ISSUE 152 : Jan/Feb - 2002 - Australian Defence Force Journal

A U S T R A L I A NDEFENCEForceJOURNALJOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN PROFESSION OF ARMSNO.152JANUARY/FEBRUARY2002

Dr. James T. GirvanDeanTHE STATE OF THE COLLEGEAs Dean, I bring you greetings from the staff and faculty in the College ofHealth Sciences at Boise State University. You are a recipient of our2007-2008 Annual Report. I hope that you take time to read about themany accomplishments of staff, faculty, and students during this past year.It is our privilege to serve the citizens of the Treasure Valley and the Stateof Idaho. As always, please know that your comments, suggestions, and/orrecommendations are welcomed. You are important to us.The 2007-2008 academic year was very productive. As you will read lateron in this letter, several milestone accomplishments were attained. At theoutset, I want to take this opportunity to thank our community partners(hospitals, clinics, health districts, physician offices, insurers, nonprofits,state agencies, individual and corporate foundation donors, and sisterinstitutions), our advisory board members, the Boise State Universityadministration, faculty, staff, and students for the support, guidance, andencouragement provided to our programs and to me as Dean. This past year was stimulatingand rewarding due, in large part, to these meaningful collaborations and friendships.All programs in the College continue to experience record applications from qualified students.Pressure still exists to increase the number of students admitted to meet the ever-increasingcommunity demand for health professionals. A first step in the process of helping address theshortage of nurses occurred in May of 2008 when the new building for nursing (and for studenthealth services) was begun as this will add more instructional, laboratory, and office space fornursing so that student enrollments can be increased. The building will be named the “NorcoBuilding” to recognize the lead donor, The Norco Foundation under the leadership of JimKissler and his father Larry Kissler, the founder of Norco, St. Luke’s, and Saint AlphonsusRegional Medical Centers both contributed major gifts as did Ed and Shirley Bews and theAssociated Students of Boise State University (for the student health center portion of thebuilding). Scheduled completion date is July 2009. Again, thanks to each of our donors formaking this new facility a reality.At this time, I would like to highlight several of the accomplishments, facts of interest, and/ormilestone events that occurred this past year. The items below are not listed in any particularorder.• Faculty, staff, and community advisory board members completed a new version of theCollege of Health Sciences’ Strategic Directions document• Approximately $507,000 in scholarship monies were awarded to 307 College of HealthSciences students enrolling for the 2008-2009 academic year• Faculty and exchanges occurred with Hangzhou Nursing College in China highlighted bythe three-month visit of two Chinese nursing faculty, Qian Ying and Tao Yue Xian• Exploration for more faculty/student and research partnerships is occurring withuniversities and hospitals in Japan (Respiratory Care faculty member Lonny Ashworthtraveled there in June and February), Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, and Ecuador(nursing faculty members Molly Prengaman and Mikal Black traveled there in March)• More than 90% of the College of Health Sciences graduates chose to live and work inIdaho.• Graduates of the Departments of Radiologic Sciences and Respiratory Care received100% passing rates on national exams• Eight health sciences students gave poster presentations at the annual UndergraduateResearch Dayii

Letters to the EditorOvercoming Learned HelplessnessDear Editor,I read with interest the article “OvercomingLearned Helplessness” by James Warn in yourSeptember/October Journal. While I fully agreethat “leadership and a performance orientatedHR system are vital ingredients for overcominglearned helplessness”, I think the author shouldalso have included two more importantingredients.Firstly, for Defence as a whole to work witha sense of purpose, all Programs should beworking with the same collective sense of selfefficacy.It is very disheartening to be activelyinvolved in a Program that is embarking on aLeadership and Cultural Change program, onlyto be laughed at by other Programs’ staffwhose leadership does not see the need for thischange. We need a program for change thathas the full support of all Defence Organisationheads.Secondly, it is very difficult to overcome asense of helplessness when your efforts toachieve are regularly smothered by mountainsof baffling bureaucracy. Perhaps theovercoming of learned helplessness will see anattitude of cooperation, instead of job andcomfort zone protection.I genuinely hope that in the future DefenceHeads enact the positive ideas expressed by MrWarn in his article so we can become an evenbetter Defence team.M.J. KellySQNLDROICAOSF Townsville

Missile firing

The Integration of Joint and Single-ServiceDoctrine – Ensuring Maritime, Land andAir Concepts are Understood and AppliedBy Captain P.D. Leschen, RAN5Australia’s single Services have a long history of joint operations, dating back to the expeditionto capture German New Guinea in 1914. During World War II, joint Australian operationalactivity involving units from all three Services reached its peak during the final operations in theNew Guinea-Bougainville-Borneo areas. Notwithstanding this evidence of interoperability there hasbeen a parallel tendency towards independent operations, albeit often as part of a larger alliedforce.In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, it became clear that the level of independent planningwas inconsistent with the future needs of Australian security. Although each Service argued that itsplanning assumptions were the product of endorsed strategic guidance, each was also working fromdifferent doctrinal foundations. The push for a more coherent defence organisation in the 1970s,combined with the move towards greater defence self-reliance, has resulted in a greater focus onjoint operations.Over the past 20 years, the ADF has madegreat strides in its capability to plan andconduct joint operations. This joint approachis reflected in strategic guidance, in the ADFcommand structure and, increasingly, in theway we structure the force. The effectivenessof these arrangements has been tested in anongoing program of major exercises andoperations, which indicate that, while thereare always improvements to be made, thebasic approach is both sound and successful.The operations in East Timor provide the mostrecent and prominent example.ADF and single-Service doctrine giveprimacy to a joint approach while recognisingthat the professional mastery of the singleServices is the key to the creation of aneffective joint capability. At the strategic andoperational levels, the various doctrinalpublications are in close alignment in theircoverage of the nature of conflict, strategicpolicy, the operational art, and the variousaspects of campaign planning andimplementation. Indeed, there is considerablerepetition of these themes in the jointAustralian Defence Doctrine Publication(ADDP) series and the strategic level maritime,land and aerospace doctrine publications. 1The maritime, land and aerospace doctrinepublications, however, also include strategicconcepts from the Maritime, Continental andAir Schools of Strategic Thought, such as seaand air control. These concepts are importantin understanding how to employ militarycapabilities as part of a coordinated jointcampaign, yet they are not covered in jointdoctrine or the Australian Military Strategy(AMS), 2 either individually or in an integratedway. The concepts are covered in theAustralian Command and Staff Course, butagain not in a particularly integrated way.Doctrinally, the ADF has a situation wherejoint, maritime, land and aerospace conceptsare expressed in four different languages,which are not necessarily well understoodacross the ADF. Moreover, the structure ofour doctrine could be taken to imply that themaritime, land and aerospace concepts are

6AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002single Service rather than joint in nature. Infact they are all joint to a greater or lesserextent. This is a significant shortfall, whichflows through into our strategic andoperational guidance. The aim of this articleis to develop an outline structure that showshow the various concepts are related, andwhy they need to be integrated. 3 With furtherdevelopment, such a structure could haveconsiderable implications for joint doctrine,strategic and operational guidance, and forcestructure decision-making.Joint Doctrine and ConceptsADF strategic and operational conceptsand doctrine are contained in a number ofpublications and documents. Strategicguidance is provided by the White Paper,Defence 2000–Our Future Defence Force. TheStrategy Section of this document includeschapters on Australia’s Strategic Interests andObjectives, our International StrategicRelationships, and Australia’s MilitaryStrategy. The chapter on the AMS notes thatthe key to defending Australia is to controlthe sea and air approaches to our continent,and places this in the context of a“fundamentally maritime strategy”, but onewhich “includes a vital and central role forland forces”. 4 The AMS is further developed ina classified document of the same name.At the operational level, the CommanderAustralian Theatre has published an interimpublication called Decisive Manoeuvre –Australian Warfighting Concepts to GuideCampaign Planning. Doctrinally, thisdocument is supported by ADFP 6,Operations, and by the three environmentalsupplements. The Air Supplement, however,has already been withdrawn, replaced by theRAAF Operational Air Doctrine Manual, andthe Maritime and Land Supplements are alsodue to be replaced by equivalent RAN andArmy publications.Decisive Manoeuvre and ADFP 6 have astrong focus on the operational art and oncampaign planning and execution. In the areaof operational art, some of the key conceptsare:• Operational Objectives and the End State• Centre of Gravity• Critical Vulnerabilities• Decisive Points• Command and Control Warfare• Manoeuvre• TempoDiscussion of Campaign Planning andExecution includes the planning sequence,stages of a campaign, logistics and coalitionoperations. Throughout these documents thereis an emphasis on the need for a manoeuvristapproach to warfare, which recognises theneed for excellent C4ISREW capabilities andencompasses ideas such as “decisionsuperiority” and “precision strike”. Using thelatest terminology, these ideas might besummed up as maintaining the “knowledgeedge” and conducting “Effects BasedOperations”.Single-Service Doctrine and ConceptsThe single Services have each producedstrategic level doctrine publications, 5 whichexplain the strategic concepts that come fromthe Maritime, Continental and Air Schools ofStrategic Thought. These concepts are crucialto understanding how each Service thinksabout operations in its particular environment– sea, land and air respectively.To a greater or lesser extent, each of thesepublications includes discussion of the jointconcepts that have already been mentioned.They set out to describe how theenvironmental strategic concepts relate to theoperational art and campaigning, and to showhow these ideas apply in their particularenvironment. These publications thereforespan both the strategic and operational levelsof war.

For the purposes of this article, however, itis the various maritime, land and air strategicconcepts, and the relationships between themand joint doctrine, that is most important.Before discussing the relationships betweenthe concepts, it is necessary to brieflysummarise them.Maritime Strategic ConceptsAustralian Maritime Doctrine, RANDoctrine 1, summarises a number ofimportant strategic concepts, which havebeen developed and enunciated by a varietyof maritime theorists over more than acentury. From this perspective, a “maritimestrategy” is about directing all aspects ofnational power to achieve national strategicgoals and, of fundamental importance, aboutusing the sea to influence events ashore.Before it is possible to use the sea, however, itis necessary to exert some degree of controlover the area that you wish to use.Sea Control, therefore, is “that conditionwhich exists when one has freedom of actionto use the sea for one’s own purposes for aperiod of time and, if required, deny its use toan opponent”. 6 Conversely, a maritime powermay wish to prevent an opponent from usingthe sea to achieve its own ends. This leads tothe concept of Sea Denial, which is “thatcondition which exists when an adversary isdenied the ability to use an area of the sea forhis own purposes for a period of time”. 7Achieving either sea control or sea denialrequires capabilities to conduct Air, Surface,Undersea and Electronic Warfare, so as to beable to operate in all parts of the maritimebattlespace.Seeking to control or deny the sea may besignificant in its own right, resulting in thedestruction or neutralisation of enemy forces,or preventing them from being reassigned toother areas of operation. Achieving control ordenial, however, is more important for what itenables a maritime power to use the sea for.THE INTEGRATION OF JOINT AND SINGLE-SERVICE DOCTRINE 7There are two crucial uses of the sea. First,keeping Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)open is of vital importance to a maritimenation like Australia, with its dependence onoverseas and coastal trade. Likewise, anyexpedition mounted against Australia woulddepend critically on sea communications.Second, an ability to control the sea enablesthe Projection of Power ashore, throughmissions such as maritime mobility andamphibious operations, support to operationson land, and land strike.History is full of examples thatdemonstrate the importance of both aspects.The Battle of the Atlantic in World War II isperhaps the best known example of a denialcampaign to cut SLOCs, against a controlcampaign to keep them open, but anequivalent battle was fought off Australia’seast coast in 1942–44 in support of thecampaign in New Guinea. The Americanamphibious operations across the Pacific inthe Second World War, and at Inchon in theKorean War, are classic examples of thepower projection role of maritime forces, andagain have their smaller local equivalents inNew Britain, Borneo and, more recently, EastTimor.This explanation greatly oversimplifies thenature and modern understanding ofmaritime strategy which, as one theoristexplains, is not purely a naval preserve, but...involves the other functions of statepower that include diplomacy; the safety anddefence of merchant trade at sea; fishing; theexploitation, conservation, regulation anddefence of the exclusive economic zone;coastal defence; security of national borders;the protection of offshore islands; as well asparticipation in regional and world-wideconcerns relating to the use of oceans, theskies over the oceans and the land under theseas. 8Nevertheless, the essential point is thatmaritime forces have great utility in a wide

8AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002range of combat operations at and from thesea and, through a credible and persistentpresence, in diplomatic and constabularyoperations in situations short of war. 9 Theaspects described are the key concepts thatguide the employment of maritime powerand, notwithstanding new terminology suchas “Battlespace Dominance”, they have stoodthe test of time very well.Air Strategic ConceptsThe RAAF Air Power Manual describesfive core air power capabilities, which are ofgreat importance in the implementation ofany strategic or operational concept forAustralia’s defence. The primary air powercapability is Control of the Air, which “is theability to use the third dimension and thesurface below it without being threatened orattacked effectively by the enemy’s airpower”. 10 Achieving control of the air requiresOffensive and Defensive Counter Air(OCA/DCA) operations.Control of the air can be an end in itself,as defensive operations to deny enemycontrol of the air can prevent or neutralise airattacks against a nation’s people,infrastructure, lines of communication andmilitary forces. It is, however, also a means toother ends, as control of the air will almostalways be a prerequisite for other defensive oroffensive military operations.The second and third air powercapabilities are Precision Strike andEngagement. Precision strike “is the ability touse air power to destroy or neutralise targetsand to undermine the enemy’s will to fightthrough the application of firepower with ahigh degree of lethality, discrimination andaccuracy”. 11 It is central to the idea of EffectsBased Operations. Precision engagement is asimilar concept that differs in that it does notinvolve the application of firepower;examples include tracking a potentiallyhostile submarine, and some surveillance andreconnaissance missions. These operationsinclude Land and Maritime Strike,Interdiction of lines of communication, andOffensive Air Support, both at sea and onland.The fourth air power capability is RapidForce Projection, which “is the deployment ofmilitary power to locations in or near an areawhere the government wishes to increasesignificantly its strategic influence on thebasis of force”. 12 The force projected could beany form of military capability, including airsquadrons and their support, or elements ofland forces. Airlift, Control of the Air andsecure forward bases are key enablers of rapidforce projection.The fifth air power capability isInformation Exploitation, which focuses onthe contribution that air platforms make,through surveillance, reconnaissance and dataanalysis, to the overall battlespace awarenessof the military commander. It closely parallelsthe focus on achieving the knowledge edge injoint, maritime and land doctrine.Land Strategic ConceptsPerhaps the essence of what land forcesdo is that “they have the capacity to capture,occupy and hold terrain, and maintain acontinual presence. Land forces also providethe capabilities to help prevent conflict,stabilise collapsing societies, and provideenduring influence in the subsequent peace”. 13In some respects, it is more difficult tosummarise the key strategic concepts of TheFundamentals of Land Warfare than themaritime and air equivalents. Focussingparticularly on the section on Australia’sMilitary Strategy, 14 the doctrine focuses on theArmy’s contribution to Warfighting, MilitarySupport Operations and Shaping the SecurityEnvironment. This leads to discussion of landforce tasks, grouped under the headings ofManoeuvre Operations in a LittoralEnvironment, Protective and SecurityOperations on Australian Territory, and

Precision strike

THE INTEGRATION OF JOINT AND SINGLE-SERVICE DOCTRINE 11Land forcesSea control, sea denial and air controlhave the closest and most obvious conceptualsimilarities. All are focussed on controllingthe battlespace so that it can be used for ourown military purposes, or to prevent theenemy from using it against us. They reflectthe nature of the maritime and airenvironments, where you can contest controlover an area but you cannot hold it in theway that territory ashore can be held.Achieving control or denial bringstogether a number of different means toachieve the end. In the air environment,Offensive and Defensive Counter Airoperations are crucial to success butinsufficient on their own. At sea they arecomplemented by the Air Warfare (includingElectronic Warfare, surveillance capabilitiesand integral C3I capabilities) and Anti-ShipMissile Defences of ships, and ashore by theAir Defence capabilities of Army units. Thusin the air environment there are a series ofconcepts which, together, provide a mix ofoffensive capabilities and layers of defence.OCA reduces or destroys the enemy’s aircapabilities on the ground or in its ownairspace, before an attack on friendly forcescan be mounted. However, these operationsmay not be possible or fully effective, sodefences are also required. Should an attackeventuate, the various defensive layers comeinto effect. Each layer destroys or neutralisessome enemy forces, with the cumulativeresult that the attackers cannot effectivelyprevent our own operations. None of theselayers is adequate on its own; it is thecumulative effect that makes control of theair possible.In the surface and undersea maritimeenvironments, similar dependencies exist inefforts to exercise control or denial of thebattlespace. Maritime platforms will includesurface combatants and their helicopters,submarines and mine warfare forces, allengaged in a variety of operations to conductsurface and undersea warfare. Maritime patroland strike aircraft, both fixed and rotarywing, use their precision strike and

12AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002engagement capabilities through maritimestrike, interdiction and offensive air support(ASW and ASuW) to complement theoperations of ships and submarines. In someareas of the world, maritime strike andinterdiction capabilities may come in the formof missiles launched from sites ashore, andthe role of mine warfare as a means for boththe control and denial of specific areas cannever be underestimated. Finally, the role ofstrategic strikes against enemy ships in port,and against port infrastructure itself, can be avery effective way of neutralising a potentialthreat before it can be fielded.Purposive ConceptsThe purposive concepts are those whichare either fundamental to our own survival,such as maintenance of Sea Lines ofCommunication and land force protectiveoperations, or enable us to take the wardirectly to the adversary. These include powerprojection in all its forms: maritime mobility,rapid force projection, amphibious operations,precision strike, and almost all aspects of landoperations, noting that “the ultimatedeterminant in war is the man on the scenewith the gun”. 16Maintenance of SLOCs is primarilyconcerned with allowing our maritime tradeto continue safely, but also allows militarycargoes and forces to be transported safely onor over the sea. The military involvement in acampaign to maintain our SLOCs, or severenemy SLOCs, is mainly limited to sea controland denial operations and the equivalentaerospace doctrinal concepts. The changingnature of merchant shipping and portarrangements is introducing a variety of newfactors that may reduce this emphasis in thefuture. For example, it may be more effectiveto disrupt the container trade by disabling thehandling arrangements of some of theregion’s hub ports than by conducting aprotracted campaign to interdict shipping. Theimpact of such possibilities is not clear at themoment, but it seems unlikely that thesedevelopments completely invalidate longhistorical experience of campaigns to disruptor maintain SLOCs.A second theme of these purposiveconcepts is strategic strike. Air powerdoctrine focuses heavily on precision strike,which is a key means of achieving effectsbased operations. Indeed, the ability of airpower to bypass the frontlines and strikedirectly at the heart of the enemy has beenone of the key ideas of air power, almostsince its inception. The means of conductingstrike have, however, diversifiedconsiderably in recent years. Often thepresence of a pilot may be a crucial part ofstrike capability, but the advent of cruisemissiles, which can be launched from air orsea platforms and land sites, provide a rangeof other options. Special forces also have thepotential to create these kinds of effects insome circumstances.The last theme of the purposive concepts island operations, both offensive and defensive.Mobility is a crucial element of landoperations, achieved through maritimemobility (sealift), rapid force projection (airlift)and highly mobile land forces. Mobilityenables forces to move into and around atheatre to defend our own territory or projectpower ashore through amphibious operations.Forces ashore can be provided with Naval FireSupport and Offensive Air Support (BattlefieldAir Interdiction and Close Air Support), andcan be supported logistically by air and sea.The necessity for this kind of support was veryclearly demonstrated in East Timor recently.Fundamentally, however, all these conceptsexist to support the various forms of landbattle.Other Forms of WarfareThe analysis in this article has focused onthe concepts that have developed from“traditional” state on state conflict. It has notconsidered revolutionary warfare concepts or

terrorism. Nor has it discussed the manyconstabulary operations that are increasinglyinvolving all parts of the ADF. These includepeace support operations, resource protectionand controlling immigration, to name just afew of the most topical issues. Lastly it hasnot considered the impact of technologicaldevelopments, and the possibility of creatinga Revolution in Military Affairs. In some ofthese instances, doctrine has evolved to keepup with changes in military operations; peaceoperations and resource protection might beexamples. In other areas there is much lesscertainty about the potential impact ofchanges. It is often unclear what the military’srole should be; some aspects of the RMA,such as cyber warfare, provide goodexamples, as does the extent of the military’srole in combating terrorism.Nevertheless, it is doubtful that any ofthese developments invalidate the mainconcepts currently enunciated in ADFdoctrine. It is more likely that thesechallenges demand the development of newideas and approaches that will coexist withexisting doctrine. The need to betterunderstand and integrate existing doctrine isstill, therefore, an important issue.ConclusionsThis article has attempted to summarisethe key concepts of ADF joint and single-Service doctrine, and show how they relate toeach other in a highly complementary way.Moreover, it argues that this doctrine is notcurrently presented in an integrated way, andthat this hinders our understanding of the fullpotential of joint operations.There are three important reasons why anattempt should be made to integrate theseconcepts more effectively than we presentlydo. First, the process of developing suchdoctrine, and any publication that mightresult, should enhance the understanding ofthe ADF officer corps of the interrelationshipsinvolved in joint operations. In particular, itTHE INTEGRATION OF JOINT AND SINGLE-SERVICE DOCTRINE 13should help officers of the different Servicesto better understand the differences in eachother’s thinking. This is very different tosuggesting that all ADF officers should thinkthe same way about operations. To quote RearAdmiral J.C. Wylie again, “Asking why theydo not agree is quite a different matter toasserting that they should agree. On thecontrary, these differences of judgement,these clashes of ideas, these almostcontinuous pullings and haulings among theServices, are the greatest source of militarystrength the nation has.” 17Second, the development of moreintegrated understanding of our doctrineshould enable us to develop a more effectiveAustralian Military Strategy and operationallevel campaign concepts. In turn, this shouldensure that the ADF can make best use of allits combat capabilities in the mostcomplementary way, and that the prioritiesfor the allocation of scarce resources are welland widely understood.Third, it should also inform our forcestructure decisions more effectively than ispresently the case. Too often, capabilities areargued in competition with each other, whenthey are really essential complements to eachother. There may be good budgetary reasonsfor this, but the strategic or operationalarguments for such competition are rarelyconvincing.This leaves the question of how or wherethese concepts should be brought together. Itis important that the single Services continueto enunciate their own views on the conductof warfare. Their doctrine publications arecentral to their professional mastery, andprovide the clearest guidance on what it ispossible to do with particular military forces.It is suggested, therefore, that the placeto bring these concepts together is in theAMS and subordinate operational concepts,and in joint doctrine. These documentsshould draw more heavily on single-Serviceconcepts to show how they are applied in

14AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002joint operations. In this way, our strategicand operational level guidance couldprovide a better understanding of both whatis to be achieved, and how it is to be donewith the forces available, now and into thefuture.NOTES:1. Formerly Australian Defence ForcePublications.2. Maritime, land and aerospace strategicconcepts were covered in the threesupplements to ADFP 6, Operations, but thesesupplements are now being replaced bysingle-Service doctrine publications.3. The article will not attempt to describe eachconcept in detail, except as necessary todemonstrate its relationships with otherconcepts. Details of the various concepts areavailable in joint and single-Service doctrinepublications.4. Defence 2000–Our Future Defence Force,Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, pp. 46–7.5. RAN Doctrine 1, Australian MaritimeDoctrine, RAN Sea Power Centre, DPS 2000.Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentalsof Land Warfare, Doctrine Wing, CATDC, DPS1998.AAP 1000, The Air Power Manual 3rd Edition,Air Power Studies Centre, 1998.AAP 1002, The Operational AirDoctrine Manual, 1st Edition, Doctrine andDevelopment HQAC, 1999.6. RAN Doctrine 1, Australian MaritimeDoctrine, RAN Sea Power Centre, DPS 2000, p.39.7. ibid.8. J. Hattendorf, “What is a Maritime Strategy”,in D. Stevens (ed.), In Search of a MaritimeStrategy, Canberra Papers on Strategy andDefence No. 119 (Canberra: SDSC, 1997), p.13.9. ibid., p.57. See the “Span of MaritimeOperations” diagram.10. AAP 1000, The Air Power Manual 3rd Edition,Air Power Studies Centre, 1998, p.36.11. ibid., p.38.12. ibid., p.40.13. Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentalsof Land Warfare, Doctrine Wing, CATDC, DPS1998, p.2-16.14. ibid., pp. 3-13 to 3-21.15. This may be less true today, where militaryoperations in situations short of war, such asServices Assisted or Protected Evacuations,Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, mayresult in potentially hostile groups beingmixed up across an Area of Operations.16. RADM J.C. Wylie USN, quoted in TheFundamentals of Land Warfare, p. 2-16.17. RADM J.C. Wylie, “Why a Sailor Thinks Like aSailor”, 1957, included in Classics of SeaPower, Military Strategy, p.150. Edited by J.B.Hattendorf and W.P. Hughes, US NavalInstitute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1989.Captain Peter Leschen joined the RAN College in 1974 as a 15 year old entry. After graduating from the College andthe Bachelor of Science program at the University of NSW, he received training in several RAN and RN ships,culminating in the award of a Bridge Watch Keeping Certificate. Following time as an officer of the watch, hespecialised as a Navigator and Principal Warfare Officer, serving in HMA Ships Torrens, Wollongong, Vampire,Sydney, Brisbane and Stalwart. Following the RAN Staff Course, he worked in Navy Office before rejoining Brisbaneas the Executive Officer. He then served on the staffs of the RAN and Joint Services Staff Colleges and the USN NavalDoctrine Command, before taking command of HMAS Brisbane. Since then he has been the Director Maritime CombatDevelopment and the Director RAN Sea Power Centre. Captain Leschen took up his current posting as Chief StaffOfficer to Chief of Navy in December 2001.

Leading Thirsty Horses to Water:High Performance Cultures and ADFCapability 1By Nick Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans, Management Consultants15This article examines the characteristics of work environments that are associated with highperformance, and how such work environments can be created and sustained in the ADF. Theanalysis was based on surveys in 1999 and 2000, involving 280 middle-level officers and nearly1300 Other Ranks and junior officers from all three Services. Members’ performance wassignificantly likely to be “above average” when they (1) have a clear idea of their common purposeand their role in it, (2) are empowered to act on their initiative, (3) feel they are supported by otherorganisational groups, and (4) are encouraged to learn from their individual and group experiences.Whether or not such a “high performance culture” exists in a work place depends on its prevailingleadership style. Thus one of the best indicators of “good leadership” is the presence or absence of ahigh performance culture. The findings point clearly to an ADF performance improvement strategythat can be effected quickly, cheaply and with little political and cultural risk.IntroductionThe ADF is increasingly pressured to “domore with less” whilst adapting itself tothe complex post-Cold War world. Up tonow, the focus of change has been onefficiency and structural change. This has putgreat pressure on units and individuals.Many members probably feel that they areworking harder than ever before and thatthey have reached their limits to improve;and they are almost certainly correct on thefirst point, if not the second. This, however,cuts no dice in the never-ending quest fororganisational improvement. (And nor shouldit: the Services have as much obligation todeliver increasing value to the nation as anyother public agency.) The next logical stepfor Defence therefore is to find different,innovative and “smarter” ways to manageindividual performance, by re-structuringcareers and by better management of the“softer” aspects of organisational behaviour.Admiral Barrie reflected this sentimentwhen wrote in this journal in early 1999 thatthe ADF has:a critical need to encourage innovationand adaptability which has been thehallmark of our operational reputation,but… to do it within a regulatory structurewhich has evolved in response to thedemands of public sector accountability.To my thinking the solution to thisproblem seems to lie in a more peoplecentricapproach… One of the first stepsto this more people-centric approach willbe [the program for Defence’s seniorleadership group] to try to ensure thatthere is alignment for what we need to doat the top to create a sense of strong andcommitted leadership throughout theorganisation.[A] significant and often overlookedaspect of the knowledge edge is thequality of the people who ultimately directand fight the battles… The highest qualityand most capable people we can growthrough learning in the defence contextwill be our competitive edge; we mustceaselessly explore new and innovativeways to maximise this potential advantage(bold added). 2

16AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002The Admiral’s incontestable propositionsactually raise more questions than theyanswer (which was probably his intention).One of the most important of these is justwhat the ADF should do “to maximise thispotential advantage”. The CDF mentionedonly one: the program to develop“alignment” in top leadership. Importantthough this is, there are obviously otherprocesses, many of which will target middleand junior levels of the institution. Whatshould these be? And will they necessarily be“new and innovative”, or might they befamiliar friends with whom we have losttouch in this frantic global-business-at-thespeed-of-thoughtworld?The article is based on two studies, in1999 and 2000, of how performance isinfluenced by career factors and the workenvironment. 3Three fundamental questions areaddressed in the article:1. What characteristics of unit workenvironments are associated with highlevels of performance?2. How can such work environments becreated and sustained in the ADF?3. What are the implications for ADFpersonnel policy?Individual Performance in the ADFAs in all other professions, work in thecontemporary military has become markedlymore complex. Contemporary militaryorganisations grapple with professional,political, technological, social and financialissues of a considerably higher order ofmagnitude than those of even a generationago. Today’s high performance is tomorrow’s“just adequate”. All organisations, whatevertheir nature, must improve continually or becalled to question.What factors affect how a personperforms in any given professional role?Skills, experience and talent matter, ofcourse. Our data show that “highly skilled”officers and members (defined as eitherhaving an advanced degree or having beento Service staff college, or as having postsecondaryqualifications, respectively) outperformless qualified colleagues by asignificant margin. 4 And, in the previousarticle, we showed that members in the thirdyear of an appointment significantly outperformthose in their first and second years. 5But the person’s work environmentmatters too – and much more than manywould believe. In fact, it is our contentionthat the major reason why some teamsperform better than others is that theyhappen to be part of “high performancecultures”, rather than just because of thedistinctive skills of their members. And since– as we will show – high performance culturedevelopment is considerably cheaper andmore reliable than individual skilldevelopment, developing high performancecultures is a very sensible and responsibleorganisational strategy.High Performance CulturesManagement research has, for manyyears, shown that certain kinds of workenvironments are conducive to sustainedhigh performance. Consistently successfulorganisations, we have been told, aresuccessful because they do things differently.In particular, this is because they managepeople differently. Such organisations makeit easier for their members to do a good jobby how they treat staff: by the ways theyreward employees, share rewards andinformation, develop managers, organiseteams and/or some other way of peoplemanagement. Thus one of the keys tobusiness success, it is said, is to find the rightmanagement strategy for a givenorganisation that will give it the “right” kindof “culture”.Managers in all sectors of the economyhave been exhorted to do just this. Themanagement consultancy industry had a

East TimorPhotographer: WO2 Gary Ramage

18AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002field decade in the 1990s as it attempted tohelp its benighted clients to lift theirperformance from the mundane to thesuperior. As management consultantsourselves, we were able to observe the mixedeffects many of these programs at closehand. At the end of the decade,commonsense was beginning to prevail.Many managers were realising, thousands ofmanagement-training-days later, thatorganisational culture is more than a“management style”. Equally, it is rarely theoutcome from a few big ticket, high profile,one-off flashy programs. Rather,organisational culture is an “organisationalstyle”. It is a way of thinking that pervadesthe organisation’s day-to-day routinedecisions as to what is “done” and what is“not done”. Culture is more about whatpeople decide to focus on – what goals to setand what solutions to use – than it is aboutgetting them to work “harder”. And what isthe “right” culture is often a matter of valuesand of circumstances than of standardprescriptions.But the basic premise is correct: the workenvironment does make a difference to howpeople perform. And for every organisationthere are certain ways of managing peoplethat will produce high performancestandards. It is the responsibility of anorganisation’s managers to identify anddevelop the features of the “right” culture forthat organisation – however difficult thismight be.High Performance Cultures in the ADFA “high performance culture” in themilitary context is characterised by fourdistinctive features:• goal clarity and focus,• empowerment to act,• teamwork and cooperation, and• an emphasis on innovation and “learningfrom doing”.First, it is difficult for any person toperform well if they are not clear on theorganisation’s goals and what is expected ofthem. (The first principle of war reminds usof this.) So a high performance culture is onein which people are clear about what theyhave to do to contribute to organisationalgoals; one in which they know what theyhave to do and can get the information theyneed to get on with it; one in which they feelthey are “in the picture” and that they knowtheir part in how goals are to be tackled.Next, a high performance culture is anenvironment in which people can, withinreason, get on and do things without havingto wait for permission: in the jargon, one inwhich they feel empowered to act. It is anenvironment where initiative is rewarded; or,perhaps more importantly, an environment inwhich people are not sanctioned for doingthings without always having to getpermission. And, whilst this all sounds verycommonsense, it is often more honoured inthe breach than in the observance. Many ofus will have worked for “zero-defects” bosseswho have been frightened to let their staffuse their initiative in case they made amistake; and we would have noticed howthis dampened what the team was able toaddress and achieve.Thirdly, in a high performance culture,people feel that they are not acting alone.They feel themselves to be supported by boththe other members of the group and by othergroups, directorates and units. Again, this is“commonsense”; but, again, agencies inbureaucracies and even many businessorganisations do not always act in a spirit ofmutual interest.The final feature of a high performanceculture is that its members feel that it isacceptable to question existing practices andto experiment with better ways of doingthem. People feel “safe” in “having a go” andrisking mistakes, as long as those mistakesare used as a means of learning about

themselves and the working environment.This feature is related to the earlier pointabout empowerment and the “zero-defects”mentality. An organisation cannot advancein the contemporary world without makingsome mistakes, so an obsession withmaintaining an unblemished record willinevitably impede progress.These elements tend to be commonoutcomes that occur together. A workplace inwhich people have a clear idea of theircommon purpose is one in which people arealso empowered, supported by others andlearn to learn from their individual andgroup experiences. 6“High Performance Cultures” and HighPerformanceSo far, so theoretically good. But, inreality, do the hypothesised performancedifferences exist? That is, are members whoseworkplaces have the above features“superior” performers? To test the hypothesis,LEADING THIRSTY HORSES TO WATER 19we developed a seven item PerformanceCulture scale to measure unit workenvironments. Service members responded toa number of items which tapped the abovefour dimensions of high performance culture.Examples of the items include “I clearlyunderstand what is expected of me in thisjob”, “I have been given the authority I needto do my current job effectively”, “My workarea gets the cooperation and assistance itneeds from other parts of Defence/the ADF”and “People in this work area are encouragedto learn from their mistakes”. Responses wereof the “Strongly agree-Strongly disagree”type. Scores on each item were summed andaveraged to give a Performance Culturescore. Table 1 shows the details of the scale.Our measure of performance was the JobPerformance scale, which was explained inthe earlier article on job rotation andperformance. This was a seven item scale, inwhich members assessed their ownTable 1: Measurement scalesPerformance cultureI clearly understand what is expected of me in this jobI get enough information to do my current jobI have a clear understanding of what I have to do to contribute to my unit/branch goalsI have been given the authority I need to do my current job effectivelyMy work area gets the co-operation and assistance it needs from other parts of Defence/theADFIn my current work area, people are encouraged to examine what they do and to find waysto do it betterPeople in this work area are encouraged to learn from their mistakes* Coefficient alpha = 0.75LeadershipSenior officers in my work area provide clear direction and leadershipSenior officers in this work area are forward thinking and progressiveSenior officers in this work area are aware of most of the challenges that their people faceSenior officers in this work area take time to talk to their staffWhen people in this work area have good ideas, senior officers make use of them* Coefficient alpha = 0.84

20AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002Figure 1. High performance culture and performance100'Bottom third' performance culture score'Middle third' performance culture score'Top third' performance culture score69% performing"above average"for theircategory182453924509285313300OR Junior offrs Middle leveloffrs (Units)Middle leveloffrs (Staff)effectiveness and performance, using fivepointresponse scales, of the “Strongly agree-Strongly disagree” type. Examples of theitems include “I do my current job well”, “Iam one of the better performers in mycurrent work group/directorate” and “Overall,my work team produces high-quality servicesand outputs”. Scores on each item weresummed and averaged to give a JobPerformance score. Table 1 shows the detailsof the scale.Figure 1 shows that, consistent with ourhypothesis, those who work in highperformance culture environments outperformthose who don’t. And the contrast isquite dramatic.Members in “High” performance cultureenvironments are much more likely to scorein the “above average” range than those in“Low” performance culture environments. 8Even compared with those in “average”performance cultures, the difference is abouttwo-fold.A word of caution in the interpretation ofthese findings. On the one hand, thesedifferences are almost certainly exaggeratedby statistical and psychological factors. Ifthere really was a five-fold margin in someADF work places over others, it would notrequire a special survey to notice it. Beingfrom comparatively small samples, thesestatistics are subject to sampling errors (eventhough the differences are highly statisticallysignificant). And there is probably somepsychological effect influencing members’own assessment of their performance levels:those in a “high” performance cultureprobably feel more positive about theircontribution than those who are not, and thiswill affect their ratings. Having made thesecaveats, however, there is little question thatthe essential differences are valid. And, evenallowing for these effects, the differences arestill remarkable. There are plainly substantialadvantages for the individual – and for theorganisation – when they are in a certainkind of environment, a certain kind ofculture.As well as performing better, people inhigh performance culture environments tendto be highly satisfied with their work andcareers (Figure 2). This is not surprising. Few

Figure 2. High performance culture and job satisfaction% with highjob satisfaction10030487435'Bottom third' performance culture score'Middle third' performance culture score'Top third' performance culture score6386LEADING THIRSTY HORSES TO WATER 213967 682942760of us enjoy being in a work situation wherewe are unsure of what our purpose is, arerestrained in doing what we believe to benecessary, feel that we will get littlecooperation from others, or are unable toinnovate when conventional methods areproving inadequate. This applies to mostpeople but it applies especially to the kinds ofcommitted and capable people who comprisetoday’s Defence Force. And beyond this,skilled people find it deeply gratifying to usetheir skills and to accomplish things. Successis its own reward.In terms of how job satisfaction isaffected by being in a high performanceculture, there are interesting differences inthe middle-level officers between unit workand staff work. We interpret this as showingthe differences in officers’ preferences forparticular kinds of work. As a general rule,officers’ preference is for “core business”work rather than being a staff officer. Thusthe opportunity to do such work is satisfying– as long as the performance culturesituation is not unfavourable. Conversely, itcould be said with only small licence thatOR Junior offrs Middle leveloffrs (Units)Middle leveloffrs (Staff)many officers find staff work to bedissatisfying – except when the performanceculture situation is favourable. That is, staffwork seems to be satisfying only whenpeople are in a situation where they feel thatthey can perform well.High Performance Cultures and LeadershipThe strong interrelationship among theelements of high performance culturessuggests that they have a common cause. Ourresearch shows that this is indeed so – andthat the common cause is “leadership”. Thatis, whether or not a high performance cultureexists is strongly dependent on the leadershipstyle in that work area. 9 The questionnaireitems that comprised the Leadership scale areshown in Table 1.The effect of good leadership is shown inFigure 3. Here, the leadership scores aredivided into top- and bottom-third zones.Members with “top-third” leaders aresignificantly more likely to be in highperformance culture environments than thosewith “bottom-third” leaders. This isespecially so for junior officers and OR.

22AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002Figure 3. Leadership and high performance culture100'Bottom third' performance culture score'Top third' performance culture score% in "top third"highperformancecultureenvironment61622764234214120OR Junior offrs Middle leveloffrs (Units)Middle leveloffrs (Staff)This gives a clear indication of one of themajor ways that good leadership is translatedinto good performance. Leaders make theirimpact, in part, through the kind ofperformance culture they create. Goodleaders engender high performance throughhigh performance cultures. Good leadersclarify goals, focus and support action,engender teamwork and encourage people toinnovate and to share their experiences. Oneof the best indicators of unit leadership isthus the presence or otherwise of a highperformance culture in that unit.This has considerable practicalsignificance. It strongly reinforces the“leadership-is-learned” theory of leadershipbehaviour. The creation of a highperformance culture in an officer’s workgroup/unit represents that grey behaviouralzone between “leadership” and“management”. It suggests that the kind ofwork environments officers create tells usmuch more about their effectiveness asleaders than almost any other criterion wecould envisage.In summary, Figure 4 illustrates therelationships explored in and confirmed bythis article.DiscussionThe findings of the study should provideconsiderable encouragement to those whoseek speedy improvements in ADFperformance and productivity. The findingspoint clearly to a performance improvementstrategy that can be effected quickly, cheaplyand with little political and cultural risk.The relevant performance improvementstrategy is derived from the followingdeductions:• The key to improving performance of ADFmembers of the current generation has littleto do with changes to skill developmentprograms; it has much to do with how theyare managed and led. ADF members arealready well skilled. For example, nearlythree-quarters of officers have at least abachelor’s degree (on top of their militaryprofessional qualifications) and nearly onefifthhave advanced degrees. If they haven’tthe essential skills now, then no tinkering

LEADING THIRSTY HORSES TO WATER 23Figure 4. How leadership develops high performance cultureLEADERS' BEHAVIOURHIGH PERFORMANCECULTURERole clarityEmpowermentCooperationLearning emphasisPerformanceMoralewith career development programs is goingto change that situation significantly. Aconsiderable investment in human capitalis simply not being exploited in terms ofthe superior individual and organisationalperformance that the ADF needs right now.• Next, this study reminds us that middlemanagement/leadershipin the ADF is asimportant as the top level in improvingorganisational performance. The day-todayperformance of the vast majority ofmembers is affected much more by whathappens in their ship or unit than by whathappens in Canberra and at ServiceCommand HQs. The key players here arethe unit COs, ships’ captains, sub-unitcommanders and warrant officers and, inHQ/staff units, the branch heads anddirectors. It is their influence that reallymatters to the performance of the averageService member.• Moreover, this process will be as muchabout creating a “learning organisation”culture as it is about improvingperformance. The term “learningorganisation” has become hackneyed anddevalued because, in most organisations, itis used to mean little more than “lots ofpeople doing lots of training”. We stronglybelieve that it has a deeper meaning thanthis, in respect of the high performanceculture described above. A “learningorganisation” is a place where performanceis used as a means of learning from, andlearning to learn from, individual andgroup experiences.• A performance improvement program inthe ADF based on particular ways ofstructuring the work environment will notbe difficult to introduce. For a start, manymiddle and senior leaders are alreadypractising its principles. It would bestrongly aligned to the Services’ culturesbecause it would be concerned withbehaviours, which are central to theServices’ concept of leadership. Such aprogram would thus be pushing on anopen door.• Finally, such a program would beextremely popular in the ADF because itwill be seen to benefit all stakeholders.Members will gain because it would help

24AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002them to be successful – and success (orpersonal performance) is a major driver ofjob satisfaction, even in relativelyunpopular career areas like staff work.Their leaders will gain because they too willbe successful. The ADF will gain because itwill be more effective. And the Governmentand the public will gain because of theADF’s improved capability. Nor need sucha program be expensive. It does not, forexample, require the construction ofanother grandiose palace of formallearning somewhere in Canberra, whoseproduct might begin to be making someimpact on organisational effectiveness infive or so years time. Rather, it is aboutgiving leaders the same kinds ofopportunities that we want them to givetheir people – clear goals, information onhow to reach them, freedom of action andthe chance to “have a go” and to learnfrom the process.ConclusionsThis article is a response to the CDF’simplicit challenge to the ADF to give himsome ideas on “new and innovative ways tomaximise [the] potential advantage” ofhaving “the highest quality and most capablepeople in the ADF”. 11Many readers will regard the abovefindings as “commonsense”. They willquestion whether the leadership-highperformance culture connection is really anydifferent to what the military still often call“good man management”. So much thebetter. But let us do things that make“commonsense” more “common”. Let us getback to the basics of organisationalleadership and management, for the good ofthe ADF, its members and the taxpayer.A recent study of leadership developmentin the ADF noted the dominance of the“development” paradigm in ADF thinking. 12The study pointed out how, when faced witha performance problem, ADF thinking seemsautomatically to focus on “development” asthe solution. Thus lists of competencies aredrawn up, staff colleges are re-structured,new training schools are set up, thecurriculum of ADFA is re-examined yetagain, and senior officers are sent onexpensive external management/leadershipprograms. All of this is done on the implicitassumptions that performance deficienciesarise from skill deficiencies and that ifleaders can be only given more or betterskills, they will be better leaders.This article throws this fixation with“development strategies” into seriousquestion. Improved performance does notrequire a further major investment intraining, education and career development.What is needed is to identify the leadershipbehaviours that are associated with highperformance (and this study is a start to that)and then to reinforce them when theyhappen.The vast majority of ADF members,whatever their rank, are skilled in their basicprofessional craft and often have additionalskills which they itch to practise and develop.If we lead these horses to the water of a highperformance culture, we can expect them notonly to drink but also to swim. And, if weknow what a high performance cultureorganisation looks like and how to create it,is any other kind acceptable?NOTES1. This is the second of two articles dealingwith performance issues in the ADF. (SeeNick Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans, “JobRotation and Military Capability: Benefits,certainly – but is anyone counting thecost?”, Australian Defence Force Journal,No. 146, Jan/Feb 2001, pp. 47-59.2. Admiral C.A. Barrie, “Change, People andAustralia’s Defence Capability for the NewCentury”, Australian Defence Force Journal,No. 134, Jan/Feb 1999, pp. 5-15.3. The two studies were parts of consultancyprojects for the Head of the DefencePersonnel Executive, to test the relationshipbetween performance, culture, leadership

LEADING THIRSTY HORSES TO WATER 25and job rotation. The data was gatheredfrom questionnaire surveys of middle levelofficers and junior officers and OR from allthree Services. The surveys are outlined inthe companion article to this.4. The criterion of performance here is thepercentage of people in the “above average”performance category for each type ofprofessional qualification. For junior OR,27% of those without post-secondary schoolqualifications, were in the “top-third” JobPerformance Grade, compared with 43% ofthose with post-secondary school technicalor tertiary qualifications (Chi-square=14.66,df=4, p

26AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002forward thinking and progressive” and“When people in this work area have goodideas, senior officers make use of them”. Thescale has a coefficient alpha value of 0.84.10. This does not mean that ADF officers do notneed skills; it means that, in aggregate, theydon’t need more skills beyond those theyhave now. Put it another way: if you had adollar to spend on performanceimprovement in the ADF, you should spendit on performance management, not skilldevelopment.11. Barrie, op. cit.12. Brigadier K.J. O’Brien, PE 98/27623 Theprovision of leadership development,education and training within Defence.Dr Nick Jans is an academic and management consultant whose work in the past 15 years has been largely concernedwith strategic human resources management and organisational capability. He is a Principal of Sigma Consultancy, anAustralian firm which specialises in strategic and organisational research. Sigma’s clients have included businesses andgovernment agencies in many countries, including the USA, Australia and New Zealand. His book, “The real C-cubed:culture, careers and climate and how they affect capability”, is to be published shortly.Ms Judy Frazer-Jans is the Managing Principal of Sigma Consultancy. She has been the producer or co-producer of anumber of studies for Commonwealth SES, the Australian Taxation Office and National Bank together with a decade ofsimilar studies for the ADF.

The Fundamentals of Junior OfficerTrainingBy Captain C.R. Smith27Your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. Everything else inyour professional career is but a corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purposes, allother public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for theiraccomplishment; but you are the ones who are trained to fight. Yours is the profession of arms, thewill to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, thenation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honour,country.General Douglas MacArthur to a West Point graduating class 1IntroductionWhile many of the world’s organisationsand institutions are coming to termswith the current management trends ofchanging and restructuring again and again, itis now more important than ever for armies toremind themselves of what makes themdifferent to civilian organisations and whatfactors are critical to success in war. It is selfevidentthat leadership is critical to an army'ssuccess in war. There are many books andarticles published that distil the principles ofmilitary leadership. Yet it is fashionable for thesenior leadership of many Western armies toapply contemporary management techniquesto the leadership of armies. This “managementculture” is likely to (if it has not already)influence the training of junior officers. Thisarticle will attempt to remind those involved inofficer training of the purpose of that trainingin order to delay the negative effects of amanagement focus by highlighting ninefundamentals of junior officer training.Nine FundamentalsOne: Inculcate the Army ethos and valuesWe face a dilemma that armies havealways faced within a democratic society.The values necessary to defend that societyare often at odds with the values of thesociety itself. To be an effective servant ofthe people the army must concentrate noton the values of our [Western] liberalsociety, but on the hard values of thebattlefield … We must recognise that thismilitary community differs from the civiliancommunity from which it springs. Thecivilian community exists to promote thequality of life; the military communityexists to fight and, if need be, to die indefence of that quality of life. We must notapologise for these differences.General Kerwin, former US ArmyVice Chief of Staff 2General Kerwin understood that combatrequires a particular mental framework and aparticular organisation to effect it. Theprofession of arms differs from otherprofessions in that its members accept death.They offer up their lives for the society theyvow to protect. This requires, by necessity, aparticular culture, ethos, and set of values. Tolead people in the profession of arms requiresleadership methods that are completelyinappropriate in civilian society. For example,military leadership is, by necessity, supportedby a system of military law completelyseparate to the law of the wider society.

28AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002An army requires leaders with particularvalues who embrace its ethos. These particularvalues are admirable in any person and are anagent of good in any society; however they area necessity for the military professional. That iswhat separates military society from the widersociety. These values and ethos have afunctional purpose in military society. Anarmy that discards them in favour of thefashionable values of the day is destined tofailure on the battlefield.Ethos can best be described as anintangible force. It can only be observedindirectly. Peter Tsouras observes that ethos islike God and “is in many respects a matter offaith and just as difficult to account for”. 3 It isthat thing which will bind people together andmove them to give their lives for the sake ofthe aims of their superiors. Without thisintangible force - this sense of community andpurpose - even the best-equipped and mannedarmy will fail in battle.Leadership is critical to the establishmentand nurturing of an appropriate ethos withinan army. Leadership promotes the values andbehaviours necessary for success in battle.Leadership is, to a large degree, about settingup a culture that encourages these necessaryvalues and behaviours. This can only beachieved through personal example. CathyDownes observes: “Every leader's action - orlack of action - is observed by followers. Forsubordinates to be fully committed toorganisational goals and values, they must seethat their leaders are examples of commitmentto those same values and goals and live thosevalues in their daily lives”. 4 This is vital for thesuccess of an army and is therefore the singlemost important element of officer training, asthe primary purpose of junior officer traininginstitutions is to develop officer qualities andinculcate the ethos and values of the army.Two: Officer training is an art, not a scienceI hope…I could not be accused ofwishing to make this art a mechanicalroutine, nor of pretending on the contrarythat the reading of a single chapter ofprinciples is able to give, all at once, thetalent of conducting an army. In all thearts, as in all the situations of life,knowledge and skill are two altogetherdifferent things, and if one often succeedsthrough skill alone, it is never but the unionof the two that constitutes a superior manand assures complete success.Antoine-Henri Jomini 5Jomini was aware that war is a humanenterprise and that armies are socialinstitutions. This being true it follows then thatthe development of army officers is morecomplex than the simple application of moderncompetency-based training structures.Modularisation and competency-based trainingare neat, rational training structures thatprovide quantifiable assessable outcomes.Competency-based training in particular isabout skills and knowledge; and to a lesserdegree, attitudes. The necessary attituderequired to achieve competence in a giventraining outcome does not necessarily implythat a trainee officer possesses an appropriatecharacter suited to being an Army officer.Therefore, officer-training institutions must notblindly apply competency-based training andmodularisation at the expense of those lesstangible but vital elements of junior officerdevelopment - character, ethos, and values.An army cannot rely on society to provideyoung men and women with appropriatevalues and an understanding of its ethos.Trainees cannot be taught to be officers. Thetraining staff and the culture of the traininginstitution must shape them. Junior officertraining cannot be easily defined as a series ofmodules or competencies. For example, ethosand values cannot be taught as a module ordefined as a competency known as “Ethos andValues”. It is a progressive thing that occursthrough immersion in an army's culture overan extended period of time. Modularisation

and competency-based training are aboutteaching. Ethics and values on the other handare related to institutional culture, and it is theinstitution’s job to nurture an appropriateculture in which the trainee is immersed andshaped into an officer. Therefore officertraininginstitutions should acknowledge theadvantages of competency-based training andmodularisation while understanding that theinstitutions themselves are greater than thesum of their parts.Three: Develop warriors, not managersBy 1945 heroic warriors and greatcaptains alike appeared creatures of thepast. The conduct of war had become aproblem of management. The mind-set wasreinforced in the West as militaryestablishments became more and morecivilianised. Relationships between armedservices, defence ministries and industryevolved into symbiosis. Generals found thetransition from brass hats to bowler hatsincreasingly easy. Robert McNamara [USSecretary of Defense] is only the familiarname among a long list of officialsdetermined to bureaucratise militaryprocedure. Their task was facilitated asarmies abandoned or modified the attitudeswhich traditionally separated them fromcivilian societies… Such a militaryenvironment hardly favoured the seriousintellectual consideration of battles asdecisive events.Showalter 6Showalter identified a culture ofmanagement in the US Army of the 50s and60s that contributed significantly to the poorperformance of the US Army in Vietnam. Aculture of management persists in mostWestern armies today. Despite this, juniorofficers must be trained as warriors, notmanagers. The Chief of the Defence Forcestated in a speech to the Australian Institute ofManagement that he subscribes “to the viewTHE FUNDAMENTALS OF JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING 29that to be a good leader these days, you mustalso be a good manager”. 7 This is not arequirement for the junior officer. A juniorofficer is primarily a leader. The job is tomotivate groups of men and women to imposetheir will on the enemy, and although theofficer may use various resources to achievethis, resources are useless without the will ofthe team. Leaders impose their will on theirteam and prevail because they understand thehuman mind. They understand that war is ahuman enterprise. Managers on the other handview people as a resource to be managed andused efficiently. Managers do not view war asa clash of human wills but as the applicationof resources and technology to achieveresource efficient outcomes.At a tactical level a management cultureleads to templated plans and a focus onprocedures and processes as opposed to results.If an outside observer were to visit all theleadership training institutions in theAustralian Army today and view theassessment criteria for tactical commandand/or leadership he/she would discoverlaundry lists of performance points, assessmenttools that focus on processes and procedures.This generates leaders who are process driven,who focus on ratios and ignore the advantagesof surprise, pre-emption, disruption and tempo.In effect a management approach to officertraining will produce automatons as opposedto freethinking and adaptable commanderswith the will and ability to defeat an enemy aseconomically (in terms of loss of life) aspossible.Four: Encourage decision-makingThe problem faced by all peacetime armiesis that of the “no defect” culture. “No defect” isbest described as a philosophy of excellence atall times. It does not take into account theessentially human nature of armies and war. Itdemands excellence at every stage of trainingand experience. It is about efficiency asopposed to effectiveness. It is underpinned by a

30AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002mentality of excessive cautiousness,adaptiveness and routine thinking. 8In a “no defect” culture individuals will berisk averse and avoid making difficultdecisions. To avoid making difficult decisionsis to avoid making mistakes. This is not a goodbreeding ground for future leaders. 9 Any formof tactical leadership and command assessmentmust be non-rigid. It must be based on trust inthe valued judgement of the instructor. Officertraininginstitutions should establish andnurture an environment in which risk isunderstood and managed, not avoided. Theculture should encourage decision-making andtrainees should be held accountable within thebounds of the training environment. Yetmistakes should be viewed as learningopportunities and used as such. Initiative,ingenuity and innovation must be promoted atall times. To punish a trainee for usinginitiative and then making a mistake based oninexperience is to stifle that initiative foreverand foster the “no defect” culture.Five: Facilitate learning and developmentHeisenberg’s Uncertainty Law in Physicssays that subatomic particles can never bemeasured because the very attempt to measurethem will cause them to change. There is acertain degree of correlation betweenHeisenberg's law and the training of officers.By the fact that when individuals know theyare being continually assessed they will altertheir behaviour from that which they wouldnaturally use in the same situation when notassessed. Therefore assessment must be of alow priority and low profile. Instructors shouldadopt an approach similar to that of thefootball coach. Just as individual footballersare aware that the coach is interested intraining them to be their best in order for theirteam to win the premiership, the traineesshould understand that the instructor is not anobstacle to graduation but a facilitator oflearning and personal development. Thetrainees must believe that the instructor hassome interest in producing a product of thehighest quality.The best way to define this philosophy is touse an analogy. Imagine the instructor is acarpenter and the trainee is a raw piece ofwood. The carpenter has collected the piece ofwood from the forest floor because some of thefeatures of that wood indicated that the woodhas potential to be carved into a thing ofbeauty. The carpenter earns a living byproducing statues and selling them at themarket. The better the carving the more moneyis earned. Often the carpenter is lucky and thenatural beauty inherent in the wood enhancesthe statue. On other occasions the carpentermakes mistakes and selects the wrong piece ofwood. The carpenter will continue to work atthe faulty wood with the same precision anddedication as every other piece of wood upuntil the moment a flaw is noticed. If the flawis such that the statue will not sell it will bediscarded back to the forest instead of wastingprecious time and energy working on thestatue any further. The instructor should adoptthe same attitude of this carpenter to the wood.Let's expand the wood carving analogy alittle further. The village has many carpenters.Each carves wood to produce a differentproduct. Some produce bowls, others furniture,others lamp stands. There is every chance thatthe piece of wood discarded to the forest hasthe potential to be an excellent lamp stand orbowl. The carpenter does not destroy the woodbut leaves it in the forest ready to be used byanother of the village's carpenters. Similarly,although trainees may be removed from theinstitution because they are not suited toleading soldiers, they are not therefore badpeople and incapable of achieving anything ofany worth in the broader community.Instructors must be careful of blaming traineesfor their failure. In doing so, at the point ofremoval from the course, individuals will beforced to redress the removal (and waste a lotof time and money) through the legal systemsince they are actually defending their personal

worth. Instructors must have a more worldlyapproach. One that says, “I have identified thatyou are not suited to being a leader of soldiers.You are inherently a good person withunlimited potential to succeed in otherendeavours; however I cannot allow you tolead soldiers. Good luck in the future”. Thisapproach does not put individuals on thedefensive and at the same time sets them upfor success in the future. This approach says toall the trainees that the instructor is concernedfor their individual welfare, the welfare ofothers, the organisation and the trainee's futurelife. It demonstrates that the instructor is notan obstacle to success but a facilitator ofsuccess.At no stage is it suggested that it is notimportant to set high standards and expectthem to be met. Nor is it suggested thatindividuals are not going to need a good"rocket" to keep them on the rails. What issuggested is an approach that aims to enhancepotential as opposed to an approach that erectsobstacles.Six: Separate the assessment of character fromskills and knowledgeOfficer-training institutions should initiallyassume that all trainees who negotiatepsychological and aptitudes testing to beselected to attempt officer training arepotential officers and have what it takes to bea good officer. Just like the piece of wood inthe analogy earlier, they have demonstratedthe potential to be a sellable product. Thereforethey need only be shaped. Officer-trainingcourses should not be seen nor structured asselection courses. Trainees should simply betrained and retrained if necessary until theyachieve the desired standards.Notwithstanding the above, what cannot befixed by simple training is an individual'scharacter. Character is developed during theindividual's childhood and teenage years. It isvirtually set in concrete prior to a traineeattending an officer-training institution.THE FUNDAMENTALS OF JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING 31Therefore instructors should be on a constantlookout in order to identify character flawsthat are not appropriate for a junior officer.The instructor must ensure that those necessaryofficer qualities are present and unacceptablequalities are not. As the flaws are identifiedswift action should be taken to remove theindividual from training.If a trainee is to be removed for pooracademic performance it should be done notbecause of poor academic performance per sebut because the poor performance may be anindicator of laziness; low intellect; or poorattitude. These are basic qualities that defineone's character and as such are unchangeableand inappropriate for an officer. Assessmentshould be used to ensure consistency oftraining across the institution and to identifywhen retraining is necessary, not to removetrainees from the course (an obstacle).An effective assessment system must havetwo parts. The first part should be a processthat assesses skills and knowledge. This processis simple and functions by comparingperformance against training outcomes. Itshould be used to identify whether someonehas achieved competency and requires nofurther training or whether someone is not yetcompetent and requires further training. Thiswill require an after-action review or debriefwhich identifies a course of action that willlead to an improvement in the observeddeficiencies. This is a simple process thatshould remain discrete from the second part.The second part of an effective assessmentsystem is more important. This part of thesystem determines whether a trainee embracesthe ethos and values of the Army, andpossesses the qualities of a professional officer- the right character. Instructors should recordobserved behaviours and the consequences ofthose behaviours as they occur for everytrainee. There should be no assessment forms.The instructor may debrief the trainee at anygiven time. This may be at the end of aparticular activity, the end of a sequence of

32AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002activities or at a time deemed suitable by theinstructor, and should occur as frequently or asinfrequently as is required. Debriefs onobserved behaviours do not necessarily have tooccur at the same time the trainee is beingdebriefed for skills and knowledge. The traineeshould be advised of the observed behavioursand consequences only. There should be nopass/fail criteria for any training activity interms of ethos, values and character. Thisshould be the case whether the trainee isplaced in a position of command or otherwise.This way the trainee realises that his/herbehaviour is not just relevant to a particularactivity but at all times. The institution is thenable to analyse a series of observed behavioursand deduce from these whether an apparentpattern demonstrates a character deficiency.Seven: Make the instructor accountableThe instructor must be given physicalownership of the raw material and madeaccountable for developing quality officers.Although this principle appears self-evident itis often overlooked. Many officer-traininginstitutions are structured more likeuniversities than military trainingestablishments. These officer-traininginstitutions are structured in a manner thatspreads the instruction amongst a number of“subject-matter-experts” and establishes twodiscrete bodies - trainees and instructors. Like auniversity, this separates the academic stafffrom the student body. In such circumstancesno individual is clearly responsible for theshaping of the trainees. It allows responsibilityto be shifted to the system and creates a “themand us” mindset in the trainees. In such astructure the trainee views assessment as anobstacle to graduation - an end in itself.When the institution is structured similar toa fighting unit with a clear and direct chain ofcommand the “them and us” mindset isnegated. When instructors are givenresponsibility for developing a group oftrainees (a platoon or section) the trainees willreadily identify that the instructor andtherefore the Army has a vested interest inshaping them into the best officers they can be.Assessment is used to ensure that each groupof trainees are achieving the training standardsand to identify when retraining is necessary.Instructors whose trainees consistently fail toachieve training standards can be madepersonally accountable. In this environmentthe trainees will view their training as a meansto an important end and not as an end in itself.Eight: Focus on command and leadership incombatOfficer training must focus on warfightingand leadership and command in combat.Despite the growing number of peacekeepingmissions, leadership training must focus onacquiring skills at leading combined armscombat. It is the basic structure for meeting allother requirements. 10 Leadership training mustfocus on high intensity combat scenarios;combat stress as opposed to workplace stress;combat leadership as opposed to organisationalleadership; motivation and the maintenance ofmorale in combat as opposed to barrackscounselling. Training should focus not onchange management but how to live anddecide in an environment of chaos anduncertainty.Armies are social institutions and war is theclash of opposing human wills. Anunderstanding of the human mind is vital forsuccess in war. Robert Leonhard goes as far asto argue that “war should be studied as abranch of psychology”. 11 He argues that, “foran army trained to think in quantifiable terms,the psychological dimension of war mustremain a mystery. Rather than contemplate thepsychological phenomenon of defeating theenemy, we are content to perform body countsand tank-loss ratios”. 12 As such junior officersmust understand what binds soldiers togetherin chaos and danger. They must understandwhy soldiers offer up their lives for theircountry. They must understand human nature

and its application to war as well as itsresponses in war. They must understand thesethings in order to use them to advantage inbattle.Nine: Assess command results, not commandprocesses and proceduresInstructors must understand how to assessleadership and command in a complex andfluid combat environment. There are manyvariables in combat. There are many thingsthat a commander cannot control. Thereforeno decision is ever completely right orcompletely wrong. One can do everything rightin combat and still fail. Therefore thefoundation for assessment should be leadingand command, not the processes or proceduresthat produce decisions and action.An instructor's reasoning might bedifferent to the trainees reasoning whenconfronted with the same problem with thesame set of complex and fluid circumstances.The fact that one might delay making adecision to act by a couple of seconds mightbe enough to completely change each pointof view. A couple of seconds might see newinformation come to light or the situationmight change in a way that could not bepredicted if the decision was made earlier.Each will make different yet equally relevantand correct assumptions. As such theinstructor's way of dealing with the situationis likely to be completely different to thetrainee’s way, yet both may be right orwrong. Both may fail or both may succeed.To suggest that there is a single assessableoutcome to a fluid tactical problem woulddemonstrate a complete lack of understandingof combat.Instructors must remove themselves fromthe situation and objectively identify thecritical elements of command. They must askthemselves; “despite the chaos and uncertaintyof the situation did the trainees maintaincommand of their force and lead it through toan acceptable outcome?” An acceptableTHE FUNDAMENTALS OF JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING 33outcome isn't necessarily the outcome that theassessor had in mind at the start. Anacceptable outcome is determined byunderstanding what the trainees knew; theirmission, their orders and the way events tookplace.Instructors should provide situations notchoreograph situations. The focus must be onresults, on meeting the superior commander'sintent, not processes or procedures. Whencombat training scenarios are choreographedthe trainees are unable to conduct a normalcombat appreciation since they becomeacutely aware that their success is dependenton how closely their responses correspond tothe responses anticipated by the instructor.They will attempt to second-guess theinstructor, not develop a tactical plan basedon a sound appreciation of the situation. Theresult is a trainee who knows what to thinkand when to think it, but not how to think,an individual who is good at followingtactical processes and procedures but unableto think laterally.ConclusionThe profession of arms requires men andwomen with a particular type of character whoembrace its ethos and values. This is necessaryto achieve the type of organisation andmindset necessary for success in battle. Officertraininginstitutions must acknowledge thatwar is a clash of human wills and thatleadership is the only means of directing theefforts of men and women in order to imposeone’s will on the enemy. Officer-traininginstitutions must therefore produce warriorsnot managers. Men and women whounderstand how to make difficult decisions incomplex combat situations and have their willprevail. This is achieved through anunderstanding that the intangible elements ofofficer training have primacy over transientknowledge and skills and cannot easily bedefined as competencies nor taught inmodules.

34AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002NOTES1. Jr., Whan, E. Vorin, (ed.), A Soldier Speaks: ThePublic Papers and Speeches of General of theArmy Douglas MacArthur, Frederick A.Praeger, New York, 1965, p. 356.2. General Walter Kerwin, “Values of Today’sArmy”, Soldiers: The Official US ArmyMagazine, vol. 33 no. 9 (September). 1978, p. 4.3. Peter G. Tsouros, Warriors’ Words: A QuotationBook, Arms and Armour Press, London. 1992.4. Cathy Downes, “An Ethos for an Army in theTwenty-First Century”, in Hugh Smith, (Ed.),Preparing Future Leaders, Australian DefenceStudies Centre, Canberra, 1998, p. 73.5. Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Manoeuvre:Manoeuvre Warfare Theory and Airland Battle,Presidio, Novato, 1991, p. 4.6. Dennis E. Showalter, “Of Decisive Battles andIntellectual Fashions: Sir Edward CreasyRevisited”, Military Affairs, vol. 52 no. 4(October). 1988, p. 207.7. Admiral Chris Barrie, Reflections on Leadership,http://defweb6.cbr.defence.gov.au/cdf/docs/aim1.doc8. Major General Karsten Oltmanns, “LeadershipTraining”, in Smith, Hugh (Ed.), PreparingFuture Leaders, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, Canberra, 1998. P. 191.9. ibid., p. 192.10. ibid., p. 190.11. Leonhard. p. 80.12 ibid., p. 111.BIBLIOGRAPHYArmy, Australian, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: TheFundamentals of Land Warfare, CATDC, 1998.Downes, Cathy, “An Ethos for an Army in theTwenty-First Century”, in Smith, Hugh (Ed.),Preparing Future Leaders, Australian DefenceStudies Centre, Canberra, 1998.Kerwin, General Walter, “Values of Today’s Army”,Soldiers: The Official US Army Magazine, vol.33 no. 9 (September). 1978.Leonhard, Robert R., The Art of Manoeuvre:Manoeuvre Warfare Theory and Airland Battle,Presidio, Novato, 1991.Meyer, General Edward C., “Leadership: A Return toBasics”, in Taylor, Robert L. and Rosenbach,William E. (eds.), Military Leadership: InPursuit of Excellence, Westview Press, Boulder.1984.Oltmanns, Major General Karsten, “LeadershipTraining”, in Smith, Hugh (Ed.), PreparingFuture Leaders, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, Canberra, 1998.Showalter, Dennis E., “Of Decisive Battles andIntellectual Fashions: Sir Edward CreasyRevisited”, Military Affairs, vol. 52 no. 4(October). 1988.Tsouros, Peter G., Warriors’ Words: A QuotationBook, Arms and Armour Press, London. 1992.Van Creveld, Martin, 1990, The Training of Officers:From Military Professional to Irrelevance, TheFree Press, New York. 1990Whan, Jr., Vorin E., (ed.), A Soldier Speaks: ThePublic Papers and Speeches of General of theArmy Douglas MacArthur, Frederick A.Praeger, New York, 1965.White, Charles Edward, The Enlightened Soldier:Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft inBerlin, 1801-1805, Praeger, New York. 1989.Captain Chris Smith joined the Army in 1991 as an Officer Cadet at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA).He graduated from ADFA with a Bachelor of Arts in 1993. Upon graduation from The Royal Military CollegeDuntroon (RMC-D) in 1994, he was posted to the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment and deployed almostimmediately to Rwanda as a Platoon Commander with ASC II, UNAMIR II. Since then Captain Smith has served as aReconnaissance Platoon Commander, Adjutant of the 42nd Battalion, The Royal Queensland Regiment, and as aninstructor at RMC-D. His most recent appointment was Adjutant of RMC-D. Captain Smith is the author of LWP-CA(RISTA) 2-3-6, Infantry Reconnaissance and Surveillance, and is currently writing a book discussing the negativeeffects of contemporary social change on the Army. This article was written early in 2000 and was one of severalcatalysts that triggered, and subsequently influenced, significant improvement in the sequencing, delivery andphilosophy of training at RMC-D.

Embracing Positive and TransformationalChange in the Australian Army –A Bridge Too Far?By Lieutenant Colonel D.J. McGuire35“The superiority of armament is only one element of success in war;… the ability of a general toadapt to changes on the battlefield and to keep a hundred thousand men co-operating toward theattainment of a single objective is the key to success.”Jomini, The Art of War. 1IntroductionTumultuous changes over the past decadehave left business managers and employeesreeling from shock and searching for the HolyGrail of management solutions. However,many “new” management philosophies havefailed to deliver all they offer. The key tosuccess in a changing environment is not somenew technique or management trend – it’s justnot that simple. Rapid change can cloud anorganisation’s vision, strategies and culture. 2Jomini emphasised that in a changingenvironment, the key to success comes fromkeeping forces focused on the attainment of asingle objective – the vision.The Australian Army has struggled with theneed for change for many years. 3 It hasexamined other organisations andexperimented with a variety of managementtools but has lacked the focus Jomini spoke of.Identifying a simple vision has been the firststep in focusing the organisation on the taskahead. That task is to stay one step ahead in arapidly changing and increasingly dangerousregional and international environment. Tokeep ahead, the Army must embrace positiveand transformational change. It must learn toencourage knowledge, innovation and the useof technology. 4 To do this the Army needs asimple strategy for change that encouragesnew ideas while building on assets alreadypresent within the organisation.The aim of this article is to analyse anddevelop strategies for the creation of a militaryculture that embraces positive andtransformational change. The first step is todefine transformational change. The article willthen propose a model for transformationalchange in the Army. The model will highlightthe key strategies required and demonstrate therelationship between them. These strategieswill be analysed and their applicability to theArmy explained. The article will demonstratethat the Army already has most of thestrategies required to embrace change. What itlacks is a plan that brings those strategiestogether and provides the focus andmotivation for change.Transformational Change and the AustralianArmyTransformational change is the process ofmoving an organisation to a higher plane,leading it to become something qualitativelydifferent while retaining its essence. 5 Thecatalyst for transformation is generally a shiftin the environment requiring considerableorganisational refocus. Transformation caninvolve dramatic, instantaneous and widereachingchange. It is for this reason that manyorganisations, including Army, have ferventlyresisted it. In fact, while transformationalchange does require a dramatic paradigm shiftin organisational focus, the components of theorganisation will generally changeincrementally – one does not dismiss the other. 6

36AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002While organisational refocus must occur atall levels, the pace and requirement for changewill vary throughout an organisation.Everything does not have to change “overnight”. 7 The challenge is to transform inresponse to environmental change rather thanas the result of crisis, thereby maintaining theinitiative and competitive edge. The need to beproactive will dictate the extent and pace ofchange. The key is, change must be focusedon the future, it must be substantive and itmust add value or it serves no purpose. 8The Australian Army’s most recentexperience with transformational change hasbeen the Defence Reform Program (DRP). TheAustralian Government imposed change uponArmy due to the Army’s resistance to do soitself. The challenge now facing the Army is toseize the initiative and control the tempo anddirection of change. The aim is to move intothe future and create new standards ofoperational effectiveness. The task will requireleadership that is vision led, team focused andsupported by a culture that encourages positivechange.For Army to develop a culture thatembraces positive and transformational changeit will require a simple model that builds onexisting strengths within the organisation.Various authors have identified their ownstrategies that, though they differ in name,serve similar purposes. 9These strategies can be summarised in thefollowing:a. a values-based culture;b. focused leadership;c. a clear and achievable vision;d. empowerment; ande. doctrine and training.An Army Transformational Change ModelFigure 1 is a proposed model fortransformational change within the AustralianArmy. The model is comprised of five keystrategies, or building blocks. Each buildingblock plays a key role, though onceconstructed the model is self-supporting andworks as an integrated system. A systemsFigure 1. The Proposed Army Change Model (ACM)LeadershipVisionDoctrine & TrainingDirective ControlCulture

EMBRACING POSITIVE AND TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMYapproach gives the model the strength requiredto withstand the rigors of change. The modelshows culture as the foundation on which tobuild the new organisation.Leadership, shown as the constructioncrane, acts as the builder that bonds everythingtogether and keeps the organisation focused onthe vision. The vision sits at the top providingguidance, stability and direction. Finallydoctrine, training and directive control are thebuilding blocks that form the super-structureof the organisation. All the components arelinked to provide the required strength anddurability.Culture - The FoundationWhile most management “experts”recognise the importance of culture in anorganisation, few clearly explain itsrelationship to performance. 10 Figure 2summarises the key components of culture andtheir relationship to organisationalperformance. It shows that culture is notimmutable and is shaped by factors such asleadership, vision and people. Culture affectsorganisational behaviour and the decisions ofits people. In turn, these influence theperformance of the organisation. 11 Figure 2shows the symbiotic relationship betweenculture shapers, culture and culture outputs.Organisational success is dependent uponhaving a strong but flexible culturalfoundation, as emphasised in the Army ChangeModel (ACM), proposed in Figure 1. TheArmy’s cultural foundation is a warfightingtradition that upholds the values of teamwork,initiative and courage. 12 While important, alonethese values do not set the conditions fortransformational change. The Army needs toencourage such values as creativity, innovationand flexibility to help open up the Army tonew ideas. 13 The cascading effect that outdatedcultural values may have on performance ishighlighted in Figure 2.The DRP seems to have been successful inprompting Army into action. It is also evidentthat the culture still contains many hiddenbarriers to organisational change. 14 Culturalchange in the Army requires a sophisticatedapproach, as it would be all too easy to “throwthe baby out with the bath water”. The newArmy culture must encourage creativity andrisk acceptance, as it is only through tryingnew ideas that the Army will learn and grow. 1537Figure 2. A Model for Understanding Cultural Performance• Leadershipactions• Performancemeasures• People practices• Vision, purpose,and strategy• Structure• Competitivecontext• Climate• Norms• Symbols• Philosophy• Values• BeliefsBehavioursDecisionsPerformanceCulture ShapersCultureCultureOutputs

38AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002The ACM depends upon the strength of itsculture to act as the foundation stone.Leadership then acts as the builder to correctlyplace and secure the remaining parts of themodel.Leadership - The BuilderThe Army places great emphasis on theselection, training and education of its leaders.Leaders are important as they contribute to aclimate of trust by demonstrating commitment,moral courage, honesty, respect for humandignity, and integrity. 16 This fosters anatmosphere that inspires creativity without fearof failure. Leaders and subordinates are willingto take calculated risks and learn from theirmistakes. In turn the organisation continues tolearn, grow and evolve, thus maintaining acompetitive edge.An atmosphere of trust is not consistentthroughout the Australian Army. The Army’sleaders must bear the majority of theresponsibility for this. Recent surveys infer thatmany subordinates have a genuine distrust ofsenior leaders across the Army. 17 Theimpression is that elements of Army’s seniorleadership would prefer to disguise or ignoreorganisational shortfalls in order to gain selfadvancement.While such a perception may bea gross generalisation, it nonetheless highlightsa potential weakness in Army’s leadership.Without trust in its leadership, the Army willnot step outside its “comfort zone” andembrace change.The Australian Army’s leaders mustdemonstrate a strong set of personal andorganisational values that complement theculture and promote teamwork and trust.Organisational values will, in turn, give theArmy a self-ordering quality, which providesdirection and stability in periods of turmoiland stress. 18 Leadership begins with values andthe Australian Army’s values of courage,initiative and teamwork are a starting point onwhich to build. The Army’s leaders areresponsible for enforcing these values and thevision. It is only through leading by examplethat trust will be established.Vision – The FocusLeadership by example is vitally important,but the leader and the organisation must knowwhere they are going. Further, it must knowthe key milestones that mark success along theway. Hence, the leader has a role in providingthe focus for transformational change. Leadersdo three things:a. they help create a vision for thefuture;b. they communicate that vision to theorganisation; andc. they implement the vision. 19The Australian Army’s vision has beenimposed upon the organisation from the top,reflecting its hierarchical nature. Senge arguesthat the imposition of a vision can onlycommand compliance, not commitment. 20Building a shared vision relies upon leaderswho encourage members to develop their ownvision. Alternatively, a leader with a sense ofvision can communicate their vision in such away that others are encouraged to share in it. 21The Army’s leaders must play a critical rolein this regard. They must educate theorganisation about the strength, purpose andintent of the Army’s vision. New leaders mustbe inculcated with the Army vision and valuesduring training to further ingrain it into theculture. Support for the vision will comethrough sharing and investing responsibilitythroughout the organisation usingempowerment.Empowerment – The Key Building Block of TrustEmpowerment is about sharing theresponsibility and rewards of management. Itis not about power as much as investing trustand delegating control. Empowerment appealsto the intrinsic motivation of staff as they gaina level of self-determination and responsibilityfor their efforts. In turn, this promotesteamwork, unity and helps focus staff on thecorporate vision. 22 It requires leaders that are

EMBRACING POSITIVE AND TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 39Adventurous trainingconfident to take risks and accept mistakes inorder to develop the trust and confidence ofthe staff.The Australian Army’s principle of directivecontrol incorporates these ideals within themilitary context. Directive control givescommanders the capacity to adjust rapidly tochange and act decisively, often without higherdirection. 23 It does not imply completedelegation of power or any negation ofresponsibility by the senior commander.Rather, directive control enables commandersto use their initiative to exploit fleetingopportunities, adapt to battlefield changes andpredict enemy action.While the strengths of this strategy areevident, it is still not consistently or correctlyapplied in the peacetime Army. The failure ofdirective control is generally due tocommanders ignoring a few simple rules. Thecommander must:a. provide a clear statement of intentand mission;b. allocate sufficient resources;c. ensure subordinates have suitableresponsibility;d. encourage risk taking, toleratecreative failure; ande. set a positive example. 24Directive control requires trust to besuccessful. By its very nature it requires riskacceptance and encourages creativity andinnovation at all levels. These traits are asessential in peace as in wartime, especially inan organisation that wishes to embracetransformational change. These skills are notnatural and must be encouraged at all levels.Most importantly, training should teach,enforce and practise these skills. Further,training must be underpinned by doctrine thatprovides the platform and direction for futuredevelopment.

40AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002Doctrine and Training – The Investment in theFutureDoctrine provides the strategic architecturefor changing the organisation’s criticalprocesses. 25 Doctrine should provide theintellectual link between where the Army istoday and where it wants to be tomorrow. Inshort, it relates the ends to the means. Doctrinemust be aligned with the Army’s vision anddrive its training to ensure that effort is notwasted and that transformational change iscontinuous.The Australian Army has taken some majorsteps down this path. It has produced keystonedoctrine, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,which spells out the future direction of theArmy, including its priorities for training anddevelopment. The doctrine is focused towardthe achievement of the vision. Other doctrine,such as the All-Corps Officer and SoldierCompetencies, provide the template for futuretraining and education ensuring that it remainsaligned with the Army’s changing needs.Training must encourage people to movebeyond the culture of risk aversion as thisstifles creativity and innovation. Trainingshould encourage creativity and innovationthrough rewards and shared responsibility.Recent doctrine supports this strategy andencourages “adaptive learning”. 26 Adaptivelearning requires trainees to be given thefreedom to make mistakes and learn fromthem. This knowledge must then be fed backinto the organisation for others to learn from.Army training is progressively moving downthis path, as trainers are educated in theprinciples of adaptive learning. 27Ultimately, Army should strive to become atrue learning organisation. Learning wouldbecome part of the daily routine rather than aspecific component of training. Army alreadyrecruits young, devoted people and putsconsiderable effort into turning them into teammembers. The next step is to encourage themto think freely, but with clear vision andgoals. 28 Recruitment should not be stereotypedtoward particular personality types as diversityhelps develop creative tension. Creative tensionstimulates staff to learn more and embracechange as a means of gaining newopportunities. Becoming a learningorganisation will require the application of allthe strategies within the proposed ACM inorder to expand the current cultural paradigmand embrace change.ConclusionThe Australian Army has already madeefforts to embrace change. It has examined avariety of other organisations andmanagement philosophies in an attempt toidentify all the strategies required to embracechange. The Army has developed a vision toprovide organisational focus. What it seems tolack is a means of drawing the strategiestogether so that they complement and supportone another.The Army Change Model developed in thisarticle demonstrates the synergy required. Itidentifies five strategies for transformationalchange and explains their relationship to oneanother. Culture is seen as the foundation onwhich everything else is built. It must bevalues-based and encourage creativity and riskacceptance. Further, it should incorporate thoseelements of Army that make it unique.Leadership is portrayed as the builderproviding guidance to the organisation andensuring that focus remains on the vision.Vision sits atop the organisation providing thepoint of focus. Doctrine, training and directivecontrol completes the structure and providesthe means to achieve the Army’s vision. Themodel’s strength comes from threecomponents:a. it incorporates the principal strategiesof many other change managementconcepts;b. the strategies it proposes complementand reinforce existing militarytools and characteristics; and

EMBRACING POSITIVE AND TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 41c. it demonstrates the necessaryrelationships and links required forthe strategies to survive the rigours ofchange.The analysis shows that these five strategiesare both suitable and applicable to theAustralian Army. They have the ability tocreate a culture that embraces change and themeans to promote it throughout theorganisation. The DRP has shown the Armythat change is a necessary part of the future.The challenge that now faces the Army is toseize the initiative and control the tempo anddirection of change to regain “the edge”.NOTES:1. Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, translated byCaptain G.H. Mendell, Greenwood Press,Wesport CT, pp.47.2. Price Waterhouse Change Team, 1996, TheParadox Principles, Irwin Publishing,Singapore, p.102.3. Defence Executive, 1998, Defence - OurPriorities, Defence Publishing, Canberra, pp.6.4. ibid., pp.2-3.5. M.V. Harper and G.R. Sullivan 1998, Hope isNot a Method, Times Business/Random House,Toronto, p.148.6. W. Kiechel, 1990, “The Learning Organisation”,Fortune Magazine, Volume 6, 12 March, pp.75-77.7. D. Dunphy & D. Stace, 1995, Under NewManagement, McGraw-Hill, Roseville, Sydney,p.112.8. Shapiro, E.C. 1995, Fad Surfing in theBoardroom, Harper Business, Adelaide, p.47.9. The main authors include Peter Senge (TheFifth Discipline), Dunphy and Stace (Under NewManagement – Australian Organisations inTransition), Harper and Sullivan (Hope Is Not aMethod), The Price Waterhouse Team (TheParadox Principles) and Covey (7 Habits).10. The main references include Peter Senge (TheFifth Discipline), Dunphy and Stace (Under NewManagement – Australian Organisations inTransition), Harper and Sullivan (Hope Is Not aMethod), The Price Waterhouse Team (TheParadox Principles) and Covey (7 Habits).11. The Price Waterhouse Change Team, op.cit.,p.103.12. Doctrine Wing, 1998, The Fundamentals ofLand Warfare, CATDC, p.iii.13. Harper and Sullivan, op. cit., pp.18-19.14. N. Jans, 1999, Part of the Solution or Part ofthe Problem? The Future for ADF HumanResource Management (Draft), To be published,p.2.15. Harper and Sullivan, op. cit., p.44.16. ibid., p.76.17. Survey data collected by 1 PsychologyResearch Unit for its 1998 Annual Report toCASAG; and in the University of MelbourneSurvey for the Army C&SC Professional EthicsWorkshop – 27 July 1999.18. Schein, E.H. 1992, Organisational Culture andLeadership, Jossey-Bass Publishers, SanFrancisco, pp.373-4.19. S.R. Covey, 1992, Principle Centred Leadership,Simon and Schuster Inc, New York, p.251.20. P.M. Senge, 1992, The Fifth Discipline, RandomHouse, Sydney, p.206.21. ibid., p.206.22. D. Dunphy & D. Stace, 1994, Beyond theBoundaries, McGraw-Hill, Roseville, Sydney,p.106.23. Doctrine Wing, 1998, The Fundamentals ofLand Warfare, CATDC, Puckapunyal, p. 6.16.24. N. Jans, 2 August 1999, Presentation toAustralian Army Command and Staff Collegeon Organisational Leadership, Fort Queenscliff.25. Harper and Sullivan, op. cit., pp.95-6.26. Senge, op. cit., p.356.27. Army Education Centre, Training DevelopmentCourse Notes, Enoggera, pp.17-22.28. J. Micklethwait and A.Wooldridge, 1997, TheWitch Doctors, Random House, London, p.156.BIBLIOGRAPHYAgor, W.H. 1989, Intuition in Organisations, SagePublishers, London.Army Education Centre, 1998, Training DevelopmentCourse Notes -Distance Education Package,Enoggera.Bennett, R. & Graham, H.T. 1995, Human ResourcesManagement – Eighth Edition, PitmanPublishing, London.Covey, S.R. 1992, Principle Centred Leadership,Simon and Schuster Inc, New York.Deal, T. and Kennedy, A. 1982, Corporate Cultures:The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life,Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts.Defence Executive, 1998, Defence - Our Priorities,Defence Publishing, Canberra.Doctrine Wing, 1998, The Fundamentals of LandWarfare, CATDC, Puckapunyal.Dunphy, D. & Stace D.1994, Beyond the Boundaries,McGraw-Hill, Roseville, Sydney.Dunphy, D. & Stace D.1995, Under NewManagement, McGraw-Hill, Roseville, Sydney.

42AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002Gates, W. 1999, Business @ the Speed of Thought,Penguin Books, Melbourne.Hanna, D.P. 1988, Designing Organisations for HighPerformance, Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts.Harper, M.V. and Sullivan G.R. 1998, Hope is Not aMethod, Times Business/Random House,Toronto.Jans, N. 1999, Part of the Solution or Part of theProblem? The Future for ADF Human ResourceManagement (Draft), To be published.Limerick D. 1999, Toward an Action LearningOrganisation, The Learning Organisation, athttp://www.mcb.co.uk/services/articles/liblink/tlo/Limerick.htm.Mant, A. 1997, Intelligent Leadership, Allen &Unwin, St Leonards.Naumann, D.S. 1995, “The Importance ofOrganisational Culture in the Management ofChange within the Australian Army”, TheQueenscliff Papers, Fort Queenscliff.Parry, K. 1996, Transformational Leadership, PitmanPublishing, Australia.Peters, T.J. & Waterman, R.H. 1996, In Search ofExcellence - Lessons from America’s Best RunCompanies, Harper and Row, New York.Price Waterhouse Change Team, 1996, The ParadoxPrinciples, Irwin Publishing, Singapore.Schein, E.H. 1987, The Art of Managing HumanResources, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Senge, P.M. 1992, The Fifth Discipline, RandomHouse, Sydney.Shapiro, E.C. 1995, Fad Surfing in the Boardroom,Harper Business, Adelaide.Stone, R.J. 1998, Readings in Human ResourceManagement, Jacaranda, Milton.Wheatley, M.J. 1994, Leadership and the NewScience: Learning About Organisation from anOrderly Universe, Berrett-Koehler Publishers,San Francisco.Yukl, G. 1998, Leadership in Organisations, PrenticeHall, New Jersey.Zbar, V. 1995, Managing the Future, MacMillanPress, Melbourne.Lieutenant Colonel McGuire is an RAE officer, currently posted as the SO1 Officer Training Development, RMC-A.Lieutenant Colonel McGuire has had a wide variety of regimental and non-corps postings and is a graduate of theArmy Command and Staff College, Queenscliff. Lieutenant Colonel McGuire has had overseas service in Malaysia,Cambodia, and briefly, in India. He has had a number of articles published in Defence publications.

ManoeuvreBy Captain S. Davison43To manoeuvre is to move intelligently in order to create a favourable situation…However, there are a number ofmisconceptions about what manoeuvrewarfare actually is. Manoeuvre is quite distinctfrom battlefield movement – this is mobility. Itshould not be merely equated with mechanisedor armoured forces, which have inherent speed,or the potential for rapid movement. Nor shouldit be equated with a rote tactical procedure suchas envelopment, which can be pulled out of thecommander’s bag of tricks – this is a battle drill.The theoretical ideal of manoeuvre warfare is toachieve the aim without the requirement for theactual application of decisive lethal force. Thereality is that this will rarely be possible and thatthere will be human and material cost. It is notbloodless. There will always be the requirementto close with the enemy over that last 1000 m.There will be casualties on both sides, noncombatantsmay suffer and there will becollateral damage. 5 It is not a means of avoidingcombat, but a means of seeking combat in away that is advantageous to us.There are many kinds of manoeuvre inwar, only some of which takes place on thebattlefield. There are manoeuvres to the flankor rear. There are manoeuvres in time, indiplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology: allof which are removed from the battlefield,but react often decisively upon it. The objectRaoul Castex 1Manoeuvre warfare is not new; its origins lie in the German and Russian philosophies ofwarfighting. These philosophies seek to understand and exploit the characteristics of war. 2 As anoperational art, it has encountered resurgence in discussion and robust debate amongst Westernarmies since the end of the Cold War, and its attending policy of nuclear deterrence. This is due tothe move away from a “Flexible Response” from a NATO “Forward Defence” as pre-planned in the“Grand Defence Plan”, to a new military strategy of collective defence based on the concept of“Counter Concentration”. 3 This shift in strategy emphasises movement of forces and gives impetusto high technology manoeuvre warfare. 4of all is to find easier ways, other than sheerslaughter, of achieving the main purpose.Winston Churchill 6The strict definition of manoeuvre limits it toone of a spatial dimension, being positional, orrelational, with respect to the enemy.Manoeuvre is more than this – it is not simply arapid movement around an enemy’s flank – it isa state of mind. Manoeuvre incorporates anintelligent approach to conflict that ruthlesslyexploits advantage, recognising the value ofspeed. The only constant is change, real orperceived, in order to gain advantage. Thecentral precept of manoeuvre is that it must beoriented on the enemy, at all levels. Thus,manoeuvre exists across the entire spectrum ofconflict. This article will discuss manoeuvreacross this spectrum; at the strategic, operationaland tactical levels of conflict.Levels of Conflict“The strategic level of conflict is that level ofwar which is concerned with the art and scienceof employing national power.” 7 Essentially, this“encompasses all military and non-militaryagencies and capabilities which contribute tonational security and the prosecution of war”. 8“The operational level of conflict isconcerned with the planning and conduct ofcampaigns and major operations. Military

44AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002strategy is implemented by assigning missions,tasks and resources to tactical operations withina designated area of responsibility.” 9 It ischaracterised by a significant emphasis onmilitary capabilities as the means to achievestrategic ends. 10 The operational level of conflictis where integration of joint assets occurs and isthe level at which decision can be achieved.“The tactical level of conflict is concernedwith the planning and conduct of battle. It ischaracterised by the application of concentratedforce and offensive action to gain objectives.” 11This level of conflict is focused on militarymeans to achieve operational or campaign ends.It embodies ownership of assets in a relativelydefined battlespace for the achievement ofspecific missions that contribute to thecampaign objective”. 12Strategic ManoeuvreIn order to understand strategic manoeuvre,one must first understand the nature ofstrategy. “Strategy is an art rather than ascience. It is an art because it involves: thecollision of adversarial wills, the clash ofasymmetrical forces, and is guided by imperfecthuman beings.” 13 Luttwak describes five levelsof strategy: “the technical (the interplay ofweapons), the tactical (the planning of battles),the operational (the construction of campaigns),theatre strategy (the execution of campaigngoals) and grand strategy (the integration of alllevels to fulfil national policy)”. 14 GrandStrategy encompasses war on two separate, butinterrelated levels. “That of method, in theclassical warfare tradition of seeking decision inthe field, and policy, as part of a broader warstrategy which may involve many non-militaryfactors.” 15“At the level of military method, strategicmanoeuvre concerns generalship (the collisionof military forces in the field) and operationalart.” 16 Hans Delbruck, the German militaryhistorian, argued that classical generalship wasdominated by two strategic methods.Niederwerfungsstategiethe strategy ofannihilation, and Ermattungsstrategethe strategyof exhaustion. 17 Alexander and Napoleon wereproponents of the great encounter battle, andthus characteristically attritionists, whereasFrederick the Great was a proponent of battleand manoeuvre, and thus characteristically amanoeuvrist. However, manoeuvre warfare isnot about being a manoeuvrist opposed to anattritionist. The British military historian, BrianHolden Reid observed that “manoeuvre warfareand attrition are complementary elements,which contain both offensive and defensiveforms whether forces are on the move or at thehalt. Thus the elements of manoeuvre warfareapply under both defensive and offensiveconditions”. 18Strategic manoeuvre as a military method isabout moving one’s forces skilfully so as tomultiply their operational effectiveness. It is theability to inflict attrition by striking selectivelyat a point and time of one’s choosing. This is theessence of Liddell Hart’s strategy of the indirectapproach. 19 Strategic manoeuvre as a militarymethod is only one of several means ofattaining the political ends of the war, however,it is the level of conflict at which politicalobjectives are integrated.At the level of policy technique, strategicmanoeuvre can be equated with diplomaticmanoeuvre, in which all actions are coordinatedin order to achieve a coherent national, orinternational, approach to conflict. 20 AndreBeaufre argues that at this level strategicmanoeuvre ceases to be a pure military method.“It broadens to include the full range of a state’spower, including: diplomacy, economic pressureand psychological factors that may be used –directly or indirectly – with military force tosecure victory.” 21 Beaufre defines the idea oftotal strategy as “not something military, but anessential government technique covering theentire phenomenon of coercion in internationalaffairs”. 22 He believes that the key tounderstanding strategy as an essential techniquein statecraft lies in the mastery of the concept ofmanoeuvre, especially at the level of strategic

policy-decision. “The political processestablishes the acceptability of national aimsand sets the conditions for the use of militarypower. Military strategists must then determinethe appropriate strategic aims that adequatelysupport political ends.” 23 “Historically, in mostWestern democracies, strategic policy inwartime has remained the province of the civilleadership, advised by Chiefs of Staff.” 24However, “no amount of tactical andoperational virtuosity can redeem politicostrategicmiscalculation”. 25 Australia’s strategicaims and their relationship to the ADF are nowclearly articulated with the recent publication ofThe Fundamentals of Land Warfare.Australia’s military strategy is developedfrom strategic policy that provides a holisticview of Australia’s use of military force ininternational affairs. … It is based on amaritime strategy that is a military strategicpreference to achieve decisions in themaritime environment. Australia applies thisconcept proactively by endeavouring to makea positive contribution to regional security.The intention is to shape Australia’s strategicenvironment by working cooperatively withregional states to prevent threats arising or todeal with them at a distance from Australiawhen they do arise. … In supportingAustralia’s military strategy, the Armyprovides the Government with options forwarfighting and military support operationsacross the spectrum of conflict. The Army’scontribution is designed to affect or shape thestrategic environment in a mannerfavourable to Australian interests.The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 26The actual employment of the Land Forcelies is in the realms of operational manoeuvre.Operational Manoeuvre“The main purpose of the operational levelis the transfer of a political input (strategicinputs) into a military output (campaigns /major operations).” 27 The aim is to design aMANOEUVRE 45campaign plan that is likely to achieve thestrategic objectives. Colonel Holger Muellerstates that “the dynamic combination of forces,space, time and information, oriented onstrategic objectives, is the most adequate answerto the politico-military requirements at theoperational level”. 28Essentially, manoeuvre at the operationallevel is the interpretation of the political intentand the transfer of this into tangible factorssuch as when and where in order to achievewhat purpose. In Australia there has been along period where a gap has existed betweenthe strategic and the tactical levels. This hasrecently been bridged by the creation of theposition of Commander Australian Theatre(COMAST), who has been charged with theconduct of the operational level of war.“COMAST is required to plan and mount jointand combined campaigns to achieve nationalmilitary objectives. This is to be achieved aspart of the national security strategy of theAustralian Government.” 29 In concert with thecreation of this position has been thepublication of the interim edition: DecisiveManoeuvre; Australian warfighting concepts toguide campaign planning. This doctrine definesdecisive manoeuvre as “the conduct ofsynchronised operations using assets from andwithin any or all environments to defeat theadversary by positioning in time and space themost appropriate force to threaten or attackcritical vulnerabilities, thereby unhinging thecentre of gravity and obtaining maximumleverage”. 30The centre of gravity is not a new concept.To quote Sun Tzu, “seize something hecherishes, and he will conform to your desires”. 31Decisive Manoeuvre defines the centre of gravityas “the key characteristic or locality from whicha military force, nation or alliance derives itsfreedom of action, strength or will to fight atthat level of conflict”. 32 It may be a capability,such as decision-making bodies. It may befunctions such as economic, logistic orinformation systems resources. Alternatively it

46AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002may be a moral characteristic. In fact, it mayconsist of a number of key elements at eachlevel of conflict. The key is to identify what theCentre of Gravity is and its associated DecisivePoints (points from which a hostile or friendlyCentre of Gravity can be threatened). Onceidentified, a Main Effort, or focus, can bedirected against it in order to attain a decision.At the operational level the political intent istransferred to the tactical level in order toorchestrate the combination of forces in timeand space, with information. The aim is toexploit tempo and mobility to achievemanoeuvre. “For decisive manoeuvre to beeffective, however, commanders and theirsubordinates must be willing to apply decisivelethal force when required.” 33Tactical ManoeuvreAt the tactical level, manoeuvre is aboutcreating an advantage and exploiting it – it isthe how. At the tactical level, skilful manoeuvreuses firepower to create or exploit advantage. Itis supported by a number of concepts such as;decision superiority, mission oriented tactics,main effort, surfaces and gaps, reconnaissancepull and risk management.Decision superiority is “the ability to makeand implement more informed and moreaccurate decisions at a rate faster than theadversary”. 34 Manoeuvre is a function of bothspace and time relying on the intelligent use offorce, rather than brute strength, to gain theobjective economically. Tempo can be createdthrough not only moving fast, but through theability to think, decide, act and react quickly.With regard to the Boyd Cycle, relative speedcreates the advantage. This can be createdeither by increasing our decision cycle orslowing the enemy’s – thus we can seize andmaintain the initiative, shape the conflict anddictate terms to the enemy. As stated, the basisof manoeuvre is change. Change heightens theenemy’s disorientation and is achieved bytempo. The commander who generates a fasteroperational tempo, switching fluidly from oneactivity to the next and synchronising forces,gains a significant advantage. The enemy isovercome by events. The enemy’s cohesion andability to influence the battle is destroyed.Ultimately, the enemy’s action is inappropriateand becomes ineffective. Battle drills facilitatetempo. Additionally, the commander makingintent clearly understood, using mission styleorders, and employing decentralised tacticaldecision-making, contributes to tempo.Auftragstaktik, or mission oriented tactics,evolved in line with German infiltration tacticsduring WWI, which relied upon small units toprobe for gaps and exploit opportunities. Thesetactics required a fast decision cycle withdecentralised control because the focus was overa dispersed front. Consequently, the articulationof the commander’s intent, and the designationof a Main Effort, are key elements ofmanoeuvre.Schwerpunkt, or point of main effort, doesnot necessarily equate to physical concentration.An objective (dear to the enemy or useful to us)is often terrain oriented, however, it may not be,particularly with a mobile enemy. Focus is theconvergence of effort in some way – in space, intime or in effort – so as to create a unifiedeffect. The German’s defined this as Angrifszielor aiming point. It is possible to be physicallydispersed and yet remain focussed on acommon objective. The German blitzes intoPoland and France in 1939 and 1940 areexamples of multiple, broadly dispersed axeswith a common focus of shattering the depthand cohesion of the enemy defences. There mustalways be a designated main effort within thecapabilities of the necessary combat power. Thedecisions of where to locate it, and when andwhere to shift it, are amongst the most difficultdecisions commanders must make in combat.Manoeuvre sees this aiming point againstenemy weakness, not strength.Flachen and Lukentaktik, or surfaces andgaps, is the principle that guides the main effortto be directed against an enemy’s weakness, asopposed to its strength. Due to technology, the

modern battlefield is characterised by gaps.Gaps, or enemy weaknesses, may take thephysical form of inferior mobility or firepower,inefficient command and control systems, or apoor night-fighting capability. Weakness mayalso be temporal, such as discernible tacticalpatterns, or a lack of initiative or flexibility onthe behalf of commanders. A weakness is anyidentified characteristic that can be tacticallyexploited. 35 In order to exploit enemyvulnerability, we must firstly avoid hisstrength. 36 To quote Sun Tzu, “an enemy may belikened to water, for just as flowing wateravoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands,so any army avoids strength and strikesweakness. And as water shapes its flow inaccordance with the ground, so an armymanages its victories in accordance with thesituation of the enemy”. 37 Manoeuvre warfare isa fluid form of combat. Attacks follow thecourse of least resistance. We may need tocreate these gaps, or fix the enemy’s attention inorder to create an enemy’s front. This can beachieved in a number of ways; through surprise,deception, or through distraction. These areforms of psychological manoeuvre. Thedeception plan in 1944 deceiving the Germansinto believing the cross-channel invasion ofFrance would take place at Calais is an exampleof surprise. This was contributed to bydeception. Deception is where we createambiguity in our operations through multiplicityand variability in order to have no discernibleform or pattern, whilst maintaining an effectiveorganisation. Distraction follows the principleof Cheng and Ch’i espoused by Sun Tzu –placing the enemy on the horns of a dilemmathrough using the extraordinary force. The effectof fixing the enemy’s attention, denying theenemy’s freedom of action and using theleverage of the mobile force to destroy theenemy. The Germans termed these supportingattacks as Stosstruppentaktika sequence ofsuppression, assault and exploitation. Once a gaphas been created, it may be necessary to launchlimited attacks perpendicular to the line ofMANOEUVRE 47advance in order to keep gaps open long enoughto exploit. The Germans termed this Aufrollen.Manoeuvre, in all these forms, follows theprinciple of reconnaissance pull, as opposed tocommand push.Reconnaissance pull is to exploit tacticalopportunities developed, or located by,subordinate units – thus the battle is shapedfrom below. To quote Sun Tzu, “the enemy doesnot know where I intend to give battle. For if hedoes not know where I intend to give battle hemust prepare in a great many places. And whenhe prepares in a great many places, those I haveto fight in any one place will be few”. 38 Utilisingreconnaissance pull, we are able to createfavourable combat ratios at that particular timeand place. It is predicated on opportunism andthe acceptance of risk in order to create, as JohnBoyd describes, unequal distribution.A fast decision cycle, achieved with missionstyle orders, accompanied with decentralisedtactical decision-making responsibility, givessubordinates the freedom of action to achieve thecommander’s intent. However, this also involvesa degree of risk. Mission style orders (should)only contain the degree of detail needed to ensurenecessary coordination. The articulation of theseorders relies on the strength of a commander. Theinterpretation of the intent relies on theintelligence (and training) of a subordinate. Intraining subordinates must be allowed to makemistakes so that they will not be afraid of usingtheir initiative in time of war. When fighting anumerically superior enemy the commander mustbe willing to take prudent risks, especially whenthere is the opportunity for significant gain.Importantly, risk does not equate to chance. Thiscapacity is contributed to by a commanderleading from the front, being located wellforward in order to make effective and timelydecisions based on first-hand knowledge of thesituation. The key to manoeuvre warfare is to actboldly and decisively in order to dislocate theenemy. In the spirit of Blitskrieg tactics, we mustnot only accept confusion and disorder, but alsogenerate it. Concurrently, we must also have the

48AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002capacity to operate successfully within it.Predictability will allow the enemy to get insideour decision cycle.The principle of maintaining a reserve is alsoin accordance with our management of risk. Thegreater the unknown, the larger the reserveshould be to deal with the unexpected. Thereserve is the trump card, used not to reinforcefailure, but to bid for victory. For when thereserve is committed, the commander hascommitted to violent, decisive engagement.ConclusionThere are a number of misconceptionsregarding what manoeuvre warfare actually is.Importantly, it is not confined to the spatialdimension. It is an approach to warfare that seeksto identify an advantage, at all levels of conflict,and ruthlessly exploit it in order to achievedecision. At the strategic level, manoeuvreencompasses the selective movement of forces soas to multiply their operational effectiveness,combined with diplomatic manoeuvre in order toachieve a coherent national or internationalapproach to conflict. At the operational level,manoeuvre is the transfer of a political input intoa military output likely to achieve decision insupport of the strategic objectives. It is the level atwhich decision can be achieved. At the tacticallevel, manoeuvre is achieved through tempo andmobility. Skilful manoeuvre uses firepower tocreate or exploit advantage. Manoeuvre warfareat this level is taking advantage of the fleetingopportunities evident in the chaos of battle,taking advantage of the enemy’s forced andunforced errors. It is also attacking the enemy’smind. It is contributed to by concepts such asdecision superiority, mission oriented tactics,designated main effort, surfaces and gaps,reconnaissance pull and risk management.Fundamentally, manoeuvre warfare is a state ofmind, relying on the intelligent use of force,rather than brute strength, to shape the battlefieldand gain the objective. However, once battle isjoined, manoeuvre and attrition arecomplementary. A fitting analogy is the ambush.The ambush is a method of outmanoeuvring theenemy. It allows an unknown and unsuspectingenemy to put itself at an overwhelmingdisadvantage – and die.NOTES:1. R. Castex, n.d. quoted in Evans, M. 1996,Strategic Manoeuvre – A Study in MilitaryMethod and Policy Technique, Commonwealth ofAustralia, (Australian Army), Army DoctrineCentre, Headquarters Training Command. p. 1.2. Land Warfare Centre, Command Staff andOperations Wing, January 1999, OperationsNotebook, Chapter 1, p. 1.3. D. Holger Mueller, 1998, “The Character ofManoeuvre at the Operational Level”, AdvancedMilitary Studies Course, Department of NationalDefence (Canada), p. 1.4. Evans, op. cit., p. 1.5. Department of Defence, 1998, DecisiveManoeuvre – Australian warfighting concepts toguide campaign planning, Defence Publishingand Visual Communications, Canberra. Chapter1, p. 4.6. W. Churchill, n.d. quoted in Schmitt, J.F. 1990.“Understanding Manoeuvre as the Basis for aDoctrine”, Marine Corps Gazette, August, p. 92.7. Decisive Manoeuvre, op. cit., p. viii.8. C.W. Orme, J. Thomas, and D. Graham, 1998,Sensor to Shooter Links in Joint Task Force 21p. 2.9. Decisive Manoeuvre, op. cit., p. viii.10. Orme, Thomas and Graham, op. cit., p. 2.11. Decisive Manoeuvre, op. cit., p. viii.12. Orme, Thomas and Graham, op cit, p. 2.13. Evans, op. cit., p..2.14. E.N. Luttwak 1987, quoted in Evans, op. cit., p. 3.15. Evans, ibid., p. 3.16. ibid., p. 5.17. G.A. Craig, n.d. quoted in Paret, P. 1986. Makersof Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to theNuclear Age, Oxford, Oxford University Press,pp. 341-44.18. B.H. Reid, 1991, quoted in Evans, op. cit., p. 6.19. C. Bellamy, 1990, quoted in Evans, op. cit., p. 6.20. A. Beaufre, 1965, quoted in Evans, op. cit.,translated by Major General R.H. Barry, p. 7.21. ibid., p. 7.22. A. Beaufre, 1967, quoted in Evans, op. cit.,translated by Major General R.H. Barry, p. 8.23. W.W. Mendel, and L. Tooke, 1993, “OperationalLogic – Selecting the Center of Gravity,” DefenceForce Journal, Military Review, June, p. 3.24. G.A. Craig, n.d. quoted in Paret, op. cit., Chapter17.25. Evans, op. cit., p. 3.

MANOEUVRE 4926. 1998, Land Warfare Doctrine The Fundamentalsof Land Warfare, Commonwealth of Australia(Australian Army), Doctrine Wing, CATDC,Chapter 3, pp. 15-16.27. Holger Mueller, op. cit., p. 3.28. ibid., p. 2.29. Decisive Manoeuvre, op. cit., Chapter 1, p. 1.30. ibid., Chapter 1, p. 3.31. Sun Tzu, n.d. (last updated 19 February 1997,cited 4 June 1999) Sun Zi’s Art of War.32. Decisive Manoeuvre, op. cit., p. viii.33. ibid., Chapter 1, p. 4.34. ibid., Chapter 4.35. n.d. Fundamentals of Maneuver [sic] Warfare,Operational Handbook 6-1, Ground CombatOperations, extract published in Marine CorpsGazette, April 1988.36. Sun Tzu, op. cit.37. ibid.38. ibid.BIBLIOGRAPHYBeaufre, A. 1965, Introduction to Strategy translatedby Major General R.H. Barry, London, Faber andFaber, p. 22. – 1967, Strategy of Action,translated by Major General R.H. Barry, London,Faber and Faber, pp. 16; 21; 70-82.Belammy, C. 1990, The Evolution of Modern Warfare,London, Routledge, pp. 14-16.Castex, R. 1994, Strategic Theories, selectionstranslated and edited, with an introduction byEuginia C, Kiesling, Annapolis, Maryland, NavalInstitute Press, p. 11.Craig, G.A. n.d. Delbruck: The Military Historian inParet, P. 1986. Makers of Modern Strategy fromMachiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press, pp. 341-344.n.d. “The Political Leader as a Strategist” in Paret, P.1986. Makers of Modern Strategy fromMachiavelli to the Nuclear Age,. Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press, Chapter 17.Department of Defence, 1998, Decisive Manoeuvre:Australian warfighting concepts to guidecampaign planning, Defence Publishing andVisual Communications, Canberra.Edgar, S.A. 1995, “Beer Coaster Manoeuvre Theory”,Australian Army Aviation Corps Journal.Evans, M. 1996. Strategic Manoeuvre: A Study inMilitary Method and Policy Technique,Commonwealth of Australia, (Australian Army),Army Doctrine Centre, HQ Training Command.Extracts from Operational Handbook 6-1, n.d.“Fundamentals of Maneuver [sic] Warfare”,Operational Handbook 6-1, Ground CombatOperations, Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988.Holden Reid, B 1991, The Counter-offensive; ATheoretical and Historical Perspective, in HoldenReid, B and Dewar, M, Military Strategy in aChanging Europe, London, Brassey’s, p. 159.Holger Mueller, D. (Colonel, Canadian Army), 1998,“The Character of Manoeuvre at the OperationalLevel”, Advanced Military Studies Course,Department of National Defence (Canada),http://www.loc.gov/lexico/liv/alpha-43.html#Military_strategyLeonhard, R. 1994, The Art of Maneuver [sic]Maneuver-Warfare [sic] Theory and AirLandBattle, Novato, Presidio Press.Lind W.S. 1985, Maneuver [sic] Warfare Handbook,Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press.n.d. Misconceptions of Maneuver [sic] Warfare,Marine Corps Gazette, January 1988. pp. 16-17.Luttwak, E.N. 1987, Strategy – The Logic of War andPeace, Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, pp. 84-85.Mendel, W.W. (Colonel, US Army retired) andTooke, L. (US Army), 1993, (cited 6 April1998). “Operational Logic Selecting the Centerof Gravity,” Military Review, June 1993.http://www.trg.army.defence.gov.au:8080/adel/adelinst/armycol/j013/3Orme, C.W. Thomas, J. and Graham, D. 1998, “Sensorto Shooter Links in Joint Task Force 21”, ADiscussion Paper, p. 2.Schmitt, J.F. (Captain, USMC) 1990. UnderstandingManeuver [sic] as the Basis for a Doctrine,Marine Corps Gazette, August 1990.Sun Tzu, n.d. (last updated 19 February 1997, cited 4June 1999) Sun Zi’s Art of War,http://home1.pacific.net.sg/ ~rongli/sun

Innovation and Exploration:The Purpose and Characteristics of MilitaryExperimentationBy Dean K. Bowley and Michael J. Brennan, DSTO, Edinburgh, Australia51“…The only way to discover the limits of the possible is to venture a way past them into theimpossible.”Arthur C. ClarkeAustralia has an active program in military experimentation (concept development) for the landforce, and has recently begun to broaden the basis for this type of experimentation to the otherServices and the joint arena. This article is based on a presentation to the INCOSE 2001 systemsconference and discusses military experimentation from the Australian perspective, highlightingpoints from Australia's most comprehensive military experimentation program to date; namely aprogram to help determine the form and function of the future Australian Army concepts andcapabilities. This program started in 1995, and is continuing. As familiarity with militaryexperimentation has increased across the ADF with exposure to experiments and trials many haveformed their own views on the purpose and nature of military experimentation. To support thebroader understanding of the power and limitations of the processes being introduced across theADO, this article discusses a role for “military experimentation” in force development. A definitionof military experimentation is proposed and the purpose, principles and characteristics aredescribed, based on an analysis of current overseas and Australian programs.IntroductionCountries with advanced military capabilityhave long (although often interrupted)histories of defining, developing andenhancing military capability through readilyidentifiable “military experimentation”processes. For example, the US, UK, Germany,and the USSR experimented using field trialsduring the “inter-war years” following the FirstWorld War to determine the impact of“motorisation” on military activities.Additionally, wargames were used by the USand Japanese navies to develop tactics andorganisations for amphibious and carrierwarfare in the Pacific during the 1930s. Thedevelopment of advanced technologies, such asrobotics, pervasive computing, and microelectro-mechanical devices are now driving anew period of military experimentation. Wewill develop an argument that there is adistinct difference between the method ofscientific inquiry for evaluating the impact ofcomputerisation on warfare and measuring theimpact of specific computer technologies.While the processes used in militaryexperimentation have differed, a common keycharacteristic is a generally iterative processthat challenges established thought throughexposure to novel concepts and capabilities,and uses innovations to promote further“exploration”. The primary goal of theseactivities is to acquire knowledge aboutmilitary operations in a scientific (andtherefore defensible) fashion to guide decisionsabout an uncertain future, while coping withfundamental system characteristics such asnon-linearity, intangibles and adaptivebehaviour. The primary means of achieving“scientific rigor” is by supporting military

52AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002judgement with scientific inquiry through anintegrated matrix of complementary studies.The framework for militaryexperimentation described in this article wasdeveloped during the Restructuring the ArmyTask Force Trials and has since formed thebasis of the AEF (Army 1999), Air 87 analysis(Unewisse 2000) and an evolving System ofSystems experimentation methodology(Grisogono and Teffera 2000, Seymour et al2000a, Seymour et al 2000b).Definition and Purpose[Military experimentation is] the processof exploring innovative methods ofoperation, especially to assess theirfeasibility, evaluate their utility, ordetermine their limits. (Worley 1999)The term “Military Experimentation”usually encompasses large “field based”activities such as the US Army’s AdvancedWarfighting Experiments and US Navy’s FleetBattle Experiments. While this descriptionfocuses attention on field trials that, arguably,have the most validity with the military user, itis too narrow to be useful for forcedevelopment. A broader definition can bederived from the components “military” and“experimentation” that the MacquarieDictionary defines as follows:“Military” 6. –n soldiers generally; thearmed forces,“Experimentation” –n the act or practiceof making experiments,“Experiment” 1. –n a test or trial; atentative procedure; an act or operation forthe purpose of discovering somethingunknown or testing a principle, suppositionetc.Literally then, the definition could be “thepractice of discovering something unknown(but useful) about the armed forces”.The US Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)definition, quoted above in italics, refines theliteral definition to be relevant to forcedevelopment, and this is adopted as thedefinition of military experimentation in thisarticle. This definition includes the two keywords needed to understand the purpose ofmilitary experimentation: innovation andexploration.The purpose of military experimentation asdefined is therefore to acquire knowledge forforce development by exploring innovativeconcepts and identifying the capabilitiesrequired. While the detailed definition of thesecapabilities and the identification anddevelopment of possible solutions may beother outcomes of military experimentationthese activities are outside the scope of militaryexperimentation per se. This is the realm ofcapability development, although scientificprocess and analysis clearly has a role here.Exploration through experimentationdetermines capability requirements fromconcepts; capability development determinessolutions for capability deficiencies.Military experimentation is explicitlyfocused at investigating systems of systemsand especially at identifying emergentproperties (properties of the system that arecharacteristic of the “level” of the system – thecapabilities of a unit “emerge” as the integratedcapabilities of the sub–unit components). Forexample it is more likely that the variables andparameters in military experimentationprograms will be environmental factors such asterrain, and vegetation, the enemy forces, orwhole capabilities like helicopter pairs orsquadrons and the emergent properties will bethe tactics, techniques and procedures requiredto exploit the new force element and how theymay change across the enemy and physicalenvironment. The aim is to establish measuresfor qualities such as flexibility, adaptabilityand robustness; qualities that are useful indetermining the worth of a capability within aforce structure.

“Scientific Inquiry” within Force DevelopmentA simple model of force development isappropriate for this article and consists of fourelements: context, concept, the capabilitiesrequired to achieve the concept, and thesolutions to those capabilities (see Figure 1). Thecontext is the strategic circumstances in whichthe military concepts are developed. Theconcepts are possible broad solutions to theproblems arising from an analysis of thecontext and can be articulated by a missionand intent, mission essential tasks, capabilityrequirements and assumptions andvulnerabilities. The capability requirements aredescriptions of what is needed, not possiblesolutions to achieve the concept within thecontext of the strategic environment, and the“basket” of solutions are clear equipment,doctrinal or organisational changes to meet thecapability requirement. We have found that it isuseful to split the capability box betweencapability needs and the detailed capabilityFigure 1. A Simple Model of Force DevelopmentINNOVATION AND EXPLORATION 53description required for capability development.The context will change due to changes intechnology, the geo-political circumstances andchanges in government policy (for example exitstrategies and casualty avoidance).It is important here to make a distinctionbetween scientific inquiry and theexperimental method. Many references discussthe nature of science, 1 and in essence scientificinquiry is a structured path towards knowledgeenhancement that is based on the analysis ofdata and open criticism and review. Theexperimental method is well understood in thecapability development environment and ismanifest in the techniques of operational anddevelopmental test and evaluation (OTE/DTE).An important goal of scientific inquiry isexploration, the other two goals beingverification and the documentation /dissemination of results. The process ofverification is part of the process of “normalscience” (as opposed to “scientific revolution”)StrategicGuidanceChangeTechnologyGeo-Political CircumstancesGovernment PolicyContextConceptMilitaryExperimentationCapability NeedDetailedCapabilityCapabilityDevelopmentSolution

54AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002described by Kuhn 1996. 2 In brief, normalscience consists of the incremental validationof theory within an accepted paradigm (anagreed basis or reference for discussion /improvement). Revolutions occur in sciencewhen the accepted paradigm no longersatisfactorily explains observations and a newparadigm is proposed to explain theobservations. (For example the special theoryof relativity and later the general theoryoverturned Newtonian mechanics as adescription of phenomena observed concerningthe speed of light.) As the accepted paradigmbegins to break down, the goal of sciencechanges from verification (of the old) toexploration so as to discover / establish a newparadigm.A useful analogy might be made drawnbetween science (as described by Kuhn) andforce development. When there is an acceptedstrategic framework and concept of operations(environmental paradigm), then forcedevelopment is “normal” (iterative forcedevelopment). An example is the incrementalimprovement in the principal platforms thatform capabilities (e.g. tanks and helicopters)that formed part of the air-land battle conceptfor NATO in opposition to the Eastern Block.Such development focuses on determining thebest solution for capabilities. In this caseexisting capability is replaced by better (e.g.M60 A1 by M60A3 by M1A1 by M1A2 etc).The so called scientific method supports“normal force development” primarily throughthe process of verification and the technique ofhypothesis testing.When there is no accepted environmentalparadigm then force development has to berevolutionary (innovative force development).This parallel concept focuses on identifying thecapabilities needed to achieve a novel concept.This is required because changes in technology,the geo-political environment and / orgovernment policy create an environmentwhere the current incremental equipmentreplacement force paradigm begins breakingdown as the concept of operations andstrategic environment diverge, and “normal”force development is ineffective for capabilityidentification. Scientific methods supportinnovative force development primarilythrough exploration and the technique ofheuristic searching. This is the goal of what wehave established as military experimentation.From the analogies above we can see whymilitary judgement is ideal and sufficient forproblem definition in the normal forcedevelopment regime:- because of the existenceof a deep, relevant, real-world experience base.It will be argued later that the selection of testscenarios is an important product of the earlystages of an experimentation program becausethis will provide the new experience base formilitary judgement.The evolving strategic environment that wenow find ourself in demands that we examineforce development as a whole, rather than asimproved capability packages. In addition toR&D technology enhancements, we seek toadd the scientific process into the choice ofdevelopment paths. When the strategicenvironment is uncertain, and the impact oftechnology unknown, the experience base isusually too narrow to confidently conduct theproblem definition. Therefore, to exploreinnovative concepts of operations, the processof scientific inquiry is added to increase theconfidence in scenario and question selection;this in essence is military experimentation.Characteristics of ExperimentationMilitary experimentation is difficult tocharacterise because in practice it is anamalgam of a selected group of techniques,task organised for specific studies. However, itis useful to consider military experimentationas part of a continuum of analyticaltechniques, Figure 2. At one end of thecontinuum are unstructured, unrepeatable,qualitative observations: arguably purelyexperiential learning. At the other end arestructured, repeatable, quantitative

INNOVATION AND EXPLORATION 55Figure 2. Analytical TechniquesUnstructuredQualitativeUnrepeatableStructuredQuantitativeRepeatableConvergentInterviewingOperationalTest and EvaluationMilitary Experimentationobservations of the sort associated withlaboratory experiments. Some way along thisaxis are two techniques, the first is convergentinterviewing (described below), the second OTE(the placing of equipment in an operationalenvironment for test). These two techniquesbracket the characteristics of militaryexperimentation. That is to say, militaryexperimentation is more structured andrepeatable than convergent interviewing andless so than OTE.Convergent interviewing is a techniqueused in social sciences when the problem is illdefined. Within the social sciences,unstructured interviews collect broadinformation, and can encompass almost all ofthe contributing factors, but the results can behard to interpret. Structured interviews on theother hand collect focussed informationefficiently, but question selection is critical toachieving useful analysis. Convergentinterviewing techniques combine both andstart with a round of loosely structuredinterviews in order to discover the underlyingissues. This is followed by a sequence ofinterviews where the questions of eachinterview are based on answers from theprevious one. Each round of interviewing isanalysed and the results used to focus theinterviews of the next round.OTE techniques are used to collect data onthe performance of a system within itsoperating environment. The purpose is to testthe system in a realistic environment and theentire system is tested. Normally combat ortraining conditions are created (with live orsynthetic environments) and the resultsobserved and measured where possible. Everyattempt is made to control the data collection,however, the tests are generally not repeatable(though the measurement framework is) andthe interactions are usually unique. There is aconstant trade-off between achieving a realisticoperational environment and the desire tocontrol the environment so as to use statisticaltechniques to analyse the data and determinecausal relationships. The process is generallydriven through a question dendritic and theevaluation criteria is normally in the form of ahierarchy of measures.For a military experimentation process tobe useful to explore concepts in a dynamicand/or ill-defined strategic environment, theprocess must be able to evaluate and optimisea real, complex “soft” system. The problem hasto be reduced to a manageable level, using theprinciples of convergent interviewing but witha range of analytical tools, whilst retainingcritical elements thus ensuring that the resultsof the evaluation/optimisation are still

56AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002applicable, relevant and useful. An appropriatemix of auditable and defendable qualitative,and repeatable quantitative results (such asthose derived through OTE) must be providedto enable decisions to be made with anacceptable level of risk.Military experimentation should becharacterised by the co-evolution oforganisation, doctrine, equipment andleadership and the related changes inpersonnel, support and training. The conceptsshould be developed both top-down andbottom-up, this promotes innovation whileretaining relevant invariant principles. Thestakeholders should be prepared to accepttolerance for surprise and “failure” ofconcepts in the experimental setting; the goalmust be to explore concepts not demonstratethem. 3The process of exploration should beiterative, continuous and non-linear; asthings are discovered they must feed backinto the original concept, modifying it, thenFigure 3. The Iterative Nature of Military Experimentation Processesallowing the concept to be re-tested. Theprocess should make extensive use of anadversary force that is free to develop tacticsto defeat the concepts. This is known as “Red-Teaming” and is simply achieved inwargames of all types. The “players” inseminars or wargames must be fullyimmersed in the environment, to the pointthat pre-conceived ideas are challenged withcredibility. The same environment must bepersuasive to the stakeholders.An analysis of these attributes leads to anumber of essential requirements forexperimentation. First, it is essential tochallenge the established paradigm. It isespecially important to challenge doctrine, andin particular combat related doctrine as combatis where the primary defeat mechanisms areexercised and is the basis of the bulk of ourmilitary capability. Secondly it is essential toensure there is innovation. This means a widevariety of concepts and capabilities should beassessed, tempered by the observation that it isConceptRefinementCapabilityDevelopmentSolutionDevelopment

likely that only a limited set of concepts may bereasonably tested in any one activity. It istherefore likely that a progressively morerigorous analytical process will be used, andperhaps more than one cycle, will be requiredto ensure all innovative solutions are tested tosome degree, Figure 3. An observation commonto contemporary military experimentationprograms is that one of the potential pitfalls ofexperimentation is for the sponsor to becomean advocate for the solution instead of for theprocess. High level advocacy for a solution hasthe capacity to stifle innovation within theprogram. Advocacy, combined with thepersuasive nature of wargames, simulations andsimulators, can cripple a program ofexperimentation because the scenario and taskselection will be biased, and theexperimentation is at risk of devolving todemonstration of the sponsor’s advocatedsolution.A21/RTA/AEF as an ExampleThe Army has adopted the “ArmyExperimental Framework” (AEF, Army 1999)to guide the intellectual evolution of the ArmyAfter Next through concept-led, capabilitybasedforce development; this process mapsonto the force development model in Figure 1.This framework was developed as a result ofthe analytical framework developed for theRTA Phase 1 Trials (Bowley and Lovaszy1999). Central to this framework was the“Battlelab” Process, 4 a term and concept thatoriginated in the Land 125 work in 1995 inpart to draw on the then emerging US Armybattlelabs. The Battlelab Process became theexperimental engine for RTA Phase 1, andwhile evolving, retains this place in the AEF(itself a management tool for the process).The Restructuring of the Army (RTA)program provided for the progressive transitionof the current force to the force envisioned inthe A21 Review. A fundamental aspect of thisrestructuring was the conduct of trials andevaluations to confirm the force structures. TheINNOVATION AND EXPLORATION 57trials were designed to identify, in ameasurable way, the strengths and weaknessesof the A21 Task Force organisation in a jointenvironment, with particular emphasis on theADF command and logistics arrangements.While the process was called a trial for lack ofa better term within defence at the time, withhindsight we can identify the end result asexperimentation due to the nature andmagnitude of the changes investigated and theuncertainty in the initial A21 Study. Theprocess has much in common with theapproach taken by the USMC during theirHunter and Urban Warrior programs and theprinciples can be clearly seen in the JointAdvanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) of theInstitute of Defense Analysis (IDA) and the USJoint Forces Command (JFCOM).The complexity of military operationalsystems and processes means that it isimpossible to analyse all issues and a normalreductionist approach would not analyse theinteractions and emergent properties of thesystems of systems [Curtis and Bowley 1997].Therefore the method is specifically designedfor focusing on those elements or tasks thatprovide a clear indication of the performanceof the overall system. OTE uses the normalreductionist approach of dividing the probleminto a number of critical issues and then seeksto design tests to gather data addressing thoseissues. When the primary scientific purpose isexploration we need to begin the investigationat a higher level; at that higher level we seekthe critical tasks and the vulnerabilities of theconcepts to focus subsequent evaluation. Thatis discovering the fundamentals of whatwarfighters will be doing rather thanspecifically measuring how well they are doingthem; 5 recognising the unexpected notmeasuring the expected. 6Initially, a problem definition phase isconducted to understand the whole problemand to explore answers to the “right”questions. The problem definition constrainsthe problem space, establishes the context and

58AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002environment for the evaluation, and refinesthe aims and objectives of activities. From theanalysis viewpoint, the outputs of theproblem definition phase are a cleardescription of what the military operationssystem has to achieve, its identified orperceived potential weaknesses and theimportant questions to be answered to bothvalidate assumptions and to “optimise” thesystem. A conceptual model is developed andthe military system is typically described by aconcept of operations, mission essential tasksand capability requirements, the weaknessesby critical areas and issues, and questions tobe answered by objectives.There are three key differences between themilitary experimentation process and OTE.First is the use of scientific inquiry andanalytical techniques to support the problemdefinition phase in military experimentation,second is our approach to the systematicrefinement of the problem through a matrix ofcomplimentary analytical tools, and finallyusing every analytical activity as the basis foran “After Action Review”.Scientific inquiry is used in support ofmilitary judgement to select tasks andscenarios during the problem definition phasein a military experimentation program. Criticalissues (those issues defining the performanceof the system) usually drive OTE, and dataelements are collected on these issues. Early inFigure 4. Selection of Tasksthe problem definition phase of RTA it wasidentified that the problem space was too illdefined,and the range of critical issues toogreat, for an OTE approach to be useful.Consequently the method of driving theprogram through identified required, orfundamental, tasks was devised. Thisexperience can now be generalised and wenote that where a problem is ill-defined theanalysis is best driven by observing and“measuring” against identified tasks, toprovide information against the critical issues.Where the problem is better defined,resolution of critical issues drives theevaluation program and tasks and scenariosare selected to answer particular questions.This again emphasises the critical difference;that of recognising the unexpected andmeasuring the expected.During the RTA “Phase 1” study, thisapproach was applied by focussing the initialrefinement process on those tasks that must beevaluated in order to provide a basis fromwhich military judgement could be used to“optimise” the Task Force. These tasks wereselected on the basis of the impact they wouldhave on the effectiveness of the Task Force(Land Command 1997). The method ofselecting tasks to be analysed from the conceptof operations, Figure 4, was developed fromthe analytic framework used in the LAV-25Trials conducted by 2nd Cavalry Regiment inCritical AreasContextProblemDefinitionConceptObjectivesDoctrineOrganisationEquipmentActivitiesandScenarios

1990/91. In this trial, evaluation resources werevery limited and, to gather as muchinformation as possible, key tasks wereconducted by an M113 troop and by a LAV-25troop. Teams of experts observed the conductof these tasks. These observations and themilitary judgement (opinions) of theparticipants formed the basis of the reports.An important aspect was that, despite alarge number of questions to be answered inRTA (of the order of 200), there were relativelyfew OTE style tests focussed on singlequestions. The vast majority of the informationwas from observations of tasks.A second key innovation is the systematicrefinement of the problem space throughmultiple iterations and layers of analytic andtraining tools, Figure 5. The pivotal tool was awar gaming environment of sufficient fidelityto challenge existing organisational anddoctrinal paradigms — in effect the building ofa synthetic experience base, supported bycarefully selected field experiments and realworld operational experience as validation forthe synthetic experience. Each level of analysisprovided three outputs: answers to specificquestions, the context for the next level ofanalysis and confirmation of the results ofprevious layers.As we have suggested earlier, the choice oftest scenarios is of critical importance to properrefinement of the problem and indeedresolution of the issues. Arguably threeprimary aspects must be considered in thechoice of test scenario. The most important isthat the test scenario produces circumstancesin which the identified and required tasks arein fact tested. That is, the required experiencebase is established. In addition, the testscenario chosen must have sufficient credibilityand detail to engage the participants in a“challenging problem”. Throughout the RTAPhase 1 work and in HE99 and HE00, the testscenarios were deliberately chosen to engage“stress” the force elements nominated againstrequired tasks. The choice of “stress” as a basisINNOVATION AND EXPLORATION 59for test reflects the OTE genesis of the RTAprocess (OTE methods require tests againstmost stressful, least stressful and most likelycomponents of the performance envelope) anda limit on the resources and time forconducting the study. The approach explicitlyassumed that a Task Force “optimised” forwarfighting against a basket of stressfulscenarios could adapt across the performanceenvelope. 7The AEF framework accordingly places asignificant emphasis on problem definition andthe choice of so called “stressful scenarios”.The experiments that have been conducted todate have received some criticism that thechoice of scenarios was unrealistic - inparticular the notion that Australia mightcommit as a lead nation in a mechanised waragainst a large army with a powerful armouredcapability (modelled as T80 tanks in the wargames). While this is indeed unrealistic andunlikely, the experiments were designed tostress the concepts and the ORBATs in order toinvestigate the limits of applicability toimprove the concepts and capabilities. Toachieve this analytic requirement the conceptsproposed were examined out of the “normal”contexts in which they were conceived. This isan acknowledged weakness of the experimentdesign, and caused some difficulty in assessingthe concepts against the BOS requirements, butin principle provided a powerful analyticconstruct. Because of the criticism, scenariodesigns are now tailored to provide “stresswithin context” for the concepts andcapabilities under consideration. This is likelyto be a design feature for the experimentsconducted under the evolving DefenceExperimental Framework.Figure 5, and the “stressful scenarios” inwhich to test the concepts, was developed fromthe build-up training conducted by 1st Brigadein preparation for Exercise Predators Advance90. In preparation for this exercise thecommander trained the brigade staffs firstlywith a TEWT; the “best” solution to the TEWT

60AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002Figure 5. Hierarchy of Analytical ToolsSEMINARSConfirmationAnswersContextWargamesSimulationFieldTrialsDecision Support ToolsModelsInfluence DiagramsDynamicModelsproblems formed the basis for the CPX used totrain the brigade headquarters. These taskswere then the basis for the field exercise, theidea being that tactical and procedural trainingwas completed without “wasting” the resourcesof a field exercise. This idea of the trade-offbetween efficiency and depth of training wasdirectly translated to the RTA Trial.A third key innovation is using eachanalytical activity as the basis for an “AfterAction Review” (AAR). The AAR, Figure 6, is areconstruction of the events taken directlyfrom training techniques used for war gaming.The Janus war game has a built in AARfacility. The aim of the reconstruction is todetermine the reason for events occurringduring the activity. The observations of thesubject matter experts and the measurement ofthe analysts are combined with the impressionsof the players. In the RTA Trial this wargaming technique was to be extrapolated to allanalytical activities.Conclusion“Military experimentation” as describedhere can be conducted at any level of conflictfrom strategic through to tactical, where theaim of the research is exploration, notvalidation and while this article uses a tacticalland example, the principles are applicableacross the operating environments and levels ofcommand. The process proposed in this articlehas a number of characteristics. It exploresproblems through a focus on activityobservation and the conduct of a matrix ofcomplementary activities based on specificanalytical tools. Each of the activities providesinformation for an “after action review”, andhas three general objectives; to validate theresults of tools with less fidelity, to answerspecific questions, and to provide the contextfor higher fidelity activities. The key componentof the process is the war gaming phase, and theessential requirement of the war game is toprovide an environment that immerses theplayers and challenges current paradigms.

INNOVATION AND EXPLORATION 61Figure 6. After Action Review ProcessSMEObservationsEVALUTIONACTIVITYSME/OAPLANCONDUCTEDImpressionsAARAnalystMeasurementsWithin this environment, a syntheticoperational experience is gained by theplayers, which is subject to their experienceand assessed by military judgement in theAAR in a similar manner to a “normal”, orreal operation. Common throughout the workto date in the land environment has been theharnessing of established collective trainingtools to the analysis process. The rationale hasbeen that these tools are familiar and providea “natural” synthetic experience to themilitary participants. An aspect that remainsfor future research is a study to evaluate therelative benefits of more “immersive” methodsto enhance the synthetic operationalexperience and hence improving the quality or“completeness” of the military judgement.Military experimentation should not beseen as a replacement for professional militaryjudgement, OT&E or strategic analysis utilisingdecision support tools, but as complementingthese established areas and filling the gapbetween the strategic context and capabilitysolutions. The primary role of militaryexperimentation is to explore innovativeconcepts of operation so as to determine thecapability requirements for future forces; thatis to recognise the unexpected not measure theexpected.NOTES:1. See Worley et al 1999 for a discussion of theapplication of the scientific method to militaryexperimentation.2. Normal science explores an accepted paradigm,for example Newtonian physics, and attemptsto determine significant facts, match facts totheory and to articulate the theory. Within aparadigm, which guides and limits problemselection, detailed research can be conducted inthe verification phase. Revolutions in scienceoccur when the current paradigm starts tobreak down under the weight of conflictingevidence. The revolution occurs when a newparadigm is proposed, for example Einstein’stheories, and then the process of verification ofthe new theory begins again.3. The differences between types of collectivetraining, demonstration, and experimentationmay be illustrated by the presence and role ofan OPFOR and the target audience of theactivity. In collective training drills, there is noneed for an OPFOR. The goal of the activity isproficiency through repetition of drills. Theaudience is clearly the trained team. In forceon force training, the role of the OPFOR is toprovide threat stimuli in a known (doctrinal),but realistic, fashion (usually through “freeplay”)for the team being trained. The audienceis again the trained team, no particular benefitis expected for OPFOR. This is characteristic ofLive Combat Training Centres – OPFORs often

62AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002win, but the subjects of the training learn fromthe experience. In a demonstration, the roles ofboth sides are choreographed to a certainextent. The audience is external to theparticipants in the demonstration, no benefitaccrues to the participants. In experimentation,the role of both teams should be essentially thesame as that on operations – to attempt todefeat the other. In this way the syntheticexperience is built up. Thus the target is bothteams, and AARs extract the militaryexperience to evaluate the concept under test.4. The Battlelab was distinct from the physicalentities of the US and was a term used todescribe the process (Bowley 1999).5. Measurements that relate to performance areinevitably made, but are used to key theanalysts to activities of and relationshipsbetween entities performing the “unexpected”.6. Personal correspondence from R. Worley.7. It should be noted that field trials in particularusing stressful scenarios inevitably involved adelicate balance (not always achieved) betweenthe stress of the scenario and the best militaryjudgement of commanders who justifiablyargued that “I wouldn’t do it that way, it isn’tthe best approach etc.”REFERENCES:Australian Army. Army Experimental Framework.1999.Bowley D. and Lovaszy Major S. Use of CombatSimulations and Wargames in AnalyticalStudies. Proceedings of SimTecT 99 (1999).Bowley D. Restructuring of the Army Task ForceTrials Scientific Framework Paper. DSTO-GD-0169. May 1999.Curtis N. and Bowley D. Hierarchical Systems ofEnquiry for Analysis of the Land Force. 15thNational Conference of the Australian Societyfor Operations Research, May 1999.CA Directive 12/97 dated 3 October 1997.CGS Directive 13/96 dated 20 December 1996.Gold Dr T. Presentation. IDA.Grisogono A.M. and Teffera E. Toward a SyntheticEnvironment Design Methodology. Proceedingsof SimTecT 00 (2000).K97-00214 LCAUST RTA Trials Management Plandated 7 Nov 97.Kuhn T.S.; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.3rd Ed 1996.Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd edition.Navy Warfare Development Command, MaritimeBattle Centre.University of South Australia Advanced OperationalTest and Evaluation Course Notes. ProfessorHoivik (USNPGS Monteray).Seymour R.S., Grisogono A.M., Unewisse M., TailbyD., Rees L. and James P. The Role of SyntheticEnvironments in C4ISR Modelling andSimulation. 5th International Command andControl Research and Technology Symposium24-26 Oct 2000.Seymour R.S., Unewisse M., Grisogono A.M., JamesP., Kirby B.J. and Yue Y. Application ofSystem-of-System Development Methodology toAdvanced Land Command and ControlConcepts, Australian Battlespace DigitisationSymposium 26-28 July 2000.Unewisse M.: Proceedings of the BattlefieldDigitisation Symposium DSTO 00 (2000).US Naval Warfare Development Command,Maritime Battle Centre.Worley R. What does Military Experimentation ReallyMean. Institute of Defence Analysis – presentationto JAWP Working Group June 1999.Dean Bowley graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1984 with a BSc and received a GraduateDiploma in Fighting Vehicle Technology from the Royal Military College of Science (UK) in 1988. He has been workingat DSTO since February 1995 after 13 years service in the Australian Army. As Head RTA Studies in 1997 and 1998,he delivered DSTO’s major programme for RTA. He is currently Head of Group in the Military SystemsExperimentation Branch at DSTO Edinburgh.Michael Brennan completing his PhD in Atomic Physics in 1986 at Flinders University, after which he worked inZurich at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, where Monte Carlo and experimental techniques were used to studystrongly electron attaching gases. He returned to Australia in 1988 as a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Research School ofPhysical Sciences at the Australian National University. Michael joined LSOD of DSTO as a Research Scientist inOctober 1995 to conduct Monte Carlo simulations of the Laser Airborne Depth Sounder and research other problemsrelated to underwater light propagation. He has worked in the United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory andas OIC of the analysis cell in the Land Operations Analysis Team as part of Australia's commitment to INTERFET. Hecurrently leads the LOD Task Force Modernisation Mission.

Reviews63TRACY by Gary McKayPublished by Allen & Unwin, 5 October2001;RRP $24.95, Softcover.Reviewed by Ms Fiona Caspersz.Tracy is a book aboutordinary people thrustinto an extraordinarysituation whichdemanded their all andgave them nothing butdevastation in return.Gary McKay wassent to assist with theclean-up operation after Cyclone Tracy torethrough Darwin on Christmas Eve 1974. InTracy he has brought together the stories ofthose who survived the nightmare.Cyclone Tracy wound her way from aninauspicious start in the Arafura Sea throughthe centre of Darwin and destroyed all in herpath. No one, apart from the weathermen,took the gathering storm too seriously until itwas upon them and there was no escape.Everyone was busy with their Christmaspreparations and, in the midst of cookingturkeys, last minute shopping and festivedrinks, she was upon them wreaking havoc,panic and destroying all in her path. TheTerritorians weren’t complacent or foolhardy,they’d simply seen it all before: cyclonesalways started out at sea then headed southwest along the coast keeping well away fromDarwin. A few days of strong winds andheavy rain were the worst they expected andwith the holiday season upon them no onewas concerned about the storm brewing out atsea. In some ways this lack of panic savedthem; natural instinct was to protect their ownbecause no one believed the storm had hitanywhere other than their home. Those whosurvived the onslaught were mentally andphysically scarred and their city was destroyedbeyond belief. They looked out to see if Santahad visited during the night and saw instead ableak landscape littered with debris.In Tracy Gary McKay paints a vivid pictureof events which led to the cyclone hit onDarwin, the ease with which lives were wipedout and the horrific aftermath whichconfronted the survivors that Christmasmorning. Tracy is well written and so easy toread it’s difficult to believe it’s a record of factand not fiction. The book is only 205 pages, awet weekend or a couple of sunny afternoonsin the garden will see it through; no one whostarts Tracy will be able to put it down halffinished. Read it and read it again to fullyabsorb the horror of the time; this is the stuffof a movie-maker’s imagination, not the resultof a natural phenomenon.CODE BREAKERS – THE INSIDE STORYby F.H Hinsley and Alan Stripp (OxfordUniversity Press)Reviewed by Colin BlairFor those who havedelved into thefascinating world ofwartime code breaking,this is essential reading.Code Breakers is actuallya collection of essayswritten in varying stylesby the people whoplayed a part in successfully “cracking”German and Japanese communication codesthroughout the Second World War.The dedicated men and women whoworked in utmost secrecy at the GovernmentCommunication Headquarters at BletchleyPark, a former stately home outside London,arguably helped shorten WWII by two or moreyears.

64AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002Thanks to their efforts in breaking theprimary German encryption coding system,based on the mysterious Enigma machine (anexample of which resides at the NationalMuseum in Canberra) the Allies wereintercepting, decoding and circulatingimportant enemy operational signals (codenamedUltra intelligence), sometimes beforethe messages reached their intendedrecipient!Code Breakers is not a cold, analyticaldescription of the achievements of the up to10,000 people who worked at Bletchley Park(known at “BP” to those who were there). Itgives a unique insight to the personalities ofthose who attacked and “broke” theformidable Enigma encryption system.There are several “layers” to this book ofpersonal accounts. Those who relish thetechnical details of how the codes were brokenwill be well satisfied. The amazing insights tohow effectively “BP” and its out-posted“crypto” teams gave the Allies a huge strategicand tactical advantage over the Germans andto a lesser extent the Japanese, also is welldocumented and explained.The book is easy to read, well illustratedand leaves one totally amazed that theEnigma/Ultra code breaking operationremained such a tightly held secret until thefirst details were published, by one of theBP team, in the early 1970s. Certainly,Germany, her Axis partners and Japan hadno idea that much of their secret operationalcommunication had been compromisedthroughout the conflict, more particularlyduring the latter years of the conflict.One is also moved to ask how the Enigmasecret – Churchill described it as his “mostsecret source”- artificially elevated thereputations of British and US militarycommanders who orchestrated and won majorcampaigns and/or battles against the enemywhile holding such a huge advantage.In fact, as Code Breakers explains, greateffort was expended in disguising the sourceof such accurate and timely Top Secretinformation in order to avoid compromisingthe BP operation.Code Breakers makes a soberingconcluding point, that the Germans weremoving to introduce a much more challengingencryption coding system shortly before theconflict ended in Europe. An interestingthought is whether, given more time, the lossof the Ultra advantage and the impact of newGerman warfighting technology would havechanged the final outcome?Probably not.