Two Models of Thinking - Fordham University Faculty

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forms of what they think about as a result of an action of those things on theirintellects:There is a difference on this point between the human mind, whichderives forms from things, and the divine or angelic minds, which do notdraw their cognition from things. In the mind which depends on things fromknowledge, the forms exist because of a certain action of things on the soul.But, since all action is through form, the forms in our minds first and mainly26refer to things which exist outside our soul according to their forms. (Italicsmine)This, however, should be taken as a very general description of whathappens when I think about something. Any time Aquinas provided a moredetailed account of what it is to think, he argued that the claim that to cognizeis to undergo a change is true, strictly speaking, only of sensory cognition. Bycontrast, as far as thinking is concerned, Aquinas took into account what Ihave labeled the “activity problem” in Aristotle. When I think aboutsomething, it seems that I am genuinely doing something and that I am notmerely the subject of a change happening to me. That was also a view thatAquinas had to adopt as a consequence of his endorsement of the claim(which he could read in Augustine and which he thought that Aristotle himselfhad subscribed to) that nothing material can act on what is immaterial.Accordingly, no material object can act on the intellect. 27Thus, Aquinas readjusted the Aristotelian account of intellectualcognition in order to make room for the intellect’s active role in the process ofthinking. 28 He obtained this result by a threefold strategy. First, he argued that,26 De Ver., q. 10, a. 4: “Hoc autem differenter contingit in mente humana quae formasaccipit a rebus, et in divina vel angelica quae a rebus non accipiunt. In mente enim accipientescientiam a rebus, formae existunt per quandam actionem rerum in animam; omnis autem actioest per formam; unde formae quae sunt in mente nostra primo et principaliter respiciunt res extraanimam existentes quantum ad formas earum.” The English translation is from St. ThomasAquinas, Truth. Transl. by James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), vol. 2,p. 19.27 See for example Augustine, In Genesi ad litteram, II, 16: “[…] non est putandumaliquid agere corpus in spiritum, tamquam spiritus corpori facienti, materiae vice subdatur. Omnimodo praestantior est qui facit, ea re qua aliquid facit.” For Aquinas’s endorsement of this claimand his conviction that Aristotle subscribed to that position, see ST I, q. 84, a. 6: “Intellectum veroposuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeumimprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem,secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requirit aliquidnobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit.”28 As a matter of fact, Aquinas thought that he was merely embracing Aristotle’sgenuine doctrine. It is clear, however, that he ended up holding a position that was not identicalwith Aristotle’s. It is also clear that Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology washighly indebted to the late ancient tradition of Aristotelain commentators, specifically to12
even though the material object does not act on the intellect, the intellect doesnevertheless receive its form. Second, he granted that the object plays somecausal role in the act of thinking, even though he dramatically curtailed thatrole. Third, he distinguished between the intellect’s reception of the object’sform, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the intellect’s act of thinkingproper.Concerning the first point, Aquinas held that the form of an object isimpressed on the intellect not by that object but by the intellect itself.Specifically, Aquinas distinguished between an active and a passive role theintellect plays in cognition. Both roles are played by numerically the sameintellect. In its active role, the intellect performs an operation called“abstraction,” which results in the production of a mental quality that has thesame form as the sensory impressions and the images caused by the object.That mental quality is nothing else than the intelligible species, Thus, theintelligible species is produced by the agent intellect, not by the object. It is,nevertheless, a representation of the object, because its form is the same asthat of the object (or is a representation of the form of the object), even thoughits way of existing is different, i.e. immaterial rather than material. Just like anyordinary action, the agent intellect’s production of the intelligible species canbe analyzed into the agent’s production of a form in a patient. The agentintellect plays the role of agent in that process. The form produced andreceived is the intelligible species. As to the patient, its role is played by theintellect itself, taken in its passive role, i.e. the so-called “possible intellect.” 29Concerning the second point, Aquinas held that the object, throughthe intermediary of its sensory image (the so-called “phantasm”), plays somecausal role in intellectual cognition. Admittedly, the image of an object is notthe sole or even the principal agent in the process of reception of that object’sform in the possible intellect. Rather, the agent intellect is the main agent inthat production. The image of the object, however, plays the role of“instrumental or secondary agent.” Even though the details of this view maynot be completely clear, Aquinas intended to reject the claim that the object,through the intermediary of its sensory image, plays a merely accessory andnon-causal role in the process of intellectual cognition. By contrast, theThemistius, as evidenced by notes to the Leonine edition of Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’sDe anima. 29 ST I, q. 79, a. 2–4; q. 85, a. 1. See Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 310–318; Stump, Aquinas, 263–264. On the role of the agent intellect in Aristotle and the controversialintepretation of De anima III, 5, see M. Frede, “La théorie aristotélicienne de l’intellect agent,” inCorps et âme. Sur le De anima d’Aristote, ed. G. Romeyer Dherbey and C. Viano (Paris: Vrin,1996), 377–390; M. F. Burnyeat, Aristotle’s Divine Intellect (Milwaukee: Marquette UniversityPress, 2008).13
Page 1 and 2: Two Models of Thinking:Thomas Aquin
Page 3 and 4: conclusion about cats. Accordingly,
Page 5 and 6: am informed by an agent, i.e. I rec
Page 7 and 8: intellect. Third, an act of thinkin
Page 9 and 10: 2.1. The form in the intellect: the
Page 11: etween the case of the color and th
Page 15 and 16: form abstracted by the agent intell
Page 17 and 18: 2.3. Acts of thinking as self-conta
Page 19 and 20: intellect produces when it performs
Page 21 and 22: Aquinas never gave a detailed descr
Page 23 and 24: neither accounts is there room for
Page 25 and 26: ***Based on what I have said, these
Page 27 and 28: None of these authors, however, que
Page 29 and 30: species. 67 That real quality, howe
Page 31 and 32: have shown above, Aquinas had alrea
Page 33 and 34: existence of its term. Scotus held
Page 35 and 36: painting, acts of thinking do not i
Page 37 and 38: exists only as long as the intellec
Page 39 and 40: cat rather than about what it is to
Page 41 and 42: Concerning the second issue, as I h
Page 43: (2) In the current order of things,

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