<strong>Political</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>America</strong>:A <strong>Search</strong> <strong>for</strong> Def<strong>in</strong>itions and a Theory, orIf <strong>Political</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong> Is <strong>in</strong> the Ma<strong>in</strong>stream of <strong>America</strong>n PoliticsWhy Is It Not <strong>in</strong> the Ma<strong>in</strong>stream of <strong>America</strong>n Politics Research?*JOHN G. PETERSSUSAN WELCHUniversity of Nebraska, L<strong>in</strong>colnLack of a clear def<strong>in</strong>ition of political corruption has limited its systematic study by analysts of<strong>America</strong>n politics. This article offers a conceptual framework with which to view corruption. Acorrupt act is categorized by its four components: the donor, the favor, the public official and thepayoff. For each component, propositions about perceived corrupt and noncorrupt elements canbe <strong>for</strong>mulated and tested. The usefulness of this scheme <strong>in</strong> analyz<strong>in</strong>g attitudes about corruption isdemonstrated with data from state legislators. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the article suggests some future researchpossibilities us<strong>in</strong>g this scheme to compare elites and public or other group<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> the politicalsystem.Though corruption has been an everpresentpart of <strong>America</strong>n political life (cf. Tooqueville,1861), analysts of <strong>America</strong>n politics have notstudied it systematically (<strong>for</strong> exceptions, seeGreenste<strong>in</strong>, 1964; Gard<strong>in</strong>er, 1970; Wolf<strong>in</strong>ger,1972). This paper offers a conceptual schemewhich circumvents def<strong>in</strong>itional problems thathave posed such a roadblock to the systematicstudy of corruption. We <strong>also</strong> provide someattitud<strong>in</strong>al data about corrupt acts gatheredfrom state senators across the U.S. and showhow our scheme contributes to the analysis ofthis data. F<strong>in</strong>ally, some reasonable future researchdirections <strong>for</strong> the study of corruptionare briefly discussed.Def<strong>in</strong>itions of <strong>Political</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong>The attention devoted to a serious exam<strong>in</strong>ationof corruption <strong>in</strong> <strong>America</strong> occurs largely atthose times when particularly venal acts havebeen exposed. Thus, the post-Watergate periodhas brought with it a renewed <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> thestudy of political corruption, especially amongpolitical scientists (cf. Rundquist et al., 1977;Scoble, 1973; Gard<strong>in</strong>er 1970, Berg et al.,1976). In all of these studies it becomesimmediately apparent that no matter what*The authors would like to thank Barry S. Rundquist,University of Ill<strong>in</strong>ois-Urbana, and Alan Booth,University of Nebraska-L<strong>in</strong>coln <strong>for</strong> their helpful comments.This project was supported by a grant from theUniversity of Nebraska Research Council.974aspect of <strong>America</strong>n politics is exam<strong>in</strong>ed, thesystematic study of corruption is hampered bythe lack of an adequate def<strong>in</strong>ition. What maybe "corrupt" to one citizen, scholar, or publicofficial is "just politics" to another, or "<strong>in</strong>discretion"to a third. Several def<strong>in</strong>itions ofpolitical corruption have been proposed andg<strong>See</strong>rallyf w be tsuiftd accord<strong>in</strong>g to *wreecriteria: def<strong>in</strong>itions based on legality, def<strong>in</strong>itionsbased on the public <strong>in</strong>terest, and def<strong>in</strong>itionsbased on public op<strong>in</strong>ion (Scott, 1972).The def<strong>in</strong>ition of political corruption basedon legalistic criteria assumes that political behavioris corrupt when it violates some <strong>for</strong>malstandard or rule of behavior set down by apolitical system <strong>for</strong> its public officials. Perhapsthe clearest statement of this def<strong>in</strong>ition hasbeen given by J. S. Nye when he stated that apolitical act is corrupt when it "deviates fromthe <strong>for</strong>mal duties of a public role (elective orappo<strong>in</strong>tive) because of private-regard<strong>in</strong>g (personal,close family, private clique) wealth orstatus ga<strong>in</strong>s: or violates rules aga<strong>in</strong>st the exerciseof certa<strong>in</strong> types of private-regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fluence"(Nye, 1967, p. 416). While such adef<strong>in</strong>ition of corruption is useful to the researcher<strong>in</strong> that it is generally clear-cut and canbe operationalized, when the behavior <strong>in</strong> questionallegedly deviates from a legal norm orstandard which is not tied to a specific statuteor court rul<strong>in</strong>g, this def<strong>in</strong>ition of politicalcorruption becomes less useful as the <strong>for</strong>malduties of office or the appropriate rules of<strong>in</strong>fluence become ambiguous. Moreover, thisdef<strong>in</strong>ition suffers from be<strong>in</strong>g simultaneouslytoo narrow and too broad <strong>in</strong> scope; all illegal
1978 <strong>Political</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>America</strong> 975acts are not necessarily corrupt and all corruptacts are not necessarily illegal.1Def<strong>in</strong>itions of political corruption based onnotions of the public or common <strong>in</strong>terestsignificantly broaden the range of behavior onemight <strong>in</strong>vestigate. Consider the def<strong>in</strong>ition proposedby Arnold Rogow and Harold Lasswell:"A corrupt act violates responsibility toward atleast one system of public or civic order and is<strong>in</strong> fact <strong>in</strong>compatible with (destructive of) anysuch system" (Rogow and Lasswell, 1966, pp.132-33). While this def<strong>in</strong>ition focuses ourattention on any act or set of acts whichthreaten to destroy a political system, theresearcher has the responsibility of determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gwhat the public or common <strong>in</strong>terest is be<strong>for</strong>eassess<strong>in</strong>g whether a particular act is corrupt.The possibility exists that a behavior may beproscribed by law as corrupt but be beneficial<strong>for</strong> the common good, such as "fix<strong>in</strong>g" thepapers of an illegal alien who contributed hislabor and skills to a rapidly expand<strong>in</strong>g economy.Furthermore, this def<strong>in</strong>ition enables apolitician to justify almost any act by claim<strong>in</strong>gthat it is <strong>in</strong> the public <strong>in</strong>terest.A third approach to the def<strong>in</strong>itional problemsuggests that a political act is corrupt when theweight of public op<strong>in</strong>ion determ<strong>in</strong>es it so (see,<strong>for</strong> example, Rundquist and Hansen, 1976).This conception of political corruption harborsthe same limitations as the public <strong>in</strong>terestfocus. Studies of public op<strong>in</strong>ion have revealedthat on many issues public sentiments are eitherambiguous (significant portions of the publichold no op<strong>in</strong>ion or hold those of low <strong>in</strong>tensity)or are divided <strong>in</strong> their op<strong>in</strong>ions. Additionally, adef<strong>in</strong>ition of corruption based on public op<strong>in</strong>ionmust consider the differences which mayexist between the public and political elites <strong>in</strong>their assessment of appropriate standards ofpublic conduct.This approach to political corruption isprobably best illustrated <strong>in</strong> the work of ArnoldJ. Heidenheimer (1970). In his view the corruptnessof political acts is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the<strong>in</strong>teraction between the judgment of a particularact by the public and by political elitesor public officials. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this scheme,behavior is judged particularly he<strong>in</strong>ous or corruptif both public officials and the publicjudge it corrupt and both wish it restricted.This type of behavior is referred to as "black"corruption. An act such as "a public official<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> hero<strong>in</strong> traffick<strong>in</strong>g" would mostlBerg, Hahn, and Schmidhauser (1976, p. 170)discuss sem<strong>in</strong>ars be<strong>in</strong>g conducted <strong>for</strong> large campaigndonors on how to use the loopholes <strong>in</strong> the newcampaign fund laws.likely fit this category <strong>in</strong> that both groups f<strong>in</strong>dthe act reprehensible and would demandpunishment <strong>for</strong> the guilty public official. At theother end of the corruption spectrum might becategorized political acts judged corrupt byboth public officials and the people, but whichneither feel are severe enough to warrantsanction. Quite possibly such acts of "white" orpetty corruption as a city council memberfix<strong>in</strong>g a park<strong>in</strong>g ticket <strong>for</strong> a constituent fall <strong>in</strong>tothis category. Between these two extremes ofcorruption acts lie the <strong>for</strong>ms of behavior whichare the most difficult to def<strong>in</strong>e and detect, andconsequently are potentially most destructiveto a political system organized along democraticpr<strong>in</strong>ciples. Heidenheimer refers to thesepolitical acts as "gray corruption" when eitherpublic officials or the people want to see anaction punished, while the other group doesnot, or it may well be that one group is <strong>in</strong>tenseabout the issue and the other ambivalent orunconcerned.2 Heidenheimer's work <strong>in</strong> thisarea, there<strong>for</strong>e, po<strong>in</strong>ts to the existence of ascale or dimension of corruption that can beused to classify political behaviors accord<strong>in</strong>g totheir degree of corruptness from "black" to"gray" to "white." It does not, however,account very well <strong>for</strong> those acts seen as corruptby only one group, nor does it seek to expla<strong>in</strong>why some groups may see an act as corrupt butother groups see it as less corrupt. Althoughthis conception of political corruption is basedon the criterion of op<strong>in</strong>ion (both public andelite), the assessment of a specific political actmay rest on violation of a legal norm or a threatto the public <strong>in</strong>terest. In other words, def<strong>in</strong>itionsof corruption are not mutually exclusive:elements of the public <strong>in</strong>terest and publicop<strong>in</strong>ion criteria are embedded <strong>in</strong> legal normswhich sanction certa<strong>in</strong> political behaviors ascorrupt.Although the Heidenheimer scheme enablesus to classify politically corrupt acts <strong>in</strong> ageneral way, a more detailed scheme seemsrequired if we are to classify adequately the2Harry Scoble (1973) refers to the situation (graycorruption) where public officials tolerate a corruptact or practice and citizens are unaware or ignorant ofthe act but would condemn it if they knew about it as"systemic corruption." Moreover, this view of politicalcorruption is useful and important <strong>in</strong> that it leads toan emphasis on the basic defects and weaknesses <strong>in</strong> thepolitical system which may be responsible <strong>for</strong> corruption(see Berg, Hahn, and Schmidhauser, 1976).There<strong>for</strong>e, rather than attribut<strong>in</strong>g such phenomena as"Watergate" to the weaknesses and foibles of <strong>in</strong>dividualpolitical actors, the "systemic view" of corruptionwould lead to a search <strong>for</strong> the sources of "Watergate"<strong>in</strong> the defects of the political process itself.