Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions ... - See also

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980 The American Political Science Review Vol. 72increase in the value of their own stock. Unlikethe DRIVEWAY, TRAVEL or LANDSALEinstances, legislators are not the sole donors,although they are in the position of being pastdonors. Public officials, by their acts, cannotconvert favors directly into payoffs. Otherevents might have an impact on the stock'svalue, regardless of a public official's favor.And, the payoff is much less direct than a cashgrant or immediate service rendered. The governmentcontract, the favorable court ruling,the increased oil depletion allowance may ormay not increase stockholders' dividends. Onthe other hand, the payoff is more tangiblethan the generalized "good will" engendered bythe WEAPONS or LAW SCHOOL acts.Other factors are also involved in comparingconflict-of-interest acts to the others previouslyTable 2. Characteristics of Ten Potentially Corrupt ActsAct Public Official Donor Favor PayoffDRIVEWAY Political, public role* Self* Private* Large (?)*Specific*Short-range*Noncampaign*TRAVEL Political, public role* Self* Private* Large*Specific*Short-range*Noncampaign*LAND SALE Political, public role* Self* Private* Large*Specific*Short-range*Noncampaign*RIGHT WAY Political, public role* Unclear ? Unclear ? Large*Specific*Short-range*CampaignJUDGE Nonpolitical,* public Unclear ? (in part)* Unclear Indeterminate sizerole* Self Potential Specific*Private*Long-rangeRoutine act NoncampaignAMBASSADOR Political, public role* Constituent Private* Large*Constituent Specific*Routine act Short-range*CampaignDEFENSE STOCK Political, public role* Unclear, in part self* Unclear Indeterminate size(?) ~~~~~~~~~~Potential Speciflc*Private * Long-rangeRoutineNoncampaign*OILPolitical, public role* Unclear, in part self* Unclear Indeterminate sizePotentialSpeciflc*Private * Long-rangeRoutineNoncampaign*WEAPONS Political, public role* Unclear, possibly Unclear, possibly SmallCONTRACT constituent nonroutine* NonspecificLong-rangeNoncampaignLAW SCHOOL Political, unclear Unclear, possibly Unclear, possibly Smallconstituent nonroutine* NonspecificLong-rangeNoncampaignCIVIL RIGHTS Political, public role* Constituent Routine SmallConstituent NonspecificPublicLong-rangePossibly campaign*More corrupt.
1978 Political Corruption in America 981discussed. The size of the payoff as well as itsimmediacy influences an official's perception ofcorruption. We cannot demonstrate that withour data, as all involve $50,000 worth of stock.Beard and Horn (1975), however, offer arelevant example. More Congress members believeit more corrupt for a legislator to cast avote for benefits to the savings and loanindustry when the legislator owns $100,000worth of stock rather than only $5000 (1975,p. 22). In our own data, several people indicatedthat if instead of owning $50,000 ofstock, the Secretary of Defense were a "major"stockholder, then the taint of corruption mightbe greater.Finally, in these four items we can see thatthe nature of the public office is also relevant.The conflict of interest involving a judge wasbelieved more odious than that involving eithera bureaucrat or a member of Congress. A judge,in a nonpolitical role, is held to higher standardsthan are legislators.The AMBASSADOR items differ from theOIL, DEFENSE and JUDGE acts. The payoff, acampaign donation, is much more immediate.The donor, however, is providing a campaigncontribution rather than funds to be usedsimply for personal enrichment. To us, theAMBASSADOR and RIGHT WAY cases seemparallel. In one case, the favor is a vote, inanother, an appointment. Why the former isseen as more corrupt is undoubtedly becausethe "spoils system" of appointment has aresidue of legitimacy that the practice of"voting for pay" has not.Our typology of corrupt acts helps explainwhy these conflict-of-interest behaviors areoften ambiguous. As the payoff becomes moreand more long-range, and the donor and favorsare constituency-oriented, it is easy to arguethat an act is not corrupt. Most public officialshope that all acts have some positive payoff forthem, principally reelection (Mayhew, 1975),and doing constituency-oriented favors is oneway to increase the probability of reelection.99Jack Anderson commented on this point in arecent "expose" of congressional misbehavior:"Favors are part of a politician's stock in trade. He isexpected to produce government jobs, public worksprojects, appointments to military academies andTable 3. Percent Agreeing Act Is CorruptPercent ofPercent ofRespondents Believing Respondents BelievingPercent of Most Public Officials Most of PublicRespondents Viewing Would Condemn Would CondemnThis Act as Corrupt This Act This ActDRIVEWAY 95.9 92.2 97.5TRAVEL 95.2 80.4 96.5LAND SALE 95.1 92.1 97.5RIGHT WAY 91.9 82.2 94.3JUDGE 78.8 82.3 91.0AMBASSADOR 71.1 44.5 81.2DEFENSE STOCK 58.3 62.1 84.4OIL 54.9 55.1 81.2WEAPONS CONTRACT 31.6 20.9 34.4LAW SCHOOL 23.7 15.5 35.9Table 4. Correlation Matrix of Perceived Corruption ItemsTRVL LDSL RTWY JUDG AMB DFST OIL WPNS LAWSDRIVEWAY .19 .28 -.28 .06 .12 .13 .02 .03 .09TRAVEL - .29 .35 .07 .15 .08 .10 .10 .10LAND SALE - .33 .16 .15 .16 .06 .08 .10RIGHT WAY - .16 .20 .14 .10 .14 .06JUDGE - .16.45 .31 .11 .20AMBASSADOR .19 .23 .15 .22DEFENSE STOCK - .46 .07 .18OIL .12 .12WEAPONS CONTRACT - L2 l
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