Two Models of Thinking - Fordham University Faculty

thinking is not something I perform, but something I have, just as I have thequality heat or the quality cold. This claim is striking, because at first sightthere seems to be little in common between a quality such as heat or cold andan act of thinking, whereas there seems to be much in common between anaction such as heating and cooling and an act of thinking.Scotus admitted that acts of thinking belong to a special sort ofqualities called “activities” (operationes). In calling acts of thinking“activities,” Scotus was just following Aristotle and was in agreement withAquinas. There is, however, a fundamental difference between Scotus andAquinas. As I have indicated above, Aquinas regarded activities as genuineactions, albeit self-contained and not transitive. Scotus, by contrast, held thatactivities are not actions but qualities. He recognized, however, that activitiesmight be confused with actions such as heating, on the one hand, and withsome other impermanent qualities such as light, on the other hand. In order toclafity this issue, Scotus listed three conditions that should be taken intoaccount when identifying something as an action, an impermanent quality oran activity.The first condition is that of being impermanent or in fieri, i.e. ofexisting only as long as an agent carries out its action. For example, the actionof heating exists only as long as fire carries it out. Also, light exists only aslong as a source of a light source performs the action of illuminating.Similarly, an act of thinking exists only as long as its causes (ordinarily, anintellect and an intelligible species) carry out their action of producing it. Assoon as the agent ceases to perform its action, the action of heating, thequality of being illuminated and the act of thinking cease to exist.The second condition is that of having a term about which (circaquem) the action or quality occurs. This term is the object of the action orquality. For example, fire’s act of heating is directed at or about a kettle.Similarly, my act of thinking about what it is to be a cat is directed at or aboutwhat it is to be a cat.The third condition is that of having a term towards which (ad quem)the action is directed. This term is produced by that action. For example, fire’sact of heating produced a hot kettle.Only items belonging to the category of action satisfy all threeconditions. Actions are impermanent or in fieri, have a term about which theyare performed and produce something. By contrast, impermanent qualitiessuch as light only satisfy the first condition. Light exists only as long as a lightsource illuminates. But light does not necessarily require a subject in which tobe received and light produces nothing. Finally, acts of thinking satisfy boththe first and the second condition, but not the third. First, acts of thinking36