ISSUE 1 : Nov/Dec - 1976 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALcapable of long distance operation, with basesin northern parts of Australia. He suggestedthat a point or line should be defined, beyondwhich any advance by a potential enemy shouldbe considered a threat to Australia. Certainplaces should be seized, if necessary, to preventthe enemy using them as invasion bases.Latham contended, as Lyons had inferredin 1937, that once the enemy established himselfclose at hand, the only alternative wouldbe ultimate surrender. He was of the opinionthat the sort of policy he proposed should bemade public as a deterrent to aggression.It is not certain what influence Latham'spaper had on Government policy or militaryplanning, although his position in Tokyo musthave engendered respect for his opinion. Certainlyhis letter was considered by the DefenceCommittee in November 1941, although theirreaction was not one of grateful acceptance.Once the Japanese threat crystallized in late1941 and early 1942, increases in the Armycommitment to Darwin, North Queenslandand New Guinea were made. By war's endthe Air Force had grown almost four-foldfrom its 1941 strength.Mention was made earlier of the lack ofcombined service planning. When it wasrevealed to the War Cabinet in September1^41 that no joint operational plans existedfor the defence of Australia against invasion,the Government gave directions that this situationwas to be corrected as soon as possible.But time had almost run out.Japanese AdvancesDuring the early days of December 1941,a further appreciation of the defence of Australiawas ordered in light of the rapidly deterioratingsituation, culminating in the attackson Malaya and Pearl Harbor on 7th-8thDecember 1941 and the sinking of the capitalships Repulse and Prince of Wales on 10thDecember 1941. This time the appreciationsconsidered defence against an invasion forceof about eight divisions, concluding that anArmy of 300,000 plus a Volunteer DefenceCorps (VDC) of 50,000 was required, a considerableincrease over any previous estimates.Concern with the manning situation andproposals for the employment of returningAIF troops in the Dutch East Indies, causedSturdee. who by now was CGS, to submit apaper on the subject on 15 February 1942. Hestrongly recommended the diversion and earlyreturn of all AIF elements still overseas,undoubtedly a view strengthened on that sameday by the fall of Singapore. It is a littlefrightening, in retrospect, to consider howclear a threat to Australia was necessary beforeattempts could be made to harness the fullmilitary resources of the nation towards itsdefence.The C-in-C ActsBlarney, who was recalled to command theAustralian Military Forces (AMF) and AlliedLand Forces in March 1942, paraphrasedwhat was still the military thinking of the timein a letter to the Prime Minister written sometime later (January 1944). The letter confirmedthe basic plan which had been in existencefor a decade. He reaffirmed that the areaNewcastle-Sydney-Port Kembla-Lithgow wasmost vital to Australia and that forces hadbeen distributed accordingly. Local forces hadbeen distributed in each state for the protectionof other centres of strategic importance.Garrisons were provided in Western Australia.Darwin and Port Moresby, with detachmentsin adjacent islands because of the difficultiesof movement to these areas. A General Headquarters(GHQ) reserve was provided fromformations raised and located in Victoria andSouth Australia.Blarney confirmed that during the period ofthe rapid Japanese advance (December 1941to mid 1942), the enemy's control of the seato the north confined Australian action to aconcentration on defence measures to retainthe most vital area.A new Chief of Staff appreciation in early1942 was the basis for new plans to increasegarrison forces when troops became available.The Darwin garrison was to be boosted fromtwo brigade groups to one division, WesternAustralia from one brigade group to one divisionand Townsville from one brigade groupto one division.Soon after Blarney's return and assumptionof command, AHQ Operation Instruction No.50 of 9 April 1942 was issued. The land forcesof Australia would consist of a Field Armyand an L of C. The Field Army would be
THE SECOND TIME AROUND. CAN AUSTRALIA SURVIVE? 15APRIL 1942 : OUTLINE DISPOSITION - FIELD ARMY^NEWCASTLE(SYDNEY• PORT KEMBLAFig. 2HOBARTmade up of 1st Army (Queensland and NSW),2nd Army (Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania),3rd Corps in Western Australia, 6thDivision in the Northern Territory and NewGuinea Force (Figure 2). The L of C wasorganized into eight L of C areas, one for eachstate or territory, the commanders also controllingthe fixed coast and anti-aircraft unitsand garrison battalions. GHQ Australia wasformed from AHQ. As C-in-C AMF, Blarneyexercised command over all Australian landforces.1st Army was the key formation, consistingof two corps of six infantry divisions, a motordivision and brigade, the remaining field troopsin Northern and Fastern Commands and corpstroops. GHQ Operation Instruction No 1 of10th April 1942, stressed to the GOC 1stArmy the importance of Brisbane on thenorthern flank of the most vital area, and ofTownsville as a potential enemy port and base.As resources increased it was intended to holdin strength progressively north from Brisbane.The tasks of the 1st Army were to defendthe east coast from Brisbane to southern NSWand to defend Thursday Island and Townsville.2nd Army in the south was to contain onemotorized division, a brigade group, the newlyarrived 41st US Div and other field troops inthe area. In addition to the local defence ofMelbourne, Hobart and Faunceston, 2nd Armywas to supervise the training of all Army unitsand headquarters.Darwin was, for obvious reasons, consideredthe most vulnerable area in Australia and itsretention was s'ated to be of great importanceto future operations. The Commander 6thDivision (soon to be GOC Northern TerritoryForce) was tasked with preventing the seizureand occupation of Darwin, but was to ensurethat his dispositions would not immobilise hisforce in the port area in the event of an invasionin great force. Clearly the AMF couldnot afford the loss of another major formationas had occurred with the loss of the 8thDivision in Singapore.
Page 1: BHBHl^BHHONOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1976No.
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Page 38 and 39: 36 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALparticularl
Page 40 and 41: 38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALlaw. Contin
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Page 48 and 49: 46 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALand perform
Page 50 and 51: 48 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALHe can now
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Page 59 and 60: BOOK REVIEWS 57The lack of discussi
Page 61 and 62: BOOK REVIEWS 59During the course of
Page 63 and 64: BOOK REVIEWS 61Westland looks to pr
Page 65 and 66: \ MEDAL FOR HORATUS 63II. A report

ISSUE 1 : Nov/Dec - 1976 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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