Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions ... - See also

1978 Political Corruption in America 977important to determine if the "donor" is aconstituent, broadly defined, or a nonconstituent.If the donor is a constituent, then a"favor" given is more likely to be perceived asless corrupt than if the favor is rendered to anonconstituent. The reason is obvious: actswhich are performed under the rubric of"constituency service," no matter how questionable,have a certain legitimacy. Of twosimilar, potentially corrupt acts, the odds arethat the constituency-related act will be judgedless corrupt than the service rendered to thenonconstituent. Beard and Horn (1975) offertwo examples supporting this proposition. Inone case, members of Congress were askedabout the legitimacy of putting favorable articlesabout campaign donors in the CongressionalRecord, as a "thank you" to donors. Thiswas seen as more legitimate if the donor were aconstituent rather than a firm outside thedistrict. A second example involved acceptingrides to and from one's congressional district ona national firm's private plane. If the firm hadties to the constituency, accepting such favorswas seen as more legitimate than if the firm hadno such ties. Probably the most corrupt situationis when the donor is the public officialhimself. If the public official can directly enrichhimself by tapping the public till, he himself isthe donor. Examples of this include paddingthe expense account, using public funds forpersonal travel, using money allocated foroffice expenses for personal activities, and soon.Another characteristic to be considered iswhether the "donor" of the payoff (recipientof the "favor") is more than one privateindividual or firm. We argue that the singledonor will be perceived as making an actionmore corrupt than if the donor is a large groupof individuals or firms.A third component to consider is the "favor"provided by the public official. We cansurmise that the corruptness of the favor willvary in some ways as does the nature of thedonor. Private favors and nonconstituency favorswill be seen as more corrupt than thosewith large public benefit or those done for aconstituent.4 Finally, if the favor is done inroutine performance of duty rather than extraordinaryactivity, it is less likely to be seen ascorrupt. For example, a member of Congresswho makes a routine phone call to a federal4Even though the dimensions of "favor" are similarto those outlined for the "donor," there are somedifferences. For example, it is conceivable that aprivate donor might pay for a favor having publicbenefit.agency to check on a federal contract of a firmwhose officers supported the Congress memberin an election campaign is less likely to beviewed as performing a corrupt act than onewho makes threats or acts in a way that thefederal bureaucrat perceives as nonroutine.The fourth component of a potentiallycorrupt act, the "payoff" given to the publicofficial, is possibly the most important determinantof its perceived corruptness. The obviousfact to consider is, of course, the size of thepayoff. It should come as no surprise that thelarger the payoff, the greater the perceiveddegree of corruptness in the act, although as weshall see later on, just what is "large" can bedifficult to agree upon. The payoff can alsovary according to the long- versus short-rangenature of the benefit to the public official. Wewould assume that a short-range benefit wouldbe perceived as more corrupt than a payoff thatwill yield benefits at a much later date, becausethe long-range payoff is separated in time fromthe favor done. Consider, for instance, anofficial of a regulatory agency who takes alucrative position in a regulated corporationafter leaving government service. Presumablythe official looked with some benevolence onthe activities of the corporation while in publicoffice; if that official had been given animmediate tangible payoff, for example a giftof money, we think most people would chargecorruption. But the later payoff probably isseen by many as legitimate.5In a similar vein, the payoff can be distinguishedas to whether it is specific or general.If a payoff takes specific form, such as moneyor a service rendered, it will likely be perceivedas more corrupt than a general payoff, such asfuture electoral support or good will. Althoughthis is a rather special case of payoff, it is alsoimportant to determine if a gift is related to apolitical campaign. Payoffs in the form ofcampaign contributions have a legitimacy notrendered to other forms of material payoffs. A$1,000 cash donation to a campaign is perfectlyacceptable, while an equal amount offered as apersonal gift to a public official subjects thedonor and official to possible legal penalties.In Table 1, we have summarized the basiccomponents of a politically corrupt act, andindicated the dimensions in each componentwhich can vary according to perceived corruptness.In outlining these components and theirsalient characteristics, we have articulated a5President Carter, however, has extracted pledgesfrom his high-level appointees that they will not takejobs with firms doing business with or regulated bytheir agency for a period of two years.