Two Models of Thinking - Fordham University Faculty

thinking about what it is to be a cat to occur. 70 Both the species and theintellect must act as efficient causes in order for an act of thinking about acertain thing to occur. Scotus argued that the species and the intellectcollaborate in the production of an act of thinking in a special way, which helikened to the collaboration of a man and a woman in the generation of achild. 71What should be stressed is Scotus’s clear distinction between twoactions involved in the production of an act of thinking, i.e. the act ofabstraction and the production of an act of thinking. 72 These are two distinctcausal processes, and more specifically two actions, which are identified bydistinct agents and distinct terms. The act of abstraction is caused by the agentintellect and the sensory image (the so-called “phantasm”). Its term is a mentalquality, i.e. the intelligible species. By contrast, the formation of an act ofthinking is caused by the intelligible species and the intellect after theabstraction of the species. The product of that second process is the act ofthinking proper. As I will show, Scotus argued that the act of thinking is amental quality, too.By clearly distinguishing between two actions involved in the act ofthinking and by claiming that the intellect must play the role of an efficientcause not just in the act of abstraction but also in the production of an act ofthinking, Scotus managed to lay the foundation for the distinction betweendispositional and occurrent knowledge. Only when the second process occursdoes an act of occurrent knowledge occur, i.e. do I actually think aboutsomething. When only the process of abstraction and reception of a formoccurs, some information is memorized and stored in the intellect, but noactual thought follows. This is the situation I experience when I know what itis to be a cat but I do not think about it.3.2. Acts of thinking as qualitiesScotus’s most characteristic insight, however, is not his distinctionbetween the two actions involved in the production of an act of thinking. As I70 Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, Vat. III, 245–330; Lect. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2–3, Vat. XVI, 349–395;Quodl., q. 15, nn. 7–9, Vivès XXVI, 137–141. It is clear that the act of thinking is distinct from theact of abstraction carried out by the agent intellect. It is an open question, however, whether theact of thinking itself is performed by the agent intellect, the possible intellect or both the agentand the possible intellect. Scotus considered each of these possibilities in Quodl., q. 15, nn. 13–20, Vivès XXVI, 141–153.71 Scotus argued that the intellect plays the main role as an efficient cause of an act ofthinking. He never held, however, that the intellect could produce an act of thinking without thecollaboration of the form of the object. See Ord. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, Vat. III, 330–338; Quodl., q.15, n. 10, Vivès XXVI, 142–143.72 See above, note 66.30