Two Models of Thinking - Fordham University Faculty

So what sort of thing is an act of thinking, if it is neither an action nora passion? Assuming that all things belong to one of the ten Aristoteliancategories, Scotus proceeded by process of elimination. 75 Apart from actionsand passions, he held that there are only two plausible candidates. First, anact of thinking may be a relation. Second, an act of thinking may be a quality.Scotus had three arguments to demonstrate that in an act of thinkingthere is a non-relative feature that cannot be reduced to a relation, and that, asa consequence, an act of thinking is not a relation.Scotus’s first argument was based on the view that an act of thinkingis the ultimate perfection of a human being. According to Scotus, however,the ultimate perfection of a human being could not be a relation. Therefore,an act of thinking is not a relation. The claim that an act of thinking is theultimate perfection of a human being was commonly agreed on. The basicidea was that the activity of thinking is what a human being is made for andwhat satisfies our deepest needs. We were born in order to think. This isconfirmed by the fact that human nature will be perfected in the final unionwith God in the beatific vision, which is (at least partially) an intellectual act,and thus may be considered as a very special act of thinking. 76 Strangelyenough, Scotus did not spend much time to support the minor premise of thisargument, according to which the ultimate perfection of a human beingcannot be a relative item. Presumably, Scotus’s point was based on the remarkthat a relative item is identified by its term and is consequently essentiallydependent on that term’s existence. For example, the relation of paternity isgrounded in a father and directed at a child. If no child is generated, there isno relation of paternity. But then, if a human being’s ultimate perfection werea relation, a human being’s ultimate perfection would be essentiallydependent on something else, i.e. its term. Thus, the ultimate perfection of ahuman being would not be ultimate, because it would in turn depend on theintelligibile quod sit calefactio et quod nullius ulterioris termini, scilicet quod nihil accipiatcalorem per eam; sed operationes sunt termini ultimi quibus nihil ulterius accipit esse, quia suntfines, I Ethicorum et IX Metaphysicae. Obiectum vero operationis ad quod terminatur operationon accipit esse per eam, sed praesupponitur operationi, quia sunt fines operantis, ut dictum est;ergo etc.” See also Ord., d. 27, q. 1–3, n. 55, Vat. VI, 86: “[…] intellectio non est actio productivaalicuius termini: tunc enim incompossibile esset intelligere eam esse, et non esse termini, sicutincompossibile est intelligere calefactionem esse et non esse calorem ad quem sit calefaction.Non est autem impossibile intelligere intellectionem in se, non intelligendo quod sit alicuiustermini ut producti per ipsam.”75 Quodl. q. 13, n. 25, Vivès XXV, 570–571; Rep. I-A, q. 6, nn. 169–237, eds. Wolterand Bychkov, 234–237.76 See for example Aquinas, Sent. I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4; Sent IV, d. 49, q. 3, a. 2; DePot., q. 5, a. 5, ad 14; De malo, q. 1, a. 5; ST I-II, q. 3, a. 2; ST I-II, q. 49, a. 3, ad 1.32