Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions ... - See also

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976 The American Political Science Review Vol. 72many variations of corrupt acts, and if we areto develop an explanation of why some acts arejudged corrupt and others not. We propose toanalyze potentially corrupt acts according tothe component elements apparently involvedwith every political act or exchange. We believethis process can meaningfully be partitionedinto the "public official" involved, the actual"favor" provided by the public official, the"payoff" gained by the public official, and the"donor" of the payoff and/or "recipient" ofthe "favor" act. Although at this early stage inthe development of a theory of political corruptionit would be too much to claim to beable to specify the exact nature of each of thesecomponents and its relation to the others, wedo believe that examining acts of politicalcorruption in this manner might hold the keyto a better understanding of why public officialsperceive some acts as corrupt and othersas "just politics," and why public officials andthe public may differ in their assessment.When discussing the subdimensions of eachcomponent of a potentially corrupt act, we willbe stating some propositions about what actswill be seen as corrupt. Those propositions willbe discussed in some detail later. When examininga "public official" involved in an alleged actof corruption, we are particularly interested inwhether the act was entered into in theperformance of the official's political duties.Presumably, an act which is considered malfeasance,misfeasance, or nonfeasance of publicduty is more corrupt than a behavior engaged inoutside of one's official political role. In otherwords, misusing one's political office for privategain is more objectionable than engaging inquestionable behavior outside of one's officialduties.3A second characteristic of the public officialthat seems to determine whether behavior is tobe judged corrupt is the political nature of thepublic official's role. If a public official is in ajudicial or other nonpolitical post, certain actsare more likely to be seen as corrupt than if thepublic official holds a political post. For example,judges have traditionally been held tohigher standards with regard to conflict-ofinterestsituations than legislators. With the newcongressional actions to regulate conflict ofinterest, it is possible that this situation may bechanging at the national level, however.The second component of a politically corruptact is the "donor" of the payoff or"recipient" of the political favor. It is most3The recent example of Congressman Allan Howe's(D-Utah) alleged solicitation of a prostitute might be agood example. He committed an illegal act, but itwould hardly be called the misuse of public office.This is not to say that the voters in his district judgedhim any less harshly. The other recent "congressionalsex scandal," that of Congressman Wayne Hayes, whoallegedly put Elizabeth Ray on the payroll onlybecause she was his mistress, more rightly fits into themisuse of public office category, and thus would bejudged more politically corrupt.Table 1. Components of a Potentially Corrupt Act and Some Salient CharacteristicsComponent More Corrupt Less CorruptPublic OfficialType of Position "Nonpolitical," i.e., the official Politicalis a judgeRole when Act Performed Public Role, i.e., act is done as Private Role, i.e., act is performed bypart of official's public duties public official acting as a privatecitizenDonor's Relation to Public Official Nonconstituent pays official Constituent pays officialPublic official pays selfFavor Rendered by Public OfficialType of Benefit Private PublicType of Recipient Nonconstituent ConstituentNature of Act Providing Nonroutine, i.e., official departs Routine, i.e., favor is performed asFavor from normal routine to provide routine part of jobfavorPayoffSize Large SmallTime when Benefits Accrueto Donor Short-range benefit Long-range benefitSubstance Specific GeneralRelation to Campaign Noncampaign Campaign
1978 Political Corruption in America 977important to determine if the "donor" is aconstituent, broadly defined, or a nonconstituent.If the donor is a constituent, then a"favor" given is more likely to be perceived asless corrupt than if the favor is rendered to anonconstituent. The reason is obvious: actswhich are performed under the rubric of"constituency service," no matter how questionable,have a certain legitimacy. Of twosimilar, potentially corrupt acts, the odds arethat the constituency-related act will be judgedless corrupt than the service rendered to thenonconstituent. Beard and Horn (1975) offertwo examples supporting this proposition. Inone case, members of Congress were askedabout the legitimacy of putting favorable articlesabout campaign donors in the CongressionalRecord, as a "thank you" to donors. Thiswas seen as more legitimate if the donor were aconstituent rather than a firm outside thedistrict. A second example involved acceptingrides to and from one's congressional district ona national firm's private plane. If the firm hadties to the constituency, accepting such favorswas seen as more legitimate than if the firm hadno such ties. Probably the most corrupt situationis when the donor is the public officialhimself. If the public official can directly enrichhimself by tapping the public till, he himself isthe donor. Examples of this include paddingthe expense account, using public funds forpersonal travel, using money allocated foroffice expenses for personal activities, and soon.Another characteristic to be considered iswhether the "donor" of the payoff (recipientof the "favor") is more than one privateindividual or firm. We argue that the singledonor will be perceived as making an actionmore corrupt than if the donor is a large groupof individuals or firms.A third component to consider is the "favor"provided by the public official. We cansurmise that the corruptness of the favor willvary in some ways as does the nature of thedonor. Private favors and nonconstituency favorswill be seen as more corrupt than thosewith large public benefit or those done for aconstituent.4 Finally, if the favor is done inroutine performance of duty rather than extraordinaryactivity, it is less likely to be seen ascorrupt. For example, a member of Congresswho makes a routine phone call to a federal4Even though the dimensions of "favor" are similarto those outlined for the "donor," there are somedifferences. For example, it is conceivable that aprivate donor might pay for a favor having publicbenefit.agency to check on a federal contract of a firmwhose officers supported the Congress memberin an election campaign is less likely to beviewed as performing a corrupt act than onewho makes threats or acts in a way that thefederal bureaucrat perceives as nonroutine.The fourth component of a potentiallycorrupt act, the "payoff" given to the publicofficial, is possibly the most important determinantof its perceived corruptness. The obviousfact to consider is, of course, the size of thepayoff. It should come as no surprise that thelarger the payoff, the greater the perceiveddegree of corruptness in the act, although as weshall see later on, just what is "large" can bedifficult to agree upon. The payoff can alsovary according to the long- versus short-rangenature of the benefit to the public official. Wewould assume that a short-range benefit wouldbe perceived as more corrupt than a payoff thatwill yield benefits at a much later date, becausethe long-range payoff is separated in time fromthe favor done. Consider, for instance, anofficial of a regulatory agency who takes alucrative position in a regulated corporationafter leaving government service. Presumablythe official looked with some benevolence onthe activities of the corporation while in publicoffice; if that official had been given animmediate tangible payoff, for example a giftof money, we think most people would chargecorruption. But the later payoff probably isseen by many as legitimate.5In a similar vein, the payoff can be distinguishedas to whether it is specific or general.If a payoff takes specific form, such as moneyor a service rendered, it will likely be perceivedas more corrupt than a general payoff, such asfuture electoral support or good will. Althoughthis is a rather special case of payoff, it is alsoimportant to determine if a gift is related to apolitical campaign. Payoffs in the form ofcampaign contributions have a legitimacy notrendered to other forms of material payoffs. A$1,000 cash donation to a campaign is perfectlyacceptable, while an equal amount offered as apersonal gift to a public official subjects thedonor and official to possible legal penalties.In Table 1, we have summarized the basiccomponents of a politically corrupt act, andindicated the dimensions in each componentwhich can vary according to perceived corruptness.In outlining these components and theirsalient characteristics, we have articulated a5President Carter, however, has extracted pledgesfrom his high-level appointees that they will not takejobs with firms doing business with or regulated bytheir agency for a period of two years.
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