether allgrievances lodged were responded to; however, AP can providedocumentary evidence of responses in the form of the QueryDatabase. The database records the homeowner queries anddefects lodged with the Operations Team and Project Office duringand after the construction phase and during the relocation phase. Itshows a clear and effective process for resolution of complaints.S21s as the grievance mechanism for general grievancesThe grievance mechanism for general community grievancesand those about the broader resettlement process itself, in theform of the S21s, seems to have been much less effective and itsappropriateness is widely questioned. At the heart of the problemis the fact that the S21 structure was intended to act in a dual role asboth a consultation mechanism and a grievance mechanism. Theywere thus both the active implementers of the resettlement process(in their capacity as representatives of the community), while alsoserving as the mechanism through which this implementationcould be criticised (where the S21 were frequently the main causeof community grievances). By being required to perform both roles,the effectiveness of the consultation process and the grievancemechanism as well as the integrity of the S21 were compromised.This also applies to the role of the community legal advisors, whorepresented the S21s and communicated grievances to AP (onbehalf of the S21s), but did not have the full support of the wholecommunity.This created a fatal flaw in the feedback loop because a sub-sectionof community members felt they had nowhere to complain aboutthe representative structure and mechanism for communicationthat they felt was failing them. As a result, many simply chose notto use it. Concerns about the S21s are discussed in detail in Topic 4:Effective Consultation and Informed Participation.When problems and grievances about the S21s were not properlyheard or addressed by AP, a self-perpetuating cycle was set inmotion: the S21s reportedly failed to feed back adequately tothe communities; their legitimacy as an accountable grievancemechanism was undermined in the eyes of the community; andcomplaints were no longer fed to AP via the S21s. The systemtherefore failed. As with the S21’s role as a consultative forum, a lackof suitable governance mechanisms (specifically inability to re-electthe S21 membership), and a breakdown in trust, was at the core ofthis problem. In spite of growing vocal concerns over the role of theS21 from increasing numbers in the community (illustrated by theemergence of the MDC), the failure of the S21 structure was neverproperly addressed (see Topic 4: Effective Consultation and InformedParticipation, Section 4.3.1). This constitutes an overall failure by APto monitor the effectiveness and appropriateness of its procedure forgrievance management.37

Grievance Mechanism to be Scaled to the Risks and AdverseImpacts of the ProjectANDGrievance Mechanism to Establish and Maintain aConstructive Relationship with Affected Communities overthe Life of the ProjectUntil recently, there has been very little evidence of attempts byAP to resolve the failure of the S21 in a decisive way. Even where achange of the S21 membership was not possible, AP could haveexplored the development of a parallel communication strategy oran independent dispute mechanism to try to overcome this (1) .Given the repeated concerns raised about the S21s, and consideringthe impacts that unresolved grievances have had on relationsbetween AP and the Motlhotlo residents (as well as amongMotlhotlo residents), the grievance mechanism was clearly notsuitably scaled (or revised) to manage the risks and impactsassociated with this project. As a result, the grievance mechanismwas not able to establish and maintain a constructive relationshipwith affected communities over the life of the project. This iswell illustrated by comments that, due to the inadequacy of thegrievance mechanism, those resisting felt that they had to protestto get AP’s attention. In the absence of an effective formal processthrough which their concerns are heard and addressed, protest andacrimony have become the inevitable tactics for many.AP has pointed out that as a result of divisions and protest thatarose at the start of the relocation process, external stakeholders didintervene and a Task Team was established as a form of grievancemechanism. The role of the Task Team was partly to focus onproblems/weaknesses of the S21s and the members of the TaskTeam were mandated to report back to the community. The TaskTeam was an external body, however, which was not established byAP but by Government stakeholders in response to ongoing conflictand unresolved grievances in the communities, and a recognisedlack of independent forum to mediate and manage these. Asdiscussed in detail in Section 4.2.1, the Task Team was also hinderedby a lack of clear TOR and lacked governance and accountabilitymechanisms of its own. The Task Team became quickly ineffectiveand was dissolved in late 2007. As such it can not be classified as anintegrated and effective mechanism developed by AP for the longterm management of community grievances.1 It should be noted that very recent efforts have seen a move to dissolvethe S21s, motivated on the basis that the Motlhotlo relocation is close tocompletion. However, attempts to re-elect an alternative representativebody have been unsuccessful.Grievance Mechanism to Address Concerns PromptlyNo time frame for resolution of different categories of grievance wasformally committed to by AP. The Project reportedly responded togrievances as fast as was practically possible.Grievance Mechanism to be TransparentFor specific grievances relating to compensation issues andhomeowner queries/ defects, the mechanism in place seems byand large to have been transparent, well understood and trusted.In the case of the S21s and management of general grievanceshowever, concerns that the S21 became a gatekeeper, withholdinginformation from AP and or community members, and in someinstances, vetoing which grievances were appropriate to takeforward, is indicative of a perceived lack of transparency andaccountability of the wider Project grievance mechanism. Regardlessof whether claims about the S21 are valid, the evidence points toa widespread loss of trust in the integrity and accountability of theprocess, which led many community members to stop using it.Include Recourse Mechanism Designed to Resolve Disputesin Impartial MannerNo adequate, independent mechanism was put in place for theimpartial management of disputes and conflict relating to theMotlhotlo relocation. In the draft RAP (2004), mention is madeof bringing in ‘external expertise’ but only in serious cases. Ideally,this would include external mediation, an ombudsman or anotherindependent process.In spite of the high level of conflict experienced as a result of therelocation, there are, however, no records of such a party beingproactively approached for assistance by AP. Instead, grievanceswhich were not easily addressed were referred to the ExCo forresolution. Given that the ExCo was comprised of parties who,in some instances, were at the heart of the concerns raised bycommunity members (e.g., the community legal advisors and APSenior Executives), this forum has not provided for the impartialmanagement of disputes required under the IFC PerformanceStandards.The Task Team is also cited by AP as evidence of an adequategrievance mechanism - in this case as providing an independentmechanism for dispute resolution. The Task Team’s membershipand intended function does partly lend itself to such a role. Someobservers have commented however that the participation ofProvincial Government and municipal officials in the Task Team doesnot allow for independence and impartiality and instead presenteda serious conflict of interest, because of their own involvement andresponsibilities in the Project with respect to the land lease and thehandover of infrastructure and services.38

This is considered a critical flaw in the Motlhotlo relocation. In theabsence of an independent mediation process established earlyin the process and communicated and accessible to all, somecommunity members chose protest as a vehicle for voicing theirconcerns, others joined resistance groups, and still others choserepresentation of external lawyers. It can be argued that all ofthese responses resulted from the basic failure of the grievancemechanism to adequately address community concerns about therelocation process.Be Accessible at No CostThe grievance mechanisms in place were free of charge and peoplewere free to use them – the issue at hand was that many feltprecluded from using the S21s as the primary agent through whichto lodge their grievances.Grievance Mechanism should not Impede Access to Judicial orAdministrative RemediesThe number of legal cases filed against AP during the relocation,some of which are still continuing, is sufficient demonstration thatthe grievance mechanisms made available by AP has in no wayaffected people’s ability or right to challenge the project on legal orother grounds.6.2.3 Managing Grievances and ResistantCommunitiesThere has not been a targeted and systematic grievance mechanismdesigned to hear, address and respond to the concerns of thosecommunity members who chose not to resettle. AP did, however,point out that all residents have the Project Manager’s number, andthat they call him when problems arise regarding school transportand water provision, both of which AP currently provide to theunresettled community.6.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 6.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance Standard RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)Ps1, Section 23Develop a grievance mechanism.:Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects..AlignmentS21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Partial alignmentAlthough S21 was intended as the official channel forgrievances in effect it never really fulfilled its purposesdue to the fact that many factions within the communitydid not trust it to feedback concerns. The S21 itself alsohad a conflict of interest in its multiple functions.PS 1, Section23Communities to be informed aboutthe grievance mechanism and anunderstandable process to be used:Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects.Alignment-S21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Partial alignmentThere appeared to be lack of clarity on where and howto submit grievances about the S21 as a grievancemechanism.39

IFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance Standard RequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism to be readilyaccessible and culturally appropriate:Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects.Alignment-S21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Non- alignmentThe failings of the S21s alienated many people from usingit as the formal grievance mechanism. This left manywithout recourse for addressing their concerns with therelocation process.PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism to be scaled tothe risks and adverse impacts of theproject.Non- alignmentFailure of AP to address the weakness of the S21 as agrievance mechanism, and the resultant poor communityrelations which ensued, is indicative of an inadequategrievance mechanism.PS 5, Section10Grievance mechanism to establish andmaintain a constructive relationshipwith affected communities over the lifeof the project.Non- alignmentThe breakdown in relations between AP and factionswithin Motlhotlo and the community in general pointto a failure of the grievance mechanism to adequatelymanage disputes and conflict.PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism to addressconcerns promptly:Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects.Alignment-S21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Partial alignmentNo eviene of a structured approach by AP tocategorising and prioritising issues or committing to atime scale for their resolution.PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism to betransparent:Grievance procedure relating tocompensation and householddefects.Alignment-S21s as the grievance mechanismfor general grievances.Non-alignmentEvidence points to lack of transparency andaccountability of S21s and of grievances being selectivelycommunicated to AP and vice versa which led to a lack oftrust in the mechanism.PS 5, Section10Grievance mechanism to includerecourse mechanism designed toresolve disputes in impartial manner.Non-alignmentNo independent mechanism was put in place for theimpartial management of disputes and conflict relatingto the Motlhotlo relocation. The Task Team was formedbut this was not initiated by AP, was rapidly dissolvedand not effective at resolving disputes. Governmentand Municipality Task Team members also hadpotential conflicts of interest which compromised theindependence of this mechanism.PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism to be accessibleat no cost and without retributionAlignment-PS 1, Section23Grievance mechanism shouldnot impede access to judicial oradministrative remedies.Alignment-40

TOPIC 77 Provide Relocation Assistance andTransition Support7.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES :• Provide relocation assistance to displaced persons: IFC Performance Standard 5 requiresthat relocation assistance should be suited to the needs of each group of displaced persons,with particular attention on the needs of the poor and vulnerable, (PS 5, Section 16).• Provide transition support for lost income and costs associated with reinstallation ofplant and equipment: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that the project compensates theaffected business owner for the cost of re-establishing commercial activities elsewhere, for lostnet income during the period of transition, and for the costs of the transfer and reinstallation ofthe plant, machinery or other equipment, (PS 5, Section 20).• Transition support should be provided for a reasonable period of time: IFC PerformanceStandard 5 requires that the transitional support be provided until such time as the affectedparties’ income-earning capacity, production levels, and standards of living have been restored,(PS 5, Section 20).7.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSISThe evidence indicates that relocation assistance was provided to communities, but that this was focusedpredominantly on the physical moving process itself. No provision was made for assessing and addressingthe need for targeted assistance to vulnerable groups during this process (e.g., providing the elderly withadditional assistance in packing up their belongings, and re-establishing themselves in their new homes).During the move, assistance was provided by the Project Managers and moving contractors. The ProjectRelocation Record (May 2007) provides a detailed plan for this including: the scope and anticipated timingof phased handover of houses; a profile of the key affected stakeholders; requirements, constraints andobligations in terms of the handover; an assessment of risks and a description of the envisaged processfor handover. It also provides some details on the relocation management structure, resources, roles andresponsibilities, dispute resolution processes, structures and resources, and a communication strategy.During the move, salvage teams arranged by AP assisted community members with salvaging valuableraw and recyclable materials such as corrugated iron from their properties. Financial transitional supportwas also given in the form of the settling-in allowance (R20, 000) given to each household.Some community respondents contested the extent to which AP can be credited for providing suchtransition support. This is based on the agreement that AP cover the capital costs of the resettlement(currently estimated at R800 million) in lieu of paying rent for the land. Under this arrangement, benefits tothe community are in terms of the construction of the new villages and associated homesteads, servicesand infrastructure. Contestation on this point thus relates to the fact that AP is perceived by some as usingrent money owed to fund the resettlement and associated ‘transition support’.Beyond the transition support described above there seems to have been no provision of targetedassistance and/or other forms of support to bridge the period between people moving from the old to thenew site. In fact, the need for any additional transitional support (until productive capacity was reinstated)was never assessed by AP.41

As mentioned in Topic 5: Compensation, AP provided agriculturalassistance through the preparation and sowing of seeds onagricultural land outside of the homestead. These efforts werehowever not taken up by community members, for a variety ofreasons - some of which AP can be considered responsible, andothers for which the community and its leaders are liable (see).Targeted assistance for businesses (i.e. other than physicallyrelocating the shops) was felt to be unnecessary because theshops were set up prior to the actual resettlement, and no furtherassistance was deemed necessary. Transition support for otherenterprises or forms of economic displacement was said to havebeen provided, but specific examples were not provided by AP.Benefits and supports have been provided to resistant communitiesto mitigate the impacts of lost access to facilities. Examples are theprovision of transport for children from the old Motlhotlo to schoolsin the new sites, and the provision of electricity in the old Motlhotlo.This might be considered as a kind of transitional support if thesehouseholds do eventually move to the new homes that have beenbuilt for them. The school transport service is, however, due to bediscontinued by year-end 2009.There was no evidence of specific support provided to vulnerablehouseholds, e.g., female headed households with dependents.As discussed in Topic 3: Identifying People, Assessing Eligibility andEstablishing a Cut-Off Date, different categories of affected peoplewere not identified. A detailed profiling and socio-economicassessment of pre-relocation livelihoods, looking at householdstructures, incomes and activities at the census stage, may haveinformed a more systematic approach to assessing the livelihoodsimpacts of the relocation. This in turn would have enabled AP tofocus on targeted assistance and transitional support for vulnerablehouseholds, or small businesses.7.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 7.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)PS 5, Section 16PS 5, Section 20PS 5, Section 20IFC Performance StandardRequirementProvide relocation assistance todisplaced persons, with particularattention on the needs of the poorand vulnerable.Provide transition support forlost income and costs associatedwith reinstallation of plant andequipment.Transition support shouldbe provided for a reasonableperiod of time, until the affectedparties’ income-earning capacity,production levels, and standards ofliving have been restored:Homesteads.Agricultural fields outside of thehomestead.PerformanceAssessmentPartialalignmentAlignment -PartialalignmentPartialalignment42Comments (if partial or non-alignment)AP delivered comprehensive support during the actualmove, but failed to assess the need for or provide targetedassistance to vulnerable groups.The settling-in allowance was paid as a once-off fixedamount to all households; the need for transitional supportuntil productive capacity was reinstated was not assessed byAP.In spite of significant effort made by AP regarding thecultivated fields (outside of the homestead), the finaloutcome did not see full replacement of these fields. Thiswas not due to lack of effort on AP’s part, but rather due tothe breakdown in trust between AP and affected residents;the legacy of the 1993 lease agreement (no provision forcompensation for loss of agricultural land); and the influencethat poverty and lack of long term economic prospects islikely to have on community need and demand for improvedcompensation.

TOPIC 88 Improve/restore living conditions andlivelihoods and address post-resettlementdevelopment needs8.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Improve living conditions: IFC Performance Standard 5 requires that living conditions at thenew resettlement site should be the same as or an improvement over conditions at the site fromwhich the displaced persons were resettled, (PS 5, Section 8).• Improve or at least restore livelihoods: When displacement cannot be avoided, the client willoffer displaced persons and communities compensation for loss of assets at full replacementcost and other assistance to help them improve or at least restore their standards of living orlivelihoods, (PS 5, Section 8).• Economically Displaced: For those that are economically displaced, a project is required toprovide additional targeted assistance and opportunities to improve or at least restore theincome-earning capacity, production levels, and standards of living to economically displacedpersons whose livelihoods or income levels are adversely affected, (PS 5, Section 20).• Identify development benefits: Under IFC Performance Standard 5, a Project should provideopportunities to displaced persons and communities to derive appropriate development benefitsfrom the project, (PS 5, Section 8).• Post-resettlement responsibilities: A resettlement will be considered complete when theadverse impacts of resettlement have been addressed in a manner that is consistent with theobjectives stated in the resettlement plan or framework, and with the objectives of PerformanceStandard 5(PS 5, Section 12).8.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS8.2.1 Improve Living ConditionsHomesteadsIn terms of meeting IFC requirements, the standards of the houses of the overwhelming majority ofresettled residents have been substantially improved, if compared with their old dwellings. Whilst thephotolog (Annex D) bears testimony to this improvement, this assessment is not shared by all thoseaffected, with a number of community respondents (relocated and resistant members) indicating apreference for their original homesteads. Some respondents noted, for example, that whilst the newhomesteads were indeed more modern, they weren’t necessarily of a better quality. Other commentsmade were that the character of the new settlement is felt to be inferior to that of the old Motlhotlo area.These matters are difficult to comment on since it is founded in differing notions of what is valuable. Asraised in Topic 5: Compensation (Section 5.2.6), these comments point to the fact that an improved structureis not in itself enough to counter the impacts associated with loss of land, home and sense of place andcommunity.43

While the standard of housing has arguably improved in general,many concerns have been expressed about minor and some moresignificant household defects, such as cracks, as well as the qualityof windows and other fixtures and fittings. Discussions with AP anda review of project documentation and grievance managementprocedures however showed that AP were actively responding toand managing these concerns. As an example, one respondentsuccessfully motivated that AP move him to a new home due to thewater-logged nature of his allocated property. Box 8.1 provides asummary of AP’s response on this issue.BOX 8.1 AP’S COMMENTS ONCONCERNS REGARDINGTHE “WET AREAS”• Concerns regarding the “wet areas” followed anextreme rainfall (second highest summer rainfall onRecord) coinciding with bulk earthwork activities, andresulting in large areas of the site becoming temporarilysaturated. Members of the community registeredcomplaints with the Project Management Team thatportions of the new villages were being constructedon “wet areas”. In response, some 22km of additionalsub-soil drains were installed and various meetingswere held with the community to explain that the wetareas would not represent a permanent problem oncedrainage had been completed. Eventually, early in2007, the Project realised that it would be impossible toconvince many of the Homeowners that the “wet areas”could be occupied, and some 145 stands (46 in GP and99 in GS) were relocated to new areas.• making sure that all home-owners have their buildingplans and ‘occupational certificates’ (these are issued by theMunicipality).At the time of finalising this report (December 2009), the ProjectManagement Team were actively working towards rectifying allvariations and defects by the 11 th December 2009. By 4 th December2009, 76 percent of all homeowners had received their occupationalcertificates. Those that were still to receive theirs (excluding theunresettled homesteads) were reportedly unavailable, in spite ofnumerous attempts made by AP. These individuals would be ableto get their certificates at the Project Office, the Mine or at theMunicipality.These efforts indicate that AP are actively addressing any defects,and are committed to improved homesteads amongst the resettledresidents. In fact, one could argue that the attention given toproviding quality homes has almost been to the detriment ofother aspects of the resettlement process, namely, restoration oflivelihoods and long term community development opportunities.It should be noted, however, that in the absence of suitablecommunity development initiatives and wage earning opportunities(considered a weakness of this resettlement process), local residentswill not be able to afford the upkeep of the replacement housesthat AP have provided, resulting in the inevitable deterioration ofthese homesteads. This is likely to cause on-going tension betweenthe two parties, as residents continue to blame AP for householddefects which typically occur in the life of any home, and for whichhomeowners themselves are responsible in the long term.At the time of writing this report, the Project Management Teamwere actively working towards ensuring that, where relevant, thesnag-lists on all houses are addressed; in fact, the resolution of thesesnags was a key condition of the closure of the contract with theconstruction contractor. Specific items that need to be attended toin this regard include (as per discussions with AP):• correction of any snags that may exist (to be addressed andpaid for by the construction contractor);• addressing any inaccuracies or ‘variations’ in the compensation(i.e., where the architectural assistants may have misinterpretedthe audit information and not provided ‘like for like’compensation) – in such instances, Anglo Platinum addressesthis variance (sometimes through financial compensation);• responding to complaints made by the home-owner, even ifthe request is perceived to be unwarranted; and44

While recognising issues related to the community’s ability to affordmaintenance, it is nevertheless concerning that complaints are madewhich show confusion about AP’s role in ongoing maintenanceof the homestead. One resident, for example, complained that abush had grown to such an extent that he was not able to accesshis driveway. This he felt was AP’s responsibility to deal with. Suchcomments indicate an expectation for AP to play an ongoingmaintenance role.It should be noted that some of the complaints raised about thequality of the houses related more to issues around compensationand proportional benefits, and pointed to a lack of understandingand/or agreement about who got what type of house. (For furtherdiscussion see Topic 6: Managing Grievances, Section 6.2.1.)Service ProvisionAP’s plans for improved service provision show an intention tosignificantly improve the quality and availability of services in GaPuka and Ga Sekhaolelo. The baseline of public services provision inthe old communities was very poor:• little to no formal road and stormwater infrastructure;• water was provided mainly to standpipes;• there was no municipal refuse removal, and• sanitation was by way of unlined pit latrines which were dugby the homeowner.Approximately 80% of the households were on a prepaid electricitysystem. Whilst municipal services were virtually non-existent, it did,however, mean that no-one had to pay for service provision.In contrast to pre-resettlement conditions, the Project has madespecific provision for water supply, sewerage (Enviro-Loos),electrification of homesteads and installation of street lighting,a formalised system of roads, waste removal, and provision ofreplacement schools and clinic, plus nurses’ accommodation.This intent to improve on pre-resettlement infrastructure andservices is captured within the Services Agreement agreed uponand signed by the S21s, the Mayor and the Municipal Manager(April 2004), whereby the S21s committed to provide for the initialinstallation of services for the new settlements (with AP as financier),after which the Municipality will be responsible for the actualprovision of services. Box 8.2 lists some relevant clauses in this regard.IBOX 8.2CLAUSES IN THESERVICES AGREEMENT• Clause-5.1 of the Services Agreement stipulatesthat: “The parties agree that the Municipality shall takeover the services upon completion of constructionthereof in the township and shall operate and maintainthe services in the township in terms of subparagraphs5.2 to 5.7”.• Clause-7.1 of the .Services Agreement stipulatesthat: “After the internal and external engineering serviceexcluding the electrical network have been installedand provided by the Applicant to the satisfaction of therelevant authority the said services shall be taken overby the relevant authority without any costs on a datedetermined by both parties”.n terms of improved living conditions, the provision of services hasnot been entirely successful – although measures are in place toaddress these. Problems pertain in particular to sanitation provision,the inadequacy of which has become a source of mistrust withinthe relocated communities. This relates in particular to the lack ofa water borne sanitation system and ongoing problems with theimpractical and difficult-to-maintain dry sanitation system (‘Enviroloos’).It would appear, however, that AP went to adequate lengths toensure that the community was made aware of the potentialproblems related to water scarcity in the area when they chosethe host site. To some extent it can be argued that the communityaccepted a degree of risk that a dry sanitation system would notprovide them with the standards of sanitation which could beexpected of a site such as Mooihoek, or Sterkwater where Ga Pilawas relocated. The practical implications were reportedly difficult tocommunicate in order to manage expectations, and the warningswere not sufficient to overcome the communities’ collective desireto choose the site they did while still to receive the desired level ofservices.Given the ineffectiveness of the Enviroloos, AP has committed toproviding an alternative solution in the form of lined VIPs in eachhomestead, at AP’s additional cost. Authorisation for this has beengranted by the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs,although according to AP, full agreement has not yet been reachedwith the Mokopane Municipality. AP are however hoping to installthe VIPs in early 2010. Rented portable toilets are being provided asin interim measure.45

Unfortunately, however, a lot of ill feeling has developed around thisissue, with community members and other stakeholders accusingAP of deliberately denying them a water-borne sewerage system.This allegation is partly rooted in the existence of two dams on theproperty which, even though they are very shallow (and thereforehold limited water), create an impression of plentiful water supply,thus fuelling accusations that AP is being negligent.In terms of service provision, there were a number of other defectsthat need to be addressed by the construction contractor before thesettlements can be handed over to the Mogalakwena Municipality.At the time of ERM’s draft report (July 2009), these outstanding itemsincluded:• access road to Ga Puka, which had become severely pot-holed;• incidences of storm water erosion;• defect rectification on a number of houses (as discussedpreviously); and• resolution of water provision problems.Discussions with AP indicated that all of the above have either beenaddressed (e.g. the access road to Ga Puka has been re-tarred) or willbe completed by 11 th December 2009. Whilst water problems arecurrently resolved (with AP supplying bulk water), the unanticipatedgrowth of the villages and water use in excess of agreed amountsper homestead, reportedly puts this resource under strain at somepoints.At the time of writing this report, the Municipality had only acceptedresponsibility for waste removal. Services that still had to be handedover were water provision, road maintenance, electricity provision,and sanitation.In terms of final hand-over to the Municipality, it would seemthat efforts have been made by the Project to ensure that theinfrastructure was delivered to the requirements stipulated in theServices Agreement, and to the satisfaction and approval of theMunicipality. The intention was to ensure that the Municipalitywould be able to take over the infrastructure and servicesimmediately following the completion of construction.Efforts include responding to a Municipal request that AP considersome form of tariff subsidy to cover the expected shortfall fromnon-payment of tariffs, thus enabling the Municipality to provide theservices required. This was agreed to, and AP reportedly tabled anoffer (in February 2009) to subsidise Homeowner tariffs for a periodof 3 years, on a sliding scale, on the condition that the Municipalitytakes over the services. As yet the Municipality have not acceptedthis proposal.Other efforts included: providing the Municipality with a “ChangeManagement Plan for Handover of Services” (February 2008);providing services operating costs as experienced by the Project;providing reports on village expansion, and so on.These efforts aside, the Municipality has raised concerns regardingthe inability of the residents to pay tariffs into the long term (i.e.beyond the three year AP tariff subsidy period). In the absence ofsuitable community development initiatives and wage earningopportunities (considered a weakness of this resettlement process),local residents are likely to remain unemployed, and will thus not bein a position to pay for the services that the Municipality is bound toprovide in terms of the Services Agreement. Until post-resettlementdevelopment is prioritised and achieved in Ga Sekhaolelo andGa Puka, this status quo is likely to remain, and with it, on-goingreluctance of the Municipality to take-over the provision of services.The situation regarding the handover of services to the Municipalityis a very difficult ‘stand off’, based on a number of highly sensitiveallegations. One aspect of this debate is the Municipality’s concernsregarding a legacy of inadequate infrastructure left behind by AP atGa Pila. This allegedly required R40 million in engineering costs toimprove after handover of the Sterkwater settlement (covered byAP). The Municipality claim they are unwilling to take on any similarproblems at Motlholto. According to AP, in the case of Motlhotlo,the Municipality appointed independent consulting engineers(paid for by AP) to review and approve the design, engineeringand construction of all services and infrastructure in the new GaSekhaolelo and Ga Puka villages. In August 2008 these engineerssigned off that the infrastructure had been completed in accordancewith the approved design and engineering (as stipulated in theServices Agreement). In line with the Services Agreement, theMunicipality was due to have immediately taken over the servicesand infrastructure at this point in the process. As already discussed,this has yet to take place.ERM is not in a position to comment on this situation, beyondmaking the observation that the arrangement for the handoverof services at Motlholto was made and contractually definedand agreed in the Services Agreement in March 2004. In termsof alignment to IFC requirements, this demonstrates appropriatelevels of integrated planning and cooperation with municipaladministration to secure the continuity of services post resettlement.In addition, extensive and regular engagement between AP and theMogalakwena Municipality appears to be ongoing in an attemptto resolve the hand-over of services and infrastructure. There isalso evidence to demonstrate a commitment by AP to ensuringcontinuity while resolution is sought on this dispute, even though46

the company is now providing services at its own cost beyondthe timescales outlined for handover in the terms of the ServicesAgreement.Concerns have, however, been raised by NGOs regarding the extentto which the Services Agreement takes cognisance of capacityshortfalls within the Municipality. This issue is reflected in similarconcerns raised by AP (see Topic 9: Implementation Planning andInstitutional Capacity, Section 9.2.2), and in fact, by the Municipalitythemselves, during an interview with ERM. The concern thereforeexists that the Municipality will not be able to provide the basicservices which are essential to the long term success of therelocation process.8.2.2 Livelihoods Restoration and Post-Resettlement DevelopmentLand Use and LivestockAs discussed in Topic 5: Compensation (Section 5.2.3), AP assistedwith the cultivation of land outside of the homestead (preparationand sowing of land), and the provision of additional replacementgrazing land, over and above what already existed at the host site.Neither of these efforts has been entirely successful as:• the majority of community members failed to accept handoverof the cultivated areas, culminating in AP terminating thehand-over process in March 2009, with only 91 formal handovershaving been completed (10 percent of total plots); and• the grazing areas have been criticised for being too far awayto be useful (although AP consider these grazing areas to beadditional to the required compensation amount).Two other initiatives were reportedly offered at the time of initialresettlement: the establishment of a game farm, whereby the fencebetween Mooihoek and Groenfontein would be dropped; and agrazing initiative involving the introduction of buffalo.The game farm failed due to reported disagreements amongst localresidents (reported by AP as community rivalries and jealousiesover benefits), and has been temporarily stalled until 2010, whenAP hopes to re-invigorate this initiative. The grazing/buffalo projectrequired that existing cattle numbers be declared and brought intoline with legal requirements. The initiative has failed at this point asmany of the communities have more cattle than are permitted bylaw and were not willing to declare their numbers for fear of losingthem.In terms of other agricultural assistance provided to individualhomesteads, AP provided taps in each homestead in order toassist with on-going agricultural activities. This was declared as animprovement on previous conditions where people had to collectwater from communal points, and bring it back to their homesteads.No other support was provided in this regard.Employment, Skills and EducationAccording to the Project Team, the Mine’s Social and Labour Plan(SLP) (April 2008) is meant to be the vehicle through which thecommunity Engagement and Development (CED) department areexpected to carry out post-resettlement activities. Within the SLP,specific mention is made of the ‘relocating villages’. Box 8.3 lists thespecific initiatives that have been planned.Skills development programmes were developed in collaborationwith the Department of Labour, who assisted in the training of 150Motlhotlo residents as artisans in carpentry, brick-making, masonry,plastering and plumbing. This included Sector Education andTraining Authority (SETA) training, i.e., accredited training for tradesassociated with construction. In addition to the employment figuresmentioned in Box 8.3, 180 people (30 percent) from localcommunities were permanently employed by the new expandedmine. Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) training was alsoprovided by AP in order to facilitate employment at AP (ABET level 4is a minimum requirement for employment). The top students fromthis programme either went onto a leadership programme or got abursary for tertiary education.BOX 8.3 SPECIFIC INITIATIVESWITHIN THE SLP (APRIL2008)• Mogalakwena (RPM) relocation will construct almost1 000 homes at a cost of over R650 million for more than10,000 residents, with the new village construction thathas employed many residents, varying between 500 and1 000 over time.• Additionally, a brickyard established for the project in aJoint Venture (JV) with the community employs manyresidents and will sustainably operate after the expansionproject is completed. The mine expansion itself has so farcreated 1 890 jobs for local people.• R50 million is to be paid from a Community BenefitFund established out of an annuity stream representinga percentage of on-mine cash costs for the life of theMogalakwena (RPM) mine.• 22 bursaries have been set aside solely for members ofthe relocating villages.47

Apart from the initiatives listed in Box 8.3, all other community andeconomic development initiatives listed within the SLP relate tocommunities that fall within the Mine’s 50 km radius, and not to therelocated villages specifically. The above initiatives have beenimplemented through the Project Management Team. The CEDdepartment will take over the implementation of communitydevelopment initiatives once the construction contract is closed andthe Municipality has taken over the settlements.BOX 8.4FAILURE OF THE BRICKYARDINITIATIVE (AS REPORTEDBY ANGLO PLATINUM ANDCONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS)• A community brickyard project was put out to tenderin 2005. Group 5 were selected to implement thisproject due to their preferable targets for communityinvolvement and local procurement. When the brickyardproject was first established, it had two thirds localemployees (700 at peak). However, three months into theprocess there was a strike over wages, even though thedaily rate was ten times higher than what the Municipalitywas paying their staff at similar skills levels. This resultedin a two month strike and an eventual increase in thedaily pay rate. As a result, Group 5 put in a claim to AngloPlatinum for increased costs. The project was reportedlyalso blighted by delays because of disputes and divisionsbetween workers from Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelowanting the facility to be split in two so that they couldwork separately from each other.• Attempts were made to hand over the brickyard tothe community but there was no suitable entity withinthe community that could take it over, due largely to asevere lack of capacity. A contractor ‘Bushveld Crushers’eventually came in as partners. The arrangement wasthat earnings would be production-related, i.e., earningsper brick. However, in spite of opportunities to increaseearnings, people reportedly tended to only work half days.This, coupled with the fact that there was no supplierstatus being achieved, led to it being unsustainable andBushveld Crushers withdrew within their first year. Sincethen, the brickyard project has ceased to operate.In terms of the progress of these initiatives, however, the followingshould be noted:• the village construction is now close to being complete, asare the associated employment opportunities that went withit (although skills gained are likely to be transferable to otherconstruction projects);• discussions with the Project Management Team revealed thatunfortunately, the brickyard initiative had been abandoneddue to labour strikes and lack of community capacity to takeownership of the project (see Box 8.4);• AP reportedly will not release the R50 million from theCommunity Benefit Fund until the Department of Land Affairshas signed the surface lease agreement. The DLA, in turn, won’tsign the lease agreement until all the problems between APand the community are solved; and• reports from local residents that several of the children thatreceived the bursaries were not passing.Of the above initiatives, only the R50 million therefore offerspossibilities with regards to ongoing development benefits fromthe project – although concerns have been raised regarding thecommunity’s capacity to manage funds of this magnitude. Outsideof the SLP and the Mine’s general community developmentinitiatives, i.e., for all communities within a 50 km radius, neither theProject Management Team nor the CED department have initiatedany specific community development initiatives within Ga Puka andGa Sekhaolelo.The picture this paints is that inadequate attention has been putinto the creation of sustainable long term development benefits forthe relocated villages. This view was confirmed by members of theProject Management Team, who raised specific concerns about thelack of post-resettlement planning and the capacity within AP toaddress this.While responses on the topic varied, almost no one at a communitylevel was either willing or able to discuss long term developmentinitiatives. In some instances, community respondents from GaPuka and Ga Sekhaolelo refused to speak about issues beyondresettlement, until such time that AP addresses their currentconcerns. In many instances, respondents seemed unable toconceptualise long term initiatives. What was clear, overall, was thatthere was very little awareness on the topic.One exception was amongst some of the educated youth that wereinterviewed. They expressed interest in community developmentinitiatives, as long as they were appropriate and realistic, andincluded skills training and capacity building.Regarding employment, it should be noted that there is very highunemployment in the resettled communities, with resultant high48

expectations for employment and skills training from AP. Withoutexception, community stakeholders raised unemployment as oneof the biggest problems facing these communities and many, ifnot all, had the expectation that AP should provide the solution inthis regard. The MTA argues that having raised the expectation ofjobs since project inception, it is now AP’s responsibility to providethem regardless of constraints. The MTA goes on to suggest thatsince people in the area do not have the skills to participate in anopen labour market, AP should establish and play an active role ina training facility to train local people in welding, pipe fitting, boilermaking and other trades, and/or in ‘mine related fields’. It should alsoencourage its big contractors to hire locally and transfer skills, andwhere possible, partner with local small to medium sized enterprisesto have a ‘positive impact’ on the lives of local people.Concerns were also raised about the Mine’s bursary criteria beingrestricted to students that excel in maths and science. This allegedlyexcludes too many students from opportunities for bursaries as wellas opportunities for employment at the Mine.The brickyard example points to a significant constraint withinthe resettled communities, namely, a lack of skills and capacityrequired for self-sustaining community development initiatives. Thefact that only 12 percent of the total population (Ga Puka and GaSekhaolelo) had completed Grade 12 is illustrative of this (MotlhotloResettlement, Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, 2002). Whilstthis is a significant constraint, AP has a responsibility to build thenecessary skills and put in place the support structures required toensure long term, sustainable community development initiatives; oralternatively, to develop initiatives that more closely match people’sskills set, e.g., agriculture projects.The inclusion of a social specialist on the Project Management Team,i.e., someone with experience and knowledge of the planning andimplementation of community development initiatives, wouldhave added significant value to this aspect of the post-resettlementplanning process. The lack of such expertise is discussed as asignificant constraint in Topic 8: Implementation Planning andInstitutional Capacity.Another key factor underlying the weakness of livelihood restorationmeasures can be linked back to the failure of AP to use the RAPas a planning tool. Whilst it could be argued that abiding by IFCrequirements for resettlement were only emerging at the time of theresettlement, and were thus not part of popular thinking at the time,the fact that AP had recent experience with the Ga Pila resettlementmade it aware of the difficulties inherent in such a process.Applying a more systematic approach to addressing the impacts ofresettlement should have been a clear learning that was applied.Had the RAP been completed, and to the required standards, itwould have ensured consideration of a livelihoods analysis whenassessing and managing the impacts on people’s lives. This wouldhave moved AP well beyond a simplistic focus on re-establishingbusiness enterprises and minor ‘quick-wins’ such as putting taps inhomesteads. Rather, it would have ensured that AP went througha detailed planning exercise for the setting up of post-resettlementdevelopment initiatives. Awareness of these requirements is evidentin the table of contents of the draft RAP (2004). Unfortunately, thefact that the RAP was never completed is reflected in the largelyunsuccessful livelihoods restoration measures.Another consideration is the extent to which lack of Governmentcapacity limited the extent to which AP were able to establishpartnerships for livelihood restoration and community developmentprojects. Partnerships with Government are critical to the long termviability of such initiatives. Whilst this is likely to have been a limitingfactor, AP should have undertaken, as part of the resettlementplanning process, an investigation into the institutional capacity ofGovernment to play an effective role in the resettlement process.Whilst such an investigation is likely to have revealed a severeshortage of capacity (as admitted by local Government), suchknowledge would have enabled AP to either engage in suitableskills enhancement or to find alternative capacity to meet therequirements of the Motlhotlo resettlement.A final constraint which is likely to have curtailed the effectivenessof community development initiatives is the psycho-social climateof the receiving environment. Comments made by Governmentstakeholders, and by community residents themselves, point to aclimate of dependency on AP for on-going provision of employmentand services, beyond what is typically planned for in an IFCcompliant resettlement process.Such expectations are hardly surprising given the perceptionamongst community respondents that the Municipality are unlikelyto meet their on-going service and infrastructure needs after thehand-over of services from AP; the fact that AP are essentially thesole employer in the area (with all the pressure to employ that comeswith that); and added to this, the knowledge within the community,that their limited skills are a significant barrier to employment atthe Mine or elsewhere. In such a climate, dependency on AP seemsa logical outcome. Such an attitude of dependency can severelyhamper the development of sustainable development initiatives,which require a partnering approach, underpinned by a vision forself-dependence.Whilst this attitude of dependency is certainly not the only realitywithin the resettled communities – one need only reflect on thelevel of mobilisation against the resettlement as evidence – therewere community comments made which pointed to a belief thatsolutions for improving their future do not lie in their own handsbut should come solely from AP. Whilst it is beyond the remit of thisreview to analyse the causal factors behind such attitudes, it is noted49

that such expectations present an extremely difficult environmentfor the implementation of development initiatives.AP’s relatively poor performance with post-resettlementdevelopment has had implications across the resettlement processin terms of unmet community expectations around employmentand benefits associated with AP, and the impact this has had oncommunity relations; in terms of ongoing grievances regardingconditions of their houses, fuelled in part by an inability ofhomeowners to pay for the upkeep of individual homesteads,and the apportioning of blame to AP; the likelihood of long termcommunity dependence on the Mine, and linked to this, thepotential for community reluctance to concede any ‘compliance’ orgood performance on AP’s part, lest this weaken their bargainingposition.8.2.3 Living Conditions and Livelihoodsamongst the Resistant CommunitiesAs expected, the conditions in the old Motlhotlo have deterioratedsince their decision not to relocate. In terms of living conditions,this is reportedly due to the impacts of adjacent blasting activities,with structural damage to houses occurring (e.g., large cracks). Interms of livelihoods, the households no longer have access tocommunal fields on which to farm. There is also a perception thatthe youth in this area are not considered for employment at theMine because of their choice to resist resettlement. Whilst AP haveprovided for school transport and provision of water, the communityfinds themselves in a vulnerable position where neither AP nor theMunicipality see them as their responsibility. Under IFC PerformanceStandards, whilst their decision to refuse resettlement is respected,the standards do not make any provision for or protection againstthe implications of this choice.50

8.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 8.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section 8Living conditions at thenew resettlement siteshould be the same asor an improvement overconditions at the sitefrom which the displacedpersons were resettled.AlignmentWhilst ERM is cognisant of stakeholder contestation of thisrating, it is our professional opinion that considerable effortwent into ensuring that living conditions were the same as oran improvement on baseline conditions.PS 5, Section 8Compensation for lossof assets to ensureimprovement or at leastrestoration of livelihoods:• Small businesses. Alignment -• Agricultural fieldsoutside of thehomestead.Partial alignmentIn spite of significant effort made by AP regarding thecultivated fields (outside of the homestead), the finaloutcome did not see full replacement of these fields. Thiswas not due to lack of effort on AP’s part, but rather due tothe breakdown in trust between AP and affected residents;the legacy of the 1993 lease agreement (no provision forcompensation for loss of agricultural land); and the influencethat poverty and lack of long term economic prospects islikely to have on community need and demand for improvedcompensation. However, the relocation has not left peopleworse off in terms of livelihoods.PS 5, Section20For those that areeconomically displaced,a project is requiredto provide additionaltargeted assistance andopportunities to improve orat least restore livelihoods orincome levels.Partial alignmentInsufficient assistance provided to displaced residents toensure sufficient restoration or improvement of livelihoodsor income levels. Standards of living and livelihoods were,however, very poor in the first instance and so arguably havebeen improved from such a baseline.PS 5, Section 8Project should provideopportunities to displacedpersons and communitiesto derive appropriatedevelopment benefits fromthe project.Non-alignmentVery limited evidence of effective sustainable postresettlementplanning.PS 5, Section12Resettlement completewhen the adverse impactsof resettlement have beenaddressed.Partial alignmentAlthough AP are making significant efforts towards successfulhand-over of households and services in full working order,required efforts towards livelihoods development andpsycho-social impacts of resettlement remain unaddressed.51

TOPIC 99 Implementation Planning and InstitutionalCapacity9.1 WHAT THE IFC REQUIRES• Develop appropriate RAP instrument or implementation plan: To adhere to PerformanceStandard 5, the project will develop a resettlement action plan or a resettlement frameworkbased on the results of the Social and Environmental Assessment. The plan or framework must bedesigned to mitigate the negative impacts of displacement, identify development opportunities,and establish entitlements of all categories of affected people (including host communities), withparticular attention to the needs of the poor and vulnerable groups, (PS 5, Section 12).• Ensure adequate capacity for implementation: Performance Standard 1 requires that theproject should establish, maintain, and strengthen as necessary an organizational structure thatdefines roles, responsibilities, and authority to implement the management program, includingthe [Resettlement] Action Plan. Specific personnel, including management representative(s), withclear lines of responsibility and authority should be designated. Key social and environmentalresponsibilities should be well defined and communicated to the relevant personnel and tothe rest of the organization. Sufficient management sponsorship and human and financialresources will be provided on an ongoing basis to achieve effective and continuous social andenvironmental performance, (PS 1, Section 17).• Management of impacts: Where resettlement is unavoidable, appropriate measures to mitigateadverse impacts on displaced persons and host communities should be carefully planned andimplemented, (PS 5, Section 2).• Develop monitoring and evaluation plan: A resettlement plan is required to provide details ofthe arrangements for monitoring and evaluation of the resettlement process, including correctiveaction, if necessary, (PS 5, Section 12).• Monitoring as part of an overall Management System: As an element of its ManagementSystem, the client will establish procedures to monitor and measure the effectiveness ofthe management program. In addition to recording information to track performance andestablishing relevant operational controls, the client should use dynamic mechanisms, such asinspections and audits, where relevant, to verify compliance and progress toward the desiredoutcomes. For projects with significant impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or unprecedented, theclient will retain qualified and experienced external experts to verify its monitoring information.The extent of monitoring should be commensurate with the project’s risks and impacts and withthe project’s compliance requirements. Monitoring should be adjusted according to performanceexperience and feedback. The client will document monitoring results, and identify and reflect thenecessary corrective and preventive actions in the amended management program. The clientwill implement these corrective and preventive actions, and follow up on these actions to ensuretheir effectiveness, (PS 1, Section 24).52

9.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS9.2.1 Develop Appropriate RAP Instrument or Implementation PlanAs previously discussed, a draft RAP was developed by a consultingfirm, and submitted to Anglo Platinum in September 2004.However, following the events of 9 th September 2001 in New York,there was a global economic slow-down and associated decreasein platinum prices. This saw a significant decrease in the pace of theresettlement process, and as a result, no further work was done onthe RAP. By the time the resettlement started in 2006/2007, the RAPhad still not been finalised, and the 2004 version remains the mostrecent one produced.The 2004 RAP was never used by the project’s team because,according to AP, it ‘served more as a record of what took place duringthe Scoping Phase’, and not as an action plan for the managementof impacts associated with resettlement. Similarly, it didn’t spell outdevelopment opportunities or provide any guidance on entitlementcategories.captured in a range of separate documents, and not in a singlemanagement plan. ERM believes that the lack of a single planningprocess, and associated systems and documentation, underminedAP’s ability to adequately manage the impacts and risks of theresettlement process.This weakness is most noticeable in AP’s inadequate approachto linking specific resettlement impacts with: (a) a compensationframework and associated entitlements, with a focus on vulnerablegroups; and (b) a monitoring and evaluation procedure tomonitor performance against these impacts. Although impactswere identified during the EIA process in the Scoping and Socio-Economic reports, the analysis of these impacts was very cursory.Furthermore, the associated management measures are veryhigh-level and vague, and lack the detail necessary to mitigate theimpacts that have been identified.As a result, key considerations typically captured within a RAP wereeither not taken into account during the resettlement or wereTable 9.1 Anglo Platinum’s Performance on RAP Documentation RequirementsTable 9.1 contains a list of key components of a RAP, andassociated comments on AP’s performance on each. This includesdocumentation captured outside of the draft RAP.No. Key RAP Requirements Comments1Identification of project impacts Cursory analysis of these in the Scoping Report and Socio-Economic report as part of the EIAand affected populations process.2A legal framework for landacquisition and compensationAddressed as part of the draft RAP (September 2004)3 A compensation frameworkNo consideration of this in draft RAP. Design Criteria were later developed and adhered to forconstruction of houses and buildings but no overall entitlements matrix was developed detailingwhat each category of resettled person would receive based on an assessment of their specificneeds/vulnerabilities.4A description of resettlementassistance and restoration oflivelihood activitiesA summary of main resettlement measures is provided in the draft RAP, with a focus onreplacement housing and services/ infrastructure. No mention made of vulnerable groups, andassociated compensation.5 A detailed budgetA budget was developed, but not captured within a public document. According to AP records,an initial budget of R675 million was developed – this has reportedly escalated to R800 million.6 An implementation scheduleThe Project Relocation Record (May 2007) provides a detailed implementation plan of theresettlement, including scope and anticipated timing of phased handover; a profile of the keyaffected stakeholders; requirements, constraints and obligations in terms of the handover; anassessment of risks and a description of the envisaged process for handover. It also providessome details on the relocation management structure, resources, roles and responsibilities,dispute resolution processes, structures and resources, and a communication strategy.7A description of organisationalresponsibilitiesProvided within a separate document (see Section 9.2.2).8A framework for publicengagement, participation, and No written documentation provided to ERM on this topic.development planning9A description of grievanceproceduresNo written documentation provided to ERM on this topic.10A framework for monitoring,evaluation, and reporting, withprovision for remedial actions toaddress issues as they ariseSeemingly no provision for regular internal or external monitoring (see Section 9.2.3).53

9.2.2 Ensure Adequate Capacity forImplementationAP had a large and dedicated team responsible for the resettlementprocess made up of structures both from AP and from thecommunity. AP described the following key roles and responsibilitiesof these various structures for the delivery of the MotlhotloRelocation Project:• Project Management and Professional Consultants:The Project Managers managed every aspect of the projectand did everything to ensure that the project was deliveredsuccessfully in accordance with the agreements between thecommunity and AP. The professional consultants (e.g. civilengineers, architects, quantity surveyors etc) were appointedunder the Project Managers to provide the technical expertiserequired to successfully deliver on the agreements.• Project Exco: This body comprised representatives from APand the communities’ legal advisors. The Project ManagementTeam reported to this body on progress and any topical issues– especially those that would result in a variance to plan. TheProject Exco acted as the oversight body, high/final level ofdispute resolution, and authority through which variationscould be addressed.• Section-21 Companies: The elected S21s represented GaSekhaolelo and Ga Puka community in terms of the relocationagreements that had already been concluded with AP. The S21swere therefore required to provide oversight on the Project soas to ensure that what has been agreed was delivered upon.• Community Liaison Officers: The CLOs (two from eachvillage) were engaged on a full-time basis to ensurecommunication and resolution of issues between thecommunity, the Construction Contractors, and the ProjectManagement. The CLOs were directly involved in managingall relocation processes and activities within the resettledcommunities. Whereas the S21s provided a higher-leveloversight on the Project, the CLOs were actively involved inmanaging community issues.• Operational Team: The Operations Team (seven from eachvillage) organised and executed most of the activities involvingcommunity members. The Operations Team worked directlyunder the instruction of the Project Management and CLOs.• Contractors: The construction contractors (Group-5 Housing,Tshepho Funeral Undertakers, Pickfords International andComet Construction) were contracted under the agency of theProject Managers to physically deliver what was required interms of the agreements.Project Management StructureThe project management structure was set up as joint venture (JV)between AP and Focus Project Management (FPM) and HararoProject Management (HPM).The project management structure is presented in Box 9.1 . Thediagram is based on an interpretation of a document compiled bythe community legal advisors dated 26 August 2004. The structurebelow was ratified by the Project Exco on the 6 September 2004.The project management function was intended to be performedjointly by Greg Morris and Nalen Padayachee, but according to AP,Nalen Padayachee did not end up being involved in any significantcapacity. Greg Morris reported, and was accountable, to the ProjectExco, and was charged with the responsibility of day to day projectmanagement.The JV provided the following key resources for the project andconstruction management:• Project and construction management function: performedby Greg Morris on a full-time basis.• Assistant project managers and coordinators: this functionwas supplied by Focus Management Project and Hararo ProjectManagement, and performed by two full-time staff members,reporting directly to the Project Manager.• Community liaison, social services and dispute resolutionmanagement: performed jointly by an AP staff member andanother from Hararo PM. Both interfaced with the communitiesand their representatives on community project issues,addressed social issues and resolved disputes where necessary.The two reported directly to the Project Manager.• General project assistance: performed by the Hararo ProjectManagement member responsible for community liaison,social services and dispute resolution management (see above),as well as two additional staff members. These individualsreported directly to the Project Manager.The organisational structures presented above and in Box 9.1illustrate a fairly well resourced Project Management Team,supported by community based structures. However, fromERM’s observations and supported by conversations with projectmanagement staff, a key resource lacking in the team were trainedspecialists in community relations, at a senior level, charged withoverseeing all social/community issues. Full time socio-economists,agronomists and livelihoods/development specialists would alsohave been key to an improved resettlement process. Although theorganisational structure includes a ‘community liaison, social services54

Box 9.1 Project Management Structure for Motlhotlo Relocation ImplementationFinancier:Anglo Platinum(RvK, RGM, JJT, DWP, EJE)Village Relocation Exco(High-level dispute resolution: RvK, SAN)(SAN, DWP, EJE, HS, YP, NP, GJM amongst others)Client Section 21Companies &Legal Advisor (SAN)Project Advisor & Oversight(YP)Project ServicesPPRNorth Project(HL & DM)Motlhotlo Village Relocation Project& Construction Management(GJM, – 100%, NP – approx. 30%))SHE(AV)Community Liaison,Social Services & DisputeResolution(RvK, RGM, JJT, DWP, EJE)Project & Construction management Services(FPM & HPM) Project & Construction ManagementServices in Support of the Project Manager(CN – 100%, MP – 100%)Community TaskTeams – Ops Team& Liaison & DisputeResolution TeamArchitects (TPC)ArchitecturalQuality Control& ProblemResolutionQuantity Surveyors(T&T) Measure& Preparationof PaymentCertificatesSocial ConsultantsCommunity Liaison,Problem Resolution/Risk MitigationOther Specialist Consultants [Civils,Electrical, Environmental, TownshipPlanning, Safety & Security, etc.]Discipline-specific Quality Control &Problem ResolutionReporting linesInterface lionesImplementationContractorsand dispute resolution’ function (with one fulltime staff member, twostaff at 80 percent and one at 15 percent), it would seem that thisteam was not sufficiently equipped with the specialist social skillsand experience required for the delivery of a resettlement of thiscomplexity.The Project Relocation Record (May 2007) describes the importantrole of the Project Managers in community liaison. Between them,there was an engineer, a quantity surveyor, a lawyer and recentlytrained community members as architects’ assistants. The lackof specialist qualifications was noted as a concern by two of theProject Management Team members and raised independently bythe construction contractors who felt that generalists were beingexpected to work in specialist communications and communityrelations/dispute resolution roles.managed process. This issue was not raised by community membersor lawyers.In the light of the socio-cultural complexities and on-going conflictwhich have come to characterise this resettlement project, the lackof (a) senior social specialist/s with skills in the fields of communityconsultation/education, social performance management andmonitoring, livelihoods and community development and conflictmediation, may have been a critical omission.AP reported making attempts to hire such a specialist social resourceinto the Project Management Team, and consulting the communitieson this. They claim to have experienced a lot of resistance fromthe S21s and community lawyers, who argued for a community55

9.2.3 Monitoring and EvaluationThe IFC ‘Handbook for Preparing a Resettlement Action Plan’stipulates that the RAP must provide a coherent monitoring plan thatidentifies the organisational responsibilities, the methodology, andthe schedule for monitoring and reporting. The three componentsof a monitoring plan should be performance monitoring, impactmonitoring, and completion audit (see Box 9.2). The scope ofthe monitoring plan should be commensurate with the scale andcomplexity of the RAP.BOX 9.2IFC MONITORINGREQUIREMENTS:DEFINITIONS• Performance Monitoring: This is an internalmanagement function allowing the sponsor or theorganisations responsible for resettlement to measurephysical progress against milestones established in theRAP.• Impact Monitoring: Impact monitoring gauges theeffectiveness of the RAP and its implementation inmeeting the needs of the affected population.• Completion Audit: Depending on the scale ofdisplacement, the IFC may require the sponsor toundertake an evaluation by an independent third party toassess whether the outcome of the RAP complies with theinvoluntary resettlement policy.In terms of internal monitoring, annual risk and governance auditswere carried out by the Corporate Head Office. However, at site level,there was no specific monitoring plan in use.oversight role was carried out, in particular, by the assistant projectmanagers and the ‘community liaison and social services’ team, whomanaged the grievance office and interacted on a regular basis withthe community residents, and the CLO teams.During the audit and compensation process, AP ensured thatthe audit team were supported by 14 assistants (known as theOperational Team). These comprised seven people from each GaPuka and Ga Sekhaolelo. This team was recruited and trained bythe Project Management Team. CLOs, two from each community,were also appointed by the community and were employed tohandle the grievances being lodged during the audit and householdconstruction phase.The regular interaction of these teams with local residents, andoversight of the audit, construction and compensation process, willhave given them the opportunity to informally monitor the situationon the ground, and identify issues as they arose. Where complaintsor issues were raised, these would be recorded in the grievance logand signed off once corrective action had been taken.However, an integrated monitoring and evaluation plan andassociated programme of KPIs and targets were not developedand applied to all areas of resettlement activity in the planning,implementation and post-resettlement stages. Performance wasnot routinely tracked against targets to establish relevant operationalcontrols/ checks and balances. Evidence of such an approach isseen in the Homeowner Queries and Defects procedure, but lessin the areas of social risk management, and community liaison.The monitoring measures used are therefore not considered anadequate substitute for the systematic and regular monitoring ofperformance, and associated corrective action, both of which are keywhen managing the complexities inherent to resettlement. This isconsidered a significant gap in the Motlhotlo resettlement process.Although the RAP provided some initial thoughts on internal andexternal monitoring, these were never completed or used by theproject’s team. No systematic external monitoring programmewas implemented as Anglo felt ‘they were under daily externalmonitoring’ due to the high level scrutiny from NGOs, the relocatedcommunities and their representatives.When measured against the IFC requirements for monitoring, it isclear that no systematic monitoring and evaluation process wasput in place for the resettlement process – this is in spite of thefact that the draft RAP made some progress towards developingthese measures. One could argue that the strong managementand supervision function carried out by the Project ManagementTeam served as something of an informal monitoring function. This56

9.3 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTAn assessment of Anglo Platinum’s performance against IFC standards is provided in the table below.Table 9.2 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsIFCPerformanceStandard &Section (#)IFC Performance StandardRequirementPerformanceAssessmentComments (if partial or non-alignment)PS 5, Section 12Develop appropriate RAPinstrument or implementationplan.Non-alignmentRAP document never finalised or used as an action plan forRAP implementation.PS 5, Section 2Appropriate measures tomitigate adverse impactson displaced persons andhost communities shouldbe carefully planned andimplemented.Non-alignmentImpacts identified during the EIA process, but their analysisand suggested management was very cursory and highlevel. No clear evidence of identified impacts/ managementmeasures being fed into the resettlement process.PS 1, Section 17Ensure adequate capacity forimplementation.Partial alignmentGood technical Project Management Team but lackingsocial/community relations and conflict resolution capacityto deal with the specific social and community developmentcomplexities inherent in a relocation process.PS 5, Section 12;PS 1, Section 24Develop monitoring andevaluation plan.Non-alignmentNo project specific monitoring programme was developed.57

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTLOOKING FORWARDPART FOUR : LOOKING FORWARD REPORTPART FIVE : CONCLUSIONii

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ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTPART FOURLOOKING FORWARDReportiv

PART 4Looking Forward Report1.1 INTRODUCTIONThe Ga Pila and Motlhotlo resettlement review has been designed as a two-pronged review process, withthe final product split into two components: the first, ‘looking back’ at resettlement activities carried outto date; and the second, a ‘looking forward’ which draws on the results of the resettlement review toidentify lessons learned which point the way towards required action.Following the completion of the looking back report, in July 2009, ERM initiated the looking forwardcomponent of the work. This report serves as the outcome of this looking forward component.1.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGYThe key objectives of the looking forward component are to:• draw on the results of the resettlement review to identify lessons learned and associated actionsrequired;• identify key obstacles to progressing forward; and• establish priority areas for focus and action, both for AP and its stakeholders.These objectives have been met through a process which draws on input from AP, the resettledcommunities and other key stakeholders, as well as on professional expertise within ERM. Themethodology employed to source this input is described below.Step 1: Looking Forward Workshop with Anglo Platinum (AP). This workshop was held on the 15 thSeptember 2009. The objective of this workshop was to present and discuss the key lessons learned andassociated ‘action themes’, allowing AP to clarify their vision for the future, identify potential obstacles tothis and formulate key next steps.Step 2: Looking Forward Sessions with Stakeholders. Following a presentation to stakeholders onthe findings of the ‘looking back’ resettlement review, subsequent meetings were held in early November2009 during which AP’s vision for the future was presented. AP’s action themes served as the framework fora discussion with stakeholders, and communities in particular, on their vision for the future. Meetings wereheld in each community, where different factions within the community were invited to participate in one,combined session in an effort towards promoting a shared vision for the future.Step 3: Developing Looking Forward Recommendations. ERM have drawn on the above feedbackprocesses with AP and stakeholders, and have used the ideas gathered, together with insights gainedduring the review, to develop a set of ‘looking forward’ recommendations. For clarity, the looking forwardrecommendations have been organised by ‘action theme’.1

1.3 KEY THEMESAND ASSOCIATEDRECOMMENDATIONSThe findings of the resettlement review have pointed to a number ofkey themes and associated recommendations. These themes are:Trust and relationship building;Stakeholder engagement;Integrated resettlement planning;Compensation; andPost-resettlement development.Using these themes as a foundation, this section seeks to outlinethe nature of each theme; describe the obstacles associated withrealising the contents of the specific theme; and then provide a listof key recommendations for focused action by AP, in order to moveforward. Some recommendations are cross-cutting, and relate tomore than one theme.1.4 THEME 1: TRUST ANDRELATIONSHIP BUILDING1.4.1 Theme DescriptionThis theme reflects an acknowledgement that trust between thevarious affected parties involved in the resettlement processes hasfundamentally broken down, and that the re-establishment of trustis essential to improving relations with associated stakeholders,and securing AP’s social licence to operate in Mogalakwena. Thisincludes trust between:• AP and local communities, including those communities notnecessarily resettled (e.g. Sekuruwe);• Trust between and within communities;• Trust between AP and their critics; and• Trust between AP and would-be partners (NGOs, MokopaneMunicipality, community legal advisors etc).The obstacles to realising this theme are captured in Box 2.1.BOX 2.1 OBSTACLES TO MOVINGFORWARD• A continued perception amongst stakeholders thatthere is a lack of transparency in AP’s communications.This is aggravated by lack of coordinated and alignedcommunication within AP (at Operations, Projects andCorporate level).• There is a perception that AP staff have attempted to coverup or deny past mistakes (e.g., around grave relocation).Such cases continue to breed suspicion.• Communities are split in allegiance and therefore it isdifficult to build trust with communities as a single entity.This requires a carefully designed, disaggregated approachto relationship building.• Relationships between AP and local communities, and insome cases between AP and authorities, are characterisedby open dispute and distrust.• There is a sense amongst the community that AP is afaceless entity. This is especially problematic in thosecommunities who resisted resettlement, and who claim notto have been engaged since the time of their resistance.This has exacerbated the distrust already felt.• AP is frequently labelled as the scapegoat for all ills withinthe community. This hinders the development of healthypartnerships where all parties take responsibility for theirrole in the current stalemate (this includes AP, Government,local residents and associated lawyers).1.4.2 Key RecommendationsThe key recommendations relating to trust and relationship buildingare presented as follows:• Publically accept findings of the review;• Improve relationships with communities in general;• Build relationships with critics and resistant communities; and• Start the negotiating process between resistant communitiesand AP.These are outlined in detail below.2

Publically Accept Findings of the Review• AP to acknowledge the findings of the report and furthermorepublicly accept a degree of responsibility for their role in thepresent situation. Whilst not accepting all responsibilities andblame laid at their door, AP will need to adopt a conciliatorytone and attitude in many cases in the interests of relationshipbuilding. Community feedback suggests that, according totraditional protocol, this is the first step in laying foundationsfor relationship building.Improve Relationships with Communities in General• A mediated process is required in certain of the villagesto resolve the conflict either with AP or between variousfactions in the communities. AP should consider the use ofan independent professional to serve as a mediator to resolvethese disputes. The objective of such a process would be tounite the communities as far as is possible in order to enablethem to move forward. This will also lay the foundations forbetter engagement in future.• AP to show that internal and external systems and processeshave been established to ensure that both AP and stakeholdersare held to account in the relationship going forward. AP toshow willingness to discipline staff for unethical behaviour ormisconduct.• Do not overpromise and be careful to manage expectations.AP to record, document, track and monitor all promises andhow they are fulfilled. AP to share this data with communitiesto ensure that expectations are aligned. AP to publicly commitand adhere to a reasonable response time for grievances (seeTheme 4 for more details on grievance management).Build Relationships with Critics and Un-Resettled Communities• As part of relationship building and securing AP’s sociallicence to operate, it is critical that AP develops approachesfor proactively and constructively engaging with their criticsand detractors. This includes government, Action Aid,community lawyers, and even the un-resettled communities.Whilst AP might not agree with the positions held by thesestakeholders, such agreement should not be a preconditionfor engagement. All of these stakeholders indicated to ERM awillingness to engage with AP more effectively and regularly,and to seek common ground so as to get beyond the currentimpasse.• AP to seek out opportunities for partnerships with NGOs. APwould benefit from the shared pool of ideas and resourcesavailable when one adopts a partnership approach. Increasedpublic/stakeholder trust can also be gained throughinvolvement in public private cooperation initiatives. Partnerscan serve to hold the ompany accountable by ensuring thatthe activities of the Company are subject to public scrutiny.Anglo’s Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox (SEAT), Tool 5A:Establishing Partnerships provides useful guidance in thisregard.Re-Start the Negotiation Process Between Un-ResettledCommunities and APIt was clear during discussions between ERM and un-resettledcommunities, that resistant Ga Pila is not open to discuss relocating,while resistant Motlhotlo is aware of the need to relocate andseem to be willing to relocate if the terms of the resettlement wererenegotiated. Each of these resistant communities is discussedbelow.• In the case of resistant Ga Pila, reconsider whether it isimperative for the residents of Ga Pila to relocate. If it has beenconceded that this community will not move and that theycan in fact be safely accommodated in the area, this shouldbe publically acknowledged, and the current approach tothis community reconsidered. Whilst ERM acknowledgesAP concerns about precedents being set with un-resettledcommunities, the current living conditions in resistant Ga Pilaneed to be addressed in some way – either by AP directly or viaa third party. In particular, this concerns access to water andelectricity in order to secure a reasonable livelihood.• With respect to resistant Motlhotlo, no progress will bemade in the current impasse unless a mediated negotiationprocess is entered into. The first step is to conduct preliminary‘talks about talks’ where the rules of engagement aredetermined, including: (a) procedural (ground rules, logistics,chair, representation, status of the agreements reached, time,place, venue etc); (b) behavioural (confidentiality, groundrules around declaring information, continuity etc); and (c)substantive (agenda for discussion, preconditions for talks,ground rules, etc). The ground rules should be determined inconsultation with the whole community.The negotiation process can be designed to achieve the following:• To fully understand and appreciate the demands and concernsof the community as well as the underlying interests thatinform these demands;• To give the community insight into the constraints andconcerns of the Mogalakwena Mine and AP in general; and• To seek alternative ways in which to meet the needs of thecommunity without jeopardising the needs of the Mine.3

This negotiation process is only likely to be effective if AP is preparedto enter the process with a degree of openness about the outcome.AP should understand that, by opening such a negotiation, theymay be initiating a totally new resettlement process, especially sincemany of these individuals are adamant that they will not moveto Rooibokfontein and Armoede. Where the community appearsto be intractable in their demands, it may be worth consideringnegotiating with a broker who operates on the community’s behalfand is trusted by the community. This should be determined in thepreliminary ‘talks about talks’.As suggested in Theme 4 AP should consider delinking the release ofthe community development funds to those who have moved andthe relocation of resistant residents. This action would significantlychange the negotiating context as it separates the issues of theresettled communities from those of the resistant ones, therebysimplifying the agenda of what needs to be renegotiated. Critically,however, it should be understood that the outcomes of thisrenegotiation will in turn result in calls for a renegotiation of termsby other resettled villages including Ga Puka (Rooibokfontein), GaSekhaolelo (Armoede) and Ga Pila (Sterkwater). This needs to becatered for.1.5 THEME 2: STAKEHOLDERENGAGEMENT1.5.1 Theme DescriptionThis theme responds to the need for an improved and bettercoordinated stakeholder communication and engagement. Thereare two aspects to this requirement, namely:• A need for a strategy for stakeholder engagement in a postresettlementcontext, in particular one which aligns activities atOperations, Projects and Corporate Community Engagementand Development (CED) level; and• The need for a new and elected representative communitystructure/s to replace the existing Section 21 Committees(S21s).The obstacles to realising this theme are captured in Box 2.2.BOX 2.2 OBSTACLES TO MOVINGFORWARD• There is a shortage of dedicated community relations/stakeholder engagement and dispute resolution specialistsinternal to AP at Operations level.• There is a lack of coordination between AP Corporate, theProjects Team and the Mine when it comes to engagingstakeholders. Each party appears to speak with theirown separate voice, without aligning the engagementactivities with an overall coordinated strategy. This resultsin inconsistent messaging, confusion and frustrationamongst stakeholders. It also enables stakeholders to, insome instances, play the different Anglo parties off againsteach other. Any efforts towards relationship are easilyundermined under such conditions.• Communities are factionalised and split their allegianceamongst various contesting organisations and individualsjostling for authority. This serves as a major challengeto establishing a representative and broadly acceptedcommunity structure.• There are certain individuals who do not want the statusquo challenged, due to the power it affords them, and theaccess it gives to existing stipends and future managementof the R25 million community development funds.• At the time of writing this report, there was no clarityamongst the community on whether the S21 structureswere still in place. There also appear to have been legaldifficulties in dissolving these organisations partly becauseit was unclear as to who had the authority to formallydissolve them. Whilst some of the S21s remain active, itwill be difficult to establish a community structure thatcan be delegated the mandate of serving as a vehicle forengagement.• Whilst stipends for individuals involved in representingthe interest of communities through community structurecan be argued as necessary given the time requirementsof this role, it has historically resulted in accusations fromcommunity members that the leaders have been ‘bought’by AP. Stipends also appear to have incorrectly incentivisedpeople to become involved in the representation of thecommunity, regardless of their suitability for the role.• There is no effective, independent higher authority thatappears able to neutrally arbitrate the conflict in the area.A series of Task Teams have been established over the yearsbut have generally failed to be effective.4

1.5.2 Key RecommendationsThis section suggests two key recommendations, namely:• The drafting of a coordinated stakeholder engagementstrategy for the Mine; and• The establishment of a new community structure/s.These are outlined in detail below.Coordinated Stakeholder Engagement StrategyAP should urgently develop an overarching stakeholderengagement strategy for the Mine and its stakeholders, includingthe resettled communities. This strategy should coordinate and linkengagement activities undertaken by the Project Team, the Mineand Corporate CED.As part of this strategy, it is recommended that, wherever possible,all engagement be facilitated through one voice, or at a minimum,that an identified spokesperson/s be present or involved in someway in all engagement functions associated with the Mine andassociated committees. Once developed, this strategy should guideall future engagement activities at the Mine.AP should strive to become more transparent through establishingforums that promote constant communication between parties.This could involve both regular, standing meetings and ad hoc,issue specific forums. These forums should give stakeholders theopportunity not only to have their issues heard but also to receiveresponse to their grievances. One such forum for communityviews to be heard and addressed is through establishing a newcommunity structure to represent the views of the community tothe Mine. However, such a structure (described further below),should not be the only forum for engagement.Establishing a New Community Structure• Benchmark recent successful resettlement projects inrural Southern Africa to identify effective models/formsfor community engagement, including but not restrictedto representative structures. Consider to what extentthese learnings can be applied in the Mogalakwena postresettlement context.• The community should be involved in a carefully managed butcollaborative engagement process conducted to determinewhat structure is most appropriate going forward. Alsoimportant to consider when determining an appropriatecommunity structure are the following (also see Box 2.3):- The form of the new structure (be it a multi-stakeholderforum, a community based organisation [CBO], a S21 oran informal ‘residents and ratepayers’ style organisation)should be determined not on its own merit but ratherbased on the proposed function that this new structuremust fulfil. It is therefore important to have a clear ideaof what the function of any new structure should entail.A terms of reference for the new structure should bedeveloped in consultation with the community.- More than one structure may be required. For example, itmay be important to have one, all-inclusive structure torepresent the views of all communities around the Mine.This may need to be augmented by either a secondBOX 2.3 ADDRESSING CONCERNSREGARDING TRADITIONALAUTHORITIESThere have been instances in the past where AP and otherstakeholder activities have been perceived to underminethe role of traditional leaders, including the Mapela TribalAuthority (MTA) and the Indunas (local headmen), amongstthe communities in their jurisdiction. In addition, muchof the factionalism has developed around divisions in thecommunity between those that are supportive of, and thosethat are antagonistic toward, the Indunas. Yet, even wherecommunities are largely not supportive of their Induna,there is still a widespread feeling that traditional leaders andstructures should not be undermined.The challenges around how best to include traditionalleaders going forward needs to be carefully consideredwhen determining a new community structure/s, whenrenegotiating compensation and when initiating livelihoodsdevelopment interventions.For instance, when facilitating the establishment ofnew community structure/s, it will be important that itsgovernance is structured in such a way that, on the one hand,it does not hand too much control over to traditional leaderswhile, on the on the other hand, ensuring that the structure/sdon’t undermine the traditional leaders either. This can befacilitated through, for example, ensuring that representationwithin the structure/s spans across all factions, including thetraditional leaders. It can also be achieved through includingan information sharing function within the communitystructure/s, whereby information is regularly fed back to thetraditional leaders, thus ensuring that they are kept informed,but without giving them the right to silence communityopinion.5

structure or a sub-committee which is formed to focuson the issues of the resettled communities.• Should several structures or entities be established, it will beimportant to be very explicit on how the different entitiesrelate to one another and existing community leadershipstructures, including the traditional authorities. It will also beimportant to specify how they report to one another andwhich is mandated to fulfil what function.• If a separate legal entity is established to administer thedevelopment fund, community buy-in would be required forsuch a structure, although certain key governance principles,including involvement of impartial externals on the ‘board’should remain non-negotiable. The following should also beconsidered:- AP to draw on specialist guidance in the setting up ofsuch an administrative structure, in particular advicearound key governance principles which help avoid theweaknesses of the S21 structures;- Such an administrative structure should be separatefrom the community representative structure mentionedabove (there should be no perceived financial incentivefor speaking on behalf of the community); and- Maintain complete transparency and accountabilityfor administration of the development funds. Localrepresentatives on such a ‘board’ to be up-skilled, wherenecessary.• It is important to be open and transparent with localcommunities about what engagements are being heldbetween AP and the new structure, and also about what isbeing discussed. Critically, the community should have sightof the terms of any and all agreements reached on their behalfbetween AP and newly elected leaders. AP should understandit to be their responsibility to ensure that the new structurereports back to the community regularly on what is beingdiscussed and agreed on their behalf. AP should also offer toprovide support to this structure to ensure that such feedbackis achieved.• It is also suggested that there be a greater degree oftransparency between the different communities, includingthose that have not been physically resettled. At the moment,the various villages and communities are aware of whattranspires at other villages, but only by word of mouth. Conflictbetween villages and competition for AP’s attention betweenvillages could be better managed if there was more opennessto all about what is agreed between AP and one village.• Use an independent body such as the Independent ElectoralCommission (IEC) or the Electoral Institute of SouthernAfrica (EISA) to publicly facilitate the process of electingrepresentatives. This pertains not only to the administration ofthe election but also to the process of calling for nominations.This nominations process should be designed to ensure thatthose nominated for leadership are fit for the role. This couldinvolve well publicised skills testing or an interview process.In addition, there is a need to ensure that the communityunderstand the significance and requirements of the post.This should be relatively easy assuming that the communityhas been involved in a collaborative engagement process todetermine what structure is most appropriate going forward,as suggested above.• Ensure the new representative structure/s have all thenecessary governance and accountability mechanisms inplace. This should include a constitution that is documented,widely communicated and understood by the wholecommunity. Build in mechanisms which allow communities torecall or re-elect their representatives. It will be important tonavigate a path which does not promote the full dissolutionof a structure too regularly, but still allows the community tohold their representatives to account. Refresh governance andaccountability mechanisms regularly and use external partiesto audit the structure’s performance.• Undertake ongoing skills training and education programmesfor community representatives to support them in their task. Itis important, however, that these not be perceived as ‘buying’representatives off, preparing them for jobs within the Mineor wrongly incentivising people to take up the posts. Similarly,the question of whether to pay stipends needs to be carefullyconsidered. If stipends are paid, then the amount paid shouldbe declared publically so as to be fully transparent, therebyavoiding suspicion of representatives amongst the community.1.6 THEME 3: INTEGRATED POSTRESETTLEMENT PLANNING1.6.1 Theme DescriptionWhilst the opportunity for implementation of an integratedresettlement action plan (RAP) has passed, there are key aspectsof the underlying resettlement risk management approach thatcan still be adopted both within a post-resettlement context andthrough the life of the mining operations activities in the affectedcommunities. There are opportunities in particular to: (a) improve6

social monitoring and evaluation procedures; (b) establish a morewidely understood and effective grievance mechanism outsideof the Household Queries and Defects procedure; and (c) developa more effective approach to post-resettlement developmentopportunities. The latter point, (c), is discussed in Theme 5.BOX 2.4 OBSTACLES TO MOVINGFORWARD• There is no existing RAP management planning documentto work with. As a result, some systems will need to bedeveloped from scratch.• Currently there is a transfer of responsibility for postresettlement being undertaken from the Projects team toCED. This change, plus recent staff changes at Operationsand Corporate level, means that there is a risk ofinstitutional memory loss.• A lack of experience at Operations level within CED insetting up effective post-resettlement managementsystems is likely to hinder significant progress in thisregard.• Current attitudes of some staff on the ground make fora challenging environment to bring about change. Thisranges from a perceived lack of empathy for communityissues, to a clear nervousness about engaging with localresidents.• Ideas around having integrated systems for socialmanagement, monitoring and evaluation seem to be intheir infancy at AP compared with their peers, both withinAnglo and in the wider industry (see Section 1.6.2 belowfor further detail).The obstacles to realising this theme are captured in Box 2.4.1.6.2 RecommendationsThe key recommendations relating to Integrated Post ResettlementPlanning are presented as follows:• Apply findings of this resettlement review into lessons learned;• Review and address social management system requirements;• Ensure appropriate staffing;• Strengthen the grievance mechanism for the post resettlementphase;• Develop and implement effective monitoring and evaluation(M&E) systems.These are outlined in detail below.Apply Findings of this Resettlement Review into LessonsLearned• Actively present and workshop the findings of the resettlementreview to all CED staff as well as with staff in other keyfunctions, both within AP, but also more broadly withinthe Anglo Group. This will allow for internal reflection onthe strengths and weaknesses of the Ga Pila and Motlhotloprocesses, and provide opportunities for staff to input intopractice ideas around improved performance, both forresettlement projects, but also any projects which includecommunity relations, livelihoods development, stakeholderengagement, managing government capacity for partnerships,and so on (essentially, any project with a social or communitydimension).• Systems for actively embedding the lessons learnt will needto be developed within AP, for example, a checklist of IFCrequirements for the different phases of the resettlementprocess, management and monitoring procedures etc.• The results of the resettlement review could also form the basisof discussions with critics or potential partners regarding wayforward, as well as with potential partners on up and comingprojects. In this way, an acknowledgement of shortcomingson AP’s part could form the basis for trust-building and anopportunity to create a new platform for moving forward. Withnew projects or partners, a reflection on lessons learnt allowsboth AP and future stakeholders to be better informed aboutthe hurdles and obstacles that could lie ahead, in spite of bestintentions and planning.Review and Address Social Management Requirements• A social management system is essentially the processwhereby (or system through which) one manages all aspectsof ones social performance at the Corporate and Operationslevel. In this context, social performance refers to all thedifferent ways in which Anglo operations contribute positivelyor negatively to the communities and societies in which theyoperate in. The idea is therefore to ensure that you have theappropriate policies and programmes in place to address theseimpacts (or risks) and enhance benefits on an on-going basis.Typically a social management system includes key elementssuch as: profiling your community, stakeholder engagement(internal and external), impact identification and assessment,mitigation and optimization, and monitoring and evaluation.Importantly, these different elements need to work as part ofan integrated whole – both at the Operations level, but alsowith the necessary linkages to a Corporate level system.7

• Anglo’s SEAT process allows for an assessment of existing socialmanagement systems, and should therefore be used to assesscurrent levels of performance and approaches at MogalakwenaMine. Typically, any weaknesses that exist at Operations leveldo not occur in isolation of Corporate level performance. Assuch, AP should also examine where and how CorporateCED functions need to better support social performancemanagement at Mogalakwena Mine and at other Operations.Ensure Appropriate Staffing• Within AP, the CED function is critical to relationship buildingat a community level. It is therefore crucial that the personnelappointed to positions within CED have the right technicalskills for this role (e.g., training in community relations,facilitation and conflict resolution), but also that they havethe right interpersonal skills. These may include qualities ofempathy, attentive listening, compassion, consideration,etc, which are critical to relationship building within theMogalakwena context. Whilst technical skills can be taught,interpersonal skills typically cannot be and are inherent to theindividual concerned. It is thus imperative that the recruitmentprocess is able to screen for the appropriate personality traitsnecessary for such a role.• In terms of technical skills, AP needs to design and implementtraining courses for existing CED staff to ensure that therequired capacity is being built. This needs to apply to CED staffat both Corporate and Operations level, to ensure alignment inmessages and actions from staff on site and those at Corporatelevel.• Ensure the scale of the budget and resourcing plan forCED is commensurate with the scale and impact of apost-resettlement project – benchmark peers and otherresettlement programmes of a similar size to verify andcompare.Strengthen the Grievance Mechanism for Post ResettlementPhase• Critically review and assess AP’s historical approach togrievance management through a quick but detailedinvestigation into what was effective and what did not workwith the grievance mechanisms used on the Motlhotloresettlement process. The idea here is to build on and developeffective internal systems already in place (e.g. householddefect tracking system), in order to establish a new andeffective grievance procedure in the post-resettlementcontext. This would be aided by benchmarking industry peersfor effective grievance procedures in other southern African ordeveloping country post resettlement contexts.• The re-development of the grievance procedure should beguided by the principles and key components outlined inAnglo’s SEAT Tool 4A: Complaints and Grievance Procedures.Of particular importance, given that it is lacking in the existinggrievance procedures, is the establishment of an externalombudsman as an independent mechanism for disputeresolution/arbitration. Members should be democraticallyrecruited from neutral organisations with no interests in theoutcomes (i.e. preferably not Government).• The grievance procedure should be managed by CED staff,and so should fit into wider CED systems and functions. Theprocedure should be designed to deal with all community andstakeholder grievances across all aspects of AP’s engagementwith and impact on the Mogalakwena communities goingforward (e.g., community health and safety issues, legacycompensation issues, community development programmes,ongoing maintenance of villages, etc). As such it may havea number of different components and consist of a suiteof databases. The Mine may wish to integrate the revisedgrievance procedure with existing incident-recording andreporting systems, in order to ensure one overall streamlinedsystem.Develop and Implement Effective Monitoring andEvaluation Systems• Critically review and assess AP’s current approach tomonitoring and evaluation (M&E) against best practicestandards both within the Anglo Group, and also amongstindustry peers operating in other southern African postresettlementcontexts. In particular, an effective M&E systemneeds to include a set of targets and KPIs against whichperformance can be managed, and corrective actionstaken. Whilst evidence of such an approach is seen in theHomeowner Queries and Defects procedure, this was lessevident in the areas of social risk management, and generalcommunity relations.• Development of the M&E system should be done with inputfrom key stakeholders, including Government, relevant NGOs,specialists and local residents. This will help to ensure that theidentified KPIs have meaning and relevance for both thoseaffected by the resettlement and on-going operations, andthose who play a role in meeting the needs of local residents(e.g., Government and/or NGOs). Seeking such input shouldbe done in a participatory manner, (e.g., through focus groupsor workshops). These stakeholders also have a key role to playin monitoring performance. Their participation should thus beencouraged in any monitoring group that is established as partof the overall M&E system.8

• Consider using specialists (e.g., consultancies/ NGOs/professional bodies) for annual external monitoring and reviewon big ticket issues, (e.g., on status of certain developmentprogrammes and performance of community representativestructures, and the development fund trust). It is alsorecommended that AP commit to a completion audit threeyears after the Motlhotlo resettlement process. This threeyear period is the date provided in the IFC PerformanceStandards, and could arguably be taken from the date at whichresettlement review was completed, thus allowing AP theopportunity to implement the recommendations made in thisreport.• Improvements on existing M&E systems should be guided bythe principles and key components outlined in Anglo’s SEATTool 6A: Developing a Management and Monitoring Plan,including KPIs. This should include the assignment of adequatebudget for on-going monitoring, as well as the identificationof responsible parties and suitable timelines for resolutions/corrective actions. Processes for the escalation and resolutionof non-compliance with targets should also be established.1.7 THEME 4: COMPENSATION1.7.1 Theme DescriptionThere is an acknowledgement within AP that some elements ofcompensation may need to be revisited in the interests of improvedrelations with both the resettled and non-resettled communities.These can be divided into:• those items that legally fall outside of the audit andcompensation process, but which would contribute toimproved community relations;• any compensation for small scale material loss/or perceivedshort changing from the audit process, including any overduehouse related defects/grievances;• addressing outstanding grievances associated with theresettlement process; and• longer term issues around benefit share in the Mine andmanagement of the R25 million development fund for eachcommunity.The obstacles to realising this theme are captured in Box 2.5.BOX 2.5 OBSTACLES TO MOVINGFORWARD• Concerns within AP of a floodgate of requests for revisedcompensation as well as concerns about fuelling existingattitudes of dependency and entitlement.• Difficulty for AP of assessing what are genuine requestsand false claims, and defining the limits of compensationand liability for AP.• Concerns within AP that any revised compensation “willnever be enough”, particularly in the context of people’sexpectations being fuelled by the mineral rights agendaand associated benefit share, nationalisation of themines debates, and expectations of a cash payout of thecommunity development funds. Concerns exist that theseexpectations may overshadow what AP can realisticallyoffer to settle outstanding claims.• According to AP, challenges exist around already resolvedgrievances being repeatedly raised – in spite of mutuallyagreed resolutions. This raises concerns around resolutionof any outstanding grievances.• Ga Pila community feel a sense of entitlement to the largercompensation amounts that Motlhotlo residents received,even though the resettlement and compensation amountswere calculated many years later.• Lack of a reliable livelihoods baseline which capturesconditions at the outset of the resettlement process – thismakes it quite difficult if not impossible to measure thedegree to which livelihoods have been degraded or towhich level they should be restored.1.7.2 RecommendationsThe key recommendations relating to Compensation are outlinedbelow.Dealing with Items that Fall Outside of the Audit/Compensation Process• As outlined in the Theme Description, there may be someissues, which although falling outside of the legal audit andcompensation process, could, if addressed, contribute toimproved community relations. AP would need to carefullyconsider which ‘items’ may be feasible. Examples may include:addressing outstanding concerns at the unresettled Ga Pila, inparticular, water supply and electricity (whether directly by AP,or via a third party); identifying key aspects of service provisionwith Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo, for which AP are preparedto take long term responsibility (i.e. until Mine closure) (AP’s9

decision to replace all existing enviro-loos with VIPs couldpotentially suffice in this regard); expanding the existingbursary scheme to include students who show competencyin subjects other than maths and science and to extend tocourses that are not necessarily university degrees and delinkingthe release of the R25 million development funds fromthe resettlement of the remaining Motlhotlo residents.Identifying ‘items’ of this nature should be carried out with thefollowing sensitivities in mind:• Wherever possible, quick wins should result in benefits atthe community level, and not at the level of the individualor faction;• Quick wins should take the form of isolated, ‘once off’events, to avoid repeat requests and setting long termprecedents;• The announcement and implementation of any quick winsshould be accompanied by an engagement process aimedat clearly managing community expectations; and• AP should also consider gaining community intelligenceon what local residents see as the most suitable ‘nonaudititems’ to address, (i.e. decisions in this regard shouldnot be driven solely by AP). This is essential to trust andrelationship building.Implementation of any quick wins should take place as soon aspossible, as they have a key role to play in improving trust andrelations between AP and the affected communities. This trustis essential to the success of many of the recommendationsoutlined in this report.Dealing with Outstanding Compensation from the AuditProcess or Grievance Procedure• AP currently has a process for investigating complaints arisingout of the compensation process, and for addressing anyhouse related defects/ grievances. This process is currentlyongoing. Prior to final hand-over from the Projects team tothe Mine, it is essential that as many outstanding grievancesas possible be addressed. On hand-over, local residentsneed to be clear on who within the Mine will be taking overresponsibility for addressing such concerns, and that theprocess for their resolution is clearly understood. See Theme 5for further detail on the required post-resettlement grievancemechanism.As discussed in the resettlement review, on-going complaintsabout the condition of the replacement houses is linked, atleast in part, to the fact that most residents are unemployedand therefore cannot afford the upkeep of their homes.Any long term resolution around household defects shouldtherefore be linked to sustainable livelihood developmentinterventions (see Theme 5 for further discussion).• As part of addressing outstanding issues, ERM would alsorecommend making land available to compensate for the350 ha of land lost due to the land claim at Ga Pila. Althoughthe impacts of this land claim could be argued to beGovernment’s responsibility, the land claim did result in theGa Pila community experiencing a short-fall in the amount ofland agreed to with AP as part of the resettlement negotiation.Doing so will go a long way towards improving communityrelations, as discussed earlier in this section.Addressing Outstanding Grievances Associated with theResettlement Process• Should AP decide to embark on the recommendationsoutlined in Theme 1 regarding the re-establishment of trustand relationship building, the ensuing engagement is likely tosee complaints being raised regarding the way in which theresettlement process was carried out. This is likely to pertainin particular to the original terms of the resettlement andagreements around compensation. Regardless of the validityof such claims, AP would be wise to provide a platform for suchconcerns to be raised and openly discussed. Decisions aroundresponses to issues raised will need to be addressed on a caseby-casebasis.Longer Term Compensation and Benefits• As previously discussed, expectations around benefit share inthe Mine are a significant factor influencing relations betweenAP and local residents. From AP’s perspective, the expectationsand sense of entitlement around such shares have the effectof undermining any other relocation compensation measuresthat were offered. The effect this has had on communityrelations, coupled with the public debates currently takingplace on the topic, has lead AP to initiate a study to considerand assess a range of feasible benefits sharing models.Possible models are currently under consideration within AP.• However, it should be noted that benefit share, if madeavailable, is unlikely to address people’s immediate need,namely, a secure source of livelihood. It is expected that equityshare payouts will be very tightly administered, and invested inbenefits at the community level (e.g., infrastructure and social10

services), rather than being paid directly into people’s privateaccounts. Thus, in terms of benefits on a household level, itis essential that any equity share is strongly coupled with ongoingefforts to improve the livelihood development optionswithin the resettled communities, thus enabling people tosecure a living (whether income-earning or subsistence based).• Similarly, the current freeze on the release of the R25 milliondevelopment fund to both Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelo iscausing tension and aggravating distrust between AP andcommunities, between resettled and resistant communities,and between villages (where linking the Ga Sekhaolelo fund tothe Ga Puka resettlement has exacerbated tensions betweenthese villages, since only one [arguably two] residents from theSekhaolelo community have in fact resisted relocation). Thefollowing interventions in this regard are advised:• De-link the release of the development fund from therelocation of the remaining Motlhotlo residents. Relationsbetween the ‘resistant Motlhotlo’ and the resettled residentsappear to have broken down to such an extent thatmaking the one conditional on the other, no longer has anyplausible link.• Instead, link the release of the development fund to theestablishment of a suitable administrative structure, whichhas the necessary governance structures and required skillsin place to effectively administer such a fund, as discussedin Theme 2.1.8 THEME 5: POST-RESETTLEMENTLIVELIHOODS DEVELOPMENT1.8.1 Theme DescriptionThe IFC requires that project proponents not only strive to restorelivelihoods and living conditions, but also to improve them.Developing sustainable communities is an imperative that APstrives towards for all communities in which they work, regardless ofwhether physical resettlement has been conducted or not. However,special emphasis needs to be given to livelihoods developmentin resettled communities due to their increased vulnerability as aconsequence of the relocation process.It should be noted that this report understands a livelihoodsintervention to be an initiative which provides or supports monetary(eg., wage) or non-monetary (eg., subsistence farming) incomeearning activities.Livelihoods interventions can be directly related to the operationof the Mine such as in the case of providing beneficiaries withincome earning jobs and access to contracts through supply chaindevelopment and procurement related support. There is alsoscope to develop alternative livelihoods such as through providingsupport to subsistence farmers, or through supporting enterprisedevelopment initiatives which strive to empower beneficiaries toearn their own income.In order to take advantage of the interventions described above,there is a certain level of capacity required of the beneficiary.There are thus a further series of interventions that underpinthose mentioned above. These are interventions which enablebeneficiaries to exploit available livelihoods opportunities, such aseducation and health programmes, and micro-financing initiatives.1.8.2 Scope of ERM’s InputDuring the course of the resettlement review, an understanding hasdeveloped of the context and associated challenges to sustainablelivelihoods development within the resettled communities. Theobjective of this section is to outline the challenges to livelihoodsdevelopment, both within the resettled communities, and alsowithin AP. It is within this context that specialist interventions willneed to be designed and implemented.ERM has also included a number of principles to consider whendeveloping an implementation plan for livelihoods development.These principles speak directly to current attitudes and obstacleswithin the resettled communities.1.8.3 Challenges for Livelihoods DevelopmentThis report describes the context into which future interventionswill need to be implemented by outlining two different sets ofchallenges, namely, those amongst local stakeholders (resettledcommunities and Government), and internally within AP (at aCorporate and Operations level).The challenges that exist within the resettled communities can bedivided into those that are generic to poor, rural communities inSouth Africa, and others which are specific to Ga Pila and Motlhotloand their unique history.Local Challenges: GenericAt a generic level, key challenges include the high levels ofpoverty and unemployment; low levels of capacity, experience andexposure to opportunities; and low levels of entrepreneurialism.• High levels of poverty and unemployment typically create asense of desperation to secure the limited opportunities that11

may be available (e.g., benefits from the local Platinum mine).This real and/or perceived lack of opportunities exacerbatesconflict between beneficiaries as they desperately ‘fight out’who will benefit from the available support. This ‘in-fighting’can undermine efforts to start-up development projects, as hasalready been the case within the resettled communities.• In a context of poverty and limited opportunities, high levelsof dependency are also inevitable; in this case on AP. This iscompounded by a wide-spread feeling that Government willnot deliver the desired or promised support required by thosein need. Levels of dependency on AP are thus heightened.• There are typically low levels of capacity amongst ruralcommunities in South Africa, and in the resettled communitiesin particular, where they have historically been subsistencefarmers. This lack of capacity relates not only to literacy, skillsand levels of educational achievement, but also to lack ofexperience and exposure of what is possible and how to accessopportunities. Envisioning ideas for livelihoods development(beyond subsistence opportunities) is therefore beyond manypeople’s frame of reference, unless input is provided fromexternal parties in the formulation of suitable ideas.• There is a low level of entrepreneurialism amongst the majorityof citizens, where most people feel more comfortable as anemployee than an entrepreneur. Estimates are that only 6percent of individuals are naturally entrepreneurial. In ruralparts of South Africa, these entrepreneurs have most often leftfor cities or have started small enterprises already. Accordingto one livelihoods development specialist, subsistence farmersstruggle to become effective managers or business owners,even with substantial support. As a result, there is a highrate of failure in small enterprises and sustainable livelihoodsinitiatives.• In terms of subsistence opportunities, it should be keptin mind that rural communities are being increasinglyexposed to non-subsistence ways of living. In many formerlytraditional communities, there is an awkward and sometimesfaltering transformation in cultures, values, lifestyles and evenexpectations around how to derive livelihoods. Amongstthe youth, for example, there is often a reluctance to adoptagricultural or subsistence interventions, as this is perceived tobe an inadequate means of achieving a widely-desired modernlifestyle.• Even where willingness exists for agricultural opportunities, theconsequence of deforestation, soil degradation and climatechange is that subsistence farmers are less able to cater fortheir food needs using traditional farming practices.Local Challenges: SpecificIn terms of challenges specific to local stakeholders, the followingkey observations per stakeholder group were made during thecourse of the resettlement review:• Government: The scope for creating positive partnershipswith Government in developing livelihood projects isconstrained by the relationships that exist between APand certain Government officials, where both national andprovincial officials have publically been very critical of AP evento the point of becoming involved in ‘point scoring’ exchangesin the public domain. In addition, there is a lack of trust thathas developed between certain officials in the Province andthe Local Municipality particularly around the issue of how theresettlement transpired.• Community leaders and representatives: A tension existsbetween the need to achieve the buy-in of community leaders(including councillors and traditional authorities) and the needto protect the projects from interference from such leaders,particularly in light of the real/perceived understandingthat such authorities often strive to find ways in which tobenefit themselves directly. There are already leadershipcontestations and factionalism due, in part, to the jostling forpower associated with the management of the communitydevelopment funds, where R25 million has been dedicatedto community development in Ga Puka and Ga Sekhaolelorespectively.• Communities: Individuals in the resettled communitieshave explicitly expressed a sense of entitlement to APsupport and even a guaranteed livelihood in the short andmedium term. This relates both to an expectation that theyshould share in the mineral wealth of the land on whichthey live and an unhappiness related to the compensationreceived, as described in Theme 4. In the context of livelihoodsdevelopment, community expectations of ‘hand-outs’ and theirsense of entitlement greatly undermines an understandingand acceptance that people need to be more actively involvedin establishing their own livelihood opportunities.• There is also a feeling amongst resettled communities thatthey deserve the focussed attention of the Mine, both interms of social investment interventions and in terms of joballocation. This does not recognise the entitlements of othernon-resettled communities who are also affected by the Mine’soperations.• Relationships: As described previously, there are low levels oftrust between AP and the resettled and resistant communities12

of Ga Pila and Motlhotlo. In addition, there is distrust andfactionalism within communities. Existing jealousies havealready, and will continue to, undermine communitycooperation, thus impacting on livelihoods developmentinterventions.Internal Challenges within APDuring the course of ERM’s involvement in the resettlement review, anumber of challenges, internal to AP, have become apparent. Thesechallenges, outlined below, could potentially impact on the successof livelihood development efforts within the resettled communities.• As previously mentioned, successful livelihoods developmentinterventions require the involvement of personnel withhighly specialised skills in, amongst other things, financial andbusiness management, business start-up, etc. It has also beennoted as ideal that those providing support to small businesseshave themselves had several years of experience in runninga small business, including experience of different cycles intheir own business (i.e. good times and bad times). Currentexpectations are that the CED practitioners, at Operations level,both plan and implement such interventions – in spite of thefact that they don’t necessarily have the required skills set orexperience in guiding a small business or livelihoods projectfrom planning through to start up and execution. In manyinstances, there is a lack of certainty about what exactly suchinterventions should even entail.A more feasible model, in this context, would be for theCED personnel to identify community needs and capacity,through an engagement process, and then commission aspecialist to work closely with the community to formulate andimplement the necessary interventions. In this sense, the CEDdepartment would act as partnership brokers and facilitatorsof the process, leaving other specialist organisations to run theimplementation process.• Linked to the above point, is an observation that existingskills training efforts, although being implemented, are notcurrently inclusive of CED personnel at Operations level. If CEDpersonnel are to adequately manage the community relationsissues that hinder trusting relationships and successfullivelihoods development initiatives, it is essential that allCED staff be included in up-skilling programmes. It is, afterall, at the Operations level, where the heat of communityexpectations and conflict is most keenly felt.• Aside from the technical skills mentioned above, it is alsoimportant that those tasked with supporting and developinglivelihoods development projects have the necessaryinterpersonal skills, as mentioned in Theme 3 (e.g., attentivelistening, compassion, consideration, etc). This is essentialfor building trust, managing conflict when it arises, providinglistening and support , etc – all of which are critical for effectivepartnerships. Observations of existing CED personnel at theMine would seem to indicate that not all are sufficiently at easein their community relations role.• During discussions with both Corporate and Operations staff,it was evident that there is currently no follow-up, monitoringor reporting on existing livelihoods interventions. Thus nolearnings can be extracted and no corrective action can betaken. ERM were also not aware of any livelihood developmentKPIs being set against which CED personnel are required toperform, at either a Corporate or Operations level. Thus, ina context where there are many other tasks to accomplish,livelihoods development is often not given the priority itdeserves.• While AP personnel are familiar with the community and theirissues, there remains a poor baseline understanding of localenterprise capacity, local socio-economic conditions includinghow the community functions from an economic perspective,cultural factors that may influence approaches to livelihoodsdevelopment and what residents value, and the economy/skills/ opportunities available in the area. Understandingthese baseline conditions is critical to identifying appropriateprojects, but also to meaningful monitoring and measurementof the impact of livelihoods interventions. Whilst the SEATassessment process is intended to feed into such a baseline, ittypically is not used to generate the required level of detailedbaseline information. This also tends to be a weak area in mostSEAT reports.• Within AP, there appears to be a lack of integration betweenthe CED department and other departments with overlappingfunctions at AP, where local procurement objectives forexample do not appear to be systematically integrated withcommunity development or Corporate communicationsobjectives. Similarly, there is a lack of coordination betweendifferent livelihoods initiatives undertaken by the variousrole-players. For instance, the Zimele hubs are currently onlyused for small business start-up, when in fact they could alsobe used to support enterprise development undertaken forcommunity development reasons.• Typically, for a livelihoods development project to besuccessful, effective partnerships with external parties becomeessential – particularly given the constraints both within thelocal communities, and within AP. However, to date, the Mine13

only has limited experience of forming effective partnershipswith other parties interested in livelihoods development.Where partnerships have been attempted (e.g., with localgovernment), this experience is often not positive, thushindering efforts to try and make partnerships work. There doesnot appear to be a database of potential reliable partners in thearea. There is also no evidence of active planning to developsuch partners or partnerships.1.8.4 Recommended Principles to InformLivelihoods DevelopmentBased on insights gained during the resettlement review, ERMwould recommend that the following principles be consideredand adopted when crafting an implementation plan for livelihoodsdevelopment:• Ensure all interventions are community focused;• Involve stakeholders in decision-making;• Address the existing sense of entitlement;• Align interventions with other community developmentinterventions;• Align interventions with other ‘Looking Forward’ interventions.These are described in more detail below.Ensure all Interventions are Community FocusedDetermining who to support through livelihoods developmentprogrammes is sensitive in so far as it raises questions around howthe benefits of the intervention are divided amongst individualswithin a community. Enterprise development, for example, isfounded on capitalist notions which are essentially individualistic.Enterprises are generally developed by individuals for their ownbenefit (and the benefit of their employees). However, livelihoodsdevelopment in the context of post-resettlement is beingundertaken for the purposes of developing sustainable communities,thereby creating a tension between an individualistic model andmore communitarian models.Concerns around benefit sharing are especially important inMogalakwena, where resettled communities are already factionalisedaround this and other resettlement related issues. Benefit sharingthus needs to be very carefully managed in this context to avoidperceptions that efforts and resources dedicated for the benefit ofthe community are being directed at projects designed to benefitsome more than others. This report proposes that this needs to bemanaged in two ways:• By influencing the form taken by any livelihoods developmentproject so that governance and benefit sharing models reflecta more communitarian approach to development, decisionmakingand benefit distribution (eg., co-operatives trusts oreven stokvels); or• By carefully selecting the focus of the project or enterpriseto be developed, where the product or service ‘sold’ by thisenterprise be, and be perceived to be, to the benefit of thecommunity. For example, an enterprise can be developed witha small group of individuals where this enterprise also benefitsthe community once implemented (e.g., interventions in thecommunity health and education sector, such as a library oreducational facility which offers educational support to localsthat are not already receiving this service, possibly at reducedrates).Involve Stakeholders in Decision-makingEngaging the community on livelihoods development interventionsis essential. Communities should be involved from early in theprocess, including in decisions related to:• The types of projects and interventions pursued;• The governance model underpinning new projects, includinghow this governance model relates to other leadership in thecommunity;• The benefit sharing model employed;• The development of mechanisms for how the community canhold those involved to account; and• The exit strategy.Stakeholder engagement within the resettled communities isparticularly important given the history of dissatisfaction andmistrust of community representative structures, and concerns thatpeople’s voices and concerns have not adequately been heard andresponded to.Address the Sense of EntitlementIt is important to ensure that livelihoods development is notperceived to be a hand-out. Any programmes should requirebeneficiaries to demonstrate their commitment by possibly showinga willingness to invest their own funds in the project or at leastto paying back loans. It will also be important to negotiate andcommunicate a clear exit strategy.Align with Other Community Development InterventionsLivelihoods development in the context of post-resettlement shouldbe additional and complementary to other community livelihoods14

development initiatives. AP already undertakes and should continueto provide livelihoods development support to communities intheir vicinity to meet other imperatives (e.g., to obtain a legal andsocial licence to operate, to reduce dependence and to achieveprocurement imperatives). Projects in a post-resettlement contextshould align with, not replace or compete with, other support.Similarly, the more generic community development supportprovided should be undertaken regardless of whether resettlementhappens or not and should apply equally to non-resettledcommunities and areas.Align with Other Looking Forward InterventionsIt is essential that livelihoods development is undertaken in parallelwith trust and relationship building activities as well as with activitiesdesigned to resolve outstanding grievances as far as is possible.It is ERM’s opinion that there will be limited successful livelihoodsdevelopment interventions until several of the resettlement relatedissues outlined in this report are addressed to the satisfaction of allinvolved.1.8.5 ConclusionsThe post-resettlement context within which AP and the affectedcommunities find themselves is both complex and extremelychallenging. Realising the themes outlined in this report will requirejoint effort and commitment from a range of stakeholders who, todate, have tended towards mistrust and working at odds with eachother.Fulfilling the intentions of these themes will however requiresignificant shifts within AP. The first of these shifts requires AP toreposition themselves (and re-imagine themselves) as guests in thelocal communities, and wider municipality. Being a guest calls foran on-going attitude of respect and humility. Ones presence in anarea is thus earned, not acquired through attaining legal rights tobe there. Hand in hand with such an approach, is the need for APto show a willingness to accept criticism, where warranted, and bewilling to engage in respectful debate with their critics.Another fundamental shift that is required relates to the relationshipbetween Operations and Corporate. The Mine is the heart of thecompany, where Corporate should view themselves as providinga support function. This requires that there be a prioritisation ofinvestment at the operations level, including in staff at the Mine.It also demands a more bottom-up approach to how communityissues are managed within CED, where Operations should be giventhe task of setting the agenda according to their issues and needs.Lastly, it is important for AP to remember who their primarystakeholders are, namely the community. All engagements witheither Government or community leaders and representatives(traditional or elected) are merely channels through which toimprove relations and communication with the community. Theseleaders are custodians of the community and mandated to protecttheir interests. AP should firmly encourage these leaders to deliveron such a mandate and provide support in this respect.If any progress is to be made towards improved stakeholderrelations and sustainable livelihoods development, it is essentialthat the themes outlined in this report are seen as part of an overall,integrated response. Each ‘action theme’ is interconnected andneed to be pursued together. For instance, for trust and relationshipbuilding to take place, the stakeholder engagement structures andprocesses need to be democratically elected and trusted. Similarly,achieving closure on outstanding compensation issues is linkedto issues of trust and to the creation of a vision for a sustainablecommunity post the resettlement and post mine closure.Underpinning all of this, is a need to implement sensible aspectsof integrated resettled planning. In particular, there is a need toensure adequate skills to manage community relations within sucha complex environment. Moving forward, there is also a need toensure that the required grievance and monitoring procedures are inplace, such that issues can be proactively responded to, and lessonslearnt and applied. It is this responsiveness to concerns that playsa key role in building trust and securing AP’s long term invitation tooperate within the Mogalakwena communities.15

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTPART FIVEConclusion

PART FIVE1 Conclusion1.1 INTRODUCTIONThe key objectives of this study were two pronged: to review AP’s performance in the resettlementactivities carried out to date at Ga Pila and Motlholto, benchmarked against the IFC PerformanceStandards, in order to identify key strengths and weaknesses, and associated lessons learnt; but also to laythe foundations for sustainable and informed actions moving forward through the development of a setof practical recommendations to Anglo Platinum based on the review findings.The findings of the ‘looking back’ components are the results of gathering and analysing extensivestakeholder testimony in order to understand people’s direct experience of the planning andimplementation of the Ga Pila and Motlhotlo resettlement processes. The recommendations outlined inthe ‘looking forward’ component are the outcome of a process of extensive feedback and workshoppingwith these same stakeholders, including community and Government representatives, and with key roleplayers within AP Mogalakwena Section Mine, CED and Corporate Affairs.LOOKING BACK: KEY FINDINGSThe review acknowledges that in the case of these resettlement processes, and in particular in the earlierprocess at Ga Pila, the best practice resettlement outlined in today’s International Standards were notin currency or as widely recognised or employed as they are now. In this way, the review is effectivelyassessing AP’s performance against today’s standard, and one which did not exist at the time.Ga PilaIn summary, the review found the Ga Pila resettlement to be broadly not aligned with best practice or IFCPerformance Standard 5.Some strengths were noted in the more technical and physical aspects of the resettlement (e.g., theprovision of adequate replacement property; land based compensation and security of homestead tenure;the provision of physical support with the actual move; and seeking to improve livelihoods). However,the overall resettlement was undermined by inadequate management of the less tangible and ultimatelymore complex social and community relations aspects of resettlement (e.g., the negotiation for land rightsand original decision to move; the ongoing management of expectations); the lack of responsiveness tothe emerging resistance; poor management of grievances and the emotional impact of resettlement; andinadequate attention to the restoration of livelihoods and addressing long term community developmentneeds.MotlhotloIn the case of Motlhotlo, the review found that significant improvements and learnings from Ga Pila hadbeen applied to make the process more aligned with the IFC Performance Standard 5 in many aspects.Key strengths related to improved implementation of: household audits and valuation of assets; grievanceprocedures for compensation and household defects; overall quality of the replacement houses; and keyaspects of service provision. There were also improvements observed in the extent of compensation; levelof improvement to living conditions (i.e. houses); and in aspects of the approach to consultation.1

In spite of these improvements, weaknesses in the managementand implementation of the resettlement process were still noted in anumber of areas, including: inadequate consideration of vulnerablegroups; restoration but not significant improvement of livelihoods;poor post-resettlement development planning; lack of systematicmonitoring and evaluation procedures suitable for a resettlement orcomplex project management; shortcomings in the representativebodies established to represent affected residents during theresettlement; lack of mechanisms to resolve disputes in an impartialmanner; and inadequate consideration of the emotional impacts ofresettlement.On balance, however, and compared with the Ga Pila process,the Motlhotlo resettlement process was found to be much moreclosely aligned with the core principles and requirements of IFCPerformance Standard 5, and various elements of PerformanceStandard 1.LOOKING FORWARD:THEMES FOR ACTIONThe findings of the resettlement review point to a number of keythemes and associated recommendations. These themes areTrust and relationship building;Stakeholder engagement;Integrated resettlement planning;Compensation; andPost-resettlement development.The intention of these themes is to ‘look forward’ to ways in which toimprove relations and build trust between AP and its stakeholders,and importantly, to improve community livelihoods and quality oflife in the affected settlements.If any progress is to be made in this regard, it is essential that theabove themes are seen as part of an overall, integrated response.Each ‘action theme’ is interconnected and thus need to be pursuedtogether.For instance, for trust and relationship building to take place, thestakeholder engagement structures and processes need to bedemocratically elected and trusted. Similarly, achieving closure onoutstanding compensation issues is linked to issues of trust andto the creation of a vision for a sustainable community post theresettlement and post mine closure. Underpinning all of this is aneed to implement sensible aspects of integrated resettled planning.In particular, there is a need to ensure adequate skills to managecommunity relations within such a complex environment. Movingforward, there is also a requirement to ensure that the requiredgrievance and monitoring procedures are in place, such that issuescan be proactively responded to, and lessons learnt and applied. Itis this responsiveness to concerns that plays a key role in buildingtrust and securing AP’s long term invitation to operate within theMogalakwena communities.CONCLUDING THOUGHTSInteractions which occur at the interface between the activities ofa large mining operation and the rural communities it impacts orbenefits, are inevitably highly complex and sensitive, both in socialand economic terms. In South Africa, as in many less developedeconomies they can also be heavily influenced by the politics ofland rights and poverty, and by local and global socio-politicalmovements such as current calls for the nationalisation of minesand community demands for benefit-sharing, and the humanrights agenda. The process of resettlement is arguably the mostcomplex, sensitive and politicised of all these interactions. At Ga Pila,such a large scale negotiated resettlement process had not beenundertaken or experienced in rural South Africa before. Politically,it also took place at the dawn of a newly democratic constitutionwhere the stakes were high and expectations for a bright future evenhigher.What this review has found is that there is no one story or truth whenit comes to a subject as emotive as the relocation of families fromtheir homes and ancestral lands to make way for the expansion ofa mine. The multi-stakeholder engagement methodology used byERM, although fraught with challenges, has attempted to give voiceto as many of these accounts as possible. This was done in orderto create a transparent forum for discussion and debate for thosewho may have felt previously excluded and to inform balanced,objective conclusions about the quality of the process that wasundertaken by AP. The quality of AP’s performance in the designingand implementing of the resettlements has been assessed both interms of ‘alignment’ or compliance with the mechanical steps of abest practice approach, but also in relation to the ‘spirit’ or intentionbehind AP’s actions.As the themes and findings above suggest there are no ‘quick fix’solutions to address the weakness in AP’s process and the resultingchallenges raised by this review, but AP has taken a clear step inthe right direction by commissioning this study. It has answeredcalls from critics and observers to undertake a detailed technicalinvestigation into the resettlement processes and to translate thelessons learned therein into positive decisive, credible actions tomove forward.2

During the 18 month period of this review, some positivedevelopments have already been witnessed in the communities atboth Ga Pila and Motlhotlo, such as the reuniting of the previouslydivided Ga Pila community at Sterkwater, which may reflect agradually improving relationship between the communities and AP.Many of the same conflicts and grievances remain unchanged orunaddressed however, either in reality or in the perception of thoseaffected.The immediate next steps for AP are critical in working tochange these current negative realities and perceptions in thesecommunities once and for all. The key to this lies in rebuildingtrust, but this can only be achieved if it is supported by tangibleactions and a demonstration of long term commitment andaccountability. This requires AP to be visible and accessible to thesecommunities from this point onwards, throughout the life of themining operations and beyond, to track and fulfil its commitmentsand promises going forward, and to publicly accept its part inthe breakdown in trust which has occurred as a result of theresettlements.Not all of those lessons learned in this review are for AP alone.Responsibility for some of the failings identified in theseresettlement processes also lie with Government and otherinstitutional actors, and with members of the communitiesthemselves, both of whom need to play a greater role inacknowledging their part in some of the problems caused, and intheir resolution. AP will require the support of other key role players,and willingness from them to explore partnerships in relationshipbuilding, capacity building and in improving livelihoods througheducation and enterprise development solutions, if they are tosucceed.3

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENTANNEXURESABCDEFGHMaps of the Relocation AreaList of Questions for InterviewsList of Consultation ActivitiesPhotologDesign CriteriaReferencesNon-Technical Executive SummaryList of Tables and Boxes

Annexure AMaps of Relocated Settlement

Map A1 Regional Overview Map

Map A2 Territorial and Administrative Organisation of the Project Area

Annexure BList of Questions for Interviews

Community QuestionsKEY ISSUEAssessing Eligibility for Compensation/ RelocationHow were you first told you may be affected by the resettlement process? By whom: mine, TA , otherDid you take part in a survey/census of assets/propertyWho conducted this and when was it? Did you keep records of it and your participation in it?Did anyone at the mine tell you there was a date or time after which you could not apply to becompensated by the project?Land AcquisitionWhat was the process by which the mine acquired your land?Did you understand this process and why is was happening?What was good about this process? What were you unhappy about? Did you feel you were consultedsufficiently about it?Do you have any records of what you agreed about giving your land to the mine?Assessment of AlternativesDid you know you could have a choice about where you wanted to be moved to?Were you made aware of how the different sites to which you could chose to be resettled?Consultation and DisclosureHow/when did the mine come and talk to you about needing to take land and how this would bedone?Did the mine communicate to you that you could take part in this process?Do you have any records of the meetings and what was talked about and what you agreed with themine?Describe the ways in which the mine has communicated with you since the beginning of theresettlement process and today? What was good about this process, what were you unhappy with?Grievance RedressWhen /if you have complaints about the mine what do you do? Whom do you speak to?Do you write down your complaints and send them to the mine?Did the mine tell you they have a system for dealing with complaints/grievances in certain period oftime once they have been registered?Do you understand how that process works? Can you describe it?Can you give an example of a time when you have made a complaint to the mine and they haveresponded to you in a way that you are happy withCan you give an example of a time when you have made a complaint to the mine and they haveresponded to you in a way that you are not happy with, or they have not responded at all?Land Based CompensationDid you farm on land prior to being relocated?Did you lose land or assets when you were relocated?Were you offered land to replace the land you lost by the Mine when you moved?Did you take part in a survey, study in which the mine tried to measure the value of land lost orlivelihoods lost with land or assets? Can you describe this process, what was your role in it?CompensationWere you paid monetary compensation for land and assets?Did the mine explain how they had calculated this amount? How was this measured/agreed? Did youagree the amount with the mine privately?Were you paid all of this before you moved?Did you know what others were being paid? How did you know, did the mine disclose the calculationsto everyone?Relocation AssistanceDid the company help you to move?How - what kind of support did they give you? (money, transport, Other support?)KEY RAP STEPS1. Identifying ProjectAffected People2. Site Selection3. Setting up andCommunicationStructure andGrievanceManagement system4. Compensation5. PhysicalDisplacement andAssistance

KEY ISSUEImprove or at Least Restore LivelihoodsAre you happy with your new house and the compensation you received?How does it compare with your old house? (better, worse the same?)Have you lost income from other activities because of moving?How much? Can you measure/calculate it?Have you informed anyone about this loss or written to the mine?What else do you feel you have lost (business/land/property/other?Do you feel you have gained anything positive from being moved - has your comfort/quality of life orincome improved?Public Services - continuityWhen you moved did you have running water/electricity etcDid you sign an agreement that you were happy with this and the house when you moved? Did youkeep a record o this?Did the mine pay for other assets lost relating to your business or farming activities (equipment, toolsetc)Post Resettlement and Development NeedsWhat do you lack now but feel you need to have a good and prosperous future here? (job, money,land, rights, health, business opportunities, happiness?)Are there development projects or business opportunities that you would like to pursue?Have you been involved in any development projects or initiatives with the mine? What werethese? What was good or bad about these? Who or what would you like to be represented by inconversations with the mine from now on?What do you hope for from the mine?Have you told them that? If so how did you tell them?What do you hope for from the Premier’s Office Task Force or Minister of Minerals and Energy?KEY RAP STEPS6. Post-relocation- Restoration ofLivelihoods7. Post -relocation-Public ServiceContinuity8. Addressing FutureDevelopment Needs

Annexure CList of Consultation Activities

Table D1.1 Stakeholder Consultation ActivitiesDate and TimeStakeholderPhase ofEngagementActivitiesStakeholder GroupDecember 2008 David Langa Design Stage CommunityDecember 2008 Christine Jesseman, SAHRC Design Stage External StakeholdersDecember 2008 Zanele Twala, ActionAid Design Stage External StakeholdersDecember 2008 Richard Spoor Design Stage Legal AdvisorDecember 2008 Mamphela Ramphele Design Stage External StakeholdersDecember 2008 Mpho Matjila Design Stage Anglo PlatinumFebruary 3 rd 2009 Philip Langa, Representative of the Royal Council Introductory Visit Traditional AuthorityFebruary 3 rd 2009 Nduna Puka Introduction Visit CommunityFebruary 3 rd 2009 Nduna Sekhaolelo Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 3 rd 2009 Representatives of the Ga Molekane Community Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 3 rd 2009 Nduna Chaba Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th 2009 Representatives of Leroleng Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th 2009 Nduna Puka Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th 2009 Nduna Sekhaolelo Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th 2009 Members of the Mashukameng Ga Chaba Committee Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th 2009A Representative of the Ga Pila Resistance Committee (nonresettled household)Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th 2009 Hendrik Ngoepe, Mogalakwena Municipality Introductory Visit Government StakeholdersFebruary 4 th 2009 Nduna Pila and Council Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th 2009Motlhotlo Resettlement Resistance (MRRC) CommitteeRepresentativesIntroductory VisitCommunityFebruary 5 th 2009Motlhotlo Development Committee (MDC) for Ga Puka and GaSekhaoleloIntroductory Visit CommunityFebruary 5 th 2009 Joseph Rapholo, Office of the Premier Introductory Visit Government StakeholdersFebruary 5 th 2009 Connie Kobe, DME Introductory Visit Government StakeholdersFebruary 5 th 2009 Members of the Ga Pila S21 Committee Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 5 th 2009 Members of the Ga-Puka S21 Committee Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 5 th 2009 A representative of the Ga-Sekhaolelo S21 Committee Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 4 th and5 th 2009Representatives of the Sekuruwe S21 Committee Introductory Visit CommunityFebruary 5 th 2009 Representative of the Sekuruwe Resistance Group Introductory Visit CommunityMarch 16 th 2009 Greg Morris, Dean Pelser, Etienne Espag, Herman Steyn Consultation Anglo PlatinumMarch 17 th 2009 Nduna Pila and Council Consultation CommunityMarch 17 th 2009 Nduna Puka and Council, S21 Committee and MDC (Ga Puka) Consultation CommunityMarch 17 th 2009 Nduna Sekhaolelo and Council Consultation CommunityMarch 17 th 2009 The S21 Committee for Ga Sekhaolelo Consultation CommunityMarch 17 th 2009 The S21 Committee for Ga Pila Consultation CommunityMarch 18 th 2009 Ga Pila Reconciliation Committee Consultation CommunityMarch 18 th 2009 MDC (Ga Puka) Consultation CommunityMarch 18 th 2009 MRRC Committee Representatives Consultation Community

Date and TimeStakeholderPhase ofEngagementActivitiesStakeholder GroupMarch 18 th 2009 The S21 Committee for Ga Sekhaolelo Consultation CommunityMarch 18 th 2009 The S21 Committee for Ga Puka Consultation CommunityMarch 19 th 2009 Community Aligned to Nduna Pila and Reconciliation Committee Consultation CommunityMarch 19 th 2009 Ga Pila Resistance Committee (non resettled households) Consultation CommunityMarch 19 th 2009 MDC (Ga Sekhaolelo) Consultation CommunityMarch 19 th 2009 Community Aligned to Ga Pila section 21 Committee Consultation CommunityMarch 19 th 2009 MRRC Committee Consultation CommunityMarch 20 th 2009 Ga Puka Community Meeting – Integrated Community Consultation CommunityMarch 20 th 2009 Community Aligned with MRRC Consultation CommunityMarch 20 th 2009 Herman Steyn and Mathews Pila Consultation MineMarch 21 st and22 nd 2009Ga Puka Household Meetings Consultation CommunityMarch 21 st 2009 Ga Pila Household Meetings (S21 aligned and Nduna aligned) Consultation CommunityMarch 22 nd 2009 MRRC Household Meetings Consultation CommunityMarch 23 rd 2009 MRRC Household Meetings Consultation CommunityMarch 23 rd 2009 Traditional Authority Consultation Traditional AuthorityMarch 23 rd 2009 Ga Pila Resistance Household Meetings Consultation CommunityMay 4 th 2009 Traditional Council Consultation Traditional AuthorityMay 4 th 2009 Sumaya Cachalia, DLA Consultation Government StakeholderMay 4 th 2009 Hendrik Ngoepe, Mogalakwena Municipality Government StakeholderMay 5 th 2009 Community aligned with Sekhaolelo S21 Committee Consultation CommunityMay 5 th 2009 Ga Sekhaolelo Household Meetings (Nduna aligned and S21) Consultation CommunityMay 6 th 2009 Community aligned with Nduna Sekhaolelo and the MDC Consultation CommunityMay 12 th 2009 Chris Ndwamato, ex Focus Project Manager ConsultationProject ManagementTeamMay 12 th 2009 Connie Kobe, DME Consultation Government StakeholderMay 14 th 2009 McKenzie Magagane, ex Hararo Project Manager ConsultationProject ManagementTeamMay 14 th 2009 Seaboy Makwena ConsultationProject ManagementTeamMay 21 st 2009 Seth Nthai and Bhadrish Daya Consultation Legal AdvisorMay 21 st 2009 Frank Enslin Consultation Construction ContractorNovember 2 nd2009November 3 rdNovember 3 rdNovember 3 rdMTA RepresentativesCommunity aligned with Sekhaolelo S21 CommitteeCommunity aligned with Nduna Sekhaolelo and the MDCCommunity aligned with Ga Pila S21 now unified with the Ga PilaReconciliation Committee, SterkwaterFeedback ofLooking BackFindingsFeedback ofLooking BackFindingsFeedback ofLooking BackFindingsFeedback ofLooking BackFindingsMTA/TraditionalAuthoritiesCommunityCommunityCommunity

Date and TimeStakeholderPhase ofEngagementActivitiesStakeholder GroupNovember 3 rdCommunity aligned with Nduna PilaFeedback of LookingBack FindingsCommunityNovember 3 rdMotlhotlo Resettlement Resistance Committee (MRRC) RepresentativesFeedback of LookingBack FindingsCommunityNovember 4 thRepresentatives of the Ga Pila Resistance Committee (non resettledhouseholds)Feedback of LookingBack FindingsCommunityNovember 4 thMogalakwena Municipality Representatives of the Municipal Departmentof Education, Municipal Manager, Mr Hendrik NgoepeFeedback ofLooking Back andPresentation ofLooking ForwardThemesGovernment StakeholderNovember 4 thOffice of the Premier,Mr. David NkoanaFeedback ofLooking Back andPresentation ofLooking ForwardThemesGovernment StakeholderNovember 5 thGa Sekhaolelo Community - Integrated Community MeetingPresentationon LookingForward Themesand FacilitatedDiscussionCommunityNovember 5 thGa Puka Community – Integrated Community MeetingPresentationon LookingForward Themesand FacilitatedDiscussionCommunityNovember 5 thRepresentatives of the Ga Pila Resistance Committee (non resettledhouseholds)Presentationon LookingForward Themesand FacilitatedDiscussionCommunityNovember 5 thRepresentatives of the MRRC and old Motlhotlo Community (nonresettled)Presentationon LookingForward Themesand FacilitatedDiscussionCommunityNovember 5 thRepresentatives of the Municipal Department of EducationPresentation ofLooking ForwardThemesGovernment StakeholderNovember 6 thNew Ga Pila Community – Integrated Community MeetingPresentationon LookingForward Themesand FacilitatedDiscussionCommunityNovember 6 thSumaya Cachalia, DLAFeedback ofLooking Back andPresentation ofLooking ForwardThemesGovernment StakeholderNovember 6 thMTA RepresentativesPresentation ofLooking ForwardThemesMTA/Traditional AuthoritiesNovember 24 thRichard SpoorFeedback ofLooking Back andPresentation ofLooking ForwardThemesLegal Advisor

Annexure DPhotolog

Photo A1 Old Crèche at Puka SekhaoleloPhoto A2 New Crèche at Puka Sekhaolelo

Photo A3 Old Evangelist Church – MotlhotloPhoto A4 New Evangelist Church – Motlhotlo

Photo A5 New Motlhotlo Village Clinic (Old Village had no Clinic)Photo A6 Typical Shop in Motlhotlo – OldPhoto A7 Typical Shop in Motlhotlo – New

Photo A8 The Old Cornelius Masebe Primary SchoolPhoto A9 The New Cornelius Masebe Primary SchoolPhoto A10 Ga Sekhaolelo – current (or before)Photo 3A11 Ga Sekhaolelo – after replacement

Photo A12 Ga Puka small ‘additional’ 30 m 2 house (Stand No. 280) – OldPhoto A13 Ga Puka small ‘additional’ 30 m 2 house (Stand No. 280) – New

Photo A14 190m 2 house Ga-Sekhaolelo, Motlhotlo – OldPhoto A15 190m 2 house Ga-Sekhaolelo, Motlhotlo – New

Photo A16 Ga-Puka 115m 2 medium house stand (Stand 52) – OldPhoto A17 Ga-Puka 115m 2 medium house stand (Stand 52) – New

Photo A18 Typical 50m 2 House – OldPhoto 3A19 Typical 50m 2 House – NewPhoto A20 Village: 43km Gravel Road with paved storm water drains

Photo A21 7.5 km tarred access roadsPhoto A22 8 km paved stormwater servitude and culvertPhoto A23 Twenty-five high-mast lightsPhoto A24 22 km sub-surface drains

Annexure EDesign Criteria

Annexure FReferences

Action Aid (2008) Precious Metal: The Impact of AngloPlatinum on poor communities in Limpopo, South Africa.Anglo Platinum (2007) Motlhotlo Village Relocation Project: Relocation Project Plan Rev 0.Anglo Platinum (2007) Motlhotlo Village Relocation Project: Relocation Record Edition Number: 03-GJM-06-Feb-2007 Confedential.Anglo Platinum (2007) Motlhotlo Village Relocation Project: Task Team Terms of Reference (TOR) – ‘Rules of theGame’ Edition Number: Rev 0-GJM-26 June 2007 Draft for discussion.Anglo Platinum (2007) Motlhotlo Village Relocation Project: Notes from Task Team Meeting with ProjectManagement Edition Number: 02-GJM-21-August-2007 Confedential.Anglo Platinum (2007) Motlhotlo Village Relocation Project: Proposed Project Management Structure forImplementation Rev-4.Anglo Platinum (2008) The Facts: AngloPlatinum’s response to Actions Aids’ Allegations.Hoffstatter (2008) Limpopo’s dirty Platnium Rush The Weekender (10 November 2008).Mogalakwena Social and Labour Plan, 2008.Ramphele, Petersen and Goldblatt (2008) Visit to communities around PPL.South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) (2008) Mining-related observations and recommendations:Anglo Platinum, affected communities and other stakeholders, in and around the PPL Mine, Limpopo.SRK Consulting (2002) Environmental Management Programme report (EMPR) addendum for the proposedPPRust North Mine.SRK Consulting (2002) PPRust Socio-Economic Report No. 4 (Final).SRK Consulting (2004) Motlhotlo Resettlement EIA Scoping Report.SRK Consulting (1998) Relocation of Ga Pila Village to Sterkwater Farm, Potgietersrus EIA Report.Synergy (2007) AngloPlantinum: Lessons Learnt from Ga Pila and Mothotlo Resettlements.Van der Merwe C (2008) Angloplat’s actions ‘adversely affected’ communities – SAHRC Retrieved 5 November 2008fromhttp://www.miningweekly.com/print_version.php?a_id=146781Wates, Meiring and Barnard (2004) Resettlement Plan for the Motlhotlo Village Relocation Project, Report No. 3-Working Document RAP Extracted Chapter.

Annexure GNon Technical Executive SummariesEnglishSepedi

ERM Ga Pila and Motlhotlo Resettlement Review1 Non Technical Executive Summary1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE REPORTIn November 2008, Anglo Platinum (AP) asked ERM to do a study of the resettlement process whichaffected the villages of Ga Pila and Motlhotlo near their Mogalakwena Platinum Mine. People had beenmoved to allow AP to mine the platinum that was found in the vicinity of these villages. After reports werepublished by Action Aid, the South African Humans Rights Commission, and others, AP decided to askERM to carry out an independent study to help them understand what had gone right and what had gonewrong with the resettlement.The study aimed to do two things:• To look back at the past, and identify the strengths (where AP got it right) and weaknesses (whereAP got it wrong) in how they resettled people to the new villages; and• To make recommendations for creating a better future for the communities and a betterrelationship between the communities and AP.Measuring How Anglo Platinum PerformedERM used internationally recognised standards from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) as ameasuring stick to see how well AP did with the resettlement. ERM decided to use these standards eventhough they did not exist at the time that the resettlements began. This would have made getting theresettlement ‘right’ more difficult for AP because there were no principles to help guide them at thetime. AP were comfortable for ERM to use these standards because they want to be able to improvetheir performance at Mogalakwena Platinum Mine and to learn from this example at other mines whereresettlement is going to have to happen.One of the most important things that the IFC standards say is that AP should make sure that the resettledresidents are not worse off than they were before they moved. Wherever possible, people’s lives shouldalso be improved.

How the Report was ResearchedERM tried to speak to as many people as possible affected by theresettlement. This was to make sure that lots of different stories andexperiences of the resettlement could be heard and included in ourreport.ERM visited the following communities:• The people from Ga Pila who moved to the new village atSterkwater;• The people who chose not to move in the old Ga Pila village;• The people from Motlhotlo who moved to the new villages- Ga Puka at Rooibokfontein and Ga Sekhaolelo at Armoede;and• The people who chose not to move from the old Motlhotlovillage.ERM met with these villages 3 times:• In February 2009 to introduce ourselves;• In March 2009 to have meetings and listen to people’s storiesabout what they remember about moving to the new villages;and• In November 2009 to share the results of the ERM study, andto give people a chance to share their ideas for creating a betterfuture for their communities.ERM also spoke to AP and other people who played a part in theresettlement process, including people in the Local and ProvincialGovernment and community lawyers.After hearing all these different stories, ERM has written this reportto show the key strengths and weaknesses in AP’s approach, and tomake suggestions about what the next steps are towards a betterfuture.Looking Back: What ERM FoundBefore measuring AP’s performance, ERM realised that there were challenges which made it more difficult for AP to do the resettlement well.Challenging CircumstancesThe resettlement process at Ga Pila was the first resettlement in South Africa since the end of Apartheid. Before this, people would simply havebeen forced to move off the land without being asked. This meant that this resettlement was very new and not everybody involved knewwhat to expect. For example:• AP had not done a resettlement in the new South Africa and did not know what to do. The IFC standards did not yet exist and so couldnot help guide AP.• People in the communities hoped that by moving to a new village, all their problems would be solved. They were disappointed whenthey realised that the benefits they received because of resettlement would only help them meet or slightly improve their previousstandard of living.• The Government did not know what to expect and many politicians became involved, sometimes making things more complicated.This all made it more difficult for AP to resettle people in a way that met expectations and avoided unhappiness.While ERM understands these challenging circumstances, the study still shows that there were strengths and weaknesses in how AP handledthe resettlement in Ga Pila and Motlhotlo. On the whole, AP’s performance was better on the Motlhotlo resettlement than it was on Ga Pila.In general, AP did the following things either very well or quite well for both Ga Pila and Motlhotlo:• They included all people who were affected by resettlement when deciding who to compensate;• They gave all people who were moved new homes and tried to give the community new farming land to replace the land that waslost;• They made sure that all people were given home ownership certificates for their new homes;• They did a good job of counting what people owned (this was recorded in the ‘Green Files’); and• They helped people to actually move from one village to the other.

The following things were not done in a very good way, for both Ga Pila and Motlhotlo:• They did not have one plan which guided them on all the things that should have been done in the resettlement process;• They did not have a good enough system in place to pick up on what was going wrong – this meant that they couldn’t always fixtheir mistakes when they happened;• They did not have enough people with the right skills working for them – this meant that the resettlement was not always done aswell as it should’ve been;• They did not give special attention to those people who were more vulnerable, like female-headed households or the youth;• They did not always listen carefully enough to people’s problems or respond quickly enough to these problems;• They did not speak directly to people enough and did not make sure that all people in the community were able to raise questionsor concerns;• They did not understand how emotionally difficult it would be for people to move to a new village; and• In spite of efforts made, they did not make sure that people’s lives were left better off than they were before.Ga PilaOn the whole, ERM found that the way AP resettled the village from Ga Pila to Sterkwater did not meet many of the IFC standards. MoreWinformation on the findings is available in the table below.Please note: ‘Non-alignment’ means that AP did not meet the IFC standard. Partial alignment means that AP went some way to meeting theIFC standard but did not do enough. Alignment means that AP did meet the IFC standard.ThemeAvoid or MinimiseResettlementLand Acquisition andLand RightsIdentifying AffectedPeople andAssessing EligibilityWorld Bank( IFC) Standard RequirementAP must consider different mine designs to try to avoid, or at least minimise, the need forresettlement.AP must try to gain rights to the land through negotiated agreements whenever possible.AP must document all agreements reached on their use of the land for the resettlementprocess.AP must ensure those with formal and informal land rights are compensated.AP must make sure everybody owns their new houses after the resettlement.AP must make sure that everybody owns the land on which their house is built.AP must identify everyone who is going to be affected by resettlement.AP must do a study to find out what people own and work out how much these assets areworth.AP must understand the circumstances of those they pay compensation to and givespecial help to those who are more vulnerable.AP must have a date by when they identify who should be given compensation. Anyonewho moves to the area after that date should not be given compensation.PerformanceAssessmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentAlignmentAlignmentNot applicableAlignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentNon- alignment

ThemeEffectiveConsultationCompensationGrievanceMechanismRelocation Assistanceand Transition SupportWorld Bank( IFC) Standard RequirementAP should consult with all those who are affected by the resettlement to make sure peoplehave all the information they need as early as possible.AP must not exclude anyone from this consultation and must do all meetings in a way thatsuits the local culture.AP must consult early in the process through an environmental impact assessmentprocess which looks at the impacts of the move.The consultation should focus on the way in which peoples’ lives may be changed as aresult of the resettlement, and allow people to give ideas around how to manage thesechanges.Consultation must happen throughout the relocation process.AP must include communities in discussions about compensation.Communities must be offered different choices when AP selects the location of the newvillage/s.AP must consider the views of the affected community when making decisions which willaffect the communities’ lives.AP must provide resettlement options, including how people are compensated.AP must provide people new property of equal or higher value.AP should compensate people by giving them new land rather than by buying their landfrom them.AP must pay compensation for all lost assets at full replacement cost.AP must pay compensation for assets other than land e.g. graves, boreholes, fruit trees.AP must try to replace assets rather than pay people for their assets.AP must compensate people for any losses their businesses experience.All compensation must be paid before the actual move happens.AP must have a system which helps them hear and address people’s issues (a grievancemechanism).AP must make sure everybody knows about and understands the grievance mechanism.AP must make sure that all people can raise their issues through the grievance mechanismand that no-one is excluded because of their circumstances or culture.AP must make sure that the grievance mechanism is able to cope with the number andtypes of issues raised.The grievance mechanism must help to build and maintain relationships between AP andthe communities.AP must make sure that the grievance mechanism addresses all issues raised in areasonable amount of time.AP must make sure that the workings of the grievance mechanism can be easily reviewedand progress followed.AP must ensure there is an option for people to raise issues with an independent body ifthey do not feel comfortable using the Mine’s grievance mechanism.AP must make sure that people do not have to pay to make use of the grievancemechanism and that they are not punished for making use of it.AP must make sure that people can still go to court if they are unhappy, even thoughthere is a grievance mechanism.AP must help people with the actual move with particular attention to the needs of thepoor and vulnerable.AP must provide people with support as they set up their businesses at the new site andmust pay them compensation for any income lost during the time of the move.AP must give support to businesses for a reasonable period of time after the move.PerformanceAssessmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentAlignmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentAlignmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentAlignmentAlignmentAlignmentNon- alignment

ThemeImprove/RestoreLiving Conditionsand Address Post-ResettlementDevelopmentImplementationPlanning, EnsuringCapacityWorld Bank( IFC) Standard RequirementAP must make sure that the conditions in which people live at the new village are the sameor better than those at the old village.AP must pay compensation for all lost assets so that people’s lives are the same or betterthan they were before. This includes for small businesses and agricultural fields.For those who lose their businesses or livelihoods, AP must provide extra support to helpthem improve or at least restore their income levels.AP must help the community to develop and benefit through the resettlement project.Resettlement is only complete when the negative changes caused by the resettlement havebeen addressed.AP must develop appropriate systems and plans to guide them as they plan and implementresettlement.AP must make sure that they consider the negative changes that may be experienced bythose who live in the area to which others are being moved (the new villages).AP must make sure they have enough of the right staff to do a successful resettlement.AP must make sure that they monitor what happens during and after the resettlement, andlearn from and correct mistakes when things go wrong.PerformanceAssessmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentMotlhotloAlthough ERM found many problems at Motlhotlo, it was also clear that the Motlhotlo resettlement was a big improvement on the Ga Pilaone. It measured much better against the IFC standards. For example, AP did the following things better at Motlhotlo than Ga Pila:• They improved on the way in which the community were involved in the negotiation and agreement for the land and new villages;• They were better at making sure that people had the same or improved homes at the new village;• They were better at how compensation was carried out, and provided more compensation to affected residents for their assets;• AP did more to try and improve infrastructure and services at the villages; and• AP consulted people more often and were better at responding to people’s problems, especially their problems with their houses.However, the weaknesses listed earlier still apply at Motlhotlo. More information on the findings is available in the table below.Please note: ‘Non-alignment’ means that AP did not meet the IFC standard. Partial alignment means that AP went some way to meeting theIFC standard but did not do enough. Alignment means that AP did meet the IFC standard.

ThemeAvoid or Minimise ResettlementLand Acquisition and LandRightsIdentifying Affected People andAssessing EligibilityEffective ConsultationCompensationWorld Bank( IFC) Standard RequirementAP must consider different mine designs to try to avoid, or at least minimise,the need for resettlement.AP must try to gain rights to the land through negotiated agreementswhenever possible.AP must document all agreements reached on their use of the land for theresettlement process.AP must ensure those with formal and informal land rights are compensated.AP must make sure everybody owns their new houses after the resettlement.AP must make sure that everybody owns the land on which their house is built.AP must identify everyone who is going to be affected by resettlement.AP must do a study to find out what people own and work out how muchthese assets are worth.AP must understand the circumstances of those they pay compensation to andgive special help to those who are more vulnerable.AP must have a date by when they identify who should be givencompensation. Anyone who moves to the area after that date should not begiven compensation.AP should consult with all those who are affected by the resettlement to makesure people have all the information they need as early as possible.AP must not exclude anyone from this consultation and must do all meetingsin a way that suits the local culture.AP must consult early in the process through an environmental impactassessment process which looks at the impacts of the move.The consultation should focus on the way in which peoples’ lives may bechanged as a result of the resettlement, and allow people to give ideas aroundhow to manage these changes.Consultation must happen throughout the relocation process.AP must include communities in discussions about compensation.Communities must be offered different choices when AP selects the location ofthe new village/s.AP must consider the views of the affected community when making decisionswhich will affect the communities’ lives.AP must provide resettlement options, including how people arecompensated.AP must provide people new property of equal or higher value.AP should compensate people by giving them new land rather than by buyingtheir land from them.AP must pay compensation for all lost assets at full replacement cost.AP must pay compensation for assets other than land e.g. graves, boreholes,fruit trees.AP must try to replace assets rather than pay people for their assets.AP must compensate people for any losses their businesses experience.All compensation must be paid before the move actually happens.PerformanceAssessmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentAlignmentAlignmentNot applicableAlignmentAlignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentAlignmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignmentAlignmentNon-alignmentAlignmentAlignmentAlignmentPartial alignmentAlignmentAlignmentAlignmentNon- alignment

ThemeGrievance MechanismRelocation Assistance andTransition SupportImprove/Restore LivingConditions and Address Post-Resettlement DevelopmentWorld Bank( IFC) Standard RequirementAP must have a system which helps them hear and address people’s issues (agrievance mechanism).AP must make sure everybody knows about and understands the grievancemechanism.AP must make sure that all people can raise their issues through the grievancemechanism and that no-one is excluded because of their circumstances or culture.AP must make sure that the grievance mechanism is able to cope with the numberand types of issues raised.The grievance mechanism must help to build and maintain relationships betweenAP and the communities.AP must make sure that the grievance mechanism addresses all issues raised in areasonable amount of time.AP must make sure that the workings of the grievance mechanism can be easilyreviewed and progress followed.AP must ensure there is an option for people to raise issues with an independentbody if they do not feel comfortable using the Mine’s grievance mechanism.AP must make sure that people do not have to pay to make use of the grievancemechanism and that they are not punished for making use of it.AP must make sure that people can still go to court if they are unhappy, eventhough there is a grievance mechanism.AP must help people with the actual move with particular attention to the needsof the poor and vulnerable.AP must provide people with support as they set up their businesses at the newsite and must pay them compensation for any income lost during the time of themove.AP must give support to businesses for a reasonable period of time after themove.AP must make sure that the conditions in which people live at the new villageare the same or better than those at the old village.AP must pay compensation for all lost assets so that people’s lives are the sameor better than they were before. This includes for small businesses and foragricultural fields.For those who lose their businesses or livelihood, AP must provide extrasupport to help them improve or at least restore their income or livelihoodlevels.AP must help the community to develop and benefit through the resettlementproject..Resettlement is only complete when the negative changes caused by theresettlement have been addressed.PerformanceAssessmentAlignment (householdgrievances)Partial alignment(general grievances)Alignment (householdgrievances)Partial alignment(general grievances)Alignment (householdgrievances)Non-alignment(general grievances)Non-alignmentNon-alignmentAlignment (householdgrievances)Partial alignment(general grievances)Alignment (householdgrievances)Non-alignment(general grievances)Non-alignmentAlignmentAlignmentPartial alignmentPartial alignment(homesteads)Partial alignment(agricultural fields)AlignmentAlignment (smallbusinesses)Partial alignment(agricultural fields)Partial alignmentNon -alignmentPartial alignment

ThemeImplementation, Planning,Ensuring CapacityWorld Bank( IFC) Standard RequirementAP must develop appropriate systems and plans to guide them as they planand implement the resettlement.AP must make sure that they consider the negative changes that may beexperienced by those who live in the area to which others are being moved(the new villages).AP must make sure they have enough of the right staff to do a successfulresettlement.AP must make sure that they monitor what happens during and after theresettlement, and learn from and correct mistakes when things go wrong.PerformanceAssessmentNon-alignmentNon-alignmentPartial alignmentNon-alignmentMany people at Motlhotlo do not agree with ERM that the process was broadly ‘aligned’ with IFC standards. In particular, they disagree withthe ratings ERM gave AP for compensation. People had very high hopes for the better future the Mine could bring. Many people feel thatthey have a right to benefit from the platinum found on their land, and also expect to be given a benefit share in the Mine. The IFC standardonly expects companies to compensate people for what they owned before the move and to support them in future development projects.It doesn’t give standards around mineral rights. The law in South Africa says that the Government owns all precious resources and not thecommunities who own the land. For this reason, the IFC does not expect AP to pay communities as much compensation as communitiesbelieve they deserve. ERM’s report does not comment on whether the South Africa’s law is fair, but only judges AP on what the IFC standardexpects.Looking Forward: What ERM SuggestsThe looking forward part of the study suggests some things AP needs to change to make sure people have a better future, and that theirrelationship with the communities can be improved. ERM has suggested that AP must:• Openly accept the findings of this report even if they do not agree with all of them. This will help AP to develop a better relationshipwith the community.• Regularly talk and listen to the community. AP must communicate in a way that makes the communities feel heard. This includessetting up a clear process for communicating with and responding to community problems and issues. AP should also help thecommunities elect new representatives to speak on their behalf.• Make sure they have the right people working for them with the right skills to work with communities. These should be people whounderstand the local language and traditions and who are interested in peoples’ issues and concerns.• Do their planning in a way that helps them achieve their goals;• Look again at the compensation paid. Where there is still unfinished business, AP needs to come to an agreement with communitymembers on how to solve these issues.• Look at other ways for the community and the Mine to work together for a better future, for example through communitydevelopment projects.Making the Report Available to the PublicIn March 2010, the final report from the study was handed over to senior staff from AP’s Community Engagement and DevelopmentDepartment in front of the affected communities in Mogalakwena. It was also made available to the media and the public in general.The report is available for all to see. Copies are held by representatives and traditional leaders (Indunas) at each of the affected communitiesand at a public facility in each village (eg. a school or clinic). The Mapela Traditional Authority and the Government will also be given a copy ofthe report. There will also be a copy of the report on AP’s website (www.angloplatinum.com).

5Tekodišišo ya ERM ya go Thothiša setšhabasa Ga Pila le sa MotlhotloKakaretšokgolo ye e Sego ya SetheknikiMATSENO GO PEGOKa Nofemere 2008, Anglo Platinum (AP) e kgopetše ERM go dira dinyakišišo ka ga tshepedišo yago thothiša batho ye e amilego metse ya Ga Pila le Motlhotlo kgauswi le Moepo wa Pholathinamowa Mogalakwena. Batho ba thothišitšwe go dumelela AP go rafa pholathinamo ka moepong ye ehweditšwego kgauswi le metse ye. Ka morago ga ge dipego di phatlaladitšwe ke Action Aid, Khomišeneya Afrika Borwa ya Ditokelo tša Botho, le tše dingwe, AP e tšere sephetho sa go kgopela ERM go diradinyakišišo tše di ekemego go ba thuša go kwešiša gore ke eng ba se kgonnego le seo se bilego lediphošo ka go thothiša moo.Dinyakišišo di ile tša ikemišetša go dira dilo tše pedi:• Go lebelela morago mo nakong ye e fetilego, le go tseba bokgoni (moo AP e kgonnego gona) lebofokodi (mo AP e bilego le diphošo gona) ka ga ka moo ba thothišitšego batho go ya meetseng yabona ye meswa; le• Go dira ditšhišinyo tša go direla ditšhaba bokamoso bjo bokaone le kamano ye kaone magareng gaditšhaba tše le AP.Go ela Ka moo Anglo Platinum e Šomilego ka gonaERM e šomišitše melawana ya boditšhabatšhaba ye e tsebjago go tšwa Koporaseng ya Ditšhelete yaBoditšhabatšhaba-International Finance Corporation, ka seisimane, (IFC) bjalo ka sedirišwa sa kelo sa gobona ka moo AP e dirilego ka gona ka go thothiša. ERM e tšere sephetho sa go šomiša melawana ye lege e le gore e be e se gona ka nako ye go bego go thoma go thothiša batho. Se se ka be se dirile gore gothothiša ‘bokaone’ go be boima kudu go AP ka lebaka la gore go be go se na melawana ya go thuša goba hlahla ka nako yeo. AP e be e lokologile gore ERM e šomiše melawana ye ka lebaka la gore ba nyaka gokgona go kaonafatša mošomo wa bona ka Moepong waPholathinamo wa Mogalakwena le go ithuta kamohlala wo ka meepong ye mengwe moo go thothiša go tlogo swanelwa ke go dirwa.Ye nngwe ya dilo tše bohlokwa kudu tšeo melawana ya Koporase ya Ditšhelete ya Boditšhabatšhaba (IFC)e di bolelago ke gore AP e swanetše go netefatša gore badudi bao ba thothišitšwego ga ba be seemongse sempe go feta pele ga ge ba thothišwa. Ge go kgonagala, maphelo a batho le ona a swanetše gokaonafatšwa.

Ka moo Pego e Nyakišišitšwego ka gonaERM e lekile go boledišana le batho ba bantši bao ba amilwegoke go thotha ka moo go kgonagalago. Se e bile go netefatša goreditaba tše ntši tša go fapafapana le maitemogelo ka ga go thothišwaa ka theeletšwa le go akaretšwa ka gare ga pego. ERM e etetšeditšhaba tše di latelago:• Batho ba Ga Pila bao ba thothetšego motseng o moswa waSterkwater;• Batho bao ba kgethilego go se sepele ba ka motseng wakgale wa Ga Pila;• Batho ba Motlhotlo bao ba ilego meetseng ye meswa - GaPuka ka Rooibokfontein le Ga Sekhaolelo ka Armoede; le• Batho bao ba kgethilego go se sepele ba ka motseng wakgale wa Motlhotlo.ERM e kopane le metse ye makga a 3:• Ka Feperware 2009 go itsebiša;• Ka Matšhe 2009 go ba le dikopano le go theeletša ditaba tšabatho ka ga seo ba se gopolago ka ga go thothela meetsengye meswa; le• Ka Nofemere 2009 go ba botša dipoelo tša dinyakišišo tšaERM, le go fa batho sebaka sa go bolela dikgopolo tša bona tšago tlišetša ditšhaba tša bona bokamoso bjo bokaone.ERM e boletše gape le AP le batho ba bangwe bao ba kgathilegotema ka tshepedišong ya go thothiša, go akaretšwa batho kaMmušong wa Selegae le wa Phrobentshe le boramelao ba setšhaba.Ka morago ga go kwa ditaba tše tša go fapafapana, ERM e ngwadilepego ye go bontšha bokgoni le bofokodi tše di lego bohlokwa kamokgweng wa tshepedišo wa AP, le go dira ditšhišinyo ka ga goremagato ao a latelago ke afe go tliša bokamoso bjo bokaone.Re lebelela Morago: Seo ERM e se HweditšegoPele e ela mošomo wa AP, ERM e lemogile gore go na le ditlhohlo tše di dirilego gore go be boima kudu gore AP e phethagatše go thothišabatho gabotse.Maemo ao a tlišago DitlhohloTshepedišo ya go thothiša batho Ga Pila e bile go thothiša batho ga mathomo ka Afrika Borwa mola Kgethologanyo e felago. Pele ga se, bathoba be ba no gapeletšwa go thotha lefelong ka ntle le go kgopelwa. Se se ra gore go thothiša mo go be go le go go mpsha kudu gomme ga semang le mang yo a bego a amegago yo a bego a tseba gore o tlo emela eng. Go fa mohlala:• AP ga se ya ka ya thothiša batho ka Afrika Borwa ye mpsha gomme e be e sa tsebe se e bego e swanetše go se dira. Melawana ya IFC ebe e se gona ka nako yeo gomme e be e ka se kgone go hlahla AP.• Batho ba ka ditšhabeng tše ba be ba holofela gore ge ba thothela motseng o moswa, mathata a bona ka moka a tlo rarollwa. Ba ile banyama ge ba lemoga gore dikholego tše ba di hweditšego ka lebaka la go thothišwa di tla ba thuša fela go fihlelela goba go kaonafatšagannyane maemo a bona a bophelo ao a fetilego.• Mmušo o be o sa tsebe gore o tla emela eng gomme boradipolotiki ba bantši ba ile ba kgatha tema, gomme ka dinako še dingwe badira gore dilo di hlakahlakane le go feta.Tše ka moka di dirile gore go be boima go AP go thothiša batho ka tsela ye e fihlelelago dikemelo le go efoga go nyama.Le ge ERM e kwešiša maemo ao a nago le ditlhohlo, dinyakišišo di sa bontšha gore go bile le bokgoni le bofokodi ka ga ka moo AP esepedišitšego go thothiša batho ka Ga Pila le Motlhotlo. Ka botlalo, mošomo wa AP o bile kaone ka go thothišeng ga batho ba Motlhotlo gofeta ka moo go bilego ka gona ka Ga Pila.Ka kakaretšo, AP e dirile dilo tše di latelago e ka ba gabotse kudu goba gabotse gannyane ka Ga Pila le Motlhotlo:• Ba akareditše batho ka moka bao ba amilwego ke go thothišwa ge ba tšea sephetho sa gore ke bomang bao ba ka lefelwago;• Ba file batho ka moka bao ba thothišitšwego dintlo tše mpsha gomme ba leka go fa setšhaba naga ye mpsha ya temo go putseletšanaga ye e ba lahlegetšego;• Ba netefaditše gore batho ka moka ba filwe disetifikeiti tša gore ke beng ba dintlo tša bona tše mpsha;• Ba dirile mošomo o mobotse wa go bala gore batho ba be ba na le eng (se se ngwadilwe ka gare ga ‘Difaele tše Talamorogo’); gomme• Ba thušitše batho go thotha go tloga motseng go ya go o mongwe.

Dilo tše di latelago ga se tša dirwa ka tsela ye kaone kudu, nageng ya Ga Pila le Motlhotlo:• Ga se ba ba le leano le tee leo le bego le ba hlahla ka ga dilo ka moka tše di bego di swanetšego go ba di dirilwe ka tshepedišong yago thothiša;• Ba be ba se na tshepedišo ye e bego e lokile kudu mo go lekanago ye e bego e kgona go bona diphošo – se e bile gore ba be ba sakgone go lokiša diphošo tša bona ka mehla ge di hlaga;• Ba be ba se na batho bao ba lekanego bao ba bego ba na le bokgoni bja maleba bao ba bego ba ba šomela – se e bile gore gothothiša go be go sa dirwa gabotse ka mehla go ya ka mo go bego go swanetše go dirwa ka gona;• Ba be ba sa hlokomele batho bao ba bego ba le kotsing kudu, go swana le malapa ao a bego a le ka fase ga basadi goba bafsa;• Ba be ba sa theeletše mathata a batho ka mehla ka kelohloko goba ba sa fetole mathata a ka pela ka mo go bego go swanetše;• Ba be ba sa boledišane thwii le batho ka mo go lekanago gomme ba sa netefatše gore batho ka moka ka setšhabeng ba be ba kgonago tliša dipotšišo goba dingongorego;• Ba be ba sa kwešiše gore go tlo ba boima bjang maikutlong go batho go thothela motseng o mofsa; gomme• Ka ntle le maitapišo ao ba a dirilego, ba be ba sa netefatše gore maphelo a batho a tlogelwa a le kaone go feta ka moo a bego a le kagona peleng.Ga PilaKa botlalo, ERM e hweditše gore ka tsela yeo AP e thothišitšego motse go tšwa Ga Pila go ya Sterkwater ga se gwa sepelelana le melawana yementši ya IFC. Tshedimošo ka botlalo ka ga dikutollo tše e hwetšagala ka mo lenaneong la ka fase.Ka kgopelo hlokomela: ‘Go se sepelelane’ go ra gore AP ga se ya fihlelela melawana ya IFC. ‘Go sepelelana ka seripa’ go ra gore AP e dirile tšentši go fihlelela melawana ya IFC eupša ga se ya dira ka mo go lekanego. ‘Go Sepelelana’ go ra gore AP e fihleletše melawana ya IFC.Morero Senyakwa sa Molawana wa Panka ya Lefase ( IFC) Tekolo ya MošomoEfoga goba Fokotšago ThothišaGo Hwetša Naga leDitokelo tša NagaGo tseba Batho baoba Amegago le goSekaseka go ba leMaswanediAP e swanetše go hlokomela ditlhamo tša meepo go efoga, goba bonyane gofokotša, nyakego ya go thothiša.AP e swanetše go leka go hwetša tokelo ya go tsena nageng ka ditumelelano tšaditherišano nako le nako ge go kgonagala.AP e swanetše go ngwala ditumelelano ka moka tše di fihleletšwego ka ga tšhomišoya bona ya naga ya tshepedišo ya go thothiša.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore bao ba nago le ditokelo tša naga tša semmušo letše di sego tša semmušo ba a lefša.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore mang le mang o na le ntlo ya gagwe ka morago gago thothišwa.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore motho yo mongwe le yo mongwe ke mong wanaga yeo ntlo ya gagwe e agilwego gona.AP e swanetše go tseba motho yo mongwe le yo mongwe yo a tlogo angwa ke go thothišwa.AP e swanetše go dira dinyakišišo go tseba gore batho ba na le eng le go lekola goredithoto tšeo ke bokae.AP e swanetše go kwešiša maemo a batho bao e ba lefago gomme e fe thušo ye ekgethegilego go bao ba lego kotsing kudu.AP e swanetšego go ba le letšatšikgwedi le e le šomišago go tseba bao e swanetšegogo ba lefa. Motho mang le mang yo a tsenago lefelong ka morago ga letšatšikgwedileo ga se a swanela go lefša.Go se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGa e amegeGo sepelelanaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelane

Morero Senyakwa sa Molawana wa Panka ya Lefase ( IFC) Tekolo ya MošomoGo dirwa gaDitherišanoTefeloMokgwa wa go rarollaDingongoregoAP e swanetše go rerišana le batho ka moka bao ba angwago ke go thothišwa gonetefatša gore batho ba hwetša tshedimošo ka moka ye ba e hlokago ka pela ka moogo kgonagalago.AP ga se ya swanela go beela motho yo mongwe ka thoko ka ditherišanong tšegomme e swanetše go sepediša dikopano tše di sepelelanago le setšo sa ka nageng.AP e swanetše go dira ditherišano e sa le ka pela ka tshepedišong ka go šomišatshepedišo ya seabe go tikologo eo e lekolago ditlamorago tša go thota.Ditherišano di swanetše go sepetšwa ka tsela yeo maphelo a batho a ka fetošwago kagona ka lebaka la go thothišwa, le go dumelela batho go fa dikgopolo tša mabapi leka moo e ka laolago diphetošo tše.Ditherišano di swanetše go dirwa ka tshepedišong go thota ka moka.AP e swanetše go akaretša ditšhaba ge go ahlaahlwa ditefelo.Ditšhaba di swanetše go fiwa dikgetho tša go fapafapana ge AP e kgetha lefelo lamotse/metse ye meswa.AP e swanetše go hlokomela maikutlo a setšhaba seo se amegago ge e tšea diphethotše di tlogo ama maphelo a ditšhaba.AP e swanetše go fa dikgetho tša go thothiša, go akaretšwa ka moo batho balefelwago ka gona.AP e swanetše go fa batho dintlo tše mpsha tša boleng bja go lekana le dintlo tšabona tša peleng goba tša boleng bja godingwana.AP e swanetše go lefela batho ka go ba fa naga ye mpsha sebakeng sa go reka naga ya bona.AP e swanetše go lefa tefelo ya dithoto tše di lahlegilego ka moka ka botlalo.AP e swanetše go lefa tefelo ya dithoto ka ntle le naga mohlala; mabitla, dipetse,mehlare ya dienywa.AP e swanetše go leka go tliša dithoto tše dingwe sebakeng sa tše di tlogetšwego esego go lefela batho dithoto tša bona.AP e swanetše go lefela batho ditahlegelo dife goba dife tše dikgwebo tša bona diitemogetšego tšona.Ditefelo ka moka di swanetše go lefša pele ga ge go ka thothišwa.AP e swanetše go ba le tshepedišo ye e ba thušago go theeletša le go rarolla mathataa batho (mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego).AP e swanetše go netefatša gore motho yo mongwe le yo mongwe o a tseba le gokwešiša mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore batho ka moka ba kgona go tliša mathata a bonaka mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego le gore ga go motho yo a sa akaretšwego kalebaka la maemo a gagwe goba setšo sa gagwe.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore lenanego la tshepedišo ya dingongorego le kgonago akaretša palo le mehuta ya mathata ao a hlagišitšwego.Lenanego la tshepedišo ya dingongorego le swanetše go aga le go tlhotlheletšaboagelano magareng ga AP le setšhaba.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego o rarollamathataa ka moka mo nakong e e amogelegago.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore lenanego la go rarolla dingongorego le kahlahlobiwa bonolo le gore tema ya lona e šalwe morago.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore goba le lenanego la tshepedišo ya dingongorego lelengwe le le ikemeng kanoši ge e le gore gona le batho ba ba sa ikwego go lokologago šomiša lenanego le le hlomilwego ke ba Moepo.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore batho ga ba swanelwe ke go lefa ge ba šomišamokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego le gore ga ba swanela go otliwa ge ba o šomiša.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore batho ba ka ya kgorong ya tsheko ge e le gore ga seba thaba, le ge e le gore go na le mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego.Go sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelanaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelanaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelanaGo sepelelana

Morero Senyakwa sa Molawana wa Panka ya Lefase ( IFC) Tekolo ya MošomoThušo ya go Thothišale Thekgo yaLebakanyanaKaonafatša/Tšwetšapele Maemo aBophelo gommeRarolla Tlhabollo yaka Morago ga goThothišaPeakanyo yaPhethagatšo, GoNetefatša BokgoniMotlhotloAP e swanetše go thuša batho ge ba thotha gape go elwe hloko dinyakwa tša bahlokang le ba ba sa itekanelago.AP e swanetše go fa batho thekgo ge ba hloma dikgwebo tša bona lefelong lelefsa ebile e swanetše go ba lefa tefelo ya tahlegelo efe goba efe ya letseno nakongya ge ba thotha. AP e swanetše go fa dikgwebo thekgo mo lebakeng la nako le lekwagalago ka morago ga ge di thothilwe.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore maemo ao batho ba phelago ka fase ga onamotseng o moswa a a swana goba a kaone go a motseng wa kgale.AP e swanetše go lefa tefelo go dithoto ka moka tše di lahlegilego go kgonthišišagore maphelo a batho a swane le peleng goba a be kaone go feta peleng. Se se amadikwebo potlana le naga tša temo.Go bao ba lahlegelwago ke dikgwebo tša bona goba mešomo ya bona ye e begoe ba tlišetša letseno, AP e swanetše go ba fa thekgo ya tlaleletšo go ba thuša gokaonafatša goba bonyane go bušetša sekeng maemo a bona a go hwetša letseno.AP e swanetše go thuša setšhaba go hlabologa le go holega ka protšeke ya go bathothiša.Go thothiša batho go phethilwe ge fela diphetogo tše di sego tša loka tše dibakilwego ke go thota di šetše di rarollotšwe.AP e swanetše go tšwetša pele ditshepedišo tša maleba le maano a go ba hlahla geba dira dipeakanyo le go phethagatša go thothiša batho.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore e hlokomela diphetogo tše di sego tša loka tše di kaitemogelwago ke batho bao ba dulago moo lefelong leo batho ba thothelwago golona (metse ye meswa).AP e swanetše go netefatša gore e na le bašomi bao ba lekanego ba maleba gothothiša batho ka katlegoAP e swanetše go netefatša gore e hlokomela seo se diregago nakong ya go thothiša le kamorago ga go thothiša batho, le go ithuta ka diphošo le go di phošolla ge dilo di senyegaGo sepelelanaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneLe ge e le gore ERM e hweditše mathata a mantši ka Motlhotlo, go bile molaleng gape gore go thothiša batho ga Motlhotlo e bile kaonafalo yekgolo ya go thothiša batho ba Ga Pila. Go etšwe bokaone kudu kgahlanong le melawana ya IFC. Go fa mohlala, AP e dirile dilo tše di latelagobokaone ka Motlhotlo go phala ga Ga Pila:• Ba dirile bokaone ka tsela yeo ba tsenetšeng ditherišano le setšhaba go fihlela kwano ya naga le naga ya bodulo empša;• Ba dirile bokaone go netefatša gore batho ba na le dintlo tše di swanago goba tše di kaonafaditšwego motseng wo moswa;• Ba bile kaone ka ga ka moo ditefelo di sepedišitšwego ka gona, gomme ba fa tefelo ya godimo go badudi bao dithoto tša bona di begodi amega;• AP e dirile mo go tletšego seatla go leka go kaonafatša ditlabelo le ditirelo mo motseng; gape• AP e rerišane le batho gantši kudu gomme e dirile bokaone go araba mathata a batho, kudukudu mathata a bona a mabapi le dintlo tšabona.Le ge go le bjale, mafokodi ao a boletšwego peleng a sa šoma ka Motlhotlo.Tshedimošo ka botlalo ka ga dikutollo tše e hwetšagala ka mo lenaneong le le tsentšwego:Ka kgopelo hlokomela: ‘Go se Sepelelane’ go ra gore AP ga se ya fihlelela melawana ya IFC. ‘Go Sepelelana ka seripa’ go ra gore AP e dirile tšentši go fihlelela melawana ya IFC eupša ga se ya dira ka mo go lekanego. ‘Go Sepelelana’ go ra gore AP e fihleletše melawana ya IFC.

Morero Senyakwa sa Molawana wa Panka ya Lefase ( IFC) Tekolo ya MošomoEfoga goba Fokotša goThothišaGo Hwetša Naga leDitokelo tša NagaGo tseba Batho baoba Amegago le goSekaseka go ba leMaswanediGo dirwa gaDitherišanoTefeloAP e swanetše go hlokomela ditlhamo tša meepo go efoga, goba bonyane gofokotša, nyakego ya go thothiša.AP e swanetše go leka go hwetša tokelo ya go tsena nageng ka ditumelelano tšaditherišano nako le nako ge go kgonagala.AP e swanetše go ngwala ditumelelano ka moka tše di fihleletšwego ka ga tšhomišoya bona ya naga ya tshepedišo ya go thothiša.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore bao ba nago le ditokelo tša naga tša semmušo le tšedi sego tša semmušo ba a lefša.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore mang le mang o na le ntlo ya gagwe ka morago gago thothišwa.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore motho yo mongwe le yo mongwe ke mong wanaga yeo ntlo ya gagwe e agilwego gona.AP e swanetše go tseba motho yo mongwe le yo mongwe yo a tlogo angwa ke go thothišwa.AP e swanetše go dira dinyakišišo go tseba gore batho ba na le eng gomme eswanetše go ba lefela dithoto tše di ba lahlegetšego ka mo go swanetšego.AP e swanetše go kwešiša maemo a batho bao e ba lefago gomme e fe thušo ye ekgethegilego go bao ba lego kotsing kudu.AP e na le letšatšikgwedi le e le šomišago go tseba bao e swanetšego go ba lefa.Motho mang le mang yo a tsenago lefelong ka morago ga letšatšikgwedi leo ga se aswanela go lefša.AP e swanetše go rerišana le batho ka moka bao ba angwago ke go thothišwa gonetefatša gore batho ba hwetša tshedimošo ka moka ye ba e hlokago ka pela ka moogo kgonagalago.AP ga se ya swanela go beela motho yo mongwe ka thoko ka ditherišanong tšegomme e swanetše go sepediša dikopano tše di sepelelanago le setšo sa ka nageng.AP e swanetše go dira ditherišano e sa le ka pela ka tshepedišong ka go šomišatshepedišo ya seabe go tikologo.Ditherišano di swanetše go sepetšwa ka tsela yeo maphelo a batho a ka fetošwago kagona ka lebaka la go thothišwa, le go dumelela batho go fa dikgopolo tša mabapi leka moo e ka laolago diphetošo tše.Ditherišano di swanetše go dirwa ka tshepedišong ka moka.AP e swanetše go akaretša ditšhaba ge go ahlaahlwa ditefelo.Ditšhaba di swanetše go fiwa dikgetho tša go fapafapana ge AP e kgetha lefelo lamotse/metse ye meswa.AP e swanetše go hlokomela maikutlo a setšhaba seo se amegago ge e tšea diphethotše di tlogo ama maphelo a ditšhaba.AP e swanetše go fa dikgetho tša go thothiša, go akaretšwa ka moo batho balefelwago ka gona.AP e swanetše go fa batho dintlo tše mpsha tša boleng bja go lekana le dintlo tšabona tša peleng goba tša boleng bja godingwana.AP e swanetše go lefela batho ka go ba fa naga ye mpsha sebakeng sa go reka naga ya bona.AP e swanetše go lefa tefelo ya dithoto tše di lahlegilego ka moka ka botlalo.AP e swanetše go lefa tefelo ya dithoto ka ntle le naga mohlala; mabitla, dipetse,mehlare ya dienywa.AP e swanetše go leka go tliša dithoto tše dingwe sebakeng sa tše di tlogetšwego esego go lefela batho dithoto tša bona.AP e swanetše go lefela batho ditahlegelo dife goba dife tše dikgwebo tša bona diitemogetšego tšona.Ditefelo ka moka di swanetše go lefša pele ga ge go ka thothišwa.Go se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGa e amegeGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelanaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelanaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGo sepelelana ka seripaGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGo se sepelelane

Morero Senyakwa sa Molawana wa Panka ya Lefase ( IFC) Tekolo ya MošomoMokgwa wa go rarollaDingongoregoThušo ya go Thothišale Thekgo yaLebakanyanaKaonafatša/Tšwetšapele Maemo aBophelo gommeRarolla Tlhabollo yaka Morago ga goThothišaAP e swanetše go ba le tshepedišo ye e ba thušago go theeletša le go rarolla mathataa batho (mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego).AP e swanetše go netefatša gore motho yo mongwe le yo mongwe o a tseba le gokwešiša mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore batho ka moka ba kgona go tliša mathata a bonaka mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego le gore ga go motho yo a sa akaretšwego kalebaka la maemo a gagwe goba setšo sa gagwe.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore lenanego la tshepedišo ya dingongorego le kgonago akaretša palo ya mathata ao a hlagišitšwego.Lenanego la tshepedišo ya dingongorego le swanetše go aga le go tlhotlheletšaboagelano magareng ga AP le setšhaba.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego o rarollamathataa ka moka tše di tlišitšwego ka nako e e amogelegilego.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore lenanego la go rarolla dingongorego le kahlahlobiwa bonolo le gore tema ya lona e šalwe morago.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore goba le lenanego la tshepedišo ya dingongoregole lengwe le le ikemeng kanoši ge e le gore gona le batho ba ba sa ikwego golokologa go šomiša lenanego le le hlomilwego ke ba Moepo.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore batho ga ba swanelwe ke go lefa ge ba šomišamokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego le gore ga ba swanelwa go otlwa ge ba ošomiša.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore batho ba ka ya kgorong ya tsheko ge e le gore ga seba thaba, le ge e le gore go na le mokgwa wa go rarolla dingongorego.AP e swanetše go thuša batho ge ba thotha gape go elwe hloko dinyakwa tša bahlokang le ba ba sa itekanelago.AP e swanetše go fa batho thekgo ge ba hloma dikgwebo tša bona lefelong lelefsa ebile e swanetše go ba lefa tefelo ya tahlegelo efe goba efe ya letseno nakongya ge ba thotha. AP e swanetše go fa dikgwebo thekgo mo lebakeng la nako le lekwagalago ka morago ga ge di thothilwe.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore maemo ao batho ba phelago ka fase ga onamotseng o moswa a a swana goba a kaone go a motseng wa kgale.AP e swanetše go lefa tefelo go dithoto ka moka tše di lahlegilego go kgonthišišagore maphelo a batho a swane le peleng goba a be kaone go feta peleng. Se se amadikwebo potlana le naga tša temo.Go bao ba lahlegelwago ke dikgwebo tša bona goba mešomo ya bona ye e begoe ba tlišetša letseno, AP e swanetše go ba fa thekgo ya tlaleletšo go ba thuša gokaonafatša goba bonyane go bušetša sekeng maemo a bona a go hwetša letseno.AP e swanetše go thuša setšhaba go hlabologa le go holega ka protšeke ya go bathothiša.Go thothiša batho go phethilwe ge fela diphetogo tše di sego tša loka tše dibakilwego ke go thota di šetše di rarollotšwe.Go sepelelana (dillo tša kametseng)Go sepelelana ka seripa(dillo ka kakaretšo)Go sepelelana ka seripa(dillo tša ka metseng)Go sepelelana ka seripa(dillo ka kakaretšo)Go sepelelana(dillo tša ka metseng)Go se sepelelane(dillo ka kakaretšo)Go se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana (dillo tša kametseng)Go sepelelana ka seripa(dillo ka kakaretšo)Go sepelelana(dillo tša ka metseng)Go se sepelelane(dillo ka kakaretšo)Go se sepelelaneGo sepelelanaGo sepelelanaGo sepelelana ka seripaMetse(Go sepelelana ka seripa)Naga ya temo(Go sepelelana ka seripa)Go sepelelanaDikgwebo potlana(Go sepelelana)Naga ya temo(Go sepelelana ka seripa)Go sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripa

Morero Senyakwa sa Molawana wa Panka ya Lefase ( IFC) Tekolo ya MošomoPeakanyo yaPhethagatšo, GoNetefatša BokgoniAP e swanetše go tšwetša pele ditshepedišo tša maleba le maano a go ba hlahla geba dira dipeakanyo le go phethagatša go thothiša batho.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore e hlokomela diphetogo tše di sego tša loka tše di kaitemogelwago ke batho bao ba dulago moo lefelong leo batho ba thothelwago golona (metse ye meswa).AP e swanetše go netefatša gore e na le bašomi bao ba lekanego ba maleba gothothiša batho ka katlego.AP e swanetše go netefatša gore e hlokomela seo se diregago nakong ya go thothišale ka morago ga go thothiša batho, le go ithuta ka diphošo le go di phošolla ge dilodi senyega.Go se sepelelaneGo se sepelelaneGo sepelelana ka seripaGo se sepelelaneBatho ba bantši ka Motlhotlo ga ba kwane le ERM gore tshepedišo e ‘sepelelane’ ka botlalo le melawana ya IFC. Ga mmakgonthe, ba ganana ledinhla tse ERM e filego AP mo lebakeng la tsa ditefelo. Batho ba bile le dikholofelo tša godimo tša bokamoso bjo bokaone bjo Moepo o ka botlišago. Batho ba bantši ba ikwa gore ba na le tokelo go pholathinamo ye e hweditšwego moo nageng yeo, gape ba holofela go fiwa kabeloMoepong. Melawana ya IFC e nyaka fela gore dikhamphani di lefele batho dilo tšeo ba bego ba na le tšona pele ga ge ba ka thotha le go bathuša ka diprotšekeng tša tlhabollo tša ka moso. Ga e hlatholle ka melawana ya go amana le ditokelo tša diminerale. Molao wa Afrika Borwa ore Mmušo ke mong wa methopo ka moka ye bohlokwa e sego setšhaba seo se lego beng ba naga. Ka lebaka le, IFC ga se ya emela gore AP elefe ditšhaba tšhelete ye ntši yeo ba dumelago gore ba na le maswanedi a go e hwetša. Pego ya ERM ga e bolele selo ka ga ge eba molao waAfrika Borwa o lokile ka ga se, eupša e ahlola AP ka ga seo molawana wa IFC o se emetšego.Re lebeletše Pele: Se ERM e se ŠišinyagoKarolo ya re lebeletše pele ya dinyakišišo e šišinya dilo tše mmalwa tšeo AP e swanetšego go di fetoša go netefatša gore batho ba na lebokamoso bjo bokaone, le gore dikamano tša bona le setšhaba di ka kaonafatšwa. ERM e šišintše gore AP e swanetše go:• Amogela dikutollo tša pego ye molaleng le ge e le gore ga ba kwane le tšona ka moka. Se se tla thuša AP go tšweletša kamano yekaone le setšhaba.• Boledišana le go theeletša setšhaba kgafetšakgafetša. AP e swanetše go boledišana ka tsela ye e dirago gore ditšhaba di ikwe ditheeletšwa. Se se akaretša tshepedišo ye e kwagalago ya go boledišana le go fetola mathata le ditaba tša setšhaba. AP e swanetše gothuša ditšhaba go kgetha baemedi ba baswa go bolela sebakeng sa bona.• Netefatša gore ba na le batho ba maleba bao ba ba šomelago bao ba nago le bokgoni bja maleba bja go šoma le ditšhaba.Ba swanetše go ba batho bao ba kwešišago polelo ya tikologo le ditshepedišo tša setšo bao ba nago le kgahlego go ditaba ledingongorego tša batho.• Dira peakanyo ka tsela ye e ba thušago go fihlelela dinepo tša bona.• Lebelela tefelo ye e lefilwego gape. Mo go sa nago le mošomo wo o sego wa fetšwa, AP e kwane le maloko a setšhaba ka ga ka moo baka rarollago mathata a.• Lebelela ditsela tše dingwe tše setšhaba le Moepo ba ka šomago mmogo go tliša bokamoso bjo bokaone, go fa mohlala, ka diprotšeketša tlhabollo ya setšhaba.Go dira gore Dipego di Hwetšagale SetšhabengKa Matšhe 2010, pego ya mafelelo go tšwa ka dinyakišišong e filwe mošomi wa godingwana wa Kgoro ya Ditherišano le Tlhabollo ya Setšhabaya AP ka pele ga ditšhaba tše di amegago ka Mogalakwena. Gape e filwe ba kgašo le setšhaba ka kakaretšo.Pego ye e a hwetšagala gore e bonwe ke batho ka moka. Dikhopi di swerwe ke baemedi le baetapele ba setšo (Magoši) ka ditšhabeng tšedingwe le tše dingwe tše di amegago le lefelong la setšhaba motseng o mongwe le o mongwe (go fa mohlala, sekolong goba kliniking).Ba Mošate wa Mapela le Mmušo le bona ba tla fiwa khopi ya pego. Gape go tla ba le khopi ya pego ye ka wepsaeteng ya AP (www.angloplatinum.com).

Annexure HList of Tables and Boxes

LIST OF TABLESGa Pila Executive Summary Ga PilaTable 1.1 Summary of Performance Assessment FindingsGa Pila ReviewTable 1.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 2.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsTable 3.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsTable 4.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsTable 5.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 6.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsTable 7.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsTable 8.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsTable 9.1 Performance Assessment Against IFC Performance StandardsMotlhotlo Executive SummaryTable 1.1 Summary of Performance Assessment FindingsMotlhotlo ReviewTable 1.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 2.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 3.1 List of Assets Audited (September 2002)Table 3.2 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 4.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 5.1 Total Amount of Replacement LandTable 5.2 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 6.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 7.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 8.1 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance StandardsTable 9.1 Anglo Platinum’s Performance on RAP Documentation RequirementsTable 9.2 Performance Assessment against IFC Performance Standards

L IST OF BOXESBox 1.1Box 2.1Box 4.1Core Principles Underpinning the Resettlement ReviewSummary of Relocation AgreementShort and Long Term Objectives of the Task TeamBox 4.2 Stakeholder Groups Involved in Scoping 26Box 5.1Box 5.2Box 6.1Box 8.1Box 8.2Difficulties Encountered During Development of Maize FieldsObstacles Experienced During the Land Allocation ProcessAnalysis of Ga Puka GrievancesAP’s Comments on Concerns Regarding the “Wet Areas”Clauses in the Services AgreementBox 8.3 Specific Initiatives within the SLP (April 2008)Box 8.4Box 9.1Box 9.2Failure of the Brickyard Initiative (as reported by Anglo Platinum and construction contractors)Project Management Structure for Motlhotlo Relocation ImplementationIFC Monitoring Requirements: Definitions