ISSUE 1 : Nov/Dec - 1976 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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ISSUE 1 : Nov/Dec - 1976 - Australian Defence Force Journal

BHBHl^BHHONOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1976No. 1


INTRODUCTIONTO THE DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALThe Hon D. J. Kitten, MPMinister for DefenceIWELCOME this opportunity to contributeto the inaugural issue of the Defence ForceJournal.I have often noted in this country the paucityof informed debate on Defence. Indeed, onlylast March I made the point that Parliamentitself hasn't been exposed to a full day's debateon Defence in two and a half years.Those of us who are concerned with Defencewill agree that the processes of command ofthe Services, of defence policy formulation andof administration are dynamic areas of activity.Change is continuous and differences of viewand judgement are to be expected.This requires of those intimately connectedwith Defence, both in the Services and in theDepartment, the exchange of ideas, and thecultivation of reflectiveness and analysis aspositive disciplines.In its own particular way the Defence ForceJournal should contribute directly to this aimof informed discussion. It should also providea means whereby we may have a more constructiveand more enlightened approach to theissues of Australian Defence.I wholeheartedly support the Defence ForceJournal, its aims and ambitions. I hope itwill encourage and stimulate professionaldiscussion of the issues involved in the broadfields of military and defence matters. U


A NEW CHALLENGEGeneral Sir Francis HassettAC, KBE.CB, DSO.MVOChief of Defence Force StaffTHE publication of the first edition of theDefence Force Journal marks anotherstep in the evolution of defence organization,philosophy and professionalism. Emergingfrom the Australian Army Journal, which hasbuilt a proud tradition over the past twentyeightyears, the Defence Force Journal providesfor the first time a magazine wherein "Defence"matters in their broadest context can beaddressed.The modern-day complexities of the militaryart, involving decision making in a rapidlychanging arena of world events, economicvicissitudes, technological change, socialawakenings and different values, provide avery real and new challenge for those associatedwith the profession-of-arms. In thischallenge there is opportunity for the concernedperson to make a contribution towards unravellingthe intricacies of some of the more intractableproblem areas and to throw light on justhow these miizht be solved.With the advent of this Journal, I see ameans by which those who are anxious tomake contributions to the profession-of-armsand its understanding can make their ideasand views known.Articles submitted for publication should beimaginatively argued and documented; theyshould be constructively critical but devoid ofpersonal criticism or animosity. Only thenwill they make a sound contribution to thesum of our knowledge and understanding andmaintain the high tradition of the military atlarge. The credibility and future worth of thisJournal is largely in the hands of its governingbody and more importantly in the handsof those who are its contributors.I commend the Journal to you — make useof it for a better understanding and exchangeof views on the many problems which faceus in our particular defence environment. (J


A STEP FORWARDSir Arthur Tange CBESecretary, Department of Defence"Every nation great or small . . . is fundamentallyeoncerned with its ability to defend theintegrity of its territory and maintain internalorder. No Government can be indifferent to itssecurity, however it defines it; and securityrequirements will compete with economic andsocial development for a share of whateverresources are available."HENRY KISSINGER.IN providing for the security of Australiaand its interests, it is a major task ofGovernment to decide how much of the nation'sresources can responsibly be devoted toDefence. Devoting more money is not in itselfsufficient. Judgment and careful discernmentare necessary to determine that mix of defencecapabilities which best provides for the country'sdefence requirements in the foreseeablestrategic circumstances.The Government looks to its professionaldefence advisers, Service and civilian, for adviceon these matters. Our task is to calculate thedefence requirements rationally — to makea true assessment of the changing strategicoutlook for Australia, examine the enduringphysical environment of the country, and thenpresent to Government a choice of capabilityoptions for the Defence Force.Future needs will ditfer from those of eventhe quite recent past. Changes that haveoccurred in the rest of the world, and Australia'smore independent stance in internationalaffairs, require that Australia should have aDefence Force more self-reliant in militarycapability and more oriented towards thedefence of Australia and its interests. Definingour future defence capability requirementsis a large and complex task that embracesmany types of professionalism.Old ideas die hard, especially when valuedtradition surrounds them, but new ideas areno better than the pcrceptiveness, imaginationand prudence of those who originate them.But ideas are what Australia needs in orderto create a Defence Force and a defence policytruly reflecting the requirements of independentAustralia in the decades ahead. Every professionshares experience within itself. It ishealthiest when it also exchanges innovativeideas. The Defence Force Journal will providean opportunity for our Service membersof the profession of arms. As a civilian administrator,f look forward to reading future issuesof the Journal. I hope there will be a placefor the civilians to make a contribution as well,on subjects within their competence, y


X A EDITORIALf DEFENCE] FORCE JOURNALoTHE first of what it is hoped will be a longline of Defence Force Journals makes itsappearance this month. It is not intended tobe a replacement for the Army Journal, whichtook its final bow in October after twenty-eightyears, but a new Journal with new ideals,embracing the three Armed Services and thecivilian component of the Defence Forces, inthe spirit of the recent reorganisation.To achieve this, the Management Committeehas agreed that a new format is required: anew cover, larger size, and less restricted policytowards article content. In this, we are delightedto have the backing and encouragement of theMinister for Defence, the Chief of the DefenceForce Staff and the Secretary of the Departmentof Defence.The quality of content of the first issue ishigh. We hope to maintain the standard andto improve upon it. To do that, we need theco-operation of you, the reader. More articles,letters and photographs you may think suitablefor the frontispiece or to illustrate your article,are urgently required. Short pieces of interest,which, while not constituting an article, may beextremely useful as a "filler" for the odd page,are also welcome.It is our desire to include as much originalcontent as possible, though this does not meanthat reprints will not be used where these areconsidered to be of interest to Australianreaders, and may come from journals notreadily available to the average person.To those authors who have already submittedarticles and may be becoming impatient,because they have still not seen themselves inprint; be assured, you haven't been forgotten.With a limited number of pages, the need tobalance content — more especially now, sincefour communities must be considered — andthe currency of the subject, some articles haveto be held back for future issues.To save time, authors of articles are againurged to submit them typed in duplicate, doubleor one-and-a-half spacing, on one side of thepaper only, where possible and where relevantsecurity cleared, and with a short biographyattached. Notes should be included at the endof the article. These are most important, sincethey add authority to your argument.There is an urgent need for book reviewers,especially from the Navy, or from those interestedin naval history. Any reviewer has theright to keep the review copy of the book, whichshould be ample compensation for the workinvolved. Anyone interested should contact theManaging Editor, stating his or her line ofinterest."Finally," in the words of the poet Goetheat the launching of one of the world's first newspapers,the Ziircher Zeitung in 1780, "readersare reminded that all beginnings are difficult,but that progress will be made . . . "y


THE SECONDTIME AROUNDCan Australia Survive?Major Adrian R. BlackRoyal Australian EngineersPrefaceOF the 332,000 Australian troops whoembarked to fight in the distant theatresof Wond War 1, 216,000 became casualties.World War 11 cost Australia a further 107,000killed, captured or wounded in operationalareas. Since 1945 thousands of Australianshave died or been injured in Korea. Malaysiaand Vietnam.If you try to provide a simple answer tothe enormous question, 'What was it all for?",you must inevitably return to one thing:national survival. No matter whether thedirect cause of involvement appeared to beof duty to the mother country or of a pleafor help from an alty in the face of aggression,judged in the ba'ance of history each commitmentwas made to establish and preserve Australia'sposition as a separate nation in theworld community.Only once before, in the darker days of1941 and 1942, have we faced a direct andpowerful threat to our survival as a nation.With a life span of three-quarters of a singleMajor Black graduated from the Royal MilitaryCollege, Duntroon in 1962. He obtained the degreeof Bachelor of Technology in Civil Engineering inAdelaide in 1964. He served as a Troop Commanderwith a Construction Squadron in Sahah during 1965and with I Field Squadron in Vietnam in 1968-69.After a year as an instructor at our own School ofMilitary Engineering, he was selected as the AustralianExchange Officer to the US Army EngineerSchool at Fort Bclvoir, Virginia, where he servedduring 1971-72. After attending Staff College in 1973.he commanded 21 Construction Squadron, planningand executing a major civil engineering project —"Operation Red Rooster", the construction of OrchardAirfield for 161 Reconnaissance Squadron at Holsworthy.He is currently serving in Concepts Sectionon the staff of Headquarters Field Force Command.century, interrupted only by this brief andsolitary danger, it is not surprising that wecannot seem to draw on our history to guideour future. Unfortunately the broader lessonsof world history dictate that our lime is runningout. Even the most cursory study of ourtotal value as a resource — that is, of spacefor people to live, of food to eat. of resourcesfor industry and of capacity to produce —against our capacity to defend this resource,shows a frightening imbalance in this capacity.It is totally illogical to pretend that othernations will not covet our resources nor recognizethe imbalance; it defies all precedent inthe history of the causes of armed conflict.Our present reaction to the unpredictablebut nevertheless inevitable threat to ournational survival, is a dotv awakening backedup by what is little more than a token defencecapability. At our present rate of progresstowards being prepared to defend Australia,it is inevitable that we will have too little toolate. Something new? Not at all. Even in ourbrief history it has happened once before. Ourpreparations for the threat which materializedin 1941 were almost as inadequate as the preparationswe are making now. The disturbingdifference is that although the lessons of historyare now available, we seem to have chosento ignore them.IntroductionIn evolving coneepts for the defence of Australiaagainst invasion now or in the future, itis vital that we should have learnt from thelessons of the past. This is not to say thatwe should give credence to the critics whoinsist that Generals are always preparing tofight the last war, but that we should derivereal value from a study of what has gonebefore.


8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALThis paper traces the development of plansfor the land defence of Australia prior to theJapanese threat of 1941-1942, the only periodin our history in which a strong and directthreat of invasion has occurred. The aim ofthis paper is to highlight the lessons of an erawith the hope that we can apply them andsurvive "the second time around".The First Twenty YearsCo-ordination of a national defence effortwas one of the reasons for Federation. ColonelWilliam Bridges set to work to draft the firstdefence plan in 1906, modifications to whichwere proposed by Lord Kitchener during hisstay in 1909. Kitchener proposed the raisingof a citizen army of 80,000 and his recommendationswere accepted; however by theoutbreak of war in 1914 the proposals werestill two or three years away from implementation.The sense of security which Australia feltin 1914 was derived from a combination offactors, principal among which were the lackof any immediate threat, and the naval supremacyof Britain made more certain by the Anglo-Japanese alliance; it was not due to any homegrowndefence capacity. That Australia wasable to send abroad a fighting force of over330,000 volunteers over the next four yearsremains the most selfless mass response to aplea for help in our short history. This responsestrengthened the post-war notion that any Australiancould become a first rate soldier withlittle training, a view which supported thearguments of those who saw little need for adefence force in the peace that followed "thewar to end all wars".In 1919 the leaders of the right-wing politicalparty remained strongly of the opinion thatAustralian-British links should remain firm;most believed also that at least an efficientnucleus defence force must be maintained asa part of the Empire network. But even themodest defence plans of 1920 and 1921 werestrongly opposed in parliament by those whofelt that expenditure on defence could not bejustified. The general agreement on defencematters, which had transcended party politicallines after Federation, had been lost in thebitterness of the conscription debates duringthe war and was not to return.BETWEEN THE WARSEmpire DefenceThe Imperial Conferences of 1921, 1923 and1926 confirmed Australian participation in theEmpire Defence Scheme as the correct defenceresponse in the post-war situation. SuccessiveAustralian Governments echoed the importanceof Singapore, the British Fleet and navalpower. These were held up to be the keystonesof Empire defence in the eastern hemisphere.In the years which followed the 1923 Conference,Lieutenant Colonel (later LieutenantGeneral) Wynter and a number of other staffofficers opposed this view, arguing that in amajor conflict Great Britain was likely to beengaged elsewhere and that Singapore wasvulnerable to landward attack. They contendedthat the soundest policy for Australia was tomaintain an Army capable of defending thestrategically important south-eastern part ofAustralia until help arrived. The need for afleet based in Australia was also identified.Although these views were reflected in partin later plans, the proponents of EmpireDefence had the greater influence on defencepolicy (and in turn on evolving defence plans),throughout the period between the wars. Thedefence of Australia against invasion as a contingencynot involving British power was neverproperly considered by an Australian Governmentuntil the difficult days of late 1941.As a result, although military plans wereclearly directed towards the ultimate defencerequirement (against invasion), planners wererestricted by both the realities of difficult economictimes and by a defence policy whichemphasised raids as far more probable thaninvasion - - a legacy of the value placed onBritish naval power.The Plan of ConcentrationIn 1933, Lieutenant Colonel Sturdee (a wartimeChief of the General Staff (CGS), butthen the Director of Military Operations andIntelligence), briefed senior Staff Corps officerson the "Plan of Concentration" which ArmyHeadquarters had produced. A scenario wasoutlined for an exercise which followed thisbriefing which clearly showed Japan to be themost likely aggressor. It was foreseen that ifJapan chose to invade Australia they would,for a variety of reasons, require a quick deci-


THE SECOND TIME AROUND. CAN AUSTRALIA SURVIVE? 9sion. The key conclusion was that Japan wouldhave to seize an area vital to the continuanceof economic life in Australia if a quick decisionwas to be obtained.This line of deductive reasoning led to theselection of three vital areas: Sydney, Newcastleand Melbourne. It was considered that all theother capital cities (and presumably some otherimportant population centres, particularly thosewith good port facilities), were important butnot critical to the main war effort or to theeconomic life of the country as a whole.Thus the principal aim of the war plans ofthe time was to be the prevention of enemyseizure of Sydney and Newcastle. Melbournewas excluded from this top priority groupingas it was considered less open to attack thanthe cities to the north.The selection of these areas was not difficult.Sydney, the most important area, held nearlyone-fifth of the total population, was the chiefport with the only Naval repair establishmentand was the largest industrial area in Australia.Newcastle was the main coal producing areaand the principal centre of steel production.Its loss would be serious but a continued effortmight be possible using Wollongong coal andsteel produced in Port Kembla. Melbourneat the time contained nearly one-sixth of thepopulation, was the second port and industrialarea of Australia and the main centre of munitionworks.The planned force deployment after concentrationof field forces as opposed to garrisonforces would place a corps near Sydney,a corps near Newcastle and a brigade pluslight horse regiment to each of Melbourne,Perth. Brisbane and Hobart. Lesser forceswould deploy to Darwin, while local forceswould protect Adelaide. The anticipateddegree of warning for an invasion was set ata maximum of seven weeks.This Plan of Concentration, with its emphasison the defence of areas vital to the continuedeconomic functioning of the nation, remainedthe basis of military planning for continentaldefence into the early 1940s.Army Headquarters produced an updatedversion of the plan in June 1937; the "StrategicConcentration, Outline Plan". This plan providedthat if a state of war was imminent orhad been declared, different measures wouldbe adopted dependent on the assessed powerof the enemy. These measures, in order ofincreasing commitment, were:• the adoption of one of the stages associatedwith District Base DefenceSchemes;• General Mobilization; and• Strategic Concentration.As with the earlier plan, Sydney-Newcastlewas defined as the "most vital area" and thisplan therefore provided once again for StrategicConcentration in New South Wales, ie. in the2nd Military District (2MD). To provide theflexibility to meet significant threats to otherthan the most vital area, "Places of Mobilization"were to be chosen to facilitate concentrationin districts other than 2MD.The implementation of various plans bystages was to be attuned to Government decreeon the state of the international situation. Inincreasing order of gravity, these would be:• a "Period of Tension", when the internationalsituation became critical andduring which defence preparations mightbe accelerated by emergency arrangements;• the "Precautionary Stage", when thepossibilty of war appeared so imminentas to require taking defence precautions;and• the "War Stage", when the probabilityof war was immediate.Provision was made in the District BaseDefence Schemes for the manning of coastfortress defences during a Period of Tensionand for the mobilization, on adoption of thePrecautionary Stage, of 13 battalions for thelocal protection of forts and the defence ofvulnerable points. On General Mobilization,10 garrison battalions would be raised to relieve10 battalions of the Field Army allotted to thelocal protection of the forts.On the completion of Strategic Concentration,the Field Forces were to be disposedas shown in Figure 1, with:• GHQ, GHQ Troops. L of C Troops andFirst Army (of two corps, each of threedivisions) in 2MD;


!() DM i:\CI I OK( 1 lot K\ \l• a mixed brigade in each of 1, 3, 5 and6 MD; and• one battalion under Darwin Command.The timetable for mobilization had beenshortened considerably. Advanced guards ofcovering troops were to be in position by the14th day and the mobilization of the FieldForces was to be substantially complete b_\the 20th day. Strategic Concentration was tocommence on the 21st day, while mobilizationwas to be completed by the 30th day.The Effect of Defence PolicyThis plan for Strategic Concentration wasnot the only Army plan in being or underpreparation. Government defence policy hadstrongly affected planning priorities and it isworth pausing to look at the effect of the policyof the time on the development of Army plans.This policy was lucidly stated in a speech tothe parliament by Prime Minister Lyons on24th August 1937. In light of a recent ImperialConference, which obviously echoed many ofthe principles agreed in the Conferences of1923 and 1926, he reaffirmed his Government'sbelief in the dependence on a Singapore basedfleet for security in the eastern hemisphere.It was contended that Singapore was "a verypowerful fortress", 1 was becoming evenstronger and would not fall. The possibilityof the Fleet being inextricably involved elsewherewas dismissed on the grounds that theUnited Kingdom would not spend a huge sumon a fleet and a base at Singapore for the protectionof its own vast interests, if it did notintend to safeguard them should the need arise.Australia's vital interests which were to besafeguarded by whatever means necessary,were:• the free passage of overseas and coastalseaborne trade: and• the maintenance of territorial integrityagainst attack either in the form ofinvasion or raids.The Government reaffirmed that the firstline of security against invasion was Navaldefence, with the Army and Air Force supplementingand co-operating. Forward Navaldefence was seen as far preferable to a landand air battle on home ground with Armyand Air Forces which were likely to be inadequate.This Government direction meant thatpriority in continental defence matters uas togo to defence against raids a-- the most probableform of attack. Acknowledging that seapower alone could not provide a completedefence against raids, the Government calledfor the Army to provide for the defence ofvital locations using a combination of fixeddefences and forces sufficient to deal with landingparties.Converting this policy to guide the preparationof war plans, Army Headquarters produceda memorandum which complied withthe requirement to give first priority to defenceagainst raids. It was obviously recognized,however, that any lesser plan should be bothcomplete in itself to enable sole implementationwhile fitting into the framework of plans ofgreater scope, all plans being regarded as partsof one complete structure. Despite the prioritygiven to defence against raids, clearly the ultimateplan in military eyes remained that ofdefence against all-out invasion.Nevertheless, detailed war plans were to beprepared strictly in the following priority:• District Base Defence Schemes;• Mobilization of the First Line Componentof the Field Forces;• Raising and despatch of an F.xpeditionaryForce; and• General Mobilization:— without Strategic Concentration:— with Strategic Concentration (to conformwith the Strategic Concentration.Outline Plan).The Government had approved the retentionof the existing nucleus Army organizationof two cavalry divisions, the equivalent of fiveinfantry divisions. District Base Troops andfull manning of the fixed defences. Becauseof the priority given to defence against raids,however, a lesser force to be known as theFirst Line Component was considered sufficientfor current needs. This lesser forceretained the full district and fixed defenceforces, but reduced the field forces to threecavalry brigades, two infantry divisions andfour mixed brigades. This organization wasstill designed to provide a nucleus and a frameworkfor general mobilization to meet thedanger of invasion. Plans were to be based


THE SECOND TIME AROUND. CAN AUSTRALIA SURVIVE? 11on the mobilization of the full order of battle,but were to be prepared to allow mobilizationof the First Line Component alone if thisshould be ordered.To simplify planning and to facilitate mobilization,it was considered necessary that thepeace and war organization should conformas closely as possible. Every unit to be activatedon general mobilization was to containa nucleus in peace in some existing unit, usuallya few officers and NCOs.C organization by the 21st day. On StrategicConcentration being ordered, this nucleus wasto expand in accordance with the L of C Plan,which provided for a main base in the Bathurstarea, west of Sydney, and an advanced basenear Muswellbrook. north-west of Newcastle.The Base Ammunition Depot was to be atAlbury to utilise existing storage facilities.1937 : PLANNED DISPOSITIONSAFTER STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONXX -.XX -[§Ji E3 2xx ^.XX.IxH-) E>s|3The plan for maintenance of the force insituations short of General Mobilizationrequired no national support or Line of Communication(L of C) system, maintenance beingundertaken within districts. On General Mobilization,2MD were to institute a nucleus L ofFig. 1Late ChangesA number of significant changes to warplans and peace organizations were recommendedin 1938 and 1939. The InspectorGeneral of the Australian Military Forces,Lieutenant General Squires, recommended inDecember 1938 that the peace establishmentof the First Line Component should beincreased to 60,000, with all Militia fighting


DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALunits to be manned to approximately twothirdsof their war establishment. Soon after.the CGS recommended that the peace establishmentof the Militia should be further raisedto 105,000 to provide for the more rapidmobilization which would be necessary to meeta possible invasion. These increases werepartly met, a strength of 80,000 being attainedthrough voluntary recruiting by mid-1939.Squires had also recommended the raising ofa permament Army force of about 8,000, toprovide a covering force for the mobilizationof the Militia. Though Cabinet approved thisproposal in principle in March 1939, they laterrejected the scheme, ostensibly on the groundsof cost effectiveness in view of the time theforce would take to be ready as a permanentArmy.Squires' other radical proposal was eventuallyimplemented, but not until October 1939.He proposed a regrouping of the existing districtbases into four "commands" — Northern(Queensland). Eastern (New South Wales),Southern (Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia)and Western, with an independent garrisonat Darwin. Each was to be responsiblefor the training and wartime operations of theformations in its area, leaving Army Headquartersto deal only with these five subordinateheadquarters on all matters.In a detailed appreciation forwarded to theSecretary in February 1939, the CGS againraised the question of having a more highlytrained, ready-force available. He pointed outthat in the event of a serious attack beforeGeneral Mobilization or Strategic Concentrationwas possible, it was essential to havea highly mobile, well trained element of theField Force to reinforce a threatened area orto cover the concentration of other formations.He recommended the raising of a "mobiledivision" composed of at least 50% permanenttroops to enable rapid action when required.It seems that no action was taken on thisrecommendation prior to the outbreak of thewar.The CGS urged a rapid improvement in railfacilities to aid strategic concentration, an indicationthat planned timings may have beenambitious. He further urged a joint servicereview of the defence situation, but, as will beseen later, no joint service plan for the defenceof Australia was produced by the time it wasneeded.A Manpower Committee chaired by MajorGeneral Blarney had been formed in late 1938and was active in 1939 compiling a list ofreserved occupations and examining personnelallocations in an emergency to the armed forces,defence industries and essential services. SeniorArmy planners had long based their plans ona broad rule of thumb that an industrialisedstate could spare one in ten of its populationto the fighting services. Planners had assumedthat the Army would be able to maintain atfull strength in a long war not more than eightdivisions. Events later proved these estimatesto be a reasonable basis for planning.During the post-depression period from 1935to 1938, funds available to the Army steadilyincreased but were still limited. At the insistenceof the military, priority in expenditurewas given to the purchase of the equipmentwhich would be necessary to outfit a muchlarger force, rather than to manpower. Followingthe disturbing international events inEurope and China in early 1938, the Governmentannounced a doubling of expenditurefor the next three years and this was furtherboosted in December 1938 after the Munichcrisis. Despite this belated emphasis ondefence expenditure and the Army's ownspending priorities, it was too late to enablean adequate level of equipping to be reachedprior to the outbreak of war in September1939. Machines and weapons ordered in 1935had still not been delivered from British factoriesnow fully committed in a late bid toequip their own Army.FINALPREPARATIONSThe Lull Before The Storm: Plans ReviewedIn December 1939, while the first contingentof the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (AIF)was preparing to embark to fight again on theother side of the world, the CGS ordered anew appreciation for the employment of theArmy in the defence of Australia. This wouldbe the basis for a review of existing plans andfor the compilation of new plans. This appreciationdefined the role of the Army as:• the defence of certain vital and vulnerableareas against heavy raids, wherelittle or no warning is given; and


THE SECOND TIME AROUND. CAN AUSTRALIA SURVIVE? 13• to be prepared to expand to resist invasionaimed at capturing and dominatingthe vital centres of the nation.The most probably enemy objectives wereconsidered to be the south-east of the continent(Sydney. Newcastle and Melbourne) and Perth.Defence of those areas was seen to be ofprimary consideration in disposing the FieldArmy. A need was foreseen for the defenceof more distant populated areas, with specialprovisions for Darwin. In these distant areas,locally raised detachments would cope withlight raids and would delay heavy raids untilthe arrival of a mobile reserve.From a consideration of the distancesbetween likely objective areas it was deducedthat reliance on a mobile strategic reserve wasnot practical, although mobile tactical reserveswould be required. This meant that the defensivesystem as a whole was to be of staticnature. For the defence of the main ports,fortress troops in an extensive system ofdefence works for immediate defence were to bebacked up by the highly mobile tactical reservestasked with engaging unpredicted landings andsupporting fortress troops in destroying theenemy.It was appreciated that operational readinessneeded to be improved. For planning, themaximum degree of warning of heavy raidswas set at 14 days. From May 1940, the wholeArmy was to be able to reach an effective warfooting within 14 days.On 29th April 1940 a General Staff paperwas produced which examined the problemof meeting a Japanese attack of not less thantwo divisions. In this review there was nochange suggested to the general defence plansand it was assumed that General Mobilizationwas still to be implemented. An "effective warstrength" (presumably referring to the fightingelement of the Army) of 114,000 was assumed,of which a maximum of 75,000 would be availablefor the Field Force.Attacks on rail links were considered probable,making reliance on the railways for theconcentration of forces an unwise policy. Allof these factors, along with the requirement forreserves to be highly mobile, led to a requirementto change the initial deployment of theArmy from the dispositions previously plannedin the Strategic Concentration, Outline Plan.Forces to be deployed near Brisbane, Newcastle.Sydney-Port Kembla, Melbourne andPerth were to be greatly strengthened, at theexpense of the Field Force available for concentration.This latter force was to be reducedto one cavalry division, four infantry divisions,each less a brigade group, and Army troops.The mobilization timetable was to be furthertightened in view of the increasing Japanesethreat. Covering troops of defended ports wereto be at 24 hours notice. All troops involvedin the protection of defended ports were to bein position by the 4th day. The Field Forcewas to be completely mobilized by the 10thday and initially deployed within Commandsby the 13th day.It was suggested that the initial deploymentof the Field Force to provide immediate supportto the main defended ports and to retainflexibility for subsequent concentration, miahtbe:• one division (—) : Toowoomba-Wallangarra;° one division (—) and Army Troops;Newcastle-Singleton;• one division (—) and Army Troops;Sydney-Liverpool; and• One division (—) : Seymour.Despite these reassessments of the requirementsfor continental defence, a lingeringimpression of the unlikelihood of Japaneseinvasion pervades many of the papers writtenat the time. A sense of urgency over furtherdefence preparations appeared to be lackingas late as 1940 and in the first half of 194LTwo factors probably accounted for this, thefirst and most obvious being the remotenessof the war against Germany and of the ATFcontingent. The second was the continuingbelief that Singapore would stand firm to enablethe intervention of the British fleet, a legacyof pre-war Government emphasis.Late in August 1941, Sir John Latham, theAustralian representative in Tokyo, wroteunofficially to the Prime Minister concerningthe possible invasion of Australia. His principalthesis was that a strong Air Force shouldbe the primary defence against invasion, beingthe only sure means of denying the enemybases from which such an attack could belaunched. He proposed a powerful Air Force


14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALcapable of long distance operation, with basesin northern parts of Australia. He suggestedthat a point or line should be defined, beyondwhich any advance by a potential enemy shouldbe considered a threat to Australia. Certainplaces should be seized, if necessary, to preventthe enemy using them as invasion bases.Latham contended, as Lyons had inferredin 1937, that once the enemy established himselfclose at hand, the only alternative wouldbe ultimate surrender. He was of the opinionthat the sort of policy he proposed should bemade public as a deterrent to aggression.It is not certain what influence Latham'spaper had on Government policy or militaryplanning, although his position in Tokyo musthave engendered respect for his opinion. Certainlyhis letter was considered by the DefenceCommittee in November 1941, although theirreaction was not one of grateful acceptance.Once the Japanese threat crystallized in late1941 and early 1942, increases in the Armycommitment to Darwin, North Queenslandand New Guinea were made. By war's endthe Air Force had grown almost four-foldfrom its 1941 strength.Mention was made earlier of the lack ofcombined service planning. When it wasrevealed to the War Cabinet in September1^41 that no joint operational plans existedfor the defence of Australia against invasion,the Government gave directions that this situationwas to be corrected as soon as possible.But time had almost run out.Japanese AdvancesDuring the early days of December 1941,a further appreciation of the defence of Australiawas ordered in light of the rapidly deterioratingsituation, culminating in the attackson Malaya and Pearl Harbor on 7th-8thDecember 1941 and the sinking of the capitalships Repulse and Prince of Wales on 10thDecember 1941. This time the appreciationsconsidered defence against an invasion forceof about eight divisions, concluding that anArmy of 300,000 plus a Volunteer DefenceCorps (VDC) of 50,000 was required, a considerableincrease over any previous estimates.Concern with the manning situation andproposals for the employment of returningAIF troops in the Dutch East Indies, causedSturdee. who by now was CGS, to submit apaper on the subject on 15 February 1942. Hestrongly recommended the diversion and earlyreturn of all AIF elements still overseas,undoubtedly a view strengthened on that sameday by the fall of Singapore. It is a littlefrightening, in retrospect, to consider howclear a threat to Australia was necessary beforeattempts could be made to harness the fullmilitary resources of the nation towards itsdefence.The C-in-C ActsBlarney, who was recalled to command theAustralian Military Forces (AMF) and AlliedLand Forces in March 1942, paraphrasedwhat was still the military thinking of the timein a letter to the Prime Minister written sometime later (January 1944). The letter confirmedthe basic plan which had been in existencefor a decade. He reaffirmed that the areaNewcastle-Sydney-Port Kembla-Lithgow wasmost vital to Australia and that forces hadbeen distributed accordingly. Local forces hadbeen distributed in each state for the protectionof other centres of strategic importance.Garrisons were provided in Western Australia.Darwin and Port Moresby, with detachmentsin adjacent islands because of the difficultiesof movement to these areas. A General Headquarters(GHQ) reserve was provided fromformations raised and located in Victoria andSouth Australia.Blarney confirmed that during the period ofthe rapid Japanese advance (December 1941to mid 1942), the enemy's control of the seato the north confined Australian action to aconcentration on defence measures to retainthe most vital area.A new Chief of Staff appreciation in early1942 was the basis for new plans to increasegarrison forces when troops became available.The Darwin garrison was to be boosted fromtwo brigade groups to one division, WesternAustralia from one brigade group to one divisionand Townsville from one brigade groupto one division.Soon after Blarney's return and assumptionof command, AHQ Operation Instruction No.50 of 9 April 1942 was issued. The land forcesof Australia would consist of a Field Armyand an L of C. The Field Army would be


THE SECOND TIME AROUND. CAN AUSTRALIA SURVIVE? 15APRIL 1942 : OUTLINE DISPOSITION - FIELD ARMY^NEWCASTLE(SYDNEY• PORT KEMBLAFig. 2HOBARTmade up of 1st Army (Queensland and NSW),2nd Army (Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania),3rd Corps in Western Australia, 6thDivision in the Northern Territory and NewGuinea Force (Figure 2). The L of C wasorganized into eight L of C areas, one for eachstate or territory, the commanders also controllingthe fixed coast and anti-aircraft unitsand garrison battalions. GHQ Australia wasformed from AHQ. As C-in-C AMF, Blarneyexercised command over all Australian landforces.1st Army was the key formation, consistingof two corps of six infantry divisions, a motordivision and brigade, the remaining field troopsin Northern and Fastern Commands and corpstroops. GHQ Operation Instruction No 1 of10th April 1942, stressed to the GOC 1stArmy the importance of Brisbane on thenorthern flank of the most vital area, and ofTownsville as a potential enemy port and base.As resources increased it was intended to holdin strength progressively north from Brisbane.The tasks of the 1st Army were to defendthe east coast from Brisbane to southern NSWand to defend Thursday Island and Townsville.2nd Army in the south was to contain onemotorized division, a brigade group, the newlyarrived 41st US Div and other field troops inthe area. In addition to the local defence ofMelbourne, Hobart and Faunceston, 2nd Armywas to supervise the training of all Army unitsand headquarters.Darwin was, for obvious reasons, consideredthe most vulnerable area in Australia and itsretention was s'ated to be of great importanceto future operations. The Commander 6thDivision (soon to be GOC Northern TerritoryForce) was tasked with preventing the seizureand occupation of Darwin, but was to ensurethat his dispositions would not immobilise hisforce in the port area in the event of an invasionin great force. Clearly the AMF couldnot afford the loss of another major formationas had occurred with the loss of the 8thDivision in Singapore.


16 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALThis Field Army organization of April 1942contained ten Australian divisions — seveninfantry, two motorized (formerly cavalry) andone armoured (in the (iHQ Reserve). Therough numerical equivalent of t\u> furtherdivisions was contained in the Northern Territoryand New Guinea Forces. The incomplete41st US Division had arrived and the 32ndUS Division was due to arrive in May.To compute the total Australian land forceorganization of the time, one must add the AIFdivisions; the 6th and 9th (yet to return fromthe Middle East) and the 8th Division (capturedon Singapore). This gives a total fightingforce on paper of around fourteen divisionsor equivalent, from a population at the timeof about 7.2 million people. A force of thissize proved later (in 1943 in particular) to bemore than the nation could bear in a sustainedconflict if industry was to continue.MacArthur's PlanGeneral MacArthur arrived in Australia inmid-March 1942 and was immediatelyappointed Supreme Commander of AlliedForces in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA).On 25th April 1942, in his first directive issuedto Blarney in his role as Commander AlliedI and Forces SWPA, he tasked the Army withpreventing any landing on the north-east coastof Australia or on the south-west coast of NewGuinea. This order would appear to be thefirst major shift in orientation away from thevital areas, focusing attention further norththan the approaches to the Brisbane-Begacoastal stretch guarded by 1st Army; it representeda swing away from the "most vitalarea" strategy long held by Australian planners.Although he undoubtedly recognised theimportance of the Sydney area to Australianindustrial production and to the war effort inthe Pacific, MacArthur apparently placed moreemphasis on denying the enemy bases in northeasternAustralia and New Guinea than hadAustralian planners to this time.The naval losses in the Coral Sea and Midwayeventually stemmed the Japanese tide.American not British naval power had probablysaved Australia from invasion. TheJapanese still landed on New Guinea in July1942 and advanced until halted at Imita Ridgeand defeated at Milne Bay, both in September1942. After these reverses the threat of invasionof Australia gradually diminished. Forthe purpose of studying the evolution of plansfor the defence of Australia, mid-1^42 is asatisfactory exit point.ManpowerOne further item of correspondence is relevantto this studs. In a letter to the PrimeMinister on 4th December 1942, Blarney againraised the manpower question. Although themanpower wastage which caused his concernwas due to losses in New Guinea, this can beused as a comparison with intensive operationallosses which might have occurred followinga major invasion of Australia. In hisletter Blarney reviewed the current distributionof divisions, which was:• three divisions in New Guinea (less onebrigade);• one division in North Queensland andone at Darwin;• two divisions (less one brigade) and onearmoured division in Western Australia;• one greatly reduced division and onearmoured division (then forming) inN.S.W.; and• one reduced division and one armoureddivision (still forming) in Queensland.The armoured divisions had been formed,in Blarney's words, "... with a view to adjustingour organization to weapons which hadpreviously not been available".- The reorganizationwhich had occurred at this time hadalready reduced the Army effectively by 11battalions or roughly one division.This force, equivalent to about eight infantryand two (plus) armoured divisions was distributedaround the perimeter of Australia. Atthis time the 9th Division had still not returnedto Australia from the Middle East. Blarney'spurpose in writing was to press for a furtherreduction of this force by one division and tourge once again the return of the 9th Division.Blarney was recommending that Australia couldonly support a force of about 10 divisionsfollowing the recent heavy fighting and medicalwastage in New Guinea. This figure is probablythe best guide to our potential force ceilingfor today.


THE SECOND TIME AROUND. CAN AUSTRALIA SURVIVE? 17THE LESSONS WE CAN'T AFFORDTO FORGETDefence PolicyBasic to our defence preparedness is theexistence of a clear and sufficiently detailednational defence policy, transcending (as faras possible) party political differences, allowingsteady strategic plan and force developmentand having wide acceptance by the community.No matter what the emphasis of this policy(e.g. the "raids" emphasis of the 1930s), theGovernment must insist that preparations fordefence against invasion by a fully mobilizedAustralia is the ultimate situation for whichthe Services should plan. Any other policythreatens our national survival.AlliancesAny plan which relies on a powerful ally toplay the principal role or even a major partin the defence of this country is unsound. Wemust plan to defend Australia unaided, treatingadditional support as a bonus if it shouldmaterialise. Twenty years of waiting for aBritish fleet which never appeared should tellus that.The Worst CoseDefence strategy for World War II was basedon the preservation, in the ultimate, of theprincipal national economic and populationbase in south-eastern Australia. Though thereare now more areas of strategic importancearound the continent, the economic "heartland"remains unchanged. So long as ourforces are inadequate 10 defend the wholecontinent equally well at any one time, priorityin defence planning must still go to the retentionof the "heartland", which is our mostvital area. This is simply a matter of planningfor the worst case, not an emotional plea toa "Brisbane Line" defeatism.Forward DefenceThe importance of the northern approachesto Australia, from the northern island chainto the remote continental north-west and north,was increasingly recognised as the threat toAustralia became extreme in 1941 and 1942.Control of these approaches remains of theutmost importance to the defence of Australia.Forward defence, by whatever name and inwhatever form, must be a part of our defenceplanning.Strategic MobilityWorld War II plans tackled the problem ofinsufficiency of forces to defend Australia bya combination of fixed coastal and anti-aircraftdefences and a more mobile field force whichcould react against a specific threat. The fieldforce lacked any real strategic mobility andconsequently, as the threat to Australia becamestronger, the field force was diminished ineffectiveness by the requirement to strengthenspecific areas, including areas remote from the"heartland". With the manpower and equipmentlimitations likely, we must cater for thedefence of important areas by relatively staticforces which can be rapidly reinforced by astrategically mobile force of considerablestrength. We must ensure that the transportationmeans are available to make strategicmobility a realistic possibility.Strategic AlternativesEven if our defence capabilities are fullydeveloped, there will be a finite limit to thescale of threat which Australia can hope tocounter by conventional means without theaid of a major ally. Beyond this point, nonconventionalmeans will have to be considered.Joint Service PlanUntil 1942 there was virtually no joint serviceplanning at the national level. A nationalcommand and control structure which recognisesthat defence is a joint service mattermust actually operate in peace as it would inwar. Plans must be developed in the firstinstance on a joint service basis, to ensure thateach element of the force contributes mosteffectively to our defence. Continual jointservice consultation is the only means of ensuringthat our total force is developed in concertwith our perceived strategic priorities.Force StructureA nucleus peacetime force must be structuredto allow rapid expansion on partial orfull mobilization to meet a threat. This requirementwas recognized by the planners of the1930s and did enable a rapid build-up whenit was required. No such plan could be readilyimplemented with our current force structure.We must quickly establish a core force carefullystructured to maintain the essential skillsand to provide the immediate expansion


18 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALnucleus of commanders, instructors andadministrators. Broader plans for mobilisationare urgently required.Equipment PolicyTo allow rapid expansion it is necessary tohave an equipping policy which does not relytoo heavily on overseas supply and which holdsadequate stock levels to equip a rapid!)expanding force, recognizing the long lead timesinherent in a military build-up. The lessonsof the undelivered British orders of 1935 areall too clear. If financial constraints cannotbe lifted, we must consider the solution of the1930s to trade off manpower for equipment.If it takes five years to ob'ain a tank and oneyear to train a tank crewman, simple mathematicsdemands four years of emphasis onbuying the tank.Defence, the Government, the Peopleand the MilitaryAll of what has been said in this article iswasted unless the people of Australia forcethe Government, through the pressure of publicopinion,to maximise our defence capability.Perhaps the most important reason for thepoor state of Australian preparedness to meetthe Japanese in 1941 and 1942 was the limiteddegree of acceptance of military advice on thethreat and on the essential preparations tomeet it. Greater Government acceptance ofmilitary advice is only possible if the communityhas a wider understanding of and concernfor defence. As the principal studentsof the subject of defence, the services mustassume greater responsibility in the process ofenlarging understanding of what nationalsecurity entails.Gavin Long succinctly reveals this crucialdeficiency in "To Benghazi'". Discussing thelack of public awareness, he states:1"There was in Australia no organised groupto press for more effective military defence,nor any journal in which military and navalproblems were discussed with authority . . .with one small exception, no military journalexisted in Australia between the wars. Tothe extent that they thus failed to establishan adequate channel of communication withthe people at large , the officer corps, bothprofessional and amateur, must share, withthe political leaders and the press, theresponsibility for neglect of the army'VThis is perhaps the ultimate lesson. fjNOTESFrom a speech by the Rt. Hon. J. A. Lyons, thePrime Minister, on The Commonwealth Government'sDefence Policy in the light of The ImperialConference. Page 4. Parliamentary Debates. 24thAugust 1937.- In a letter from General Blarney to Prime MinisterCurtin dated 4th December 1942.3 Gavin Long. Australia in the War of 1939-1943,Series One. Army, Volume I. To Benghazi, Page11. Canberra. Australian War Memorial.I asked (iod foi strength, thai I might achiese I was made weak, that I might learn humbl)to obey.I asked for help, that I might do greater things — I was given infirmity, that I might dobetter things.I asked for riches, that I might be happy — I was given poverty, that I might be wise.I asked for all things, that I might enjoy life — I was given life, that I might enjoy all things.I got nothing that I asked for — but everything that I had hoped for.Despite myself, my prayers were answered. I am. among all men, most richly blessed.Written by an anonymous soldier.AWARDSThere will be a prize of $30 in cash to be awarded to the author or authors of the bestoriginal article in each issue of the Defence Force Journal, as judged by the lioard of Management.All prizewinners will then be eligible to compete for the annual prize of $21)0 for firstplace and S75 for runner-up. again judged by the Board of Management.


umMPMBimfBB 1M•JaMISTMMH SMICtSCommander P. J. M. Shevlin. AMRoyat Australian NavyIN February 1974 Lt. Col. L. D. Johnson,CO of 4 RAR, wrote an article for theArmy Journal on 'The Need for an AustralianAmphibious Force'. In that article he madethe points that:• between Cocos and Christmas Islands tothe north and the Antarctic Islands ofHeard and McDonald in the south, Australiahas defence responsibilities for ninegroups of islands;• for deployment to many undevelopedparts of the continental Australian coastsea lines of communication must be used;and• a purely land-based, land-air operationstrained Army would be unable to deployquickly enough to meet all the needs ofcontinental defence and would be unableto cope adequately with operationsrequired for the defence of island territoriesor in the island chain.Lt. Col Johnson postulated that the sort ofAustralian Defence Force that would be ableto cope with Australia's special geographicalproblems needed to be structured around anamphibious organisation as such a force wouldCommander Shevlin went to sea in the RN in May1943 and as a Midshipman and Snh-lieutenant participatedin the amphibious invasions of, and tacticalre-deployment along the coasts, of, Sicily, Italy andMalaya. Post-war as a Lieutenant and LieutenantCommander he participated in amphibious operationsat Aqaba and at Sue:.; as a frigate captain hecommanded the /VG.V Group at the Kuwait landings;and later commissioned the RN's first LPD. participatedin her trials and first operations in the MiddleEast, and also obtained experience in USN andFrench LPD types. He has been Director of JointWarfare in Navy Office since 1969, and is now ProjectDirector for the new amphibious ship.be essentially mobile, with embarked elementsready for immediate response and with theships free to steam unhindered around thecoast with any type of equipment, unhinderedby geographical obstacles.While strongly supporting L.t. Col Johnson'scall for the Australian Services to be capableof amphibious operations, this writer wouldtake issue with two points in his article; firstlyhis statement concerning the past, that theAustralian Services have fought in wars forover 100 years without having to developparticular skills in amphibious operations, and,secondly, his thesis that although it would bereasonable for Australia to raise a brigadesizeamphibious force, to do so would soinvolve the three Services that they would belimited in the conduct of any independentoperations outside that being undertaken bythe amphibious force. It is considered importantto refute these two ideas because it isbelieved that too wide an acceptance of thesemisconceptions has for too long delayed thecreation of an effective amphibious capabilityin the Australian regular forces.Australian Amphibious HistoryFar from not having had to acquire amphibiousskills, the contrary has been the casefor both RAN and Army in both World Wars.principally for the conduct of operations inthe island archipelago to the north of Australia.The first actions against the German Army byAustralian forces in 1914 were undertaken bythe Australian Naval and Military ExpeditionaryForce (ANMEF) commanded byColonel W. Holmes, DSO, which undertook aseries of successful landings from the newlyconverted amphibious transport, HMAS Berrinia.(Cmdr. J. B. Stevenson. RAN) into New


L20 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALIreland and New Guinea to capture those thenGerman colonies. The Royal Australian Navy'sfirst action casualties were suffered al the firstamphibious landing when Lieutenant CommanderC. B. Flwell was killed, sword in hand,on I lth September 1^14 leading a bayonetcharge against the German trenches defendingRabaul.Then in March 1915 an RAN Bridging Trainwas formed under Lieutenant CommanderL. S. Bracegirdle DSO, one of the companycommanders from the naval component ofANMEF. Five months after being raised thisunit was responsible for the ship-to-shore movementof the British Army IX Corps landingat Suvla Bay at Gallipoli. and there theyremained until the withdrawal from Gallipoli.The unit was then in demand to serve threedifferent Army Commanders, but the AIF' wonand the Bridging Train joined the AustralianArmy in Egypt where they supported Canalcrossings and then an amphibious landing atEl Arish as the Commonwealth Desert Forceadvanced up the Sinai to Palestine.At the end of 1916 the hard won amphibiousexpertise was allowed to be disbanded andthen, twenty-six years later in 1942 Australianamphibious training had to be restarted fromscratch when a Combined Operations TrainingCentre was set up in Port Stephens with adirecting staff provided by the RAN, RoyalMarines, Royal Artillery and RAAF while atToorbul in Queensland a complementary Armyschool was established under Lt. Col Rose, acavalryman from 7 Division. The 2/25thBattalion of 7 Division was the first completeunit to be trained at Toorbul while at HMASAssault in Port Stephens individual trainingwas conducted for RAN landing craft crewsand beach parties (designated Beach Commandos)and for Combined Operations Signalsunits. Interestingly in view of its role todayas base for the First Australian Landing CraftSquadron, HMAS Moreton in Brisbane thenrecruited RAN personnel with local knowledgeof the Queensland coast specifically to supportArmy amphibious training at Toorbul.By early 1944 when the whole of 6 Divisionhad been trained for amphibious operations,the First Australian Combined OperationsSection was formed to direct the amphibioustraining of the three divisions of I AustralianCorps with Commander A. S. Pearson RANas SNOCOS (Senior Naval Officer, CombinedOps Section) and Senior Beachmaster for theseries of Australian amphibious landings inBorneo and New Guinea carried out in successionat Salamaua, Lae. Buna, Tarakan.Wewak, Labuan, Brunei and Balikpapan.I liese landings were executed from ships ofthe RAN's amphibious squadron comprisingthe three Landing Ships Infantry, Westrcdia,Manoora and Kanimbla. These ships eachcarried 20 RAN landing craft of a type whichwould now be designated LCVP (landing craftvehicle and personnel.) The troops landedacross beaches controlled by RAN Beach Commandos.The final Australian landing of thewar, that at Balikpapan on 1st July 1945, wasa truly combined operation with Australiantroops landing from RAN ships under thecover of an RAN cruiser and destroyer force'sguns and with RAAF air cover.Apart from these offensive landings, Australiantroops had to be extracted by sea byRN and RAN ships from Greece and Creteand, as an administrative move from Tobruk:all without the advantage of amphibious ships.Post-1945, although Australian Army unitshave not participated in operational amphibiouslandings, the allied land forces, of whichthey have formed part, have had to conductamphibious operations in Korea, Borneo andVietnam, and HMA ships have been involvedin these amphibious operations. Meantimesoldiers of the SAS Regiment and the Commandoshave maintained an expertise in atleast small scale amphibious operations for,by Australian definition, a section landing bycanoe or rubber dinghy from the sea and preparedto meet opposition (though planning toavoid it) is conducting an amphibious operation.'Additionally the Gunners maintainedan Amphibious Observation BaUer> until theend of the Korean War.An Amphibious Capability for the 1980sIt. Colonel Johnson's article suggested thatAustralia should raise a brigade size amphibiousforce of which a battalion group with astrength of about 1300 should be maintained1Amphibious Operation. An operation in whichland forces are landed and supported from thesea as a combat operation prepared to meetarmed opposition.


A NEW AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY FOR THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICES 21at sea. He observed that the bulk of the forcesand equipments required are already availablein the Australian Services, apart from specialistamphibious shipping, but he went on, withoutexplanation, to claim that the creation of anamphibious force would reduce the size andcapability of the three Services for the performanceof individual Service duties. Thisclaim would appear to be based on the ideathat a separate Marine Corps with its ownair support is a necessity for the conduct ofamphibious operations; but the need for sucha concept cannot be substantiated. As notedearlier, Australian Army units have conductedamphibious operations successfully in twoWorld Wars: although the US Marines conducteda series of island-hopping amphibiousoperations required in the Pacific in WorldWar II, US Army units provided the bulk ofAmerican participation in allied landings inthe North Africa and European theatre; whilein the UK forces the British Army has alwaysprovided the bulk of wartime landing forces.Even in the so-called 'peace' of the '50s to'70s, when the Royal Marines CommandoBrigade has provided the spear-head of UKlanding forces, their armour, artillery, engineerand logistic support has been provided byArmy units.In this writer's view, to meet Australia'sstrategic requirements and to give greatertactical flexibility to operations around Australia'scoast, all Field Force units should becapable of tactical deployment by sea as wellas by land and air. There would be no lossin any Service's capabilities to conduct theirindividual single service roles, but there wouldbe a very definite gain in joint capabilities forstrategic and tactical movement. A PatrolBoat inserting a beach recce party; destroyersproviding escort and/or naval gunfire support;a clearance divin« team clearing underwaterBritish LSLs beached during an exercise in the Mediterranean.


22 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALobstructions: or carrier aircraft providingreconnaisance and'or close air support wouldbe allocated to a particular amphibious operationonly for the time each such ship wasrequired for its particular role and the shipswould be undertaking tasks for which theyhave for long been trained, but are too infrequentlyexercised. The only effect on theRAAF would be to provide some reductionin the calls on their fixed and rotarv wingtransport squadrons, and to require theirLRMP squadrons to become familiar withthe characteristics of amphibious shipping. Inthe case of the Army, units would have tolearn how to embark in, live in and land eithertactically or administratively from a ship. Acavalry squadron embarked in Townsville tobe put across a Cape York beach; a tanksquadron embarked in Melbourne, to be putacross a beach in NW Australia; or an infantrycompany group embarked by helicopter, movedby sea and then inserted by helicopter wouldnot be lost to the Field Force; they wouldmerely have demonstrated an important addedcapability to an Army Commander's optionsfor administrative or tactical movement.The Australian Defence Force possesses allthe required capabilities for such amphibiousoperations now, apart from• the necessary specialist ships, and• army units, trained to operate from suchships.The Amphibious Heavy Lift ShipThe new RAN Amphibious Heavy Lift Ship(LSH) approved for procurement by theGovernment in August 1975 and to be namedTobruk will provide the Australian forces withsome capability for all forms of amphibiousoperation and LOTS* operation. Developedfrom the last group of the UK's very successfulLSL design, the LSH will be a roll on/roll off hull design with bow doors and bowramp and combined stern door/stern ramp.Between bow and stern doors will be theenclosed Tank Deck capable of carrying asquadron of tanks or any other equivalent sizemix of wheeled or tracked vehicles, and offwhich deck will be located Army workshopsand stores; below it will be Army cargo holds.* Logistics Over The ShoreTwo combined ramp/hatches will connectthe lank Deck to an I'pper Vehicle Deckwhich can be utilised as either a stowage forwheeled vehicles and artillery, or for containers,or to carry Army landing craft, or.when not required for cargo, as a second helicopterdeck.On either side of the Tank Deck will besited Troop Messes, while aft there will beseparate dining and recreation spaces forofficers, SNCOs and soldiers, together withhospital facilities including surgery. Abovethese after accommodation spaces will be adedicated Flight Deck for Helicopter operations.For ship-to-shore movement the LSH willbe able to either• beach itself and unload through its bowdoors; or• position its own (when required) sidecarriedpontoon causeway to which itcan marry its bow ramp; or• 'swim' amphibians from its lowered sternramp; or• utilise its own davit-carried landing craft(LCVPs) and, when carried as cargo,Army landing craft, which can be loadedeither alongside or at the stern ramp; or• use its pontoons as self-propelled lighters;or• use helicopters for both personnel andequipment moves, the ship being able tooperate a flight of Wessex: or• any mixture of the above, as appropriateto the particular situation.To control embarkation/landing operationsthe LSH will have a joint operations roomand a joint communications centre, and acombined naval flying control/Army load controlposition on the port side of the bridge.Noteworthy, this new 6,000 tonne ship atabout one third the displacement of the amphibioustransport. HMAS Sydney, and requiringonly about one quarter of Sydney's complement,will have 80% of the troop lift and75% of the total cargo lift of the much largership. Additionally it will have the heavy liftcapability that Sydney lacked, being able tocarry tanks, heavy engineering plant andLC.M8 size landing craft.


A NEW AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY FOR THE AUSTRALIANSERVICESArmy Involvement-Right from conception the new ship shouldbe a splendid symbol of 'jointery* at theworking level. The LSH Project Team includesArmy and RAAF advisers: the ship"s complementwill include a permanent Armydetachment from Signals and Transport Corpswith the detachment commander being one ofthe ship"s departmental heads and with hisdetachment having important responsibilitiesfor the maintenance and operation of primarilyArmy user spaces in the ship such as theTank Deck and Army communications. And,as in the British Services, the Army will maintainand operate the pontoon causeway thatthe ship will be able to carry.Once the ship is commissioned it is to behoped that all Field Force units will becomefamiliar with being moved and landed fromthe LSH by all the methods of which the shipis capable.Roles for the Amphibious ShipThe new LSH is being designed to operatewith the LCH of the First Australian LandingCraft Squadron (AUSLANCRON ONE), andmany will be the roles that this small butversatile amphibious force will be able toundertake, and thus extend the operationalcapabilities of the Australian Army as its unitsre-acquire the expertise to operate from a shipoff shore as easily as from a jungle, bush ordesert base. Administrative moves; tacticallodgement or extraction by landing craft orhelicopter: seaborne logistic support: sea-basedsupport of national development or disasterrelief tasks; HMAS Tohruk will be able tomake a significant contribution to all suchoperations. Because the LSH is derived froma class of ship designated Landing Ship Logisticin the UK forces, some doubts have beenraised as to whether the Australian ship canperform more than logistic tasks. It is rele-An artist's impression of the LSH, HMAS Tobruk.


24 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALvant therefore to draw readers' attention tothe fact that in the Soviet Navy the main tacticaland assault landing capability for theRussian forces is provided by their LSLequivalents,the Alligator class which aresimilar in size, layout and capabilities to thatplanned for the LSH. Of recent months thepresence of a single Alligator class ship, withmarines and tanks embarked, off the coast ofAngola or in the Indian Ocean has causedconsiderable concern in Western Defencecircles, and these ships have been used onother occasions to provide tactical threat aswell as strategic deployment.Now, while the LSH is building, Arms andNavy should be planning an evaluation programmeto establish exactly what range ofoperational roles these RAN amphibious shipsand their embarked Army forces can undertake.Well known are the logistic supporttasks that the UK LSLs have undertaken inNATO, Middle East, Far East and Caribbeanareas, but less well documented are the LSLstactical capabilities. During 'confrontation'these ships were also used as mobile bases forthe tactical deployment of Commandos byhelicopter, to supplement the UK forces' otherlarger and more 'assault orientated' amphibiousships. How best then can the AustralianDefence Force use the LSH?It is suggested that Army officers of all armsand services should be thinking deeply on howthe I Sll I CM combination can be used musteffectively as tools of both logistic and fieldforce commanders.In the LOTS field, do the Services' presentorganisations provide the necessary beach unitexpertise for the LSH to self-discharge acrossa beach without having to wait for TerminalGroup personnel to be flown or driven to theappropriate beach area?In the tactical field, the following thoughtson ship useage are offered for consideration:• the lodgement of a cavalry squadron toharass a coastal line of communication.• the helicopter and/or gemini insertionof SASR units along a coastline;• the tactical re-deployment of a tanksquadron or artillery battery;• the surface and/or air deployments ofinfantry patrols from a mobile base;• the insertion of engineer units, suitablydefended, to either destroy enemy routesor create/improve own lodgement routes;• the provision of a mobile base for ArmyAir Corps helicopter operations.In the near future, as it was in the past, thesea will be able to become an Australian ArmyTAOR instead of being either a hostile or aneutral zone. The Services must be ready totake maximum advantage of the new tacticaland administrative movement opportunities. QTORTOISE AM) HAREThe Royal Navy with its usual panache for total efficiency incorporated the simplestmovement in devising its salute. But the Army, with its inbred love of ceremonial for itsown sake, devised the most circumlocutory and physically exhausting manoeuvre possible,suggested a correspondent to The Times.Quoted in The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal.From H\1S LEANDER after sinking an old Bermudan tug. Justice, by gunfire:"Justice has not only been done, but it has been seen to be done. There is no Justice.RIP.Hard work has an astonishingly poor record in terms of killing people. So little inlife is worthwhile unless people work for it. Having shown your capacity for hard worknever surrender it.The Honorable Jim Killen. The Minister for Defence, in anaddress to air crew graduates at RAAF. East Sale.(RAAF News)


Captain R. J. Linwood*Royal Australian InfantryPut Your HeadInrWhe Sand -Here ComesTheir ArmourAUSTRALIAN infantrymen have not foughta direct engagement with enemy armoursince Korea when a small number of tanks,probably Soviet built T34s were briefly engagedby Bren gunners according to a newspaperreport which appeared at the time. Althoughour combat troops have since been involvedin three substantial conflicts not once have theyencountered enemy armour of any description.Subsequently, the generation of anli tankgunners who fought Rommel's tanks in theWestern Desert in 1942 has nearly all gone,with the result that today's level of anti armourexpertise and our infantry's ability to counterany enemy armour is so low as to approachvirtual non-existence at bo'.h commander andweapon operator level.In light of most other conflicts that havetaken place since 1945 and the significancethat armour has had in many of them, theauthor proposes to examine the Australianinfantry's current ability in this field, compareit to NATO's anti armour capability and todiscuss possible and realistic methods ofremedying the critical situation to be foundwithin the Infantry Corps.Conventional Conflicts Since 1945One should embark upon a study of recentwars involving the use of armour to see justCaptain Linwood graduated from RMC Duntroonin 1973 with a Bachelor of Arts (Military Studies)anil was posted to 5/7 RAR where he was AntiArmour Platoon Commander. He is currently OfficerInstructor, Weapons Wing, Infantry Centre. Singleton.He coaches in Small Arms and Sniping and isinvolved in the development of Anti Armour Coursesfor Infantry.* This article was written in January 1976. Sincethen, the author has taken through No. 1 AmiArmour Course at Singleton, so a start has beenmade.—Ed.how relevant this article is in the light of ourcurrent standard of readiness for such a war.The stark reality of what this article is aboutwould be brought home to the student veryquickly. Accounts of the Arab-Israeli conflicts,in particular the Seven Day War 1967 and theYom Kippur War of 1973, the Indo-PakistaniWar, the Turkish-Cypriot War -- all limitedconventional wars — clearly indicate the overwhelmingsignificance and influence of thetank and personnel carriers in the final outcomeof battles. The use of counters in theform of infantry anti armour weapons thathave been by necessity developed to curb thetank also shows a dramatic increase. In theYom Kippur War, Israeli sources acknowledgethat two thirds of their tank losses were attributedto infantry anti armour weapons andinfantry placed mines and this surely substantiatesthese claimed developments in thearmour war.During the same time, the Australian Armyhas somewhat glibly looked on with halfhearted attempts to capsulise the lessonsre-demonstrated into parcels of informationfor the student of military history but has notitself really learnt the infantry anti armourlessons that have arisen from these wars. Thelessons of mobility, shock action, the abilityof an enemy to muster a powerful attackingforce and how Australian infantry could copewhen faced with such an enemy, especially inview of its very small armoured support andlack of mechanisation, appear to have gonevirtually unheeded — unheeded in terms ofreacting physically to prepare for such aneventuality. The Yom Kippur War and itsmilitary lessons have aroused interest in theAustralian Army and indicated the lack ofawareness of its poor level of defence capability,especially within the infantry, should itbe employed at short notice against an enemyequipped in a similar fashion to the combatantsof the 1973 war.


26 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALAnti Armour in the Context ofContinental DefenceIt is necessary to examine the current stateof anti armour capacity within the limits ofthe context of the defence of Australia. Thereis little doubt that any invasion of mainlandAustralia (albeit for our minerals as currentpolitical scares indicate) would not be one bya mobile, mechanised force relying on lightarmour for its mobility, firepower and abilitsto achieve surprise by moving rapidly overlong distances in order to capture strategicgoals. The physical enormity and relativelyimpractical aspect of a foot invasion becomesapparent when one considers the distanceinvolved between entry points and targets orstrategic areas. Subsequently, any enemy wouldalmost certainly be highly mechanised employinga variety of AFVs including tanks, lighttanks, armoured personnel carriers and selfpropelled artillery in the armour and mechanisedinfantry concept backed up by trackedor wheeled resupply vehicles or air supply.If infantry training is oriented for the defenceagainst such an invasion then it must haveboth the weapons and the knowledge of howto counter and defeat such an enemy. It isfoolish and naive indeed to assume that infantrycan engage armour and defeat it alone andvice versa as the lessons of the 1973 Warwould indicate. An Israeli counter-attack forexample, was carried out alone in a piecemealfashion by an armoured brigade which wasalmost entirely annihilated by the Arab antiarmour fire. The author does not intend toeven suggest that the Australian infantry shouldattempt such a lone manoeuvre, but in lightof the fact that the RAAC is so desperatelyshort of tanks and equipment with which tocarry out one of its subsidiary roles of supportingthe infantry, the need for an increasedself reliance and a high degree of awarenessof the requirement for an anti armour capacityfar above the present one should be apparentto every soldier. This is especially so for theInfantryman upon whom the brunt of the fightingultimately falls.It is probably true that the old adage of "thebest weapon against a tank is another tank"is still valid. However, it is the combinedarms team utilising the integrated firepowerand tactics of all members that will ultimatelydecide the outcome of a conflict: nvoIvingarmour and infantry - none will on their own.This lesson has been demonstrated time andagain from Hannibal's conquests with hisarmour clad elephants and foot soldiers to theiron clad steeds and infantry of the MiddleEast Wars, as recently as three years ago.Current Infantry Anti Armour CapabilityIt hardly needs stating that the presentinfantry anti armour capability is patheticallyweak. Let us examine this contention in thefollowing terms:• weapons• organisation• tactics• knowledge of likely enenn• integration of all arms anti armour firepower• trainingWeaponsThe Australian infantry is equipped withfour anti armour weapons. Principally a veryclose range weapon, the No 94 Energa grenade(Anti Tank) can be fired from the SLR usinga special Ballistite cartridge. This projectileemploys a HEAT (High Explosive Anti Tank)shaped charge warhead which is designed topenetrate armour at a range of up to 150metres. The Energa has been neglected bythe bulk of infantrymen but is still in serviceas a personal weapon. A more familiar weaponto the individual is the 66 mm Rocket LAW(Light Anti Tank Weapon) which is the firstof the recoilless weapons and has been combatproven in South Vietnam. In 1972, Governmenttroops successfully destroyed severalRussian built T54 and PT76 tanks at An Locwith LAWs. One such soldier is credited withthree kills at a range of less than twenty metres.This weapon has an effective range of 200metres over which it is very accurate in thehands of trained users, and it will penetratemost armour including the frontal armour ofthe T62 Russian main battle tank and its predecessors.A principal advantage of the LAWis that every man may carry one or more andoperate them on his own. Its low weight makesit ideal for the individual in all phases of war,particularly close defence, ambushing and tankhunting. Its only real disadvantage is its shortrange and under-employment.


PUT YOUR HEAD IN THE SAND — HERE COMES THEIR ARMOUR 27The L14A1, 84 mm Gun Anti Tank CarlGustav (Medium Anti Tank Weapon) is thesmaller of the two crew served weapons inservice. It can be operated by one man in anemergency, and in the author's opinion, is stillone of the best non guided weapons in its classin use today. Its HEAT round has an excellentballistic performance, good penetration,is lightweight and very reliable whilst the gun'ssighting system and resultant accuracy aresuperb. Properly maintained and prepared theMAW is easily capable of hitting stationaryand moving targets at 550 metres and 450metres respectively. Competent handlersachieve remarkable accuracy with the MAWservice in the Australian infantry in the earlysixties but was discarded as was the 120 mmBAT due to the lack of use of such weaponsin a CRW environment. Anti tank platoonswere subsequently re-employed as trackers andreconnaissance troops. The MRAW has seenactive service in its anti armour role when usedboth in the Yom Kippur War by the Israelisand the Turkish-Cypriot War by the Turks.During one particularly hectic phase of theinitial Golan Heights battle, Israeli infantryheld off the Syrian assault with jeep mounted106 mm RCLs and 3.5" RLs while the Israelitanks withdrew to rearm with more ammunition.HEAT strikes on the Syrian tanks wereif?


28 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALcan be dismounted and dug in should thesituation require it.None of these weapons has any night visionassistance in Australia other than relativelyprimitive reticule illumination and the use ofbattlefield illumination. Anti tank mines ofBritish and American origin exist with assaultpioneers and some unit riflemen trained in theuse of them. These mines have been widelyused throughout the world since 1945 andhave proved to be capable of inflicting substantialdamage to armoured vehicles. Pakistaniinfantry used large numbers of anti tankmines to offset the technical advantage heldby the Indian armour during the 1965 war.OrganisationsAs previously stated the Energa grenadeand the LAW are individual weapons and areshows the same allocation of MAW per riflecompany but removes all eight MAW fromthe anti armour platoon, replacing them witheight MRAW, the 106 mm RCL mounted onvehicles. A comparison drawn between thenew organisation and other formations of asimilar nature in foreign armies shows that theallocation of such weapons here is still farshort in terms of defensive fire capabilityrequired, should be engaged by an armouredenemy. This is a dangerous limitation for anyinfantry battalion, especially in the AustralianArmy.TacticsThe anti armour platoon, whose primaryrole is to prevent enemy armour from penetratingthe battalion area, consists of a headquartersand four sections. The normal allo-Australian troops in action with a 1 06 mm RCL.issued at that level as required. Infantry battalionscurrently have sixteen MAW and tourMRAW — the latter being an interim measure.Eight of the MAW are in the anti armourplatoon and the rest are allocated on a scaleof two per support section in the rifle companies.Evidence suggests that training on andthe employment of these by some units hasuntil recent months been neglected. The newbattalion organisation shortly to be effectedcation is usually one section to each riflecompany whilst on the move, or concentratedwithin the overall anti armour plan in thedefence. The company support sections remainwith their parent unit and are responsible forthe local prevention of enemy armoured penetrationof the company area. Tactics and doctrinefor infantry anti armour warfare toda\comprise little more than brief paragraphs hereand there in training and tactics publications.


PUT YOUR HEAD IN THE SAND HERE COMES THEIR ARMOUR 29The only Australian pamphlet to deal with thesubject in any detail is the 84 mm MAW pamphlet.This is a serious shortcoming of ourtactical thinking and level of knowledge.Perusal of equivalent foreign training informationsources in this field bears testimony tothat.Recently, units have been forced to developtheir own tactics and training thereby oftendeveloping different and conflicting methodsof employment of their weapons. Althoughsteps are being taken in the right direction toproduce an overall doctrine for the AustralianArmy, such doctrine will not likely dictate thedetailed knowledge the infantryman requires.Where are they to get it from? The answerlies in the wealth of historical lessons learntand information derived from the conflicts thathave arisen in the past few decades wheremodern weapons have been deployed —weapons Australia uses or could have usedterislics. enemy tactics, performance abilitiesof the various types and models of enemyAFV's, gun ranges, night operation capacities,national armaments — the list is endless.None of our recognition pamphlets are anywherenear up to date, so much so that theSoviets probably regard them as collectorsitems.Very little training of this nature is cloneexcept by individuals and there are no apparentmoves to update, renew or create referencematerial for the infantry in particular to alleviatethe shortage of such information thatcommanders and instructors alike face.Integration of All Arms Anti ArmourFirepowerIn almost all battles involving an armouredenemy force and friendly infantry, quite avariety of anti armour firepower is available,yet very few people appreciate or bother toagainst her. This information is readily available,more often than not in non-service publications.1 06 RCL in mounted role.Knowledge of the EnemyClosely allied to tactics for the conduct ofanti armour operations is the detailed knowledgeof the enemy so essential in any aspectof warfare. Much of the Australian Army andparticularly the infantry is dangerously ignorantof such aspects as current enemy and likelyallied armoured vehicles, recosmition charactrainin the use of it. Friendly armour integratedwith infantry defences to provide antiarmour defence is virtually unheard of in exeicises,and it is safe to say very few soldierswould have a sound knowledge of the methodof operation of a Centurion if one were toappear in their position. Seldom, if ever, ismore than a token service paid to the integrationof medium and field artillery andmortars with anti armour weapons in a carefullyprepared anti armour defence plan.


30 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALAnti armour minefields are mostly paperrepresentations on tactics TEWTs. The use ofFGA aircraft on immediate call to attackarmour and break up such an assault is rarelyeven heard of, certainly at unit level. All ofthese serious deficiencies are probably due tothe fact that the infantry is rarely exercisedin the use of such measures, as there nowpopulates the Army a generation of soldierswho have never had to fight enemy armour(except of course for a few long serving soldiersand senior officers). Perhaps it is in the fieldof the combined arms application of antiarmour efforts that commanders can make upmuch ground. Even though Australia doesnot have large numbers of APDSFS firingtanks, aerially delivered ATGW, Smart artilleryor appreciable quantities of night visionequipment, there is a large amount that canbe achieved to atone for our sins of negligence.The infantry can do that by appreciating fullywhat they have themselves and what supportingweapons can achieve in the anti armourbattle.TrainingPresent training is seriously hampered byboth economic and administrative problems.Lack of ammunition, insufficient sub calibretraining devices, over stringent and restrictivesafety regulations, insufficient ranges and trainingareas, no efficient moving target facilities(other than at Puckapunyal). a shortage ofarmoured targets and equipment of all descriptionsincluding 106mmRCL carriers: all painta gloomy picture for the present and immediatefuture for the full scale training required.Training aids such as models, films and publicationsare in short supply. As yet, there areno defined performance standards requiredduring training of the anti armour gunner inorder to assess whether the soldier is capableof completing his task or not. Yet, thirty-fouryears ago the German Army training in thisfield was nothing short of astonishing. Comparetoday's training requirements to thoseshown in the following extracts from an accountof a German prisoner of war on anti tank gunnerytraining."The course lasted from 8 to 10 weeks . . .During the mornings of the first two weekswe learned the basic principles of gun layingand aiming . . . The afternoons were spentin manhandling the gun at the double. The3.7 cm gun was drawn by two men withropes, and two men pushing behind . . .The whole distance to be covered was 9kilometres . . . Aiming and firing of dummycartridges was then practised on a movingtarget of cars camouflaged as tanks . . .weeks were spent mainh in theoreticalinstruction and firing practice with a detachablebarrel liner (Einstecklauf) with ordinaryrifle ammunition at a range of 10 metres . . .The time allowed for sighting, loading andfiring was 35 seconds, and the standard tobe obtained was four hits and one near miss.Wooden practice tanks of the same size asnormal tanks were pulled along at a speedof ten kilometres per hour . . . The fiveshots were to be fired at the following distances:1,200, 1,000, 800, 600, and 400 metres.The standard to be reached was 80 percent . . . The best shots usually got tenextra shots as a reward."Infantry Anti Armour Training in NATOA very sobering comparison may be madeand conclusions reached by investigatingNATO's solutions to the anti armour problem.As in Australia's strategic thinking.NATO is defensively oriented with an overwhelminglyarmoured/mechanised enemyaligned against it in the form of the WarsawPact forces. It is very probable that any likelyenemy of Australia will be equipped similarlywith Soviet origin or Soviet designed armour,a disturbing fact that has come to light inalmost every conflict in recent years. WhilstNATO cannot possibly maintain the balanceof tanks with the Soviets (currently about threeto one in favour of the latter) it is nonethelesspursuing a policy of equipping its forces withsuch armour on the basis of its defensive capability,fn this field, all member nations -notably Britain with the Chieftain, Germanywith the Leopard, France with the AlVIX 30and the USA with the M60 family have optedfor all round superior quality in their tanks.Gunnery, rangefinding, stabilisation, fuel,ammunition, range, crew comfort and equipmentperformance aspects are all superior tothe Soviet counterpart. It is hoped that thesuperior quality Western armour will be ableto destroy several enemy tanks for each friendlycasualty in the event of a massed attack. On


PIT YOLR HEAD IN THE SAND - HERE COMES THEIR ARMOUR 31this theory, seven out of ten enemy tanks withtheir supporting mechanised infantry wouldstill reach NATO infantry defensive positions.Because of such a threat. NATO infantryis currently employing a massive array of antiarmour weapons notably ATGW systems.These may be delivered to the target in severalways. Infantry ATGW are essentially employedand launched in two of these modes — groundlaunch and vehicle launch. Ground launchATGW are found in almost all infantry formationsand are often employed down to platoonlevel, with even smaller sub units using themto complete specialised tasks such as tankhunting. ATGW currently in service in NATOarc known to include Vigilant, Swingfire, SSI 1.SSI2. TOW, Dragon and^Milan. Most of theseare carried and fired by one man. Systems suchas Vigilant and SS11 belonging to the manuallyguided class, or first generation family,Dragon and Milan are similarly man portablewith semi automatic guidance, very short minimumranges and maximum ranges of 1000 and2000 metres respectively. These systems arevery simple to operate and provide the infantrymanwith a powerful anti armour punch withextreme accuracy at ranges far greater thaneffective enemy tank gun range. TOW is acrew served weapon equipping many of theNATO members' armies and has a range of65 to 3000 metres. Using semi automaticguidance, this second generation weapon systemis a formidable weapon which has proved itslethality in Vietnam (although it was helicopterlaunched there) and the Middle East undercombat conditions. Israeli operators were ableto familiarise themselves with TOW in a fewhours and have claimed a very high kill ratewith it, an even higher rate than achieved withthe Swingfire they already had. Reports evenreveal that the Israelis fitted a night visiondevice to TOW. allowing night engagement oftanks again (as claimed) with a very high successrate. TOW replaces the 106 mm RCLstill found in some US units.Many NATO mechanised infantry unitsinclude armoured vehicles mounting ATGW.The range extends from tanks organic toinfantry battalions mounting HOT, SS12 andACRA, and Sheridan 152 mm gun/launchertanks to specialist armoured ATGW carriersintegral to such infantry units. These includeAMX Id mounting HOT. Raketen-jagdpanzerwith SS12, Entac and HOT, Ml 13 mountingTOW. FV 102 (Striker) with Swingfire, andan assortment of light skinned vehicles carryingvarious systems such as TOW, Dragon, Milan.SSI2 and Entac.The recoilless weapon family is still to befound, incorporating 120 mm Wombat. 106mm RCL, 90 mm RL, Armbrust, Carl Gustav84 mm NAW and the LAW to name most.These weapons proliferate within the infantryorganisations, particularly anti armour subunits. Many are also carried in ritle platoons.British rifle platoons if not already carryingATGW are substantially equipped with recoillessweapons. For example a mechanised rifleplatoon carries one MAW in platoon headquarterswhilst each of the three sections carrysix LAW. Air portable rifle platoons carrynine LAW per section. This is very heavy antiarmour firepower in relation to that at thedisposal of Australian rifle platoons.To cap this impressive and increasing arrayof both recoilless and guided weapons, allNATO soldiers undergo very substantial trainingin day and night firing, tank recognition,Soviet and Warsaw Pact armoured tactics, minewarfare and co-operation with friendly arms.Soldiers are also thoroughly trained in theoperation of their anti armour weapons andare required to fire these weapons regularly.ATGW gunners fire some live rounds annuallyand spend considerable time on simulators inboth miniature range and actual battlefieldenvironments.What can be Done to Help OvercomeThese Problems?First of all our Army must face reality andbe prepared to train with what weapons andconditions we have at present. The fact thata family of ATGW may be purchased for theinfantry soon will not help them if war breaksout tomorrow. Reliable estimates show thepresent weapons having to last for some yearsyet. Not all of the problems listed can beovercome, but some of the chronically weakaspects of the appalling state of the art canbe significantly bolstered if the following courseof action is followed. Both RAAC and RA Infneed to drastically update themselves in allaspects of anti armour warfare (a start hasbeen made with the publication shortly of a


DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALTIB dealing with the doctrinal aspects of thiswithin the concept of our current defencepolicy) and produce the results of such researchin the form of comprehensive anti armourcourses at both Centres, each dealing exclusivelywith those matters pertaining to theirown Corps* responsibility. This informationdistribution should be aimed at the weaponoperator and junior commander (specialist)level in great detail, whilst at senior commanderlevel the tactical employment and considerationsshould be taught to a moreadvanced degree and over a wider spectrumthan it presently is.Today's training pamphlets need to beupdated in some cases and there is a definitecase for a specific pamphlet for the specialistanti armour platoon covering the varied aspectsof anti armour tactics and so on to be produced.Such a pamphlet should follow alongthe lines of the better foreign equivalents. Subjectmatter for such anti armour training shouldinclude (depending on the recipient level) thefollowing:• weapon handling and firing• tactics (employment and sighting)• minor tactics (operation at crew andplatoon level)• AFV recognition (advanced)• enemy armour tactics• specialist roles and uses of weapon otherthan anti armour• mine warfare• all arms co-operation.Pure weapon handling, organisational useand deployment can be effected by units ashas been demonstrated in at least one battalionusing existing doctrine found in weapon pamphlets.As an interim measure a detailed graspof the intricacies involved may be obtained byjunior commanders by undertaking privateresearch from existing manuals, foreign servicepublications, defence publications and a surprisinglylarge amount of commercially availablesources of information on many of thesubjects involved. Economic considerations liebehind the equipment shortages, ammunitionand training areas but what is to be the costof readiness? That is a question most soldiersare not qualified to answer and is not withinthe scope of this paper.Weapon Effects against Armour and theirAssistance to InfantryOne must keep in mind the enemy tacticsfor both their mechanised and tank formations.It is common practice for enemy infantry toride on top of tanks and in some open armouredpersonnel carriers. Syrian troops on the GolanFront were often observed doing this duringthe 1973 war. Commanders often do not closedown but ride exposed to maintain betterobservation, particularly in tanks. A lot ofemphasis is placed on night operations usingnight vision equipment. Most enemy tanksemploy the short stop principle to fire as onlythe more recent T62 and T64 are stabilisedsufficiently to allow accurate fire otherwise.Careful use of all types of weapons will havea far reaching effect on an armoured vehicle.COHPtRISDN OF tINCES(01 I FIRST ROUND HIT JO", PI0UHI1 '! OH I lilt SI2! IIDIET1001 1500 2000 2500•U'liIIIII'. ...Ml105** U junHiIHa11(1•MM It IIISldtt Tk pi•ftp» »—< Israeli contja' clanIsraeli conbat resultJ Sunt clan Mai si 1st annate*, Israelis data about 1200ar•S.i.[VtStiit' clans arc nuct [i eater lor tpeir lank juns-aroitiu jOOQffl2 rUEW results capable tie to use el • agiificitui ^sterns m si[Hi Hits3 til results ire tkose capable e-l ieii| ppMmti liter iitiaul cDilitmnsTable 1


PIT YOLR HEAD IN THE SAND — HERE COMES THEIR ARMOL R 33Australia's aging Centurion — the best anti tank weapon, which, when combinedwith all other arms, poses a formidable anti armour defence.Firstly, consider the weapons within the battalion.Small arms fire will kill exposed troopsand crew commanders or at least force thevehicle crews to close down. Several Israelicrew commanders died in this manner earlyin the 1973 war. From inside, observation isthus severely restricted especially if the vehicleis moving, and the cupola machine gun cannotbe used. This certainly decreases the enemyarmour's ability to locate and fire at friendlytroops, particularly anti armour weapon operatorswho usually have to expose a part ofthemselves above ground in order to fire theirweapons. Anti tank mines will either kill anenemy AFV in the case of a BMP or BRDM,or disable a tank or self propelled gun. thusmomentarily taking that vehicle out of theassault and leaving it for follow up tank killingoperations. Whilst the battalion mortarsand field artillery will not usually seriouslydamage a tank, a direct hit by high explosivewill scour any troops off, blast in any openhatches, ignite external fuel tanks, damageperiscopes, externally mounted weapons, radioaerials, infra red and white searchlights, severelyjolt and concuss the crew thus decreasing theirbattle efficiency.Fighter AFVs may be destroyed or substantiallydamaged as to render them temporarilyinoperable depending on the angle of impactand the type of vehicle. Airburst missions aredeadly when fired to detonate above personnelcarriers and exposed crews. Smoke (whitephosphorus) will blind the enemy, blackenoptical devices, cause local fires amongstexternal fuel tanks and externally stowed cargoand force the AFV to remain closed up. Theeffect on the morale of the crews must besignificant as most Soviet AFVs are not airconditioned and burning phosphorus has aprofound effect on enclosed areas such asmetal AFVs. Even the simple expedient ofthe Molotov Cocktail can brew up a tank.Several T54 were gutted by fire from thesewhen attacked by students in the streets duringthe invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Lackof visibility and the inevitable confusion couldlead to dislocation of the assault, break up ofthe formations and subsequently to the failureof the attack.Medium artillery and direct fire artilleryfiring HEAT will destroy most armour if adirect hit is achieved. Their use in defensivefire plans must be considered. The use of allforms of illumination bears mention but as itis a double edge weapon the use of it mustbe made judiciously. Illumination serves twomajor purposes: it provides friendly infantrywith the visible targets and it also serves toplay havoc with enemy night vision equipmentparticularly the passive light intensificationvariety which some of the more modernvehicles such as the T64 and BMP are reputedto have. Whilst friendly armour will probablyconduct their own battle of movement, it isof tremendous morale value to friendly infantryto know they are there and what they arecapable of doing; namely, their superior performancein terms of accuracy and range overtheir enemy counterparts.At battalion command level are availableon call FGA aircraft whose formidable array


34 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALLeopard I, Australia's new MBT.of armour busting ordnance includes APcannon, rockets, HE and Napalm bombs — allpresently available in RAAF storages. IsraeliDefence Force Mirage and Phantom FGA aircrafthave repeatedly demonstrated the modernaircraft's effecti-veness in delivering precisestrikes on armour although this capability wasat times severely restricted by Egyptian airsuperiority. Used in conjunction with theseweapons are the vital and extremely effectiveobstacles which can be used to break up.canalise, immobilise and confuse the enemyarmour assault. The Israeli anti tank ditchdug across the Golan Front and the hundredsof Syrian tank casualties directly attributed toit is a classical example of this effectiveness.A well planned and meticulously prepareddefence incorporating the use of all arms isvital to success and an integral part of proventactical doctrine. So it is to be applied in theanti armour battle.Having examined the current state of theart in the Infantry at present and comparedit to NATO, one can no doubt see that muchneeds to be done. By examining the presentavailability of firepower and what can beachieved, certain areas of training have beenhighlighted showing what needs to be donewithin the Infantry to improve current capabilitieswith today's weapons. But what abouttomorrow?The FutureTt should be clear to the concerned readerthat the solution to today's inadequacies liesnot only in a revamp of interest and trainingbut also in a procurement programme ofmodern weaponry. With the exception ofEntac and the experimental Malkara of thefifties, Australia has no ATGW. These missileswhich never made their way into thehands of the infantry anyway, border on antiquityand urgently need replacing. As it isnot an aim of this discussion to argue whichATGW systems Australia should procure, theauthor does not intend to specify any particularsystem. A personal choice is of courseheld. It suffices to say that the infantry urgentlyneed modern weapons including a combinationof recoilless gun type weapons, ATGW,multi attack anti tank mines — and lots ofthem all. All have their limitations and thusneed to be used together so they are mutuallyadvantageous. Not only should the establishmentsof such weapons in the battalions bemarkedly upgraded, but also should the degreeof specialisation and amount of training at alllevels. One only has to review the EgyptianArmy's preparation for war in 1972-7? to havethat point made.Tactical employment of the infantry antiarmour weapons will be the football in a gameplayed by many others whose interest has hopefullybeen kindled by this article, and theauthor does not intend to discuss that topichere. One matter of overriding concern shouldnow be clear in the light of the evidence producedin this discussion. The Australianinfantry is chronically ill-prepared to meet anddeal with an armour oriented enemy. Unlessrectification of this condition occurs very soon,Australian soldiers may well learn by bitterexperience what the European soldier didduring the German blitzkrieg of 1939-40. y


"THEIRS (5/VOT TO TREASONWHY-?Squadron leader A. K. RobertsonRi >yul A ustratian A ir ForceAn Essays in Military" Ethics'Forward, the Light Brigade!'Was there a man dismay'd?Not tho' the soldier knewSome one had blunder'd:Theirs not to make reply.Theirs not to reason why,Theirs but to do and die:Into the valley of deathRode the six hundred.—The Charge of the Light Brigade,Alfred Lord TennysonINTRODUCTIONIN its baldest terms, this essay is concernedwith the problem of reconciling obedienceand authority in the human military situation.The theme is of military ethics and dwells onthe standards that govern, or should govern,the conduct of the individual serviceman. Theproblem has many ramifications bound up notonly with old questions of loyalty, duty, obligationand the rights of the individual, but alsowith rather new questions of personal responsibilityand the dynamics of decision-making ina technologically complex and bureaucratic age.An investigation of this nature should spana whole range of thought in such disciplines as,among others, ethical philosophy, law. psychology,history, modern management theories.Squadron Leader Robertson is an Education Officer.He has previously served in Headquarters, SupportCommand, Melbourne and was Senior EducationOfficer at RAAF Base, Richmond, NSW. He attendedthe RAAF Staff College in 1975, and this article isbased on a prize winning paper he wrote in thatyeat. He is now on the staff of the RAAF StaffCollege. Fair bairn. ACT.and sociology. A thorough analysis in theseterms is certainly beyond the present writer'scompetence and intent. What is attemptedhere, however, is an approach to the problemby way of some inter-disciplinary observationsand their relevance to modern times. Theguiding purpose is to express some insightsthat may have value for those who have aresponsibility to recruit, train or manage militarypersonnel, and for the individual servicemanin coming to a deeper understanding ofhis situation.THE MILITARYETHOSPreservation of the Body CorporateA Russian grand duke was once reported assaying T hate war because it spoils the armies'.The point was a good one. The military wayis in fact marked by the concentration of menand materials on winning specific objectiveswith the least expenditure of blood andresources. After the battle at Wejh, forexample. Colonel T. E. Lawrence did notshare the satisfaction of his fellow officers.and was moved to write: 'To me. an unnecessaryaction, or shot, or casualty, was not onlya waste but a sin ... I am unable to take theview that all successful actions are gains . . .Even from the purely military point of viewthe assault seemed a blunder. The 200 Turksin Wejh had no transport and no food, and ifleft alone for a few days must have surrendered'.1 The military is as concerned asany other body with self-preservation despite,paradoxically, its dedication, as necessary, togive and partake of death.Men do not give their lives lightly. This iswhy qualities of leadership and obedience.


36 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALparticularly in dire circumstances, are so highlyvalued in the military. Thomas Carlyleexpressed the feelings of countless writersthroughout the ages when he wrote: ' . . . thecommander of men; he to whom other willsare to be subordinated, and loyally surrenderthemselves, and find their welfare in so doing,may be reckoned as the most important ofgreat men'.*Tradition and the IndividualTradition is vital to the military. Tradition,with its strong emotive appeal, and as abody of precedent, is the principal bulwark ofauthority. Tradition also predetermines to agreat extent the serviceman's behaviour andhis mode of thought. The professional servicemanis an individual, but his patterns are cutfor him and he conforms to them. In momentsof stress, however, when he must call upon allhis reserves of initiative and courage, his individualitymay well be his greatest asset.The traditional military leader is an insulatedperson, sometimes difficult to approach,and alone in his decision-making, but fundamentalchanges are occurring. Conditions ofmodern warfare tend to reduce the authorityand power of decision of the military leader:a consequence is that responsibility for theconduct of military operations tends to beindivisible and no one person held accountablefor decisions. Bureaucratic influences andtechnological controls, arising largely from thecost to society of maintaining military forces,exert enormous pressure on the military way.to the extent that decision-making has becomea highly participative affair involving all levelsof authority. The independent leader has perforcebecome a dependent manager ofresources of which he may have only an imperfectunderstanding. Rarely now would a leaderneed to stand before his men, brandish hissword, and shout "Follow me!" In the coldercalculations of modern warfare, the old cry'Up, up and at them!" — that was once thepith, the quintessence, of the whole practicalart of war — has lost its sting.THE DEFENCE OF OBEDIENCETO SUPERIOR ORDERSThe Function of LawAttitudes towards obedience and authorityin the military are reflected to a great extentin the way legal sanctions are applied, particularlyin the laws that govern 'the defenceof obedience to superior orders'. In this context,the words of Rousseau are apt: 'Since noman has a natural authority over his fellow,and force creates no right, we must concludethat convention forms the basis of all legitimateauthority among men ... To removeall liberty from his [Man's] will is to removeall morality from his acts. Finally, it is anempty and contradictory authority that setsup, on the one side, absolute authority, andon the other, unlimited obedience'/ Few wouldargue that law — the 'legitimate authority' -sanctifies principles of community conduct ibeyond all doubts or dispute; on the otherhand, the law is not necessarily 'an ass'. Lawoperates in a community to bind rights toduties by means of a system of sanctions anddeprivations. The life of the law is not logic,but experience, and. not unlike the words ina dictionary, stands astride the worlds of yesterdayand today. A universal solution to theproblem of obedience to authority still lies inthe world of tomorrow, and an exhaustivetreatment of the subject has yet to be written;however, a statement of the current positionsin comparative law and the law in Australiamay be useful in highlighting the difficulties.British LawBritish law places a high degree of personalresponsibility on the individual servicemanwho breaches the law when acting under orders.The position is summarised by an eminentBritish jurist as follows:"When a soldier is put on trial on a chargeof crime, obedience to superior orders isnot of itself a defence ... A so'dier is boundto obey any lawful order he receives fromhis military superior. But a soldier cannotany more than a civilian avoid responsibilityfor breach of the law in bona fide obediencetii orders . . . His position is in theory andmay be in practice a difficult one ... Hemay be liable to be shot by a Court martialif he disobeys an order, and be hanged bya judge and jury if he obeys it . . . Thehardship of a soldier's position resultingfrom this inconvenience is much diminishedby the Crown to nullify the effect of anunjust conviction by means of a pardon."''t


THF.IRS NOT TO REASON WHY . . . ? 37An "inconvenience", indeed. Apparently, thesurrounding context makes no reference to theliability of the soldier's military superior inissuing an unlawful order.United States LawIn the United States the legal position of theserviceman appears to differ little from that ofhis counterpart in Britain. Conflicts in SeventeenthCentury Britain had the effect of erasingfrom the British consciousness much of theauthority of military law, and the supremacyof civil jurisdiction became firmly established.I'nited States law owes much to the Britishexperience, although the emergence of theI'nited States as a nation made it more receptiveto continental influence than might otherwisehave been the case. According to theAmerican jurist, Wharton:'Where a person relies on the command oflegal authority as a defence, it is essentialthat the command be a lawful one. whichhe was required to obey . . . An order whichis illegal in itself and not justified by therules and usages of war, or which is, in substance,clearly illegal, so that a man ofordinary sense and understanding wouldknow as soon as he heard the order that itwas illegal, will afford no protection for ahomicide . . . Moreover, if it is not part ofthe soldier's military duty to kill the particularvictim, his act in so doing is criminal. . . When an act committed by a soldier isa crime, the fact that he was ordered tocommit the crime by his military superioris not a defense".'Recognition by the courts of the necessityfor discipline in the military, and of the positionin which the subordinate may find himselfthrough no fault of his own, has in fact led toa lenient view of the soldier's culpability whenacting under orders, except in cases where theorder is ' . . . so palpably unlawful that areasonable man in the position of the personobeying it would perceive its unlawful quality'.'The question-begging phrase, "reasonable man',still remains. The continental influence maybe seen in other provisions that could holdmilitary commanders responsible for war crimescommitted by military subordinates or otherpersons subject to control. 6It William Calley's trial on a charge of masskilling of civilians at My Lai, in 1%4, laidbare the agony of a military court in comingto a convicition. notwithstanding the defenceof obedience to superior orders. The burdenon the court was especially heavy, for themembers had knowledge wider than the evidence:they, like Calley, knew the stresses ofdecision in war: their emotions resisted thefacts, but, as jurors, they could not ignorethem. Calley's culpability was clearly establishedin law. The jury decided that even ifCalley's superior, Captain Medina, had orderedthe death of 'everything that moves', Calleywas responsible for knowing that such an orderwas illegal and should have disobeyed it. Thesubsequent order by the President to releaseCalley shook the nation, but probably camedown on the side of majority public opinion.Canadian LawEvidently, Canadian law gives a good dealof weight to the defence of superior orders;moreover, military and civil law seem to bestrongly in accord on this matter. CanadianOR & Os spell out the position of a Canadianserviceman as follows:"... every officer and man shall obey theorders of every officer and man senior tohim . . . but if an officer or man is givenan order that he considers to be in conflictwith the National Defence Act, QR & O,or general or particular orders binding onhim. he shall point out the conflict orally,or in writing if the order does not requireimmediate obedience, to the superior bywhom the order was given. If the superiorstill directs him to obey the order, he shalldo so.' 7There remains some uncertainty as to w hatthe subordinate's position would be if hecarried out the order and the order was subsequentlyfound to be illegal. Elsewhere inOR & Os the wording stresses obedience to'lawful' commands. A man would indeed beimpaled on the horns of a dilemma if calledupon to decide whether every order given tohim were lawful or not.Continental LawWhile the doctrine of absolute liability, ie.'individual responsibility' (or 'intelligent bayonets'),is more compatible with Anglo-Americanlaw, the alternative doctrine of 'Respondeatsuperior' is more compatible with continental


38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALlaw. Continental legal systems owe much tothe Roman law. which gave exclusive jurisdictionto military courts over offences committedby soldiers. In Anglo-American law.as stated earlier, the civil courts have unquestionedsupremacy over military courts. InSpain, on the other hand, the military courtshave jurisdiction over offences committedagainst the military, whether committed byservicemen or civilians; the same situationexists throughout Latin America, and onemight conjecture — as an aside — whether theconstitutional instability of Latin Americaowes something to this fact. However, ongrounds of jurisdiction, the main inference tobe drawn is that the dilemma of the continentalserviceman is less difficult than that ofhis British, American or Canadian counterpart.'Duty of obedience' and 'accountability ofsuperiors* are two sides of the one coin. Theduty of continental servicemen to obey commandshas a long tradition, as, also, has theaccountability of the commander. Of interestis that the German military manuals of 1957.in accord with the Prussian military tradition,do not prefix the words 'commands' and'orders' with the word 'lawful'. German servicemenwould appear, therefore, to have adefence denied to British, American or Canadianservicemen.International LawThere is no equivocation about the responsibilityof the individual in international law.The essence is that individuals have internationalduties that transcend the nationalobligations of obedience imposed by individualstates; however, to understand the forceof this principle, one must also understand thenature of international law. International lawis ultimately an expression of internationalmorality. Phrases such as 'crime in internationallaw' were echoed at the NuremburgTrials as if international law were a body ofstatutes — which, in fact, it is not. The mainsources of international law are custom (theobservance being a matter of political convenience)and treaties (such as those concluded atThe Hague and Geneva Conventions). Inmatters other than 'war crimes', internationallaw operates effectively only where there is abasis of mutual consent. The 'legality' of theNuremburg Trials is, as a consequence, acomplex issue that invites disagreement amonginternational lawyers even today."For our purposes, the main observation tobe made is that the Tribunal laid the principalgrounds for prosecution upon Article 8 of theNuremburg Charter, "... the fact that thedefendant acted pursuant to an order of hisgovernment or superior shall not free him fromresponsibility', and went on to assert thatArticle 8 was "... in conformity with thelaw of all nations.''' The General Assemblyof the United Nations avoided endorsing theentire Nuremburg proceedings, but did affirmthe principles of international law found inthe Charter. A great deal of recent commentaryattempts to whitewash the accused at Nuremburg,to discredit the proceedings, and to dismissmuch of the factual evidence. ForGermans, of course, Nuremburg is a misty andunpleasant image, best forgotten, but theghosts have yet to be laid to rest.Australian LawThe foregoing discussion on 'the defenceof obedience to superior orders' has been developedpartly with a view to placing the Australiansituation in perspective. In Australia,the defence has yet to be tested. No judicialdecision on the matter has been handed downin Australia, and no manual sets out clearlywhere the serviceman stands. A draft bill onthe Uniform Disciplinary Code — yet to bepresented to Parliament - is expected tomodify some of the disciplinary provisionsinherited from British legislation, particularlyon questions of obedience to orders. Therehas also been strong political interest in thematter, as suggested by questions in Parliamentand as indicated by the following statementmade by the former Minister for Defence:'It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that asoldier under our military law is conceivedmore in terms of duties than rights . . .Undoubtedly, an aura of harshness andrepression still surrounds military life flowingfrom the inferior status inflicted on servicemenby much of the statutory law datingback to 1903 . . . My major concern aboutthe code as it currently stands is that afterseveral readings I cannot find a clause whichplaces upon a member of the AustralianDefence Forces an obligation to refuse an


THEIRS NOT TO REASON WHY jgorder which is illegal under Australian lawor the Geneva Convention." 1The word 'obligation', as used here, wouldseem to make the serviceman's position morerather than less difficult, despite the Minister'shumanitarian intent. If a serviceman wereobliged both to obey and to disobey a particularorder, his position would be intolerable,and his behaviour would be quite unpredictablein a moment of crisis.The 1973 draft of the Uniform DisciplinaryCode included a form of defence of obedienceto superior orders, but the 1974 draft expresslyrejected it, stating that superior orders arerelevant only in mitigation. A primary issuestill is whether or not the defence should beretained in a limited form. Retention seemslikely; in which case, the related issue of includingthe offence of giving an unlawful commandneeds to be considered. A suggested versionof the offence of giving an unlawful commandwas put forward towards the end of the 1974working party deliberations, as follows:'32A. (1) A person who knowingly gives anunlawful command or issues an unlawfulorder is guilty of an offence for which themaximum punishment is imprisonment forfive years.'(2) It is not a defence if the command ororder is not carried out.'"If the law is amended thus, a greater burdenof responsibility for 'lawfulness' will be carriedby the superior, and the subordinate will, as aconsequence, be protected more than he now is.The difficulty of fixing personal responsibilityremains, for the law in Western society implicitlyinsists that man is never an automatonentirely enslaved to the will of another — thathe is always free to listen to the voice of hisconscience and to choose.THE DYNAMICS OF OBEDIENCEAND AUTHORITYPurely legal considerations do not reach tothe heart of the problem. The law is moreconcerned with the use and effects of obedienceand authority in relation to social ends thanwith the dynamics of obedience and authorityas such. Many forces are at work in the obedience-authorityrelationship - forces in thesituation itself, the subordinate and the superior.The Changing Basis of Authorityin the MilitaryMorris Janowitz asserts that 'There has beena change in the basis of authority and disciplinein the military establishment, a shift fromauthoritarian domination to greater relianceOD manipulation, persuasion and group concensus.'1 - For the military, with its traditionsOf authoritarian discipline and conservativeoutlook, any shift in the basis of authoritymust cause fundamental difficulties. Changeson an unprecedented scale have in fact occurredin the military within living memory. Thesechanges have been most obvious in technologicaldevelopments — in communications,weaponry and man's capacity to wreak awesomedestruction — and a concomitant growthin bureaucratic control.Moral questions take on a new characterwhen the unit of battle is less likely to be aman on the battlefield with his hand on a swordor bayonet than a remote personage with hisfinger on a button. In modern warfare, thedestruction of whole cities from a distanceseems to excite less moral repugnance thanthe face-to-face shooting of hostages. Indeed,the morality of using advanced technology inwar has yet to be circumscribed by convention.A vigorous, ruthless use of manpowerwithout regard for casualties may, in the widerview, be less repugnant than a vigorous useof technology, common law values notwithstanding.A relatively new and emotionlessbreed of men, the 'technocrats', is growing,with the power to influence decisions withoutnecessarily having learned or even having toaccept the responsibility.The 'shift from authoritarian domination",as Janowitz puts it. has far-reaching consequencefor the validity of the 'chain of command'.With the growth of technical elementsin military operations, strict adherence to theprinciple of hierarchy can now become dysfunctional.The hierarchical system presupposesa single channel for passing downorders that lower levels are bound to obey.There is a growing dependence on staff officers,who may increasingly exercise de facto authoritywith regard to problems that fall withintheir competence. There is, therefore, a growingtendency to separate the line authoritystructure from the true power structure.


40 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALBureaucratic control is not a modern phenomenon,but it has evolved in modern timesto a state of great complexity. Responsibilityfor decision-making in a bureaucracy is oftendifficult to fix or even to recognize; moreover,responsibility is easily ignored when one isonly an intermediary far from the consequencesof action: one has only to shuffle paper in anoffice to participate in mass murder, as someadministrators must have done in consigningvictims to the gas chambers of Auschwitz andBelsen. Bureaucratic functions tend to channelpeople in narrow, specialized jobs that denythem a view of the whole situation. A consequencefor the bureaucrat himself is that heis sometimes unable even to act without direction;in yielding to this situation he loses someof his human quality and is alienated fromhis own actions. An implication for the militaryis that servicemen need to understand thenature of the bureaucracy of which they arenow very much a part, and to be constantlyaware of the reasons and the ethical bases ofcontrols and decisions.Psychological Aspects of Authorityand ObedienceUltimate authority may well have a divineorigin or merely reside in the individual's conscience.The ultimate source of authority Manrecognizes, however, is a personal matter andis not addressed here. The present concern iswith how a man perceived authority in hisenvironment and how he reacts to it in theform of obedience.Authority consists of rights — the right toact for a body in certain areas, the right todirect others to perform activities of variouskinds, and the right to impose sanctions anddiscipline. Whatever emotive or semantic difficultiesthere may be in defining 'management'and 'leadership', one fundamental is clear:'managing' and 'leading' are essentially theexercise of authority. Authority is supportednot only by law and custom, but also by groupor societal approval, by concepts of privateproperty, and by the human need for a leaderin group effort. A complex set of attitudes,therefore, creates what Newman, Summer andWarren describe as 'a zone of acceptance'common to leaders and followers. 1 'Obedience stems from a sense of obligation— a compulsion felt by the subordinates toaccomplish assigned tasks. A sense of obligationis itself simply an attitude. In the military,this attitude is conceived in terms of'duty', and is also bound up with concepts of'loyalty' and 'honour'. In the business world,the attitude is one of 'contract', and honouris satisfied when a man is 'as good as his word'.The mechanism by which men recognizeauthority and obey it has been well-researchedby psychologists, sociologists and managementtheorists. Until more modern times the militarywas universally regarded as pre-eminentin the field; indeed, researchers continue tostudy the military environment and its powerto exert subtle and abiding influences overindividuals. The very words 'authority' and'obedience' connote a military image even topeople who have not experienced a militaryenvironment. Nevertheless, the military is nowincreasingly regarded as a sub-group in a largersociety, and independent research may contributeto a broader understanding of thesubject.Modern ManagementResearchModern management theorists have given agreat deal of attention to the resolution ofconflict situations. A current managementphilosophy is 'Management by Objectives'.The method of resolving conflict in terms ofthis philosophy is instructive. In managementby objectives, there are two main considerations— the setting of objectives and the outcomesof proposed courses of action as seenby all the parties involved. In an organizationguided by this philosophy, employees areexpected regularly to make known their ownpersonal objectives, the objectives they see fortheir immediate working group, the objectivesthey see for other groups, and so on throughthe hierarchy. Careers are determined largelyby the compatibility of personal objectives withthe objectives of the organization as a whole.In the event of conflict over a particular issue,agreement is sought first on the basis of theobjectives of the parties concerned, and thenon the prediction of outcomes of optionalcourses of action. When objectives are incompatibleand particular outcomes highly uncertain,conflict is resolved by bargaining and bythe application of a variety of persuasive techniques.The concept of 'bargaining', whichbusinessmen see as the operation of 'the prin-


THEIRS NOT TO REASON WHY . 4!ciple of compromise*, could be viewed bytraditional military men as 'the compromiseof principle". (Military executives may, however,benefit by refining their thinking on thenicety of the distinction.)Modern business management has had toadapt to the increasing pace and complexityof the business world at large. A consequenceis that managers rely more than ever beforeon the voluntary co-operation of their subordinates.The more willing and enthusiasticsubordinates arc. the more vigorous the enterpriseis likely to be. Psychological techniquesare used widely to promote the desired atmosphereof co-operation. The factors of humanmotivation and group dynamics have, accordingly,been subjected to intensive research.For the most part, the research seems onlyto have confirmed what most managers alreadybelieved to be true, but occasionally somestartling results have been produced.Business management research appears toconfirm what military managers have traditionallyaccepted as true of the nature ofco-operation -- that co-operation is primarilyan emotional response and that thinking playsa lesser part. The usefulness of this knowledgeto a superior lies in his making an act ofco-operation emotionally attractive to the subordinate.However, the matter goes deeper.Attitudes of voluntary co-operation take timeto develop. Co-operation, as with all elementsin the affective domain of human attitudes andmotivation, is developed slowly by simpleactions, day by day. 14 Military experience doesnot, however, under-rate the value of reasonin promoting co-operation. In the military,authority is generally recognized to have greatervalidity and consequent power if the reasonsfor its application are clear to the one who isexpected to obey.Modern business management, in turningaway from overt, authoritarian controls, hasturned towards manipulative techniques. Individualshave a need for a measure of personalindependence, a desire to participate in decision-making,a willingness to learn and gainexperience, and a tendency to identify personalsecurity with group goals. 1 "' The extent towhich such psychological observations aboutsubordinates may always have been valid isimpossible to say, but the range of implicationsfor the military may be studied to advantage.While a military force without overt,authoritarian control is virtually inconceivable,little imagination is required to conceive ofsituations in which manipulative techniquescould be more effective than obviously authoritarianmethods.The distinction between 'manipulation" and'leadership' is difficult to draw as both areessentially concerned with persuading othersto do what you want them to do. Napoleon'sspeech to his Army of Italy in 1796 couldhave fallen into either category: 'Soldiers youare unclad, badly nourished; the governmentowes you much, it can give you nothing . . .I will lead you into the most fertile plains ofthe world. Rich provinces, great towns willbe in your power; you will find there honour,glory, and riches!'"' Napoleon also knew howto praise and made his men worthy of thatpraise. Indeed, he was probably the first Europeangeneral to recognize bravery and faithfulnessin 'other ranks' by means of someformal token, and this he did by grantinggolden rings. Was he a clever leader, or merelya cunning manipulator?Psychological ResearchSometimes the findings of business managementand psychological researchers point inopposite directions. According to Richardsand Neilander. 'The real source of authoritylies entirely in the acceptance of its exerciseby those who are subject to it . . . Why dosubordinates accept, rather than reject theauthority of their superiors? The answer liesin the consequences attendant upon each ofthe two alternatives . . . Submission to authoritymay result either from a deliberate recognitionof it as good or from an acquiescenceof it as inevitable, to be endured permanentlyor temporarily with scepticism, indifference orscorn, or with fists clenched but in thepockets'. 17 This statement is consistent withthe argument advanced by Newman. Summerand Warren, K; but a recent work by ProfessorMilgram, which was widely acclaimed inreviews during 1975, throws an entirely differentlight on the matter. Milgram conductedsome experiments 1 " which seem to show thatthe mere trappings of authority are in themselvesquite sufficient to produce obedience —that, even in a free society, it seems that it is


42 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALnot what people do, but for whom they do itthat matters.Milgram's conclusions seem to turn theclock back on the thinking that underlies therelation of obedience to authority, but hisexperiments are impressive and evidently meetrigorous criteria of scientific method. Heasserts that a person — the ordinary person— can come to view himself as the instrumentfor carrying out another's wishes and nolonger regard himself in any way as responsiblefor his own actions. He argues that theperson who. with inner conviction, will notsteal, assault or kill, can perform such actswith re'ative ease when commanded by arespected authority. He observed that therewere 'poignant, even tragic' elements in someof his subjects, as when a person strove desperately,yet unsuccessfully to control his actionsin a situation of real consequence to him. 1 "Milgram's book is fascinating in all its detail:however, one of his minor conclusions shouldhave been accorded greater significance: thereis, he says, a tendency for the individual tobecome so absorbed in the technical aspectsof his task that he loses sight of what he istrying to achieve beyond that task. For illustration,Milgram cites the film 'Dr Strangelove'and the bomber crew who were so absorbedin the procedure of dropping an atomic bombthat their concern for competent performanceeliminated their moral concern over the consequencesof dropping the bomb. Concernfor professional perfection can amount toobsession.THE RECONCILIATION OF OBEDIENCEAND AUTHORITYIs a Reconciliation Possible?In history, the higher generalities of howauthority is maintained, and why people obey,rarely receive intelligible expression, as theyare usually described in forms appropriateonly to the age in question. History purports,among other things, to tell the story of civilization— of class conflicts, and the pathos.the heroism and the grossness of the generalmultitude of humanity. Against the vast backdropof history viewed in these terms, with itspatterns of conflict, resolution of conflict andcontinuing conflict, obedience and authorityseem impossible of reconciliation.Philosophies try to reconcile obedience andauthority in different ways. The moral questionof obedience to authority — that is whetherone should obey when commands conflict withconscience — has been argued and treated toerudite philosophical analysis in every historicalepoch. Some philosophers have arguedthat the fabric of society is threatened by disobedience,that in the larger interest of preservingorder and the constituted authoritystructure, evil acts may be necessary and haveto be tolerated. Other philosophers have arguedfor the primacy of individual conscience, assertingthat the moral judgment of the individualover-rides the command of constituted authoritywhen the two are in conflict. Philosophicalargument, therefore, points in alldirections, and its usefulness lies only in elucidatingthe problem itself.Psychologists and other theorists, with theirpassion for objectivity in their practical researchinto human behaviour, tend to be selective intheir analyses and are necessarily guardedabout the generalizations they are tempted tomake. In these circumstances, they have difficultyin 'painting the big picture' that mustbe seen for the whole truth to be known. Consequently,they tend to adopt an attitude ofpragmatism — 'it works, so it must be right".Nevertheless, such conclusions are invariablyset largely in ignorance, and one can never besure that what works in one situation willnecessarily work in another.Towards a Code of Military EthicsWhere, then, does the reconciliation lie? AsRousseau stated in the opening sentences of'The Social Contract': 'Man is born free; andeverywhere he is in chains . . . How did thischange come about? I do not know. Whatcan make it legitimate? That question I thinkI can answer'. 2 " Problems of obedience andauthority surface when a man is under pressureto act in a way that is incompatible with hispersonal code of ethics. A constituted authorityoperates within its own peculiar code ofethics, expressed partly in its system of laws,but more broadly in the customs and politicalethos of the society at large. In the military,then, the problem may be seen as an incompatibilityof two disparate codes of ethics —the ethics of the military, and the ethics ofthe individual.


THEIRS NOT TO REASON WHY 43Mankind's progress may well be viewed tosome extent in terms of how man has succeededin accommodating himself to the lawsof nature. The laws of nature are immutable,but the laws of man. and the forces thatgenerate authority over a group, are not immutable.Resolution of the conflict of obedienceand authority can come about only by interactionbetween man and his society in a mannerthat either modifies the ethical code of theconstituted authority or causes man to modifyhis own personal ethical code. The implicationsfor the military are several.A code of ethics for the military needs tobe expressed in simple and inspirationallanguage. The law is not an appropriate placefor such a code: the prosaic terms of the lawcould entomb the principles amongst a complexcollection of punishments and sanctions-Perhaps a code of ethics for the military wouldbe too multi-faceted for comprehensive prescription,but something more is required thana statement such as the pithy West Point motto,'Duty, Honor, Country". What is required isan intelligible statement of faith for framingpersonal decisions in particular situations.A military man can claim to be a professionalonly if his personal code of ethics isnot in conflict with the ethics of his profession.If the two codes are in harmony then,fundamentally, obedience and authority arereconciled. Obedience in these circumstancesis not robot-like, but a thoughtful surrenderto the common purpose of the individual andthe military.An implication for the training and managementof the military is the need to educateservicemen to resolve their dilemmas of consciencebefore moments of stress occur. If.under stress, a man's intellectual search intothe morality of an act is not clear or logicalto him. and there develops a hiatus of personaland military ethics, the consequences may eitherbe tragic for the individual or inimical to amilitary operation. An implication for recruitingis the need to select men who have arational, intelligent understanding of obedienceand authority. An unwillingness to obey ispatently unacceptable; a willingness to obeymindlessly is not only without morality, butdevoid of the kind of individuality and personalinitiative western-style democracy seeksto preserve.CONCLUSIONThe military ethos is difficult to capture inwords, possibly because it consists of a set ofaltitudes found deep in the human psycherather than of a set of rational calculations.It is concerned with the fundamental issuesof life and death, the preservation of society,and the ideals that motivate men. Militaryways are, however, changing with changes insociety and advancing technology, and militarythinkers are re-examining the fundamentalsthat govern the military way of life.To some extent, legal sanctions reflect theformal relationship of obedience and authority,particularly in laws that deal with 'thedefence of obedience to superior orders'. Internationallaw. Continental law, and the laws ofBritain, the United States, Canada and Australia,are at variance on critical points of theissue, but they have the common ethic thatsuperior orders constitute grounds only formitigating punishment and cannot be used tojustify an act that is 'obviously unlawful' inthe view of the 'reasonable man'. The law.therefore leaves important questions unanswered.(What is 'obviously unlawful'? Whois a 'reasonable man"?) A proposal to includein Australian legislation the offence of issuingan unlawful command aims to place moreresponsibility on superiors than presently existsfor the lawfulness of commands; in so doing.Australian legislation may embody a newprinciple in the military law of Western democracies.Purely legal considerations do not, however,reconcile obedience and authority. The lawis intended to mirror the will of society and,in a democratic society, can be changed onlyin the light of how society sees itself. Thedynamics of obedience and authority are notyet understood at the personal level or withinvarious institutional frameworks. Within themilitary, the basis of authority is changing.largely in response to advancing technologyand bureaucratic controls, but with disturbingeffects on the hierarchical structure and theprocesses of fixing responsibility. Diminishingconfidence in normal authority is both a consequenceand a problem that still has to befaced at all levels of military management.Business management traditionally operateson a basis of 'bargaining' and compromise.


44 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALalthough modern management has refinementswhich have the twin effects of inducing greaterindividual participation in decision-makingand offering greater scope for co-operativeeffort. Modern methods have also shifted awayfrom authoritarian controls and adopted possiblymore powerful tools of persuasion andmanipulation. The military is not ignorant ofmanipulative technique, but may need toinvestigate the field further in response toincreasing anti-authoritarian pressures.The recent psychological research of ProfessorMilgram points to a conclusion thatrespected authority is of itself sufficient tocommand obedience. His conclusion re-assertsa traditional belief and, from a military viewpoint,re-affirms the desirability of developingstrong, respected leadership at all levels withinthe military to maintain the status of lineauthority. Milgram's research also points toa more sinister conclusion — that personalabsorption with technical performance, to theexclusion of consequences, narrows moralconcern for one's actions. A military educationprogramme should aim at coming to termswith the morality of military action and thebehaviour necessary to that action.Obedience and authority cannot, apparently,be reconciled in terms of law, psychology.historical experience or philosophy alone. Thereconciliation, if it is possible, seems to liedeep within Man himself, his concept of society,and his concept of a world-view. Within themilitary, a reconciliation may be approachedrationally by inculcating an intelligible codeof ethics. The military has yet to develop aformal code of ethics, reflecting its own idealsand self-image and expressing a positive intellectualattitude towards conflict. The conflictof obedience and authority can be seen as aconflict of military ethics and personal values- a conflict that may not be recognized untila moment of stress occurs. An implication forthe management of the military is that thereexists a need to resolve ethical dilemmas beforemoments of stress occur. An implication forrecruiting is that there exists a need to selectmen who have a rational, intelligent understandingof obedience and authority.A foundation of Western philosophy is thateach man is ultimately responsible for his ownactions. Men who take up arms against oneanother in war do not on that account ceaseto be moral human beings, and acts of authorityare always limited by their power tocommand the support of thinking men. Theuncritical romanticism unfolded in Tennyson's'Charge of the Light Brigade' may have extolledsome tine military virtues: but it also celebrateda needless death not consistent with theethos of professional military men. The moreclinical revelations of Nuremburg and My Laiexposed the failure of legal processes to resolvebasic problems of military ethics; yet thc\exposed even more acutely the need for militarymen to know not only what they do andhow they do it, but also why. Assumptionsthat place value on the individuality of Manlead to the conclusion that obedience andauthority are reconciled best in wise subordinationto wise command.y17NOTES1 Vagts. Alfred. A History of Militarism, quotedfrom p. 16.= Ibid. p. 20.Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Social Contract, pp.7-8.1 Dicey's 'History of the Common Law', quotedfrom 'The Canadian Yearbook of InternationalLaw. 1970". p. 67.5Wharton's 'Criminal Law and Procedure', quotedin 'The Canadian Yearbook of International Law.1970'. p. 68.8Hammer. Richard. The Court Martial of Lt Calley,p. 12. quoting in full Article 501 of the UnitedStates Army Field Manual. 1956.;Canadian Armed Rorces QR & (). Chapter 19.quoted from 'The Canadian Yearbook of InternationalLaw. 1970'. p. 66." For extensive argument, see 'The NuremburgTrials'. Heydecker & Leeb.: ' Belgion. Montgomery. Victor's Justice, p. 143.1(1 Barnard. L.. Address to Army Legal Convention.Cnnungra. 17 January 1973.IINichols. D. B.. Group Captain. DLS-AF. Minuteto JAG-AF 11 April. 1975.IJJanowitz. Morris. The Professional Soldier, p. 8.lsNewman. William H.. Summer. Charles E.. andWarren. E. Kirby. The Process of Management.p. 42." Richards. Max. and Neilander. William A.. Readingsin Management, p. 709. et seq.18ibid. Richards and Neilander have analysed theseminers extensively.1,1Lang. Kurt. Military Institutions and the Sociologyof War. p. 58.Richards. Max and Neilander, William A., op. cit..p. 710.' v Milgram. Stanley. Obedience to Authority.IIIibid., p. xiii.-" Rousseau. Jean Jacques, op. cit.. p. 3.There is an extensive bibliography which spacedoes no! permit me to include. Any reader interestedmay obtain a copy by writing to me.—Editor.


A MUSKETRY COACHING AIDUSINGVIDEO TECHNIQUESS. Peeler sonTechnical Officer. Optics and SurveillanceDivisionWeapons Research EstablishmentWXTOTHING could be easier than hittingIN the bull's-eye at 25 yards with theservice rifle: simply align the foresight andrearsight according to the easy-to-follow diagram;lay the tip of the foresight below theaiming mark in the prescribed manner; squeeze— (don't pull!) — the trigger, so that the sightpicture is not disturbed, and there it is -- aperfect hit in the middle of the target. Repeatas instructed for the remaining shots in theexercise and the result clearly has to be aperfect score. Naturally, if one is dealing withrecruits who are learning to shoot with theservice ritle. then scores will be less than perfect,but the whole business is so simple thatafter a few trips to the range they will all beachieving near-possible scores."Of course the foregoing has an air ofunreality, even allowing for the gross oversimplificationin not considering the influenceof aspects such as breathing, grip, posture,physical condition and concentration. On theother hand, the fundamentals of good marksmanshipare very simply stated, and the levelof performance attained by the individual islargely a measure of his success in co-ordinatingthese basic elements. Given that the levelof performance required for qualification isless than perfection, the spread of individualscores may be linked to the degree of motivation,and the final lines of the first paragraphcan be amended to — "after a few tripsMr Pederson joined the Ministry of Supply in 1950.He later served with the Ministry of Aviation atthe Royal Aircraft Establishment. Farnborough, atthe Proof and Experimental Establishment. Shoeburyness,and at the Royal Radar EstablishmentFlying School, Pershore. In 1965 he came to Australiaand is employed as a Technical Officer at theWRE (Visual Surveillance Group). He has hadtwo terms as President of the South AustralianRevolver and Pistol Association and is a FlyingOfficer in the Citizen Air Force. RAAF.to the range they will all be achieving at leastadequate scores".However, every instructor will agree thateven this statement does not describe the realsituation, because there still remains the problemof the odd man possibly highly motivated,who cannot shoot even adequately with theservice rifle; he cannot group and may not beable to put all his rounds on the target. Thisdoes not mean that all is lost, however, asremedial coaching will eventually find thecause of the problem and. once it has beenidentified and corrected, his scores will risewith practice until he is performing at a levelappropriate to his motivation. Our first paragraphnow ends - - "after a few trips to therange, and a few sessions of diagnostic andremedial coaching where necessary, they willall be achieving at least adequate scores".At this point the instructors are again throwingup their hands in horror. Manpower limitationsand the tight schedules of training programmesallow for only a bare minimum ofsuch remedial coaching, with the result thatthe recruit with a marksmanship problem maywell go on to Corps training, taking his problemwith him. Few things are easier to acquirethan bad habits, especially in shooting, andthey are very hard to lose.This is the situation which led to the developmentat the Weapons Research Establishment(W.R.E.) of the Musketry Coaching AidEquipment (figure 1).The items illustrated consist of (1) a miniaturelightweight TV camera mounted on the standardS.L.R.; (2) a commercial TV camera withlong-focus lens, mounted on the tripod; (3) acontrol box to select the output of one of thesecameras and direct to it (4) the TV monitorscreen and (5) the videotape recorder: (6) amicrophone.The Rifle-Mounted CameraThe lightweight camera was developed andproduced at W.R.E. some years ago, sincewhen it has built up a reputation for reliability


46 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALand performance in a number of applications.As shown in figure 2. it is mounted on astandard S.L.R. dust cover so that it may bereadily attached to any service rifle.This location ensures that the centre of gravityof the camera attachment coincides with thenormal point of balance of the rifle. Thecamera is offset obliquely to the left so thatit does not interfere with the normal rifle sightline, the travel of the cocking handle, or theejection of spent cases. In order to minimiseshock and vibration effects on the vidicon tubeduring firing, the camera is carried on a recoilabsorbingmount. The precision-ground railsof this mount ensure that the camera returnsto exact alignment after each shot, while thetotally-enclosed design excludes dust andmoisture. The collar supporting the lens providesadjustment of the camera axis in azimuthand elevation, so that it may be harmonizedwith the sights of any S.L.R. at a range of25 yd. The lens, designed and manufacturedby the Mechanical and Optical TechniquesGroup at W.R.E., has a focal length of 150 mmand a maximum aperture of f/16. This restrictionon the aperture serves primarily to minimisethe risk of overloading the vidicon tubeshould the rifle be pointed toward the sun orother intense light source. In addition, thephysical size of the lens is greatly reduced,resulting in a lightweight, yet extremely ruggedand compact, optical system which does notinterfere with the shooter's grip on the foreendwoodwork. The camera is provided withits own sight, consisting of a silhouette mask,in the shape of an S.L.R. foresight, cementedto the front face of the vidicon tube. Thismask is produced by vacuum deposition ofa thin film of lead onto a 0.005 inch thickmicroscope cover glass, the size relationshipbetween the sight silhouette and the targetimage matching that perceived by the eye.Figure 3 shows a typical sight picture as displayedon the television monitor screen.The Monitoring SystemThe commercial TV camera on the tripodin figure 1 is used as an electronic spottingtelescope. It is fitted with an 81 inch f/5.6telephoto lens which produces a large-scaleimage of the target to enable each hit to beobserved and recorded.The outputs of the two cameras are fed tothe control box. which enables the operatorto select one of these signals for display onthe television monitor screen. The picturebeing viewed may be simultaneously recordedon videotape when required, together with theinstructor's spoken instructions and comments.Operating ProcedureThe operating procedure that has evolvedis quite straightforward and can be thoroughlyacquired in less than a day. The pupil issettled down with the rifle, given a briefdescription of the purpose of the system and,if deemed necessary, allowed to fire a coupleof shots into the backstop to demonstrate thatthe handling of the weapon is completely conventional.When the pupil is settled and theinstructor has gone through his preamble, thevideotape recorder is started and the instructorstates the date and time, the name and otherdetails of his pupil, and his own name. Therifle camera input is selected and the pupilasked to lay an aim and hold it. This preliminarywill often show up basic faults inthe sight picture, and problems in breathing,grip and posture without a shot being fired,while dry firing will show up faulty triggercontrol. If any faults are apparent at thisstage, the recorder can be stopped andrewound, and the pupil is shown his replaywhile the instructor points out the errors. Therelevant section of tape can, of course, bereplayed repeatedly until the point is made.The pupil then returns to his rifle, loads, andstarts the exercise. After the first shot is fired,the spotting camera input is selected for a fewseconds to indicate the position of the hit,then the ritle camera is selected in time forthe second shot. As the exercise proceeds,the instructor's comments, whether directed tothe pupil or, sotto voce', to the microphone,are recorded on the tape. This removes theburden of remembering that, say, the thirdshot was snatched or the fifth shot was accompaniedby a flinch — on replay the voice trackidentifies each feature of the pupil's performanceas it occurs, in synchronisation with theplayback of the sight picture. (It must bepointed out here that, although the operationcan be learnt in a day, learning to interpretthe record is necessarily a longer process, andin common with any other type of diagnosis.


A MUSKETRY COACHING AID USING VIDEO TECHNIQUES 47the accuracy and quality improve as experienceis gained. Once the equipment enters regularservice, a collection of tapes could quickly beassembled to illustrate the classic faults, andeventually a master tape produced to speedup the familiarisation of instructors). At theend of the exercise, usually five shots, the tapeis rewound while the target is being changed.The instructor and pupil then view the replavwith the target before them, and a quickanalvsis i^ made while the shot holes in thetarget are labelled in sequence.ing the trigger. However, even this closescrutiny does not quickly give a clear-cut diagnosis,since the real problem case is usually asubtle blend of several faults. On the otherhand, the replay will have shown the traineethat the rifle hits where it is pointed, 1 and that,for a variety of reasons, it is not being pointedat the right spot at the critical moment. Heshould also have grasped the causes of someof his errors, and he can proceed to a secondexercise with these firmly in mind. The secondtarget should show some improvement, while(WRE. Salisbury, SA)Fig. 1 Musketry Coaching Aid Equipment.Diagnosis ofFaultsThis preliminary evaluation will not usuallyprovide an instant solution, but it will almostcertainly reveal a number of highly suspectshots. These can then be examined in minutedetail, using the frame-by-frame stop-motionfeature of the videotape recorder. Close studyof the two seconds prior to trigger releaseusually discloses faults in breathing, holding orposture, whereas flinching or muscling occurin the last fifth of a second. Problems of triggercontrol are confined to the final one or twoframes, and the videotape record has shownmany times that what should have been aperfectly good shot has been ruined in a fewthousandths of a second by snatching or jerkthetape replay will show the reasons for hisimprovement. Once this stage is reached, thetape begins to establish the causes, not onlyof his bad shots, but also of his good ones.From the earliest stages, the camera attachmenthas been designed to fit any S.L.R. without modification.However, experience has shown that adedicated TV training rifle should be part of theequipment package, for the simple reason that thevalue of the TV information depends upon theaccuracy of the zero-ing of the rifle sights. In thecase of the problem shooter who cannot group,the accuracy of zero of his issue rifle is an unknownquantity.During a trial at the Infantry Centre, a rifle waszeroed by a "committee" of six instructors. Thisrifle was then used for TV instruction with thecertainty that the rifle sight line, the camera sightline and the trajectory coincided at 25 yd.


48 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALHe can now pick up his rifle with a clearmental image of what his sight picture shouldlook like, and he should begin to produce agroup, albeit a large one. Having achievedthis, the trainee begins to realise that he canbe the master of the rifle, and anxiety beginsto give way to confidence.There is no fundamental difference betweenthis process and classical coaching methods,except for the additional visual informationgiven by the television camera and stored onthe videotape. The system does not claim toturn instructors into Olympic coaches, or badshots into expert marksmen, but it offers theprospect of improved training standards withinthe existing structure, and, hopefully, improvedstandards of marksmanship.Development StatusThroughout the development of the equipment,a close liaison has been maintained withthe Army Office and the Infantry Centre. Thefirst engineered prototype was sent to theInf. Centre, Singleton for evaluation early in1976. Production models may incorporatesuch improvements as the substitution of avideo cassette recorder for the reel-to-reelmachine, and integration of the componentsinto a combined transit/operational package.The equipment could also be adapted foruse with other weapons by fitting appropriatesight silhouettes and lenses of suitable focallength. The camera body has a standard "C"type lens mount so that any 16 mm cine ortelevision camera lens may be fitted, althoughthis may entail modification or re-design ofthe lens support collar.As a further bonus, when the equipment isnot in use on the rifle range, the commercialcamera, with the monitor and videotaperecorder, could well be used elsewhere on theunit as an addition to the existing range ofinstructional aids. Perhaps the RegimentalDiary could be augmented with a videocassettelibrary of important events.To sum up, the TV sight picture monitor isoffered as an addition to the present schemeof rifle marksmanship training, to assist theinstructor with those trainees who encountera real problem in reaching the basic qualifyinglevel of skill. It is not seen as a mass trainingaid for all recruits, although the master tapeof classic faults could have some instructionalvalue, as could a tape showing the right techniques.If it proves to be of value in enablingthe instructors to turn out a higher percentageof competent, confident riflemen with noincrease in training time or expenditure ofammunition, it will have met the originalaim.ftFig. 2(WRE. Salisbury, SA)Lightweight camera mounted on a standard SLR.


A MUSKETRY COACHING AID USING VIDEO TECHNIQUES 49Fig. 3IWRE, Salisbury, SA)Typical sight picture on the TV Monitor screen.* * * *IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM, LONDONDEPARTMENT OF SOUND RECORDSThe Museum's oral history programme was set up in 1972 under the direction of DavidLance. With a collection now amounting to about two thousand recorded hours of interviews,it has become the largest and most varied oral history programme in Britain.The Imperial War Museum is concerned with the broad field of war in the 20th century.In organising its recording programme the Department of Sound Records has exclusivelyused a special project approach and. to date, has completed seven separate projects. Thegroups of people who have been interviewed divide evenly between service personnel andcivilians. Thus, on the one hand, there have been projects with military, naval and air forceofficers and other ranks. On the civilian side medical-welfare work, wartime industry,pacifism and conscientious objection, and war artists have been the main areas of research.The projects so far carried out have been mainly concerned with the First World Warperiod. Current work is concentrating on the inter-war years and the programme willeventually deal with the Second World War and post-war periods.In 1976 two projects, which have already begun, will be carried out. One will beconcerned with the British Army in India up to 1939 and the other with the mechanisationof the British Army during the same period. A third project on the Spanish Civil War willalso get underway. Future plans include a social history of the Royal Air Force and thedevelopment of radar before and during the Second World War.All the oral history projects are organised and carried out by Departmental staff —which includes three historians — who are supported by a small number of freelance interviewers.There are four other members of the Department who have special responsibilitiesfor technical processing, cataloguing and transcribing. Freelance typists are also used fortranscribing purposes.The oral history archive at the Imperial War Museum will be officially open for publicreference in 1977. but some specialised uses are already made of the collection. Recordingshave been incorporated into Museum exhibitions and educational services: transcripts canbe made available through the Museum library: and oral history tapes have been used innational, regional and local radio broadcasts. One forty-five minute radio programme,compiled and presented by David Lance, and created entirely from IWM recordings wasbroadcast nationally by the BBC in 1975. Further broadcasts are being scheduled. A fairlyactive publishing programming has been pursued. Three catalogues have so far been printedand several articles by the staff based on the Department's research work have been publishedin historical and professional journals. Plans are also advanced to publish a seriesof audio teaching cassettes in conjunction with the publisher Longman.


mxon E}l hope that members of the other Services will bear with us for the next few issues whileletters concerning articles in the Army Journal are still coming in. By excluding them, wewould deny the readers of that Journal a forum — Ed.Captain Gregson talks of the reluctance ofwomen leaders to compete on equal termswith men. {Army Journal No. 325, June 1976).I assume she advocates a greater involvementin those areas previously denied them. 1 heartilyendorse her remarks.Does Captain Gregson advocate the replacementof the six month WRAAC OCS course,after which a graduate is commissioned as alieutenant, with a more realistic twelve monthcourse graduating as a second lieutenant?If she does, she has made no mention ofthis cosy little advantage.331 Supply Company, K. A. ThomasSeymour. Victoria.LieutenantI have just read Major McCullagh's articlein the August issue of the Army Journal. Myfirst thought was that maybe Major McCullaghis not aware that for the period 1955 to 1972the Australian Army had been on operationsagainst the type of person he sees as guerrillas,whether they be Malayan CTs, Bornean "incursionists"or VC/NVA.Almost everyone who served in the Armyfor the period 1955-72 is well aware of thestrengths and weaknesses of a guerrilla movement,and would easily be able to consider theproblem from the point of view of ourselvesas guerrillas, either as local force or nationalheadquarters.However, as Major McCullagh has gone tothe trouble of researching and writing his article,I find it surprising that he (apparently) has notstudied some campaigns which fit exactly thesituations he describes in his article, namely:• The Russian Front 1941-44, and the partplayed by partisans in it,• Yugoslavia 1941-45,• Vietnam 1945-73.All these were campaigns brought to a successfulconclusion, i.e. the (foreign) invaderswithdrew and the guerrillas were left in control.The most outstanding guerrilla campaignof the Second World War was that carried outby the Russians.The following books may be of interest toMajor McCullagh (and other readers):0Partisan Warfare — Otto Heilbrunn• Handbook of Intelligence and GuerrillaWarfare — Alexander Orlov° Viet Con» — Dousilas Pike.HQ field Force Command.Paddington, NSW.A. H. McAulaxWG2


Development of SeabedResources and Naval Co-operation*Captain P. Kavanagh, N.S.Republic of IrelandIN time of peace, when no threat to nationalsecurity from external or internal sourcesis apparent, the size of the Navy of a nationwithout aggressive tendencies may well dependon the contribution it makes to nationaleconomy and welfare.There are many roles, primarily civilian incharacter, in which Navies can co-operate withthe rest of society to make use of knowledge,experience and developments in the underwaterfield, for exploration and exploitationof the seabed resources, without interferingunduly with their primary objective of preparingfor war, and which may be fitted in withNaval planning, training and operations. Manyof the tasks envisaged cannot readily be undertakenby other agencies without enormousexpenditure on vessels, equipment and trainingof personnel. While seabed explorationcannot be expected to yield a quick financialreturn for expenditure, it is of utmost importanceto nations, who would hope to benefitin the longer term from their geographic maritimeposition. This is particularly true in thecase of small nations who cannot affordseparate organisations for the many and variedchores in the oceanographic field but whichmust receive attention if the potential forexploration is to be assessed and developed.Roles in which Navies may co-operate bycontributing knowledge, experience and exper-tise, making use of their skills and of theirequipment, and in which the value of theirco-operation can readily be seen, are discussedhereunder. While some of the roles envisagedare only obliquely connected with the explorationand exploitation of the seabed, they arematters which require attention if safe methodicaland economical progress is to be made.Fishery ProtectionWhile fishing and marine biology will notreadily be identitied with seabed resources inthe public mind at the moment, when so muchpublicity centres on new found mineralresources, they are nevertheless most importantresources. Their value is rapidly increasingand by the exercise of proper control, neednot be a diminishing resource.Fishery protection has been, traditionally,an alternative role for Navies over the centuriesand has played an important part in theeconomy and development of maritime nations.Fishery protection has changed in concept andscope in recent years and is likely to be anarea of greater international co-operation inthe future. As it demands regular patrollingin all weather, it provides purposeful peacetimeactivity giving valuable experience andtraining in seamanship, navigation and communicationswhich are basic to naval operations.It may be simultaneously carried outwith general surveillance and the exercise ofmaritime jurisdiction. Fishery protection maytake various forms: conservation within exclu-* The O.C. Naval Service presented this paper atthe Stockholm Maritime Symposium on 12 June1975.Reprinted with permission from An Cosantoir, TheIrish Defence Journal.Captain Kavanagh joined the Merchant Navy as aCadet in 1937, after a pre-sea course at the IrishNautical College. He served in the British MerchantNavy between 1937 and 1942 and the Irish MerchantNavy between 1942 and 1947. He qualified as aForeign-going Master Mariner in 1947 and wascommissioned as an Ensign in the Irish Naval Serviceon 13 June 1947. He was an Instructor at theNaval School, saw service in corvettes, getting hisfirst command in 1951. He was promoted Captainin 1973 and appointed Commanding Officer andDirector. Naval Service.


DEVELOPMENT OF SEABED RESOURCES AND NAVAL CO-OPERATIONthe laws of the flag nation will probably applybut the departments charged with implementingthe laws may not have the means ofenforcing them. Navies, who have traditionallyaided the civil power in enforcing the lawbeyond the coast in respect of revenue, emigrationand crime will be required to extendsuch aid as use of the sea increases. Smallcountries with large continental shelves, willbe particularly dependent upon their Naviesfor such duties. Defence and protection ofinstallations such as oil rigs, from enemies ofand rescue areas and may be in a position tocall upon air and medical support. Beingunhampered or uninhibited by commercialconsiderations naval vessels can be made availablemore readily than commercial vessels forthe task. Few countries can afford to maintainvessels with long range and endurance forsuch tasks alone.EnvironmentalprotectionThe effects of sea pollution are felt in areasfar distant from the source and primary damage{Defence Public Relations)RAN Tracker over Taiwanese trawler on the North-West Shelf, WesternAustralia.the nation, from subversive elements withinand from any unlawful activity, will alsodemand Naval attention.There will be greater need for regulation oftraffic, marking or destruction of navigationalhazards and general policing.Search and Rescue will demand greater attention.Navies have traditionally played a prominentpart in the SAR role as they normallyhave ships deployed or available at short notice,well equipped for search and rescue operations.Their personnel are trained in boatwork,fire-fighting and damage control and are wellequipped and skilled in communications. Theofficers, because of their training, are wellsuited to co-ordinate operations in the searchto marine life is increased by the creation ofbiological imbalance. It is therefore a matterof international concern and has led to conventionsfor control of pollution of the sea.Navies contribute by monitoring, inspecting,reporting and by example. They may also beto the fore in clean-up operations in the eventof heavy oil spillage and may be required asco-ordinators. Exploration and exploitation ofthe seabed, particularly for oil, has greatlyincreased the risk and incidence of pollution.ConclusionWhile Navies must primarily be a part ofa Nation's Armed Forces providing an extensionof military capacity to sea-ward of thecoastline, co-operation with the rest of society


54 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALis both desirable and possible without diminutionof their primary function. While armedforces cannot be expected to pay their way,the cost effectiveness of Navies can be improvedby involvement and co-operation in certaincivilian activities such as exploration andexploitation of the seabed and associated tasks.Such involvement may justify a larger Navyduring peacetime in the eyes of society thanmight otherwise be contemplated or countenanced.It could provide more vessels, usefuland interesting activity upon the seas, suitablenautical experience and training and improvedcareer structure. It could create a more favourablepublic image, improving morale and aidingenlistment, while aiding the nationaleconomy.u* * *CURRENT DEFENCE READINGSReaders may find the following articles of interest.The journals in which articles appear are availablethrough the Defence Library Information Service atCampbell Park Library and Military District librariesBig threat from the little bombs. New Scientist, 3June 76: 516. (Nuclear Weapons — strategic; Nuclearweapons — tactical; Defence planning — Europe;NATO).The RAAF needs new fighters and jet trainers. (Ministerfor Defence. D. J. Killen). Aircraft. August 76:14-16. 48. (Defence procurement — Australia; AirForce — Australia; Aircraft procurement — Australia).Mirage replacements — the options'? (Roy Braybrook).Aircraft. August 76: 18-25. 48. (Defenceprocurement — Australia; Aircraft procurement —Australia; Tactical Fighter Force).Reorganisation of the Swiss Army (II): report ofthe Federal Council to the Federal Assembly onthe future concepts of national military defence inthe 1980s. Armies and Weapons (Interconair). May76: 7-10. (Armed forces — Switzerland; Defence —Switzerland).New quality assurance requirements for M.O.D.Welding and metal fabrication. May 76: 281-284.(Quality control — M.O.D. contracts; Defenceindustry — U.K.).Ours is a force for peace. Far Eastern EconomicReview. 20 August 76: 24-25. (Defence policy —Japan; Self Defence Agency, Japan).Sitting it out on the China front. Far Eastern EconomicReview. 20 August 76: 26-27. (Sino-Sovietrelations; Defence planning — U.S.S.R.).The security of Norway and the Atlantic Alliance.NATO Review. June 76: 3-6. (Defence policy —Norway; International security — Norway; Strategicrelations — Norway; Atlantic Alliance; NATO).The challenge for the west in a changing strategicenvironment. (General A. Haig). NATO Review.June 76: 10-13. (Strategic relations — Europe;Atlantic Alliance: NATO).The Air-Launched Cruise Missile. Interavia. June76: 580-583. (ALCM; Air-Launched Cruise Missile:Nuclear weapons; Air Force — U.S.).The East West technological co-operation symposium:a recent NATO colloquium. NATO Review. June 76:17-19. (East-West relations — technology transfer;COMECON — technology advancement; Strategicrelations — Europe).Defence budget boost and Bonn bars arms to crisisareas. German International. June 76: 13. (Defencebudgeting — Germany; Arms sales — Germany).The Indian Navy in the seventies. Pacific Affairs.Winter 75-76: 500-518. (Naval strength — India;Defence budgeting — India).Why the nuclear power race worries the U.S. BusinessWeek. 23 August 76: 68-69. (Arms control —U.S.: Nuclear reactors; Plutonium; Nuclear warfare).Logistics: the thin bread line. Defense & ForeignAffairs Digest, 7/1976: 6-11. 28-29. (Logistics planning;Strategic warfare).The tank is dead: long live the tank. Defense &Foreign Affairs Digest, 7/1976: 18-27. (Tanks (combatvehicles); Gunnery — tanks).Counter-insurgency in the post colonial era. (DouglasHyde). Asian Defence Journal. June 76: 5-15.(Counter-insurgency).TechnicalNavy firefighters train at NTC San Diego. AllHands. (U.S. Navy), February 76: 12-15. (Fire fighting— training).Dutch "Tramp" class missile frigates. Naval Record.April 76: 49-51. 54. (Missile frigates — Dutch"Tromp" class; Anti-submarine warfare; Surveillancesystems — naval).Swedish combined minelayer support ships. NavalRecord. April 76: 69-71. (Minelayer ships — SwedishNavy; Mine warfare — Swedish Navy; Submarines— Sweden).Helicopter gunships: a new dimension in warfareis created as heavily-armed helicopters swarm aboveVietnam's battle grounds. War Monthly (U.K.). Issue29, 76: 1-9. (Helicopter gunships; Helicopters — U.S.Army). NOTE: This article will not photocopy satisfactorily.The importance of efficient alarm and control systems— they can avert serious damage at sea. Safetyat Sea International. May 76: 4-11. 18. (Marine safety— alarm and control systems; Alarm systems —shipping).Development of communications for British forcesin Germany. Communication c£ Broadcasting, Spring76: 29-36. (Communications — military; Communications— British forces in Germany).MRCA meeting its targets. Aerospace InternationalMar/Apr 76: 6-15. (MRCA: Combat aircraft; Defenceprocurement — NATO).Versatile harooon. Aerospace International, Mar Apr76: 16-24. (Harpoon missiles; Missiles — anti-shipping;Missiles, tactical — U.S.).Caseless gun seen 300% more effective. AviationWeekly & Space Technology, 16 August 76: 47-50.(Aeriai gunnery; Weapon systems — air-to-air; Guns,liquid propellant).AF seeks to cut solid propellant smoke. AviationWeek & Space Technology, 16 August 76: 43. (Rocketexhaust; Solid rocket propellants).


• \THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVEAGAINST GERMANY 1939-1945. Vols Iand II by Sir Charles Webster and NobleFrankland, H.M.S.O., 522 pp and 322 pp. S28.Reviewed by Professor /.. C. F. Turner, Professorof History, University of New SouthWales, RMC , Duntroon.Reprinted from the Saturday 12 June 1^76edition of The Canberra Times with permission.THESE two volumes of the official Britishhistory of World War II were publishedoriginally in 1961, and form part of a set offour volumes dealing with the operations ofthe RAF Bomber Command. The periodcovered is that of the independent air offensiveagainst Germany between September 3, 1939,and March 31. 1944.Sir Charles Webster was best known for hismasterly study of the foreign policy of Castlereagh.while Dr Frankland, who served as anavigator with the RAF is at present Directorof the Imperial War Museum. They have producedone of the finest studies of war everwritten, and their work combines profoundanalysis with a graceful and attractive style.No aspect of the war has produced so muchcontroversy as the contribution of strategicbombingto the Allied victory, and the greatscientist. Sir Henry Tiz/ard, has declaredunequivocally that the fearful sacrifices of theRAF Bomber Command injured Britain morethan Germany. In his opinion, the investmentin money and manpower expended in thebombing offensive exceeded by far the damagedone to the enemy. Webster and Franklandconfirm this view.In June 1942 Sir Arthur Harris, C-in-CBomber Command, declared in a letter toChurchill that his operations would preserve"the flower of the country's youth" from arepetition of the Somme and Passchendaele.Much has been written of the "lost generationof subalterns" and the effects on British politicsand society of the sacrifice of 37,000 officersin the holocausts on the Western Front. However,while the total British casualties in WorldWar II were barely a third of those of 1914-13,the slaughter of elite youth was even greater.Apart from those killed in the RAF Fighterand Coastal Commands, and the officers whoperished while serving with the Royal Navyand Army, 55,000 aircrew of Bomber Commanddied in the unique and terrible battlefought over Germany and Western Europe.The authors refer to Sir Arthur Harris as a"great commander", but their volumes donothing to substantiate this claim. He emergesas an extremely obstinate and narrow-mindedman, whose extravagant statements werematched by his absurd miscalculations. Hereally believed in December 1943 that his"Lancaster force alone" could achieve byApril 1, 1944 "a state of devastation in whichsurrender is inevitable". He really thought hewas winning the Battle of Berlin in the periodNovember 1943-March 1944, when in fact "lewas suffering a smashing defeat. Finally, afterlosing 94 bombers out of 795 despatched toNuremburg on March 30, 1944, he broke offthe battle and surrendered the skies to thenight fighters of the Luftwaffe.Even with regard to the prosecution of hisprecious bomber offensive, Harris was incrediblyobtuse. He resisted by every means theintroduction of a Pathfinder force until it wasfinally thrust down his throat by the Air Staff,and his indifference contributed to a year'sdelay in the introduction of the vital anti-radardevice known as "Window". It is impossibleto estimate the numbers of bombers and aircrewwho were lost through this folly.However, Harris had the ear of Churchill,who in turn was guided by his "scientificadviser", Lord Cherwell, who on March 30,


56 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL1942, formulated a master plan for crushingGermany. Drawing up a list of 58 Germantowns, which he singled out for destruction,this learned Oxford don informed the PrimeMinster that "there seems little doubt that thiswould break the spirit of the people". Thispolicy, as politically immoral as it was strategicallyabsurd, foundered on the twin obstaclesof German organisation and German morale.It was to reach its culmination, long after thewar had been won by other means, in themonstrous horror of the attack on Dresden onFebruary 13, 1945.So far from the bombing offensive destroyingGerman armaments production, it continuedto rise dramatically until September1944. Admittedly the rate of increase of totalGerman factory production was reduced in1943 by nine per cent and in 1944 by 17 percent, but less than half of this reduction wasin armaments. The daylight offensive of theUnited States Eighth Air Force in 1943 waseven more costly than that of the RAF BomberCommand and, after what the authors describeas a series of "tremendous victories of theGerman fighter force" was broken off followingthe disastrous attack on Schweinfurt onOctober 14 1943.Certainly, the destruction wrought by theRAF in its "area bombing" in 1943 was on acolossal scale. Between March 1943 and March1944 200,000 people were killed and a muchlarger number injured, and Berlin, Essen and,above all, Hamburg were subjected to anincredible ordeal.However, the authors state:"In fact armaments production was not onlymaintained but much increased during the firsthalf of 1943 . . . The workers, both native andforeign, endured the ordeal to which they weresubjected without any widespread demoralisation.The first result was due to the reorganisationof Germany's methods of productionby Alber Speer, the ablest of all Hitler's lieutenants,the second to the measures taken todeal with the etfects of the bombing . . . Thestoicism and indeed, in many cases the heroismof the German people may be considered tohave been mistaken, but, whatever the consequences,the refusal to accept defeat throughanguish and terror must command respect andadmiration".This work makes it abundantly clear thatGermany was not defeated or even seriouslyendangered by the independent bombing offensiveconducted by the RAF and the US EighthAir Force. She was overpowered in two giganticoperations of war — the successful invasionof Normandy in June 1944 and the crushingof the German front in White Russia in theRed Army's offensive of the same month.These disasters had the same effect on NaziGermany as Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig hadon Imperial France, and made her ultimatecollapse inevitable.y•THE CITIZEN GENERAL STAFF' (THEAUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE CORPS1907-1914), by Captain C D. Coulthard-Clark.Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel D. FAliott.Military Intelligence has not been the focusof balanced or scholarly research in Australiato date. Only with the setting up of the presentRoyal Commission into Intelligence andSecurity under Mr Justice Hope has therebeen some increased interest into this subjectwithin the general community. However, eventhis has been directed largely at the moresensational aspects such as security matters,rather than to intelligence as an Arm of theservice and an essential part of the militaryprofession.The book under review is possibly the firstpublished in this country to be concerned withthe subject, and the only one dealing withintelligence within the Australian Army. It isfortuitous, therefore, that it has come outbefore the results of the Royal Commission,which may foreshadow changes to the presentintelligence structure, for it will exist to recordhow that structure came into being. As a pointof interest, the book has been studied by theCommission.The text examines the development of anintelligence system within the AMF from prefederationdays, and the subsequent emergenceof an intelligence corps until its disbandmentin 1914. It is a small book (95 pp). This maybe a disappointment to those readers who mayhave envisaged a more voluminous work coveringevents to a later period, and dealing withintelligence operations within the Army in


BOOK REVIEWS 57The lack of discussion of intelligence metho-dology is perhaps mainly due to the fact thatthe book is a corps history rather than a historyof intelligence overall. The disbandmentof the AIC before it was given an opportunityto operate under wartime conditions is alsorelevant. Had it continued in existence throughoutthe war, detailed examination of its operationand methods would have been necessary.Nevertheless some fascinating vignettes doappear. There is reference to the pre-AICassignment of the then Colonel Bridges on anespionage mission to New Caledonia, and theactivities of Captain Taylor and his arrest oftwo suspected German agents at Prospect in1912. There is mention of the role of theIntelligence Officers of the 5th Division at thebattle of Polygon Wood, although by that limethis had nothing to do with members of theCorps.fsome detail. However, as the author hasstated, the organization and structure of theearly Intelligence Corps was completely differentto that of the reformed Corps whichhas existed since World War II. The disbandingof the AIC in I'M4 thus forms a clearbreak in historical continuity and makesseparate examination of both periods appropriateand convenient.Readers, many within the Army and evenwithin the present Intelligence Corps, may besurprised by the number of illustrious militarypersonalities connected with the creation andearly years of the AIC. The names of officerslike Bridges, Monash and McCay are usuallyremembered for their wartime exploits, andnot for any connection with intelligence. Evenmore startling must be the realization that theAIC, as the title of the book suggests, was theprogenitor of the General Staff structure inthe Australian Army, and that these officersnot only performed that function, but did soin their own time as citizen soldiers. This wasa situation which could not last, and the authorhas explained the outcome clearly.Attention is drawn also to the prominentpart that ex-AIC officers played in the formationand work of other organizations such asthe Special Investigation Bureau and the PacificBranch of the Prime Minister's Department;forerunners of ASIO and Foreign Affairs.There is also the rleelin» association with theearly development of the Survey and FlyingCorps.This first volume is therefore full of interestingmaterial which should hold the attentionof the general reader and be a useful aid forthe researcher and military historian. The comprehensivelist of officers' biographies is a casein point. This should prove an invaluablereference list, but unfortunately it may be aprecedent hard to follow in the second volume.In all, this is a well written and readablebook. We await the second volume with anticipation.UPEACE IS NOT AT HAND, by Sir RobertThompson, London, Chatto and Windus, 1974.Austra­Reviewed by Major R. B. Johnston,lian Staff College.In this sequel to 'No Exit From Vietnam'Sir Robert Thompson deals with the war inVietnam from 1969 until early 1974. He discussesthe considerable advances made in SouthVietnam and in the Republic of VietnamArmed Forces under President Nixon's Vietnami/ationand pacification policy. The bookexplains why North Vietnam departed fromnormal doctrine and launched a conventionalinvasion when the strength and influence ofthe Vietcong was at such a low ebb and therewas no chance of a popular uprising. Itexplains why this invasion failed and why theNorth then accepted ceasefire terms which ithad previously rejected.This book refutes many of the popularlyheld misconceptions created by North Vietnamand her supporters. Examples of these are:the bombing of the Hanoi dykes: the 200,000political prisoners; and, the conditions underwhich prisoners were confined in the 'tigercages'. It points out the grave dis-service ofthe press and television through inaccurate andincomplete reporting and sounds a warningfor any free country that might be involvedin a war with a country that excludes the worldpress. This one sided reporting. Sir Robertclaims, 'was largely responsible for the creationof the myth that the war was unwinnable'.Finally this book explains why the ParisCeasefire Agreement of 1973 did not achievepeace and examines the world strategic impli-


58 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALcations of the United States acceptance of anagreement that could not be enforced.Sir Robert Thompson writes in a vigorousstyle. He is forthright and forceful and supportshis arguments logically with wellresearched facts. Although the book is a sequelto his previous work it introduces the readerto the history before concentrating on thedefined period of study and could easily beread without any prior detailed knowledge ofthe Vietnam situation. The author was aRAF officer during the Second World Warand served in Burma where he was awardedthe MC and DSO. After the war he returnedto Malaya where he had previously been inthe Malayan Civil Service. He was successivelyDeputy Secretary and Secretary for Defence,Federation of Malaya, from 1957 to 196FFrom 1961 to 1965 he was closely involvedwith the Vietnam war as head of the BritishAdvisory Mission to South Vietnam. Subsequentlyhe has made frequent visits to SouthVietnam as a consultant to the United StatesSecurity Council and the White House. Throughthis continuing close association and personalcontact with the military and political leadersof both South Vietnam and the United Statesof America he is able to write with authorityand insight. He despises the journalists whowrote their articles from the relative comfortof Saigon and avoided the same mistakes bytravelling as widely as possible within thecountry and learning from the people whowere involved at village and hamlet level.The text is supported by maps which arehelpful but would be even more so if theywere mounted to fold clear of the book foreasy reference. A comprehensive index andlist of notes is included at the back of thebook. Notes placed in this way do not alloweasy reference during reading, nor do thesehave a cross referencing system that wouldallow them to be read separately and the supportedtext found easily.The book is well researched and presentedin a simple, coherent form. It does not stopat merely recounting occurrences but analysesreasons for and implications of events. It willbe controversial for many people but it willbe difficult to refute its logic.Sir Robert Thompson has produced a bookwhich should be of sreat value to all militarvand strategic students. He certainly achieveshis aim of directing attention to the world wideimplications of an unsatisfactory conclusionto the Vietnam conflict. He has said what hefeels must be said to counter the feeling ofresigned acceptance of an ever diminishingfree world society. In his words, quoted fromthe preface to the book:'This has not been a pleasant book towrite and it will not be a comfortable, orcomforting, book to read, because it dealsmainly with one of the most bitter wars inhistory and with the harsh reality of thedanger which now faces the United Statesand the West.'Although this hook was published in 1974,before the end of the Vietnam War. it isstrongly recommended to readers who wishto get a more balanced view of the conflict asseen through the eyes of an acknowledgedexpert in the field of revolutionary warfare.—Editor.H90 MINUTES TO ENTEBBE, by WilliamStevenson, London, Corgi Books, 1976, 216 pp.,SI.95.Reviewed by Major D. M. Ivison. RCTUK Exchange Officer. Army Office, Canberra.ON Sunday 27th June this year, the worldread about the hijacking of an Air Franceairbus en route from Athens to Paris with 250passengers on board. The hijackers weremembers of the Popular Front for the Liberationof Palestine (PFLP). It was yet anotherin a series of aerial kidnappings.Exactly one week later, on Sunday 4th July,came the electrifying news that Israeli forces,by an audacious coup de main, had freed thehostages from Entebbe airport in Uganda.Scarcely less swift than the rescue operationwas the publication of William Stevenson'sbook "90 Minutes at Entebbe", only a fortnightafter the event — surely a literary record!This short and very readable book analysesstep by step the mechanics of the hijacking,the involvement of Uganda and its erraticleaderIdi Amin. This and the feelings of thehostages is well covered by interviews withand extracts from diaries kept at the time bythe prisoners.


BOOK REVIEWS 59During the course of the fateful week, themajority of the 250 passengers were releasedby the hijackers, but some 83 of Israeli anddual nationality were segregated and kept tobe used as a bargaining counter for the releaseof 53 convicted Arab terrorists held in fivecountries.While unsuccessful attempts were being madean the diplomatic front, the Israeli Governmentand armed forces were collecting intelligenceand formulating military plans to effect therelease of the hostages. A daring plan involvingelements of all services of the IsraeliDefence Forces was drawn up, rehearsed andsuccessfully executed. The plan, based on anairborne assault over 2,500 miles from Israeliterritory, must surely be unique in the annalsof military operations for sheer audacity andenterprise. The actual assault and rescue operationlasted only ninety minutes and cost theattackers one dead and minor injuries to ahandful of others. Two of the hostages werekilled and a small number injured. Thehijackers were all killed, as were a number ofUgandan soldiers. The Israeli team alsodestroyed several Ugandan MiGs on the groundto deter pursuit. One is left wondering if anyother nation in the world would have thecourage and audacity to undertake such anoperation aptly codenamed 'OperationThunderbolt'.A fascinating book for all readers, militaryor civil. My only criticism is that, being writtenso soon after the event, it is not possible forthe author to analyse the results objectivelynor to divulge his sources of information. Forall that, once begun, it is a difficult book toput down.yOF NAUTILUS AND EAGLES, History ofthe Royal Australian Navy by P. Firkins,Sydney, Cassell Australia, 1975. 230 pp., $14.95.Reviewed by K. I. TaylorManaging Editor, Defence Force Journal.In his foreword to the book, "Of Nautilusand Eagles", Vice Admiral Sir John Collinssays, "The author has successfully achievedthe difficult task of making his book, whiletechnically correct, very readable to the layman."Peter Lirkins has indeed produced a bookworthy of his subject. He has the uncannyknack of fully dealing with an action in onepart of the globe, without getting it chronologicallyout of sequence with events takingplace elsewhere. Thus the reader is able tofollow the drama of an individual action withoutlosing sight of the broad strategic concept.In the opening chapter, he quotes from RearAdmiral Patey's Operation Order No. 1, issuedaboard HMAS Australia in 1914. three daysafter the outbreak of war. The wording is crispand precise, leaving no room for misconstruction,and yet giving the individual commandersgreat scope for initiative. The book is writtenin a similar crisp and concise style, which iscomplemented by a production which doescredit to the printer and publisher. The print,though small is fine and easy to read, and theillustrations are neat and clear.The book deals with the history of the NavalService in Australia from the earliest days until1972. All aspects are covered, including thecoastwatchers of the Pacific campaign, mineclearance and even administrative responsibility.The great actions of the first and secondSydney's in two World Wars, the exploits ofthe famous "scrap iron flotilla" of ancientdestroyers in the Mediterranean and the tragicloss of HMAS Perth in the Battle of the SundaStrait are all covered in fascinating detail. Alsocovered are the less spectacular, yet no lessimportant roles of the battle-cruiser Australiain the North Sea in 1915-18 and HMAS Adelaidein 1940, under the command of CaptainHarry Showers. Adelaide, by her presence offNoumea, probably saved New Caledonia froma Vichy takeover, which would have been bothembarrassing and dangerous to the Allies' causeafter Pearl Harbor.As a long-serving member of the RoyalNavy, it was something of an embarrassmentto read of the early neglect and later acquisitivenessdisplayed by the Mother Countrytowards the seaward defence of Australia duringthe last two hundred years. Hulks, suchas HMS Nelson, known locally as "HMS Uselessand Dangerous", were fobbed off on theinfant colonies. Then there was the call forthe modern and powerful Australian Fleet toleave home waters in 1914 for service in the


60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALNorthern Hemisphere. This was no doubtjustified after the destruction, by HMASSydney, of the raiding cruiser SMS Emden inthe Cocos Islands, and the bottling up and subsequentdestruction of SMS Ki'migsberg in EastAfrica, but it is harder to understand why theAustralian Government was prepared to dispersetheir fleet in 1940, when the threat of apowerful Japanese Navy loomed large and themyth of the invincibility of the fortress ofSingapore was already suspect to clear-thinkingstrategists.* •wealth of Australia by sending out officers ofsuperb calibre to command ships of the AustralianSquadron. Admiral Sir George Tryon,the first Commander-in-Chief, was such a man,as was Vice Admiral Sir William Creswell, whomore than any one man was responsible forthe establishment of the Royal Australian Navy.In later years, Commander (later Admiral SirPhilip) Vian. of Altmark fame, was GunneryOfficer of HMAS Australia in the early twenties.Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, VC,RN. who hoisted his flag in the second Australiain July 1942, was Commander AustralianSquadron at the Battle of Savo.There is much in this book for the navalhistorian. There is also much food for thoughtfor those who may scoff at the present size ofthe Royal Australian Navy. Written by anex-member of the RAAF, it is a fitting tributeto a small, but intensely professional servicewhich has always been in the van of navalactions across the globe during this turbulentcentury.O» *CURRENT DEFENCE READINGSReaders may find the following articles of interest.The journals in which articles appear are availablethrough the Defence Library Information Service atCampbell Park Libran and Military District libraries.Nevertheless, in both wars, Australians afloatdistinguished themselves. How fortunate wasthe RAN in having among its first graduatesfrom Jervis Bay such men as Collins of theSydney and Waller of the Stuart. This professionalismand dash has, happily, been carriedon through Korea and Vietnam. The US Navysimply refer to their Australian colleagues as"'The Professionals".Britain somewhat compensated for her roughhandling of the colonies and later the Common-Anti-communist guerrillas: Indochina and Mozambique.Foreign Report (Economist). 15 Sep 76: 4-7.A question of confidence (Taiwan). Far Eastern EconomicReview. 10 Sep 76: 26-30.Questions on a naval decision (Malaysian defencecontracts). Far Eastern Economic Review. 10 Sen 76:41-45.Has military-industrial romance turned sour? U.S.Sews and World Report, 13 Sep 76: 51-52.When a tiny new nation is thrust into a powerbroker's role (Seychelles). US, News and WorldReport. 56-58.The politics of international terrorism. Orbis, Winter1976: 1251-1269.Controlling political terrorism in a free society. Orbis,Winter 1976: 1289-1308.Asian collective security: the Soviet view. Orbis,Winter 1976: 1564-1580.Anti-submarine warfare: the envious siege of wat'ryNeptune. Defense and Foreign Affairs. 8-9 1976:60-65.Iran: the psychopolitics of arms; the politics ofneighborliness. Defense and Foreign Affairs. 8-9 1976;6-17. 31. (9 p.)Vulcan's forge. (A critical review of equipment,inspired by the Farnborough Air Show in Britain).Defense and Foreign Affairs. 8-9 1976: 18-26.New destroyers: their place in the fleet. (D. J. Killen).Navy Quarterly, Autumn 1976: 4-8.Psychological strategy: the psychology of mass conditioning.Defense and Foreign Affairs, 8-9 1976:80-83.Electronic environments (air defence). Defense andForeign Affairs, 8-9 1976: 85-87.Management leverage: a new concept in militaryprocurement. Perspectives in Defense Management.Winter 1975-76: 79-89.Reliability by design, not by chance. (Military equipment).Defense Management Journal. April 76: 13-18.Can contract methodology improve product reliability?Defence Management Journal. April 76: 20-23.TechnicalU.S. anti-missile work stresses optics. Aviation Week& Space Technology, 6 Sep 76: 30-34.DOD pushes manufacturing technology. AviationWeek & Space Technology. 6 Sep 76: 35-36.New missile research funds lacking. Aviation Weekand Space Technology. 6 Sep 76: 82 + (4 p.).Lynx: Britain's world beating new multi-purposehelicopter now in production. (Advertisement supplementby Westland). Aviation Week & Space Technology,6 Sep 76: 8 p.Future combat aircraft: can Europe cooperate?Flight International, July 76: 13-14.


BOOK REVIEWS 61Westland looks to product improvement. (Helicopterindustry). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 Sep76: 121 - (3 p.).Farnborough signals near-term hard sell. 1980s plans.A vial ion Week & Space Technology, 13 Sep 76;14-18.MIG case may spur Japan arms buy. Aviation Week& Space Technology, 13 Sep 76: 25-27.Ramjet research payolfs believed near (missile engineering).Aviation Week & Space 'Technology, 13 Sep76: 71-77.DOD, ERDA seek space power focus (avionics).Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 Sep 76:79-83.A total system for aviation security. Intcravia, June1976: 543-544.Punishment of aerial piracy — a new development.Interavia, June 1976: 545.The design and development of a military combataircraft. Part 3: Longitudinal stability and control.Intcravia. June 1976: 553-556.The air-launched cruise missile. Interavia, June 1976:580-583.Computers and information technology. ModernOffice and Data Management, Sep 76: 47-49.A DOD approach to establishing weapon systemreliability requirements. Defense Management Journal,April 1976: 2-11.Avionics equipment reliability: an elusive objective.Defense Management Journal, April 1976: 24-29.The B-l strategic bomber — a necessary weaponssystem. Royal Air Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1976:236-242.DOD spurs shuffle of research centers. Aviation Week& Space Technology, 23 Aug 76: 43. 46.Can U.S. block Soviet bid for nuclear supremacy?U.S. News and World Report, 6 Sep 76: 16-18.Anatomy of the arms trade. Newsweek, 6 Sep 76:33-37.Relations of Self Defense Forces with public better.according to second half of '76 White Paper. JapanReport, 16 Aug 76: 1-3.Iran: psychopolitics and the arms trade. Defense andForeign Affairs Daily, 23 and 24 Aug 76 (4 p.).Panmunjom: cutting Kim down to size. Far EasternEconomic Review. 3 Sep 76: 8-10.The shape of war to come? (Review article of SIPRIYearbook, just published). New Scientist, 17 Jun 76:628-629.Is Britain arming apartheid? (Sale of £8 million communicationssvstem to South Africa). New Scientist,17 Jun 76: 644-645.Nuclear fission and war. (Review of biography ofFrederick Joliot-Curie). New Scientist, 17 Jun 76:646-647.Sea control and maritime airpower — an Australianview. Pacific Defence Reporter, Sep 76: 15-20.The Australian aerospace industry: another solution.(Dr Kevin Foley). Pacific Defence Reporter. Sep 76:57-63.ACVs for Australia? (Cmdr. E. A. Woodward. R.N.).Pacific Defence Reporter. Sep 76: 69-73.Police and the security industry. Security Gazette,Jun 76: 186-187.The relevance of civilian-based defense to U.S.security interests. Military Review, May 76: 24-32.Arms, men and military budgets. Sea Power (U.S.).May 76: 14-16.The new Soviet maritime strategy — and the lack ofan effective U.S. counter-strategy. Sea Power, May76: 17-20.The Soviet military machine: morale, muscles, andmegatons. Sea Power, May 76: 31-34.The security and defence of Sweden. RUSI Journal.Jun 76: 23-32.Western European collateral damage from tacticalnuclear weapons. RUSI Journal, Jun 76: 32-38.Soviet ground forces and the conventional mode ofoperations. RUSI Journal (RUSI RMAS ResearchCentre Bulletin). Jun 76: 45-49.A thermal pointer for the Chieftain main battle tank.RUSI Journal, Jun 76: 89-91.TechnicalBalloon-borne radar to look for low fliers. Electronics,19 Aug 76: 33.New sensors evaluated in Sinai buffer. Aviation Week& Space Technology. 23 Aug 76: 40-42.Nuclear power for Defense. National Defense, MayJun 76: 432-435.Latest trends in tank technology. Armor, May/Jun76: 39-46.Milan and Harpoon — Britain's new guided weapons.Defence Attache, May/Jun 76: 12. 14.The Air Launched Cruise Missile. InternationalDefense Review. Jun 76: 370-374.Three new Soviet Air-to-Air missiles in service.International Defense Review, Jun 76: 400.Ground-based electronic warfare. InternationalDefense Review. Jun 76: 425-428.The Perceval: forward surveillance and landing system(Peter Young). Pacific Defence Reporter. Sen 76:27-32.The AN/AWG9 and the AIM 54A: a formidableoption for Australia. Pacific Defence Reporter, Sep76: 47-50.Support for gas-turbine navies — Fleetlands andWrougton offer a wide range of service worldu ide.Navy International. Sep 76: 31-33.Marisat takes first operational step: present marketpotential believed 4.5(H) ships. Sea Technology, May76: 10-12.Switchgear and distribution aboard warships. Shipbuildingand Marine Engineering International, Jun76: 289-292.Communications for air defence systems. SystemsTechnology. Jun 76: 10-16.Mini-based system to manage 3 million documents.Computcrworld, 23 Aug 76: 28.Research in information science: an assessment.Information processing and management, No. 2,1976: 117-123.Field independence, intelligence and target detection.Human Factors, 18 (3), 1976; 293-298.Specialized training versus experience in helicopternavigation at extremely low altitudes. Human Factors.18 (3), 1976: 305-308.


A Medal for HoratiusColonel W. C. Hall in The ArmyCombat Forces Journal (U.S.)Reproduced from the Canadian Army JournalRomeII Calends, April, CCCLXSubject: Recommendation for Senate Medal of Honour.To: Department of War, Republic of Rome.T. Recommend Gaius Horatius, Captain of Foot, O-MCMXIV, for theSenate Medal of Honour.II. Captain Horatius has served XVI years, all honourably.III. On the Hi day of March, during the attack on the city by LarsPorsena of Clusium and his Tuscan army of CXM men, CaptainHoratius voluntarily, with Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal JuliusHerminius, held the entire Tuscan army at the far end of the bridge,until the structure could be destroyed, thereby saving the city.IV. Captain Horatius did valiantly fight and kill one Major Picus ofClusium in individual combat.V. The exemplary courage and the outstanding leadership of CaptainHoratius are in the highest tradition of the Roman Army.1st Ind. A.G: IV Calends, April, CCCLXTo: G-IIIFor comment.lid. Ind G-III. IX Calends, May, CCCLX.To:G-III. For comment and forwarding.JULIUS LUCULLUSCommander, H Foot LegionG. C.II. Change paragraph III, line VI, from "saving the city" to "lessenedthe effectiveness of the enemy attack." The Roman Army was welldispersed tactically; the reserve had not been committed. The phraseas written might be construed to cast aspersions on our fine army.III. Change paragraph V, Line I, from "outstanding leadership" toread "commendable initiative." Captain Horatius' command was IImen — only I/IV of a squad.J. C.Hid. Ind. G-II II Ides. June, CCCLX.To: G-II. Omit strength of Tuscan forces in paragraph III. This informationis classified.


\ MEDAL FOR HORATUS 63II. A report evaluated as B-II states that the officer was a CaptainPincus of I iternum. Recommend change "Major Pincus" to "anofficer of the enemy forces."T. J.I\ th Ind G-I IX Ides. January, CCCLX1To. JAGI. Full name is Gaius Caius Horatius.II. Change service from XVI to XV years. One year in RomulusChapter, Cub Scouts, has been given credit for military service in error.E. .1.Vth Ind. JAG Hd of February, CCCLX1.To: ACiI. The Porsena raid was not during wartime: the temple of Janus wasclosed.II. The action against the Porsena raid, ipso facto, was a police action.III. The Senate Medal of Honor cannot be awarded in peacetime.(AR CV1II-XXV, paragraph XII,c.)IV. Suggest consideration for Soldier's Medal.Vlth Ind. AG. IV Calends, April CCCLXITo: G-IConcur in paragraph IV. Vth Ind.Vllth Ind. G-I, I day of May, CCCLXIP. B.L. .1.To: AGI. Soldier's medal is given for saving lives, suggest Star of Bronze asappropriate.E. .1.Vllth Ind. AG III day of June, CCCLXITo: JAGFor Opinion.IXth Ind. JACi. II Calends, September, CCCLXIG. CTo: AGI. XVII months have elapsed since event described in basic letter. Starof Bronze cannot be awarded after XV months have elapsed.II. Officer is eligible for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.Xth Ind. AG. I Ide of October. CCCLXITo: G-IP. B.For draft of citation for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.G. C


MDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALXlth Ind. G-l 111 Calends, October, CCCLXITo: G-III. Do not concur.II. Our currently fine relations with Tuscany would surfer and currentdelicate negotiations might be jeopardized if publicity were given toCaptain Horatius' actions at the present time.T. J.XI 1th Ind. G-II VI day of November, CCCLXITo: G-IA report (rated D-IV), partially verified, states that Lars Porsenais very sensitive about the Horatius affair.E. T.Xlllth Ind. X day of November, CCCLXITo: AGI. In view of information contained in preceding Xlth and XILh Indorsements,you will prepare immediate orders for Captain G. C. Horatiusto one of our overseas stations.II. His attention will be directed to paragraph XII, POM, which prohibitsinterviews or conversations with newsmen prior to arrival at finaldestination.L. T.RomeII Calends, April, I, CCCLXI ISubject: Survey, Report of DEPARTMENT OF WARTo: Captain Gaius Caius Horatius, III Legion, V. Phalanx,APO XIX, c/o Phalanx, APO XIX, c/o Postmaster,Rome.I. Your statements concerning the loss of your shield and sword in theTiber River on III March, CCLX, have been carefully considered.II. It is admitted that you were briefly in action against certainunfriendly elements on that day. However, Sergeant Spurius Lartiusand Corporal Julius Herminius were in the same action and did notlose any government property.III. The Finance Officer has been directed to reduce your next pay byII I/II talents (I IJI/IV talents cost of one, each, sword, officers; 111/IVtalent cost of one, each, shield, M-II).IV. You are enjoined and admonished to pay strict attention toconservation of government funds and property. The budget must bebalanced next year.H. HOCUS POCUSLieutenant of Horse,Survey OfficerQ

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