ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

A U S T R A L I A NNO. 107JULY/AUGUST1994

*The underway replenishment ship HMAS Westralia.

4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Teeth To Tail Versus CapabilityDear Editor,li is interesting to note the increasing use ot theterm "tooth-to-tail" within current defence literature,including your journal. The term itself and the conceptit represents I believe is being misunderstood andgreatly abused. The original concept behind the temi"tooth-to-tail" was in relation to increasing DEFENCECAPABILITY. All changes within defence should beaimed at increasing CAPABILITY. However the term"tooth-to-tail" is currently being used to supportarguments for change which ultimately decreasecapability.A simple example will clarify the difference betweenCapability and the misuse of the term "Toothto-Tail".Most experts will agree that a mechanisedinfantry battalion will defeat a non-mechanised infantrybattalion of the same size. To keep the mechanisedbattalion mobile a large tail (lower Tooth-to-Tail ratio)of support services is required such as work-shops andfuel distribution just to identify two. INCREASEDCAPABILITY from mechanisation despite a lowerTooth-to-Tail ratio provides the winning edge.The Army is trying to raise another infantry battalion.The current Army rationale is not to fully fundextra units. For this extra infantry battalion to train,equipment and other resources are required. Withoutbeing fully funded there will not be sufficient funds tobuy more equipment such as vehicles, radios andweapons or provide extra rations, training dollars andfuel for this new battalion. These resources will haveto be reallocated from existing units. Units are alreadysuffering from a lack of resources and removing moreresources from units will significantly affect theirtraining. It is highly unlikely that by reallocating resourcesto the new battalion that this battalion will beable to be fully resourced to provide effective training.This extra infantry battalion results in more soldiers,but trained to a lesser level (due to lack of trainingresources). While this infantry battalion will increasethe tooth-to-tail ratio there is no corresponding increasein CAPABILITY but rather a general loweringof CAPABILITY across the Land Army. An extrainfantry battalion (/fully funded (with training dollarsand newly purchased equipment) would increasecapability.The Army's capability would be improved withthe removal of one complete brigade off the currentORBAT (unfortunately politically unacceptable). Thereallocation of this brigade's equipment and manningwould allow the remaining brigades to be equippedand manned close to entitlement. These extra trainingresources made available to the other brigades wouldincrease their readiness and capability.The Navy is intending to buy si\ submarines tintcan only man four of these submarines. The initialpurchase and ongoing maintenance costs on the twounmanned submarines is money that may be betterspent on training personnel in the four manned submarines.This extra training in the four manned submarineswould increase the capability. Buying sixrather than four submarines increases the teeth but thetotal CAPABILITY is not necessarily increased.The Navy has commenced the building of ANZACclass ships that maybe fitted for weapon systems,rather than fitted with complete weapon systems.The idea is to buy more ships with the defence dollar.The sailors will be training on incomplete ships (thedefence of a ship is a totally integrated system) whichresults in a less CAPABLE sailor and hence system.In a time of crisis, weapon systems will be purchased(if available) and then the training of the ship as acomplete system begins in earnest, perhaps too late.Again more teeth with more ships but an overall lossin CAPABILITY.Having the correct mix of teeth to tail is a balancingact if the MAXIMUM CAPABILITY is to be attainedwith minimum resources. Having too many teethcompared to the sustaining tail results in a loss ofcapability as does too much tail and not enough teeth.The Australian Defence Force is still searching for thecorrect mix. Logic and sound reasoning should be thedriving force on the correct mix not politics.The MAXIMUM DEFENCE CAPABILITY willonly be realised when all units/ships/bases are fullyequipped and enough resources are made availablewithin the Defence Force to fully train all personnel.This paranoia of having more teeth and less tail islowering the capability of the Defence Force to fulfilits primary role in the defence of Australia.S. Targett, CSMWarrant Officer I

.Unionisation in the Australian Armed Forces —The Emergence of the Armed Forces Federation of AustraliaBy Captain Toni Averay, ARA.Introducti onThe Defence Force is probably the only employerin Australia which denies its "employees" theright to representation in the determination of pay andconditions. Even though the Armed Forces Federationwas formed in 1984 in an effort to secure thisrepresentation for service personnel, the Federation isstill denied recognition and has no "right" to any rolein the remuneration process. This is despite occasionalstatements of political support, such as that madeby Gordon Bilney in March 1993, when as Ministerfor Defence Science and Personnel, he included thefollowing statement in a letter to the Armed ForcesFederation:". . . The Labor Government has for some timesupported the right of members of the ADF toform voluntary associations to advance their interestsas a professional body of employees. Virtuallyall people in employment have a union or associationto represent their common interests and I seeno reason why members of the ADF should be inany way different. I therefore support the right ofyour association to exist and to advance the welfareof the ADF membership ..."This article will examine the current and futureroles of the Armed Forces Federation of Australiaagainst the background of military unionisation ingeneral, and the Australian context in particular. Thisarticle will argue that Australian service personnelneed some form of collective representation in thedetermination of pay and conditions, and that there isscope for the Armed Forces Federation to have greaterinvolvement in the Defence remuneration process.Military UnionisationThe concept of military unionisation conflicts withthe traditional approach to the management of armedforces. The strict discipline and command structuresof military organisations have traditionally justified apaternalistic approach to personnel managementmatters, such as the determination of pay and conditions.Members of the armed forces have traditionallyaccepted their lack of input in this area and havehappily relied on the government and the military hierarchyto look after their interests. In fact, the requirementto protect and further the interests of subordinateshas traditionally been regarded as an importantaspect of the command responsibility of officers.A number of theories have been put forward toexplain the emergence of military unionisation, whichamounts to a rejection of traditional military paternalism.Moskos has described a process of transitionfrom "institutional to "occupational" phases (Moskos,1977). During the institutional phase, service personnelsee military employment as a calling, and acceptpersonal sacrifice for the greater good of the organisation.However, after the transition to the occupationalphase, members of the military see their employmentas just a job. and consequently they demand similarbenefits and conditions to those enjoyed by civilians.The "convergence" theory suggests that militaryindustrial relations undergoes an "evolutionary" process,gradually becoming more closely aligned withcivilian industrial relations procedures. Janowitzargues that growing support for industrial organisationwithin the military can co-exist with traditionalmilitary ideals of duty and service (Janowitz, 1960 &1977). However, the emergence of support for militaryunionisation might just be a reflection of economicchanges which have made the protection of thefinancial interests of subordinates difficult for thecommand structure to achieve (Group Representationin European Armed Forces, 1979, p 60).The European ExperienceMilitary unionisation has traditionally been opposedon the basis that it presents a threat to military disciplineand command by challenging military authority.It is also commonly argued that military unionismwill adversely affect combat efficiency and unit cohesiveness.The lack of collectivism and representationin the military has probably been the area ofgreatest divergence from the civilian norm of mostindustrialised societies (Ballantyne, 1983, p 4).

X AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994US and UK RejectionThe concept of military unionisation has beenrejected by both the United States and the L'nitedKingdom. It is appropriate to examine the approachof each of these countries separately because theirexperiences are markedly different. The US consideredthe concept of collectivism for its military in themid 1 970s. but the prospect caused so much concernthat Congress moved to legislate against the possibility.However, there has never been any seriousattempt to unionise the British military.The move to unionise the US military gatheredmomentum in the mid 1970s when the large governmentemployee union, the Association of FederalGovernment Employees (AFGE). proposed organisingthe military. The union's campaign gained supportfrom many serv icemen, and a number of reasonswere suggested for this rev ersal of the traditional conservatismof US servicemen in this area. The US militarywas now an all-volunteer force with the recentabolishment of conscription, and it was felt thatsoldiers now wanted a career with benefits similar tothose available in civilian employment. They were nolonger prepared to accept low pay and poor conditionsout of a sense of duty or patriotism. It was alsoacknowledged that there had been a general erosionof benefits which created dissatisfaction amongservicemen and fostered support for some form ofcollectivism. The military had apparently enteredMoskos' "occupational" phase.Both the general public and the US Congress werestrongly opposed to the concept of military unionismfor the American armed forces. Acknowledgementwas made of the successful European experiences:however, it was generally felt that this was irrelevantto the United States. This argument was summarisedin an article in a 1978 military journal which arguedthat the societal context of European unions wasvastly different from that of the United States. Thearticle described the nature of civil-military relationsin America as different from those in Europe:Americans did not consider their armed forces as justanother part of the labour force: "Americans continueto expect standards of conduct, discipline, dedicationand self-sacrifice from their military which they arenot prepared to have bargained away at the behest ofany union." (Taylor. 1978. p.87).Opposition to the prospect of a unionised US militarywas strong. Some opponents argued that unionisationwould mean an increase in manpower costs aspay and conditions were "improved" by union action— if unions do nothing else well, they do raise wagesand benefits — and this would inevitably result inhigher defence costs or a reduction in operationalcapabilities {Sabrosky. 1977. p. 150). The attitude ofthe military hierarchy was expressed by GeneralMaxwell Taylor: "Collective bargaining over suchmatters as pay. overtime and safe working conditionshas no place (in the military) since pay is fixed by law.overtime has no meaning in a profession always onduty, and the work is of necessity often dangerous"{quoted by Coulter. 1978. p.23). A further fear wasbased on a traditional distrust of unions. There wasconcern that once a military union gained power, itcould present a real threat to government control of thearmed forces: "There is no sound reason to assumethat military unions would exercise indefinitely a degreeof politically neutral self-restraint and self-denialunparalleled in the history of the union movement . . .To rely on a military union not to act like a union, isfundamentally unwise" (Sabrosky. 1977, p. 156).Government action to prohibit unions in the USmilitary quickly followed. The bill was drafted bySenator Strom Thurmond, who argued that "thefundamental need for obedience and the consequentneed for discipline make it impossible for servicemento do some of the things that civilians are entitled todo" (quoted by Coulter. 1978. p.24). The bill waspassed with only three dissenting votes. The AFGEbacked away from its proposal without any effort tochallenge the government action. The issue had beenquite definitely put to rest, and there has been noserious attempt to resurrect it since.The British perception is that there can never be aplace for unionism in the British armed forces. Asargued by one former senior officer, the military areregarded as belonging to a service, not an occupation(Lunt, 1978). The Queen's Regulations specificallyban military collectivism. This attitude places theBritish military firmly in the Moskos "institutional"phase, with no likelihood of progressing on to the"occupational" phase. The British accept the paternalisticrole of the government and the military hierarchyin looking after the interests of service personnel.Service pay is largely determined by recommendationput to the government by the Review Body of ArmedForces Pay. which was established in 1971 to advisethe Prime Minister on pay and allowances for thearmed forces. The Review Body bases its approachon acceptance of the fact that members of the armedforces have no right of association and that the Rev iewBody's responsibility is to ensure fair levels of paywhere there cannot be a process of collective bargaining(Review Body on Anned Forces Pay [UK], 22ndReport. 1993).

UNIONISATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE 9The Australian ExperienceThe Australian military has traditionally been conservativein regard to the concept of military unionism.This may in part be attributable to its origins in thesimilarly conservative British military, although unlikethe British situation, collectivism in the Australianmilitary has never been specifically prohibited underthe Australian Constitution or the Defence Act. However,there were certain limitations in service lawmanuals, and the provisions of s. 13 of the DefenceAct highlight the fact that service personnel are notengaged under a normal employment contract. Noaction can be brought before a court by military personnelconcerning their employment. This "unique"employment relationship was recognised by the HighCourt of Australia in 1985 in the case of Coutts vCommonwealth: Military service has always stood ina different position from service under a contract ofemployment with a private employer . . . (no servicepersonnel have) at common law any right of actionagainst the Crown for breach of contract or any rightto sue for pay. However, the 1988 CommonwealthEmployees' Rehabilitation and Compensation Actincludes members of the Defence Force in its definitionof "employee" under s.5( 1).Australian service personnel have until recentlyaccepted their lack of representation in conditions ofservice matters and were seemingly happy with thetraditional paternalistic approach where such matterswere left in the hands of government and seniorofficers. A proposal in 1974 by Whitlam GovernmentDefence Minister. Lance Barnard, for the establishmentof an organisation to represent service personnelin the determination of pay and conditions receivedlittle support within the military. An organisationknown as the Australian Armed Forces Associationwas formed in 1974, but it attracted very few membersand disappeared within a few years. However, by1984. there was sufficient support for the concept ofsome form of collectivism within the ADF to enablethe successful establishment of the Armed ForcesFederation of Australia.The Armed Forces Federation of Australia (ArFFA)was formed by a group of RAAF officers in October/November 1984. It does not regard itself as a "trade"union in the traditional sense, but rather as a professionalassociation. This emphasises a differentapproach to objectives, strategies and politics. TheFederation prefers to be seen as a watchdog and lobbyorganisation, with its main objective being to adviseand inform the government, the opposition, the mediaand the services of concern in matters relating to pay.conditions of service, welfare and other personnelrelated issues. The reaction of the ADF to the formationof ArFFA was supportive and markedly differentfrom the heavy-handed reaction of the US authoritiesto the attempt to introduce military collectivism there.The Chiefs of Staff issued guidelines on representativeorganisations for the Australian military, and theFederation's Constitution was carefully drafted tocomply with these guidelines. These guidelinesrequire any military association to be voluntary, nonindustrialand to have no political affiliations. Theguidelines also specify that associations are not tointerfere with government control of the services, thechain of command or disciplinary processes.The Federation's Constitution complies with theserequirements, categorically rejects the right to strikeand limits Federation activities to avoid interferencein military command and discipline matters. TheFederation concentrates on consultation and negotiation,and prohibits any action that may result in itsmembers confronting their superiors {Parsons. 1992,p. 15). The Federation also agrees to suspend itsactivities in any unit going on operations, and confinesits area of interest largely to service pay andconditions matters. However, even after the formationof ArFFA, the military hierarchy in general stillregarded conditions of service matters as being exclusivelytheir domain. This was illustrated in a statementmade by the Chief of the Naval Staff in 1985. inwhich he said that although he was happy for Navymembers to join ArFFA. he was concerned aboutArFFA trying to get involved in conditions of servicematters because that was his job (Pratt. 1987. p.330).The Federation's conservative record to date has eamtit the support of the Defence hierarchy. The currentChief of the Defence Force. Admiral Alan Beaumont,said last year: "The Federation's aim of protectingand promoting the welfare of its members is consistentwith my objective and those of the Chiefs of Staffon behalf of the whole of the ADF'. (CDF letter toArFFA dated 8 June 93. quoted in Annx NewspaperNo 839. 26 August 93).The establishment of ArFFA has been described asan "unequivocal rejection of paternalism", reflectingincreasing doubts about the ability of the militaryhierarchy to adequately protect and further the interestsof their troops (Hogan, 19H9. pp. 13 & 17). Infact, it has been argued that among service personnel,"it is widely believed that the convention of thegovernment's faithful protection of the service-member'sinterests had been set aside" (Gowans. 1986.p.25). There was a growing body of opinion, bothwithin and outside the Defence Force, that service

II) AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994personnel should have an association to representthem because virtually every other group of people inAustralia had such a right (Grazehrook, 1983, p.47).Service personnel had been traditionally conditionedto expect their military leaders to act in their bestinterests, but by 1983 it was apparent that these leaderslacked the influence required to effectively intercedeon behalf of their subordinates (Jauncey, 1983,p.47). The climate, therefore, was right for the establishmentof a military "union". The Moskos "occupational"phase had apparently been reached. It wasgenerally perceived among ADF personnel that therehad been a widespread erosion of conditions of serviceand that the government and service chiefs were unableor unwilling to improve conditions. It was thisdissatisfaction which fostered support for ArFFA.The political climate was also right for the formationof such an organisation. As part of its platformfor the 1983 Federal Election, the Australian LaborParty had reiterated the position established bythe Whitlam Government: "Serving personnel shouldhave the right to form and be members of associationsin respect to their pay and conditions" (quoted byLawrence, 1986, p.31).The Industrial Relations Commission plays norole in the determination of pay and conditions formembers of the Defence Force. The Defence ForceRemuneration Tribunal (DFRT) was established in1984 to perform this task, and although reasonablyindependent, it is expected to follow Commissionpolicy as much as possible. Under s.58k of theDefence Act, the DFRT is required to have regard todecisions and principles of the Commission which areconsidered relevant "in the opinion of the Tribunal".Under the Act, the Tribunal is supposed to conductreviews of pay and all allowances every two years.This is designed to safe-guard the interests of servicepersonnel who are technically disenfranchised withrespect to matters concerning their remuneration(Oates, 1992, p.33). Unfortunately, for various reasons,the Tribunal has been unable to meet this reviewtimetable.The DFRT is comprised of three part-time memberswho sit in a judicial capacity to hear submissionsput to it by HQ ADF. acting on behalf of service personnel.The hearing operates like a court, with theDepartment of Industrial Relations acting on behalf ofthe Commonwealth as the employer. No other partieshave the right to present submissions to the DFRT.although they may appear at the discretion of theTribunal and put forward arguments in the capacity ofinterveners. The Tribunal is under no obligation toconsider the evidence or submissions of interveners.The Armed Forces Federation, the RSL and theAustralian Medical Association (AMA) are the mostregular interveners.The most obvious disadvantage of the current systemis that service personnel are not independentlyrepresented in the remuneration process. In fact, it hasbeen suggested that the absence of provision fordirect employee representation before the DFRT wasa major factor in the decision to form ArFFA (Pratt,1987, p.330). While HQ ADF notionally representsthe "employees", there is a tremendous conflict ofinterest in this role. HQ ADF works directly to theCDF, who is responsible for running the DefenceForce within an allocated annual budget set by theCabinet. It is his staff who are responsible for preparingsubmissions arguing for Defence pay rises, eventhough such pay rises may have to be funded out ofthe allocated Defence budget. This dual responsibilitycreates a conflict of interest recognised in the 1988Cross Report which commented that the CDF isplaced in "an invidious position if. say, proposedremuneration increases are likely to impact on reequipmentprograms" (quoted by Oates, 1992, p. 15).The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR)represents the Commonwealth as the employer intribunal hearings. It has been suggested that this in factmeans that the "employer" is therefore representedtwice in the form of the CDF and DIR. The questionwhich must be asked then is — where is the employee?(Gowans, 1986, p.28) A further major difficultyis presented by the limited understanding DIRhas about the realities of service life. In a civilianindustrial hearing in front of the Industrial RelationsCommission, the employer organisations can at leastbe relied upon to understand the working conditionsto which the union might be referring, even if theydisagree with a particular argument. In DFRT hearings,DIR is generally unable to relate to the militarysituation, and tends to adopt a civilian point of viewof any argument. This problem was identified in a1990 Parliamentary Research Paper on conditionsof service in the military: "DIR has little practicalexperience with Defence and unlike other employers,is not held responsible for productivity, efficiency,employee morale or manning level" (quoted by Oates.1992. p.25). This is a most unsatisfactory situationwhich only makes it more difficult for the tribunalto get the true picture from the point of view ofservice personnel. Captain Oates elaborated furtheron the problem: "DIR's lack of involvement in ADFmanagement, its lack of direct knowledge of ADFmatters and no independent information accessmake that Department poorly placed to performthe employer's role in any bargaining process"(1992, p.31).

UNIONISATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCEIIFuture DirectionsThe Armed Forces Federation is currently seekingfederal registration with the Industrial Relations Commissionin a bid to gain legal recognition for its role inrepresenting the members of the Defence Force. It isfelt that registration will secure the Federation's rightofappearance at all DFRT hearings, and force the governmentand ministers to consult with the Federation on allmatters affecting pay and conditions of service. Thestatus of the Federation would also change from alobby group to a legal representative group. However,the Federation would remain an independent organisationand would not seek affiliation with the ACTU orany other union body.However, while registration will improve the statusof the Federation and perhaps '"legitimise" its role inthe eyes of many Defence personnel, it will not givethe Federation the exclusive right to represent Defencepersonnel before DFRT. The operation of the DFRTis laid down in the Defence Act, so it would be necessaryfor the Act to be amended before the Federationcould replace the Defence Force Advocate in tribunalhearings. However, registration would at least givethe Federation legal status and force the ADF to acknowledgethe role it can play in representing servicepersonnel.Perhaps in the future, the Tribunal's functions couldbe absorbed by the Industrial Relations Commission.This was in fact a recommendation of the 1985 HancockReport into Australian industrial relations, whichacknow ledged the unique nature of the Defence Force,but still concluded that the responsibility for determiningsalaries and allowances should reside with theIndustrial Relations Commission (Report of the Committeeof Review, 1985. 8.116). However, this approachis probably unlikely in the foreseeable future becauseof the inherent differences between military andcivilian employment, and the resulting requirementfor different approaches to wage determination. Asargued by Captain Oates. civilian procedures aregenerally incompatible with the military ethos andservice under a code of discipline. The ADF is notstructured to conform to a civilian pay setting systemwhich is now partly based on industrial democracy(Oates. 1992. pJl).A separation of the salary vote from other Defenceexpenditure within the Defence budget must be regardedas a necessity. This is something which ArFFAcould pursue as a major issue. Separation is necessaryto avoid the conflict between competing interests forthe same funds. There should never be a requirementfor a "trade-off between one area of Defence expenditureand another. After all. it has been pointedout that servicemen need satisfactory and fair paylevels as well as modem equipment and adequatetraining provisions (Lawrence, 1986, p.36). One cannotbe offset against the other without adverselyaffecting morale and efficiency.ConclusionThis article has argued that Australian service personnelrequire some form of collective representationin the determination of pay and conditions, and thattherefore, the Armed Forces Federation should havegreater involvement in the Defence remuneration process.The important role played by service conditionsmatters in terms of the overall morale and effectivenessof the Defence Force is now acknowledged. The growingdemand among service personnel for increasedrepresentation in the remuneration process was highlightedinitially by the formation of the Armed ForcesFederation. Continued support for the Federation sincethen indicates that this lack of representation is still anissue of concern for service personnel.Arguments that such representation would presenta threat to military discipline and authority have beenshown to be unfounded in the conservative behaviourof the ArFFA to date. The experiences of unionisedarmed forces in Europe have also shown that militaryunions concern themselves with issues of pay andconditions, not with discipline and operational matters(Group Representation in European Anned Forces,1979. p.2).Many Australian service personnel are no longerprepared to accept their lack of representation in theremuneration process. The Defence Force remainsone of the only areas of employment where representationin the determination of pay and conditionsis denied. It seems likely that this situation will eventuallybe corrected.BIBLIOGRAPHYArmy, Australian Army newspaper, various issues.Arango. R.J.. Major. US Army. "Military Unions — Causes andConsequences". Military Review. November 1477. pp.3-15.Armed Forces Federation of Australia. Constitution.Australian Defence Report. 28 May. 1992.Ballantyne, I.J.. Major. Ralnf. "Military Unionism: Its Potentialfor Development in the Australian Armed Forces in the 1980s".Defence Force Journal. No 39. March/April 1983. pp.3-10.Cortright. D. & Watts. M.. Left Face: Soldiers. Unions andResistance Movements in Modern Annies. Greenwood Press.1991.

12 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994CMRI Project. Final Repon. Croup Representation in the EuropeanArmed Forces, 1979.Coulter. P.G.C., Captain, "Three Strikes; is the Union Out?",Marine Corps Gazette, August 1978. pp.22-27.Commonwealth Employees Rehabilitation and Compensation Act,Australia, 1988.Defence Act. Australia. 1903.Grazebrook, AW. "The Defence Force Needs a Voice". PacificDefence Reporter. July 1983. pp.46-47.Gowans, P.T.F.. Brigadier, "The Armed Forces Federation ofAustralia — A Major Change in Defence Industrial Relations.Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia, Vol 8,No 2, June 1986, pp.23-29.Hogan. G.P., Captain, Aust Int Corps. "Collectivism in the AustralianDefence Force: Military Anathema or Natural Progression?".Defence Force Journal. No 77. July/August 1989. pp. 11 -18.Janowitz, M., The Professional Soldier. The Free Press ofGlencoe, 1960.Janowitz, M., "From Institution to Occupation: The Need ForConceptual Continuity". Armed Forces and Society, 1977, 4,pp.51-4.Janucey, J.R., Major. RAA, "The Evolution of Military IndustrialRelations'*. Defence Force Journal, No 40. May/June 1983.pp.35-49.Krendel, E.S., & Samoff. B.L.. (eds). Unionising the ArmedForces, University of Pennsylvania Press. 1977.Lawrence, R.K., Lieutenant Commander, RAN "A Study of theArmed Forces Federation of Australia and its impact of theAustralian Armed Forces", Journal of the Royal United ServicesInstitute of Australia, Vol 8, No 2, June 1986. pp.31-37.Lunt, J.D., Major General. "A Right to Strike?". The ArmyQuarterly and Defence Journal, Vol 108, No I. January 1978.pp. 10-13.Moskos, C, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in MilitaryOrganisation". Armed Forces and Society. 4, pp.41 -50.Oates, P.J., Captain. RAN. The Australian Defence Force andEnterprise Bargaining, 1992. Unpublished paper.Parsons, Jim. "Personnel Representation in the Australian DefenceForce or Trade Unionism'?". Journal of the Australian Naval Institute,August 1992, pp. 15-16.Pratt, Graham., "The Development of Military Industrial Relationsin Australia", Journal of Industrial Relations, September 1977.pp.321-333.Report of the Committee of Review, (The Hancock Report). 1993.Review Body on Armed Forces Pay (UK). Twenty-second Report,1993.Royal Netherlands Naval Officers Association. Information Sheet.Sabrosky. A.N., Blue Collar Soldiers'.' Unionisation and the USMilitary. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Philadelphia. Pennsylvania,1977.Swedish Officers Association, Information Sheet.Taylor, W.J., (Jr), Colonel, US Army, "Military Unions for theUS: The Irrelevance of the European Experience", Naval WarCollege Review. Winter, 1978, pp.79-87.Captain Toni Averay joined the Army in March I9H5 as an RAAEC officer and was posted to EnoggeraEducation Wing in Queensland as a Lieutenant instructor. After transferring to RAEME in I9H7 she was promotedto Captain and posted to I Training Group as a Training Development Officer. Captain Averay wasadjutant of RAEME Training Centre 1990-91 and instructor and company second-in-command at Duntroon in1992. In 1993 she was selected for full-time civil schooling where she completed a Graduate Diploma inIndustry Relations at Canberra University. Captain Averay is currently posted as S()2 Pay and Allowances inthe Directorate of Personal Support and Conditions — Army.

Politics and the ManagA Case Study from theArmy Health ServicesBy Colonel W.P. Ramsey.The Contest of ChangeIntroductionDuring the past seven years the Australian DefenceForce has undergone major structural reshaping.The Dibb Report (1986) and subsequent DefenceWhite Paper (1987) have provided a new focus fordefence planners. They created a renewed interest infield activities with a strategic emphasis on northernAustralia. At the same time, the economic consequencesof the national recession was manifested asfinancial restraint in all government departments includingDefence.The Australian Army identified one solution tothese influences as the amalgamation of static andfield units with similar functions. It was anticipatedthat the amalgamated units would more effectivelyutilise the available personnel while still performingthe same functions; the Army Health Service (AHS)were not immune from these changes. In 1989, a fieldhospital (1st Field Hospital) and a static hospital(2nd Military Hospital) were amalgamated in Sydney.The new 1st Field Hospital retained a primary roleof providing level three medical support to thefield Army. At the same time the new hospital wasalso tasked to provide Australian Support Area(ASA) medical support to military personnel in theSydney area, previously provided by 2nd MilitaryHospital.The amalgamation process was a major change forboth medical units and had the potential to dramaticallyalter the work practices of all personnel involved.It is well recognised that the process of change isassociated with uncertainty and anxiety among participants(Brown, 1979, p. 171). These characteristicswere demonstrated at 1st Field Hospital during theamalgamation process. This article will explore themanagement of change at 1 st Field Hospital and willbegin with a contextual analysis of the circumstancessurrounding the process of change (Pettigrew. 1987.p.655). It will then consider the traditional militaryapproach to the management of change. Finally, analternate approach that recognises the management ofchange as a political process will be described.It is acknowledged that external factors play animportant part in shaping the actions of individualswithin an organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978,p.5). The ideology of both major political parties inAustralia reflects national perceptions and expectationsabout the defence forces. While both partiesacknowledge the need for a well equipped DefenceForce, it is also acknowledged that the Defence Forcereceives significantly lower priorities during times ofpeace (O'Connor, 1985, p. 15).Although the Australian Defence Force (ADF)receives little public attention during peace time, exceptionsdo occur when it is involved in major financialexpenditure, especially the purchase of significantcapital equipment items. Other instances are usuallyassociated with controversial social issues such as theenlistment and retention of homosexuals in the ADF.Recently, the peace and environmental movementshave also sought to influence the national defenceagenda by arguing for a peace dividend following theend of the "cold war".One other social issue has also had a major impacton the Australian Army. While the ADF has formallyacknowledged the effect of Equal EmploymentOpportunity (EEO) principles on the employment ofwomen, the ratio of males to females in the AustralianArmy is still only 10:1. (Defence Report, 1990-1991).At the same time, the employment of women incombat-related tasks has now received formal recognition.The impact of these initiatives is relevant to 1 stField Hospital. For many years, the only females inthe unit were nurses associated with an operationalrequirement (Daniel. 1990).In another external contest, it is important to considerthe impact of changes to the Australian healthcare system on AHS. Army Health Services areunique in that they provide comprehensive health careto all personnel and are financed by costings determinedby historical expenditure. The civilian healthcare system has recognised inefficiencies with historicalbased funding and has developed a number ofmethods, including privatisation, to restrict healthexpenditure. While contracting-out has been used bythe Army for some services, until now the AHS have

14 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCH JOURNAL, NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994not been involved. However, privatisation may have asignificant impact on all AHS members includingthose employed in Army hospitals, such as 1st FieldHospital.At the same time the consumers have modifiedtheir demands in line with changes identified in thecivilian community. Improved education standardsand a greater awareness of health issues is manifestedas a growing critical assessment of the quality ofhealth services. The demand for quality care and thefear of litigation are recognised as significant factorsthat affect health care professionals in the direct provisionof health services (Palmer & Short. 1989).A major internal contextual factor of change wasassociated with the structural reshaping of both unitsdue to amalgamation (Pettigrew. 1987. p.657). Thenew 1st Field Hospital maintained the organisationalstructure of a field unit with the addition of a staticclinical services department. The organisational divisionof labour in field medical units is based on clinicalservices and administration support services.Bureaucratic management control is maintained by aformal hierarchy, rules and standard operating procedures.At the same time, in a field medical unit, theskills of medical administrators are well recognisedbecause of the difficult circumstances of providinghealth support in a potentially hostile environment.Thus, within this framework, professional autonomyis resisted while other military skills are more highlyrecognised. The imperative of battlefield medical supportis based on a philosophy to provide the greatestgood to the greatest number and accepts that not allsoldiers may survive or will receive full and comprehensivetreatment.The structural integrity of the static hospital underwentmore dramatic changes. Static hospitals aremanaged by less bureaucratic techniques and placea greater emphasis on professional autonomy withless emphasis on hierarchy, rules and procedures. Inthe static hospital, health professionals with clinicalskills are more highly regarded than personnel withadvanced military skills, such as medical administrators.The philosophy of care in static military hospitalsis recognised as the desire to provide high qualitymedical care for all.While the Commanding Officer (CO) retainedresponsibility for all services within the hospital followingamalgamation, a realignment of organisationalauthority occurred and was associated with a greateremphasis on the skills of senior medical administratorsat the expense of clinical specialists. This realignmentreflected a requirement to accentuate the unit'sprimary task of providing field medical services. Atthe same time, the traditional clinical division oflabour on professional lines was maintained with asenior medical officer responsible for clinical sen icesand the senior nursing officer responsible for nursingservices.Culture reflects another important internal contextualfactor (Pettigrew. 1987. p.657). The amalgamationof both hospitals was associated with a cultural shift toreflect the dual role that emphasised the need for militaryskills while continuing to provide high qualityhealth care from the static facility. The culture of fieldmedical units reflects a greater concept of selflessnesswith a commitment to service 24 hours a day and theacceptance of deployment at short notice for longperiods of time. On the other hand, the culture of thestatic hospital resembled an equivalent civilian hospital.While work was highly regarded, the commitmentto work did not reflect the same degree of selflessnessas evidenced within the field unitThere was also an acceptance in the field unit of amore rigid code of discipline with an acknowledgementof the need for more physical activities thatoften required aggressive physical and mental characteristics.The static hospital placed less emphasis on astrict code of discipline and attributes such as physicalfitness were less well regarded.The acceptance of females was also an importantcultural difference between the two units. While theonly females in the field unit were nursing officers,the static hospital included and accepted a largenumber of females in a broad range of employmentcategories. It has been recognised earlier that theamalgamation process occurred at a time when morewomen were expecting to be employed in field units.Notwithstanding the official policy on EEO. theinclusion of women in field units reflected a majorcultural change to a male-dominated organisation.While many women supported the amalgamationprocess as a method of gaining employment in thefield Army, others were more reserved and manifesteda fear of uncertainty often associated with change(Brown. 1979. p. 171).The Management of ChangeThe culture of the new hospital was associatedwith a greater emphasis on the military ethos ofservice. At the same time, the desire for high qualitymedical care was emphasised as an imperative forsoldiers in all circumstances and not restricted to staticfacilities. The new hospital also acknowledged theplace of women in the field Army and includedwomen in all categories of field activities.

POLITICS AND MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 15The military approach to management, includingmanagement of change, is based on the assumptionthat the actions of individuals may be shaped accordingto needs. The existence of needs is said to begeneric to human nature and encompass the desiresof survival, social approval and self-actualisation(Aungles & Parker. 1989, p. 16). Thus, to ensurecontinued and effective performance of organisationroles, all members of the organisation should be providedwith the means to satisfy individual needs.The instrumental, rational account of managementas a technical process that includes the systematicapplication of scientifically-based knowledge recognisesthe CO as the person responsible for managingchange. Thus, to manage change effectively, the COshould provide a prescription for change. That prescriptionshould include: the design of an appropriateorganisational structure; coordination of activities;well-defined rules and procedures; and effectiveleadership to motivate an acceptance of change(Mintzberg, 1975,p.230).Leadership and the ability to motivate individualsplay a vital part in military management philosophy.General Sir John Hackett, in the well regarded militarytext The Profession of Anns (1983. p.215) arguesthat the leader provides the direction for success andidentifies the characteristics and qualities of a goodleader. Military leadership principles are based on themotivation theories of Maslow (1954) and Herzberg(1966). Motivation theories assume that individualsseek knowledge to understand change. Thus an importantpart of the management of change includes anexplanation of the effects of change on an individual.It may be argued that these processes occurred at1st Field Hospital. A detailed organisational structurewas prepared and an implementing instruction thatdescribed levels of hierarchy, control methods and adivision of labour was issued. The process of changewas also discussed in detail with individuals. It mayfurther be argued that leadership and motivationalskills were also invoked. However, the managementof change at 1 st Field Hospital may also be addressedby recognising the influence of interests of key personnel.The interests of individuals are a complex setof predispositions that include goals, values, desires,expectations and orientations. These interests causean individual to act in a particular way. The interestsof individuals may be classified as: task intereststhat are connected with the immediate work beingperformed; career interests which reflect future aspirations;and extramural interests which encompassprivate attitudes, values and beliefs that may shapereactions to position and career (Morgan. 1986.p. 150). Thus, an understanding of the different typesof interests of individuals and the influence of contextualissues described previously provides a methodof recognising personal agendas as they relate tospecific actions and activities.The tensions that exist between different interestsmakes work inherently political even before consideringthe actions of other individuals. It is well recognisedthat the formation of coalitions is an importantand integral component of organisational behaviour.Coalitions form between individuals or groups withsimilar values, ideologies or a common interest in aspecific issue or event (Morgan, 1986. p. 154). It isacknowledged that in many organisations there isoften a dominant coalition that controls importantpolicy areas. It is also appreciated that in militaryunits, these dominant coalitions form around the COor other key personnel. In the health care system it isrecognised that professional monopolists usuallydominate corporate rationalisers and consumers(Alford. 1972, p.80). At 1st Field Hospital thesegroups are represented by medical and nursing staff,medical administrators, and patients. A recognition ofthese coalitions by the CO offers an important meansto secure desired objectives.Conflict occurs when the interests of individualsand groups differ and this is inherent to all organisations(Edwards, 1986, p.24). At 1st Field Hospital,conflict among key personnel was a manifestation ofthe emphasis placed on administrative skills and theimposition of a dominant military culture in preferenceto professional autonomy. It is also important torecognise the intensity of this conflict in terms of theeffect of changed expectations of health care consumerson health professionals.While all health professionals support the objectiveto provide a high standard of health care, it isalso acknowledged that conflict is inherent betweenthe medical and nursing professions (Willis, 1989).This conflict is related to medical dominance of thenursing profession and is influenced by genderdifferences between the two groups. Professionalconflict was identified at 1st Field Hospital. Conflictdue to gender was also apparent at 1st Field Hospitalwith the employment of females in a wide range offield occupations.Conflict is resolved by the use of power (Morgan,1986. p. 157). Power has been defined by Dahl as "theability to get another person to do something he orshe would not do otherwise" (Morgan, 1986. p.158).There are a number of sources of power available to aCO that may be mobilised to resolve conflicts. In amilitary setting, the most obvious source of power isthe legitimised power of formal authority vested inthe CO and acknowledged by all military personnel.

16 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Formal authority allows the CO to attempt to controlconflict by decree. It was possible to promote EEOprinciples with the compulsory employment ofwomen in the field component and in positions ofauthority. However, it should be noted that this actionresulted in covert manifestations of conflict. Theestablishment of an organisational structure, rules andregulations that are justified on technical terms arealso motivated by considerations relating to issues ofcontrol.Control of resources is also a powerful tool availableto a CO. At 1st Field Hospital, the control ofstaffing was a key issue and was used to influence thebalance of power between department heads. It waspossible to effectively place greater emphasis of fieldactivities by allocating staff to the person in control ofthe field component. At the same time the maintenanceof the traditional division of labour betweenmedical and nursing staff did not resolve that inherentconflictThe influence of medical administrators was alsoincreased as a result of their ability to control informationsystems within the hospital. The senior medicaladministrator acted as a "gatekeeper" (Pettigrew.1972. p. 197) and was able to control and shape informationflows in accordance with personal intereststhat also conformed with the CO's desired outcome.The coalition between CO and the senior medicaladministrator played an important part in shapingactions within the hospital.Symbolism and the management of meaning alsoplays an important part in the control of conflict(Pfeffer, 1981. p. 181). Ceremonies are an integralcomponent of any military organisation. At 1st FieldHospital, military parades were used to demonstratethe power structure within the organisation. In addition.the use of the unique military language of acronymsand abbreviations was also used to reinforce hierarchalrelationships. These relationships were furtherdemonstrated during ritual events such as regular conferencesand formal social functions. Finally, a mythwas cultivated following 1st Field Hospital's victoryat the annual health services sports competition in1990. This myth created a strong bond between allpersonnel and was invoked as a symbol of successand unity.ConclusionThe amalgamation of two Army units to create anew 1st Field Hospital was undertaken as part of theAustralian Army solution to financial restraint and arenewed emphasis on the field Army. Other lessapparent external factors influenced the amalgamationprocess: community attitudes to social issuessuch as the employment of women, the nature of thecivilian health care system and consumer expectations,in particular. Internal factors also affected theprocess of change. Specifically, the establishment of abureaucratic control structure that placed greateremphasis on medical administration at the expense ofprofessional autonomy. Changes to the corporateculture were also initiated that placed greater emphasison the military ethos and acknowledged the placeof women in the field Army.The amalgamation process was one of majorchange for both medical units, and dramaticallyaltered the work practices of key personnel. The militaryapproach to managing this change is derivedfrom an instrumental account of management andemphasises the psychological perspective of leadershipand motivational skills. However, this approachdoes not pay credence to the interests, meanings orbeliefs of individuals within an organisation. A considerationof these factors recognises that conflict isinherent in all organisations and that power resourcesmay be mobilised to manage conflict. This articleidentified the power resources available to the CO 1stField Hospital and their use. In this case the mobilisationof power resources controlled most sources ofconflict so that the amalgamation process was recognisedas a success. At the time these actions wereintuitive; they may have been enhanced to a greaterunderstanding and awareness of the politics of managingchange.KIW.IOCRAPmAlford, R.. 'The political Economy of Health Care: Dynamicswithout Change" Politics and Society. Winter. 1972. p.79-116.Aungles, S., & Parker. S., Work Organisations ant! Change. Allen& Unwin. Sydney, 1989. p. 16.Brown. R.. Reorganising the National Health Sen-ice. Blaekwelland Robertson. 1979. p. 171 -172.Daniel, A.. Medicine anil the Stale, Allen & Unwin. 1990. Sydney.Defence Report, 1990-IWI. AGPS, Canberra. 1991.Dibb. P.. The Dihh Report. AGPS Canberra. 1986.Edwards. P.. Conflict at Work. Blaekwell. New York. 1986. p.24.Hacked. J.. The Profession of Arms. Sedgwick and Jackson.London. 1983, p.215-228.Her/berg. F., "The Motivation-Hygiene Theory", in OrganisationTheory: Selected Readings. lid by D.S. Pugh. Penguin. Melbourne.l990,p.375-392.Mintzberg. H.. "The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact", inOrganisation Theory: Selected Readings, ed by D.S. Pugh.Penguin. Melbourne. 1990. p.223-245.Morgan. G.. Images of Organisations. Sage. London, 1986. p. 141-198."O'Connor. M.. To Live in Peace: Australia's Defence Policy.Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 1985. p. 15.

POLITICS AND MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 17Palmer. G.. & Short. S.. Health Care and Public Policy.Macmillan. Melbourne. 1989.Pettigrew. A.. "Information Control as a Power Resource"Sociology, Vol. 6. 1972 p. 197.Pettigrew. A.. "Context and Action in the Transformation of theFirm". J. Of Management Studies, 24.6. Nov. 1987. p.649-670.Pfeffer. J. Power in Organisations. Pitman. Marshfield. 1981.p.181.Pfeffer. J. & Salancik. G.. The External Control of Organisations.Harper & Row, London, 1978, p.5.Willis, E.. Medical Dominance: The Division of Labour inAustralian Health Care. Allen & L'nwin. Sydney, 1989.Colonel Wayne Ramsay joined the Army as a medical undergraduate in 1976. He graduated from the University of Tasmania in1977 with a Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery and Bachelor of Medical Science. His first posting was as RMO 1stArmoured Regiment and was followed by a range of command and staff appointments. From Dec SS until Jan 92 he was CO 1stField Hospital. He attended Command and Stuff College. Queenscliff in I9S6 and completed a Master of Health Administration atthe University of New South Wales in 1992. He is currently posted as Commander, Land Command Medical Senices.1994 RMF HISTORY CONFERENCETheRAAFinEuropeandNorthAfrica• The 1994 RAAF History Conference will be held onThursday 20 October.• The venue will be the Theatre of the National Galleryof Australia, Canberra.• The registration fee of $30 will include attendance,morning and afternoon teas, lunch and a bound copyof the proceedings.• Seating is limited so early registration is advisable.• For registration forms please contact:Ms Sandi Seignarack of the Air Power Studies Centre,RAAF Base Fairbaim, ACT 2601Telephone: (06) 267 6563 • Fax: (06) 267 6382

DIGGECalendar 1995The Diggers calendar presents the pictorial history of our nation in battle and in keeping the peace.With a superb painting accompanying each month. Diggers begins with our earliest military actions in 19thcentury New Zealand and takes us through both World Wars up to our most recent engagements in Vietnam andthe Gulf War. It also includes our peacekeeping effort around the world.Australia's contributions in each of these actions is provided in a brief summary which accompanies everycalendar page.The Diggers Calendar 1995 is available from Defence Public Relations at a cost of $ 19.95., ,DIGGERS Calendar 1995 — Mail Order FormI would like () copies of the Diggers Calendar at a cost of $ 19.95 each. Enclosed is a cheque/money ordermade out to the Receiver of Public Monies for $NAME:ADDRESS:STATE:POSTCODE:Please send your order and payment to:Defence Public Relations, Department of Defence, B-4-24, RUSSELL OFFICES, ACT 2601.

Appreciating the Military Problem — Part TwoBy Major Darn I Smart, RAA."Rules are for the guidance of wise men and theblind obedience of fools. "AnonIntroductionWar is fought in an environment of imperfectknowledge and violent action. At its essenceare initiative and decisive action. At their differentlevels the leader, commander, and strategist mustall solve military problems to apply violence and wininitiative. These problems are not susceptible to merecalculations or even to logic alone. They require intuition,prediction, and imagination. The problem-solvingaid provided to invoke these skills is the appreciationprocess.The appreciation process was conceived in 19thcentury Germany by Moltke and Elder (Chief of theGerman General Staff in 1853), who said:'Our science gives us no fundamental rules to bealways applied, no formula to help us over all ourdifficulties. The essential thing in war is on everyoccasion to 'appreciate the situation' rightly and tomake arrangements that are best suited for thatsituation."'Thus, the essence of the appreciation is the rejectionof rules or formula in favour of the demands of thesituation. Since its beginnings as a systematic studyfor solving tactical problems, the appreciation processhas evolved into an institution in professional armiesaround the world.This is the second of two articles written on theappreciation process in the ADF. It proposes modificationsto the process in order to address the ADF'srequirement for a problem-solving process in terms ofthe following criteria: 2a. providing a guaranteed solution;b. timeliness;c. simplicity;d. creativity; ande. accountability.It is beyond the scope of this article to modify theentire appreciation process. I will only concentrate onthe selection of factors, analysis of information, andthe development of courses open. These were the elementsof the process specifically evaluated in my firstarticle. A factor shall be defined as a category ofinformation relating to the aim. The term informationwill be used to represent facts or reasonable assumptionsbearing on the aim.'The topic will be addressed as a new doctrine forthe appreciation process called the Queenscliff 92Doctrine. 1 It is written to supplement, rather thanreplace, the existing doctrine in JSP 102.Having reviewed the appreciation process in termsof the requirements of the ADF, it is apparent thatalthough it is theoretically sound, it is weakened by anumber of practical deficiencies. 5The appreciation process is not user-friendly.Logical deductive reasoning is a complex mentalprocess requiring great discipline. Also the serial processingof information in the short term memory isinefficient. It fails to take advantage of the significantparallel processing powers of the long term memory.The appreciation process is not a complete methodology.It relies heavily on factor and deductionguides used to guarantee a doctrinal solution at the expenseof creativity. Specific gaps exist in the methodof the process for selecting factors, and developingcourses of action for both the enemy and own forces.Moreover, the appreciation process is not capableof being amended to meet time constraints.The process does not do enough to promote creativethinking, through the use of intuition or insight.The first three deficiencies collectively give theconcept of situating the appreciation credibility, sincethey are the areas where it excels. The final deficiencyis a more general and subjective criticism, but onewhich should not require further justification.A User-Friendly ProcessEven though the existing appreciation process isnot user-friendly, it is important to recognise itsstrengths. These are that it is logical, in the sense thatconclusions can be explained and supported, and it iscomprehensive in the analysis of information. Theseadvantages should be retained as the test of any modifiedapproach.The deficiency in the existing process is a result of

20 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/Al'Cil'ST 1994the way information relevant to the aim is structuredand analysed by being uniquely categorised underfactor headings. Thus, the information that the enemyhas air superiority by day is categorised under relativestrengths, but not time and space. We rely on deductionsto bridge the gap when information is relevant tomore than one factor. Information is then analysed byfactor, one piece at a time. This requires considerablemental discipline in the application of the "So what?"test, to information which may later be discovered tobe irrelevant, redundant or wrong.Thus, two areas for improvement can be identified:a. information should be more easily available foranalysis with all the factors; andb. some process of reviewing information is requiredto identify the most important facts first, toreduce the deductive workload.To improve the process, we must take a differentapproach to the way the problem is structured. Factorsshould not be considered as unique categories ofinformation. It must be recognised that informationis likely to be relevant to many, if not all, factors. Inscientific terms, the factors are the dimensions of theproblem space and information is considered as multidimensional.The proposed technique for analysis is to firstreview all information in terms of the first factor andthe aim. Using the knowledge base of the long termmemory, relevant information is identified and deductionsare drawn from the broad sweep of all the dataavailable. If necessary, specific pieces of informationcan be identified for more detailed deductive analysis.This compares to the existing doctrine of making separatedeductions from each piece of information. It isappropriate to call this process "Wargaming thefactor" 6 as we apply the technique of deduction laterallyacross all known information in terms of the factor.After consideration of the first factor is complete,the other factors are then wargamed in turn.The objects of wargaming are to quickly identifythe key deductions linking the factor to the aim. tohighlight key information (or information gaps),requiring more detailed analysis, and to define theconstraints and freedoms affecting possible courses ofaction.It retains the benefits of a comprehensive analysisof all information. In fact, all the information is analysedwith ali the factors; this gives greater exposure tothe information than the existing process. The lateraluse of deduction also retains the logical integrity ofthe process, whilst making it more efficient by usingthe capacity of the long term memory to sort andrelate vast quantities of information. Conclusionsdrawn from wargaming can be supported and provenfrom the professional knowledge stored in long termmemory.Thus, the benefits of wargaming are that informationis automatically made available for analysis withall the factors, and that the parallel processing powerof the long term memory is used to ease the burden ofdeductive reasoning.Factor SelectionBy representing factors as component parts (ordimensions, of the problem, we have already developeda measure of guidance for their selection. Factorscan be established on either the physical properties ofthe problem or on the theoretical principles of theproblem. For military problems, the norm has been touse the physical dimensions of relative strengths, theenvironment, and time. These have been developed ingreat detail in existing tactical and operational appreciationdoctrine and remain relevant in the proposedmodification to the process. However, systems of nontangiblefactors could also be used. eg. the principlesof war. or the basic considerations for operations.Further general guidance on selecting factors canbe derived from the proposed new relationship betweeninformation and factors. If all the information isanalysed in terms of every factor, then it follows thatthe set of factors must completely describe all theinformation. Thus, if there exists any information thatcannot be adequately described in terms of the factors,then the list of factors is incomplete.Once factors have been selected, they should eachbe considered in terms of their importance to the aim.Then the most decisive factor should be selected. Thiscould be apparent from the nature of the aim, eg. indelay missions, time is the dominant factor; in capturemissions, the ground; in destroy missions the relativestrengths. Having identified the decisive factor in theproblem, it is wargamed first.Generating Courses OpenAssume that an appreciation is being conducted inthe new format and all the information has been wargamedin terms of each of the factors. Thus, we haveidentified the key deductions linking the factors andthe aim and defined the constraints and freedoms

APPRECIATING THE MILITARY PROBLEM 21effecting possible courses of action. In effect we havedecided all that it is possible to do and how it can bedone. To link these conclusions into a course of action,it remains to decide what must be done to achievethe aim. This process will be described as "TaskAnalysis".Task analysis approaches the problem in terms ofthe aim. This compares with wargaming. which approachesthe problem in terms of the situation and theinformation. Using professional knowledge, the aimis dissected into its implied component parts or tasks.These tasks can be derived either hierarchically ortemporarily. A hierarchical set of tasks are enablingtasks, a temporal set of tasks is the timed sequence oftasks required to achieve the aim. The current Armytactical appreciation process already provides guidancefor tasks analysis under the "assessment of tasks"heading.Task analysis should be conducted for both friendlyand enemy troops in a military appreciation. Then,by comparing the results of wargaming, what can bedone, with the conclusions of the task analysis, whathas to be done; workable courses of action can begenerated. Because the conclusions of wargamingand task analysis are derived separately, the new processshould assist in the identification of multiplecourses of action.Meeting Time ConstraintsThe process of wargaming is highly redundant toensure a comprehensive analysis of the problem.Thus, it is responsive to time constraints. As the timefor a full appreciation is reduced, the process can firstbe shortened by only wargaming the decisive factor.This still ensures that all the information is considered.Then, after courses are developed, they can bevalidated against the other factors. If even less time isavailable, then the process may go straight to the taskanalysis, with a subsequent validation of coursesagainst all the factors as time allows.Thus, in developing the concepts of wargamingand task analysis, we have also created a processwhich is responsive to time constraints. The risks involvedin shortening the process have been minimisedby ensuring that the decisive factor is analysed first,and that within each factor the most relevant informationis identified first. It is accepted that shortenedappreciations are more likely to produce doctrinalsolutions.Fostering CreativityCreativity is encouraged by reducing the externalconstraints imposed on a problem solver and byestablishing the conditions to encourage insight intothe problem. Both of these requirements are addressedby the Queenscliff92 Doctrine.By allowing the freedom to choose and prioritisethe factors relating to the aim, we have removed oneof the constraints entrenched in the existing process.Similarly, the use of task analysis to replace the templatescurrently provided for outline plans will allow agreater freedom of expression in developing coursesopen.By analysing all the information for every factor,the new doctrine encourages creativity by allowingthe aim to be represented in several different ways, ie.in terms of each factor. Changing the perception ofthe problem allows the mind the maximum chance tore-order the information to gain insight into novelsolutions. When time is constrained, the short versionsdescribed above will restrict the likelihood ofcreative solutions.The Queenscliff 92 Doctrine relies on professionalknowledge in the same way as the existing process.The conclusions of both wargaming and task analysisare only as valid as the professional knowledge of thecommander. The symbiotic relationship between themethod and knowledge has been retained and must beexplicitly explained in any amendment to the appreciationprocess.The Queenscliff 92 Doctrine has been consolidatedto provide a direct comparison with the existingappreciation process in Figure 1.ConclusionThe Queenscliff 92 Doctrine has been developedin this article to address the structural deficienciesidentified in the appreciation process in terms of theADF requirement for a problem-solving process. Itproposes three reforms to the appreciation processwhich:a. restructure the relationship between informationand factors so that all information is available foranalysis under every factor. The individual factorshaving been selected are also analysed to identifythe decisive factor for analysis first;b. replace the technique of sequential deduction

22 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Figure 1A Comparison of the Queenscliff 92 Doctrine with the Existing Appreciation ProcesstfQUEENSCLIFF 92 DOCTRINE1SELECTION OF FACTORSFactors are selected as categories of information.All the information relevant to the aim must be ableto be expressed in terms of the factors. Existingguidance in tactical and operational appreciationsis still valid.tPRIORITISING FACTORSFactors are prioritised in terms of their importanceto the aim. The decisive factor in terms of the aim isselected first. Then all other factors are prioritised.1ANALYSING INFORMATIONThe decisive factor is wargamed against the aimreferring to all the information available: to identifykey deductions, and highlight information requiringfurther analysis, and to define any constraints orfreedoms affecting possible courses of action.All the information is then wargamed against eachof the other factors in turn. During this stage thecommander may wish to reconsider which is thedecisive factor.1IDENTIFYING COURSES OPENAfter all the factors have been wargamed the aim issubjected to a task analysis. The object of taskanalysis is to identify what must be done to achievethe aim. By linking these conclusions with thosefrom wargaming it will be possible to derive workablecourses of action.THE EXISTING PROCESS 1TREVIEW OF THE SITUATION1SELECTION OF THE AIM1SELECTION OF FACTORSFactors are selected from a list developed for militaryuse. More detailed guidance is provided forspecific tactical and operational appreciations.VPRIORITISING FACTORSFactors are arranged to ensure the logical considerationof the information. They can also be prioritisedas either overriding or pervasive.kANALYSING INFORMATIONThe information is distributed between the factors.Starting with the first factor each piece of informationis subjected to an exhaustive process of deductionin relation to the aim.l 1IDENTIFYING COURSES OPENCourses of action are considered as factors. Deductionsare drawn from the analysis of information.These deductions are crafted into courses of actionusing professional knowledge.i rSELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE1OUTLINE PLAN

APPRECIATING THE MILITARY PROBLEM 23using information one piece at a time, by "Wargaming".This allows us to apply the associativeability of our long term memory laterally to allthe known information in terms of each factor,analysing the decisive factor first. The objects ofwargaming are to:(1) quickly identify the key deductions linkingthe factor to the aim:(2) to identify key information (or informationgaps) which require further analysis; and(3) to define the constraints and freedoms affectingpossible courses of action; it alsoc. proposes a new technique to assist in the developmentof courses open, "Task Analysis" whichaims to identify what must be done to achieve theaim. using either enabling tasks or a time series oftasks. Courses open are developed from the overlapbetween the deductions of wargaming thefactors,, and the results of the task analysis of theaim.The Que e use I iff 92 Doctrine retains the advantagesof logical reasoning and the comprehensive analysisof information, inherent in the existing process. It providesgreater guidance to assist the understanding ofthe general appreciation process, whilst retaining thebenefits of the guidance already provided for specificoperational and tactical appreciations. The inefficientprocess of analysing information one piece at a timehas been replaced by the mind's associative ability todraw deductions from a large array of information.It also offers shortened forms, trading creativity fordoctrine when time is constrained.NOTES1. Nazareth. J., Dynamic Thinking for Military Command, TateMcGraw Hill, New Delhi, 1976. p.l 17.2. Detailed explanation lor these criteria is outlined in Part 1 ofthis article, ADFJ, previous issue.3. These definitions clarify current doctrine which is ambiguousin its use of the term "factor".4. The title does not imply that the doctrine is endorsed by theArmy Staff College at Fort Queenscliff, it merely nominatesthe location of its inception.5. Detailed explanation for these deficiencies can be found inPart I of this article.6. This term should not be confused with common usage at theInfantry Centre where a technique of wargaming is used toevaluate and optimise courses open.7. These examples are trivial and should not be used as a template.In operational terms, the decisive factor should includeconsideration of the centre of gravity of the problem.Editor'sNote:Part I of Appreciating the Military Problem appeared in the May/June issue of the Australian Defence Force Journal.If any reader has copies of theAUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL 1949-1955that they no longer want,we would love to have them hack in our care.Issues most sought after are:Nos 2, 3. 6, 7, 9, 13. 14, 18, 20, 22. 25, 26. 28.30.31.35.42.43.56.57.60.61.

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How to Get the Most From Your Military InterpreterBy Capt D.J. KilcuUen, RA Inf.". . . interpreting has sometimes been called the artof transferring a speaker's statement from thespeaker's mouth to the interpreter's ears, and fromthe interpreter's mouth to the audience's ears,without it passing through the minds of any. "R. (ilemet.Head of the GATT Interpreting Unit. 1957.IntroductionEvery year, many exercises and activities occurwhich involve foreign troops. For every singleone of these activities there is a language problem —even if it is only knowing what US company commandersmean when they tell you "My FIST is intravelling overwatch". Consider, then, how enormousthe language problem becomes when the participatingtroops are from Indonesia. Thailand. Brunei. Malaysiaor any of the other non-English-speaking countrieswhich regularly take part in training in Australia. Thesame problem arises when foreign officers visit thiscountry. In these circumstances the Australian representativeis likely to be allocated the services of one ofthe Military Linguists trained by the ADF School ofLanguages at Point Cook in Victoria. But this involvesits own problems — many people are unfamiliar withinterpreters, and feel constrained by their presence.Again, it is difficult to know exactly how to brief yourinterpreters, and what to expect from them.The aim of this article is a simple one: to explainwhat interpreters are. what they can do for you. andhow you can employ them in an effective manner —in short, how to get the most from your interpreter.What is an InterpreterThink of an interpreter as being one of the manyspecialist advisers available to the commander. Interpretersprovide a liaison function, allowing effectivecommunication between two officers who do not havean effective shared means of understanding.Military Linguists are trained at the ADF School ofLanguages. Point Cook. They undergo a year of intensivetraining in their language, with a strong militaryand government orientation, but also with the ability toconverse and write on a wide range of general topics.such as might unexpectedly be raised by, say, anIndonesian General at a cocktail party. They also studyand practice techniques of interpreting and translatingboth into and out of Fnglish. Generally speaking, youcan rely on your interpreter to understand what yourforeign counterpart is saying, and to convert it into theappropriate English equivalent.In addition to this training, most interpreters havelived in or at least regularly visit the relevant foreigncountry and have experience in interpreting and translatinga wide range of spoken and written material. So.they have a good cultural understanding of the foreignnation's way of life. Armed with this knowledge ofthe interpreter's background, let us look at the serviceshe or she can provide for you.Services Provided by Military LinguistsMilitary Linguists offer three principal services:• Interpreting. Spoken interpretation of meetings,orders groups, social functions, negotiations, andany other face-to-face communicative situations.• Translation. Translation of instructions, orders, letters,plans or other written documents into English,or into the foreign language.• Liaison. The interpreter's cultural understandingallows him or her to perform various services suchas briefing your personnel on religious restrictionsfor your visitors, ensuring food taboos are not infringed,and generally smoothing out the potentialfriction involved in the meeting of two cultures.Another important wartime task of the interpreteris interrogation. However, since an interrogation interpreterrequires extra qualifications such as the abilityto conduct tactical questioning, and since such activitiesare not in regular demand at present, they fall outsidethe scope of this article and will not be examinedfurther.Hav ing now gained some idea of the services interpreterscan provide, let us look at each in turn and considerhow to employ the interpreter most effectively.

26 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994InterpretingThis is not the place to delve too deeply into theblack arts employed by interpreters to convert aforeign language sentence into idiomatic, militarycorrect English — and vice versa — in the twinklingof an eye. Suffice to say that the interpreter relies ona good general knowledge of the foreign language,the learning of technical terminology in advanceand the taking of a specialised form of notes whichact as "memory joggers". In all these area, exceptpossibly the first, you can be of great assistance toyour interpreter.Remember that what is everyday language to you.may not be so to your interpreter. Generally an effortis made to allocate, say, an infantryman to an interpretingtask involving infantry matters, a naval aviator tomatters of maritime aviation and so on. But this cannotalways be done, and your interpreter may not be fullyfamiliar with your technical jargon. You must thereforebrief your interpreter on any specialist termsinvolved, so that familiarity can be developed beforeany discussions take place. Give the interpreter asmuch time as possible for preparation.Include the interpreter in any briefings, discussions,and meetings you conduct. Brief him or her thoroughlyabout your aims and objectives, and the impressionyou wish to make on your counterpart. Remember,that the interpreter's credibility rests on not appearingto take sides: avoid compromising this impartiality infront of your foreign guests.Remember to pace your conversation so that theinterpreter has time to keep up. Do this by speaking atnormal speed for at most a couple of sentences, andthen pausing for approximately the same length oftime. Do not slow down your delivery to "help theinterpreter": a very slow delivery actually makes interpretationharder. Instead, speak in a measured way. nottoo fast, not overly slow.Interpreter's notes are designed to facilitate the sortof mental gymnastics required for instantaneous translation.They are not suited to the taking of minutesduring meetings. Splitting the interpreter's attentionin this way can only result in both tasks being donerxx)rly. hence if minutes must be taken, someone elseshould be tasked to provide them. Of course, this doesnot preclude the interpreter being asked his or heropinion on the proceedings afterwards, and indeedmuch useful information can be gained by the interpreter,who is able to understand such things asmuttered asides or off-the-record remarks made by theforeign speaker."While the interpreter passes your message, use theavailable pause to observe the foreign visitor's reaction— valuable understanding can be gained in thisway, especially in negotiations. Remember also thatmany senior overseas officers speak English well andmav understand more than you think.TranslationYour interpreter can be used to translate many ofthe important documents involved in a visit or exercise— everything from a Mess Dinner menu to anExercise Safety Instruction. As a general rule, forevery 200-250 words of text the interpreter willrequire about one hour to produce a perfect, publishablesolution." Of course, a rougher rendition can bedone in a much shorter time, and an oral translation ofthe important points of a foreign language documentcan be given almost immediately. The golden rule isto specify exactly what your requirements are: theinterpreter will then work to those requirements.The linguist's aim will be to produce a translationthat is accurate, on time and in a form acceptable tothe user. You as the user must specify what form isacceptable. This means knowing whether you want toread the document yourself or are happy with an oralbriefing: whether you need an in-depth knowledge ofeverything in the document; and whether you havetime to read the whole document or would prefer asummary or precis of it. A sound practice is to ask fora quick oral briefing on the document and then armedwith a rough knowledge of what it contains, specifythose parts of it for which you require a detailed writtentranslation.Another crucial point is that you must always give adeadline. This should follow the guideline mentionedearlier — one hour for every 200-250 words. If youfail to set a realistic deadline, the interpreter may continueto work on accuracy, when what you reallywanted was a less perfect English version delivered ina timely manner.LiaisonLiaison, although one of the less tangible servicesprovided by the interpreter, can be one of the mostvaluable. The many small cultural frictions which canquickly cause offence — religious matters, personalspace, fixxi taboos, and alcohol, for example, can be

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM VOIR MILITARY INTERPRETER 27smoothed out by giving your interpreter a liaison rolewith your guests.Most visiting VIPs bring their own escort officersand ADCs. but some may be reluctant to state theirreal opinions or needs for fear of giving offence. Theinterpreter, by liaising with the relevant ADC or escortofficer — preferably in advance — can make yourvisitors feel much more comfortable and moreamenable to Australian ways. It may incidentally alsoprovide you with a valuable source of extra informationon their opinions and state of mind.A Checklist for Employment ofLinguistsHaving examined the range of interpreting servicesavailable, and methods of employing the interpretereffectively, let us summarise these points in the formof a checklist for those likely to employ interpreters.The checklist provides a ready reference for those likelyto be allocated an interpreter for visit or exerciseliaison tasks. In short, the principle ways in which youcan improve your interpreter's performance — andhence your own — are to make the interpreter part ofyour team, to brief him or her effectively, and to speakclearly, concisely, and simply.Conclusion• Explain the subjects to be discussed and the variousparticipants viewpoints.• Give the interpreter any documents to be referred toor needing translation.• Brief the interpreter on any liaison tasks required.During Interpretation• Give a measured, clear delivery. Say what you haveto say clearly and simply.• Use pauses to observe your counterparts' reactionto your message.• Make the interpreter part of the team.• Ask the interpreter's impression of proceedings andpersonalities.• Task someone else to take minutes if necessary.Translation• Give a clear and realistic deadline for the translation.• Get a quick oral briefing from the interpreter on thegist of the document.• Decided how much of the article needs translating,and in what format.• Allow one hour per 2(X)-250 words of text to betranslated.Liaison• Have the interpreter work with the escort officers tomake arrangements.• Task the interpreter to brief appropriate personnelon cultural differences.Unfortunately, the quote with which we began thisarticle reflects the reality of much of the use of professionallinguists in all fields, including business,international relations and defence. By applying thehints contained in this article and making use of thechecklist provided, any commander who finds him orherself tasked to deal with non-English-speakingnationals should be in a position to well and truly getthe most out of the Military Interpreter.Checklist for Employment of InterpretersPreparatory Briefing» Explain the aim and objectives of the activity.• Explain the desired impression to be made on theforeign participants.• Provide a list of the more common technical termslikely to be used.NO IKS1. The term "translation" is usually used when the productis written, whereas the term "interpreting" usually relates tospoken language.2. J. Herbert. The Interpreter's Handbook. Editions Georg.Geneva. 1957. p. 151.3. See Green. S.. "Smart Talk", in Lingo. Vol 1. No 2.. Mareh1993, p. 124. ADL School of Languages. Guidelines for Interpreters, 1992/5. An interesting account of the work of military interpreters isgiven in Birse. A.H.. Memoirs of an Interpreter. MichaelJoseph. London. 1965. Birse points out the immense differencebetween interpreting for Churchill, who was a wellstructuredsteady speaker, and Trumartn — who was notoriously"flighty" in conversion.6. Green, op. cit.. p. 13,7. This figure is based on the Australian Defence LanguageProficiency Rating Scale (ADLPRS). for Level 2 or Level 3Translators. An experienced linguist working in a familiarfield may be able to work much more quickly. but this is thebase level. A Level 3 Translator may be required unless thematerial to he translated is in a formal or military register or isof limited length.8. See Sykes. J.B.. Ed.. Technical Translator's Manual. Aslib.London. 1983.54-55.

28 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994BIBLIOGRAPHYBell, R.T.. Translation ami Translating. Longman, l^ondon. 1992.Brise. A.H.. Memoirs of an Interpreter. Michael Joseph, London,1965.Duff, A., Translation, OUP, Oxford, 1989.Glemet, R., Conference Interpreting. GATT Languages Unit,University of Geneva Sch(x>l of Interpreters, Geneva. 1957.Green, S., "Smart Talk", Lingo, Vol. 1 No. 2, March 1993.Herbert, J. The Interpreter's Handbook. Editions Georg, Geneva,1968.Nida, E., et. al. Towards a Science of Translating. OUP Oxford,1964.Picken, C. Ed., The Translator's Handbook. 2nd Edition. Aslib,London, 1989.Ro/an. J. La Prise de Notes en Interpretation Consecutive. Lihrairede L'Universite Georg, Geneva, 1979.Sykes, J., Ed., Technical Translator's Manual. Aslib. London. 1983Guidelines For Interpreters. ADF School of Languages, PointCook, 1992.Code of Ethics, Australian Institute for Translators and Interpreters.1992.Captain D.J. Kilcullen graduated from the Defence Force Academy in I9K7 and after training al RMC returned to ADFA to completea BA Hons in Fnglish and Politics in 19X9. He has since sened in a variety of Infantry regimental appointments, and is a1993 graduate on the ADF School of Languages, Point Cook, in Indonesia. In 1994. he will be serving in a staff appointment at theDirectorate of Infantry: He is currently undertaking a PhD in International Relations through the University College, (/NSW.THROUGHAUSSIEEYESA pictorial record ofADF experiences on"Operation Solace"A large hard cover book featuring more than 200 photographs supported by a briefhistory off the planning and conduct of Australia's involvement.Includes a list of recipients of the Australian Active Service Medal (Somalia Clasp).To order send a cheque or money order for $30 to:Electronic Media Unit,APW1-B-07, Department of Defence,REiD ACT 2600

Australia's Involvement in Vietnam and the Gulf Conflicts:A Comparative Analysis of Strategic Foreign Policy FormulationBy Private N. P. Oakey.IntroductionThis article serves to establish that there are importantparallels that can be drawn between the decisionsto commit Australian military forces to the warefforts in both Vietnam and the Gulf conflicts. A comparisonof the foreign policy decision making processesin each case is made within a coherent framework ofdomestic and international perspectives. This analysis isused to draw up a number of important parallels anddifferences between the two decisions and permit someconcluding speculation on the type of strategic foreignpolicy decisions best suited to Australia's interests.In attempting to establish any parallels betweenAustralia's Vietnam War contribution and the deci--sion to send ships to the Middle East in 1991. onemust essentially look at the process of foreign policyformulation. At the outset, the reader should be awarethat this process is one of great complexity, being theend result of a whole host of inter-related factors.In order to provide a certain degree of logic to ouranalysis, it is imperative that these elements be placedinto some sort of coherent framework. To further thisend. the Vietnam and Gulf war decisions will belooked at in terms of both the prevailing internationalclimates and elements of the domestic contexts; bothare important in the shaping of foreign policy decisionsof any government.was one of great volatility and hostility. Basic to thisperception was the concern about the southwardambitions of the People's Republic of China and thepossible fall of South East Asian "dominoes" as agreat danger to Australian interests. The Australianassumption that Hanoi was an important "village" inChina's "countryside of the world" and so open toChinese communist direction legitimised (in theireyes at least) intervention in South Vietnam. As such,intervention then was to be a purely Australian solutionto a purely Australian problem. Yet it was not aproblem which Australia sought to overcome byitself. In true Cold War spirit, under the auspice of thehighly revered ANZUS agreement, Australian decisionmakers sought "reliance on a great and powerfulfriend to guarantee the Pacific as an area of securityand tranquillity in a turbulent and hostile world".'It was on the understanding of two basic premisesthat Australia actively sought United States involvementin Vietnam. The first was that the United States,through its involvement, would become committedto the South East Asian region, thereby creating abuffer zone across the approaches to Australia.Secondly, it was felt that if Australians actively assistedthe American war effort in Vietnam and developeda "habitual closeness of relations with the UnitedStates" 2 they would have an obligation to Australiashould it be threatened from any outside source. Theinternational context was thus one dominated bysecurity concerns. What must now be assessed, isthe extent to which these desired state of affairs werebrought about by activity in the Australian domesticsphere.Australia and Vietnam —The International ContextAustralia's involvement in Vietnam is an exemplarycase of the all pervading fear by Australians thatthey are living in an unstable region. The internationalcontext within which the Vietnam decision was madewas one flavoured heavily with Cold War ideology;an era of superpower expansionism and a blind drivefor global hegemony. This view of the world as oneof capitalism versus communism encouraged the evolutionin Australia of a strongly Eurocentric outlook,which meant that Australia's perception of the regionAustralia and Vietnam —The Domestic ContextIt would be unsound to consider the reasons forAustralia's Vietnam effort in isolation from thedomestic political context. There exist a number of"institutions" in the domestic arena which may playan important role in the shaping of foreign policy andserve as a useful comparative measure when lookingat Australian involvement in the Gulf. It is thus tothese "institutions" to which attention must be directed.Firstly, it is imperative that we consider the role ofthe executive. It is the contention of this article that

;n M SIR \[ 1 \N OUhNCI IQkCI l()l R\AI. NO Hr.ll I 1 MOIST 1^4one of the chief features of the decision was one ofexecutive dominance. The key actors were a fewstrategically placed policy makers in the Departmentof External Affairs. Foreign policy was little debated:"'even within the Cabinet it tended to be a matter forthe Prime Minister and the Minister for ExternalAffairs".' Australian decision makers in the earlymonths of 1965 took advantage of uncertainty withinthe US administration over the best course of actionto take. They pushed assiduously for the most vigorousmilitary intervention for the purpose of avertinga communist victory in South Vietnam in the fullknowledge that such a push might have an effect inthe confused conditions which existed. 4 Thus it isclear that the Australian decision making elite werenot "dragged" into the war. On the contrary, theywere very active in its design and implementation.To discuss the role of parliament in the decision tosend troops to Vietnam is in many ways an exercisein the obscure and the futile. The House was presentedon the 29 April 1965 with a fait accompli and it isclear that subsequent parliamentary debate in no waycontested or shaped in any important manner thedecisions of executive government.When looking at the role of the political partiesforeign policy was for the (Liberal) government of theday a crucial issue to which domestic considerationswere subservient. The Democratic Labor party waseven more extreme in its anti-communist stance andvehemently opposed the Labor proposals of a politicalrather than a military solution in South Vietnam.In this domestic political climate, Menzies had effectivelypaved the way for Australian involvement inVietnam. The government would simply be portrayedas the defender of national security and Labor's reservationscould be depicted as a lack of faith in theAmerican alliance and an unwillingness to take afirm stance against communist aggression. Thus, "forthose organising Australia's Vietnam War effort, theycould be sure that in this climate no real debate on thedecision could take place"/The media was a further element which effectivelyblocked rational debate on the Vietnam issue in thedomestic context. There was little opportunity for thenation's media to comment/report on the decisionuntil it was announced. Hence, as with parliament, theability of the media to influence that decision was. tosay the very least, somewhat restricted.The role of public opinion is often, given the natureof democratic government, seen to have a decisiverole in the shaping of foreign policy decisions. However,given the limited media discussion of the Vietnamissue, informed opinion was largely confined toa minority of civil servants and academics. As the warprogressed, however, public opinion polls showedpopular support for the war effort at well over 60 percent. "Vietnam in some senses appeared to be themost popular war in Australia's history"" with theanti-war movement emerging only when the war wasat an end and no longer a political issue.In sum. Australia's drive to get the United Statesinvolved in South Vietnam and its efforts to ensurethat it was itself part of that involvement, was politicallymotivated and a response to what it saw as thenecessary defence of South East Asia under threat ofadvancing communist aggression. The rigidities ofCold War international relations meant that Australiafailed to appreciate that they were confronting quite adifferent phenomena — that of anti-colonial nationalism.It is thus important that the reader be aware thatthe principles on which the decisions to send troopsare in many respects ambiguous. Australia's policy of"forward defence" towards Vietnam was one whichthe international climate (and the narrow-mindedapproach of Cold War diplomacy) encouraged andone which the domestic context had little opportunityto modify. It is this decision to send troops to Vietnam,to which Australia's war effort in the MiddleEast in 1991 must now be compared.Australia and the Gulf Conflict —The International ContextThe international context in which Australia madethe decision to send ships to the Gulf is in polar oppositionto that which prevailed during the Vietnam Warera. The end of the Cold War has meant that superpowerupmanship is no longer the guiding principlearound which global, political and strategic issues arearranged. It is clear that the division of power betweennation states today is infinitely more complexthan that exhibited in the Vietnam War period. Theend of superpower confrontation has seen the erosionof bipolarity which provided the framework for orderingand disciplining the behaviour of world politicsfor over 40 years. A multilateral balance is emergingwhich means that peripheral, middle powers, such asAustralia need no longer guide their actions along oneside of an iron curtain. The thawing of the Cold Warhas bestowed on all states a more global outlook(although this has not meant that Australia has becomeany less committed to the American alliance).Many analysts see. with the loosening up of the politicalrigidities of decades past, the emergence of a"New World Order" which will, given the recedingthreat of global war. bring in an era of peace. It is not

AUSTRALIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND THE GULF CONFLICTSsurprising that given Australia's incessant fear of itconstantly being the object of an elusive aggression(such as in Vietnam) that it has readily attached itselfto this romantic notion of everlasting global harmony.One world body which has attracted a disproportionatedegree of power with the decline of bloc rivalryis that of the United Nations. "Cold War divisionswhich crippled the Security Council for so long (andduring Vietnam) have now disappeared . . . thus theUnited Nations collective security function is nowworking the way it was meant to**. 1 A New WorldOrder policed by the United Nations is said to be adistinct possibility and is held by those in Canberra tobe one of the main premises underlying Australia'scommitment to the Gulf. "The reality and extent of(the) New World Order (and the new role of theUN)", said the Minister for Foreign Affairs, SenatorGareth Evans, "is being tested by the present Gulfcrisis"." Thus, unlike Vietnam, the decision to sendships to the Gulf can (but not necessarily) be seenmore as the Australian contribution to the global solutionof a global problem of unprovoked aggression.Re-establishing international order, it is held, alsoengages Australia's direct interests as well as a globalsense of what is right and what is wrong:"The security and prosperity of middle powers likeAustralia will, in the years ahead, depend directlyon the strength of the United Nations principles.The strength of those principles in the years aheaddepends directly on the support we give themtoday. If we or our neighbours were subject toaggression in the future, we would want, and wemay need the support of the UN. It is in our interestto support the UN today.""Indeed. Australia's unprecedented commitment torecent UN operations in Cambodia and Somalia lendscredence to such philosophy.The second basic reason for Australia's decision(although not as readily admitted) in terms of the internationalcontext also differs from that of Vietnam inthat it is strongly flavoured with a degree of economicself interest. The Gulf is the hub of the world oilmarket and. despite all the rhetoric, it is clear that thiswas oil which Australia needed and to which it wasprepared to make a military commitment. Before turningto the domestic context, the reader should beaware that in terms of morality in international politics(if such a thing can be said to exist), military interventionin the Gulf was in many ways a more appropriatepolicy than it was in Vietnam. With Iraq's unprovokedaggression against Kuwait, the moral principle behindsuch a decision is clearly unambiguous. The basison which the decision was made in Vietnam is. as previouslyhighlighted, an issue of great debate.Australia and the Gulf —The Domestic ContextWhile the international environment in which thedecision to send ships to the Gulf was very differentfrom that which existed in the mid-1960s, someinteresting parallels can be drawn with that era whenone turns to the domestic context of foreign policyformulation.As with Vietnam, the decision to send ships to theGulf was once again one made largely by the executive.After high level consultation with Washington, itwas only the Prime Minister, the Minister for ForeignAffairs and the Defence Minister who bore the decisionfor a military commitment. Thus, not even a fullCabinet debated the issue before a resolution wasannounced.As was also the case in Vietnam, the prompt executivedecision was presented to the parliament with astrong flavour of the fait accompli. The opportunityfor qualitative debate which might have shaped theimportant decision thus did not arise. Hawke did.after the decision had been made, recall both theSenate and the House of Representatives for a reportand debate on the war and Australia's involvement,but such debate could do little to modify the decisionand as such, was of limited purpose.The role of the parties in the Gulf decision wassimilar to that of 1965 with only one major partyformally opposing the Middle East commitment. In arare display of bi-partisanship the Federal Oppositionindicated their support of Australian participation inoperations against Iraq. The Democrats opposed, butappeared to gain little electoral advantage in their callfor the issue to be fully and publicly debated."' Indeed,one might say that given that the Opposition supportedthe government on the war. the debate could not beanything but limited. Thus again, as with Vietnam thegovernment of the day was able to use the Oppositionto its own advantage in stifling informed opinion.The Gulf decision was not one widely debated inthe media even though, unlike Vietnam, there was afairly lengthy period for educated speculation. Oakesattributes this to the difficulties of getting politicaldebate off the ground in a holiday period when "currentaffairs programmes go into recess" and "papersswitch to summer reading mode"." Much media discussionwas simply derived from or mirrored that offoreign press agencies. Thus, it is clear that as in themid 1960s. the media did little to shape the decision.Not unrelated to this is the role of public opinion. Itis accepted that military actions require a degree ofsecrecy and as such are a prerogative of the executive.

32 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994However, it is the contention of this article that thedecision to enter a war is not of the same league andshould firstly be presented to the people (via parliament)for whom that decision is being contemplated.As with Vietnam this was not done: "Whilst PresidentBush was assiduous in preparing world. UnitedStates, congressional and public opinion for a UnitedNations resolution which set the scene for war againstIraq after January 15th (the Australian executive) didno more than respond grudgingly to parliamentaryquestioning". 1 ' This meant that whilst a majority ofthe Australian population did support its government'swar effort, they mav have done so blindly andwithout hindsight. 1In sum. the domestic context in which the Gulfdecision was made is one which identifies closelywith that made on the decision to send troops toVietnam.ConclusionFrom the above discourse, the reader should nowbe aware of a number of fundamental differences andparallels in the circumstances which shaped the decisionfor military intervention in the Vietnam and Gulfconflicts. It is accepted that there are a whole host ofas yet unmentioned differences including: the natureof the commitment (ships as opposed to combattroops), the differences in the type of military hardwareused, the number of casualties — the list goeson. Such factors are not the concern of this articlewhich has sought to focus more on a comparison ofthe processes which led to the respective decisions asdetermined by the international and domestic contextsin which each was made. It should be clear that thereasons for each decision were very different. Yet animportant parallel can be made in that both cases thetraditional "institutions" of the domestic contextoffered no substantive opposition to the decision ofthe executive in what it saw as vital in the light of theprevailing international climate.In closing, the analysis presented in this articlehas pointed (albeit somewhat subtly) to the type offoreign policy decisions best suited to Australia'sinterests. In the Vietnam War. Australia played anactive, initiating, some might say even aggressive rolein the decision to send troops and secure UnitedStates involvement. Yet its war aims were clearly notfulfiled: "it was clear that the Vietnam conflict hadnot locked the United States into South East Asia.On the contrary, it had proved to be the cause of itsphysical withdrawal from the region: the Americans'experience in Vietnam has almost certainly madethem less — not more — ready to come to thedefence of nations like Australia"." In contrast, theAustralian role in the Gulf was much more of acomplaint partnership with a much broader UnitedNations-backed international force. In this instance itwas to benefit to an infinitely greater extent than it didfrom the decision to send troops to Vietnam. Australiawas seen to be unambiguously championingthe cause of collective security, "global citizenship",freedom from aggression and maintenance of a NewWorld Order under the United Nations. This simpleobservation brings to light a rather interesting paradox:it appears that when Australia is a "primemover" in war decisions it seems to ultimately sufferfrom their outcomes, as it did in Vietnam. Whereaswhen our nation adopts the position of an "obedientpartner" as it did in the Gulf and continues to do so inCambodia and Somalia, it is rewarded to no end.Thus in this case logic would lead one to concludeAustralia's interests are best furthered through apolicy of obedience (not aggressiveness as in Vietnam)to "great and powerful friends": although it isalways dangerous to expect logic in internationalstrategic relations, it would seem that Australia canonly benefit from a system of collective security undera United Nations umbrella of New World Order.NOTES1. Sexton. M.. War for the Asking, Penguin Books, Melbourne1981,p.9.2. Frost. F.. Australia's War in Vietnam. Allen and Unwin,Sydney 1987. p. 16.3. Bell. C, Dependent Ally: A Sillily in Australian ForeignPolicy. Oxford University Press Australia. Melbourne 1988.p.79.4. Sexton. M.. op. cit. p.94.5. ibid., p.88.6. Barclay. G.. "The Light that tailed: Australia and the VietnamWar" in Current Affairs Bulletin. November 1990. p.28.7. Howard. B.. "Labor, the UN and the limits of Australia'sobligations in the Gull" in Current Affairs Bulletin. November1990. p.28.8. Evans. G.. "Crisis in the Middle East" in The Monthly Record.November 1990, p.596.9. Hawke. B.. "The Gulf Crisis: Government policies in responseto developments", Statement 10 the House in TheMonthly Record. December 1990. p.852.It). O'Brien. D.. "The First Week" in The Bulletin. January 29th-Febmary.Sth 1991. p. 14.11. Oakes. L.. "Keating: our first Gulf Casualty" in The Bulletin.February 5th 1991. p.28.12. Barnet. D.. "Is it time for Australia to shut-up" in The Bulletin.December 1990. p.31.13. For statistics on public support for the Gulf War see Goot.M., "The Peace Movement engulfed" in Current AffairsBulletin, April 1991, p.25.14. Sexton. M.. op. cit. p.5.

The Great CrusadeSOLDIERS. SAILORS AND AIRMEN OFTHE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE!You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade,toward which we have striven these many months.The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes andprayers of liberty-loving people everywhere marchwith you. In company with our brave Allies andbrothers-in-arms on other Fronts, you will bringabout the destruction of the German war machine,the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressedpeoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in afree world.Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy iswell trained, well equipped and battle-hardened. Hewill fight savagely.But this is the year 1944! Much has happenedsince the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The UnitedNations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats,in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensivehas seriously reduced their strength in the air andtheir capacity to wage war on the ground. Our HomeFronts have given us an overwhelming superiorityin weapons and munitions of war. and placed atour disposal great reserves of trained fighting men.The tide has turned! The free men of the world aremarching together to Victory!I have full confidence in your courage, devotionto duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothingless than full Victory!Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessingof Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.— Dwiaht D. EisenhowerThe Longest DayOn 6 June 1944 the greatestlanding-force ever assembled beganthe Allied liberation of France —and of Europe. For those whosurvived 'D-Day', and thebloody battles that followed it,the bitter-sweet memories of thosemomentous hours will never beforgotten; for many others, it was themoment of supreme sacrifice.

Air Force Memorial —Runnymede, England.Tlie 50th Anniversary Drum Service— Portsmouth, England.The Prime Minister, Paul Keating, laying a wreath at theAir Force Memorial — Runnymede, England.

Peaceful Invasion at NormandyOn 6 June 1994. the teaches of Normandy wereinvaded once again. However, this time the invasionwas a peaceful one unlike 50 years ago when Alliedtroops stormed the shores.Half a century before, on 6 June 1944. afteryears of planning and preparation. Allied trtx>psmade their assault on the Normandy coastline. TheNormandy landings were the prelude to the liberationof France and ultimately the end of the war inEurope.Australia^ participation was limited as most ofher troops had been recalled to defend Australiaagainst a probable invasion from Japan. However.Australian airmen played a vital role in the air warprior to and during the invasion.At least 25 Australian soldiers were also involvedin the landings and although no Royal AustralianNavy vessels were in the invasion fleet several RoyalNavy craft were commanded by Australians. About500 Australian naval personnel were on Britishcruisers and destroyers off the coast of Normandy.At the invitation of the British and French Governments,the Prime Minister. Mr Paul Keating attendedcommemorative functions in both England andFrance and took part in wreath laying ceremonies.On 4 June 1994. the Prime Minister laid a wreathat the Air Force Memorial at Runnymede. England.Service personnel attending included Air CommodoreSearle, who was representing the Chiefof Air Staff. Commodore G.P. Kable. HADS —London, Colonel Don Tait. senior army adviser tothe Australian High Commission, members of theHigh Commission Staff and members of No 1Squadron who were in England to participate in theD-Day and Portsmouth flypasts.Four Australian veterans who were sponsored bythe Australian Government to attend the anniversarycommemorations also attended the ceremony. Theveterans, representing the three services and thoseheld as prisoners of war accompanied the PrimeMinister to the ceremonies in England and France.A Drumhead Service, conducted by the Archbishopof Canterbury, was held on Sunday 5 June.The ceremony signified the forces committed to the"Great Adventure" that was to liberate Europe fromthe Occupation, to give thanks to those who tookpart in this momentous event and to remember thosewho did not return.An Australian F-111 from the RAAF"s No 1Squadron was part of the flypast.Following the service a flotilla left Portsmouthheading across the Channel to take part in the commemorationactivities planned for the anniversary ofD-Day on the Omaha, Utah. Gold. Juno and Swordbeaches of Normandy.On 8 June. Air Commodore Searle. attended achurch service and the inauguration of a wall builtbehind the Typhoon Pilot Memorial in Noyers-Bocage. France, on which the names of 150Typhoon pilots are engraved.The memorial commemorates the pilots of theAllied Typhoon ground attack aircraft who lost theirlives in the Battle of Normandy. Air CommodoreSearle laid a wreath in memory of the eight Australianswhose names appear on the memorial wall.Air Commodore Searle at the wall of the Typhoon Pilot's Memorial — Noyers-Bocage.

6 JUNE 19 44By early 1944. 3.500.(XX) soldiers, sailors andairmen in Britain were preparing for D-Day. About1.7(X).(XX) were British. They were joined by1,500.000 United States tnxips. In addition therewere Australians, Canadians. Greeks. New Zealanders.Rhodesians and South Africans. Those whohad escaped from countries occupied by Germanyalso joined the Allies, including Belgians. Czechoslovaks.Dutch. French, Norwegians and Poles.A huge Allied deception plan — Operation Bodyguard—was launched to mislead the Germans intodiverting troops away from the planned invasionsites.Bad weather caused a delay to the chosen invasiondate of 5 June. The weather experts advisedGeneral Eisenhower, however, that although farfrom perfect, there would be some let up on 6 June.At 10.00pm on 5 June. Operation Neptune (thecodename for the naval element of Overlord) began.The greatest amphibious operation in history waslaunched. One thousand two hundred and twelveAllied warships, 4,125 amphibious craft, 735 ancillarycraft and 864 merchant ships set sail, with13().(XX) men embarked. It was the biggest fleet thatwas ever put to sea.They took part in a live-pronged attack along a50-mile stretch of the Normandy coastline from theCherbourg Peninsula to the Caen Canal againstbeachheads designated (from west to east), Utah,Omaha. Gold. Juno and Sword.In the early hours of 6 June Allied paratroopersand gliderborne troops landed on the flanks of theinvasion area to protect the assault forces during theearly stages of the landings. Bombers dropped 'window'(thousands of strips of tinfoil), to confuseenemy radar and 'Ruperts' (dummy paratroopers),to take attacks on Rouen. Caen and Avranches.Throughout the night, whilst the airborne troopsfought to secure key areas, midget submarines werewaiting with lights to guide the Allied tanks on tothe beaches.Then, at firstlight. Allied bombers dropped 5,000tons of explosives on the main coastal batteries andthe Royal Navy warships HMS Warspite and HMSBelfast led a ferocious barrage to cover the invasionforces.At 6.30am on 6 June — H-Hour — the first seabornetnx>ps (American) went ashore at Utah Beachand by mid-morning were able to push inland. A USArmy report said that operations on Utah Beachwere 'smooth, perfectly co-ordinated and magnificent'.At Omaha Beach United States' forces encounteredrough seas, underwater obstacles and a crackGerman infantry division unexpectedly exercisingin the area. By the evening they had breached thedefences but 'Bloody Omaha' was the beach whichcost most Allied lives.Gold Beach was the site of the firstBritish assault,it was extensively mined and covered with obstaclesbut. with the use of 'Hobart's funnies' (tanks adaptedto deal with a variety of obstacles), losses wererelatively light and troops pushed inland past Arromanche,making for Bayeux. By 8.00am villagesbehind the beaches were celebrating liberation andthe commandos were moving on to the planned linkupwith the Americans from the Utah and OmahaBeaches.Juno Beach was assaulted by the Canadians. Itwas well protected by rocks and heavy gun emplacements.In the rough seas many landing craft werewrecked, while others fell victims to mines. Using'Hobart's funnies' the Canadians overcame many ofthe obstacles and by the evening were making forCaen.At Sword Beach, the biggest worry for the Britishwas the strong artillery battery at IJ; Havre. Duringthe landings a smokescreen helped to hide theinvaders and the seafront defences were breached.The first commandos at Sword Beach were thenable to link up with airborne troops at Ranville. AtOuistreham the population was delighted to learnthat their liberators included a battalion of the FreeFrench.Overall, operations on D-Day were a stunningsuccess. More than 130,(XX) men had landed by seaand 23,000 had been brought in by air, 11 .(XX)Allied troops had been killed, injured, or went missingbut this number was much lower than SHAEFhad dared to hope.The Allies now had a foothold in Europe and.although it would be another eleven months beforeNazi Germany was finally defeated, it was the beginningof the end of the war.

50th Anniversary Flypast at Portsmouth. EnglandTyphoon Pilot's Memorial — Noyers-Bocage, France.\..-:,*».; ••''%* ;-..

Australians in the Great InvasionThousands of airmen of the Royal Australia AirForce fought in the aerial bombardment campaignwhich, in its later stages, prepared Western Europefor Allied invasion. In Bomber Command alone3486 members of the RAAF were killed.The invasion, which came when Allied armiesstormed ashore on the Normandy beaches on 6 June1944. preceded by 25,000 airborne troops, was theclimactic high point of the Second World War.It was here at the fortified and obstructed beachesthat hundreds of young Australian aircrewmen ofthe RAAF. flying heavy bombers, helped to destroyartillery batteries and obstacles to clear the way forthe infantry, who might otherwise be in great dangeron the beaches.It was here that Australian fighter pilots in a dayfighter squadron (No 453) and night fighter squadron(No 456) and more than 200 individual fighterpilots serving in Royal Air Force squadrons weresent to keep Luftwaffe at bay as the infantry battledto seize the beaches.Thus, although their numbers were not large,these young Australians who had learned to fly inthe Empire Air Training Scheme were there to representtheir country in one of the great battles inhistory.A huge 80-kilometre wide invasion fleet of 6(XX)ships had ploughed through the English Channelcarrying 130.000 men and 20.000 vehicles and hadput them ashore. The task had only just begun.Another 2.000.000 servicemen waited to be shippedto France, to engage and defeat the Nazi forcesdefending "fortress Europa".On D-Day the sky was full of Allied aircraft whichflew a total of 11,000 sorties. Some Australians flewtransport aircraft carrying American paratroopers totheir drop zones. Others took part in air operationsaimed at misleading the enemy as to the point ofattack. No less than 13.000 members of the RAAF.including the men on operational squadrons, were inEngland at the time of the invasion.Bomber Command dropped more than 5(XX) tonsof bombs in an attempt to silence shore batteries.Of the 1136 bombers committed. 168 were fromRAAF squadrons or had RAAF pilots. In 5 Group.RAF. 43 Lancasters were captained by RAAF pilots:14 from No 463 Squadron led by Wing CommanderRollo Kingsford-Smith: 14 from No 467 led bySquadron L.C. Deignan and 15 from the remainingfive squadrons of No 5 Group, including No 61 ledby Wing Commander A.W. Doubleday. No 460Squadron flew two missions, dropping 150 tons ofbombs, and No 466 (Halifaxes) bombed a battery atMaisy which threatened both Utah and Omahabeaches, where the American army was to land.After the Normandy landing. Australian bomberstook part in heavy and continuous air attacks oncommunications behind the beaches and were usedalso in direct support of British troops. The shock ofheavy bomber attacks had a stupefying effect onGerman ground troops: following a close supportstrike, the British soldiers generally encounteredonly weak enemy resistance.Heavy bomber support for the Normandy operationsended on 23 July when the strategic bombingcampaign over Europe was resumed. Within 21/2months. 86.000 tons of bombs rained on the industrialareas of Germany of which RAAF squadronscontributed 6 per cent.On 8 July Australian Lancasters and Halifaxesattacked Caen in daylight. Squadron Leader W.Blessing of Braidwood. NSW. was shot down andkilled when marking this target from his Mosquitolight bomber. Blessing, who had been decoratedwith the DSO and DFC, was one of the most courageousand skilful pilots in Bomber Command.The Spitfires of No 453 Squadron led by SquadronLeader D.H. Smith were on station over theAmerican sector of the beachhead at 8.40am onD-Day. They saw no sign of the Luftwaffe. TheGentian air force had lost the initiative on the firstday and never regained it. By 25 June No 453 hadmoved to France and on 2 July at Liseux clashedwith a mixed enemy force. The Australians claimedfour enemy destroyed and five damaged.

D-DAYOn Friday. 1 September 1939. Adolf Hitler invadedPoland — and, in consequence. Britainand France declared war on Germany.A year later, however. British tnxips fighting inEurope had been driven through France and facedwhat appeared to be certain defeat. Fortunately, inthe greatest evacuation in military history. 330,000British and French troops were snatched to safetyfrom the beaches of Dunkirk, under the guns of theGerman Army, by a hurriedly-assembled fleet of1,200 naval ships and civilian craft.France surrendered to Germany in June 1940 andNazi Germany, with its ally, Italy, controlled Europefrom Norway in the north to the French/Spanishfrontier in the south and the Polish/Russian borderin the east.Britain, weakened after Dunkirk and facing shortagesof trained manpower, weapons, ammunition andfood, faced Hitler alone in Europe. Hitler planned toinvade Britain but, without air supremacy, he wasforced to abandon his invasion plans after the Battleof Britain.Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister,realised that Nazi Germany could be finally defeatedonly on its own territory and he was determinedto gain a foothold on Continental Europe again.Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia, followed by Japan'sattack on the United States' fleet at Pearl Harbor,brought these two countries into the war on the sideof the Allies.By 1943 the tide had turned against Germany,which had suffered defeats by the Soviets at Stalingradand by the British at El Alamein in NorthAfrica.For some time the Soviet Union had been pressingits allies to open a 'Second Front' in the westto ease the pressure on its armies in the east. Afteran unsuccessful raid on Dieppe in 1942, Alliedamphibious operations had improved greatly. Itwas decided, therefore, to launch an invasion of'Fortress Europe'. The operation would be codenamedOverlord.General Dwight D. Eisenhower, of the UnitedStates' Army, was appointed Supreme Allied Commanderin December 1943. His Deputy was AirChief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, of the Royal AirForce, an expert on air/ground co-operation. AirChief Marsha] Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory. of theRoyal Air Force, became Commander Allied AirForces: Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, of the RoyalNavy, became Commander Allied Sea Forces andGeneral Sir Bernard Montgomery, of the BritishArmy, became Leader of Assault Troops. LieutenantGeneral Omar Bradley, of the United States'Army and Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey, ofthe British Army, became Commanders of the maininvasion forces (the US First and Anglo-CanadianSecond Armies).Supreme Headquarters Allied ExpeditionaryForces (SHAEF) was set up at Bushey House,Bushey Park, near Hampton Court, in West Londonand Southwick House, at Southwick, near Portsmouth,became the advance headquarters forOperation Overlord and D-Day.The 'D' in military terminology, stands for theday on which an operation is actually launched. Theprecise time is known as H-Hour. So, for the plannersof Operation Overlord. D-Day would be theday, whichever date, on which the landings wouldbegin and H-Hour would be the exact time of thefirst landing.The target date, by which everything would beready, was set for 1 June 1944 and D-Day was to bebetween 4 and 7 June, depending on the weatherand other conditions.Over the next few months Allied aircraft flyingreconnaissance flights over northern France andmembers of the French Resistance working withmen and women British agents, who were parachutedsecretly into France, helped to build up an accuratepicture of the German defences. Combat swimmers,landed by midget submarines, surveyed theplanned landing beaches to check obstacles, gradientsand load bearing capacities of the beaches.Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Montgomery'sold adversary in North Africa, was in charge offortifications on the French coast. He had strengthenedthe coastline against Allied attack by placingbatteries of heavy artillery, mines, explosive obstaclesand infantry and Panzer (heavy amour)divisions at the likely landing areas. He believed thatany invading army would have to be pinned downand destroyed on the beaches if he was to prevent aninvasion.

50th Anniversary CommemorationsAustralian Defence Force Journal5TCDMEDUM0WHOCSAINT-UURENTSUR-MEROMAHABEACH«*•53^BEACHARROMANCHESJUNOBEACHCOURSEULLESCOtMMIERES

AUSTRALIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND THE GULF CONFLICTS 33Hie Gulf WarBIBLIOGRAPHYBell. C, Agenda for the Nineties: Australian Choices in foreignand defence policy. Longman Cheshire. Melbourne, 1991.Bamett. D., "The Middle East Game: Why we don't understandtheir rules" in The Bulletin. 29 January 1991. pp.32-34.Barnett. D.. "Is it time for Australia to shut up" in The Bulletin. 18December 1991. pp.30-31.Barry. J. and Thomas. E., "A Text book Victory" in Newsweek, 18March 1991. pp.54-56.Cheeseman. G.. "The Wrigley Review: Defence and the AustralianCommunity" in Current Affairs Bulletin. November 1990.pp.4-5.Christie. J.. "The Gulf: Anatomy of Crisis" in Asia Pacific DefenceReporter. September 1990. pp.6-7.Devine, F., "The boys we betrayed" in The Australian. 12 August1991, p.ll.Editorial. "The Gulf War: a retrospect" in Defender: The NationalJournal of the Australia Defence Association, Volume VIII.Number 2. Winter 1991. p.7.Editorial, "The Gulf War and Australia" in Defender: The NationalJournal of the Australia Defence Association, Autumn 1991.p.3.Evans, G., "Crisis in the Middle East" in The Monthly Record.Publication of the Commonwealth Department of ForeignAffairs and Trade, September 1990. pp.595-601.Evans. G . "Global and Regional Security after the Gulf in TheMonthly Record, February 1990, pp.39-44.Evans. G.. "The Middle East". Extract from debate in the Senatein The Monthly Record. December 1990. pp.854-858.Goot. M.. "The Peace Movement engulfed" in Current AffairsBulletin, April 1991. pp.25-28.Hawke. B.. "Gulf Crisis — Ministerial Statement" in The MonthlyRecord. December 1991. pp.851-854.Hawke. B . "The Middle East: Gulf War". Statement to the Housein The Monthly Record. January 1991. pp. 13-18.Hawke. B . "Report to the Nation on the Gulf Crisis" in TheMonthly Record, March 1991. pp.87-89.Hewson, J.. "The Middle East Crisis and the Risk of War". MediaRelease 9 August 1991 and Media Release of 10 Augustaffirming Opposition support for Australian involvement inthe Gulf War.Howard, B., "Labor, the UN and limits of Australia- obligationinthe Gulf in Current Affairs Bulletin, November 1990,pp.28-29.Hurst. II.. "Quick Reaction to Iraq crisis" in \sia Pa ilu Defent iReporter. September 1990. p.38.Lipski, S., "Out of the Top Jaw" in The Bulletin, 29 January 1991.p.26.Lipski, S., "Newsflash: Australia no longer an island" in TheBulletin, 12 February 1991, p.26.Malik. J.. "Asian reactions to Australia's role in the Gulf crisis" inCurrent Affairs Bulletin, April 1991. pp. 19-23.Mellor, B., "And the Band played Walt/ing Matilda" in TimeAustralia 27 August 1990. p.32.Oakes, L., "Keating: our first Gulf Casualty'.'" in The Bulletin 29January 1991. p.28.O'Brien. "The First Week" in The Bulletin 29 January 1991. p. 14.The Vietnam WarBell, C, Dependent Ally: a study in Australian foreign policy,Oxford University Press Australia, Melbourne, 1988.Barclay. G.. "The Light that failed: Australia and the VietnamWar" in History Today. February 1988, pp. 18-22.Barclay. G.. A very small Insurance policy. University of QueenslandPress. Queensland. 1988.Clissold. B.. "Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War: Primemover or obedient partner?" in Sabretache Volume XXXIJanuary/March 1990. pp. 12-17.Frost, F., Australia's War in Vietnam, Allen and Unwin, Melbourne.1987.Sexton. M.. War for the Asking, Penguin Books. Melbourne. 1981.Nigel Oakey enlisted under the Defence Force Ready Reserve Scheme in 1992. He immediately undertook afull year of military service. He was posted to 1RTB Kapooka for three months basic training. His initialEmployment Training was then conducted at the Royal Australian Ordnance Corps IRAAOC) Centre atBandiana from where he was posted to 52 Combat Supplies Platoon. Enoggera 16 Brigade). Private Oakeycompleted his BA in Political Science and Industrial Relations in 1993. He has recently taken up it graduateposition with the Shell Company of Australia.

YOUNG"ENDEAVOURADVENTURE AT SEA FOR YOUNG AUSTRALIANSA'HOYYOUNG AUSTRALIANS!OPPORTUNITY TO SET SAILFOR ADVENTURE IN 1995!!!An adventure that could change your whole life.Apply Now!If you are between the ages of 16 to 23 then you'reready for a voyage on YOUNG ENDEAVOURin 1995, Australia's national sail training ship!A voyage on YOUNG ENDEAVOUR is a unique and unforgettable experience — a truly great adventure. It isa lot to do with learning about sailing and the sea, also learning about yourself and other people.YOUNG ENDEAVOUR is operated by the Royal Australian Navy on behalf of the Young Endeavour YouthScheme, a specially created organisation whose aim is to give a broad range of young Australians an opportunityto develop personal skills, initiative, teamwork and leadership qualities through participation in an "adventureunder sail" on board the ship.On each sail training voyage, there are berths for 24 young Australians (12 male/12 female). If you are betweenthe ages of 16 to 23, are in good health and can swim at least 50 metres, you can apply.No previous sailing experience is necessary. In fact a lot of people who come aboard haven't been to sea before.There is an all-inclusive fee, but if money is a problem, financial assistance can be applied for through the YoungEndeavour Youth Scheme. No one misses out if they can't afford to pay for a berth."YOUNG ENDEAVOUR offers young, enthusiastic people a chance to discover new things about themselves byovercoming personal and shared challenges and by learning from others. By the end of the voyage the challenges thathave been overcome bring an amazing sense of achievement. This unique experience binds all those on board in a waynot possible on "land" and the friendships formed seem more real. For me, YOUNG ENDEAVOUR will be an ongoingpart in my life — its an experience that in my opinion is priceless and beyond measure".Youth Crew Member, V 9/93, Age 17, from QueenslandYoung Endeavour Youth Scheme Telephone: (02) 368 1800For Further Information and Application Forms: PO BOX 399 Toll Free: (008) 267 909Potts Point NSW 2011 Facsimile: (02) 368 0183

Psychological Operations in SomaliaBy Captain D.J. Wilson AA Psych.IntroductionThe ultimate objective of Psychological Operations(PSYOPS) is to convince enemy, friendly andneutral personnel to take favourable actions towardAustralia and its allies. It can maximise the destructivepower of our forces as well as reduce the needto destroy. PSYOPS can save the lives of Australiansoldiers, noncombatants and enemy forces (FM 33-1.1987).In the Australian Army. PSYOPS has been definedas "planned psychological activities directed towardsenemy, friendly and neutral audiences (target audiences)in order to create attitudes and behaviourfavourable to the achievement of national, politicaland military objectives" (MLW 1-2-10. 1987). Whilethe US Army defines PSYOPS as "planned activitiesof propaganda and psychological actions in peace andwar directed toward foreign enemy, friendly, andneutral audiences in order to influence attitudes andbehaviours in a manner favourable to the achievementof national objectives — both political and military.It includes strategic, operational, and tacticalpsychological operations" (FM 33-1, 1987. p. 1-2).PSYOPS derives its chief effectiveness from beinga part of a total operation. It is not a substitute forcombat power. However, it may be employed whenthe use of combat forces is inappropriate such as duringpeacetime or against civilian population. Whenskillfully and closely integrated with military andpolitical actions. "PSYOPS can act as a catalyst andcan often mean the difference between mission successand failure" (Borchini. 1993).United States Army PSYOPS units usually operateas support units and their primary role is to supportother military units or government agencies in reachingnational objectives. PSYOPS assets can also disseminatecommand information and products thatexplain the intent of military operations to target audiences(Jones. 1993). A commander, for example, mayuse PSYOPS to let his enemies know that it is honourable,as well as sensible, for individual soldiers orentire units to cease hostilities in the face of overwhelmingcombat force. PSYOPS is an asset thatgrows in usefulness through increased understanding.With training, its effectiveness becomes limited onlyby the ingenuity of the using commander and his\herPSYOPS personnel [4 POG(A). 1992].The following article's overall aim is to introduceUS Army PSYOPS elements and highlight the USArmy's capabilities demonstrated in Somalia. Firstly,the US Army's current PSYOPS structure, assets andgeneral capabilities will be assessed. Secondly, anexamination will be made of Operation Restore Hopeand how PSYOPS was utilised by the 8th PSYOPSBattalion (Airborne) based in Mogadishu. Somalia.The final section will concentrate on the difficultiesencountered by US Army PSYOPS in Somalia, possibleimprovements and future directions that may bevaluable to the Australian Army in its considerationof PSYOPS deployments.US Army PSYOPSThe general mission of the 4th PsychologicalOperations Group (Airborne) based in Fort Bragg.North Carolina. USA is "to deploy anywhere in theworld on short notice and plan, develop, and conductPsychological Operations in support of the UnifiedCommanders, Coalition forces, or other governmentagencies, as directed by the National CommandAuthorities" [4 POG(A). 1992. p.2|. The 4 POG(A)PSYOPS support the strategic, operational and tacticallevels of war. PSYOPS consolidation operationsare directed toward populations in friendly rear areasor in territories occupied by friendly military forces(FM 33-1,1990).The following illustrates some examples of favourableconditions for achieving PSYOPS objectives instrategic, operational, tactical, and consolidation operations(FM 33-1. 1990):• High casualties and defeats suffered by the enemy.• Precarious enemy military situations.• Insufficient or inferior enemy supplies and equipment.• Inexperienced or unqualified enemy officers.• Unfavourable news about the enemy home front.• Excessive time periods of combat for enemy troops.• Ethnic or political dissident minorities (soldiers andcivilians).

36 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994• Inexperienced or untrained troops.• Sickness and lack of medical supplies.• Lack of an effective enemy information program.• Unit or significant individual defections.The 4 POG(A) is the only active-duty (i.e. regular)PSYOPS Group in the US Army. It comprises aGroup Headquarters, three regionally-orientatedBattalions, a Tactical Support Battalion (TSB). and aPSYOPS Dissemination Battalion (PDB).The 1st PSYOPS Battalion (Airborne) [ 1 POB(A)]covers Latin America and the Caribbean regions ofthe world. The 6 POB(A) has responsibility forEuropean and African regions. The 8 POB(A) coversthe Middle East. Asian and Pacific regions. The TSBsupports conventional forces and Special OperationsForces (SOF) with audio-visual, loudspeaker, productdevelopment for operational and tactical PSYOPS[4 POG(A). 1992)]. The PDB has audio-visual production,radio, television, and advanced printingcapabilities.The 4 POG(A) has a global responsibility for allUS Forces. However, the Group's potential operationsare greatly enhanced by three US Army ReservePSYOPS Groups which add up to a total of nineteenPSYOPS Battalions or 22 Companies. The 2ndPSYOPS Group. (Airborne) is based in Parma. Ohioand it has a regional orientation toward Europe andthe Atlantic. The 5th PSYOPS Group (Airborne)based in Washington, DC, focuses on Europe, Centraland South America. The 7th PSYOPS Group (Airborne),based in San Francisco, California concentrateson the Pacific (Morrisey. 1993).PSYOPS soldiers are trained as linguists and areaspecialists capable of understanding the political,cultural, ethnic, and geographic subtleties of theirintended target audiences. All US Army Corps arerepresented in US PSYOPS to allow a unique combinationof trained personnel to operate anywhereoverseas. All PSYOPS personnel are required to beAirborne qualified to allow them to support anytactical scenario US Special Operations Forces arerequired to conduct (FM 33-1. 1990. Parker. 1992 ).Operation Restore HopeAs previously described, the 8 POB(A) is part ofthe 4 POG(A) and covers the Middle East. Asia andthe Pacific regions of the world. The 8 POB(A) wasassigned the task of providing PSYOPS support to theUnified Task Force (UNITAF) that landed on thebeaches in Somalia, late December 1992. The USPSYOPS Battalion was based in the old US Embassycompound in Mogadishu. Somalia.The following cultural summary will enable thereader to understand the complexities of the Somalipeople. Onlv bv understanding some of these culturalaspects surrounding Operation Restore Hope, onecan appreciate the potential difficulties a multifacetedUNITAF PSYOPS programme may pose on aPSYOPS battalion.Practically all Somalis are Sunni Muslims. Often.clan leaders are religious leaders and take an activepart in mediating civil disputes as well as administeringreligious affairs. Since independence in I960.Somalia's government has emphasised a separationof church and state. However, in recent years, Somaliahas seen a steady growth of political organisationsoperating under a religious cloak. (Defence LanguageInstitute. 1993).Somalis are organised into an extensive clan structurethat has existed since the Middle Ages. Clanstructures emphasise loyalty to and from theirmembers. Constant fighting over political and ethnicdifferences has marked Somali society throughout itshistory (Defence Language Institute. 1993). On apolitical level, the Somali national character ismarked by an extreme dislike of central authority andgovernment in general. Most Somalis have a pastoralnomadic background and little need or respect for aformal government. It is impossible to exaggerate thefragility of the ethnic-based alliances under which thissociety continues to operate (US Army Int.. 1992).The nature of social structure is such that everyclan, lineage, and indiv idual is in a potentially adversarialor alliance relationship with other members ofSomali society. No clan, lineage, or individual canever be considered politically neutral (Defence LanguageInstitute, 1993).Key considerations for the United States Army's 8POB(A) in Operation Restore Hope are that politicalneutrality is not part of the Somali world view(Borchini, 1993). Somalis have trouble accepting thatthe United Nations and private organisations workingin Somalia do so under strict guidelines designed toensure impartiality (Defence Language Institute.1993). Broadly speaking, for Somalis. favouritism isperceived as an alliance constructed to exclude others,and armed factions might easily disrupt or stop aid ifthey believe that supplies have been channelled totheir enemies (US Army Int., 1992).The senior commanders in Somalia gave the 4POG(A) the mission of providing an informationdissemination capability for the Somali people. Theinformation was given by a daily newspaper andradio program, both named "Rajo" (meaning "hope"

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 37as well as leaflet drops and loudspeaker teams(Borchini, 1993).The following gives details of how the 8 POB(A)conducted its Unified Task Force (UNITAF)PSYOPS mission during Operation Restore Hope.The information given was compiled while on deploymentwith the 8 POB(A) in 1993. Further informationgathered on UNITAF PSYOPS was gained fromseveral briefings conducted by the 8 POB(A) Commanderto various command elements. These briefingsdetailed the structure of UNITAF PSYOPS and itscapabilities during operations in Somalia (Borchini.1993).• UNITAF Somalia PSYOPS Mission: To supportUNITAF tactical and operational objectivesthrough the use of loudspeaker broadcasts, leafletdrops, posters, newspapers and radio broadcasts(Borchini. 1993).• UNITAF Somalia PSYOPS Task Organisation:(Borchini, 1993):ProductDevelopmentCentre (PDC)Joint PSYOPS Task ForcePrintSectionIRadioSectionLoudspeakerTeamsUNITAF Somalia Broad PSYOPS Themes:(Borchini, 1993)- To explain UNITAF rules of engagement.-To highlight that UNITAF does not support orfavour any faction.-To affirm the roles and capabilities of the 23nations in UNITAF.-To highlight the seamless transition fromUNITAF to UNOSOM II.-To encourage displaced persons to return totheir homes, plant their fields and harvest newcrops for future prosperity.-To highlight redevelopment and re-establishmentof Somali infrastructure.-To highlight the agreements made by factionleaders.-To focus on the disarmament process and tokeep everyone up to date with the progressshown in each region of the country."Rajo"The JPOTF provided news on military activities,public service announcements and messages of peacein Somalia. The Battalion produced the daily Somalilanguage paper (except Fridays) and distributedbetween 15,000 to 25.000 papers daily throughouttheir period of operations (Borchini. 1993). Unfortunately,most locally produced Somali newspaperswere aligned with one or another clan vyingfor power in the war-torn nation. "Rajo" aimed toprovide news from a non-clan, impartial perspective(Stevenson, 1993).The radio program which reviewed the "Rajo"newspaper was broadcasted four times per day. Flachproduced session was prerecorded and thoroughlychecked by the Somali interpreters prior to any broadcastgoing to air. This process ensured the translatedSomali message did not hold any clan biases and atall times remained objective. Each pre-recordedbroadcast lasted 45 minutes and was repeated twiceon AM and twice on Short Wave radio (Borchini.1993).Leaflet DropsThree days before US Marines landed in Somalia,leaflets were being dropped to inform the warringSomali factions that troops were prepared to use forceto protect relief operations in the country (see Fig. 1).All leaflet drops were coordinated at the highestlevels to ensure the projected PSYOPS message wasunified and could be backed up by military action(Borchini, 1993).The dissemination of these leaflets was accomplishedthrough a variety of methods. The main disseminationtechnique in Somalia was the use of staticline deployment of boxed and bagged leaflets fromaltitudes of 1000 to 500 feet. There are several mathematicalcalculations which determine the dispersionof different size leaflets according to the weight of thepaper printed over the designated area. To ensurefurther dissemination accuracy, most missions madeseveral passes over each target area, when hostilitiesin the region were favourable. Over 7 million leafletswere disseminated by JPOTF from 9 December 1992to 10 April 1993 (Borchini. 1993).Tactical Loudspeaker TeamsThe loudspeaker teams (LST) were from the 9thPSYOPS Battalion (Airborne) [4 POG(A)] and wereprimarily equipped for tactical operations. ForOperation Restore Hope, they fell under the commandof the JPOTF Commander and were tasked

38 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCK JOl/RNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Figure 1WBHBIMBwHwflMHBPMMIWHSBHwBBHBAdoonka Ciidanka (United Nations) Waxayxagan uyimaaden in ayidin Caawiyaandadka idin Caawinaya Somalia dad.Waxaan u isticmaalicarnaa Hubcayaga Siaanu u caawino dadka idin Caawinaya iyociidankayaga. Uma aan sugidoonowaxgalitaan cuntada ama ciidanka waxaygabanayaan. Waxaanxagon u Joog naa inaanu idin Caawino.United Nations forces are here to assistin the international relief effort for theSomali people. We are prepared to useforce to protect the relief operation andour soldiers. We will not allowinterference with food distributionor with our soldiers'activities.We are here tohelp you.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 39according to the overall PSYOPS objectives set downby UNITAF (Borchini, 1993). These teams landedwith the first US Marines and played pre-recordedPSYOPS messages (English version shown), as theyproceeded into Mogadishu."American Forces are landing to help the UnitedNations distribute relief supplies to the Somalipeople. Please stay in your homes. We mean noharm. We are here to help you." (Borchini, 1993)In Baidoa, the 450-watt loudspeakers were utilisedin supporting Australian forces in several missionsunder Operation Solace. Firstly, with the explosiveordnance disposal (EOD) teams operating withI RAR. During this mission, a loudspeaker wasmounted on the front of the leading Range Rover anda local Somali linguist asked people where they haveseen explosives or arms in the surrounding areas asthey drove in Baidoa. While this was occurring, thelast vehicle would randomly distribute "mine awareness"leaflets by hand which showed exactly what thetypical explosive ordnance looked like (see Fig. 2)(Borchini. 1993). A second mission, was where aloudspeaker was "manpacked" by a US Army soldierFig1DSQDDHDBaBDDON'T TOUCHMINES OREXPLOSIVES]

4() AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1944in the main well area of Baidoa. There was approximately115(X) bodies buried on the edges of the mainravine from the mass starvation suffered during thecivil war. The primary task was to prevent thesebodies from contaminating the local water system,with the onset of the rainy season in April (Borchini,1993).Due to sensitive nature of exhuming Somali bodies.Australian forces wanted only to announce a portion(the Safe Water message) of a designed leaflet (seeFig. 3) to keep UNITAF military forces detachedfrom the task. The designed leaflet was eventuallydistributed by SACO throughout Baidoa by hand andvehicle. The attempt by SACO to exhume the Somalibodies was achieved over many days without incident.This action was further followed up by an articlein the "Rajo" newspaper and radio in April 1993(Borchini, 1993).The last PSYOPS mission was developed tocounter PSYOPS by Somali warlords about UNITAFand relief agencies desecrating grave sites throughoutSomalia. The use of newspaper, radio, loudspeakerand leaflets clearly illustrates to the reader, how manyof the UNITAF PSYOPS missions were conductedby the JPOTF.As shown. PSYOPS was simply applied to enhancethe effectiveness of missions by using only loudspeaker/leafletcapabilities with 1 RAR in Baidoa.However, the overall PSYOPS approach by theJPOTF of further informing the Somali people ofactivity within Baidoa by newspaper and radio, alsohelped prevent further conflicts in operational areas(Borchini, 1993).This section has examined how the 4 POG(A), particularlythe 8 POB(A) acting in the capacity of theJPOTF conducted some "real world" missions inSomalia. It demonstrates exactly how the US ArmyPSYOPS Structure, objectives, and assets are utilisedin times of conflict. Although the PSYOPS shown bythe 8 POB(A) in Operation Restore Hope wereundoubtedly impressive, a more critical look at theproceedings in the next section of this is essential forfuture PSYOPS planning.Lessons for Australia From USPSYOPS Experiences in SomaliaIgnorance concerning PSYOPS. even in the USArmy, is still a significant stumbling block in planningoperations. Analysing the problems encounteredin Operation Restore Hope and particularly in supportof Operation Solace, is vital for future AustralianPSYOPS. Taking into account time pressures, personneland operational constraints imposed on the 8POB( A), some unforeseen problems did arise.The main area of concern that will be covered isthe low priority that was given by the 8 POB(A) topre-testing and post-testing of PSYOPS prcxiucts ontarget audiences. Pre-testing is where a representativesample of a target audience is assessed under appropriatebehavioural research methods. During pre-testingof a potential PSYOPS product (ie. a leaflet, loudspeakeror radio messages), people from a samplegroup that represents the target audience are randomlychosen to give feedback on the PSYOPS product.Post-testing involves finding appropriate measuresthat indicate the impact of the PSYOPS product on anintended target audience (Shipman. 1985).Evidence of pre-testing by the 8 POB( A) was onlyshown by UNITAF PSYOPS personnel on a randombasis with educated Somali journalists, interpretersand workers within the old US Embassy compoundin Mogadishu. Similarly, only some verbal feedbackwas gained on the impact of leaflets, handbills, postersand loudspeaker announcements (Borchini, 1993).Although most UNITAF commanders were verypositive towards PSYOPS support, they did express aconcern that they could not see the actual impact ofPSYOPS in their operations. There was limited objectivemeasuring of whether these products had a negative,neutral, or the intended psychological impact onthe Somali people. What behaviours were actuallybeing changed in the target audiences, and were thereany unintended consequences from the developedUNITAF PSYOPS products?It is recognised that in time of war and low intensityconflicts, forces will not always have the opportunityor the resources to objectively measure the impact ofPSYOPS on behaviour. However, without objectiveresearch conducted on PSYOPS. the 8 POB(A) hadto continually try to sell the worth of PSYOPS toeach UNITAF commander. This is because at thetime they could not back up their actions with solidresearch results from previous operations in Somalia.If the underlying goal of PSYOPS is to changefriendly, neutral or enemy behaviour towards a commander'sintent (FM 33-1. 1990). it is perfectly logicalthat we must aim to measure those changes. This willenable us to see whether we are changing the targetaudiences behaviour in the desired direction. Thismeans that we need correct research methodologiesdeveloped to ensure PSYOPS is appropriate and properlyaccountable (Shipman. 1985).The profession of Psychology aims to understandthe complexities of human behaviour. AAPsych Corpsis well placed to contribute to Australian PSYOPS

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 41and developing efficient monitoring practices for thefuture. Due to the nature of psychology, the pretestingof newly developed PSYOPS products, theirthemes, symbols and impact on target audiencescan only be enhanced by closely identifying howPSYOPS works in an operational setting.More importantly, possible improvement on thePSYOPS conducted in Somalia can be seen in morethorough data analysis and interpretation of missions.In an operational setting, this gives the commandertimely feedback from his supporting PSYOPS elementallowing him to incorporate the results in ongoingoperational planning. For example, some basicresearch principles may have shed light on PSYOPSsupport in Operation Solace. The EOD teams conductingmissions throughout Baidoa collected manyexplosives each day. A simple assessment of whethermore explosives were collected when US loudspeakersupport was given may have revealed that there was arelationship between PSYOPS support and moreexplosives being found in Baidoa. This simple analysiswould give the commander timely feedback onwhether PSYOPS support was truly enhancing EODoperations within his HRS.AAPsych Corps units hold personnel with the necessaryexpertise to monitor such behavioural changesin people from PSYOPS intervention. Units like 1Psych and 1 Psych Research in PSYOPS planninggives the Australian Army the opportunity to conductmore accountable, flexible and efficient PSYOPSthan many other countries engaged in this type ofoperation.Figure 3Moving the bodies of these deceased Somalis while respecting Somalireligious traditions Is a necessity to help make the water safe.IDQIilODOver the past several years, the civil war and factional fighting combined with banditry andlooting caused many Somalis to die from starvation all over Somalia. In the SHTJKHASHAROW ravine area, many of those who died were buried near the banks of the ravine.This has tbe potential to pose a very hazardous health risk to those who use the ravine'swater for drinking and washing. Under the strict guidelines set by Somali elders, the buriedwill be moved with proper religious respect and traditions to another location. The Somalipeople themselves will work on this task and hopefully be able to remove all of the bodiesbefore the rainy season washes them into the water system. This operation will preventdisease from spreading and will be supported by relief agencies. Until the bodies have beenremoved from the banks near the ravine, and the water is safer to drink, do not drink waterfrom the ravine or other surface water, only drink water from wells; clean all watercontainers before using wells. To prevent disease.boil water for 5 - 10 minutes before using

a: AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Future DirectionsIn future conflicts. Australian forces may not be asfortunate as the US were in the Gulf War andSomalia. If the Australian Army wishes to improve itsPSYOPS capability it must start training now foroperational deployment. If Australian forces need tocall upon effective PSYOPS support in future, theappropriate infrastructure must be put in place and thenecessary planning conducted. Australia should becompetitive in maintaining a PSYOPS initiative in theAsian/Pacific region.The application of PSYOPS. as demonstrated bythe US Army, is a fighting skill which can only beimproved with practice and appropriate behaviouralmeasurement. PSYOPS ought to be included in theearly stages of ADF planning, rather than as an afterthought in counter-intelligence operations. UntilPSYOPS is seen more as a logical, cost effective toolwhich can enhance many facets of a nation's defence,the quality of PSYOPS in support of future conflictsinvolving Australian forces is in serious doubt.The aim of PSYOPS is to change enemy behaviourin line with the commander's intent. This task canonly be achieved by being able to analyse currentintelligence and having the necessary personnel toproduce effective PSYOPS material. It must be notedthat poorly prepared PSYOPS can be more harmful toa nation's objectives, than no PSYOPS at all.The US UNITAF PSYOPS battalion's primaryequipment requirements cost under $US 150.000 toset up (excluding Tactical Loudspeaker capabilities)(Borchini. 1993). Although this does not include stationerysupplies and equipment maintenance, this iswell within the reach of most defence forces.It should also be clear that Psychological Operationsdo not win wars alone and without the forceto back the PSYOPS message, success will alwaysremain questionable. This is the reason why allPSYOPS planning should begin, be coordinated andcontrolled at the highest levels of the ADF.In an era when our Army is getting smaller, it istime to start thinking about fighting smarter. There isno smarter way to fight than through the aggressiveapplication of PSYOPS. In peacetime, conflict orwar. PSYOPS provides the commander with an edgethat may save countless lives (FM 33-1. 1990). Asemphasised throughout this paper. PSYOPS shouldbe viewed like any other weapons system in a commander'sarsenal which is a non lethal force multiplier|4 POG(A). 1992]. If "Psychological Operations"is truly a force multiplier, can Australia afford not toenhance its defensive efforts with one of the mostcost-effective weapon systems in modem warfare'.'REFERENCESBorchini, C.(LT COL)(1993) Presentation material given tovarious Unified Task Force command elements on PsychologicalOperations; in support of Operation Restore Hope, 8th POlifA)Commander, Fort Bragg. NC. USA.Defence Language Institute.! 1993) Somalia: An urea study.Foreign Language Centre. Presidio of Monterey, California.Field Manual 33-1.(1987) Psychological Operations. Headquarters.Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.Field Manual 33-1.(1990) Psychological Operations, Headquarters.Department of the Army. Washington. D.C.Jones. J.(COL)( 1993) Briefings conducted to various AlliedOfficers on US Army Psychological Operations. 4 POCK A)Commander. Fort Bragg. NC. USA.Manual of Land Warfare (Australian Army).(l987) PsychologicalOperations, Part One, Vol.2. Pam. No. 10Morrisey. R.(1993) Briefing conducted to various US ArmyCommand elements on Psychological Operations support. ExecutiveOfficer for 8 POB(A). Fort Bragg. NC, USA.Parker. J.(MAJ)( 1992) "Training the PSYOP Force". SpecialWarfare. PB 80-92-2, Vol.5. No.2. USAJFKSWCS. Fort Bragg.NC, USA.4th Psychological Operation (Airborne) [4 POG(A)],( 1992)Capabilities Handbook. Print Company. PDB(A). Fort Bragg.NC, USA.Shipman. M.U985) The Limitation of Social Research. 2nd Ed.,Longman. London & New York.Stevenson. J.fMAJK 1993) Presentation given upon return fromOperation Restore Hope. 8 POBIA) Company Commander. FortBragg. NC. USA.US Army Intelligence,! 1992) Restore Hope: Soldier Handbook.ATCRM 1100-065-93. US Intelligence and Security Command.Washington. D.C., USA.JLCaptainDaren Wilson completed his Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree at Charles Start University and theUniversity of NSW in 1988. After working as a psychologist with the disabled, he joined the Australian ArmyPsychology Corps in 1990. He has sened in psychology units in Kapooka, Adelaide and Sydney. In early 1993.he graduated from the Psychological Operations Officers Course held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA.and was deployed to Somalia in support of Operation Restore Hope with the US Anny. He is currently servingas a Psych. Officer with 1 Psychology Unit in Sydney.

Countering Terrorism in Australia Through CoordinationBy Lindsay Hansch.IntroductionWhere did it all begin? Although some arrangementswere in place in Australia during the1970s, it was the bombing of the Hilton Hotel duringthe Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting(CHOGM) in February 1978 that gave the necessaryimpetus for some positive, coordinated action. Theincident, although a relatively minor event by terrorismstandards overseas, was the beginning of a newera in counter terrorism preparedness in Australia.Perhaps the major outcome was the ProtectiveSecurity Review by Mr Justice Hope. In his review,Hope identified many shortcomings in the nationalcapability to deal with acts of terrorism. This promptedthe government of the day to act and it did so in apositive way. Among the arrangements subsequentlyput in place was the establishment of the StandingAdvisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperationfor Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) as the overall coordinator of the nationalarrangements. A highly trained counter terrorist forcewas also set up within the Australian Defence Force,and the Commonwealth Government machinery fordealing with the day-to-day aspects of counter terrorismcoordination was also put in place. One of thepriority tasks facing SAC-PAV after its formationwas the development of the National Anti TerroristPlan (NATP). This plan has been in place since 1979and. while it has been updated five times since, it haslargely stood the test of time as the major guiding andplanning document for the national arrangements.by academics seeking to make their contribution to aparticular debate. A common purpose of all definitionsis that they are generally designed to support aparticular interest. Simply adopting someone else'sdefinition is therefore often not an appropriate solution.It is perhaps not surprising that it took some time togain agreement between all governments in Australiato a definition of "terrorism" Nevertheless a definitionthat is acceptable has been adopted and it now formsthe basis of the arrangements outlined in the NATP.The definition of terrorism that satisfies Australia'sneeds is:"Acts or threats of violence of national concern,calculated to evoke extreme fear for the purpose ofachieving a political objective in Australia or in aforeign country. This definition includes seriousacts or threats of politically motivated violencedirected:• against visiting VIPs or resident foreign diplomats;• against Australian VIPs:• at influencing government policy or overthrowinggovernments or the system of government:• at aircraft or civil aviation; or• at engaging in or supporting hostile activities ina foreign country." 1 .This definition closely resembles the definition ofpolitically motivated violence in the ASIO Act 2 . Thisis not surprising since terrorism is a form of politicallymotivated violence. However, it does not necessarilyfollow that all politically motivated violence is terrorism.While the motive may be the same, the meansmay differ considerably.StrategyTerrorismWhat is terrorism? One of the problems with tryingto develop definitions is getting agreement betweenall parties concerned. This is often exacerbated by theextraordinary number of definitions in use. somedetermined and shaped by foreign policy and othersAn essential element of capability is strategy. Whatis strategy? It often depends on where you function inthe overall structure of an organisation. Generally itinvolves the definition of ends and means and thisusually occurs at the highest level. However, if youare

44 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994This is not to suggest that the operational role of thepolice is any less important, but it does have the effectthat the police, from the perspective of the government,are seen to be at the operational level ratherthan the strategic. The high level strategies are implementedthrough various operational plans and ordersdesigned to meet the specifics of an incident.Australia" s national strategy for countering terrorismis based essentially on three fundamental elements:• integrated and coordinated preventive measuresdesigned to minimise the scope for any incident tooccur:• a comprehensive capability to respond to any incidentthat might occur; and• positive enhancement of the national security environment,which is to suggest that all elementsin our society regard security as a cooperativeendeavour which each element has a particularcontribution to make.'The major focus is on preventive measures. Preventionincludes such activities as support for cooperationagainst terrorism in international forums,arrangements within the international community forintelligence sharing, immigration entry controls, limitationson access to weapons and explosives and thecoordination of protective security programs for highrisk targets including both people and facilities.Most of the preventive measures in place inAustralia have been developed over many years and,initially at least, were established for purposes otherthan counter terrorism. For example, intelligencearrangements were established for national security,immigration entry controls to prevent the entry of allundesirables and limitations on access to weaponsand explosives were put in place to reduce criminalactivity. Preventive measures alone do not guaranteeimmunity from terrorism. Therefore, those measuresmust be backed by a comprehensive response capabilityto deal quickly and effectively with a terroristact. should one occur. Having an effective responsecapability also serves as a deterrent, which contributesto the preventive measures and to the general enhancementof the national security environment.Response Arrangements andCrisis ManagementTerrorism has been described as a form of communicationto publicise a cause using fear. Its focus ispolitical and for this reason it invokes national andinternational interests. This sets terrorism apart fromthe normal criminal activity dealt with day-to-day bythe police services.Responding to and resolving acts of terrorismrequires most of the operational capabilities found inthe average police service. However, the difference inmotive between the terrorist and the ordinary criminal,and that terrorists are likely to have been trained forthe operation, means that a much higher level ofoperational capability may be required. It is for thisreason that a greater proportion of the effort and costexpended in Australia since the Hilton bombing hasbeen oriented at improving the basic capabilities ofthe police and. in some cases, developing capabilitiesthat are beyond the police capacity.Overlaying the operational capabilities of the policeand other agencies are the government structuresneeded during an incident to provide political leadership,to respond to the terrorist's political demands andto provide support to the police in dealing with theterrorists. These arrangements, along with the policecommand and control structures, are referred to as thenational crisis management response arrangementsand are set out in the National Anti Terrorist Plan.A critical element of our ability to deal effectivelywith a major terrorist act in Australia is the relationshipbetween the government crisis managers andpolice operational commanders on the one hand andthe media on the other. To illustrate the dimensions ofthe problem, consider the hypothetical example of anaircraft hijacking. A number of dedicated, well armedand well-trained terrorists are threatening the lives ofhundreds of passengers and demanding the release oftheir colleagues from gaol in another country and safepassage out of Australia. What are the key considerationsin this situation?First, it is a police problem but one that goes beyondresponding to normal criminal activity and for whichpolitical guidance and specialist assistance will berequired, particularly from the CommonwealthGovernment. Secondly, there inevitably will be complexpolitical issues affecting government interestsand the interests of foreign states either because theirnationals are involved or because they are the targetof the demands. There are likely to be pressures forgovernment to take a firm stand and other conflictingpressures that the government take all possible measuresto end the incident without violence. Finally.there is the critical issue of the public informationpolicy where there will be conflicting demands fromthe media and public to know what is going on andfrom operational commanders that rescue operationsnot be prejudiced. Inevitably, a world audience oftens or hundreds of millions will focus on the minuteto-minutedetail of events and this will be one of thegreatest challenges that the police and other crisismanagers will have to face.

COUNTERING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH COORDINATION 45Exercise Brindabella was held in Canberra in May 1992. Three of the key overseers,Senior Sergeant Graham Waite of the NT Police who was an umpire; Superintendent Brian Brinkler of the AFPwho was chief controller and the exercise coordinator Senior Sergeant Rowland Legg of theVictoria Police (then on secondment to the Protective Services Coordination Centre) get a briefingfrom Detective Sergeant Peter Drennan of the Special Operations Team (AFP).Over the past two decades. Commonwealth andState governments have adopted a consistent policytowards terrorism. This has included a determinationto oppose terrorism and to uphold the rule of law.support for international cooperation as the mosteffective means of combating terrorism, emphasis onpeaceful and legal counter measures, readiness to takefirm action to bring terrorists to justice, acceptance bythe Commonwealth Government of a leading role indeveloping a coordinated national capability tocounter terrorism and cooperation by the State andTerritory governments in developing plans and providingresources in support of the national capability.These principles have provided guidance to the operationalagencies, particularly the police, in developingappropriate capabilities.National Counter TerrorismOrganisationThe primary organisation for consultation and cooperationbetween Commonwealth and State governmentagencies concerned with maintaining a defenceagainst terrorism, is the Standing Advisory Committeeon Commonwealth/State Cooperation for ProtectionAgainst Violence (SACPAV). SAC-PAV has twoimportant functions:• to propose to heads of Government steps to ensurenationwide readiness and co-operation between relevantCommonwealth and State Government agenciesfor the protection of Australia from terrorism; and• to bring together bilateral and nation wide arrangementsbetween the Commonwealth and the Statesto deal with protective security and counter terrorismplanning including aviation security, the protectionof holders of high office and the NationalAnti Terrorist Plan. 4In discharging their responsibilities. SAC-PAVmembers refer appropriate matters to their governmentsand otherwise represent their State or thenational interest at the six-monthly meetings of thecommittee. SAC-PAV has not been without its difficulties,but generally these have been overcome by allmembers developing a better understanding of eachagency's responsibilities and through a good spirit of

46 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994A "hostage" is executed and the Special Operations Team go in.cooperation. SAC-PAV is widely regarded as one ofthe most successful Commonwealth/State cooperativeforums.Membership includes senior representatives of allpolice services, senior officials of the State Premiers'Departments and the Territories Chief Ministers'Departments and senior Commonwealth officers fromthe Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.the Attorney General, and the Australian DefenceForce. Other Commonwealth departments and agenciesserve the committee as advisers, including theAustralian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).the Australian Protective Service (APS) and Departmentsof Finance and Transport and Communications(Aviation Security). Recently, the Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade and the New ZealandPolice and Prime Ministers Department were grantedobserver status.Through SAC-PAV, the Commonwealth and theStates have sought to enhance the national capabilityto deal with terrorism by developing and testing thearrangements necessary for a joint Commonwealth/State Government response to a terrorist act. Theyhave achieved this by coordinating the developmentof agreed strategies and policy responses to terroristthreats and demands and by sponsoring the developmentof the appropriate operational capabilities. Thishas included the provision of specialist equipmentand training and the conduct of periodic exercises totest the arrangements.Day-to-day coordination, planning and monitoringof protective security arrangements is facilitated bythe Protective Services Coordination Centre (PSCC).a branch of the Federal Justice Office of the CommonwealthAttorney-General's Department. The PSCCprovides executive and secretariat support for SAC-PAV and its various sub-committees and projectgroups. If a terrorist incident occurs, it will arrangethe activation of the national crisis managementresponse arrangements and maintain an informationlink with all SAC-PAV members.Within the Commonwealth Government there isanother committee that forms an integral part of thenational arrangements, the Special Inter-Departmental

COUNTERING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH COORDINATION 47Committee on Protection Against Violence (SIDC-PAV). The SIDC-PAV is the coordinating body withinthe Commonwealth and several of its members arealso represented on the SAC-PAV. One of the SIDC-PAV's important functions is to monitor the threatfrom terrorism. At its regular monthly meeting, theSIDC-PAV considers reports from the intelligenceand operational agencies and determines the level ofalert to be maintained. Any changes are notified to allSAC-PAV members. The SIDC-PAV also meetsfrom time to time in an abbreviated configuration,usually agencies with a direct interest, to considerwhat to do about serious threats or incidents. Thisconfiguration is known as the Special Incidents TaskForce (SITF) which also forms an integral part of theCrisis Coordination Centre referred to later.National Crisis Management ResponseArrangementsConsistent with the national strategy. Australiamaintains a capability to respond quickly to terrorismshould the front line preventive measures fail. Themajor elements required to provide an effective responsecapability are machinery to provide coordinatedpolicy direction, an effective operational commandstructure, properly trained and equipped operationalresponse units and comprehensive media liaisonarrangements.The framework for responding to a terrorist incidentis set out in the National Anti-Terrorist Plan (NATP)which was developed jointly by the CommonwealthNational Crisis Management StructureINCIDENTSCENEPOLICE FORWARDCOMMAND POSTPolice Forward CommanderMedia Liaison OfficerMEDIACENTREPOLICFHEADQUARTERSPOLICEOPERATIONSCENTREPolice CommanderMedia Liaison OfficerRESPONSD3LEGOVERNMENTDEPARTMENTSTATE CRISISCENTREMinisterAdvisersPolice CommissionerMedia Liaison OfficerLiaison OfficersCRISISCOORDINATIONCENTREIncident CoordinatorSpecial Incidents Task ForceInformation CentreMedia Liaison OfficerLiaison OfficersPARLIAMENTHOUSEMINISTERSMINISTERIAL GROUPMinistersSenior AdvisersMEDIACENTRE

4S AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994and State Governments and police services. It outlinesthe agreed roles and responsibilities of Governmentsin managing a response to terrorism and outlines thebasic organisation needed to coordinate and managethat response. The plan recognises that the appointedPolice Commander has operational responsibility forresolving a terrorist incident but, of course, he mustwork within the government's policy guidelines.The crisis management organisation outlined in theNational Anti-Terrorist Plan consists of four key elements(Figure 1):• a Police Forward Command Post at the scene ofthe incident from where the tactical decisionsaffecting the management of the incident are made;• a Police Operations Centre which is the commandcentre for the overall Police Commander and isnormally located in the Police Headquarters;• a State Crisis Centre from where the State Premier,or a minister appointed by him, and his senioradvisers, including the Commissioner of Police,manage the state aspects of the crisis; and• the Commonwealth Government's Crisis CoordinationCentre responsible for the coordination ofthe Commonwealth's involvement including thedevelopment of strategies and policy responses inconsultation with the State in which the incident isoccurring.PolicyAustralian governments have adopted a policy ofgranting no substantive concessions to terrorists." Thisis consistent with the approach adopted by most westerncountries. Within the context of granting no substantiveconcessions, the use of force is regarded as anabsolute last resort. The preferred option is to convincethe terrorists to surrender. These principles arerelatively straightforward, but their implementation,particularly in the early stages of an incident, requiressome skill.Specialist Capabilitiesto provide a higher level of capability to that which isgenerally achievable in police forces. The ADFCounter Terrorist Force, comprising the TacticalAssault Group (TAG) and the necessary command,communications and support elements, can bedeployed to assist State authorities in the resolution ofa high risk terrorist incident such as a hijacking or amajor siege involving hostages. It provides a specialisedmilitary assault capability as the last resortoption to save the lives of hostages. What is moreimportant, however, is that it allows the government tomaintain a firm line in its negotiation with terrorists.Besides the Commonwealth resources, each policeforce possesses a range of specialist capabilities torespond to a terrorist incident. These include speciallytrained negotiation teams, bomb response teams,intelligence units and Police Assault Groups (PAG).The PAGs (the generic title for Tactical ResponseGroup. State Protection Group, Special OperationsGroup, etc) are generally responsible for the initialcontainment of an incident. They also provide a limitedassault capability should it be needed either in anemergency before the TAG is able to reach the sceneor as the last resort option when the ADF is notinvolved.These specialist police capabilities existed in oneform or another in most police services before SAC-PAV was established. However, they have been furtherdeveloped with SAC-PAV assistance in the formof equipment, training and exercises. Equipment providedby SAC-PAV generally consists of items thatare beyond those needed for day-to-day police work.For example, DVP radios and operational supportvehicles for the PAGs. the "Echidna" remote vehicle,bomb suits and vehicles for the bomb squads, specialistnegotiator vehicles for the negotiation teams andsecure communications for intelligence, commandand control have all been provided by SAC-PAV.SAC-PAV policy is that police should use this equipmentin their day-to-day work to ensure that they arefamiliar with it and that it is well maintained.An important caveat applied to all SAC-PAV providedequipment is that it should be made available toany other jurisdiction if there is a terrorist incidentoccurring and additional resources are required.A key early policy decision in the management of aterrorist incident will be the nature and level of Commonwealthassistance to the State in which the incidentis occurring. The Commonwealth maintains aspecialist counter terrorist force within the AustralianDefence Force (ADF) which is trained and equippedOperational ResponseThe operational response to a terrorist incident willnormally occur in four phases: initial response andstabilisation, negotiation, resolution and investigation.

COUNTHRING ThRRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH COORDINATION4')The initial response will occur as the normal policeresponse to any incident. This will invariably meanthat the first on the scene will be general duties police.It is then up to these officers to assess the situation,report what they know and make some judgementabout the resources needed to contain or control theincident. For major incidents involving ongoing terroristactivity, it is likely that the police assault groupwill be deployed to contain the incident and securethe scene. A Police Forward Commander will beappointed who will move quickly to the scene andtake control. He will be initially concerned with thesafetv ol the public which means keeping everyonenot involved away from the scene, evacuating peoplewithin the immediate vicinity and containing the terroristswithin a defined area. The principle means ofdoing this will be the positioning of cordons — anouter cordon to keep the public away from the sceneand an inner cordon, generally the police assaultgroup, keeping the terrorists within their stronghold.At some time during or immediately following theinitial stabilisation of the incident, the negotiationphase will begin. It is not necessary to wait until thesituation has been stabilised to begin negotiating.Experience in overseas counter terrorist operationsand criminal incidents in Australia indicate that theearlier contact can be made with the hostage takers,the better, as it has a calming effect and helps stabilisethe situation. The negotiation phase will continueuntil either the incident is resolved through the effortsof the negotiators or a judgement is made that a negotiatedsettlement is unlikely and it should be ended byforce. Alternatively, the terrorists themselves maydecide that they do not wish to continue to prolongthe incident and either surrender or create a situationwhereby an assault has to be initiated.The central activities occurring during the importantnegotiation phase will be the actual conduct ofnegotiations; provision of information to the public,generally through the media; intelligence gatheringoperations; and the refinement and rehearsal of hostagerescue plans.Negotiations with terrorists will be conducted by aspecially trained police negotiation team. This teamwill receive direction and guidance from the PoliceForward Commander based on the agreed jointgovernment negotiation strategy. This strategy willallow police commanders and negotiators to conductnegotiations, including the taking of decisions onminor tactical concessions. Tactical concessions mayinclude such things as the provision of fcxxJ or medicalassistance. However, substantive concessions arenot negotiable and police must operate on that basis.Essentially, an incident can end either peacefully orby force. The primarv objective will always be tosave the lives of any hostages. The preferred strategyis to persuade the terrorists to surrender. Alternatively,if negotiations fail and. in particular, if violentaction by the terrorists occurs, or is anticipated, actionto subdue the terrorists by force may be the onlyavailable alternative.There are two possible ways of ending an incidentby force: an emergency action or a deliberate assault.An emergency action is mounted in a situation ofimmediate and pressing danger requiring the PoliceForward Commander at the incident site to initiateaction at once to save life. The type of situation thatmight justify an emergency action is the start ofwholesale killing of hostages or a "break-out" by theterrorists from the stronghold. The primary considerationin this situation is speed of action. A decision tomount an emergency assault should be made by thePolice forward Commander on the basis that morelives are likely to be lost by not acting than in takingpositive action. In making this decision, the PoliceForward Commander will be assisted by any guidelinespreviously agreed by governments.A decision for a deliberate assault is made when itbecomes apparent that there is no reasonable prospectfor a negotiated resolution and that force is the onlyavailable alternative. The primary consideration in adeliberate assault is surprise. It is mounted at a timeand in a manner selected by the tactical commanderas offering the greatest chance of success. The deliberateassault offers the greater opportunity to minimisethe loss of innocent life but it also requires more timeto implement. It therefore follows that if an incidentmust be ended by force, it should be by a deliberateassault rather than by an emergency action.It is in preserving the ability to achieve surprisewhere the law enforcement agencies and the mediaare most likely to clash. During the siege at theIranian Embassy in London a few years ago, somemedia organisations were successful in gaining agreementto telecast the actual assault on the conditionthat a delay was built into the telecast to ensure thatthe terrorists were not alerted. We now know that onemedia organisation, unknown to the police, hadgained a vantage position behind the embassy, butwere fortunately still setting up their cameras whenthe assault was launched. Consider the implications. Itwas known that the terrorist had access to televisionsets and the likelihood that they were monitoringevents was high. What would their reaction have beenon observing an assault being launched against them?Even with the built-in delay in the telecast therewas still a large element of danger. What if the assaulthad been delayed or called off at the last moment'.'

50 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Having observed the attempt, the terrorists wouldhave been prepared for any future similar attempt. Inthe worst case, some of the hostages may have beenkilled in retribution. The law enforcement agencieshave an inherent responsibility to protect innocent lifeand their negative reaction to some requests from themedia will often be driven by that motive.The implication for crisis managers, however, is thatthe incident should be managed to avoid creating a situationwhere an emergency assault is necessary. The useof force to end an incident should be a deliberate policydecision and a last resort. This requires clear decisionsin advance concerning the limits of negotiations and theacceptable threshold for the use of violence.The final phase is the investigation where the policehave to draw together all the available evidence tofacilitate prosecutions and inquiries. This is normalpolice work, but in the case of terrorism, some additionalconsiderations are present. For example, theterrorist may have come from thousands of kilometresaway to commit the crime and may or may nothave known the victims. Thus the collection of evidenceabout the motives of the terrorists will requirethe cooperation of overseas agencies and little will beavailable locally. There is also an additional dimensionwhen non-police agencies (such as the ADF) areinvolved in activities which result in the deaths of terrorists.Arrangements for this are included in theNATP. but much of the detail will need to be workedout at the time.Public Information and MediaManagementThe problems of public information and mediamanagement are perhaps the most difficult to manageeffectively because of the conflicting interestsbetween law enforcement agencies and the media.These are problems that the SAC-PAV has beenattempting to resolve for some years with only limitedsuccess. No one would deny that the law enforcementagencies are responsible ultimately to the public, butthe nature and amount of detail that can be releasedmust be balanced against the need to protect innocentlife. Those in the greatest danger are undoubtedly thehostages, so great care is taken to ensure that no informationthat could irritate the hostage takers to theextent of causing them to cause injury to or kill ahostage is made public. The lack of substantial successhas, in part, been due to the lack of a real appreciationBrrnmigS^V *;' - -/.BTS-ymff~ r &LA&fcThe media are always there.

COUNTERING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH C(X)RDINAT1QN 51of the magnitude ot the problem that will be laced ilthere is a significant terrorist incident in Australia.This is entirely understandable as the only real experiencein Australia has been with criminal incidents.Until recently, the major focus of SAC-PAV hasbeen directed at the local media organisations, largelyignoring the need to educate members of its ownagencies. Attention has, for example, been focused oneditors and news directors in the hope that they mightexercise some control over the release of criticalinformation which, for operational reasons, we mavnot wish to see released. SAC-PAV has also attemptedto develop guidelines for the media, albeit with littlesuccess. This may be entirely appropriate in the normalrange of criminal activity where the main interest willbe from the local media. But how effective will it beif there is a major terrorist incident? In reality, we donot know as we fortunately have not been put to thetest, but there are many examples available to indicatehow the media might respond.Take, for example, the siege at Aramoana in NewZealand in 1990. A crazed gunman, in profile not unlikethe gunmen involved in the Strathfield and HoddleStreet massacres, rampaged through a small villageindiscriminately killing anyone he saw before beingcornered by the police. Whilst this was not. by Australia'sdefinition, a terrorist incident, its sheer ferocityelevated it to a similar level and attracted the worldmedia. Within 24 hours of the news of that siegebreaking, there were over 400 foreign and local mediarepresentatives at the scene. When the limited numbersof police present could not satisfy their demandsfor information and film footage, they went lookingfor it. Every available aircraft in the district was hired,locals were approached and made offers to hire theirbuildings as vantage points from which to observeand film, phone calls were made to residents stillinside the village and attempts were made to speak tothe gunman. The New Zealand police had no hopeof controlling what was going on and there appearedto have been little consideration by the media as to thedangers they may have posed to the innocent peoplestill within the village, not to mention the police officerswho were trying to apprehend the gunman.The siege at Cangai in Northern New' South Walesearly in 1993 also highlighted the impact of mediaactivity on police operations. On this occasion threearmed men seized two children and then went on akilling spree through southern Queensland and northernNew South Wales. They were finally trackeddown by police and besieged in an isolated farm housenear Cangai. Some media organisations were able tocontact the hostage takers by the only telephone availablebefore the police were able to respond. They keptthe line tied up for some time recording interviewswith both the hostages and hostage takers that wereput to air before the siege had ended. One intervieweractually asked the young hostages whether they knewthat the men had killed. This action by the media notonly prevented the police from making contact andbeginning the negotiation process that might haveresolved the situation more quickly, but it paid littleregardto the potential impact that their direct discussionsmight have on both hostage takers and hostages.There were also attempts by the media to get close tothe action and police had to contend with media helicoptersand film crews not only exposing themselvesto some danger but. what is more important, riskingthe lives of the innocent children who were the hostagesin the drama.As a hypothetical example of the magnitude of themedia management problem, imagine that it is theyear 20(X) and the Olympic Games are in progress inSydney. A group of armed men seizes a building inthe Olympic Village at Homebush Bay housing athletesfrom a number of countries. The police respondand seal off the area, but the news quickly breaks. Notfar away in the Media Village at Darling Harbour,there are 13.000 representatives of the world's media,all with the responsibility to report what is occurring.How do the crisis managers and police deal with theincident and at the same time satisfy the media's likelydemands for information?Appealing to the local news directors and editorswould not in any of the cases described have contributesignificantly to managing the problem. What isneeded are clear policies and strategies to assist thecrisis managers and operational commanders in doingtheir jobs without prejudicing the lives of innocentpeople and, at the same time, providing the mediaw ith information to satisfy their legitimate needs.Crisis managers must be positive and forward thinkingin their approach to media management policy.The aim of media management from their perspectiveshould be to satisfy the public that the governmentis in control of the situation and is taking effective measuresto end it. To assist, the National Anti-TerroristPlan provides objectives and strategies for managingpublic information as well as detailing media liaisonarrangements.Overseas ExperienceAustralia's problems in devising suitable arrangementsfor dealing with terrorism are unique. The

52 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994When the exercise is over, there is the debrief. Exercise Brindabella brought together officers from NSW,Victoria, NT, SA, Queensland and WA police services, the Australian Defence Force and ASIO.They provided the umpires, role players and controllers who guided the exercise to achieve the objectives.federal system of government, with States beingresponsible for law and order, means that arrangementsmust be based on cooperation. The size of thiscountry and the sparsity of communications alsomakes it difficult to maintain centralised responsearrangements. Arrangements in other western countriesvary considerably and are generally supported bymore stringent legislation justified by a higher level ofthreat from terrorism.In the United States, a single federal body, the FBI.has jurisdiction over any terrorist incident within thecountry. The US definition of terrorism is also muchbroader than our own. The FBI is provided with adequateresources to deploy it's Hostage Rescue Teamanywhere within the US at short notice and on arrivalit simply takes over from the local police.Counter terrorism in the United Kingdom is alsohandled by a single organisation and the relative sizeof the country allows deployment of its counter terroristforce in relatively short time. The actual UKarrangements are similar to those of Australia exceptwithout the State Crisis Centre. The major differenceis that the crisis management team, including theirduty minister, deploys to the scene and has authorityto make decisions on behalf of the government. Theirprimary counter terrorist force is also provided by themilitary.Canada faces similar structural and geographicproblems to Australia, but has legislation that permitsgreater flexibility at the national level. However.Canada has used the Australian model as the basisof its arrangements. The Royal Canadian MountedPolice, for many years, maintained the primarycounter terrorist force. However, that responsibilitywas recently handed over to the Defence Force.Most European countries maintain a single responsecapability supported by legislation giving themjurisdiction over all areas within their national borders.ConclusionSpecial arrangements are necessary to deal with aterrorist incident because terrorism is qualitativelydifferent from non-terrorist criminal activity. It isdifferent in the complexity of the operational, politicaland media issues involved. Operational commandersrequire specialist support and need policy guidance.

COUNTERING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH COORDINATION 53While initial policy direction early in an incidentprobably will be based on standing policies, it is likelythat these policies will have to be modified andadapted to the particular circumstances of a specificincident. It is absolutely essential that these policiesaddress media management and public information.Irresponsible media activity and reporting can havea major effect on the outcome of a terrorist incident.Terrorists rely on the media to spread their message.Therefore indiscriminate reporting will be playinginto their hands and enhancing their cause. Whilstthere may be some sympathy for their cause, theimmediate concern will always be the innocent victimsof terrorism. Their safety must always be foremostin the minds of the law enforcement agencies intheir efforts to resolve the incident.Ultimate operational responsibility always lies withthe police, irrespective of government direction ormilitary involvement. It is the police who are responsiblefor ensuring that the law is upheld and for theprotection of the public. Good cooperation betweengovernments, timely and effective guidance and support,and the assistance of the media in achievingthose worthy goals will be essential.NOTES1. National Anti Terrorist Plan. Annex K.2. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 asamended by the Australian Security Intelligence OrganisationAmendment Act 1986.3. SAC-PAV Strategic Guidance. September 1992.4. SAC-PAV Terms of Reference published in the SAC-PAVHandbook (Third Editionl. August 1990.5. SAC-PAV Strategic Guidance. September 1992. Annex D.Lindsay Hansen is currently the Director. Counter Terrorism Coordination in the Protective Services Coordination Centre inCanberra. A former Army officer, he served with the Special Air Senile Regiment for several years and was the officer responsiblefor counter terrorism policy, plans and coordination on the Joint Operations Staff, Headquarters, Australian Defence Force from19H6 to 1990. He is a graduate of the Army Command and Staff College and the Joint Sen-ices Staff College and has sened inVietnam (twice), the United States and Singapore in addition to most Australian states. He has occupied his current position sinceJanuary 1991.A Highly TrainedProfessional ForceToday's ADF uses some of the most advanced equipment in the world and the training ofpeople has a very high priority.The ADF has enjoyed a reputation as a highly trained professional force. This reputationcan only be achieved through constant review of the training requirements and the trainingsupport of Australian industry.As the ADF has looked for more efficient training methods. Australian industry undertooka more pro-active role in Defence training. These Australian industries now undertake to traindefence personnel in a wide range of subjects, as diverse as basic flying training, maintenance,logistical supply and support.The training skills developed by Australian industry are now recognised as setting thestandard in these specific fields and are in demand by many defence forces throughoutthe world.Many countries, including those from our local region, are currently using Australianindustries' expertise for the training of both Defence and industrial personnel. These trainingrequirements include both in-house type training and training conducted by industry.

The Western Front was a continuous line of trenches stretching 450 miles from theSwiss border to the Belgian coast. In France and Belgium, it was the scene of the most prolongedand intensive fightingof the First World War.The Australian Imperial Force fought the first battle of the Somme andexperienced one of the bloodiest clashes of the War, sustaining 30,000 casualties. In so doing,they also weakened the German defences and hastened the end of the War.Seventy fiveyears later, a group of war veterans and widows returned to the Western Frontto pav tribute to those who fought and died there.Australians on the Western Front is an account of this pilgrimage and of the battles it commemorated.It is available from the Australian Defence Force Journal at $25 per copy.

An Australian Paukenschlag?By Lieutenant Commander DM. Stevens, RAN."If we could only have had more boats it wouldhave led to a Paukenschlag like that off the coast ofAmerica."— Korvettenkapitiin Heinrich Timmin the War Diary of U 862December 1944.IntroductionThe Paukenschlag or "Operation Drumbeat", alludedto above by the commander of U-boat 862,was the code name for the German U-boat offensiveagainst the American Atlantic coast that began inJanuary 1942. In the first two weeks of the campaign,a mere five U-boats sank 25 allied ships totalling200,000 tons. In the four months it took for theAmericans to introduce effective anti-submarinemeasures, 137 ships of almost one million tons wouldbe lost. For the Allies it was a major disaster, forthe U-boat commanders it would become regardedas "The Second Happy Time" of the Battle of theAtlantic. :In December 1944. however, U 862 was not in theAtlantic, and though planned to be part of a largeroffensive, the U-boat was in reality quite alone.Korvettenkapitan' Timm was actually making hisobservation while operating off the Australian eastcoast where he believed he had at last found anothersafe hunting ground for the U-boat arm. Elsewhere.Allied anti-submarine measures had largely driven theonce feared "grey wolves" from the shipping routes,but Timm had just detected a large concentration ofshipping at the eastern entrance to Bass Strait and noescorts were apparent.Due to wartime secrecy and because it was sothoroughly overwhelmed, the German U-boat offensiveagainst Australia in late 1944 has for 50 yearsremained virtually unknown and unexamined. Thisarticle aims to be an initial attempt to correct this deficiency.It will try to explain why Australia evenfigured in German planning at such a late stage inthe war and why the last major U-boat offensive inthe Far East ultimately proved to be such a futileendeavour.U-boat Operations in the Far EastThough Germany began developing plans forU-boat operations in the Indian Ocean early in theSecond World War, no practical action was takenuntil late 1942. While distant operations by theHilfskreuzers, or surface raiders, were still reapingsuccess, there was no urgent need to augment themand in any case the BdU 1 (Commander-in-ChiefSubmarines), Admiral Karl Donitz. was unwilling totransfer the scarce, long-range. Type IX U-boatsaway from the critical Atlantic battles. Japan too, wasat first less than supportive of a free-ranging Germanpresence, regarding the Indian Ocean as primarilyImperial waters. In the first agreement to delineate theOcean in August 1942. the German zone of operationswas limited to the waters south and west of 20°Sand 85°E.The first steps by U-boats into the Indian Oceantherefore remained tentative and were confined to thearea around the Cape of Good Hope. As the war drewon into 1943, and both Axis partners found themselveson the defensive, the situation changed. Japanesesubmarines now made few operational patrols andwere primarily engaged in transport duties in thePacific. They could not readily be spared for remoteoperations in the Indian Ocean. Recognising theirinability to continue to harass Allied shipping alone,the Japanese proposed greater German efforts in thenorthern part of the Indian Ocean, using U-boatsbased in Penang.This change in Japanese attitude coincided with adifficult time for U-boats in the Atlantic and a desireby Donitz to seek areas where Allied defences wereweaker. Available intelligence suggested that theIndian Ocean might indeed offer new opportunities,so in June 1943 the first 1 1 U-boats of "GroupMonsun " left their bases in Europe and headed east.The danger then existing in the Atlantic was evidentwhen only five of these boats survived to reach theIndian Ocean. After operations in the Arabian Sea.where another boat was lost, the remaining U-boatseventually reached Penang in November 1943. Withonly 8 merchant ships sunk in return, the results weredisappointing, but Group Monsun did at least confirmthat, in comparison with the Atlantic, anti-submarine

56 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994measures in the Indian Ocean were weak and opportunitiesfor attack more favourable. Donitz thereforedecided to continue sending long-range U-boats to theFar East. Ultimately. 44 operational and transportU-boats would be allocated to Indian Ocean operations.Besides Penang. facilities to support the boatswere also established with Japanese assistance inSingapore. Djakarta and Surabaya.German Interest in Australia.One of the first references to the possibility ofU-boat operations off Australia appeared in May1944 in a report written by Kapitanleutnanf Luddenof U 188. Liidden was the first of the Monsun commandersto return home and he recommended thatpreliminary reconnaissance of the areas south andwest of Australia should be undertaken. In this way. ifit was intended to make a surprise attack with a largergroup of boats, the force could operate with a soundknowledge of traffic and defence conditions."A great weakness of German operations in the FarEast was that operational control remained solelywith BdU. The German commander at Penang. Chefim Siidraum, Fregattenkapitan Dommes. thus hadlittle flexibility and no planning authority to arrange amission to Australia. German strategic interest in theIndian Ocean was, in any case, still concentrated onthe tanker and merchant ship routes in the PersianGulf and Gulf of Aden, so no immediate action wastaken on Uiidden's recommendations.However, the Japanese still found themselves hardpressed in the Pacific and continued to request evengreater German cooperation. The Head of the JapaneseNaval Mission in Berlin. Vice Admiral Abe. madeseveral personal representations to Donitz asking formore U4x>ats in the Indian Ocean and suggesting theexpansion of their operations to include the Australianarea. With the improvement of Allied defences in thewestern Indian Ocean making targets more difficult.Donitz finally agreed to the Japanese request. Afterinitial consultation with Penang he released thefollowing message on 14 September 1944:'Operation for Pich (U 168) and Timm (U 862) inAustralian area approved. They are to sail whenready for war. Make use of Japanese knowledge ofthe traffic and defence situation."'U 168. under the command of KapitiinleutnantHelmuth Pich. was a Type IXC U-boat of 1.140 tons.Pich was one of the most experienced of the FarEastern commanders, having first arrived in PenangKorvettenkapitan Heinrich Timm— Commander U862.Photo courtesy of U-Boat Archivin November 1943. U 862 was a larger and longerrange Type IXD2 and had only recently arrived fromEurope. Timm though, had already displayed hisprowess, sinking one ship in the South Atlantic andanother four in the Mozambique Channel on thevoyage out.Donitz understood that the Australian operationwould primarily be for the benefit of the Japanese, butto show further German commitment, agreed to allocatean additional U-boat. At a conference on 26September. Donitz was able to inform Vice AdmiralAbe that three submarines would now be scheduledto operate in the Australian area.'' The third U-boatwas to be U 537. commanded by KapitanleutnantPeter Schrewe. U 537 was another Type IXC. andhad arrived in Djakarta from the Atlantic in earlyAugust.The preparations required for a sortie of three submarinesto Australia were not insignificant. Skilledmanpower was scarce and. being far from home,spare parts were almost impossible to obtain. The FarEast bases were also critically short of torpedoes andthose that were available had often deteriorated in thetropical conditions. Many of these torpedoes ranslow, increasing the likelihood of a failed attack. Inlate September, the three Australian-bound U-boatswere each ordered to be equipped with 14 torpedoes.

AN AUSTRALIAN PAUKENSCHLAG' 57only half the full outfit of a Type IX. but a large proportionof available stocks."'A further difficulty for the Germans was that.despite BdU's suggestion, the Japanese had not operatedin Australian waters for over a year. They thushad little idea of the current traffic and defence situation,particularly off the West Australian coast wherethe Germans intended to concentrate. Without anymeans of obtaining accurate intelligence, the U-boatCommanders would be forced to rely on pre-warcharts and their own hunting instincts.A lack of current intelligence was not. however, aproblem for the Allies. Unknown to both the Germansand the Japanese, their secret communications hadbeen thoroughly compromised. The Australian CNSas Commander South West Pacific Sea Frontier, wasreceiving daily Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) reportsfrom the US Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL)and was fully aware of German planning for theAustralian operation. Just five days after the BdU hadgiven approval for the mission, westbound Alliedshipping was instructed to be routed well dispersedand pass not less than 250 miles south of CapeLeeuwin." Air patrols were also increased and additionalanti-submarine vessels were transferred fromDarwin to Fremantle. These ships were to form partof a "Hunter Killer" group under the direct operationalorders of Naval Officer-in-Charge (NOIC)Fremantle. Of far more danger to the U-boats, however,were patrolling allied submarines.U168U 168 was the first of the assigned U-boats to sailand left Djakarta at 0900 on 5 October 1944. TheU-boat was initially programmed to conduct a onedaysurface passage to Surabaya to complete batterytrials. On successful completion of the trials, U 168was to proceed south and operate off the southwestcoast of Australia. Following normal procedures tosafeguard a friendly submarine, local Japanese unitswere alerted by signal to the precise details of U 168'sdeparture and arrival times, intended course andspeed. The signal was decrypted and the particularsrepeated in the FRUMEL summary for 5 October. 12Though there was little time left to arrange an encounter,the Dutch submarine Zwaardvisch was onpatrol nearby and was ordered to attempt an intercept.Zwaardvisch belonged to the British 8th SubmarineFlotilla based at Fremantle and was commandedby Lieutenant-Commander H Goosens. Thesubmarine had left Fremantle for its second FarEastern patrol on 26 September and six days laterpassed through the Lombok Strait.Shortly after dawn on 6 October, with Zwaardvischoff the north coast of Java at periscope depth.Goosens sighted U 168 on a steady easterly course at14 knots. Zwaardvisch was well positioned for anattack and 11 minutes after the sighting, fired a fan of6 torpedoes. On board U 168 the torpedoes were seenseconds before impact and much too late to takeavoiding action. Two torpedoes hit. One piercedthe U-boat's pressure hull but failed to detonate,the second exploded in the forward torpedo room.Immediate shutting of the water-tight doors failed toslow the flooding and U 168 sank rapidly by the bowswith the loss of 23 men.Zwaardvisch surfaced shortly afterwards and fiveof the survivors, including Kapitanleutnant Pich, wererecovered for interrogation. The remaining survivorswere put on a native fishing vessel for return toJapanese territory. Pich was unable to explain why hehad been caught unawares, but one crew member waslater to blame the Japanese, stating that they neverstarted anti-submarine air searches before 1100."The torpedoing of U 168 was reported by Surabayalate the same day and two Japanese submarinechasers were ordered to proceed to the scene. 14 TheJapanese found nothing and Zwaardvisch returnedsafely to Fremantle on 26 October having sunk ordamaged another four enemy ships. Despite this failureand other similar losses, there appears to havebeen little extra effort put into improving anti-submarinedefences by the Japanese. The Germans wereso unimpressed by Japanese capabilities that evenafter the loss of U 168. Berlin raised the point that itmight still be safer for U-boats to proceed independentlyrather than in the company of a Japaneseescort."The Australian operation remained the principaloffensive mission planned for the Far East andobviously remained important, both for keeping theU-boats effectively employed and as a show ofpractical support for the Japanese. In early November.BdU therefore authorised another Type IXD2.Oberleutnant zur See" Striegler's U 196. as a replacementfor U 168.U 5The next U-boat to depart. U 537, sailed fromSurabaya on 9 November for a series of diving tests.

58 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 10" JULY/AUGUST 1994If the tests were successful, she was then under ordersto pass along the eastern coast of Bali and proceedoutward bound for operations off Darwin and northwestAustralia. Japanese units were again alerted tothe presence of a friendly submarine. Five daysbefore departure, the Surabaya Guard Force providedcomplete details of U 537's program after leavingport. The message included the following lines:"10th 0800 in 7-12°S 115-17°E wherediving tests will be carried out for 10 mileson course 156 degrees."' 7Unknown to her crew, U 537's fate had thus beensealed even before the U-boat sailed. In Darwin on6 November, the US submarines Flounder, Guavinaand Bashaw received patrol orders that organisedthem into a coordinated search and attack group.Commander J Stevens. Commanding Officer ofFlounder, was the senior officer. The following day.all three boats departed for their allocated areas. Onthe morning of 10 November. Commander Stevensordered the submarine to submerge in a position northof Lombok Strait. The Flounder's patrol report completesthe story:"0754 Officer of the deck sighted what appearedto be a small sailboat bearing 347° (T).distance about 9,(XX) yards.0809 Target was identified as a German submarinemaking 12 knots.0826 Fired four stern tubes. Track angle 90°starboard, range 1.000 yards, gyro anglesvery small. Torpedoes were set to run at8 feet.0827 Observed hit about 40 feet inside the bow.There was a tremendous explosion and thewhole target was obscured by smoke andflame." I8The sinking took only 20 seconds and had occurredone mile from the advised position. There were nosurvivors from U 537's crew of 58. Flounder went onto sink one other ship on this patrol, eventually securinein Fremantle on 13 December.U862After arrival in the Far East, U 862 had spent sevenweeks undergoing refit in Singapore and 10 days inDjakarta, allowing the crew time for a short period ofrecuperation in the mountains. With all in readiness.Korvettenkapitiin Timm finally began U 862's secondwar cruise on 18 November, unaware of the loss ofU 537. Expecting the other U-boats to be operating inthe west. Timm instead planned to take his boat alongthe shipping routes to the south and cast of Australia.Fortune was with U 862 and for a change insufficientdeparture details were available for allied submarinesto arrange an intercept.Reaching Cape Leeuwin on 28 November. Timmturned his boat east to try to intercept shipping in theGreat Australian Bight. For a week. Timm conducteda fruitless search, eventually suspecting that traffichad been warned and directed away from the normalroutes. U 862 then moved towards the Spencer Gulfhoping to have more success around the focal area ofAdelaide.On 9 December, the Greek steamship Illisos wassighted off Cape Jaffa, 130 miles southeast ofAdelaide. Detecting the ship too late for a submergedtorpedo attack. Timm instead surfaced and orderedhis 10.5 cm deck gun into action. In the rough seasprevailing, accurate fire could not be maintained andas Illisos was also returning fire. Timm soon decidedto break off the attack.On being advised of the incident. NOIC Port Melbourneordered two Australian corvettes in the vicinity.Burnie and Maryborough, to search for the U-boat.The corvettes found nothing on their own ASDIC, butwere counter-detected by U 862's hydrophones. Timmsurfaced, but in poor visibility could not identify thewarships and since the worsening seas prevented atorpedo attack, decided instead to run south at highspeed.No doubt remembering the mine-laying exploits ofGerman surface raiders in 1940 and suspecting thatU 862 might attempt the same. Bumie. Maryboroughand HMAS Lismore were then ordered to sweep theshipping routes in Bass Strait. With the reduction inthe Japanese threat, the local convoy system aroundAustralia had ceased in February 1944, but other safetymeasures were now reintroduced. These measuresincluded routing all shipping, except local traffic,south of Tasmania and ordering ships in southernAustralian waters to zigzag and darken ship at night."Timm had meanwhile moved to a position south ofTasmania where U 862 came across a tanker on acourse for New Zealand. The target was movingquickly and the U-boat again surfaced to try to moveinto an attack position. With night and heavy rainmaking the approach more difficult, the attack wasfinally thwarted by the appearance of an aircraft that,apparently mistaking the U-boat for the tanker,attempted to exchange recognition signals. U 862crash-dived and waited, but the expected counterattacknever came.U 862 then turned north and while passing east ofBass Strait, heard on hydrophones what sounded like

AN AUSTRALIAN PAUKENSCHLAG? 59a large undefended group of ships moving at highspeed. It was this detection that inspired Timm to penhis comments about an Australian Paukenschlag.Only one ship was actually sighted, but it was too faraway for U 862 to reach a firing position. With noother U-boats in the area to assist the opportunity theattack was lost.The U-boat continued moving up the coast and onChristmas Eve caught up with the American Libertyship Robert J Walker off Moruya. The attack began at0255 on Christmas Day and continued for more thanthree hours. The Libertv ships were well sub-dividedand five torpedoes were eventually needed to ensurethe ship was finished. At least two of the torpedoesran slow, one so slow that it was destroyed by gunfirefrom the freighter before it could hit.The first RAAF aircraft arrived in the area ten minutesafter the last torpedo exploded, beginning a massivesearch that would last for over two weeks. Alsoincluded were several RAN and USN warships fromSydney and the Royal Navy"s 4th Destroyer Flotilla,that put to sea immediately from Melbourne. It was tobe the largest and longest submarine hunt ever conductedoff Australia. The searches were all negativeand though some attacks were made on suspiciousobjects. U 862 managed to keep well clear. HMASQuickmatch recovered the 68 survivors of Robert JWalker on 26 December, two men having been lostduring the attack.Deciding that, for the moment, he had causedenough commotion off New South Wales. Timmheaded off undetected towards New Zealand. On theway, another freighter was sighted. A good attackposition was reached, but again Timm was let downby a faulty torpedo. Attempting to conserve his stocks.only one was fired and this detonated prematurely300 m from the U-boat. The freighter escaped undamaged.Crossing the Tasman Sea. U 862 then sailedaround North Cape and down the east coast of NewZealand. At times Timm brought the U-boat veryclose to the coast, close enough to Gisborne andNapier to see cars on the streets and to hear musicfrom the cafes. The shipping though, was disappointing,several coastal vessels were seen but not theexpected concentration of larger ships. Only one submergedattack on a small freighter was made. Despitethe ship showing full peacetime lighting. Timm missedthe shot. New Zealand was left undisturbed, withthe population completely unaware of U 862's visit.U862 departing Norway on the Voyage to Penang.Photo courtesy of U-Boat Archiv

60 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994U862 and U181 alongside the Japanese Cruiser Moyo at Singapore.Photo courtesy of David VincentWith seven torpedoes now remaining, Timm hadplanned to return to the area off Sydney, but on 19January 1945 he received orders from FregattenkapitiinDommes to return immediately to Djakarta.The Japanese expected an Allied landing on the Malaypeninsula and Dommes was concerned that Penangand Singapore would fall soon after.For two weeks, the U-boat headed west into mountainousseas. Finally turning north. U 862 stumbledacross another Liberty ship, the Peter Sylvester, on6 February. The Liberty ships again proved theirexcellent construction when it took four hits from fivetorpedoes to sink. Thirty-two men were lost in theaction and Peter Sylvester gained the dubious distinctionof becoming the last Allied ship to be sunk by asubmarine in the Indian Ocean.U 862 broke radio silence for the first time sinceleaving Djakarta on 9 February, reporting her arrivaltime at a pre-arranged escort point in Sunda Strait.' 1Though the signal was decrypted, it would appear therendezvous position was unknown to the Allies andTimm was again fortunate enough to avoid an encounterwith an Allied submarine. The U-boat finallyreturned to Djakarta on 15 February having sunk onlytwo ships, totalling 14,000 tons on the three monthvoyage. In his post cruise report Timm explained:"Mistake in planning operation was that sea areawas too large. Better chances are to be expected byconcentrating on traffic north and south of Sydney.The sea area would repay a generously-plannedoperation with several boats." :iU196The last U-boat allocated to the Australian operationwas U 196. which had arrived in Penang in mid-August after sinking one ship on the voyage fromFrance. The U-boat departed Djakarta on 30 Novemberand initially headed west to act as a refuelling stopfor U-boats returning to Europe. On completion.Oberleutnant zur See Striegler's orders directedU 196 to operate off southwest Australia for onemonth then proceed to Japan for a refit. Problemswith the other U-boats caused the refuelling operationto be cancelled 11 days after U 196 sailed. A recall

AN AUSTRALIAN PAUKENSCHLAG? 61order was sent, but despite repeated requests byPenang for a position report. U 196 failed to respond.By the end of December, she was presumed lost. NoAllied submarine claimed U 196 as a victim andthough it is possible the U-boat struck a submarinelaid mine in Sunda Strait, her disappearance remainsa mystery.ConclusionAlthough the Monsun U-boats together destroyedclose to a million tons of shipping, sinking rates werenot high enough to disrupt Allied strategy and cameat a huge cost. Of the 44 U-boats Donitz sent to theIndian Ocean, only five safely made the round tripback to Europe, six including U 862. were taken overby the Japanese on the defeat of Germany and fourwere destroyed while operating from Far Easternbases. The remaining U-boats were all lost whiledeploying or returning to Europe.The high loss rates and maintenance difficultiesexperienced by U-boats in the Far East ensured thateven at their peak there were never more than four orfive boats available for operations. By Februan. 1945.when U 862 returned to Djakarta, there was only oneoperational U-boat left and Donitz had already agreedwith the Japanese that future German efforts wouldconcentrate on Allied supply lines around the Philippines.Timm's comments about Australian watersthus came too late to be acted upon. U 862 was to bethe only U-boat ever to operate off Australia and thePaukenschlag envisioned by Timm was thankfullynever to come about.The phenomenal success of radio intelligence, andthe lack of available enemy resources meant thatAustralian sea and air defences were never required toconfront a determined underwater offensive. Nevertheless,it is sobering to imagine what might havehappened. The unsuccessful search for U 862 afterthe attack on Robert J Walker was a major undertaking,involving at least 12 warships and 189 dedicatedRAAF sorties." Despite advanced warning, the freemovements of U 862 showed that, when not betrayedby SIGINT. the U-boats were extremely difficult topin down. With the Pacific war receding even further,Australia's own defences were not worked up andSecond War Cruise of U862Pacific Ocean\Attack on freighter27/12/44Wellington'Attack/on freighter16/01/45

62 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994shipping had largely returned to peacetime practices.If the veteran U-boats of Group Monsun ever hadbeen able to mount a determined challenge, the Australianswould have been hard-pressed to match them.On the other side, despite the lack of results achieved,the cruise of U 862, travelling alone, further fromhome than any other U-boat during the war. muststand out as an epic accomplishment. By 1944, theaverage life expectancy of a U-boat at sea was onlyeight weeks. Despite sickness, boredom, extremes ofclimate, frustration with faulty equipment and momentsof terror. Timm kept his crew motivated and inhigh spirits, though all already knew that the war waslost. Timm's crew regarded him as one of the bestU-boat Commanders of the war, but U 862's performancewas also testimony to the qualities of leadershipand loyalty instilled in the U-boat arm as a whole.NOTES1. Quoted by Jochen Brennecke in "Haie im Parodies (Sharksin Paradise)" Ernst Gerdes Verlag. Preetz/Holstein undated,p. 259.2. The first "Happy Time" was from July to November 1940when the U-boat "Aces" achieved their greatest successes.3. Commander.4. Befehlshaber der Unterseehoote.5. Lieutenant Commander.6. Report by Commander of U 188 dated 6 May 1944. Submarines— German and Japanese Operations Indian Ocean.AA (Victoria), MP 1587/1 167A.7. Captain.8. BdU to Penang 1846/14 September. National ArchivesRecord Group (NARG) 457. Entry 9020: USN RecordsRelating To Cryptology. 1941-45. National Archives WashingtonDC. SRMN 037: COM1NCH File of U-Boat IntelligenceSummaries, entry for 23 September 1944.9. Vice Admiral Abe to Tokyo 27 September. AA (Victoria):Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL). CRS B5553/1"Periodic Summaries", chronological series. 1944-45. ItemNo: 3, 3 October 1944.10. NARG 457, op. cit. SRMN 053: OP-20-G1 Reports onGemum U-Boats East of Capetown July 44-May 45. entry 1 for2 October 1944.11. CSWPSF message to C-in-C E. Fleet and NOIC Fremantle141406Z/SEPT/44. A/S Precautions. AA (Victoria) MP1185/8 2026-5-316.12. FRUMEL Summaries, op. cit.. 5 October 1944.13. Interrogation of Survivors from the German U-Boat U 168.Submarines — German and Japanese Operations IndianOcean. AA (Victoria). MP 1587/1 167A.14. FRUMEL Summaries, op. cit.. 8 October 1944.15. Special Intelligence Bulletin No. 542. 30 October 1944 copyof text held by author.16. Lieutenant.17. Soerabaja Guard Force's 041815 November. FRUMEL Summaries,op. cit., 10 November 1944.18. USS Flounder — Report of Fourth War Patrol. Copy held onmicrofilm by Australian Defence Force Academy Library.19. Australia Station Daily Narrative, Naval Historical Section.Russell Offices. Canberra.20. V 862 091015 February. FRUMEL Summaries, op. cit.. 14February 1945.21. U 862 Short Report to Berlin sent 27 February. FRUMELSummaries, op. cit.. 9 March 1945.22. 106 by Beauforts. 24 by Catalinas and 59 by Kingfishers.Eastern Area Intelligence Section to RAAF HQ. AA (ACT)1619/100/2 Box 5 6/2/5. Folio 54A.REFERENCESAustralia Station Daily Narrative. Naval Historical Section,Russell Offices. Canberra.Brennecke J. Haie im Parodies (Sharks in Paradise). Ernst GerdesVerlag. Preetz/Holstein. undated.Gunton D. The Penang Submarines, City Council of GeorgeTown. Penang. 1970.Mallmann-Showell J. U-Boat Command and the Battle of theAtlantic, Vanwell Publishing, New York, undated.Naval Staff History BR 1736(50)(4) War With Japan Vol. IV TheSouth-Fast Asia Operations and Central Pacific Advance,Historical Section. Admiralty.Naval Staff History BR 1736(52)(3) Submarines Vol. Ill Operationsin Far Eastern Waters, Historical Section. Admiralty.Reiffenstuhl G. Herrmann R and others. Kriegslagebuch vonU 862 (War Diary of U 862), unpublished manuscript, copyheld by author.Saville A, German Submarines in the Far East in US NavalInstitute Proceedings. August 1961.Schirrmann A and Peitl F, Freie Jagd Im Indischen Ozean(Hunting Free in the Indian Ocean), unpublished manuscript.copy held by author.David Stevens is the Direclor of Naval Historical Studies in the Maritime Studies Program. Prior to this appointment he hadserved for 20 years with the RAN, including time as the anti-submarine waifare officer onboard HMA Ships Yarra and Hohart andon exchange in HMS Hermione. Other postings included attachment to the Staff of the Commander of the RAN Task Group {luringthe 1990-91 Gulf War and three years in HQADF Development Division. In 1992 he graduated from the ANU with a MastersDegree in Strategic Studies.

Book ReviewsTHE LAST CALL OF THE BUGLE —THE LONG ROAD TO KAPYONG,by Jack Gallaway, University of Queensland Press,1994. 312pp, index, 30 photographs, 30 sketchmaps. RRP$ 18.95.Reviewed by Bob BreenThis book is a eulogy to a generation of Australianmen who responded to The Last Call of the Bugle andfought as members of 3rd Battalion, the Royal AustralianRegiment (3 RAR) in Korea from September1950 until late April 1951. They responded to a callby the Australian Government to enlist on contract fortwo years to fight North Korean Communist forcesthat had invaded South Korea. Most members ofK Force, as the special enlistment was called, hadfought in World War II and volunteered to take theirchances in battle once again. It is arguable whetherthey joined to fight against the southern march ofCommunism, or to escape from the monotony or consequencesof their circumstances.Hie K Force veterans were joined by many lesserpaidyoung, inexperienced soldiers from the newlyraisedRoyal Australian Regiment. They flew togetherto join 3 RAR in Japan before deployment to Koreain September 1950. Subsequently, drafts of K Forcereinforcements joined 3 RAR in Korea during operations.The raising of K Force as a pool of reinforcementsfor overseas service was the last time theAustralian Government used a special enlistment tobolster the strength of the Army to deploy and supportan expeditionary force.Those who fought with 3 RAR in Korea during theperiod Gallaway covers and on subsequent operationsthere had a significant influence on the character ofthe newly-raised Australian Regular Army in generaland the fledgling Royal Australian Regiment in particular.Several young officers who were to commandinfantry battalions in Vietnam in the 1960s and to riseto General rank in the 1970s were blooded in theKorean War under the watchful eyes and occasionallysharp tongues ol members ot K Force. The \oungerRegular Army soldiers of 3 RAR in Korea were tomodel their attitudes to leadership, personal courageand physical endurance on the K Force men whoformed a bridge of experience between the AustralianArmy that fought in World War II and the AustralianRegular Army of the 1950s. Much of the backbone.rugged individualism and larrikinism associated withthe Royal Australian Regiment in the 1950s and1960s was imparted by the men of K Force, main ofwhom joined to put their personal stamp on the Armyafter sen ice in Korea.This book is not the work of a disinterested academichistorian. Jack Gallaway was 3 RAR's SignalsSergeant during the period he writes about. He haswritten with the passion of a man who has felt formany years that no writer had fairly acknowledgedthe achievements of 3 RAR in the Korea War or fullyunderstood the immense hardships, frustration anddangers that members of the Battalion faced as a loneAustralian combat unit, lighting as part of the hastilyraised,under-strength 27th British Commonwealth Brigadeamidst, and many times in the van or covering theretreat of. an enormous US-led United Nations army.Gallaway's book continues a consistent storyline inAustralian military history about how Australiantroops have been exploited for their fighting qualitiesby allied commanders who had their own personaland national agendas. He is critical of the seniorBritish and American commanders who gave theAustralians many of the difficult tactical tasks andthen ordered them to stand aside so that their owntroops could mop up and claim the glory.This book is not only an accessible history of theexploits of 3 RAR but also a summary of the higherlevel planning and conduct of the Korean War bythe United Nations Commander-in-Chief. GeneralDouglas MacArthur. Gallaway is critical of Mac-Arthur's decisions and belittles MacArthur's selfpublicisedachievements, such as the landing at Inchonwhich outflanked invading North Korean forces. Heputs MacArthur in the dock and. using mainly secondarysources, argues that his prosecution of the KoreanWar was badly flawed. Gallaway contends that Mac-Arthur's inept interpretation of Chinese intentionsbefore they crossed the Yalu River in late 1950 directlyendangered the lives of members of 3 RAR andlater threatened the survival of the entire Battalion.Aside from General MacArthur. Gallaway hasfocused much of his narrative on three individuals:Lieutenant Colonel Charles "Charlie" Green, CommandingOfficer of 3 RAR until his untimely deathon 1 November 1950, six weeks after assuming command.Green's eventual successor. LieutenantColonel Bruce "Fergie" Ferguson who commandeduntil July 1951 and the Officer Commanding Alpha

64 AUSTRALIAN DEFHNCH FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Company for most of the period. Major Bernard"Ben" O'Dowd. Gallaway's interest in these threeofficers is personal as well as historical. His aim is toget as close as he can to the truth about each officer'scontribution to the successes and failures of 3 RAR inKorea. The performance of these three men is crucialto understanding the story of 3 RAR in Korea untillate April 1951.One of the strengths of this book is Gallaway'smeticulous research. Gallaway realised that he neededto back up his incomplete personal knowledge ofaspects of 3 RAR's operations with additional information.He also recognised that he had reasons not tolike some of his fellow 3 RAR veterans and they hadreasons not to like him. Accordingly. Gallaway hasbased his interpretation of events on the recollectionsof almost 80 3 RAR Korean War veterans as well asother primary and secondary sources. He knew that ifhis book was not based on a wide range of sources itwould be dismissed as a personal diatribe.Notwithstanding his deeply-felt personal reasonsfor telling 3 RAR's story and his strong opinionsabout the performance of particular senior NCOs andofficers. Gallaway has adhered to the substance ofgood scholarship while largely ignoring academicform. He has a blunt writing style, replete with whatwould be now regarded as "politically incorrect"Australian colloquialisms. He lays out the facts,develops his line of argument and leaves it to hisreaders to come to their own conclusions. Academichistorians will have an interesting time deliberatingover Gallaway's thesis that 3 RAR was instrumentalin deciding the outcome of the Korean War.The vast majority of 3 RAR Korean War veteranswill be grateful that one of their number has taken thetime to write this book. The historic ledger needed tobe balanced. There will be some veterans who willfind fault with Gallaway's interpretation of events,especially a small number of venal, obsequious officersand senior NCOs. These men knowingly or unknowinglycontributed to the biased and incompletehistory of 3 RAR's first eight months in Korea. Theyhave much to answer for. Until recently, the AustralianRegular Army's failure to retain operationalinformation, to record interviews with its veterans andto commission the writing of its own history has facilitatedthe oral and written perpetration of many incorrect,florid accounts of 3 RAR's operations inKorea. The Official History of Australian combatoperations in the Korean War. published by theAustralian War Memorial in 1985. and a monographon the Battle of Kapyong. belatedly published by theArmy in 1992, have filled many of the gaps and comecloser to the truth. Gallaway's book continues tocorrect the record.In his 68th year Jack Gallaway has got off his chestwhat he wanted to say about 3 RAR in Korea. Hewrites in anger but mostly he writes with admirationfor fellow Australians who fought as members of agallant Australian infantry Battalion, engaged foreight months in some of the most dangerous anddemanding operations ever fought by Australianinfantrymen in war. Gallaway has done his Battalion,his Regiment and post-World War II Australian militaryhistory a great service.This book is also a reminder that institutional historiesof the Australian Regular Army need to becommissioned urgently as it approaches its 50thanniversary in 1996. At the book launch on 13 April1994. Jack Gallaway stated that he felt a very personalsense of urgency to write his book because so manyof his comrades were dying or succumbing to prolongedserious illness. The same urgency should befelt by the Army. The recent introduction of Armymilitary history grants of up to $15,000 per grant willnot facilitate the full time effort that will be requiredto write the Army's institutional history of the 1950sand 1960s. The Army, like other significant publiclyfundedinstitutions, should commission professionalhistorians to write more of its institutional history andnot rely on a free ride from authors like Jack Gallawayand other part-time enthusiasts.