ISSUE 3 : Mar/Apr - 1977 - Australian Defence Force Journal

MARCH/APRIL 1977No. 3FORCEJOURNAL

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALBoard of ManagementBrigadier D. J. McMillen (Chairman)Captain I. H. Richards RANColonel R. S. FlintGroup Captain J. A. Gibbins RAAFMr B. CuttingManaging EditorMr K. I. TaylorIllustrations by members of the Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick.Printed and published for the Department of Defence, Canberra, by RuskinPress, North Melbourne.Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 wordsis the ideal length. Articles should be typed, double spacing, on one sideof the paper and submitted in duplicate.All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:The Managing EditorDefence Force JournalBuilding I Room 1-32Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600.

DEFENCEFORCEJOURNALNo. 3March/April 1977A Journal of the Australian Profession of ArmsContents3 Editor's Comment4 Letters to the Editor9 The Australian-American Alliance: Some Possible Restrictions on a USResponseCaptain M. G. Smith15 Public Health in the ArmyBrigadier W. B. James, MBE, MC, MB, BS, DPH. DIM & H, D1H, MECM25 First of the LineGroup Captain Keith Isaacs, AFC, ARAeS, RAAE35 Folklore of AviationDavid Ixince43 The Audio Visual SequenceMajor Adrian Sandery, BA, BEd, DipT, MACE47 Ethanol — The 6th Column?Chaplain S. J. Hessey(Retd)50 Clausewitz Absolute War and a Politico-Military Communications GapCaptain M. I. Can55 Book Reviews62 Good On Ya, Mate! Lessons My Aussie Taught MeMajor John W. Mountcustle, United States ArmyNo article in this Journal is to be reproduced in whole or in part without authority.The views expressed in the articles are the author's own and do not necessarily representofficial opinion or policy.© Commonwealth of Australia 1977

An F-IIIC of(Defence Public Relations)1 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, in afterburner above RAAF Amberley, Queensland.

y^1^ \Editors Commentf DEFENCE) FORCE JOURNAL\7IT is with great regret that we heard of thedeath in South Australia of Brigadier J. H.Thyer. CBE, DSO, (RL), at the age" of seventynine.Jim Thyer was a prolific writer of greatclarity and purpose, belying his advanced yearswith his grasp of contemporary military problems.Several of his articles appeared in theArmy Journal. His "Foreign Policy and aCredible Defence," (Army Journal, No. 312.May 1975) won the annual award for the bestoriginal article.His foreword to the book "The Grim Gloryof the 2/19 Battalion, A1F" appeared in ArmyJournal. No. 325, June 1976. It was a piecehe was well qualified to write, as he wasColonel GSOl of 8 Australian Division whenthat ill-fated formation, of which 2/19 Battalionwas a gallant part, was attempting tostem the advance of the Japanese into Malayaand Singapore. He spent three years as aprisoner of war in Changi. Of those yearsand on behalf of those who did not survivetheir terrible privations, he wrote, "The sacrificeof our people will not have been in vainif we see to it that those we elect to lead us,now and in the future, adequately fulfil themoral obligations of their high office and donot barter our security for a mess of potage."Brigadier Thyer retired from active duty in1945, but maintained his interest in the Armyas, at various times. Representative ColonelCommandant, Royal Australian Corps ofSignals, and Colonel Commandant, CentralCommand, a position he held for ten yearsfrom 1957 to 1967. His forceful pen and alertmind will be sadly missed in Australian MilitaryLiterature.We extend our deepest sympathy to hiswidow and family.In this issue we are attempting an experimentsuggested by a reader, in bringing the"Letters to the Editor" forward to the frontpages in the hope that there they will assumetheir rightful importance as a forum forinformed debate.At the request of the Officer Commanding.Audio Visual L'nit, Fyshwick, in future issuesthe name of the Staff Artist, Mr David Hammond,will not appear on the inside cover.This is because several other members of theunit have lent their skills in producing theartwork to illustrate articles. Where appropriate,however, the individual artist will signhis or her work.The number and quality of articles receivedin this office is encouraging, but there is alwaysa requirement for more from all sections ofthe Defence Community. Every endeavour isbeing made to keep a "balanced" journal.However the success or otherwise of this policydepends upon a like balance in the materialreceived. The fervent wish of your Editor isto see the encouraging trickle of articles turninto a mighty flood, providing powerfulammunition for turning the Defence ForceJournal into a monthly publication; in thewords of Hamlet " . . .a consummationdevoutly to be wished."U

£TX£R§pixoat aCAN AUSTRALIA SURVIVE?Major Black's study of plans for the landdefence of Australia before and during theSecond World War poses the question, "TheSecond Time Around. Can Australia Survive?"(Defence Force Journal. November December1^76). He may have his history right but thereare aspects of the preface to the article anda section headed 'lessons we cannot afford toforget' which invite comment.The preface contains several dubious assertions.Major Black appeals to the so-called'lessons of history' in a way which assumesan inevitability and logical pattern in historya determinism about the future course ofevents. It seems that Marxists are not alonein wishing to impose a pattern on history! Inthe preface we are told 'It is totally illogicalto pretend that other nations will not covetour resources . . . ; it defies all precedent inthe history of the causes of armed conflict".There is an ' . . . unpredictable but neverthelessinevitable threat to our national survival. . . The broader lessons of history dictatethat time is running out".Apart from his historical determinism Blackmay also be challenged on the question of the'"broader lessons of history" - which in thiscase the reader is to conclude are that resourcerichbut militarily weak countries are invariablysubject to invasion. During the l^thCentury many wealthy but weak states inNorth and South America seem not to havefallen prey to foreign attack. Perhaps theUnited States was protected because of thelack of effective strategic 'reach' by potentialaggressors and the remainder by the Monroedoctrine. Trade and economic penetrationwere seen as alternative means by which majorpowers gained access to the continent'sresources. One might ask wh\ trade andeconomic penetration rather than conquestmight not continue to be preferred in the caseof Australia? The combination of economicwealth and military weakness may often havebeen a cause of conquest but is it a universallaw that the one necessarily follows the other?The inevitability of the "resources-grab' isfast becoming part of the theology of Australiandefence thinking. For many it hasreplaced that earlier leit-motiv, the downwardihrust of asiatic communism - a piece ofconventional wisdom which now seems increasinglyto have been based on a rather inaccurateand incomplete understanding of events andtheir causes. Is there not a risk that we areabout to fall for a second set of defence assertions,dressed up in the "lessons of history'and 'logic' without first testing their validity?Perhaps this exhibits an aspect of our nationalpsyche. Several years ago Michael Howardobserved that Australians were addicted tomanufacturing "threats' — in a way the westernF.uropeans found unnecessary - in order tojustify defence preparations.The difficulty with basing defence thinkingon the 'lessons of history' is that there canbe no certainty as to what they are or willbe next time - - in many cases, like beauty,they are in the eyes of the beholder. Blackclaims for instance that judged in the balanceof history each (Australian expeditionary)commitment was made to establish and preserveAustralia's position as a separate nationin the world community. It is his judgementevidently that Australian intervention in Vietnamcontributed positively to our security.Many would dispute that.An appeal to the 'lessons of history' b\many with a defence barrow-to-push seemsto be an attempt simply to make a respectableargument for large, or larger forces — to meetthe 'inevitable' threat. The 'lessons of history"are also comforting because they returnus to the concrete, knowable past, and to thealleged relevance of our military history. Butone could perhaps advance another "lesson"from the history of warfare this Century: it isthat major wars have each been profound!)dissimilar in their conduct and consequences.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5The rate of change in the world's politics,society and technology suggest that there aremore surprises ahead of us.No doubt defence planning is much easier(if not more successful) if continuity ratherthan change in warfare is emphasised. Thereis another way to make planning more manageableand that is to make the world smaller.Are defence planners, transfixed by mapswhich show only the continent of Australia,already retreating further into the Looking-Glass? There is a wry tale that Australia'spost-war foreign and defence preoccupationwith South East Asia — our "friends andneighbours' binge — was the consequence ofa cartographic accident. The Department ofExternal Affairs was supplied only with mapswhich showed Australia and South East Asia.Our world-view was limited. Today's enthusiasmfor maps of Australia gives rise for newconcern. The threats and answers to Australia'snational security are unlikely to befound within it. At best the new fad hasgenerated a parlour game which may eventuallyrival 'Diplomacy'. (The outline for thegame 'Defeating the Enemy in the North West'seems to include: no nuclear weapons and noallies allowed against the mysterious, nonsuperpower but formidable enemy.) Just whythe enemy seems to prefer the Pilbara toCollins St., Port Kembla and Russell Hill isnever made very clear.Our comparative geo-political and culturalisolation allows us all too easily to forget thatour national security extends beyond a mapof Australia to factors such as trends in worldpolitics, changes in the military balance ofthe super powers and military technology,among many others. It was of course worldevents not regional issues that involved us intwo world wars. It is to these sorts of issuesand problems that military analysts shouldalso be turning their minds before the Looking-Glassreveals only the 'Pilbara Syndrome".Here Major Black is innocent. He doesemphasise that our strategic heartland remainsin the South East. He does however take upthe neo-isolationist call for once quaint nowtrendy 'self-reliance'. He asserts (p. 17) that'Any plan which relies on a powerful ally toplay the principal or even a major part in thedefence of this country is unsound'. If he isworried that ANZUS has no ironclad guarantees,let us also have his analysis of the considerableeconomic and social costs of selfrelianceinstead of collective security. B\logical extension he would also need to arguethat the defence plans of the non-super powermembers of the NATO and Warsaw alliancesare unsound. Such a general proposition ofself-reliance seems to lead all the way to akind of 'Garrison State' which would bedefensible even against super power attack.But would such a society be worth living in?Department of Defence Paul MenchCanberra, ACTMajor* * *The article by Major A. R. Black entitled"The Second Time Around. Can AustraliaSurvive?" (Defence Force Journal, NovemberDecember 1976) uses material which, althoughit is not new, has not been widely discussedin Australia. It provides a neat and illuminatingaccount of Australian defence planningbefore and during World War Two and drawsattention to the lessons of the period. It wouldbe presumptious of me to re-emphasise thenecessity to heed the lessons. The events of1941-42 must serve as our most relevant model.Nevertheless Major Black, in passing andwithout contributing to his logical and clearlyexpressed paper, makes a comment which, indefence of the Australian generals, T feel mustbe clarified. He puts particular stock onGeneral MacArthur's directive of 25 April1942 and concludes that "MacArthur apparentlyplaced more emphasis on denying theenemy bases in north-eastern Australia andNew Guinea than had the Australian plannersto this time". 1 hope that Major Black hasnot been influenced by MacArthur's falseclaims that upon his arrival in Australia hedecided to abandon the Australian defensiveplan and to take the fight to the Japanese inNew Guinea.The Chiefs of Staff appreciations of December1941 pointed to the importance ofdefending the North Eastern Approaches butrecognised that the area could not be adequatelydefended for a number of reasons.Firstly, the trained troops were not available.The militia had only just been called up andthey were ill-equipped: indeed the equipmentwas not available. Secondly, there were few

6 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALairfields in the area. Thirdly, there were veryfew aircraft to use the limited airfields in thearea. Fourthly, if land forces were moved tothe area they could not have been adequatelysupported by air and naval forces, and theywould therefore have been vulnerable toJapanese assaults. A strong land force at PortMoresby could have done little to prevent aJapanese naval force approaching Brisbanehad that been the Japanese intention.However, as the level of training and equipmentimproved the army was able to progressivelymove northwards. This was stressedby Blarney in his first operation instruction of10 April 1942 in which he stated that hethought that the first Japanese southwardmovement would be directed against PortMoresby. The assessments made by the Australiandefence planners during the first fourmonths of 1942 compared more than favourablywith those prepared by their AmericanAllies. One American plan prepared in March1942 suggested that a defensive line should beprepared across Australia based on three positions.These were:a. In the east, along the general line westfrom Maryborough in Queensland.b. In the centre, along the MacDonnellRange north of Alice Springs.c. In the west, along a general line northof the line Lowlers, Mt. Magnet, Geraldton.By April 1942 the 7th and part of the 6thDivisions had returned to Australia. A USDivision had arrived in Australia and anotherwas on the way. The level of training hadincreased and a US Naval force was operatingin the South West Pacific. The defence ofNorth East Australia, which had already beenrecognised as important, was now closer tobeing feasible. The plans to shift the defenceemphasis to the North Eastern approaches,which had been foreshadowed by Sturdee andthe War Cabinet in March 1942. could nowbe executed.The evidence that MacArthur placed moreemphasis on the area than the Australians istenuous. But even if it was true thatMacArthur had placed more emphasis on thearea, this should not be seen as an indictmentof the Australians, for MacArthur had accessto intelligence which the Australians hithertohad been denied. About this time Americancryptanalysts began to break the Japanesecodes. MacArthur's directive of 25 April 1942was a direct response to information that theJapanese were planning to attack Port Moresbyand then follow this with an attack on thenorth-east coast of Australia. It is so mucheasier to make your plans if you know whatthe enemy is going to do. Vet despite hisdirective, MacArthur made no effort at thisstage to have additional infantry moved northwardsin Australia and into New Guinea.MacArthur's claims have taken many yearsto refute, but books like Gavin Long's Mac-Artluir as Military Commander have contributedto rectifying the misapprehensions causedby the Commander-in-Chief and his flatteringsubordinates. It would be a pity if the greatpanjandrum were to get away with it again.First BattalionThe Royal Australian Regiment D. M. HornerLaverack Barracks,MajorTownsvUle, QUI.RA In!ARMOUR THREATI congratulate Captain R. J. Linwood onhis well researched and thoughtful article "Putyour Head in the Sand — Here Comes TheirArmour". (D.F.J., November/December 1976).The need for infantry to be capable of repellingarmoured attack from their own resourcesis a matter requiring early resolution.The RAAC, like any armoured corps, hasa natural preoccupation with the threat ofenemy armour because it is a fundamentalprinciple that its survival and capacity tooperate uninhibitedly in a mobile role dependson the early elimination of that threat. Inevitablyand properly the RAAC possesses themost knowledge of the subject and would playa major part in dealing with the eventuality.Out of our infantry's necessary and prolongedpre-occupation with counter-insurgency,however, an attitude has emerged that theRAAC is the cure-all and you can refer theproblem to it as one would refer rat infestationto a pest control specialist. If, however,the specialist is busy elsewhere exterminatingan even larger gathering of rats, it is to behoped that you had the forethought to lay inyour own rat-traps and not merely mouse-traps.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 7The inadequacy of battalion weapons hasbeen glossed over for too long in our traininginstitutions and our thinking. We are slowlyprogressing from the thinking of the middle6Us when one Chief Instructor of the InfantryCentre taught his officer-students that the CarlGustaf was the ultimate weapon and tankscould be disregarded thereafter. Nevertheless,the head-in-the-sand, send-for-the-ratcatcherphilosophy is still with us. lying just concealedin the thinking behind TIB 28, (The InfantryDivision) and surfacing from time to time indiscussions on tactical exercises.In 1964, infantry instructors were posted tothe Armoured Centre for the ENTAC trialand subsequently as instructors in the ATGWWing. Their presence was regarded as significantby the RAAC but with apparent indifferenceby their parent corps, probably becauseof its Vietnam commitments. As one whoremembers their realization of the scope ofthe problem and their enthusiastic participationin the introduction of tactics and weaponrynew to the Australian Army I find it particularlygratifying that an officer of the InfantryCentre should be resurrecting this long-standingweakness in our preparation for war.Department of Defence M. A. Count(Central Office)Lieutenant ColonelCanberra. ACT.AT RISKCommander Shevlin suggests some interestingroles for the LSH in his article, "A NewAmphibious Capability for the AustralianServices," (D.F.J., November/December 1976).I must suggest, though, that many of thesewould not be practicable in the event of amajor conflict. In such a conflict, the enemywould have considerable air support, if notoverwhelming air superiority.Given this hostile air situation, I think itis unlikely that any major units of the Fleetwould be put at risk in the waters aroundthe enemy invasion beaches. To do so wouldinvite their loss, notwithstanding the considerableair defence capability of some ships. (Ido not know the weaponry planned for theLSH).Directorate of Artillery. Canberra.A.C.T.D. J. RedMajorDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALCongratulations on the birth of the DefenceForce Journal.I support the last paragraph of Mr Killen'scontribution regarding the stimulation of professionaldiscussions on military and defencematters.Mr Killen, himself not an unhumorous man.would no doubt support the continued inclusionof humorous pieces such as "A Medalfor Horatius". I hope that we can see morelight-hearted articles in future issues.K. T. GrahamSwan Barracks. Perth. WA.Major* * *Thank you for sending me a copy of thenumber one issue of the new Defence ForceJournal. In my opinion it is a most desirablepublication and will meet a very definite need.The services wanted such a journal.Stuart M. McDonaldBrighton, VictoriaMajor General* * *I, for one, am pleased to see the passingof the Army Journal and the birth of theDefence Force Journal. The reason will beobvious shortly. The appearance of the newJournal is of a high order and promises muchfor the future. I would like to offer my congratulationsto you and to all who have beenassociated with the Journals inception andproduction.One final look back at the Army Journal.In your editorial of June 1976 you made aplea for reader feedback, indicating that therewas so little unsolicited comment that youwere uncertain as to your reception by themilitary community. My opinion, based on abroad level of contact with officers from themiddle and junior ranks, is that the ArmyJournal was nut highly regarded as a trulyprofessional publication for one reason — itwas not sufficiently critical. Rightly or wrongly,the Army Journal was commonly believed tosutler from a censorship imposed at a highlevel which largely excluded opinion contraryto stated policy, resulting in a publication lackingin critical, imaginative and controversialmatter. This was. in my opinion, the principalreason for the apathetic response to the Army

8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALJournal. If the Defence Force Journal is tolake its rightful place as a key medium ofdebate on defence matters, this stigma ofcensorship must be avoided. In his introductionto the first issue the Minister for Defencegives a positive lead: let us not crush theopportunity now at hand.Your first editorial in the Defence ForceJournal indicates that there will be a "lessrestricted policy towards article content". AsI understand it, the Board of Management isnow the final arbiter of Journal content. 1would like to see you clear up once and forall the matter of censorship, by statingunequivocally who controls content and onwhat basis.I am also concerned with three quantitativematters:• A recent note in Routine Orders in the2nd Military District (NSW) indicatedthat distribution would no longer be onan individual basis but on a varying scaleof issue, eg. Lt Col/Maj 1:2, Capt/2Ltl:3andSnr"NCO 1:5.9The first issue is dated November/December.Does this mean that only sixissues will be published annually?*• I understand that the Defence ForceJournal, as with the Army Journal, is tobe restricted to 64 pages.All of these restrictions would appear to befinancially based. If so, they are indeed falseeconomy. This publication should have sufficientpriority to allow the provision to allinterested individuals (which I would hopeincludes the whole officer corps) of a personalcopy. Alternatives might include the lodgementof an application by all individuals wantingto receive a copy or, if necessary, a systemof paid subscription.Your comments on the number of articlesawaiting publication are inconsistent with theother two quantitative restrictions T have highlighted.I hope that you will press for morefrequent publication and more room in whichto publish. Anyone in any doubt about theimportance of this publication should readagain Gavin Long's opinion as expressed in'To Bengha/i'. page 11.One final suggestion related again to yourJune 1^76 Army Journal editorial. If youreally want to know what we think of yourpublication, all you need to do is include asmall tear-out reader attitude survey in yournext issue. You will soon find out how manypeople read the Journal and any other statisticyou might find valuable. It might be illuminating!Regular OfficerDevelopment Committee.Reid, ACT.A. R. BlackLieutenant Colonel* See mv comments on page 3.—EditorNEIGHBOURLY AIDIn my official speech at the opening ceremonyof the Second Asian Congress of Paediatricsheld in Jakarta in August 1^76 in thepresence of the President of the Republic ofIndonesia, General Suharto, I said inter alia:"For technologically developed countries,and here I speak as a resident of Australia,the nation's surest defence is to make itspeople and its resources as useful as possibleto those more populous countries around.Mutatis mutandis, this is true for the defenceof every country. In the case of Australiathis means being as co-operative as possiblein supplying food, in providing engineeringskills, in assisting with surveying and inmaking provision for technical training."Comments in your Journal by DefenceForce experts would be of great interest.Thomas Stupleton.Past President.Australian Institute ofCamperdown. NSW International Affairs.MONTHLYAWVRI)The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article inthe January February issue of the Defence Force Journal to Major L. N. Hall for his articlePrisoner of War Conduct After Capture.

7H€ AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN UUMCi:Some PossibleRestrictions on aUS ResponseCaptain M. G. SmithRoyal Australian InfantryIntroductionALLIANCES are never perfect: they arenever unchangeable. Because they cannotbe unconditionally guaranteed, under allcircumstances, there can, therefore, be no suchconcept as the model alliance. Alliances, aswith relationships, depend on the interestsof the protagonists involved. Internationalalliances, by virtue of the multiplicity of factorsaffecting the individual members and the collectivebody are, by nature, even less stable.As Edmund Burke once put it:"Men are not tied to one another by papersand seals. They are led to associate byresemblances, by conformities, by sympathies.It is with nations as with individuals.Nothing is so strong a tie of amity betweennation and nation as correspondence in laws,customs, manners and habits of life. Theyhave more than the force of Treaties in themselves.They are obligations written in theheart. They approximate men to men withouttheir knowledge and sometimes againsttheir intentions. The secret, unseen, butirrefragable bond of habitual intercourseholds them together even when their perverseand litigious nature sets them to equivocate,scuffle, and fight about the terms oftheir written obligations".'In terms of Australian strategic security theAustralian-American alliance is not watertight.It claims no guarantees and no binding obligations.Its emphasis is on consultation andmutual consent. The assistance to be offeredin the event of armed aggression is not statedequivocally but in the form of a declarationof intent.- To the pessimistic Australian strategistthen, the alliance represents nothing moreCaptain Smith has previously contributed to theArmv Journal, his most recent article being in April.1976.in reality than a moth-torn security blanket —it is as useful to Australia today as was Singapore,the Empire, and the Royal Navy beforeDecember 1941. :On the other hand by accepting Burke'sdictum we can see some sense in the existenceof such an alliance. If alliances can never hopeto be unconditionally guaranteed then thestated or unstated terms of a commitment onpaper are not really worth much. 1 What isimportant is the degree of common interestand mutual understanding that each of theallies possess. To the optimistic Australianstrategist then, the alliance represents a symbioticattempt to meet and solve commondefence problems. This commonality is seento be underpinned by the social, economic andpolitical similarities which historically"' arethought to have linked the countries.This article attempts briefly to examine someof the more obvious restrictions which mightbe placed on the US response to an Australiansecurity threat. Such restrictions, naturally, areviewed from an Australian perspective. Itshould also be noted that this article makesno attempt to define and assess 'threat estimates'."Similarly, where scenario-settings areused they are intended merely to illustrate aparticular principle which might cause the typeof restriction on US responses referred to.The Alliance — An Asymmetrical RealityFirstly, it is essential to see the alliance incorrect perspective. The alliance is not even:it is not symmetrical. The relative size andeconomic importance of the two countries precludethem from claiming equal status. TheUS is a super-power. Australia, though alignedto her (and perhaps sheltered by her), is not.At best Australia is a low-ranking middlepower who would find difficulty in claimingunion with the Third World. American influencein prescribing global strategy is undisputed.Australia's, if it exists, is not considered.In terms of regional security Australiarelies heavily on US policy and presence. In

10 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALterms of America's regional security Australianpolicy is of little consequence. Economically.Australia is directly of minor importance tothe IS though is perhaps more important inthe triangular relationship between the twocountries and Japan." On the other hand, theUS is economically of vital significance to Australia.Socially, Australia is very largely influencedby the American mass media and thusAustralians believe they can relate to andidentify with the Americans. The same cannotbe said of Australian identification in the US.Frank S. Hopkins has correctly pointed out"that most Americans have never met an Australian"1 ' and Robin Boyd has rightly assessedthat "communication is virtually one way alongthe Pacific axis". 10This asymmetry does not mean that thealliance is necessarily impotent and/or meaningless.There are those who claim that sucha relationship is nothing more than the offspringof an "unequal partnership' -- that inRealpolitik it could be no other way, and thatit does not prevent the alliance from functioningeffectively. Others, more cynical perhaps,see this asymmetry as an in-built restrictionon American response to assist Australianinterests. They would not necessarily call forthe alliance to be abandoned but for are-appraisal of its effectiveness. In either casethe alliance is still asymmetrical in nature, andbeing such, diverging viewpoints must at timesexist between the member countries.The crux of this argument is simply this:that if both countries view the alliance differentlyor if its importance is not equally understood,then so too might the need for responseby both parties be judged differently. On theone extreme we might consider the situationwhere an ill-informed and apathetic Americanpublic might prevent American interventionon Australia's behalf. Such cases where thissituation might arise are difficult to imagine.They could range from the occupation andannexation by an over-populated and resourcehungryAsian power of some more remoteparts of Australian territory (including islands).to American tacit support for a policy ofopening-up White Australia in order to pacifyboth the demands of some Asian (or ThirdWorld) countries and of their own multinationalpressure groups.On the other extreme it is conceivable thatalthough the Americans may be fully awareof the existence of a threat toward Australiathey may simply not view that threat throughthe same glasses. For instance, the resettlementof Indians, Chinese or Indonesians" in partsof northern Australia might not be seen byAmerica as representing a threat to Australiannational sovereignty, but in terms of avoidinga greater and more realistic threat, viz, theproblems of over population and resource allocation.Such a policy would be even morecredible if the US had already announced herintention to do likewise.In a world of ever-diminishing resources itis also possible that the American desire for'dolly-lolly' might persuade them to acquiescein the event of an industrialised and re-armedJapan occupying and further developing largeareas of Australian mineral deposits.Such scenarios may be (and hopefully are)totally unrealistic. Even if true one wouldhope that Australia had sufficient lead timeand sufficient perception to alter its strategyaccordingly. Nevertheless, there is more thana kernel of truth in the fact that the existingasymmetry between Australia and Americacauses different and sometimes diverging viewpointsto emerge. It is very much as FrankHopkins experienced from listening to Australianand American addresses at severalCoral Sea celebrations in the early sixties."The Australian talk of dependence," he said,"baffled the Americans who failed to realisethe depth of Australian insecurity, and theAmerican talk of partnership puzzled the Australians,who never seemed to realise what ahigh estimate our (American) Armed Forcesplaced on their military capabilities". 12American Strategic ConsiderationsAustralian politicians have long soughtAmerican oral reassurance that the alliancewould be honoured under all possible threatconditions. Such reassurance however, like theANZUS Treaty itself, can never be binding.On the one hand Australians hear the hearteningwords of John Foster Dulles and A vera 11Harriman 13 and see the strong sentimental tiesbetween leaders like Harold Holt and LyndonJohnson. On the other, we read with someconcern the weirds of pragmatists like McGeorge Bundv when he explains the raw extent

AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE: POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON US RESPONSE IIof American involvement overseas: "TheAmerican commitment anywhere is only asdeep as the continued conviction of Americansthat their own interest requires it". 14In this simple statement of national selfinterestprobably rests more truth than in allthe spoken rhetoric and public euphoria whichhas somewhat plastically come to pervade overthe alliance since the Second World War.Nations cannot afford the luxury of permanentfriends: nor, as history has revealed, permanentenemies. Nations have at best only transientforeign interests — transient in the sense thatwhile their policy for national survival remainsconstant their changing relationship with otherstates is the variable factor.If this fact is undisputedly accepted then itfollows that American global strategic policy isnot static. In this sense Australia's relationshipwith the US must be ever fluid. Moreover,because of the asymmetry of the relationshipAustralia may well (and undoubtedly will) havelittle influence in choosing the direction inwhich American policy is to flow. Accordingly.American response to an Australian call forassistance must be weighed against America'sother global interests.'' For instance, Americahas long pursued a policy of providing greatassistance to Indonesia. So too has Australia.though for somewhat different reasons. If onewas to crystal ball gaze, it would not be difficultto imagine a situation where the Indonesianarchipelago was of greater strategicimportance to the US than was Australia. Ifunder these conditions Indonesia was to claimparts of Papua New Guinea and /or parts ofAustralian territory or if Indonesia was tothreaten Australia and/or Papua New Guineain some way," 5 would the US still be preparedto respond to Australia's plea for assistance?Similarly, if America decided that Indonesiaand/or Japan should be re-armed andre-directed to represent American interests inAsia, then how important a part would theAustralian-American alliance play in decidingAmerican foreign policy?But in terms of American strategic policythere are some even more obvious restrictionsthat might be placed upon a quick US responseto assist Australia. Firstly, despite the greatadvance in nuclear weaponry, we cannot beat all certain that the next world war wouldnot be fought conventionally. If this doesoccur then America, like Britain in 1941, mightfind it impossible to provide adequate forcesto meet contingencies on multiple fronts. Thisbeing the case, Australian territory could conceivablybe given an extremely low priority.In a world conflict NATO would almostundoubtedly be given priority over ANZUSand SEATO. In this case, although the alliancemight still stand in principle, America mighthave to confess to being unable to provide thenecessary defence assistance required. Even ifAmerica was not committed elsewhere therecan never be any real guarantee that US logisticsupportto Australia would arrive in sufficienttime and quality to be of use or that the supplyroutes themselves would not be interdicted. 17SecondK. in the event of Australia beingthreatened. America might well place moreemphasis than Australia hitherto has on the'self-help' aspect of Article II of the ANZUSTreaty.'" In such a case America might agreeto render only that assistance which was to bematched by an Australian effort. This couldmean that because of insufficient allied forcesa military stalemate would result. In the politicalbargaining that might be expected tofollow, Australia — possibly at the behest ofthe US — could well have to make certainconcessions to the aggressor, some of whichcould possibly involve territorial rights.'"Thirdly, in what might be considered a somewhatsimplistic overview, there are other factorsto consider. For example, America might, forreasons of detente (the balance of power, orwhatever), consider that to involve herself withthe problems of Australian defence is simplynot worth the effort or the risk. Even theAmerican facilities at Pine Gap and NorthWest Cape might be considered too unimportantto warrant defending. Additionally, Americamight consider that inept Australian policy-"was the real cause of conflict in the area andmay not be so readily prepared to bail Australiaout from what might be seen as her justdeserts.Finally, some consideration must be givenas to whether or not the American nuclearumbrella is included as part of the alliance;and if it is, then how much control Australiamay have over its use. There are undoubtedlyboth advantages and disadvantages ensuingfrom any 'nuclear connection". Advantages inthe sense that it may provide a deterrence

12 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALagainst would-be aggressors, and disadvantagesbecause it might target Australia to the activitiesof America's enemies. But assuming thatthe alliance does include the nuclear umbrellathen it could occur that, under rapidly deterioratingthreat conditions, Australia might considernuclear action as its only remaining hopefor survival. An American decision to usenuclear force under these conditions wouldhave to take stock of the global situation. Ifit was considered that such action would providethe catalyst for nuclear retaliation orestablish a dangerous precedent for futurehostile nuclear reaction it is doubtful that Australia'swishes would be supported by the US.Therefore, when considering internationalrelationships — especially uneven alliances likethe Australian-American the strategicoptionsopen to the partners must be considered.In democratic nations, more than elsewhere,the ultimate acceptance or rejection of thesestrategic options largely rests upon the attitudeand psyche of the constituents.American Domestic ConsiderationsWhether or not the American public knowsor even cares about Australia is a vexing question.Whether or not they particularly care orwant to care about world events is also opento debate. In a sense American foreign policycan be seen as the compromise between twocontrasting sets of factors. On the one handAustralians view the deeply patriotic, keenlvindividualistic and free enterprise forces whichhave shaped America. These are the NattyBumpo- 1 type myths which portray the Americanas a hard working, honest and independentsoul ever more bent on further extending andimproving the frontiers of his nation. Linkedwith this betterment is the prevailing attitudeof isolationism — of an America totallyindependent from outside strife: a nation ableto deter all aggressors but not wishing tobecome involved with the problems of others.In the formulation of foreign policy theseforces are inherent in the Monroe Doctrine andmore recently the Guam Doctrine. To someextent American public opinion is still verymuch as George Washington prescribed:"The destiny of Europe and Asia has notbeen committed, under God. to the keepingof the United States; and only conceit,dreams of grandeur vain imaginings, lust forpower or a desire to escape from our domesticperils and obligations could possiblymake us suppose that Providence hasappointed us his chosen people for the pacificationof the earth". 22On the other hand America is a real superpowerin a real world, unable to stay alooffrom the demands of global strategy even ifonly for the sake of her own national securityThe extent to which America will want tobecome involved in future outside adventuresmay largely depend on the changing balancebetween these contradictions. America wouldno doubt prefer not to play the role of internationalpoliceman and watcher, but her superpowerstatus prevents her from doing so. Itis because of these contradictions that onemight argue that although the Vietnam warwas fought in the jungles of Indochina, it waslost on the American streets and campuses.Similarly, any prolonged American militaryassistance required to help defend Australia,or protect Australian interests, might for thesame reasons either quickly peter out or benot thought worth the initial effort. Muchwould seem to depend, therefore, on the educationof and sympathy from the Americanpublic in relation to Australian sovereignty.-In much the same way the history books nowreflect the fact that although America's commitmentin the Second World War was verymuch a 'Europe First' policy, this was onlymade possible because of the Japanese attackon Pearl Harbor. Thus, while the Americanpeople could justify their entry into a waragainst Japan, their main efforts were directedagainst Nazi Germany.Another possible restriction upon USresponse, related to American domesticmatters, is the traditional counter-stanceadopted by the President and Congress. Itmay therefore occur that even though theWhite House may wish to assist Australia itshands are tied by Congress, or similarly, thatan initial American commitment to Australiais not as great as it might have been, or, islater withdrawn at a time when Australia isvery reliant upon it. As an illustration of thisprinciple one might judge the reason for therecent success of the Soviet and Cuban-backedM PL A 24 in Angola largely as a result of Congressreluctance to grant increased aid toFNLA 24 and UNITA." Although that parti-

AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE: POSSIBLE RESLRICLIONS ON LS RESPONSE 13cular situation would probably never resemblenn imagined Australian threat, the principleof Congress-Presidential bi-polarity in foreignaffairs is, nevertheless, a reality.One further aspect of American decisionmakingshould also be considered: that is thevery limited ability of any outside nation ininfluencing the American policy makers. AsAlastair Buchan has pointed out, 25 Americanallies possess only limited capability to shapeUS policy after the initial policy-making processhas begun. In terms of US support forAustralia this could mean that the final Americandecision might largely rest on how favourable(or unfavourable) an impression Australiahad registered at the lower and more informallevels of policy formulation.There are those who suggest that the realbinding force of the Australia-Americanalliance is the large degree of economicco-operation and mutual dependence betweenthe countries. While this dependence is certainlytrue for Australia 26 it does not necessarilyapply for America. Not only do Americanimports from, and exports to, Australiatotal only a small amount of all Americanforeign trade, but so too does American investmentin Australia rank as only the fourthlargest concentration of US investmentabroad. 27 From an economic standpoint then,Australia is much more dependent on the USthan is the reverse. This means, of course,that within the alliance the options of USassistance to Australia weigh very favourablyon the side of America. From an economicviewpoint there is no question that, assumingthe current trade trends continue, Americawould have little difficulty surviving if Australiawas to go under: and America mighteven prosper if Australia was to go under toan industrialised and productive country whichitself had good relations with the US.Another economic consideration to be takeninto account is the continued ability of Americato maintain its influential position of big businessand the unforeseen decline of nations'importance are impossible to predict. Yet itdoes happen. In less than a century Britain,once the world's greatest nation, has beenreduced to the ranks of a middle power. Similarly,the rise of the USSR and the PRC tosuper-power status was once not seriouslycontemplated. For Australia then, if Americawas to wither so, too, would the effectivenessof the alliance, and so too, would America'scapability to respond to Australia's needs.ConclusionsThe foundation stone of the Australian-American alliance was the ANZUS Treatssigned in September 1951. It was an alliancelargely born as an American concession forAustralia's reluctant agreement to the JapanesePeace Treaty. Later, SEATO did to someextent increase the depth of the alliance butadded no substance to any bi-lateral defencecommitment between Australia and America.The alliance continues to rest on the goodwilland mutual consent of both parties. Thealliance is neither binding on either party nordoes it provide a guaranteed security cover forAustralia. For the most part Australian-American co-operation has been harmonious,with Australia still able to voice dissentingopinion over issues as varied as Suez, Laosand Indonesia. 2S But as with all alliances thereexists a number of restrictions that must beplaced on the ability of member countries toalways respond to the wishes of the otherparties. In matters of national security theserestrictions are continually in a state of flux,depending on the current self-interest of themember states. This fact might suggest that itis folly to base national defence policy primarilyon the basis of an alliance system. Alliancesmay be useful to combat common enemies(both militarily and politically), but they provideno guaranteed answer against localisedthreats or threats which, for one reason oranother, are considered by one party to beoutside the domain of the alliance. On theother hand, greater self-reliance might not onlyadd strength to existing alliances but mightprovide the 'big stick' necessary for thosethreats not covered by alliances.LIndoubtedly there are a number of otherrestrictions to a US response which have notbeen discussed here. An immediate examplethat comes to mind is the extent to which theUS could (or could not) inflict economic and/ordiplomatic pressure upon certain countries onAustralia's behalf. These restrictions togetherwith those already raised, are left to the politiciansand strategists (and eventually to theAustralian people) so they may decide theextent of Australian national security which

14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALis presently to be gained from the Australian-American alliance.QNOTES1 Quoted by Peter Lyon "Great Britain and Australia''in H. G. Cileber (ed) Problems of AustralianDefence, Melbourne, 1970 — p. 76.\\/l S l'A( 1 \rticle l\•' An examination of Australia's false strategicdependence on the Singapore base and Britishsea power in the inter-war years can be foundin John MacCarthy Australia and ImperialDefence 1918-19: A Study in Air and Sea Power,Brisbane, 1976; especially Chapters 3 and 6.1 There are numerous historical examples of paperalliances being prosed meaningless. In the extreme.one example might be the Soviet-Nazi NonAggression Pact.' Arguments for and against historical similaritiesbetween Australia and America have been statedelsewhere. It might simply be said here thatalthough there is some commonality between eachcountry's history there are also deep and markeddifferences.'• This term is currently one of the most over usedcliches around. Its meaning appears to be so wideas to include everything from nuclear holocaustto pollution.7 This word is used in the dual sense: to describesomething that is not symmetrical, and to evokethe Australian desire for the relationship to besymmetrical.1In 1974 Australia provided nearly half of Japan'siron and aluminium imports, one third of itscoking coal, and four fifths of its wool imports.The importance of the Australia-Japan relationshipis therefore of interest to the USA.: ' Frank S. Hopkins "The American Image ofAustralia" in Norman Harper (ed) Pacific Orbit:Australian American Relations Since 1942, Melb..1968 — p. 221. Frank Hopkins was the US ConsulGeneral in Melbourne 1960-6?." ibid p. 145.11The list is neither intended to be complete, nordefinitive.12Frank S. Hopkins op. cit. p. 236.11 See T. B. Millar Australia's Defence, Carlton.2nd ed. 1969. p. 48. There are undoubtedly morerecent examples.« H. G. Gelber — "The USA and Australia" inH. G. Gelber op. cit. p. 91.11America's refusal to assist with the defence ofSingapore, and position a naval fleet there —despite several requests from Australia and Britainduring 1940-41 — might be considered as anexample of this. See R. A. Esthus From Enmityto Alliance: US-Australian Relations 1911-41,Seattle. 1964. chapter 8." ; The number of threats are too numerous toimagine, ranging from the siting of missiles againstAustralia TNG to the question of coastal waterterritory and poaching by fishing vessels. Onemight also consider the possibility of a countryembarking on a 'foreign adventure', against a supposedthreat in order to unify dissenting domesticparties opinion and thus prevent internal chaos.Some commentators, for example, have consideredthis reason to be the main cause of the 1965India-Pakistan conflict.17On page 22 of the US hearings on 'The Postureof Military Airlift' before the Research andDevelopment Subcommittee of the House ofRepresentatives Committee on Armed Services.November 11th, 1975. it was stated that the totalUS military airlift capacity (including the (nilAir Reserve Fleet) was 34.12 million ton milesper day. Therefore, by deduction, the maximumthat Australia might expect, on a twenty-fourhour shuttle, would be about seven thousandtonnes per day. A more realistic figure however,might be one thousand tonnes. Also of interest,is that the US currently has a fleet of seventyC5A aircraft capable of transporting most heavybattlefield equipment. However, equipment comingby sea. would probably not arrive for at least[luce weeks from the lime of the decision to makeit available.1S Article II states: " .... the Parties separatelyand jointly by means of continuous and effectiveself-help and mutual aid will maintain and developtheir individual and collective capacity to resistarmed attack".19We should not entirely discount the possibilityof America diplomatically bargaining with anotherpower at a very high level and without first consultingAustralia. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of1902 — which committed the British Empire —was signed in this way (despite Australian racialprejudice at the time) simply because Australianinterests were either not considered or thought tobe of only minor importance by Britain.20An historical example of inept Australian policymight be Australia's 'Trade Diversion' policy of1436-37. This policy primarily discriminatedagainst the US and Japan and favoured the Commonwealthcountries. Most Australian economistsat the time agreed that the policy was economicallysuicidal but there was only minor oppositionamongst political parties. Japan and Americanaturally reacted against the policy and the Australianeconomy suffered adversely. Furtheraccounts can be found in H. Burton "The TradeDiversion' Episode". Australian Outlook. April1%8 and R. A. Esthus. op. cit.. chapters 2 and 4.-' The fictional character of the James FenimoreCooper series on early American history: ThePathfinder, The Last of the Mohicans, etc.22Quoted in H. G. Gelber "The USA and Australia "op. cit.. p. 80.One of Roosevelt's reasons for not agreeing toBritish and Australian requests for a US presenceat Singapore in 1940 was the forthcoming Presidentialelection to be held in November of thatyear. It was felt that such a policy would alienatethe large number of 'isolationists' in the country.See R. A. Eshtus. op. cit.. chapter 8.21MPLA — Popular Movement for the Liberationof Angola. FN LA — National Front for theLiberation of Angola. UNITA — National Unionfor the Total Independence of Angola." See H. G. Gelber "The USA and Australia"op. cit.. p. 87.-•'• Total Aust. Exports to USA in $m1970-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75519 615 759 750 832Total Aust. Imports from USA in Sm1970-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-751.042 873 860 1.348 1.71627The Australian Chamber of Commerces figure forAmerican investment abroad in 1971 is SUS86billion; S27.6 billion. Europe; S24 billion. Canada:$23.3 billion, 'developing' countries; S4.8 billion.Australia.25See Norman Harper "The American Alliance"in Norman Harper (ed) Pacific Orbit op. cit. pp.3-24.

in the armvBrigadier W. B. James, MBE, MC, MB,BS, DPH, DIM & H, D1H, MFCMDirector of Medical Services — ArmyIntroduction: The Problems of PublicHealth in the Army"In 1943, for every man wounded, 1 waslosing 120 from sickness. My daily evacuationrate was 13 per 1,000. A simple calculationshowed me that the whole of my(Fourteenth) Army would melt away in threeor four months."THIS extract from a speech by Field MarshalSir William Slim to the Royal AustralasianCollege of Physicians in 1957 very clearlyshows the folly of thinking that the only medicalrequirement in war is to provide surgical servicesfor the men wounded in combat. Butthis notion, that the medical services in warare required only to provide treatment for thewounded, dies hard and too often lessons ofthe past are forgotten. So that with each newcampaign tragedies of great suffering, illnessand death still occur because the principles ofpublic health are not appreciated. Slim goeson to acknowledge this in his speech — "Thisgloomy picture . . . was changed by early 1945into that of the healthiest Army Britain hasever had overseas. Our sickness rate of evacua-Hrigadier James graduated from RMC Duntroon in1951. He served in I RAR in Korea as a platooncommander. As a result of this service, he M-asawarded a Military Cross. After service witharmoured units in Australia, he left the Army andstudied medicine. He was reappointed to theRAAMC. He served as Senior Medical Officer1 Task Force in South Vietnam, and, after trainingin the United Kingdom, was appointed Director ofMedical Services. I Military District. He is currentlyDMS (Army).tion was 1 per 1,000 per day. The transformationwas only possible, the existence letalone the victory of my Army was only possible,because of the skill, courage, ingenuity,energy and devotion of my doctors. I yieldto none in my admiration for our surgeons. . .theirs was the more spectacular role, but themen who saved and restored my Army werethe physicians. It was their research whichdiscovered new means of grappling with causesof disease ... it was their advice which enabledmy officers to order preventative measures thatreduced startingly the incidence of sickness."These extracts also clearly illustrate the twomain aspects of the problems of Public Healthin the Army, the first being the appreciationof the necessity of public health facilities andmeasures in any community, and the secondaspect being the means, and knowledge, to solvespecific problems encountered in a particularcampaign relating to time, place and nature ofthe conflict. In the succeeding chapters it isintended to show that the former problem hasusually been the most difficult to solve whilstsolution to specific public health problems arefar less difficult. It is strange that this shouldbe so, for at the conclusion of both the CrimeanWar and the Boer War Royal Commissionsreported and stressed the need for sound publichealth measures and employment of "a MedicalOfficer charged especially with the sanitarysupervision of the Army" (Herbert 1860) yetin the early phases of World War I and WorldWar II the importance of military hygiene wasignored. Lewis in the British Army Reviewof 1961 writes of this as "an attitude of laissezfairetowards hygiene insidiously developing

16 1)1 i I N( I 1 ()K( 1 lot R\ \lbetween wars". From this we see that theseproblems can further be examined in separatephases, the first concerning difficulties in timeof peace and secondly, difficulties in time ofwar. This of course is a continuing problemfor non-military powers such as the BritishCommonwealth countries, who "run down"their armies in time of peace and tend to retainonly the •"essential" elements of a service.It is intended in this article to deal withthese "facts of life" by firstly giving an historicalaccount of the development of publichealthin the army, then dealing specificallywith problems in time of peace and time ofwar in an attempt finally to show the continuingneed for high standards in militarypublic health as they apply to the present day.HistoricalBackgroundReferences to hygienic sanitary practices canbe found in many early writings as in DeuteronomyChapter 23, Moses gives perhaps thefirst description of a shallow trench latrine tohis army: "Thou shalt have a place also withoutthe camp, wither thou shalt go forth abroad.And thou shaft have a paddle upon thy weaponand it shall be when thou shalt ease thyselfabroad, thou shalt dig therewith and shalt turnback and cover that which cometh from thee".Homer in his writings describes an outbreakof plague among the Greeks at the siege ofTroy some three thousand years ago and ofhow Agamemnon, believing this was due tothe filthy state of the camp, stopped the epidemicby having the camp cleaned and allrefuse thrown into the sea. But this was inthe age when Man although believing "cleanlinesswas next to Godliness" was motivatedto carry out certain hygienic practices, notthrough knowledge of disease but ratherthrough the belief that uncleanliness and diseasewere due to the spirits of evil and mustbe avoided.Similarly it was appreciated that a fit healthyarmy was necessary for victory. Moses understoodthat for success an army required goodhealth and high morale, and laid down clearrules for selection of troops for his army. Tnchapter 20 of Deuteronomy he declared the"fearful and fainthearted let him go and returnunto his house, lest his brethren's heart faintas well as his heart" and in chapter 23 decreedthat the unclean "shall not come within thecamp".Although appreciating man) of the problemsof health, the early military leaders werefrustrated by lack of knowledge of cause ofdisease and n was not until the renaissance ollearning (1450-1750) that understanding ofdisease, and from that, prevention methodsbecame possible. Such great works as Vesalius""Fabrica" (1543) Jean Fernel's "Medicina"(1542) and Fracastoro's "De Contagione"(1546) threw light on the working of the humanbody and provided evidence for the specificityof disease and the nature of infection, anillater in 1616 William Harvey, in accuratelydescribing the circulatory system providedanswers for the spread of infection throughthe body. At the same time social reformersappeared to stir public conscience into theinjustices meted out to the poor, the sick andthe crippled. Sir Thomas More wrote "Utopia"in 1516 in which he outlined the need to carefor the less privileged people in society. Bythe work of these great men and others suchas John Gaunt on "Bills of Mortality" (1662),Ramazzini on industrial diseases (1690) andRichard Mead on "Plague" (1720) the stagewas set for a new age, an age of reasoningand later understanding.From the great discoveries in science, fromthe compassion of man to his less fortunateneighbours, from the stark exploitation ofworkers in the industrial revolution in Englandand Europe, slowly was born the frailbut viable discipline of public health. But thisenlightenment was slow to reach the armyand even the lucid and factual writings of SirJohn Pringle when Physician General to theForces (1742-8). published as "Observationson the Diseases of the Army", were ignoredby Army Commanders and Army medicalofficers alike. In this publication Pringle wroteon commonsense measures of hygiene, preventionof disease, and even described the meansof the spread of plague by lice, which was tocause havoc in the British Army 100 yearslater in the Crimea. Despite the enlightenmentin matters of health shown by Pringle and alsoby James Lind in his "Essay on the MostEffectual Means of Preserving the Health ofSeamen" (1757) where the dangers of poorventilation, damp, filth, poor food, poor clothingand excessive fatigue were stressed as

PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE ARMYrmajor contributory factors in underminingthe health of armies or ships' crews, the policyof laissez-faire continued until after theCrimean War. Perhaps the main cause of thisattitude was that the British soldier was consideredas expendable cannon-fodder thatdidn't deserve humanitarian consideration.Cecil Woodham Smith in her book "FlorenceNightingale" writes: "The private soldier of1854 did not bear a good character. Theyoung man who was the disgrace of his village,the black sheep of his family, enlisted. TheDuke of Wellington described his army, thearmy which won the victories of the Peninsularand Waterloo, as 'the scum of the earth enlistedfor drink'. The soldier was a dangerous bruteto be kept in subjection only by flogging,punishment, drill and iron discipline". DrBrush of the Scot's Greys wrote to the HospitalsCommission of 1857: "No general officerhas visited my hospital Lin Crimea] nor, to myknowledge, in any way interested himself aboutthe sick," and went on further to point outthe folly of this lack of interest in saying,"Unless those in Command do take an interestin their sick soldiers . . . until they do lend ahelping hand to their medical officers it willnot be possible for the duties of the medicaldepartment to be efficiently carried on", whichimplies that the army could not be maintainedat efficient fighting strength and condition insuch circumstances.It was with this background and philosophyin matters of health and administration thatthe British army sailed for Crimea in 1854.The army, triumphant at Waterloo 40 yearsearlier, had been allowed to run down instrength, so that administrative and medicalresources were quite inadequate for the mobilizationprogramme. So chaotic was the situationthat Cecil Woodham Smith writes:"Before the Army sailed the processes bywhich the troops were to receive food andclothing, to be maintained in health and caredfor when wounded or sick, had already falleninto confusion". In the campaign appallingerrors in medical matters were made so thatin the first six weeks due to poor siting ofthe British camp and inadequate sanitary control,an epidemic of cholera broke out, rapidlytaking 2000 victims. This quickly overwhelmedthe medical facilities of the force so that whenthe Battle of the Alma was won in September1854, "there were no bandages, no splints, nochloroform, no morphia, the wounded lay onthe ground or on straw mixed with manurein a farmyard". Despite heroic efforts of themedical staff, the inspired work of FlorenceNightingale and her gallant nurses, despitethe goodwill of the British people at home,the final statistics of this fearful campaign werethat 73% of the original force of 30,000 diedfrom diseases in the first six months. Thisfigure did not include the number who diedfrom battle injuries.The public scandal of Crimea quicklybrought public reaction, and as a result of theRoyal Commission in 1857, public healthideals were incorporated into army regulations.The Commission recommended two fundamentalrules for the maintenance of health inthe army which were adopted and apply tothis day. The first was that the health of anarmy or unit of an army is the responsibilityof the officer in command, and secondly thatmedical officers and health officers be appointedand be "given power to advise commandingofficers on all matters pertaining to the healthof the troops, including the siting of camps,diet, clothing, drill, duties on exercises". Thusthe disaster of Crimea produced dramaticchanges in the army, the firm establishmentof public health as a necessary part of an armyand with this a consciousness of the needsand equality of all men. Cecil Woodham Smithsums this up by writing, "Never again was theBritish soldier to be ranked as a drunkenbrute, the scum of the earth. He was now asymbol of courage, loyalty and endurance, nota disgrace but a source of pride."The Army in PeaceThe British way of life, dating back forcenturies, has been that of a peace-lovingpeople, slow to anger and placing their faithin freedom of all peoples to choose their formof employment, their way of leisure, and theirreligious and political views. This attitude of"fair play" and respect for the rights of manabhors war and aggression so that in timesof peace the military services are seen asunnecessary and expensive tools of evil. Thisconcept has been carried by the British peopleto all parts of the world and has continued asthe guiding philosophy of both Commonwealthcountries like Canada, Australia and New

18 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALZealand, and British inspired republics likeIndia, United States of America and Ireland.That this philosophy is correct few woulddoubt, but it has meant that in all campaignswhere Britain and her allies have been inducedto enter, they have entered with an untrainedand poorly equipped force. In more recentcampaigns such as Crimea, Boer War, WorldWar I, World War II, Korea, and in the caseof Australia, Vietnam, battle has been joinedwith unfavourable conditions on our side andinvariably stinging defeats or disastrous sicknessrates have occupied the first phase of thewar. The causes of these failures are many,but not the least being failure to appreciateboth the broad and the specific aspects ofpublic health. Examples of such disasters aregiven in Table 1.Rates of Illness due to a Dysentery andb Malaria in Campaigns involvingBritish, American or Australian troops2 a.

PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE ARMY 19to a peacetime situation. The first is the specificduty of public health care to large militarycommunities containing soldiers, their wivesand families, whilst in the second place studyon a global scale must be followed so thatpreparatory plans, possible hazards and newadvances are available at short notice to covera force mobilized for service in any part ofthe globe. In the latter case the task is sovast that paradoxically the "skeleton medicaldepartment" in peace really needs to be largerthan is required when battle is joined and allfactors of place, time, space and nature ofoperations are known.Army Public Health Fields of Endeavourin Time of Peacea. Due to Requirements of a Peacetime Army1. Provision of public health services for armyinstallations — water, food, waste disposal,health education, housing, immunization, etc.2. Provision of public health services for families,e.g. school health service, child welfare, familyplanning service, housing, recreation facilities,home visiting, etc.3. Training of stalf in public health duties.4. Provision of health services in training exercises.b. Due to planning for War1. Selection schedules for recruiting.2. Immunization requirements for service in anypart of the world.3. Clothing, diet, shelter, and movement requirementsfor all climates and seasons in the world.4. Regular updating on prevalent diseases, accidentcauses, and living conditions in all parts of theworld.5. Updating and research on preventive measuresagainst disease, injury including occupationalhazards, and hazards due to weapons of war.e.g. radiation, chemical and biological as wellas conventional weapons.6. Revision of training programmes on health.7. Updating on the psychiatric problems in peaceand war.8. Educating the army as a whole to be vigilantin matters of health.Table 2The Army in WarThe aim of our army in war is to defeat theenemy and restore law and order to enableman to live in peace. As mentioned in theprevious chapter, the English speaking peoplestend to maintain only a skeleton army in peaceso that in times of war huge, rapid, mobilizationmust take place to build up a strong army.US Army Death Rates Per 1000 Per Year(from Preventative Medicine in World War II - US Army Vol 111 page 234)120 —VA100- ^80 —!E3 DiseaseD Non-Battle Injury@ Battle60-40— ^120MexicanWarCivil War(North)1LaSpanishAmericanWarFig. 1m.WorldWar^zCSWorldWar 11

20 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALFor the aim to be achieved there must he sufficientmen, materials and determination to carryout the task. Conversely should there not besufficient men, or materials, or determination,then the aim cannot be fulfilled. These threefactors are in fact essential elements for victoryand thus must be available at the rignttime and the right place. To achieve theseessentials the production and procurement ofmaterials is the responsibilty of government ofthe country and supply services of the army,but to secure men and determination the medicalservices play a key part.To have men and determination implies fithealthy men with high morale, and it is withinthis field that a high standard of preventiveand curative medicine is essential. When thinkingof the medical services in war, the tendencyvery naturally is to think in terms of care ofthose wounded from hostile enemy action, forit could be argued that the men in the armyare young men selected to a high physical andmental standard, and as such rarely get sick.However this has sadly been proved incorrectall through history. The figures graphicallyshown below give death rates by cause in theUS Army during wars in the past 200 years,and show the fallacy of this thinking.The graph (fig. 1) clearly shows that in thepast deaths from battle injury was dramaticallyless than deaths from disease and non-battleinjury, ft shows that even with modern medicalknowledge and facilities, in World War IIdeaths due to disease and non-battle injurywere still alarmingly high.The high incidence of illness, and thereforeunusable manpower is still a major cause ofhospitalization in modern war. Table 3 givesthe 10 leading causes of hospitalization in UStroops in Vietnam in 1966.Ten Leading causes for hospitalization inUS Troops in Vietnam in 1966Rales in per 1000 per year.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8,ConditionInjury due to BattleInjury not due to battlePyrexia of Unknown OriginSkin conditionsDiarrhoeal diseasesAcute respiratory diseasesMalariaNeuropsychiatries conditionsRate1000183.672.957.239.939.032.727.414.59. Eye disorders 6.210. Ear infections 5.4Table 3A simple calculation will show that the principlestated above, namely that battle injuryonly accounts for a fraction of the sicknessrates in war. This can be shown by comparingrates due to battle compared with the ratesof other causes of hospitalization as follows:Hospitalization due to Battle—83.6/1000/yearHospitalization due to other causes—295.2/1000/yearThis gives a ratio of 1 battle casualty admittedto hospital for every 3.5 admitted for othercauses.What does all this mean? It means twothings; firstly that greater emphasis must begiven to preventive medicine in war than hasever previously been realized or accomplished,and secondly, the realization that to have sufficientnumbers of fit men to ensure success inbattle, a vast reduction in man-power wastagethrough non-battle injury and sickness is essential.Of course this has been written about sooften, but it is readily forgotten. Cecil WoodhamSmith writes of Florence Nightingale towhom:"It became clear . . . that she must lookafter the troops not only when they were ill,but when they were well. What she did forthem outside the hospital was as importantas what she did inside the hospital" (Crimea1855).Again after World War II the same conclusionsare reached by a Consultant Physicianto the Army (RAMC) who wrote:It is my opinion that the Army MedicalService requires to he more pre-occupiedwith prevention than it is at present. Thismeans that a much higher proportion ofpersonnel should he allocated to whole-timehygiene duties. It always struck me as absurdthat we had about 5% of our personnelengaged in prevention and most of the restoccupied in curing diseases which need nothave occurred had known knowledge beenfully applied . . . one medical officer engagedin hygiene can save the work of 10 medicalofficers in hospitals ..." (Marriot. 1946).It must be realized however that preventivemedicine, a high standard of hygiene, and so

PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE ARMY 21a low incidence of non-battle injury and sicknessis not the sole responsibility of the medicalservices, it is the responsibility of evensoldier of every rank constantly to practise andemploy the principles of public health. Successin public health starts with a high standardof personnel hygiene, and as with civilianpublic health, teaching, supervision and provisionof facilities for good hygiene at all levelsOf command. Brigadier MacCallum ofRAAMC writing about this point makes thefundamental point that "It is axiomatic thatthe ideal of thorough indoctrination of theindividual soldier is the pivot of hygiene training",and the advantages and successes of thisregime can well be demonstrated in the followingtable (4) concerning malaria rates inUS troops in the Pacific Campaign of WorldWar II. Rates per thousand troops per yearare given and the numerical hygiene effort foreach rate also shows clearly that the rate fellproportionally to the effort in control andprevention.Malaria rates US Army World War II —Pacific Asiatic area, compared with numberof units engaged in malaria control andsurveyB

22 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALchallenge that may be detrimental to the healthof man.What has been achievedThe wheels of progress turn slowly in ademocratic society but nonetheless much hasbeen achieved in the field of Public Health inthe Army since the calamitous days of Crimea.Although the enthusiast may feel that thewheels of progress turn too slowly, experienceand natural conservation of free people areundoubtedly a sound safeguard against injudiciousreforms.Following the disasters of Crimea manvreforms inspired by Florence Nightingale andengineered mainly by Sidney Herbert wereintroduced into the Army. "Army Healthofficers were appointed and the practice ofhygiene was acclaimed the primary duty ofthe military medical service" (Fewis 1958). In1860 the Army Medical School at Fort Pitt,Chatham opened as recognition that armydoctors and medical staff needed special trainingto enable them to advise on hygiene matters.At the opening address of this school.Deputy Inspector-General Fongmore said ofnewly commissioned army doctors, "His studieshave all tended towards the prime object ofthe great bulk of British practitioners - thecure of disease. But the cure of disease, thoughimportant ... is by no means his chief duty. . . he best performs his functions, in the eyesof the State, who has the least to treat, whokeeps his men in the most efficient state ofhealth." (Fongmore 1860) This school, laterto move firstly to Netley in 1862, and then toMillbank in 1907 has continued to be anintegral part of the British army and has providedhigh quality training for both armydoctors and medical staff in such fields asmilitary surgery, military medicine, pathology,army health and later psychiatry. Along withcivilian recognition that public health staffrequire special training, the army has been tothe forefront in arranging such special trainingfor its medical staff. Public Health Inspectors,qualified by civilian examination have longbeen employed in army field units. Similarly,the specialty of army health was recognisedfor army doctors who received special armyand civilian training including post-graduatediplomas in Public Health, Tropical Medicineand Industrial Health, and forms a departmentwithin the medical services, these two groupsbeing specifically charged with the preventativeaspects of diseases and maintenance of healthfor all ranks.Within the scope of activities of army health,the RAVIC has developed to meet the changingneeds of the arm> since its inception afterthe Crimean War. But for a depressing regressionin this field prior to the Boer war, resultingin gross failures in health prevention andcontrol, and another Royal Commission in1901, the achievements in the field of armyhealth have been steady and fruitful.So today in Britain and in many Commonwealthcountries the army has establishedtraining centres for the teaching of army healthto all ranks of the Medical Corps. Such placesare the Military College at Millbank which ismainly concerned with research and furthertraining for doctors, and the Army School ofHealth at Mitchett where both research andtraining of medical orderlies is carried out.Within those and other similar institutionsstudents are taught the principles and practiceof public health as applicable to army life.These include not only elements of environmentalhealth, communicable disease andsanitation hut also detail as to clothing, did.survival in differing climates, housing, andsuch topics necessary for good health. Combinedwith this are continuing research programmesinto methods of combating ill healthin all parts of the world where troops mayserve.Fqualh important has been the efforts toensure that non-medical personnel in the armyare made aware of, and appreciate the needfor health as a requisite of command. Althoughmuch effort has been expended in this theresults are not always good, even though itsimportance has been stressed for many years.In 1779 US General George Washingtonappointed a Prussian army officer FrederickVon Steuben inspector of training and it isinteresting to record part of the instructionslaid down by Von Steuben for Captains. "ACaptain cannot be too careful for the compansthe state has committed to his charge. Hemust pay the greatest attention to the healthof his men, their discipline, arms, accoutrements,ammunition, clothes and necessities. . . " (Greaves 1970). In this context more

PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE ARMY 23and more emphasis is being placed on healtheducation and understanding man in the Trainingschools of the army. The war of 1939-45did much to enlighten commanders and mostsenior officers today would agree with thewords of US General Maxwell D. Taylor whosaid, "A reflective reading of history will showthat no man ever rose to military greatnesswho could not convince his troops that he putthem first, above all else." (Greaves 1970) andof Field Marshal Montgomery who said, "Thereare no bad battalions, there are only badofficers." These expressions reflect the changedattitudes of modern leaders and not only ensurethat health standards today are high in thearmy but give a lead to soldiers of the future.Current Problems and Changing Patternsof Public Health in the Army"Much, today, that we see as abnormal inthe physical, mental, and social field was incomparatively recent times regarded as normal.Mere absence of disease is no longer enough.Utopians must be positively healthy." Brockington(1969). So it seems that as we uncoverthe secrets of one disease more problems arepresented to us, and this is a true and verysobering fact in a rapidly changing world.In the discipline of public health in the armythe words of Professor Brockington well apply,for with new sophisticated means of travel,types of weapons, areas of operations, and theemphasis of speed many new problems areunfolding daily. To look at but a few of theseemerging problems will provide evidence ofthis truth."The problem of malaria which in 1955 wasestimated to have caused 2.5 million deaths,and 250 million cases, was taken up by theWorld Health Organisation as requiring paramountattention, and eradication programmeswere started in many parts of the world."Young (1966). But not only has the task provedenormous, new problems have appeared inthe form of resistance developing in the mosquitoagainst hitherto effective insecticides andlarvicides, and in the form of resistance bythe malarial parasite to suppressive drugs. Tocomplicate these problems doubt is now beingcast on the toxicity and consequent danger toman of many insecticides e.g. DDT, and suppressivedrugs e.g. Dapsone (Strickland (1970)).For these, and many other reasons the problemsof malaria control, prevention, and eradicationhave still to be solved.Sadly the story of Yaws and Cholera, whichover the centuries have caused untold deathsand suffering, and which in recent timesappeared to be controllable still held mysteriesto man. The El Tor strain of Cholera, appearingin Indonesia in 1960, has relentlessly spreadwestwards for no apparent reason. The vaccinesagainst this disease are good but not100% effective. Why? The programme toeradicate Yaws in Africa appeared relativelysimple, for one or two million units of Penicillinrapidly cured the condition. But nowevidence is starting to appear that the characterof Yaws is perhaps changing and Syphilisis taking its place in the African populations."Venereal syphilis has in fact been reportedin some areas where Yaws had been previouslyendemic." WHO (1970).In tropical areas where Australian troopsmust be ready to serve, communicable diseaseslike leptospirosis, Infective Hepatitis, Denguefevers, Amoebiasis, Schistosomiasis, Ankylostomiasisand Filariasis are among but a fewfor which the whole answers on preventionand cure are still wanting. Environmentalproblems of hot climates including heat illnesses,prickly heat, tropical ulcers and othersrequire much more research before we can saythey are completely under control.Modern travel with high speed aircraft atsupersonic speeds and stratospheric altitudeshas produced a whole new range of publichealth problems for both civilian and armyauthorities. Prominent among the problems isthe risk of carrying dangerous communicablediseases such as smallpox, rabies, cholera,yellow fever and others into non endemic areas;the problem being that the early incubatingcase may arrive at a free area long before thedisease is detectable, and subsequently becomea source of infection in a new otherwise "free"area. Of great interest and worry to an armygeared for modern air travel are the problemsof circadian rhythms and acclimatisation. Theterm "circadian rhythms" is "employed todescribe changes in biological function whichappear to be governed by a timed interval ofabout 24 hours" McGirr (1966). Workers haveshown that following "rapid transit acrossmore than 5 to 7 time zones (the clobe is

24 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALdivided into twenty-four time zones of onehour each for every fifteen meridians of longitude)produces a deterioration of behaviouralintegrity as judged by reaction and decisiontimes for relatively simple tests" McGirr (1966).This in effect means that the performance ofsoldiers after being rapidly transported East-West or West-East through 5 or more timezones, will be considerably poorer than normalfor 1 to 4 days. This finding could have graveconsequences for an army planning to rapidlyfly troops into an area involving long East-West or West-East flight.Similarly, the proven need for acclimatisationof troops to changes in climate (hot or cold)suggests that ideas of "quick reaction" forcesheld central!) and u\ailah!e for service quickl)in any point on the globe may not at presentbe practical. It would seem that for suchoperations to be feasible, considerable researchand investigation would be required.In the same vein, future problems for thepublic health service of the army will includesuch diverse subjects as diet, clothing, shelter,sanitation, and mental health in extremes ofclimate, altitude and modes of travel. Thelist is unending as suggested by ProfessorBrockington.ConclusionThe story of Public Health in the army isreally complementary with the world widestory of public health. It is a story of man's"growing-up" and realization that "no man isan island unto himself", that health, happiness,efficiency and satisfaction in one's role in lifeare produced by the interactions of people inthe community, the environment in which welive, and the product of the endeavours ofman and nature. So it is a dynamic discipline,constantly changing to meet changing needs,but not changing so much that lessons of thepast can be ignored, or conversely that theproblems ahead are insurmountable.Perhaps the biggest problem in the story ofpublic health however has not yet been solved,and that is the problem of responsibilities inthe task. To get the authorities in both theservice and civilian life to be aware that toobtain high standards of health positive actionis required of a wide range of people."The control or eradication of diseaserequires the participation and co-operation oflarge numbers of people of widely differentinterests, including politicians, administrators,doctors, teachers, and especialh the peoplethemselves". Hobson (1%1)To apply this to the army, the great workof Florence Nightingale, Sidney Herbert andothers in establishing better hospitals, an armyschool of Health, improving the standards ofthe medical service and establishing the principlesof public health, hygiene, sanitation andpreventive medicine, must be continued andextended. These principles must be taughtover and over again to all branches of thearmy, at the recruit training units, at the serviceand arms training schools and particular!)at the administrative and staff training institutions.A firm grasp of these principles mustbecome a prerequisite for command at alllevels, not only because lessons of the pastshould be avoided, but also because problemsof the future can be better tackled. QBIBLIOGRAPHYBrockington, Professor C. F., "A Short History ofPublic Health" 1966.Brockington, Professor C. F., ''The Theory andPractice of Public Health" 3rd Ed. 1969 Chapter I.Greaves. Lt. Col. F. L.. US Army (retired), "TheProper Leader", Army Journal, April 1970.Hobson. W., "The Theory and Practice of PublicHealth" — preface to 1st Ed.Lewis, Colonel M. M., "The Specialty of ArmyHealth" 1948, Public Health, 1958.Long, Gavin. "Official Australian War History1939-45".Longmore. Deputy Inspector-General T.. Annualreport of the Army Medical Department for theYear 1859, London. HMSO, 1861.MacCallum. Brigadier. W. P.. "Medical Services inWar" 1939-45 Part III Australia.McGirr. P. O. M., "Orcadian Rhythms in Flight".Occupational Medicine, Vol 18 No 1 1968.Marriott. Brigadier, H. L., 1946, Army Quarterly 52.63.Ministry of Defence. 'Manual of Army Health".1965.Personal F.xperiences, Author — 8 Fd Amb Vietnam1968-9.SEATO Military Medical Bulletin. Vol III.Slim. Field Marshall Sir W. "Courage" 1957.Smith. Cecil Woodham 'Florence Nightingale." 1950.Strickland, J. F.. et al.. "Agranulocytosis Probablydue In Dapsone." \1cJ Journal of A list. Ma) I l )~nThe Holy Bible. Deuteronomy — King James Version.W. H. O. Chronicle, "Five Years of Research onthe Treponematoses." Vol 24 No 2 1970.Young M. D.. "A Manual of Tropical Medicine"Hunter et al 1966.

s.First of the LineGroup Captain Keith IsaacsAFC, ARAeS, RAAF (Retd.)WHEN the Aircraft Carrier* emerged fromthe 1914-18 war as a major weapon ofwar, it was inevitable that the Royal AustralianNavy — with the largest island continentin the world to protect — would seek to acquiresuch a ship for service in Australasian waters.The RAN first initiated plans for a navalair service in 1913 and, as early as 1917, amove was made to obtain Australia's first aircraftcarrier. With the incursion into thePacific of the German raiders SMSs Wolf —with her Friedrichshafen FF33E seaplane,Waifchen (or Wolf Cub) — and Seeadler, theAustralian Naval Board requested the loan ofa carrier similar to HMS Riviera. TheAdmiralty replied, however, that this was "notpossible in the circumstances." In fact, carrierswere in such demand at the time that the RoyalNavy had taken over an Australian mailsteamer, ss Nairana — which was being builtin the United Kingdom for the Bass Strait runbetween Melbourne and l.aunceston — andconverted in into a light aircraft carrier whichwas commissioned as HMS Nairana in September1917.During the same year aircraft of the RoyalNaval Air Service began operating aboard* The term aircraft carrier is a controversial oneand covers many types of ships — ships thatcarried landplancs which could he launched only;'•hips with fight decks for takeoff only; ships withfully operational fight decks; ships with catapults:and ships that acted as seaplane carriers, or tenders.Albatross was often referred to as a seaplanecarrier, although she carried hoat-amphihiansrather than seaplanes. Thus, the author has chosenthe generic term aircraft carrier to describe HMASAlbatross, precursor of post-WW II carriersHMASs Sydney. Vengeance and Melbourne.Reprinted from Aircraft with permission.Australian warships serving with the RN.HMAS Brisbane first embarked a SopwithBaby seaplane in mid 1917 and, in December,Sopwith Pups were launched from HMASsSydney and Australia. During 1918 Australiawas equipped with a Sopwith 11 Strutter anda Camel — or, sometimes, two Camels — andSydney and Melbourne each carried a Camel.When the war ended on November 11, 1918,plans for a Royal Australian Naval Air Servicewere still in abeyance, and the Australianwarships returned their aircraft to the RoyalAir Force in 1919, before sailing for homewaters.The postwar period brought a cut in defencespending, and it appeared that many yearswould pass before Australia could afford topurchase an aircraft carrier. As an interimmove, HMAS Australia embarked an Avro504L seaplane, H3034, in July 1920 for twomonths, and a second 504L seaplane, H3042.joined HMAS Melbourne on September 29for a Pacific cruise to New Guinea and Rabaul.These experiments were not a success, however,and the two aircraft were returned to theAustralian Air Corps, and were renumberedA3-47and48in 1921.Plans for a naval air service received afurther setback in September 1920 when theFederal Government decided to establish anautonomous air force which would inter alia,provide support for the army and navy. Inthe event, approval was given for a squadronof "ships aeroplanes" and, in 1921, six FaireyHID seaplanes were ordered for co-operationwith the RAN. They were initially allocatedAustralian Naval Aircraft serial numbers,ANA-1 to 6, but were renumbered A10-1 to 6after the Royal Australian Air Force wasformed in 1921.

26 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALIn May 1923, the RAN instituted a specialbranch of observers, whereby selected navigatorsunderwent a three months course atRAAF Point Cook flying in Avro 504Ktrainers and Fairey HID seaplanes. The latteraircraft also participated in fleet exercises, butworked mainly with the sloop HMAS Geraniumsurveying the Great Barrier Reef. One HIDaccompanied Geranium in 1924, and two 11 IDsoperated from shore bases with the sloop forthe 1925 season. As the latter year began, itseemed likely that naval aviation would remainin the doldrums for some time to come, but —within six months - the situation changeddramatically.In the first instance, three RAN lieutenantsstarted a four year pilot training course atRAAF Point Cook. Six months later theformation of the RAN Fleet Air Arm waspromulgated by Navy Order 137-16, June 1925.Then, on June 10, came the surprise defenceannouncement of the year. While openingFederal Parliament the Governor-General,Lord Stonehaven, revealed that the Governmenthad decided to purchase "a seaplanecarrier," and added that provision had beenmade for "the aeroplanes and necessary amphibiansto equip the seaplane carrier."Proof that this untoward announcementcame as a shock — particularly in defencequarters — is contained in the forthcomingautobiography of Air Marshal Sir RichardWilliams (this important work is being publishedby the Australian War Memorial, andSir Richard and the AWM kindly granted permissionto quote selected extracts), "In 1926... I read in the Press one morning that onthe previous day the Government had placeda contract with a dockyard in Sydney for theconstruction of a seaplane carrier to be knownas HMAS Albatross," recalls Sir Richard. "Ihad heard nothing of this from the Navy soI sought confirmation of it from the Minister,and when I asked him who was to supply theaircraft he said 'You will'. He had not mentionedthe matter to me previously. This wasan extraordinary position."The Government's announcement alsocaused embarrassment to the RAN because,apparently, an aircraft carrier specificationhad not been prepared. This confused situationresulted in a cryptic cable being receivedby the Admiralty Director of Naval Constructionwhich stated, in effect, that it was politicallydesirable to build a "seaplane carrier"in Australia. The cable then provided the twoonly known specifications --a speed of 21knots, and a cost of one million pounds! TheNaval Constructor in charge of the Admiralts'sAircraft Carrier Section is on record as retorting— "a more unsatisfactory way of producingan aircraft carrier I do not know, andcannot imagine."What then brought about this unusual politicaldecision that, to all intents and purposes,ignored the two services involved — the RAAFand the RAN? It all began in February 1924when the British Government informed theDominions that, for the time being, no furtherexpenditure would be incurred on the SingaporeNaval Base. This decision particularlyaffected the political defence planning of Australiaand, as a result, a naval expansion programwas immediately initiated.On June 27, 1924, the Prime Minister, MrBruce, announced plans to purchase two 10,000ton cruisers, and two ocean-going submarines.The Labor Opposition argued that the cruisersshould be built in Australia to assist the localshipbuilding industry, as Cockatoo IslandDockyard was about to close down throughlack of work. The construction of the cruisersexcited a nation-wide controversy and, afterprolonged investigations, the Governmentordered the two warships from Great Britain,thereby saving more than one million pounds.This money was then used to keep CockatooIsland Dockyard employed, thus appeasing theOpposition, the public and relieving the shipbuildingdepression. So it came about thatone million pounds was allotted for the localconstruction of an aircraft carrier which, thepoliticians argued, was required to offset thecarriers being introduced into the Pacific areaby Japan.Australia's so-called "seaplane carrier"necessitated much original thought as thedesign of such a ship had never before beenplanned from the drawing board stage. Theearly seaplane carriers of the RN had beenimprovised versions of ships laid down forother purposes. "You can say that the hull wasdesigned around three holds, three cranes, and

I IRST OF THE LINE 2721 knots," wrote the designer of the Albatross,Constructor Stephen Payne, some years later.Payne had the assistance of a young navalarchitect, Mr Woolnough, who was attachedto Australia House, London. Woolnoughattended the weekly meetings at the Admiraltyand, presumably, obtained the necessaryinformation, piecemeal, from Australia as thedesign progressed. He, at least, ascertainedthat Albatross would be required to carry amaximum of nine aircraft, although it is notcertain what type of aircraft was nominated.It would appear that the designer assumedthat the Fairey 11 IDs in Australia were the"seaplanes" intended for the "seaplane car-rier". At any rate, the dimensions of the aircraftdeck, hatch, and hangars provided sufficientspace to operate the IIIDs with theirwings folded. The cranes, also, had the capacityto cope with the all-up-weight of the IIIDs.In fact. Janes Fighting Ships, from 1929 to1934, annually reported that "at present 6lairey machines are carried" aboard Albatross— despite the fact that the last Fairey HIDhad been phased out of RAAF service in 1929.Another error has been perpetrated over theyears by the assumption that Supermarine SeagullIII amphibians were specifically acquiredfor Albatross. Although six of these aircraftwere ordered in 1925, they were purchased toreplace the Fairey 11 IDs in the Seaplane TrainingFlight, and for survey work in northernwaters. This is borne out in Sir RichardWilliams' memoirs, and substantiated in astatement made by the Minister for Defence,Sir Neville Howse, on July 1, 1926 — "asamphibians were urgently required for trainingpersonnel for the seaplane carrier nowunder construction, and for use this seasonon the Barrier Reef survey, Seagulls, being thebest amphibian type available, were ordered.This number, however, six, was limited tothose which would definitely be used up intraining, it being anticipated that improvedtypes would be available when the time arrivesto order aircraft for the seaplane carrier."\tRare photograph of HMAS Albatross with her forward catapult fitted. The carrier is flying her paying-offpennant as she sails from Sydney Harbour on 1 1 July 1938.To accommodate nine of these unknown"improved types," Albatross was designedwith a high freeboard forward, which containedthree holds, or hangars. Each hold containedspace to store three aircraft, of similar measurementsto the HID. Three cranes were positionedon the aircraft deck, above the holds,for hoisting aircraft up from the aft hangar,lowering them over the side for takeoff, retrievingthem after landing alongside, and returningthem to the hangars below deck. Provisionwas also made in the bow for the installation,at a later date, of a catapult for launchingaircraft that were strengthened for thispurpose. Of necessity, the ship's bridge, machinery,crew quarters, and boats were placed

28 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALA 1931 photograph, showing the light area marked out for the flight deck, and the circular installationcdjacent to the forward crane where an E III H catapult was installed in 1936.Anchored off Garden Island on 19 March 1932, dressed overall for the opening of the Sydney HarbourBridge. Three Supermarine Secgull III amphibians are ranged on deck.

FIRST OF THE LINE 29Photographs of the Seagull V using Albatross' catcpult have not been located, but this view of A2-1launched from the E III H catapult from the cruiser HMAS Canberra depicts the technique.beingaft. Plates and sections were despatched fromEngland to Australia, and the keel of Albatrosswas laid down at Cockatoo Island Dockyardon April 16, 1926.During the same month the six Seagull IIIamphibians, A9-1 to 6, arrived by ship inAustralia and were erected and tested at RAAFPoint Cook. On July 1 the Seagulls wereallotted to the newly formed No. 101 (FleetCo-operation) Flight and, a few months later.the flight moved to RAAF Richmond underthe command of Flight Lieuienant A. E.Hempel. The Fairey IIIDs still in serviceremained at Point Cook as seaplane trainers.While Albatross was under constructionfrom 1926 to 1928, No. 101 (Fleet Co-operation)Flight moved to Bowen, Queensland,where a coastal base was established for theSeagull Ills to work with the survey ship,HMAS Moresby, on the Great Barrier Reefproject until late 1928. Meanwhile, threeex-RAF Seagull Ills were acquired in 1927,and renumbered A9-7 to 9. Reporting theirarrival at Point Cook in January, Aircraftadded that "... it is still a little early to talkabout equipment for the aircraft carrier whichis now be'ng built at Cockatoo Dock. NSW."With the extra Seagulls in service, the RAAFextended survey flying to New Guinea in late1927.On Thursday. February 23, 1928 — the dayafter H. J. I.. (Bert) Hinkler. completed thefirst solo flight from England to Australia inAvro 581E^Avian, G-E^BOV — Australia'sfirst aircraft carrier was launched at CockatooIsland Dockyard by the Governor-General'swife. "I name this ship Albatross," declaredLady Stonehaven. "I am proud that she isthe result of Australian workmanship, and Icongratulate those who have so faithfully andskilfully constructed her. May she prove avaluable addition to the Royal Australian Navy..." The Sydney Mail reported that "Albatrossglided down the ways in stately fashionto the accompaniment of cheers by the largecrowd of spectators, and the strains of AdvanceAustralia Fair played by the Naval Band."During the speeches, the Chairman of theCommonwealth Shipping Board, Mr Larkin,observed that "one and all hoped that theseaplane carrier would have a peaceful life,and would never have to be used in warfare"

-(> DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL— a hope, unfortunately, that did not eventuate.The previous month, January 1428, Cabinetdecided not to approve authority for the continuationof the RAN FAA, thus negating thedecision made in 1925. It was decided, instead,that the RAAF would provide the aircraft,pilots, and maintenance personnel for the newcarrier, and the RAN the observers and telegraphists.Naval officers, however, could trainas pilots for RAAF service if circumstancespermitted — although this was also discontinuedin the 1930s. In the event the Navywas given operational control of embarkedRAAF aircraft, a system that remained inforce until 1944.Albatross, the twelfth ship of the name, wascompleted in December 1928. On her trials,during the same month, she exceeded therequired speed of 21 knots, and 22.5 knotswas attained with 12,910 hp. The ship's machinerycomprised Parsons geared turbines withtwo shafts, the designed horsepower being12,000, and four Yarrow boilers were installed.Dimensions included a length of 443^ ft., abeam of 60 ft., and a draught of 16J ft. Standarddisplacement was 4800 tons. Armamentcomprised four 4.7 inch anti-aircraft guns, andtwo 2 pdr pom-pom guns. The ship's complementnumbered 450. including six officers and24 other ranks from the RAAF.HMAS Albatross commissioned at Sydneyon January 23, 1929, under the command ofCaptain D. M. T. Bedford. RN. A month laterthe carrier positioned at Port Phillip whereaircraft stores, and personnel, of No. 1 1(Fleet Co-operation) Flight embarked on February21. On the 25th, six Seagull Ills werehoisted aboard at Geelong — and, more thanone RAAF officer heaved a sigh of relief tosee the folded-wing aircraft lowered throughthe 41 ft. x 20 ft. hatch and into the hangars,albeit the fit was close! By coincidence, theFairey HID (span 46 ft. \\{ in., length 37 ft..A Seagull III, engine running, is about to be lowered for takeoff from the sea.deck awaiting their turn.Note two other aircraft on

FIRST OF THE LINE 31A Seagull III, wheels being lowered, hoisted aboard Albatross in New Guinea waters.height 11 ft. 4 in.), and the Seagull III (span46 ft., length 37 ft., height 12 ft) possessedalmost the same dimensions, particularly whentheir wings were folded.No sooner had Albatross joined the Fleetthan she was called upon to assist in thesearch for Kingsford Smith's Southern Cross,G-AUSU, lost near Wyndham on March 31,1929. As the days slipped by with no tracebeing found of the Fokker F.Vllb-3m, theMinister for Defence, Sir William Glasgow,ordered HMAS Albatross, and her Seagulls,to proceed from Sydney with all possible speedto Wyndham. The entire crew of the carrierwas recalled from leave, and Albatross sailedon April 11 for her dash to the west. Shortlyafter her departure, however, Captain L. H.Holden in the DH61. Canberra, G-AUHW,located the Southern Cross on April 12, andAlbatross was ordered back to Sydney.Working up exercises for HMAS Albatrosswere carried out in Australian waters wherethe carrier, and her aircraft, operated as areconnaissance element for the new 10,01)0 toncruisers HMASs Australia and Canberra which,at that time, did not carry aircraft. In June1929, combined manoeuvres took place withthe Royal New Zealand Navy cruisers Duneclinand Diomede. Rear-Admiral E. Evans (laterAdmiral Lord Mountevans), commanding theAustralian Squadron, was most impressed withthe performance of Albatross, and her aircraft.So much so, that during the concluding sportsregatta at Hervey Bay, north of Brisbane, hegave permission for a special race for the Seagulls.The event was decided on a time basis,and the amphibians roared around the courseat low level in full view of the RAN andRNZN ships anchored in the bay. As Lieutenant-CommanderG. W. R. Nicholl, RN.remarked in his book, The SupermarineWalrus, "... it is difficult to imagine TheirLordships of the time approving a similar contestin the Royal Navy!"In .July and August Albatross made a viceregaltour of the New Guinea area with Lordand Lady Stonehaven. In addition to her Seagulls,Albatross embarked the Wackett WidgeonII for tropic trials. Meanwhile, the Chief

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL'st&f'&ZA civilian interloper temporarily carried aboard Albatross was Francis Chichester's DH Gipsy Moth secplcne,here seen being towed in Sydney Harbcur after being carried from Jervis Bay in June 1931.of the Air S'aff, Air Commodore R. Williams,had already initiated aetion to replace thewooden-hulled Seagull Ills in Albatross. "Iobtained the dimensions of the hangar and thecapacity of the crane — anything which affectedthe handling of aircraft in and out of the ship,"'recalls Sir Richard in his memoirs. "... withthe assistance of my Director of TechnicalServices, then Wing Commander H. C Harrison,we drew up a specification of the aircraftwe would need." The resultant specification- an air-cooled pusher engined boat amphibian,of metal construction, strengthened forcatapulting, fitted with folding wings, with provisionfor a crew of three, and of such dimensionsas to operate from Albatross — wassubmitted in 1929. This aircraft eventuallymaterialised as the RAAF's Supermarine Type236 Seagull V of 1433 and. later, the RAF'sand FAA's Walrus I of 1935, and woodenhulledWalrus IF of 1941.Meanwhile, in November 1929, Albatrosstook part in combined exercises with the RANand RAAF, in Port Phillip Bay. The SeagullIII crews opened the mock war with an earlymorning attack on their erstwhile friends atPoint Cook and Laverton. They then maintainedpatrols over the RAAF bases to alertthe tleet of retaliatory raids.In December. Squadron Feader V. R.Scriven, a RAF exchange officer, took overfrom Squadron Leader Hempel as No. 101(Fleet Co-operation) Flight's CommandingOfficer, and Senior Air Officer aboard Albatross.The flight comprised one squadronleader, one flight lieutenant and three flyingofficers, all of the General Duties branch. Thesefive pilots — Albatross carried a maximumof six Seagull Ills only, one of which was areserve aircraft — were allotted five navalofficers as observers. The RAAF also provideda Stores and Accounting branch flyingofficer, and 24 non-commissioned officers andairmen of eight trade musterings. In addition,six RAN telegraphist air-gunners were attachedto the flight.No. 101 (Fleet Co-operation) Flight reembarkedin Albatross during May, 1930,after spending a month at RAAF Richmond.The carrier then departed on a second exten-

FIRST OF THE LINE 33sive cruise to New Guinea and the MandatedTerritories. In August, Captain H. J. Feakes,RAN, assumed command of Albatross fromCaptain Bedford. I ate in 193d the carriervisited Adelaide, Port Lincoln, Port Pirie andWallaroo for the first time. The close of theyear also brought the first effects of the depression,and the RAN sea-going squadron wasreduced to Australia. Canberra, Albatross,and one "S" class destroyer.For the next two years, Albatross continuedto operate along much the same lines as shehad done during 1929-30; winter cruises to theNew Guinea area, spring cruises to southernstates, training exercises, and combined operations.In February 1931, Squadron LeaderJ. E. Hewitt took over command of No. 101(Fleet Co-operation) Flight from SquadronLeader Scriven, and Captain C. J. Pope, RAN,replaced Captain Feakes aboard Albatross inAugust 1931.The full impact of the depression hadreached Australia by 1933 and, on April 23,HMAS Albatross was paid off into the ReserveFleet. For the next five years the aircraftcarrier was either swinging at anchor in SydneyHarbor, or berthed at Garden Island. Ironically,the prototype Supermarine Seagull Vthe amphibian specially designed for Albatrossto Air Commodore Williams' specification —took to the air for the first time on June 21,1933, two months after Albatross was laid up.Early in 1936 an E III H catapult was fittedto Albatross at Garden Island, in anticipationof the carrier being recommissioned by thetime the first of the 24 Seagull Vs had arrivedin Australia. But, it was not to be. Apparently,catapult trials were carried out with a SeagullV in August 1936 — although the author hasyet to locate photographs of this historic event.Albatross remained in reserve until April I 1 '.1938, when she was accepted by the Admiraltyas part payment for the new cruiser, HMASHobart; as from 1936 all the RAN cruisers -Australia, Canberra, Sydney, Hobart and Perthwere equipped with their own Seagull V amphibian,thus negating the requirement for Albatross.Flying her paying-off pennant. HMASAlbatross sailed from Sydney under the commandof Captain H. G. D. Acland, RN, onJuly 11, 1938. As she proceeded down theharbor, the carrier was farewelled by a formationof Seagull V amphibians of the No. 5(Fleet Co-operation) Squadron, commandedby Squadron Leader C B. Wincott. RAF,from RAAF Richmond - this squadron was• ll^a- 1%- ...THE BEGINNING the launching at Cockatoo Island Dcckyard, Sydney on 23 February 1928

34 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALformed from the No. 101 (Fleet Co-operation)Might on April 20, 1936, and it was subsequentlyrenumbered No. 9 (Fleet Co-operation)Squadron on January 1, 1939.Although Albatross severed connections withthe RAN in 1938, her subsequent history isfull of interest. On October 6, 1938, the carrierwas commissioned in the RN as HMS Albatrossfor trials at Devonport, and was thenplaced in reserve on November 30, 1938. HMSAlbatross recommissioned on August 25. 1939—due to shortages she had no catapult installed—and embarked No. 710 Squadron, FAA,comprising six Supermarine Walrus 1 amphibians.She then sailed for war service in theSouth Atlantic, West Africa, and Madagascarareas. In 1940 a catapult was reinstalled, andin 1941-42 Albatross underwent a refit inAmerica. In 1943 the carrier returned toEngland, was paid off, and the catapult wasagain removed. In 1944 HMS Albatrossjoined the Home Fleet as a repair ship, andtook part in the Allied invasion of Normandy.On August 11, Albatross was hit by a torpedooff Courseulles and casualties exceeded 100,including 50 killed. Fhe ship also destroyeda Junkers Ju. 88, and two shore batteries.HMS Albatross joined the Reserve Fleet inJanuary 1945 at Portsmouth, and later Falmouth.In 1946 Albatross was sold to a Britishcompany which planned to convert her into apassenger luxury cruiser. When conversioncosts became too high, it was decided to useAlbatross as an off-shore floating cabaret atTorquay on the Devonshire coast. The shipwas saved this fate when it was bought by theGreek-British Yannoulatos Group of shipownerson the day Prince Charles was bornand, in whose honour, she was renamed HellenicPrince. She was then converted to apassenger vessel and, in 1949, was charteredby the International Refugee Organisation.Carrying 1000 displaced persons, the shipreturned to Sydney on December 5, 1949,where she had first taken the water some 21years previously in 1928. Hellenic Prince wasfinallv scrapped at Hons>komi on Ausiust 12,1954.Although the genesis of naval air power inAustralia is closely associated with the RAN'sfirst aircraft carrier, the warship was almostforgotten by the nation she served. That is.until August 31, 1948, when the Naval AirStation at Nowra, NSW, was commissionedas HMAS Albatross. RANAS Nowra is theshore support base for the RAN FAA, and itis most appropriate that the station perpetuatesthe name HMAS Albatross — the first of theline.IjtAND THE END. SS Hellenic Prince lex HMS Albatross, ex HMAS Albatrossibeing broken up in Hong Kong in 1954.before

FolklopDavid LanceKeeper of the Department of Sound Records,Imperial War Museum, LondonReprinted from RUSI, Journal of the RoyalUnited Services Institute of Defence Studies.with permission.THE popular image of flying is stronglythat of a life-style as opposed merely tothat of an occupation. The distinguishingfeature between these two concepts is that,with the former, greater significance is attributedto altitudes, traditions, style and continuity,than to the objective functions anddiscipline of a particular field of activity. Inmany cases the popular image is a notoriouslyunreliable measure. Perhaps the best test ofits authenticity is the extent of coincidencebetween the popular view and the professionalone, and the degree of correlation between theimage of the activity and the history whichprecedes it.In the case of aviation, and the somewhatnebulous criteria of a life style, the history,the professional view and the popular imageof the activity overlap to a considerable extent.In its evolution this image has been influencedmore by the early history of flying than by itscontemporary development. It has also beensignificantly conditioned by what peopleremember and by the way they have communicatedtheir experiences. There is in fact adeveloped and deeply ingrained folklore whichhas fundamentally conditioned contemporaryattitudes to flying and, more particularly, tothe flier.Although historical facts are an importantaspect in its development, folklore dependseven more on beliefs and these often grow outof events or experiences which may not havebeen written down and attitudes which haveof AviafeioRnot otherwise been recorded. This process, forall its informality, creates traditions which arequite as influential as the recorded historicalfacts. Thus it is that the folklore of aviation,in some areas, has influenced our appreciationof it quite as much as the written historicalrecords have done.The folklore of aviation has its roots partlyin historical circumstances. From the time theWright brothers accomplished the first freeflight in a power driven heavier-than-airmachine only 11 years passed before the firstgenerations of their primitive aircraft werecatapulted into the largest and most technologicalwar the world had ever known. Themanner in which these machines came intoprominence: the speed with which they developed;and the quality of their activities combinedto make a singular impact on a popularconsciousness which had yet to be conditionedor sated by many comparable developments.In the early part of the 20th century flyingattracted the individualist, the eccentric, sometimesthe irresponsible and frequently the outspoken.These pioneers themselves establishedthe aviator's image, partly by their idiosyncraticbehaviour and partly by their own accountsof it. Since many of their activities were bytheir nature individual and unwitnessed it wasunavoidab'e that this image, to a very greatextent, should be self-created. It derivedthough from some tangible factors.The character of the pre-war pioneers andthe quality of their machines still colour manyof our present attitudes to flying. The imageof proceeding "on a wing and a prayer", forexamp'c, is historically well founded. It wasborn of two picturesque uncertainties. Wouldi he machine fly and, if it would, could thepilot? As far as the machine was concernedthe manufacturer could have little certainty

36 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALand no insurance. He built one aircraft andthis served as the prototype, test machine andproduction model. It was therefore with wryhumour that an early monoplane of Handle)Page design was nicknamed "the Yellow Peril".The pilots were as ill-prepared for taking tothe air as their machines. The apotheosis oftheir careless spirit may have been EdwardPetre, whose first flight risked not only hisquite replaceable life — for there were numerouswilling substitutes — but also Handle)Page's irreplaceable machine.Edward got up and he got in . . . this"Yellow Peril" and all of a sudden he wastrying the controls. He was working theempennage and working the rudder. All ofa sudden he opened up the engine full. The(machine) nearly went over the chocks and(1) shouted out "What arc you up toEdward? What the devil are you up to there?Come you out! Come you! . . . But Edwarddidn't take no notice. He simply openedup and revved up and he went over thechocks and away it went. He ran abouttwo hundred yards and he was in the air.Edward was in the air . . . and he flew thatmachine as an experienced man. He turnedit round and climbed (and) away he went. . . Next thing we heard that he'd landedin Brooklands . . . and when he landed hewas interviewed by an official in Brooklandsaerodrome. And he got severely reprimanded.And they was going to chargehim with flying a machine without a licence,because he had no licence and that was hisfirst time in the air. 1The men who built and flew the early flyingmachines are acknowledged visionaries, but toa great extent the challenge which motivatedthem was more immediate, deeply personaland often qui'e frivolous. In some respectsthey were the "ton-up kids" of their generationand many of their exploits reflect thischaracter. This feature of flying was widelydemonstrated before the war at many publicflying displays. These gatherings, which gavea tenuous source of income to the manufacturers,provided the pilots — who were theperformers — with a circus in which to disp'aytheir tricks.The main feature as far as I can recall wasthis racing round the pylons . . . the pilotswould take off and they would have to doso many circuits. And of course there washandicapping went on. The slower machineswent off first and they would tear roundthese (pylons). Mind you, they used to flyvery close to the ground. The best pilotswould fly with their wing tip three feet fromthe ground and three feet from the pylonsas they went round the corner on prett>steep banks. And this of course made veryspectacular flying, especially as . . . thepilots were sitting out in the open mostly.You could almost see the expression on hisface and you would see him peering overhis shoulder to see where the next fellowwas and then they'd dodge over the manin boot When they overtook . . . theydidn't dare go underneath — because theywere too low — but over the top was theusual thing. You would get behind the chap,try and get at his blind spot, climb upbehind him and then dive down in front ofhim. Erighten the daylight out of him sothat he swung out of the circuit . . . andyou took his place. That seemed to be thedrill . . . And of course the more spectacularthey could make it the bigger the draw.-This tendency to self-exhibition was notconfined to the civilian pilots. It was quite asevident when, from 1914, flying began to bemore hurriedly adapted to the needs of war.Even the discipline and constraints of militarylife did little to blunt the identifiable exhibitionismof the aviator.An aeroplane pilot decided to do a spectacularstunt and, seeing both doors of oneof our big airship hangars wide open, flewhis aeroplane right through the hangar . . .This was a source of envy to another pilotwho had, in fact, a bit of a chip on hisshoulder and thought he would improve hisprestige if he did the same . . . Well, heseeing that the hangar door was open atone end and that the mechanics were openingthe door at the other end ... he thoughthis opportunity had arisen to do this. Whathe didn't know was that the . . . end doorsbeing opened were only being opened justwide enough to get one aeroplane out ofstorage and would then be closed up again.And while he was circling around this happened.So when he got himself into his dive

to go slap through the hangar and was wellbetween the windscreens and low down ata height to go through the doors . . . hesaw to his horror that the far end was closed.And so this made him instantly decide thathe couldn't escape in any way except bythrowing himself at all the stored planes,which he did. They acted as a pleasantshock absorber for him and, when he hadcrushed most of them against the fire doorsof the hangar and wrecked a lot of them.he climbed out. quite uninjured but somewhatshaken, with his prestige not greatlyimproved.•'FOLKLORE OF AVIATIONThe identity of spirit which characterisedcivilian, military and naval aviation was hardlysurprising under the contemporary circumstances.Flying was the enthusiasm of a smalland closely knit community. The great expansionof the military and naval air services, andthe rapid technological developments whichfollowed the outbreak of war, were firmlybased on the civilian pioneering work whichpreceded it. Most of the original war planes,for example, were of civilian construction andhad not been designed to military specifications.Similarly, the main civilian flying centres.such as Eastchurch, Hendon and Brooklands,provided the only ready-made additional airfieldsto accommodate the expansion of militaryflying and training that took place. Aboveall else though, it was the aviators themselveswho ensured that flying, whether in a civilianor military context, retained the same fundamentalethos. For the pre-war cavaliers offlying provided an important corpus of experienceboth in the Royal Flying Corps and theRoyal Naval Air Service after war broke out.With the civilian flying schools also openingtheir doors more widely to an influx of regularr(Australian War Memorial)"Flying was the enthusiasm of a small and closely knit community." A Bristol Boxkite atPt. Cook, Vic.and volunteer servicemen, military and navaltraining as well as the operational squadronscame under the strong influence of the civilianpioneers.The result was an intrusion of a mostunmilitary influence which would have beendifficult enough for the traditional arms of thetwo services to absorb. On the air branchesof the Navy and Army, which had been createdbut two years earlier, the effect of this influencewas dramatic and in some ways permanent.The traditions already developing

38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALbefore the war were transferred directly intothe embryo air service where they matured inmuch the same character as they had firstbeen formed.Perhaps the main reason for this continuityof spirit was that after war broke out flyingcontinued to attract the same kind of people.Moreover, from 1914 the military and navalair services increasingly offered a great manymore flying enthusiasts opportunities whichpreviously had been confined mainly to thosewho had the money to indulge this expensiveappetite. The sense of patriotism whichimpelled young men to rush to volunteer forthe other arms of the services, was no lesslively in candidates for the Royal Flying Corpsand the Royal Naval Air Service. But therewas for them an additional incentive. Theywanted to fly.I was always very interested in flying rightback from about 1912 when I used to go toHendon to watch the flying which was goingon there. 1 was also interested in Ballooningbecause I was born within sight of theAlexandra Palace where regular balloontlignts used to take place at Bank Holidaysand other occasions. Another reason wasthat I had a brother who was in theAdmiralty — he was several years olderthan 1 was. He was called ur> and he wentinto the airship service for a time. So I wasinterested both in the naval side of aviationand to some extent in airships. So really 1think both those circumstances induced meto try to get into the Naval Air Service.My real reason in fact was that I wantedto fly.'With a wave of eager volunteers available,the two air services were able to be highlyselective in those they chose and the standardof their personnel therefore became extremelyhigh. This selectivity reinforced the aviator'snatural predilection to regard themselves ascorps d'clite.The first thing 1 did was to go and reportat the War Office . . . only to get a coldbucket thrown over me by being told thatthe Royal Flying Corps was a very exclusiveCorps; that it had frightfully hand pickedpeople in it; and the only people who couldget into the Royal Flying Corps were peoplewho were seconded from the resular regimentsand, not only that, from the betterclass of regular regiments. And so that wasthat."'Thus it was that both the RFC and the RNAScame to develop very early a special sense oftradition and exclusiveness. Such feelings werenot confined to the aviators alone. They pervadedthe two air services at all their levelsand in all their activities.Everyone who joined in the Royal FlyingCorps held some trade or other. The men inthe general regiments . . . might be anyone.But all us recruits in the RFC had somekind of training or apprenticeships . . . andtherefore we did consider ourselves a bitsuperior to the others . . . There was awonderful spirit of comradeship but at thesame time we did feel ourselves superiorto the infantry and the cavalry who mayhave come from any walks of life."Other traits which characterised pre-warcivilian flying were also readily detectable inthe military and naval air services. In the areaof training, for example, the essential individualismof flying stood out. The main reasonfor this was that aviation was still a pioneeringfield. Competence and experience in theperiod from 1914 to 1918 were very relativethings and the instructors frequently had littlemore of either than their students. Both werestill pioneers and as a result it was practicalUimpossible to formalise flying training to anygreat extent. The level to which instructioncould extend was very quickly reached, owingto the limitations of the aircraft as well as theinstructors, and beyond this level the aspirantaviators were on their own.You couldn't say there was such a thing asformal instruction at all . . . You were justfeeling your way by trial and error — witha good deal of trial and as little error as youcould manage. There were always one ortwo senior people . . . who perhaps (would)come up with you on your first flight. He'dcome as a passenger just to make sure youcould land the thing on the water, andwatch you from the shore (for) your firstflight or two and see if you made any howlingblunders and mention it to you. Butafter that it was more or less a case of —rather like when you're young being chuckedinto the deep end and knowing you've damn

FOLKLORE OF AVIATION 39well got to swim. We just trained ourselveson the kind of basis of mutual self help. 7As flying skills could not be taught to anysophisticated degree, pilots had necessarily tolearn from their own experience. This processinevitably had many catastrophes and thesecontributed substantially to an image of flyingwhich the aviators did little to discouragewhen recounting them.I thought I'll do something that nobodyelse has ever done. I will loop off the ground. . . Now my aircraft went to its maximumspeed level at about 70 miles per hour. ButI thought now, if I hold it down just overthe top of the grass until I'm going flat out,I can then go in a very big loop, pull it upand when I get to the top, pull the joystickinto my tummy, whip the tail over and thengravity plus the engine will pull me round.And I will be the first man in the world toloop (off the ground). That morning I wentoff and tried this . . . There were somesheep which were grazing on the far endof the grass airfield. There was a bean fieldwhich just came in at the corner (of theairfield); the beans were about two feet high.And this Bristol Bullet ... I pulled up ontop of the loop, I flipped in and I realisedthen that I hadn't enough room. There(was) nothing else to do about it. But I sawthe sheep and to my astonishment they allstarted to run out, star fashion, away fromme. That I'm certain saved my life becauseI was so interested in the sheep that I didn'tstiffen myself up when the crash came. Iwent straight into the deck . . . : I shotright through the front of the aircraft; mybelt broke; I was knocked out but my legshad shot through this rotary engine . . .Had that thing turned another quarter of aturn I would have lost both my legs. Asit was I finished up with the engine betweenm'crutch . . . And the only thing one couldsee of the aeroplane above the bean fieldwas the very tip of the rudder. The groundwas hard and not one bit (of the aeroplane)had sunk more than a few inches into theearth. It was flattened like a pancake. MyCO seeing this . . . strolled slowly acrossto the crash and when he got there he foundme singing . . . the latest song of the timewhich was"Sprinkle me with kisses,A lot of loving kissesIf you want my love to grow". 8With flying still at an essentially experimentalphrase this process of trial and errorwas quite unavoidable. It was moreover aprocess which was greatly accelerated by theneeds of war. For, in the application of bothpilots and aircraft to military purposes, taskswere set which were altogether more complexthan those which the pre-war aviators had setfor themselves. Often the goals were quitebeyond the capability of contemporary technology,and it was mainly for this reason thatthe impact of air power on the war effort wasrelatively slight. But there were successeswhich demonstrated and reinforced the imageof the aviator as an individualist, stretchinghimself and his machine to the limits.An aeroplane throws out a slipstream fromits propellers — and we need to come upbehind feeling the slipstream on our topwing, which just shook the Camel a littlebit, and then you knew you were just underneaththe slip-stream. Well if you were justin that point and you were coming up straightbehind him he couldn't shoot at you becausehe had no gun actually in his tail; his backgun was from underneath the fuselage whichmeant he had to shoot down at a slightangle. He couldn't shoot straight behind.So that gave you a very narrow angle, whichgot narrower as you got in, that you wereimmune from being hit. And if you couldcontrol yourself enough to get up little bitby little bit by little bit, he couldn't hit youand probably didn't know you were therebecause he couldn't see you either. Andthen you opened fire . . . (from) abouttwenty five yards if you had enough nerveto get in as near as that; and the successfulones did. If you shot, from further awayyou'd probably miss . . . The whole secretof the thing was to have the patience to getin close after you'd been lucky enough tofind your Hun.''More often the initiative of the pilots indeveloping their skills and their machines wasless spectacular than this. Given that theiraircraft and equipment were inadequate formany of the roles they were expected to carryout, the military and naval aviators showed a

40 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALremarkable and sometimes bizarre genius forinvention by making appropriate modificationsthemselves in the field.1 don't remember any machine coming outfitted with bomb racks. They used to sendbomb racks out. On my small machine 1took on four twenty pound bombs. I fitteda bomb rack just behind the engine under thefuselage. No bomb sights or anything likethat. There was a hole in the floor of thefuselage, and I used to squint down throughthat and when I could see the target I letihe bombs go and sometimes I pulled themachine up too much and the bombsbounced off my axle. But it didn't seemto do any damage.There was a Serbian Pilot attached to theFrench flight. He was an absolute fanaticagainst the Bulgarians, he loathed them.And he used to borrow bombs from me andhis bomb rack, I suppose, only took fouror possibly, he had one under each wing;he probably took six bombs. But that wasn'tenough for him. He'd cut out the passengerseat and used to stack the inside of hisnacelle with bombs — incidentally, this wasa Maurice Farman Shorthorn — and hewould take up a walking stick with a crookedhandle and when he'd dropped the bombsoff his wings he would then take the walkingstick and hook my bombs alongside him,he'd pick it up — they were only smallbombs —and he'd spin the safety fan offand then throw the bomb overboard. 1 "Despite their many technical deficiencies animportant part of the image of flying must beattributed to the character of the early aircraftand the impact which they made on their pilots.The relationship between men and machineswas personal to a degree that is difficult tograsp by those who were not actively involvedin this era of flying, in this relationship thecycle of cause and effect is difficult to analyse.Certainly many of the early aviators wereunashamed romantics and the tendency topersonalize the machines which made theiradventures possible came quite naturally tothem. But equally clearly the aircraft hadintrinsic qualities which stimulated emotivereactions to them at least as much as scientificcuriosity about speed, range, rate of climb andother factors of performance.To me it was at once my favourite aeroplaneand it remained the whole time. It was anabsolute beauty. She really was, of course,a glider with an engine in it, but she hadno bad manners; unlike the Camel (which)for some reason or other the torque of theengine twisted . . . and she'd always turnto the right more under control than to theleft. If you turned to the left you had towatch that you didn't get into steeper turnthan you wanted, and so on. The (Sopwith)Triplane was in every atom of her controlsmooth: but of course you realised that youmustn't play any tricks with her because.I think I'm right, the safety factor was onlythree and a half. There was only one setof flying wires for instance and they didn'teven connect with the middle plane and . . .when I was diving very hard . . . the strainon the centre section, you could almost seea curve on it. Allowing for that, and whynot, allow for the fact that she was by nomeans as strong as for instance the SE5,you could sit back and enjoy flying her.She was so delightful ... 1 remember oneshocking occasion, when it was very hotand there was a ground haze which climbNup with you the whole time . . . and thehorizon is always level with you. 1 wascoming home from a very high patrol whichwe'd broken off really high up — somethingabout seventeen or eighteen thousand (feet)— and then the trouble was to put this oldSopwith Triplane down to the ground. Youcould always spin in; for instance in aNieuport — you spun down. But never,never, never with a Triplane . . . Andbelieve it or not I went to sleep. Onlymomentarily ... To my horror I suddenlyrealised I couldn't recognise the groundbelow me. Really the culprit was themanner of the Triplane. She was so beautiful... I was really heartbroken at leaving myTriplane. And I only flew once (more),nostalgically, at Eastchurch 1 went up inone. But she was still the most gloriousthing to fly. 11As the aircraft themselves came to acquiremore than a mechanical identity, so many ofthe men who flew them came to assume almostlarger than life proportions. The military andnaval branches of the armed services havetheir heroes, but in neither of them is there

FOLKLORE OF AVIATION 41(Courtesy Defence Public Relation',)A Scpwith Pup at Point Cook. The type of aircraft in which James McCudden, VC, demonstratedhis flying ability.anything quite comparable to the concept ofthe air ace. Such men, though usually of juniorrank, captured and retained the public imaginationand have remained almost as well knownoutside the air services as within them. Thequalities and activities which established thereputations of these aces of the air are wellillustrated by one contemporary pilot's recollectionsof James McCudden, VC.He was a brilliant pilot; absolutely outstanding.I had enormous admiration for hisflying ability and I've seen him do the mosthair-rasing stunts around the aerodromewhen he was demonstrating what a Pupcould do. His favourite one was to loopdirectly off the ground when he was takingoff and continue looping. On one occasionhe looped thirteen times from take off. Juststraight off the ground and when he's finishedhe was about 500 feet high. It was a wonderfulpiece of flying. And then he used to flyupside down. He'd go up to about athousand feet, turn the machine upsidedown; just go around the aerodrome upsidedown till the engine stopped. Then he's goon gliding and next thing he'd roll it out andgel the engine going again, awaj he'd goand, oh, he was absolutely marvellous; therewasn't a thing he couldn't do with thatmachine. And we all admired him tremendously.He was at Dover at the time of one ofthe Gotha raids on London. When the readinesswent he went off; he went almost mad.Rushing around. His Vickers gun was notloaded; the belt wasn't loaded. But he hada Lewis gun on the top plane which he usedto Are and he dashed around, grabbingmagazines of ammunition — all he couldget from various mechanics and stuck thesearound the wire in his cockpit and awayhe went. We heard that he'd tackled theGotha formation before it reached Londonand he'd dived in amongst them and managedto separate some of the machines andhelp to break up the formation. He thenran out of ammunition, but continued todive in amongst the formation further dispersingthem. A most outstanding and bravedeed for any man. 12A powerful reason why the aviators of WorldWar I established for themselves a uniquereputation, was because their exploits in theair so greatly contrasted with the war on the

42 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALground. The numbers of foot soldiers weremeasured in millions, while the airmen wereby comparison a mere handful; the battles onthe ground were massive impersonal confrontations,while those in the air were fought byidentifiable individuals; battlefield casualtieswere so enormous that they became anonymouslists of statistics, while air losses were of acontrastingly conceivable order. In a way thewar in the air was a different war, allowingas it did scope for humour, chivalry and humanreactions which had not been crushed b\mechanised, mass human slaughter.One of our gallant officers who was flyingan FE2b flew over on the 1st April, over aGerman aerodrome, and over it he droppeda football. He just dropped it over andhared back to our lines. One can imaginethe terrible sight of this slow moving "bomb"coming down from about 5,000 feet, landingon the aerodrome, all the Boche runningfor cover, waiting for the explosion and thencomes the big bounce. When they pickedthe ball up on the football was printed Aprilthe 1st.There was a sort of code, I think, merelybetween flying people — whether they wereGerman or British. There was a great comradeship,if you can call it, between them.I had a flight commander who was namedMaxwell Pike and he went up and was shotdown in flames and that was the end ofMaxwell Pike. But two days afterwards aGerman aeroplane came over, dropped amessage bag and told us that "The gallantCaptain Pike was shot down in mortalcombat and has been buried behind ourlines with full military honours". That isthe sort of esprit d'aviator I suppose you'dsay. That spirit it held on, I think, to thevery end. 13Flying developed enormously in the fourhectic years of activity stimulated by WorldWar I. At the end of this period it was inmany ways no longer recognisable as the prewarhaven of a small group of eccentric sportsmen.Only four years had elapsed since theRoyal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval AirService could together muster only a little overa hundred operational machines at the outbreakof war. Yet by 1918 the two air serviceshad grown sufficiently to be constituted, asthe Royal Air Force, a new and independentservice with a strength of 22,647 aircraft and293,532 officers and men. But while a greatdeal had changed in terms of material andmanpower the essential character of flyingremained little altered. Thus it was that newgenerations of aviators remained in spirit motivatedby much the same impulse which was,for one pre-war pilot, crystallised in SamuelCody's injunction—Warp the wings. Warp the wings. Imitatethe birds, my boy, imitate the birds. 14Most of the characteristics and traditionsof the aviator which have been described inthis article are well known, even to those withno historical interest in flying. They are simphgeneral knowledge. But it is not so much inthe technical advances of aviation, its organisation,scale and rate of development that wecan find the origins of this image of flying. Itcan be traced more through the personalreactions of individuals to the kind of events,which have been described above, from whichthe traditions have grown. It is due to thefact that their reactions were so deeply andstrongly personal that they have been sustainedin what I describe as the folklore of aviation, yThe author wishes to thank the contributorsto the Imperial War Museum's aviation recordingproject, listed below, who have been quotedin this article.NOTES1C. G. E. Tye Esq. (RNAS) 1WM Reference00031004 02.» E. J. Furlong Esq. (RFC) IWM Reference000015,08,02.• Air Marshal Sir Victor Goddard. KCB. CBE.MA (RNAS) IWM Reference 000303 16 14.' F. W. Verry (RNAS) IWM Reference 00031107 01.« C. J. Chabot Esq. (RFC) IWM Reference 00000814,01.'• C. R. King Esq. (RFC) IWM Reference 00002711 02.' G. Donald Esq. (RNAS) IWM Reference 00001811 04.» Wing Commander F. J. Powell. OBE. MC (RFC)IWM Reference 000086 08 04.• A. B. Yuille Esq.. DFC (RFC) IWM Reference000320 04 03.w F. D. H. Bremner (RNAS) IWM 000004 09 04and 06.« Sir Herbert Thompson. CIE (RNAS) IWM Reference000308 06/01.w J. C. F. Hopkins (RFC) IWM Reference 00002106 06.u Wing Commander F. J. Powell. OBE. MC (RFC)IWM Reference 000086 08 00.M G. Donald Esq. (RNAS) IWM Reference 000018iroi.

AUDIO VISUALMajor Adrian Sandery,BA, BEd. DipT. MACEAdelaide University RemittentFOUR years ago, for a period of just overthree years, T led a production team atArmy Headquarters. 1 This team was knownas the audio visual section and had a responsibilityto produce audio visual sequences forthe army. An audio visual sequence is a setof 35 mm slides with a synchronised taperecorded commentary.- The Audio VisualSection was designed to be a central productionagency which could use the expertise andresources already available in that section ofthe Directorate of Military Training (as it wasthen known) in which it was located. It functionedby receiving requests for sequences fromvarious army sources and then producingsequences sponsored by the appropriate directorateor army school. It was, 1 think, a successfulprogramme, and as far as I know, itis still operating.There is a need in military instruction forinstructors to be able to prepare one-of-a-kind,simple sequences for themselves, as well as thecontinuing need for a central facility to handlethe more complex and the more technicallydifficult sequences and also those sequenceswith wide appeal which can be duplicated inlarge numbers and distributed widely (e.g. mapMajor Sandery is an instructor at CSTU, 4 TrainingGroup, Adelaide. He is a lecturer in education atthe Torrens College of Advanced Education.reading). This first need could be met byallowing instructors access to two relativelycheap pieces of equipment, in addition to thecurrently available automatic slide projectors(e.g. Hanimex or Pu.ximet). These two piecesof equipment are a camera kit (e.g. the KodakVisual Maker) and a Synchronised CassetteRecorder (e.g. the Hanimex Synchro-recorder).The effectiveness and versatility provided forunit instructors by these two pieces of equipment,can be demonstrated by outlining theproduction of an audio visual sequence.Two main types of sequences may be produced.Firstly, a sequence using the principlesof programmed learning, in which the sequenceis construe ed so that the material to be taughtis broken down into easily assimilable parts:the parts are arranged in order of progression;provision for students' responses is made aftereach stage of learning: and immediatereinforcement is given for correct responses.Secondly, a sequence which is in the form ofan illustrated lecture, or visuals with commentaryadded, may be produced. These two typesof sequences may be presented in many differentways. Some of these ways are:• to stand up and talk using display boards,chalk boards, pictures or charts° overhead projector transparencies synchronisedwith a reel to reel tape recording• a film strip and microgroove disc recordingto be used in a machine such as theDukane; any of the different moving films

44 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALnow available — 70 mm. 35 mm, 16 mm.super 8 mm and 8 mm• a microfiche reader synchronised with acassette recording• a live television presentation of a videotapedreproduction: and a radio presentationintegrated with notes and/or picturesand diagrams.The method of expression that I am advocatingfor instructors is an automatic slide projectorsynchronised with a cassette synchrorecorder.This method of expression utilisesonly two pieces of equipment. At present threepieces of equipment are required as the synchroniseris a separate item not included inthe tape recorder/reproducer.Audio visual sequences are already wellknown in the army. Apart from those preparedand distributed centrally, there are quitea few sequences available commercially. 1 ' Packagedeals for new equipment often includetraining aids such as films and manuals andincreasingly audio visual sequences.There are ten steps in the production of asequence. They are Definition, Analysis, StoryBoard, Art Work, Photography, RecordingPreview, Testing, Review and Instructors'Notes. These steps are not meant to be definitiveor prescriptive. This is only one methodof production,' as a glance at any of the standardtexts on programmed learning or individualizinginstruction will show."'The first step is definition. The target audiencemust be clearly defined. It makes a differenceif the audience consists of seniorofficers or seventeen-year-old recruits. Thesubject matter to be covered in the sequencemust also be clearly defined. In a linear programmethis would take the form of a studentperformance objective, but for a slide tapepresentation it could be a more general aim.After definition, an examination of howclosely the material relates to the job must bemade. This is the second step in which ananalysis is made of the material which is tobe presented, but if the aim or objective hasbeen properly specified and clearly enunciatedmuch of the analysis will have been done. Itonly remains to ensure that the instructionwill be relevant to subsequent job performancerequirements. Remember, material whichinvolves movement may be best covered by afilm or videotape.The third step is to make a story board.This involves three things — writing the script,planning the visuals and relating the audio tothe visual. Story boards may be formulatedin several different ways. One way is to usesmall sheets of paper with words and visualsoutlined. Kodak recommend the use of planningcards and television producers use preparedoutline sheets. These formulations maybe converted to or supplemented by a typedscript. This should be clear and concise. Asno visual should be projected for more than30 seconds, unless it is highly detailed andrequires a longer description, the script shouldbe broken into short sequences of up to 25seconds. The vocabulary used should beselected carefully. Technical terms with whichthe students may not be familiar should bedefined and the language should be kept simpleand the sentences short. To provide activestudent participation, students should be askedto answer questions or perform activities asoften as possible. When recording, time mustbe allowed for these activities to be carried out.The next step is to prepare the art work.Production of well planned visuals does notrequire an illustrator. There are many readilyavailable items to assist the non-artist to produceattractive useful visuals, such as pictures,charts and diagrams. Careful chalkboard workcan produce a good visual. There are manydifferentways of producing a very high standardof lettering such as the use of letteringguides or letraset.The fifth step is photography. At this stageboth prepared art work and direct photographyof equipment or personalities, inside or outsideis carried out. If possible the entiresequence should be photographed in one photographicsession. Using the Kodak visual makerkit it is possible to photograph prepared artwork, pictures from books and even photographs.Using the copy stand it is possible tophotograph vertically or in three dimensionsas well as the normal horizontal format. Thecamera can be detached from the copy standfor normal photography outside or inside usingflash cubes. It is a very simple camera tooperate and does not require a trained photographer.The copy stands are included in thekit. The normal type of film used in thecamera is a colour transparency film whichcan be sent away for processing in a prepaid

THE AUDIO VISUAL SEQUENCE 43mailer. This is another advantage as theinstructor receives his slides back, in colour,already mounted and ready for use, withouthaving to use the unit darkroom. The cost ofa kit is around $100 which is far less than acopy stand attachment for an inservice camerawhich also requires a trained photographer tooperate it.Recording is the sixth step and should notbe attempted until after photography has beencompleted. The commentator should have aclear, fairly high pitched voice without a strongaccent or any other speech peculiarity. It neednot be recorded by a professional. Americanresearch indicates that for an instructionalsequence, commentary added using the voiceof a person that the trainee would normallyexpect to hear in that situation does not addto or detract from the effectiveness of thesequence (e.g. Drill-RSM or Current Affairs-Education Officer). Reading the script shouldbe well rehearsed before recording and afterI), I k I .tmh, it 1„r>, „, ( ItThe Author at work using the Kodak Visual Makerto turn pasted up art work into slides.recording the tape should be played backwhilst the slides are projected to see if theymesh together. Several false starts can beexpected. Background music and sound effectsenhance the sequence. They can be recordedsimultaneously or dubbed in later. Except innovelty or special effect recording, the backgroundmusic should simply support the pictures.The best background is the one whichgoes unnoticed during the presentation. Aninstructor can record his commentary usingthe microphone supplied with the synchrorecorder and background music can berecorded simultaneously by using a secondtape recorder to play suitable music in thebackground.One way to synchronise audio and visual isto use a cassette recorder with an in-builtsynchroniser. The smaller cassette recordersin general have advantages of size, weight andsophistication over the present 4-track reel toreel machines and the cassettes themselves areeasier to use and store than reels. The builtin sychroniser eliminates the need for anotherpiece of equipment and simplifies the settingup of a synchronised slide sequence. Thesynchro-recorder is connected to an automaticslide projector via the remote control outletand pulsing can be effected by pressing abutton on the cassette recorder. In the playbackoperation slide changes are effected literallyby an electronic thumb from the soundtape via the synchroniser and the remote controllead.When the audio and visual parts of thesequence are completed, they should be previewedby the writer and by any other peoplewith expertise in the subject matter. Anyerrors or weaknesses should be corrected. Thisis the seventh step. The eighth step is testing.The sequence should be tested on the type ofstudent for whom it was prepared. Tests shouldbe made carefully and objectively to locateany weaknesses in the sequence and to ensurethat the sequence does achieve the objectiveslaid down in the definition stage. Testingshould also include an analysis of the questionsset in the sequence and a final test of thecontent of the sequence.The ninth step is review. The results of thetesting will probably indicate the need forchanges. Be prepared to make extensive altera-

46 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL(Derek Lambert, Torrens CAE)Paximet 35 mm Automatic Slide Projector fitted with zoom lens, connected to aHanimex Synchrorecorder projecting into a Hanimex Portable Daylight Screen.tions if these are indicated. It may even benecessary to go back and redefine the sequence.The preparation of instructors' notes is thetenth and final step. As the author will probablynot be the only user, instructors' notesmust be provided with each sequence. Thesenotes should contain the following information— title, aim or objectives, duration, knowledgewhich the students are required to have beforethe sequence is shown and preparation requiredof the instructor. This includes the provisionof stores and perhaps the preparation of problemsto be used in the sequence. Any followup activities should also be included.Existing stocks of film strips, or film stripspurchased commercially, may be converted toaudio visual sequences by cutting and mountingin slide mounts.' 1 Commentaries, eitherexisting or formulated can be added. Anotherimportant source of very useful slides is thepersonal slide collections of individual soldiers,and many soldiers are prepared to loan theseslides for instructional use. They can be incorporatedin'o an instructors sequence and maysave valuable preparation time.In conclusion it may be noted that audiovisual sequences are a very effective methodof varying instructional presentations. OneAmerican researcher states that in certaininstances automated instruction has accomplishedthe following:• raised student end-of-course proficiency.• provided instructors with an effectivemeans of dealing with individual differences,cimposed the attitudes of students towardslearning the subject matter.• made significant changes in the instructors'job,• in general reduced the time required totrain a student to a satisfactory level ofperformance.Q1NOTESArmy Journal No. 258. November 1970. CaptainA. Sandery — "Education or Training: Is that thequestion?"- RAAEC Newsletter. Vol. 13. No. 3, December1969. "The Audio Visual Sequence" — CaptainA. Sandery.'•'• McGraw Hill Australian Trade Technicians News,Feb. 1976. Engineering Trades "Machine ShopSafety Series'".• RAAEC Newsletter. Vol. 15. No. 2. August 1971."A Teaching Innovation" — Captain A. Sandery.> De Cecco. J. P.. The Psychology of Learning andInstruction. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 1968.Markle. S.. Good Frames and Bad. Wiley. NewYork. 1969. Melching. W. H. et. al. A Handbookfor Programmers of Automated Instruction.HUMRRO. Washington, 1963.• RAAEC Newsletter. Vol. 16. No. 3. December1972. "AACEI Geography" — Captain A. Sandervand WQ2 D. Millard.

ETHANGLTHE 6th COLUMN ?C 'haplain S. ./. HesseyWHEN General Mola was besieging Madridduring the Spanish Civil War (1937-39)his Army consisted of four columns of troopsoutside the city. But he declared that his supporterswithin the city constituted a fifthcolumn.The Army should have a constant interestin all things likely to establish, maintain, orthreaten its fundamental fitness. The 'Enemy'is seldom limited to the men and equipmentof the opposing force. Like the defenders ofMadrid we may have to contend with a fifthcolumn, and like any Army at any point inhistory we may have to contend with a sixthcolumn, the weakness within ourselves. It maybe argued that our use of the substance EthelAlcohol constitutes such a weakness. Therenow exists a small but highly informed groupwho understand in precise and scientific termsthe nature and effect of this substance. Theirfindings suggest that it is no longer goodenough to label all who question our drinkinghabits as "wowsers".This article seeks to draw attention to factsrelated to the use of Ethel Alcohol (Ethanol)and to encourage a wider recognition of itspower among us.Ethanol — The SubstanceIn its pure state a clear colourless liquidproduced in the natural organic cycle by theChaplain Hessey has been an Anglican priest for 20years in a variety of Pastoral and Special appointments,including chaplain of a Psychiatric Hospital,a girls' boarding school and in the CMF. For severalyears in Australia and North America he worked inMass Media Communication and was a delegate tothe World Anglican Congress in Toronto '63. AfterARA enlistment he served in Brisbane, with HRARin Vietnam and at Singleton with 3TB, Inf Centreand DSU. He holds a Diploma in Theology and ispresently studying for a Diploma of Religious Education.action of Yeast + Sugar = CO, + C 2 H,OH.Man first copied nature in contriving the processof fermentation to produce beverages withup to 16% Ethanol and then by distillationspirits with up to 96% Ethanol.Pharmacologically Ethanol is classified asan anaesthetic and thus its main action is onthe brain and central nervous system producinga progressive descending repression. Inother words it puts us to sleep. Ethanolbelongs to those substances classified as Drugs- (i.e. "a substance which when taken intothe body causes changes in thinking, feelingand behaviour"). Ethanol use is therefore partof our Drug Use and the problems of its abusea part of the general problem of Drug misusein our Society. Ethanol is a Drug of Addiction( "compulsive repeated use resulting inharm to the user and those about him").Between 5% and 10% of our populationare alcoholics ( Ethanol dependants) a muchlarger number suffer from "Grog Strife". 1 Thiscan occur in any or all areas of life — domestic,social, legal, health or employment.Ethano! in the SystemUnlike food, which must be digested, Ethanolis absorbed directly and rapidly into the bloodstream.Unlike food, which the body needs.Ethanol is automatically eliminated. TheC.R.OH molecule is very small compared toother Drugs and this aids its absorption. Eliminationoccurs in small quantities via the breath,perspiration and the kidneys. Mostly (90%) ithas to be 'oxidised' by the liver. This occursat a fixed rate. For the average man this worksout at about lOg per hour.Remarkably, civilised man pours his drinksin standard measures related to the % ofEthano] in the beverage. A standard 10 oz.beer, 4 oz. table wine, 2 oz. Port, or 10 oz. ofspirits all contain just on 10g of Ethanol. If

48 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALwe drink at the rate of one standard measuredrink per hour we allow the body to eliminateEthanol as fast as we absorb it.Increasing the intake beyond our capacityto eliminate causes an excess in the bloodalcohol level. This excess must circulate inthe bloodstream and thus through the brainuntil it is eliminated.These measurements are related to the'average' man. In practice the effect of Ethanolvaries from person to person and even fromplace to place and time to time. But the factremains that the figures for the average mangive us a yardstick by which to talk intelligentlyabout the effects. Tolerance to thisdrug, food in the stomach, atmosphere, bodyweight and other facts notwithstanding, eachof us has a body capacity to eliminate Ethanol(repeat for the average lOg per hour) and itis this ability which has to cope with our intake.Ethanol in Our SocietyWestern man uses Ethanol as a social drug.It is readily available and socially acceptable.It appears at most social gatherings, it is foundin most homes, and it is used in the centralsacramental act of Western Religion.It is one of our oldest drugs and we use itto relieve our tensions and frustrations, tolubricate our social intercourse, to promoteour relaxation, enhance our food and quenchour thirst. When it achieves these objects itprobably does us and our society much good.On the other hand it is perhaps unfortunatelytoo much associated with the process of reachingmaturity. Doing it, in fact overdoing it,is equated with masculinity. But sooner orlater we come up against the facts.Take these for starters—— Hospital admissions — 1 in every 5 beds.— Mental institutions — 1 in every 4 admissions.— Prison admissions — J of all violentcrime.— Road deaths — 1 in every 2.— Marriage disruption — 2 in every 5divorces and judicial separations.— Suicides — 1 in 3.— Industry — largest single cause of lostmanhours and accidents.— Health — the nation's No. 1 healthproblem. 2Those of us in the helping/healing professionshave known for years the importance ofrecognising such facts. At last the scientificanalysis of Ethanol and its physical and socialeffects is bringing the true picture into sharperdefinition. The result is probably worse thanwe feared.Consumption FiguresAustralian intake of Ethanol has been risingrapidly for decades. In the period betweenthe outbreak of the Second World War andnow. we have increased our intake by threetimes. If this tendency continues we can forgetabout continental defence or any other kind ofdefence. Newspaper sensationalism aside (andwe have enough of that) the fact is that theway we are using Ethanol makes it a very realcandidate for the position of public enemyNo. 1. We can tut, tut, about Pot and narcoticsand the decline of young Australia fromnow till kingdom come, but if we refuse toface the problem of Ethanol we may be wastingour time.Normal Use and OveruseAwareness of the Ethanol problem mustraise questions — "What is safe use?", "Howmuch is too much?" There are two basicguidelines:• For the Alcoholic. Alcoholism is achronic relapsing illness which has manycauses and occurs in specially susceptiblepeople. For such any use of Ethanol isdangerous.cOther Users. The following have beenestablished by the World Health Organisation:More than 8()g of Ethanol dailv — Riskof Strife.More than 120g of Ethanol daily — Certaintissue damage. 3Approx. 10% of drinkers are hazardoususers. Normal use for most drinkers liesbetween nil use to 80g of Ethanol or 8standard measure drinks on a regularbasis.The Industrial Problem"The Employer who says that he has noalcoholism problem does not know his employees."4"Australian Industry loses one billion dollarsa year from alcohol."' Apart from humani-

ETHANOL — THE 6th COLUMN? 49tarian considerations there are sound economicreasons for industrial leaders to recognise andsupport tested programmes of education andrecovery. Today many industries are facingthe problem on the assurance that it can bedetected and treated. There are strong indicationsthat Industry could provide one of thekey elements in a reversal of our present trends.The Defence IndustryAs an employer of a sizeable slice of thenational manpower we may regard the ArmedForces as an Industry. Like other industrieswe must be adversely affected by "Grog Strife".Ours is among the occupations listed as 'atrisk'. Consider some aspects of our industrialtradition - the 'Mess' system, the number ofalcohol sales points, lower prices, compulsoryattendance, and Peer Group Pressure.For officers and sergeants much of thisrelates to traditions deeply embedded in thecustoms of the Service, the requirements ofMess life and the alleged connection of suchwith "F sprit de Corps'. For the ordinarydigger, especially in the first months of Armylife, it may perhaps be more related to ourfailure to provide and educate him with anythingbetter to do with his 'off duty' time.This at least is a part of the problem that weshare with the whole of our society."There is nothing else to do" is a constantcry from the young soldier, a little lost in hisnew world and often very very lonely.One of the Good Things in LifeI think it was Dr Moon that I first hearduse this term, "one of the «ood thin«s in life",'and that is how I personally, as a user ofEthanol, want to view it.A social drug may have a place in helpingus to cope with the problems of life and withone another. But the advantage of such usemust be weighed against the adverse elfectsEthanol use is protected in many ways: Byits long historical connection with our culture;by its place in our social and economic structures;by the very fact that most of us areusers and tend to defend our habit. In theArmed Services this protection may go evendeeper.This article questions our protection of theuse of Ethanol. On the basis of fact it wouldappear to constitute a large part of the 6thColumn which strikes at the heart of that veryfitness and preparedness which is otherwiseproclaimed.QN li. The Author wishes to acknowledge thekindness and assistance of Dr Pat O'Neill andhis team in the 'Hunter Regional CommunityAddiction Service', and to the over 10,000Recruits and Infantry Corps Trainees whosequestions sent me in search of the truth.1NOTESA term used to describe any trouble related toEthanol use.- Or Everingham — when Minister of Health.Drew, Moon & Buchanan, Alcoholism in Industry.> ibid.Dr E\eiinghum — Australian Journal of Alcoholismanil Drug Dependence, Nov 75.,;Dr Moon, an acknowledged authority on Alcoholismin industry, at a Seminar at the University ofNewcastle.In the article entitled "Put Your Head in the Sand -- Here Comes Their Armour''which appeared in Issue No. 1 of this Journal (on November December 1976). it was stated(on page 34) that napalm bombs were available in RAAF storages.The Board of Management is advised by the Director-Cjeneral of Operational Requirements.RAAF. that this is not the case: the RAAF holds no napalm bombs or any othernapalm-type weapon.

ClausewitzAbsolute Warand aPolitico-Military Communications Gap( cjptaiii M. I. CarrRoyal Australian InfantryIntroductionTAKEN in its broadest aspect war canpossibly be seen as a result of the natureof man, the nature of the state in which manexists or the nature of relations between states— or any combination of the three. The conceptof war, however, varies widely amongstthem. If we presume that man is the arbiterof his destiny then war can be seen as a manmadephenomenon. It is a common peculiarityof man-made phenomena that, unlike naturalphenomena, they can be influenced by what isthought or said about them. 1 Clausewitz,despite his refusal to put a 'clumsy pedantic'definition to war did describe it more fullythan perhaps any other man and enunciated aphilosophy which has maintained coherence,even to the nuclear age.Clausewitz's method of describing warcentred on his use of the concept of absolutewar, (or a war in abstract) as a dialectic forumfor argument. Using that concept he was ableto describe a perfect situation of war. He then,however, set about reducing the perfect situationto a digestible and pragmatic reality; thisreality was his message. Clausewitz arguedthat man was not a plaything of fate and anyact of war was the result of man's actions atthe highest levels of society i.e. the politicalcontrol of a nation state. He was expresslyconcerned about what might be called, inmodern terms, the existence of a politicomilitarycommunications gap; the implicationCaptain Carr graduated from RMC Diintroon in1968. He served with HRAR in Malaya and Vietnam.In 1971 he was appointed to 1P1R in Port Moresby.In 1974 he served as S03 in the Office of the MilitarySecretary. He is currently engaged in researchfor an MA(Hons) degree under the auspices of theDepartment of Government. Faculty of MilitaryStudies, RMC Diintroon.of which is a two way exchange of informationwhich has broken down. Clausewitz expressedthe necessity for communication in most positiveterms. Although only a small portion ofhis work it forms the base upon which the restwas founded. His ideas in this field certainlyretain their relevance and appear of majorimportance to any nation whose primary concernappears to be a purely conventionalmethod of defence.BackgroundBefore discussing Clausewitz's work it isnecessary to have some understanding of theevents of his time which influenced his thought.Clausewitz lived through the French revolutionand the Napoleonic wars and made a study ofNapoleon and his methods. From this he learntone great lesson: the universal currency ofpolitics is power and power resides in theability to wreak physical destruction.- Themost obvious and immediate lesson of theNapoleonic wars was that previous conceptionsof war, in terms of defined strategy, wereobsolete. The limited war concepts of themonarchical systems and their traditionalmethods were found wanting in face of thetremendous offensive impact and nationalisticfervour of Napoleon's forces.Clausewitz devoted most of the periodbetween 1818 and 1830 to writing his life'swork On War, but died before he could finishit. Apart from the inexhaustible material andthe scope of the field which Clausewitz triedto cover his main difficulty lay in the natureof his concept of war. '*He did not believethat the nature of war was such that anyabstract theory could ever succeed in explainingits manifold and complex phenomena."In order that he might better succeed inexplaining his thought Clausewitz became aphilosopher of 'war and his explanations arecouched in both abstract and real terms. This

(LUSfWII/ ABSOLUTE WAR AM) A POLITIC O-MII IT AR V COM M I NIC ATIONS CAP 51dialectic has, at times, resulted in confusion,and at other times in deliberate misrepresentation.At first appearance his emphatic generalizationtends to strike to the core of his subject.Yet further reading lays open a series ofqualifications that drastically change hisemphasis and meaning.There have also been varying interpretationsplaced on his work by competent critics andtheir divergence of opinion has not helped toclear the confusion. Ritter, for example, says"... his true originality does not lie in thedoctrine that today comes at once to mind -the phrase about the higher unity of politicsand war. In essence he took this over fromthe technical military literature of his time.His real discovery is the concept of absolutewar."' Fuller, however, writes that " . . .because of Napoleon's offensive principle, hefoisted on to him his absolute concept . . . Onthe other hand his penetrating analysis of therelationship of war and policy has never beenexcelled . . . " 5 It is divergence of opinionof this kind which makes a proper assessmentof Clausewitz's philosophy difficult. It isapparent, however, that his significant philosophicalcontribution occurs at a very highlevel of analysis and concerns the fundamentalnature of war and its significance for man andhis activities. 6The only section of his book On War whichClausewitz felt to be in its final form was Book1 Chapter 1 and it is in these passages thatthe underlying message of the book is mostclearly expressed. What Clausewitz succeededin doing was to analyse the new concepts ofwar which had been introduced by the FrenchRevolution and which had already been utilizedand changed by Napoleon. His philosophy ofwar flows from this analysis. Napoleon'sactions had provided a revolutionary antithesisto the concepts of war which the monarchicalpowers regarded as strategic and tactical wisdom.Clausewitz. in analysing Napoleon'sactions synthesized the military events of histime. The legitimate monarchical powers werethe status quo operatives of the time and wereconfronted with a style of revolutionary peoples'war which they were unable to combat. Itwas part of Clausewitz's aim to redefine thisnew type of war so that the legitimate powersmight also benefit from its brilliant, spontaneousoriginality. He wanted them to understandNapoleon's success in terms of the politicalreality of a unified nation state.Clausewitz often commences his analysissaying in some ways the opposite of what heconcludes with, following a pattern of thesis,antithesis and synthesis. He demonstrates thistrait in the first chapter where he insists thatthe use of force is theoreticalh without limitsand then goes on to explain why it must infact be limited. 7 He develops the theory thatextremes exist in the abstract world of ideas,which bears little relation to reality, and consequentlyhe writes of war in terms of abstractionbut qualifies his arguments from reality.An unfortunate result of his method has beenthat some people interpret his writings withouttaking notice of the qualifications. ConsequentlyClausewitz's abstractions have oftenbeen taken as his gospel rather than as philosophicalidealism, while the qualifications ofreality have been ignored. Clausewitz doeshowever stress that the abstract nature ofthings must remain as the point of directionfrom which reality is to be observed andunderstood.The concept of absolute war, for which hehas been both praised and vilified, Clausewitzdeveloped from Napoleon. Napoleon's antithesisof the monarchical generals' reluctanceto fight battles was achieved by the transferenceof the ruthlessness of the civil war to theexternal enemy, and "... once ignited, hatredof this intensity is appeased only by totaltriumph, when the foe is utterly humiliatedor destroyed, or when one's own side is completelyexhausted." 8 Clausewitz writes that"... we might doubt whether our notionof its absolute nature had any reality, if wehad not seen real warfare make its appearancein this absolute completeness right inour own times . . . the ruthless Bonapartequickly brought it to this point.""However, he qualifies this statement in thesame chapter when he says that,"... war originates and takes its form notfrom a final adjustment of all the innumerablerelations which it affects: but fromsome among them which happen to predominate,then it follows . . . that it restsupon a play of possibilities, probabilities,good fortune and bad." 10Clausewitz took the act of war directed uponthe enemy's power of resistance as the basis

52 DEFENCE FORC E JOURNALfor his analysis: he had observed that Napoleonfought his wars and won them in this way.As Liddell Hart has written "if the termabsolute war has any meaning it is that of afight until the capacity of one side for furtherresistance is exhausted." 11 Consequentlyabsolute war — or war in abstract — oughtto end in the complete victory of one sideover the other and furthermore any moderationin war is an absurdity since failure toutilize all the forces at one's disposal defeatsthe purpose of war. It is interesting to notethat Clausewitz, on his first page, separatesthe proper political object from the aim ofmilitary action "... as something not belongingto war itself" 12 and he is thus able to postulatethat war in its ideal form is the applicationof unlimited physical force (given the separationof war from its political object). The twoare rejoined in his concept that ideal war isonly theory and not reality. Clausewitz realizedthat in practice war is never an isolated actand force is not an end in itself: he writes that"The probabilities of real life take the placeof the extreme and absolute demanded bytheory." 1 ' 5He goes on to say"if the extreme is no longer shunned andno longer sought, it is left to the judgementto determine the limits of effort, and thiscan only be done by deduction accordinglo the "laws of probability* from the datasupplied by the phenomena of the realworld." 14Thus force is not an end in itself and can onlybe justified when rationally employed for publicpurposes. The abstract concept of absolutewar can be construed as the negation of statesmanship:war as an act of violence pushed toits utmost bounds neglects the ends of policy.War, A Rational Political Instrument?Ritter writes that Clausewitz was assailed bydoubts as to the historical reality of his theoryof absolute war 10 and denied that the idealcould ever become the goal of political action.Oausewitz demonstrates this in Part VI ofChapter 1 where he writes:"Everything assumes a different shape if wepass from the abstract world to that ofreality. In the former ... we had to conceiveboth one side and the other as notmerely striving toward perfection but alsoattaining it." 16Clausewitz, however, says perfection would beattainable if war were a wholly isolated actwhich arose quite suddenly and had no connectionwith the previous course of events —if, that is, it consisted of a single decision orof several simultaneous decisions or if its decisionwere complete in itself and the ensuingpolitical situation were not already being takeninto account and reacting upon it. 17 That thesereasons are themselves abstractions showsquite clearly that Clausewitz saw the limitationsreality placed on the abstract ideal. Throughhis dialectic Clausewitz presumes his apparentcontradiction to be a self evident explanation.The contradiction is exemplified in his ridiculefor the idea that there is a way of overcomingthe enemy without great bloodshed, thus implyingthat war is an act of annihilation continueduntil total victory is achieved. The possibilitythat such action many bankrupt the state isthe negation of policy since policy should bedirected not only to victory but the ensuingpeace (where peace is an absence of war).Clausewitz assumes the understanding of thatconcept in his principles of idea and realitywhere reality takes into account probabilityand his idea is not a "condition necessaryfor peace." 1 "Clausewitz then avoids the attempt to definewar; instead he relies on confining himself toits 'essence' and so states that "war is ... anact of force to compel our adversary to do ourwill." 19 The essence of war is divided into ameans of imposing will, that is force, and anobject, which is the aim of that imposition.Clausewitz further clarifies this when he writes."to achieve this object with certainty wemust disarm the enemy, and this disarmingis by definition the proper aim of militaryaction." 20Thus disarming the enemy may push aside theobject as something not rightly a part of theaction of war. His concern was to delineatethe military action of war which is by nomeans the whole. The capitulation of thearmed forces has come to be seen as an endof war when in fact it is only a means to anend. The real end is the political capitulationof the enemy government and it is upon thisaspect that Clausewitz bases his theory of militaryaction. Capitulation of armed forces is

CLAUSEWITZ ABSOLUTE WAR AND A POLITICO-MILITARY COM Ml NICATIONS (JAP 53thus only an end of military action and mayoccur before or after the capitulation of thegovernment.Clausewitz's view of war was that it shouldbe a rational instrument of national policyand the three words rational, instrument andnational arc the key concepts of his paradigm.-'They imply what war ought to be: war oughtto be a rational decision: war ought to beinstrumental in achieving what should be anational goal. This centred upon one of hismain points, that absolute war, a war in theabstract, an ideal situation not related to reality,is an 'ought to be' and not an "is'. Clause -witz's greatest achievement was perhaps hiscreation of the awareness that war was anoffshoot of national policy; he created thisawareness on two levels — war as a politicalexpression and war involving the whole nation.The Communication RequirementGiven that political theories can be descriptiveor prescriptive, where the former describeactual occurrences and the latter specify meansby which certain goals may be achieved,--'Clausewitz can be seen to develop his theoryalong prescriptive lines. He does not see warfor war's sake but as a political-military combinationin which each justifies the other inthe context of war. War to Clausewitz thushas a dual nature. It is an autonomous sciencewith its own method and objective and yet atthe same time a subordinate science in thatits ultimate purpose is external.- 3 Clausewitzstates that"The war of a community of whole nationsand particularly of civilized nations alwaysarises from a political condition and is calledforth by a political motive. It is therefore,a political act."-'He qualifies this, however, by saying that:"... the political object is not on thataccount a despotic lawgiver, it must adaptitself to the nature of the means at its disposaland is often thereby completelychanged, but it must always be the firstthing to be considered." 25His famous dictum that:" . . . war is not merely a political act buta real political instrument, a continuationof political intercourse, a carrying out ofthe same by other means," 26rests on the assump'ion that the political designis the object and war is the means and themeans can never be thought of apart from theobject. 27Clausev.it/ is emphatic and repetitious inhis method of expressing the prescriptive politicaltheory. Having defined war as a politicalinstrument he instructs the reader how it canbe used in the pursuit of certain objects. 28Ritter suggests as the reason for his repetitiona " . . . profound concern to wrest discussionof the problem of war from the hands of themilitary experts . . . The tacticians of traditionalcombat doctrine. The bitterest experienceof his life had been to watch the miserablefailure ... of this narrow specialisedacademic (sic) knowledge, totally lacking in theover-all view of the political situation." 29 Thecrucial errors at Jena and Auerstadt had beenmade in the political rather than the militaryand strategic sphere and there was no realunderstanding of the character of the new styleof warfare. 3 " Clausewitz, by synthesizing thenew spirit in politics and war that had eruptedin the Revolution, was stating that politicalaction had to achieve a degree of knowledgeof military expertise that was previouslyunthought of. "Instead of assigning to politicsa more subservient role in war Clausewitzemphatically asserts its primacy: it is politicsthat begets war. Politics represents the intelligence,war merely its instrument. The onlypossible course is the subordination of themilitary viewpoint to the political." 31 Againhe qualifies this assertion by writing that it allrests upon the assumption that the politicalarm knows the instrument it is going to use.Given this knowledge then... it is entirely its affair to determinewhat events and what direction of eventscorrespond to the aim of war." 3Political Decisions and Military CapacityClausewitz postulated that war has its ownlanguage but not its own logic. By languagehe refers to the means or methods of conductingwar and his logic relates to the purposefor which the language is adopted. 33 It canbe seen that Clausewitz was arguing that politiciansshould understand that they share theessential responsibility for the success or failureof war. To this extent Clausewit/ must beseen as viewing war as a man-made phenomenonand the political act of choice of waras an objective principle designed to confermaximum advan'age.

54 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALFurther qualifications follow in a quantitativesense when Oausewitz writes that"it is true the political element does notpenetrate deeply into the details of war.Vedettes are not planted, patrols are notsent round as political considerations. Butits influence is all the more decisive in regardto the plan of a whole war, or campaign,and often even for a battle." 34The quality of the politico-military relationshipis, however, a little harder to qualify.Logically the means of war should be gearedto the object but psychologically it can becomputed backwards, that is. the politicalobjectives are determined by military capacity.1. This leads back to the point that thepolitical arm must have a full and detailedknowledge of the instrument it intends to useand must ensure that the instrument is capableof carrying out a given political direction. Theact of choice of war as a political decisiontherefore rests firmly upon the objective factof military capacity. The act of choice becomesnot only a moral and political decision butone that affects the whole nation as militarycapacity is reliant upon the whole economicand manpower capacity of the nation.Similarly. Clausewitz qualifies his absoluteprinciple of utmost force by the admissionthat the political object,"as the original motive of the war, shouldbe the standard for determining both theaim of the military force and also theamount of effort to be made." 36The matching of military to political aimsmarked the fundamental distinction betweenabsolute and real war. Clausewitz stresses:"As war is no act of blind passion but isdominated by the political object, the valueof that object therefore determines themeasure of the sacrifice by which it is tobe purchased." 37Clausewitz did not believe that the complexstructure of war could be explained by abstracttheory. He insists that the fundamentals ofwar are subject to"... an infinite number of historical, psychological,moral and incidental modifications." 3 "However, he did believe that the reality of warshould be viewed from the abstract point ofview in order that the reality be more clearlyunderstood.ConclusionClausewitz's lessons not only retain theircurrency in a wartime politico-military relationship,but also in the modern peacetimetriumvirate of which the bureaucracy is amember. Clausewitz considered that knowledgeof aims, objectives and abilities was an essentialprerequisite for conflict and his penetratingenunciation of responsibilities in the first andfinal chapters of On War can easily be translatedto the present. Yet just as easily, thesimplicity of his message can be, and in somecases has been, lost in the tangle of technologywhich accompanies modern man. The messagedoes, however, have relevance to the technologicalage and can be adapted to it. It mustnot be seen to be subsumed through a lack ofunderstanding of the modern accoutrements ofdefence and warfare; an understanding andknowledge which must be made available atall levels of the modern defence organization.If defence is to be a practical undertakingwhere effort can be seen to be worth the sacrificethen knowledge of aims, objectives andabilities must be coldly and realisticallyappraised.uNOTES1 Anatol Rapoport, ed.. Clausewitz — On War.Penguin. London. 1968. p. 12.- ibid., p. 21.8Introduction by O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Translator)to Karl Von Clausewitz. On War, Combat ForcesPress. Washington. D.C.. p. xxiii. Subsequentreferences to Clausewitz are from this edition.4 Gerhard Ritter. The Sword and the Scepter -The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. 1,The Prussian Tradition 1740-1890. University ofMiami Press. Coral Gables. Florida. 1969, p. 63.1Major General J. F. C. Fuller. The Conduct ofWar I7fl°-I961, Eyre and Spottiswoode. London.1961. p. 60.''• Samuel P. Huntington. The Soldier and the State,The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.Cambridge. Massachusetts. 1957. p. 56.7Bernard Brodie. War and Politics, The MacmillanCompany. New York. 1973. p. 11, to. 10." Ritter. o'p. cit., pp. 44-45.• Clausewitz. op. cit-, p. 570.1,1 ibid. p. 571.» Basil Liddell Hart. Thoughts on War. Faber &Faber. London. 1944. p. 43.I - Clausewitz. op. cit., p. 3.13ibid, p. 9.II18ibid.Ritter. op. cit.. p. 60."'• Clausewitz. op. cit., p. 6.1T Clausewitz. op. cit., p. 6.'« ibid., p. 20."' ibid., p. 3.-" ibid." Rapoport. op, cit., p. 12.» ibid., p. 48.

BOOK REVIEWS 5523 Huntington, op. cit., p. 56.21 Clausewitz, op. cit.. pp. 15-16.-'"> ibid., p. 16.'-'•• ibid.-• ibid.** Rapoport. op. cit.. p. 48.-•' Ritter, op. cit., p. 57.»o ibid., p. 48.1 Ritter, op. cit., p. 58. See also Clausewitz, op. cit.,p. 598.32 Clausewitz. op. cit., p. 598.33 Brodie, op. cit., p. 1.!1 Clausewitz, op. cit.. p. 597.Rapoport. op. cit., p. 11.'•"'• Basil Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon. Faber& Faber. London, 1933. p. 123.7 Roger Parkinson. Clausewitz — A Biography.Wayland Publishers. London. 1970, p. 315.38 Clausewitz, op. cit., p. xxiii./\A HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE the greater because it was carried through byAND FOREIGN POLICY 1901-23, Volume : Governments which made no claim to full1, by Neville Meaney, Sydnev University t sovereignty in foreign affairs and defence,Press^ 1976, pp. XI and pp.'306, $18.00. which possessed no diplomatic service and notrue foreign office and which, with rare andpartial exceptions, lacked able and independentmindedmilitary advisers. (Captain W. R. Cresswell,as he was in this period, emerges as atleast a partial exception). Like previous writers,Meaney admits that imperial sentiment (loyaltyto the Empire, pride in the British race) asopposed to Australian nationalism was dominantin the Commonwealth at this time. Unlikemany of his predecessors, however, he deniespower to the Pacific. At the same time theyi- acted successfully greatly to augment Aus-tralia's own military and naval forces. ThoughDeakin stands head and shoulders above allothers in the development of an independentReviewed by Professor B. D. BeddieUniversity of NSW. RMC DuntroonTHIS, the first volume of Dr Meaney's twovolume work, bears the suh-title: TheSearch for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14. Itis distinguished in two ways: it is the first fullscale diplomatic history of the Commonwealthin this period and it is a sustained pieceof research of very high quality. A glance atthe "Select Bibliography" (pp. 285-296) willquickly bring home to the reader the wealth 1of sources that confronted Meaney in undertakingthis study. A close reading of the textof his book reveals a mastery of these highly yditfuse and often badly organized sourceswhich calls for unqualified admiration.Meaney is able to bring coherence and jsharpness to the mass of his materials because ehe has a distinctive thesis to propound. His sthesis is that the leaders of the Commonwealth hin its first two decades succeeded in fashioning"a defence and foreign policv which possessedits own inner coherence and logic" andwhich required "Isletting aside the strategic cappreciations of the prestigious British authorities,the Colonial Defence Committee, the eCommittee of Imperial Defence, the Admiralty yand the War Oflice". This achievement was sthat the dominance of imperial sentimentdeprived Australians of the sense of a distinctivenational interest to be realized within (andindeed, by means of membership of) theEmpire. He concedes that in the years 1901to 1905 there was a lack of clarity in thedefinition of Australia's national interests anda failure to develop a coherent defence policy.But. after the defeat of Russia by Japan andunder the leadership, above all, of Deakin,Australian Governments became fully seizedof the frailty of British power in the Pacific.In these circumstances they strove unrelentingly(though unsuccessfully) to obtain signidficantly increased commitments of British naval

56 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALAustralian policy within the framework, of theEmpire, Fisher, Hughes and Cook are eachrepresented as adept in carrying forwardDeakin"s essential policies. Among unofficialleaders Frederick Eggleston emerges as themost perceptive and persuasive advocate ofan independent outlook in foreign policy anddefence.Readers of this journal may find of specialinterest Meaney's quite detailed discussion ofcertain aspects of military and naval affairs.The thoroughness that he brings to all aspectsof his research is, for example, shown in histreatment of Major-General Sir Edward Hutton,the first General Officer Commanding the Australianmilitary forces. No previously publishedaccount of the activities of Hutton underthe Commonwealth Government can in anyway rival that provided by Meaney. Whilegiving full recognition to the qualities in Huttonthat have been so praised by other writers.Meaney also insists (and rightly so) that hewas arrogant, underhand and sometimes tactlessand lacking in political sense. Meaneyalso shows (for the first time so far as I amaware) that Flutton greatly influenced Bridgesand Brudenell White both of whom continuedto offer advice based on Hutton's principles,though they were politically unacceptable, longafter the latter had returned to England. Onthe naval side, Meaney treats in detail thenegotiations leading to the establishment ofthe R.A.N, and the bitter controversies thattook place when the Admiralty, in the eyes ofthe Australian Government and. indeed, ofthe Colonial Office, unilaterally abrogated the1909 Agreement.Readers of this volume will certainly lookforward with impatience and, indeed, excitementto the appearance of its successor. Theymay also hope that Dr Meaney, having madehimself pre-eminent in the field, will not leavethe story at 1923 but will carry it forward atleast to the Second World War.The text of the book is not wholly free ofminor errors and something quite serious hasgone wrong on page 214. A negative seemsto be lacking on page 237. Finally lest praiseshould seem to run unbounded. Dr Meaneyregularly writes 'try and' when he means tryto". ||NELSON AND HIS CAPTAINS, by LudovicKennedv. London. Collins, 1975, J53 pp..S 14.30.'Reviewed by R. E. Wright, Defence Centra!.Canberra.DLRING the decade to 1805 which iscovered by this book, John Jervis andHoratio Nelson evolved the fleet and tacticswhich enabled the great British naval victoryat Trafalgar. Although other important actionssuch as St Vincent, the Nile, Copenhagenand Algeciras were fought during this period,only relatively short descriptions are given ofthem. Rather, the book is primarily concernedwith the Captains who ranked among Nelson's"Band of Brothers", that group of mendescribed as probably the most talented everto have served in the Royal Navy.Nelson's Cap'ains are skilfully introducedinto the chronological narrative. Their backgroundand personalities are given in varyingdegrees of detail as some left or were thesubject of more detailed records. The availabilityof one particular primary source, thediaries of Betsy Wynne, results in ratherlengthy accounts about the ability of CaptainsFremantle and Foley as suitors. In this respectwe are left mercifully ignorant about the restof the "Band of Brothers".More importantly, from the other availablerecords.Ludovic Kennedy records that mostof Nelson's captains came from middle classcountry families being "simple, decent men,direct in speech and manner, reasonably welleducated but with no intellectual pretensions:they had a high sense of morality and honourand an appreciation ... of the wider eventsin which they were taking part."While valid as a generalisation, this descriptionobscures their individual qualities whichusually served Nelson well, and which Kenned>records where appropriate. The most strikingof these is the initiative shown by Foley ingetting between the French line and (he shoreat the Battle of the Nile. Followed by fourBritish ships, he found as he had expected thatthe French were unprepared for battle on theirinner side. Nelson then placed the remainderof his fleet on the outside, effecting a witheringcrossfire which destroyed the van of the Frenchline in two hours vigorous fighting. However,

BOOK REVIEWS >"as is only to be expected, not all of Nelson'srelations with his Captains went smoothly.-Simple misunderstandings caused most of hisdifficulties with men such as Samaurez, Troubridgeand Ball.Well written and readable, the book isrecommended to those wanting to know moreabout the men who won some of the RoyalNavy's greatest victories, rather than aboutthe victories themselves.yWORLD WAR II: AN ACCOUNT OF ITSDOCUMENTS, edited by James E. O'Neilland Robert W. Krauskopf, Washington.Howard University Press, xix pp. and 269 pp.Reviewed by Professor L. C. F. Turner, Facultyof Military Studies, Royal Military College,Duntroan, Canberra.THIS book consists of a series of paperspresented at a conference on historicalresearch relating to World War II held atWashington in June 1971. Nearly all the contributionsare by American historians, butHenri Michel provides a comprehensive studyof documents relating to the French Resistancewhile Noel Frankland analyses Britisharchival policy with his usual clarity and skill.Although the papers differ sharply in qualityand interest, the book is a valuable guide toAmerican sources. The most readable contributionis by Barbara Tuchman, whose witand humour in discussing the problems shefaced when writing her biography of GeneralStilwell make a refreshing contrast to the heavypedantry of the official historians. She commentssardonically on "the fairy tale of theChinese war effort" and on the attempts byAmerican propagandists to present it in afavourable light in the United States. She saysthat ""communiques have about as much relationto what actually happens as astrology hasto the real science of the stars". It is alsogratifying to find an historian who has theconfidence to criticise Michael Howard's muchpraised but rather tedious history of theFranco-Prussian War.While the papers are concerned primarilywith research problems and the accessibilityof documents, some significant points emerge.Russell Fifield in his paper on American policytowards Indo-China remarks that in November1943 and June 1944 Roosevelt offered theFrench colony to Chiang Kai-shek. Failing topersuade the Generalissimo (who had enoughproblems of his own), he sought to put Indo-China under an international commissioncomposed of American, British and Chineserepresentaives. The proposal was dropped byTruman, who did not share his predecessor'shostility to France. Indeed when the Japaneseattacked and massacred the French troops inIndo-China in March 1945, Roosevelt refusedat first to allow the U.S. air force units inChina to give any assistance to the French.De Gaulle's reactions need no elaboration.Australian scholars will be indebted to ClaytonJames for his comprehensive assessmentof documents and private papers relating toGeneral MacArthur. Although the materialis so copious that no individual scholar canhope to examine all the relevant sources, yetthere is a curious lack of information aboutthe Clark Field disaster in December L'4I orthe Bataan campaign of 1942. James says ofsome documentary collections relating toMacArthur that "there have been obviousdeletions of papers which could convict himof less than perfection". He makes the comment:"If only the documents are examined.MacArthur appears with few exceptions, tobe composing paeans of praise to the Australiansserving under him; his real opinionmay be better judged by the way he used theirservices".This volume illustrates very clearly howinterpretations of World War II are changingin the light of later research and more matureevaluation I'his is particular!} evident inLouis Morton's excellent paper "Prologue toPearl Harbor", which not only examines theextensive and highly controversial Americanwriting in that field but also refers to importantresearch by Japanese historians. In the lightof the information now available, Roosevelt'semotive phrase, "A Day of Infamy", can besafely consigned to the dustbin of History, y*DOUGLAS HAIG. by E. K. G. Sixsmith,London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976, pp.xi and 212 pp., $17.95.Reviewed by Major Warren Perry, R.I .IN an essay entitled Haii>, Winston Churchillsaid: "One can see . . . the strength of willand character which enabled him to withstand

?8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALthe various intense stresses to which he wassubjected. With his front crumbling underthe greatest of German assaults, or with hisown army collapsing in the mud and bloodof Passchendaele. with an Ally always exactingand frequently irregular, with the Governmentat home searching high and low forsomeone to replace him, he preserved at alltimes a majestic calm. He lived each daywithout departing from his convictions, orseeking sensational effects, or, courting popularity,or losing heart. He was equally sureof his professional qualifications and of hisconstitutional duty: and he acted at all timesin strict accordance with these definite conceptions."These words depict in a nutshellthe character of Lord Haig (1861-1928) andthey illustrate the conditions under which hedischarged his duties as C-in-C of the BritishArmies in France.As a writer on the subject of higher command,its methods and its problems, theauthor. Major-General Sixsmith, is alreadywell known. This work, Douglas Haig, shouldnot disappoint his earlier readers.It covers Haig's life from birth till death.But the major part of it examines his careerin the war of 1914-18 — at first as a subordinatecommander of Field-Marshal Frenchand then, from December 1915 until after theArmistice in 1918, as French's successor inthe post of C-in-C of the British Armies inFrance.When war came in 1914, Haig had hithertomet all the requirements of a good officersince he had passed out of Sandhurst first andwith the Anson Memorial Sword. He wascommissioned in the 7th Hussars in 1885. Hehad commanded a squadron and later a regimentin action. He attended the Staff Collegein 1896-7 where he distinguished himself notbecause of any intellectual superiority butbecause of his dominant personality. It madeitself felt in every company — in the field,on the polo ground and in the mess. Haig hadalso served with distinction before 1914 inhigher command and staff appointments athome and in India.Not even Oxford endowed him with intellectualcuriosity and unlike his distinguishedcontemporary. Allenby, he had no interestsoutside the Army, except polo. His educationwas, therefore, narrow and specialised and,unlike Monash. he did not pursue knowledgefor its own sake. Like Wellington, however,he spoke French with ease and skill and thisaccomplishment was an advantage to him inhis dealings with French politicians and soldiers.Although Haig wrote with skill and clarity,as his famous "Backs to the Wall" order ofApril 1918 illustrated, he was almost inarticulate,like Wavell, when it came to presentingan argument or defending a case orally. Hecared for his troops. But discipline was paramountwith him — he insisted on obedienceto orders and the will to fight.The question, "Was Haig the best officeravailable to command the British Armies inFrance?", is an eternal one; and so it mustforever remain incapable of a final answer.This book, interestingly illustrated withmaps and pictures, is an important contributionto the literature on Lord Haig. The authorhas packed much into a small compass andhe has presented his case critically and judiciously,y*DUNKIRK; THE BRITISH EVACUA­TION, 1940, by Robert Jackson, London,Arthur Barker, 1976, 188 pp., $13.50.Reviewed by Major D. H. Ivison, UK ExchangeOfficer, Army Office, Canberra.SO many books have been writen aboutDunkirk and the evacuation of the defeatedBritish Expeditionary Force in May and June1940, that it is difficult to imagine what morethere is to say. Robert Jackson's book doesnot pretend to be for military historians, butis aimed rather at a more general audience.While analysing the day to day retreat of theBEF to Dunkirk, Mr Jackson introduces manypersonal experiences and anecdotes from soldiersinvolved in the withdrawal.It is a story not only of British troops fightinga lost campaign, but of French soldierstoo. whose heroism and self-sacrifice made thedeliverance of Dunkirk possible. This is afact quite often forgotten. Without the steadfaststand of the French troops holding thedefence perimeter, it would not have beenpossible for the 180,982 Allied troops to escape.

BOOK REVIEWS 5s>albeit minus much of their heavy weapons andequipment, to tight another day.Although the bulk of troops rescued wereBritish Army, the part played by the naval andair forces is also well covered in this book. Itis sobering to read that during the evacuationsome 226 ships were sunk, ami 171 Alliedaircraft destroyed.The book is written in a very readable styleand is well illustrated with clear anil understandablemaps.U* These books obtainable in Australia throughHodder and Stoughton (Australia) Pty. Ltd.WHO'S WHO IN MILITARY HISTORY byJohn Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, London.Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976. $19.95.Reviewed by Major C. WinterArmy Office, Canberra.IN this volume the authors have produced astudy of military leaders who have shapedthe course of war from the Turkish conquestof the Byzantine Empire in 1453 to the YomKippur War in 1973. Apart from the numberof American generals included, a balanced andrepresentative selection has been achieved. If.as Napoleon claimed, there have been onlyseven great commanders in history, then itmust be concluded that any selection is arbitrary.This selection of military leaders, coveringa period of five hundred years and arrangedalphabetically in three hundred and fifty pages,provides valuable reference material. It willalso be found to bridge the gap to some extentbetween general political history and militaryhistory, important aspects of which are regrettablyignored by some historians. The volumeis very handsomely produced on good qualitypaper and is abundantly illustrated in colourand monochrome. It is completed with auseful, but limited, glossary of terms and aseries of maps showing the main theatres ofwar.The first entry is Abbas the Persian Shahand conqueror who died in 1629; the last entryis the Russian Marshal Zhukov, Russia's leadingsoldier in the Second World War. Betweenthese two entries, military leaders as diverseas William the Silent and Mao-Tse-tung. Cromwelland Che Guevara, and King George II ofEngland and Dayan. are linked over the centuriesby membership of the profession ofArms. Other entries relate the achievementsof people like Thomas Cochrane, the eccentric-British admiral who planned to overwhelmSebastopol and Crondstadt in the CrimeanWar by using sulphur gas - an anticipationof poison gas warfare; of Schlielfen. 'theepitome of the pure staff officer' and authorof the Schlieffen Plan. Appropriately, briefmention is made of Jean Henri Dunant thefounder of the Red Cross movement and recipientin 1901 of the first Nobel Peace Prize.Some information complements very wellthe more general history of a period. Lorexample, the Prussan soldier, Steuben, in theservice of the United States. He was the drillmasterof Washington's Continental Army,and 'It was thanks to Steuban's tireless elfortsthat American troops were able to match theprofessional skills of British regulars in thelater battles of the war'.The authors have developed to a high degreethe ability to encapsulate the qualities, achievementsand background of a military leaderwithin a coherent, comprehensive and briefarticle. The entries on William the Silent,Cromwell, Lrederick the Great and Napoleonare particularly good examples of this.Two predominant thoughts emerge fromreading about these military leaders paradedso effectively before our view: firstly, theimportance of winning: success covers a multitudeof shortcomings. Secondly, in an ageincreasingly dominated by sophisticatedweaponry this book is a timely reminder, ifsuch be needed, that basically it is soldierswho wage war, whether it is in the fifteenthcentury or the twentieth century.The familiar names of the military leadersof the nineteenth and twentieth centuries arewell represented and well portrayed, as wouldbe expected. However, Australian readers inparticular will be disappointed that no Australiangeneral is included.The authors make the claim that 'in an ageof global conflict, guerilla war, ultimate deterrentsand the obscenities of destruction pro-

60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALduced by modern technology, the study of waris once more respectable*. With this renewedrespectability in mind WHO'S WHO IN MILI­TARY HISTORY is strongly recommendedas a valuable reference book which brings intosharp focus military leaders who have shapedthe course of war.QTHE DESERT HATH PEARLS, by RexHall, Melbourne, Hawthorn Press, 1975. 218pp. S9.95.Reviewed by John RobertsonHistory DepartmentFaculty

BOOK REVIEMS 61• The statement that without orders, lifechanged and the population adopted theways of the new regime; yet he writesof the loudspeakers blaring music, ofeditorials and articles in the sole newspaper,articles on radio and TV, and ofthe organisation of street, block anddistrict committees.0The passages describing how the studentsand youth turned against the decadentwestern culture, and burned books, magazines,records and tapes of pop singers.It was the students and young peoplewho purchased these items, were the fansof the singers and frequented the"discos".• The working class and students are saidto be overwhelmingly for the NL.F; yethe writes of how the new regime wascareful in instituting its reforms due tothe deep anti-communist feeling in thecity. The 1968 Tet offensive founderedin the urban areas as the population gavelittle or no support to the VC local forceand mobile force units who entered thetowns.Terzani states that he and two Vietnamesefriends each day circulated through the city,meeting at night to compare notes. He relatesmany conversations he himself had with Vietnameseof all ages, both North and South; yethe is not credited with and does not state thathe is fluent in Vietnamese. The thousands ofservicemen who served in SVN, especiallythose who attended the various colloquiallanguage courses, will realise how restricted isone's contact with the people, unless one isreally fluent in Vietnamese, and able to differentiatebetween North, South and CentralVietnamese.Terzani has adopted the phraseology of theNLF/PRG. The GVN forces are alwaysdescribed as "Saigon troops", "Thieu artillery","Thieu time", "puppet troops", and soon. Like journalists before him, he writes ofthe city as a single being: "... Saigon -silent, holding its breath - did not sleep". Irecall readinsi similar over-dramatised writingsfrom Tet 68: "Saigon is a city of fear", ...while looking down from the Caravelle at thecrowds, no different from those on any othernight. Admittedly fighting was going on insome areas, but elsewhere, life in Saigon wenton as normal.He describes the fear of the expecied bloodbath,stirred by atrocity tales from cities alreadvfallen, and of course backed by other knownkillings, such as the slaughter at Hue in 1968.Terzani claims that the corpses in the massgraves near Hue were those of VC soldiers,and civilians killed by American bombing. Hedoesn't explain why the mass graves werelocated away from the towns as they were,why so many bombing casualties had theirhands tied, why so many were shot in thehead or buried alive. Perhaps we underestimatethe ingenuity of American pilots.References to GVN officials, officers andsoldiers are derogatory, except in the referencesto "Big Minh". They are described asobsequious, arrogant, or drunken, while NVA/NFL members are honest, down-to-earth finetypes. He repeats the story of General Manh.Chief of Security, fleeing with suitcases fullof gold, but ignores the fact that a suitcasecould not bear the weight, and lifting andcarrying it would be quite a feat. There areother incidents reported which are hearsay,certainly not seen by Terzani or his two friends.The book describes the all-too-familiarreshaping of a nation under the leadership ofthe Party: "re-education" of teaching facultiesat all levels; merging all trade unions into onefederation; mass meetings and elections thenand there (but nominations called for time andtime again until only Party-approved candidatesstand); formation of self defence groupsto guard each factory, street, etc., against"enemy agents and saboteurs"; public criticismand trials; the only newspapers, radio and TVbroadcasts are of the new regime; calls fordenunciation of those who listen to foreignradio broadcasts; and so on.If you served there and are interested in abiased eyewitness report, the book may be ofvalue.yKrrutum. In issue no. 2 of the Journal p. 62. we spelt the name of the publisher of the book"Ernest K. Gann's Flying Circus" incorrectly. It should have read "Hodder and Stoughton".Our apologies for any inconvenience caused.

LESSONSMajor John W. MountcastleUnited States ArmyWHILE playing golf with several officersa few weeks ago, I managed to salvagea bogey on a particularly difficult hole. Notingmy obvious relief, one of my grinning friendsused his best imitation of an Australian accentin exclaiming, "Good on ya\ Mate!" Thatcomment brought a laugh from the rest of usin the foursome, all of whom had served withthe "Aussies" at one time or another duringthe Vietnam war. As we finished playing thelast few holes, I could sense a bull sessionbrewing.We were soon settled in the clubhouse and,sure enough, one story led to another as werelaxed over our beers. Like any group ofveterans telling their war stories, this particularconversation soon developed into a foursidedcontest with each participant trying tobest the others with accounts of Australianderring-do. The combat tales were quite variedand the descriptions of different characters wehad met were, to say the least, very colourful.In spite of minor differences in opinion, all ofus could agree on two points: the Australianswith whom we had worked were top-notchprofessionals, and we had all learned valuableMajor Mountcastle was commissioned in 1965 fromthe Virginia Military Institute. He saw service inVietnam as a Reconnaissance Platoon Leader andthen as a Tank Platoon Leader with 1st Bn, 69thArmor in 1966-7 and again in 1969-70 as a memberof MACV Advisory Team S. In 1971-74 he waswith 1st Armored Division in Germany as a TankCompany Commander. He obtained a BA in Historyat the Virginia Military Institute in 1965 andan MA at Duke University in 1976. He has beena student at the US Army Command and Staff College,Fort Leavenworth, and will be taking up anappointment this year as Military History Instructorat West Point.YA, MATE!MY AUSSIE TAUGKT MElessons while serving with the soldiers from"Down Under."As I consider some of the points made inthat informal discussion, it occurs to me thatmany of the things 1 learned while servingwith an Australian in Vietnam had not onlyimmediate utility, but have been quite valuablein the years since I last left the Far East. Manyof the decisions I made later, while posted inGermany as a company commander of a tankunit and as a staff officer, were influenced bythe keen observations made years earlier bya quiet, determined, and highly resourcefulwarrant officer in the A.A.T.T.V. Thinkingback to that tour of duty, I can still rememberhow white the sand looked in the coastal regionnorth of Hue in September, 1969. It seemedto stretch northward forever as I flew out ofthe First ARVN Division Headquarters, headedfor the Vietnamese unit with which 1 was towork for the next seven months.The French had called the area "The StreetWithout Joy." As I scanned the desolate tidalflats below our helicopter that day, I had toadmire the French for their way with words.It was, after twenty years of war, a thoroughlyjoyless place. Then, the pilot saw what he hadbeen looking for — a circle of armored personnelcarriers laagered on a bit of groundsomewhat higher than the surrounding terrain.The metallic sound of his voice over theintercom brought me back to the business athand. "There's the ARVN cav'. Captain. Theyhave an Aussie advisor, with them. He's beenout here by himself since the last Americanwas wounded. He'll probably be glad to seeyou." Having said that, he returned to hiscontrols and we quickly lost altitude as weapproached a spot marked by a billowingpurple smoke grenade. Just before removing

GOOD ON YA MATE! 63my headset, I got a last word from the pilot."Hope you like rice, Sir. Good Luck!"The sand blown up by the helicopter hadnot yet settled when I was greeted by theAustralian advisor. Within minutes, he was10 provide me with the first of several import -ant lessons that have stayed with me ever since.it I were asked to describe this first lesson, orperhaps give it a title, I would probably saythis: Good manners and consideration forothers need not be abandoned in the field.The lean man in faded olive drab and theblack beret was smiling a genuine welcomeas he extended his hand. Introducing himself,Mr. Smith* did not hesitate to shoulder partof my equipment as we trudged through thesoft sand to where my Vietnamese counterpartlounged in the meagre shade of his personnelcarrier.Although I had little chance to talk to thisFriendly Australian as I puffed along underthe mountain of gear that I had been issuedin Saigon, he must have sized me up ratherquickly. His sharp eyes took in the signs ofmy previous service in Vietnam. My fadedjungle fatigues, battered boots, and Montagnardbracelet told the story of an earlier tourin the Central Highlands as well as the 25thInfantry Division patch on my right sleeve.During the introductions that followed, whichhe carried off smoothly in a mixture of Vietnameseand English, my new-found friendexhibited considerable savoir-faire as he presentedme to the troop commander as "... acombat veteran who has returned to Vietnamto assist his allies in fighting Communism."A small point? Perhaps. It was sufficient,'.hough, to establish my credentials with mycounterpart, a man who had seen a virtualparade of American "advisors" over the years.The extra effort made by this Australian toease my entry into a new and strange environmentimpressed me tremendously. I have triedto remember this example of sensitivity andsocial acumen in my dealings with foreignofficers ever since.My first few weeks with the armored cavalrytroop were busy, physically demanding, andconfusing. I soon found that the commanderof the troop was not particularly eager topractise his English, had no desire to emigrateto San Francisco, and was singularly un-* Not his real name.impressed with my limited command of Vietnamese.Mr. Smith was to be my counsellor,instructor, and buffer during that tryingbreaking-in period.The Australian began teaching me somebasic Vietnamese phrases and displayed greatpatience at the end of each day as 1 happilyreverted to English and prattled on incessantlyabout the wife, son, and hamburgers I so sorelymissed. After listening to my questions andcomments regarding the strange ways of theVietnamese troops in the unit, Mr. Smithpressed another nugget of wisdom upon me:Don't assume too much.Many times since, I have reflected on hissound advice. As he pointed out, a professionalofficer, tied as he is to the doctrines andpractices of his own service, and a product ofhis particular society, is especially susceptibleto the pitfalls that await one who assumes thatforeigners act and think as he does. It is fartoo easy to deal in superficial aspects of unitorganization and tactics when serving withforces of different countries, ignoring the lessobvious considerations of religion, values, andsociety. The surprise that comes from realizingthat they really are not "just like us" canbe a jolting experience. Luckily for me. "my"Aussie (as I had come to regard him) was ableto help me over many of the stumbling blocksthat tripped some of the poorly preparedAmerican advisors in Vietnam.After several weeks of preliminary drizzling,the monsoon season set in during mid-October.By that time, our troop had left the Hue area.We moved north into Quang Tri Province andassumed the defence of the eastern segmentof the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that dividedNorth and South Vietnam. During the lastmonths of 1969 and the first quarter of 1970,we fought a series of sharp, dirty actions inwhich death and wounds often came amidstthe cold, swirling fog which usually coveredthe sodden gray sand fiats and scrubby foothillsof the region. It was during this periodof awful monsoon weather that I learnedsomething else from Mr. Smith. When you'retruly miserable, "courage" can mean changingyour socks. Yes, I said changing \oursocks! I could just as easily have said cleaningyour weapon, checking the night positionsin a driving rain, shaving, or even forcing asmile, telling a joke. When the elements seem

*4 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALto lose their neutrality and alls themselveswith the enemy, it is so easy, so enticing, tosimply withdraw into your miserable shell,forgetting everything other than the futileattempt to stay dry. It was in just this typeof situation that my Aussie displayed his owncourage and determination. He said, "Anyfool can sit like a lump in the rain. It takesa proper soldier to live and fight in this muck!"I listened, I learned. I changed my socks,drank my tea, shared the "CARE" packageshis wife sent from Sydney, and learned, onceagain, to laugh in spite of myself. With Mr.Smith's help, 1 fought and won the battleagainst the North Vietnamese, the weather,and my own self-pity.Another point that he drove home was anobvious one, but one that has been frequentlyoverlooked. Simply put, it was this: Americanscan learn something from their allies. Toomany Americans have felt, as I did, that "Madein U.S.A." stamped on a piece of equipmentnecessarily made it a superior product. Thispoint of view is not only shortsighted, but isalso an indicator of the "tunnel vision" thatcan afflict soldiers of any nationality. Over thepast few years, 1 have seldom missed an opportunityto expound on this theme to my fellowAmericans. As a teaching point, 1 will oftenpull my handy Australian-issue ration canopener from my pocket. Although similar tothe American type, the addition of an extrainch of tin provides not only a spoon, but theleverage needed to open a can of army rationswithout cursing. Want another example? Considerthe fact that a pair of Australian armyboots is still a status symbol among Americanveterans of Vietnam. Those Americans whomanaged to "acquire" a pair of these willnot part with them. Talk to an Americanhelicopter pilot about the advantages of theAustralian metal cargo net and you will hearthe oft-repeated comment, "Why don*t wehave that piece of gear?" Of course, thepoint to be made here is not that Australiansmake a good can opener. I am talking aboutan appreciation of what we can learn fromothers if we will but try.As the end of Mr. Smith's tour of dutyapproached, we spent many evenings talkingabout his home and the family in Australiathat he was so anxious to see again. One night,shortly before he left, out talk was broken bythe distant, but unmistakable plop, plop, plopof mortar rounds leaving their tubes. We werealready diving for cover when the first 82-mmrounds began exploding in the centre of thetroop's night position. Soon, ground flaresbegan to pop as North Vietnamese sappersand infantry assaulted the thin circle of barbedwire ringing our perimeter.During the next four hours, we fought off asuccession of enemy ground attacks. On severaloccasions, the enemy breached our defencesand fighting took place at close quarters.It was during the last enemy assault that Ilooked up from my radio just in time to seea North Vietnamese running toward us with agrenade in each hand. Firing his weapon ata cluster of sappers on the other side of ourperimeter, Mr. Smith did not see the dangerapproaching from behind. Thanks more to luckthan to marksmanship, I was able to hit theNVA soldier with several rounds from mypistol. Knocked off his feet by the heavy .45calibre slugs, the NVA slid to a stop at theAussie's feet. I think 1 will always rememberthe flash of my friend's smile when, after aquizzical look at the dead man, he turned andsaid, simply, "Good on ya', Mate." This shortphrase, coming from the professional that Ihad come to admire so much, meant moreto me than he will ever know.It was with real sadness that I bid farewellseveral weeks later to this man who had taughtme so much. Both of us talked past the lumpsin our throats as he boarded the helicopterthat would carry him on the first leg of hislong trip home. As soldiers of previous warscan testify, the bonds between soldiers of twonations fighting side by side can become exceptionallystrong. Forged of friendship andmutual respect, these ties and the lessons thatcan be learned from one another should neverbe taken lightly. In my view, they may wellbe priceless. Today, as 1 look back on myexperiences in Vietnam, the unpleasant thoughtsare less distinct, the recollections of good timesgrow ever stronger. Running through manyof my memories is the picture of that smilingprofessional soldier from Australia. I won'tforget the lessons he taught me. My Aussie,who, without knowing it, paid me his greatestcompliment with the simple phrase, "Goodon ya', Mate!"U