ISSUE 1 : Nov/Dec - 1976 - Australian Defence Force Journal

8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALThis paper traces the development of plansfor the land defence of Australia prior to theJapanese threat of 1941-1942, the only periodin our history in which a strong and directthreat of invasion has occurred. The aim ofthis paper is to highlight the lessons of an erawith the hope that we can apply them andsurvive "the second time around".The First Twenty YearsCo-ordination of a national defence effortwas one of the reasons for Federation. ColonelWilliam Bridges set to work to draft the firstdefence plan in 1906, modifications to whichwere proposed by Lord Kitchener during hisstay in 1909. Kitchener proposed the raisingof a citizen army of 80,000 and his recommendationswere accepted; however by theoutbreak of war in 1914 the proposals werestill two or three years away from implementation.The sense of security which Australia feltin 1914 was derived from a combination offactors, principal among which were the lackof any immediate threat, and the naval supremacyof Britain made more certain by the Anglo-Japanese alliance; it was not due to any homegrowndefence capacity. That Australia wasable to send abroad a fighting force of over330,000 volunteers over the next four yearsremains the most selfless mass response to aplea for help in our short history. This responsestrengthened the post-war notion that any Australiancould become a first rate soldier withlittle training, a view which supported thearguments of those who saw little need for adefence force in the peace that followed "thewar to end all wars".In 1919 the leaders of the right-wing politicalparty remained strongly of the opinion thatAustralian-British links should remain firm;most believed also that at least an efficientnucleus defence force must be maintained asa part of the Empire network. But even themodest defence plans of 1920 and 1921 werestrongly opposed in parliament by those whofelt that expenditure on defence could not bejustified. The general agreement on defencematters, which had transcended party politicallines after Federation, had been lost in thebitterness of the conscription debates duringthe war and was not to return.BETWEEN THE WARSEmpire DefenceThe Imperial Conferences of 1921, 1923 and1926 confirmed Australian participation in theEmpire Defence Scheme as the correct defenceresponse in the post-war situation. SuccessiveAustralian Governments echoed the importanceof Singapore, the British Fleet and navalpower. These were held up to be the keystonesof Empire defence in the eastern hemisphere.In the years which followed the 1923 Conference,Lieutenant Colonel (later LieutenantGeneral) Wynter and a number of other staffofficers opposed this view, arguing that in amajor conflict Great Britain was likely to beengaged elsewhere and that Singapore wasvulnerable to landward attack. They contendedthat the soundest policy for Australia was tomaintain an Army capable of defending thestrategically important south-eastern part ofAustralia until help arrived. The need for afleet based in Australia was also identified.Although these views were reflected in partin later plans, the proponents of EmpireDefence had the greater influence on defencepolicy (and in turn on evolving defence plans),throughout the period between the wars. Thedefence of Australia against invasion as a contingencynot involving British power was neverproperly considered by an Australian Governmentuntil the difficult days of late 1941.As a result, although military plans wereclearly directed towards the ultimate defencerequirement (against invasion), planners wererestricted by both the realities of difficult economictimes and by a defence policy whichemphasised raids as far more probable thaninvasion - - a legacy of the value placed onBritish naval power.The Plan of ConcentrationIn 1933, Lieutenant Colonel Sturdee (a wartimeChief of the General Staff (CGS), butthen the Director of Military Operations andIntelligence), briefed senior Staff Corps officerson the "Plan of Concentration" which ArmyHeadquarters had produced. A scenario wasoutlined for an exercise which followed thisbriefing which clearly showed Japan to be themost likely aggressor. It was foreseen that ifJapan chose to invade Australia they would,for a variety of reasons, require a quick deci-