Two Models of Thinking - Fordham University Faculty

3.1 Two actions: abstraction and the production of an act of thinkingScotus distinguished between two actions that must ordinarily takeplace in order for an act of thinking to occur. 63 The first action is the agentintellect’s abstraction of a form, the so-called “intelligible species,” from asensory image present in the imagination. This action is identical with thepossible intellect’s reception of the intelligible species, as the agent intellect’sproduction of a species and the possible intellect’s reception of a species arejust two descriptions of one and the same process. Against Henry of Ghentand Godfrey of Fontaines, Scotus argued that the agent intellect’s act ofabstraction is an act of producing a form in the possible intellect, becausesuch a form must be present in the intellect prior to the occurrence of an actof thinking. 64 Scotus’s argument for this claim was based on the assumption(which Scotus took to be self-evident) that the object of an act of thinking mustbe present to the intellect prior to the occurrence of that act of thinking as wellas on the further assumption that the object of an act of thinking (as far asabstractive cognition is concerned) is a universal, i.e. something like “what itis to be a cat” as opposed to “what it is to be this particular cat.” Given thesetwo assumptions, Scotus argued that only a form present in the intellect priorto the occurrence of an act of thinking could account for the presence of theobject prior to the occurrence of an act of thinking. 65 Since the form present inthe intellect prior to the occurrence of an act of thinking is the intelligiblespecies produced by the agent intellect, it follows that the agent intellect’sabstraction of a species is a pre-requisite for the occurrence of an act ofthinking and must be distinguished from it. 66Scotus regarded the agent intellect’s act of abstraction as a real action,i.e. a process that ends up in the production of a real quality, the intelligible63 I say “ordinarily” because God can bypass both actions and produce an act ofthinking immediately in my intellect, as I indicate below. Also, notice that here I am consideringacts of abstractive cognition.64 Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, Vat. III, 201–244; Lect. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, Vat. XVI, 325–348;Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 4 and q. 5, eds. Wolter and Bychkov, 207–220 and 221–232.65 Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, nn. 349–350, Vat III, 210–211. For Scotus’s argument thatonly a form present in the intellect can account for the presence of the object as a universal priorto the act of thinking, see Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, nn. 352–358, Vat. III, 211–216; Lect. I, d. 3, p. 3,q. 1, nn. 266–273, Vat. XVI, 331–334; Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 4, nn. 95–97, eds. Wolter and Bychknov,210–211. See King, “Rethinking Representation.”66 Scotus contrasted the agent intellect’s act of abstraction to the act of thinking properin Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, n. 359–360, Vat. III, 216–218; Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 4, n. 103, eds. Wolterand Bychknov, 212–213; Quodl., q. 15, n. 14, Vivès XXVI, 145. See also Lect. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, n.275, Vat. XVI, 335.28