36 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>107</strong> JULY/AUGUST <strong>1994</strong>• Inexperienced or untrained troops.• Sickness and lack of medical supplies.• Lack of an effective enemy information program.• Unit or significant individual defections.The 4 POG(A) is the only active-duty (i.e. regular)PSYOPS Group in the US Army. It comprises aGroup Headquarters, three regionally-orientatedBattalions, a Tactical Support Battalion (TSB). and aPSYOPS Dissemination Battalion (PDB).The 1st PSYOPS Battalion (Airborne) [ 1 POB(A)]covers Latin America and the Caribbean regions ofthe world. The 6 POB(A) has responsibility forEuropean and African regions. The 8 POB(A) coversthe Middle East. Asian and Pacific regions. The TSBsupports conventional forces and Special Operations<strong>Force</strong>s (SOF) with audio-visual, loudspeaker, productdevelopment for operational and tactical PSYOPS[4 POG(A). 1992)]. The PDB has audio-visual production,radio, television, and advanced printingcapabilities.The 4 POG(A) has a global responsibility for allUS <strong>Force</strong>s. However, the Group's potential operationsare greatly enhanced by three US Army ReservePSYOPS Groups which add up to a total of nineteenPSYOPS Battalions or 22 Companies. The 2ndPSYOPS Group. (Airborne) is based in Parma. Ohioand it has a regional orientation toward Europe andthe Atlantic. The 5th PSYOPS Group (Airborne)based in Washington, DC, focuses on Europe, Centraland South America. The 7th PSYOPS Group (Airborne),based in San Francisco, California concentrateson the Pacific (Morrisey. 1993).PSYOPS soldiers are trained as linguists and areaspecialists capable of understanding the political,cultural, ethnic, and geographic subtleties of theirintended target audiences. All US Army Corps arerepresented in US PSYOPS to allow a unique combinationof trained personnel to operate anywhereoverseas. All PSYOPS personnel are required to beAirborne qualified to allow them to support anytactical scenario US Special Operations <strong>Force</strong>s arerequired to conduct (FM 33-1. 1990. Parker. 1992 ).Operation Restore HopeAs previously described, the 8 POB(A) is part ofthe 4 POG(A) and covers the Middle East. Asia andthe Pacific regions of the world. The 8 POB(A) wasassigned the task of providing PSYOPS support to theUnified Task <strong>Force</strong> (UNITAF) that landed on thebeaches in Somalia, late December 1992. The USPSYOPS Battalion was based in the old US Embassycompound in Mogadishu. Somalia.The following cultural summary will enable thereader to understand the complexities of the Somalipeople. Onlv bv understanding some of these culturalaspects surrounding Operation Restore Hope, onecan appreciate the potential difficulties a multifacetedUNITAF PSYOPS programme may pose on aPSYOPS battalion.Practically all Somalis are Sunni Muslims. Often.clan leaders are religious leaders and take an activepart in mediating civil disputes as well as administeringreligious affairs. Since independence in I960.Somalia's government has emphasised a separationof church and state. However, in recent years, Somaliahas seen a steady growth of political organisationsoperating under a religious cloak. (<strong>Defence</strong> LanguageInstitute. 1993).Somalis are organised into an extensive clan structurethat has existed since the Middle Ages. Clanstructures emphasise loyalty to and from theirmembers. Constant fighting over political and ethnicdifferences has marked Somali society throughout itshistory (<strong>Defence</strong> Language Institute. 1993). On apolitical level, the Somali national character ismarked by an extreme dislike of central authority andgovernment in general. Most Somalis have a pastoralnomadic background and little need or respect for aformal government. It is impossible to exaggerate thefragility of the ethnic-based alliances under which thissociety continues to operate (US Army Int.. 1992).The nature of social structure is such that everyclan, lineage, and indiv idual is in a potentially adversarialor alliance relationship with other members ofSomali society. No clan, lineage, or individual canever be considered politically neutral (<strong>Defence</strong> LanguageInstitute, 1993).Key considerations for the United States Army's 8POB(A) in Operation Restore Hope are that politicalneutrality is not part of the Somali world view(Borchini, 1993). Somalis have trouble accepting thatthe United Nations and private organisations workingin Somalia do so under strict guidelines designed toensure impartiality (<strong>Defence</strong> Language Institute.1993). Broadly speaking, for Somalis. favouritism isperceived as an alliance constructed to exclude others,and armed factions might easily disrupt or stop aid ifthey believe that supplies have been channelled totheir enemies (US Army Int., 1992).The senior commanders in Somalia gave the 4POG(A) the mission of providing an informationdissemination capability for the Somali people. Theinformation was given by a daily newspaper andradio program, both named "Rajo" (meaning "hope"
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 37as well as leaflet drops and loudspeaker teams(Borchini, 1993).The following gives details of how the 8 POB(A)conducted its Unified Task <strong>Force</strong> (UNITAF)PSYOPS mission during Operation Restore Hope.The information given was compiled while on deploymentwith the 8 POB(A) in 1993. Further informationgathered on UNITAF PSYOPS was gained fromseveral briefings conducted by the 8 POB(A) Commanderto various command elements. These briefingsdetailed the structure of UNITAF PSYOPS and itscapabilities during operations in Somalia (Borchini.1993).• UNITAF Somalia PSYOPS Mission: To supportUNITAF tactical and operational objectivesthrough the use of loudspeaker broadcasts, leafletdrops, posters, newspapers and radio broadcasts(Borchini. 1993).• UNITAF Somalia PSYOPS Task Organisation:(Borchini, 1993):ProductDevelopmentCentre (PDC)Joint PSYOPS Task <strong>Force</strong>PrintSectionIRadioSectionLoudspeakerTeamsUNITAF Somalia Broad PSYOPS Themes:(Borchini, 1993)- To explain UNITAF rules of engagement.-To highlight that UNITAF does not support orfavour any faction.-To affirm the roles and capabilities of the 23nations in UNITAF.-To highlight the seamless transition fromUNITAF to UNOSOM II.-To encourage displaced persons to return totheir homes, plant their fields and harvest newcrops for future prosperity.-To highlight redevelopment and re-establishmentof Somali infrastructure.-To highlight the agreements made by factionleaders.-To focus on the disarmament process and tokeep everyone up to date with the progressshown in each region of the country."Rajo"The JPOTF provided news on military activities,public service announcements and messages of peacein Somalia. The Battalion produced the daily Somalilanguage paper (except Fridays) and distributedbetween 15,000 to 25.000 papers daily throughouttheir period of operations (Borchini. 1993). Unfortunately,most locally produced Somali newspaperswere aligned with one or another clan vyingfor power in the war-torn nation. "Rajo" aimed toprovide news from a non-clan, impartial perspective(Stevenson, 1993).The radio program which reviewed the "Rajo"newspaper was broadcasted four times per day. Flachproduced session was prerecorded and thoroughlychecked by the Somali interpreters prior to any broadcastgoing to air. This process ensured the translatedSomali message did not hold any clan biases and atall times remained objective. Each pre-recordedbroadcast lasted 45 minutes and was repeated twiceon AM and twice on Short Wave radio (Borchini.1993).Leaflet DropsThree days before US Marines landed in Somalia,leaflets were being dropped to inform the warringSomali factions that troops were prepared to use forceto protect relief operations in the country (see Fig. 1).All leaflet drops were coordinated at the highestlevels to ensure the projected PSYOPS message wasunified and could be backed up by military action(Borchini, 1993).The dissemination of these leaflets was accomplishedthrough a variety of methods. The main disseminationtechnique in Somalia was the use of staticline deployment of boxed and bagged leaflets fromaltitudes of 1000 to 500 feet. There are several mathematicalcalculations which determine the dispersionof different size leaflets according to the weight of thepaper printed over the designated area. To ensurefurther dissemination accuracy, most missions madeseveral passes over each target area, when hostilitiesin the region were favourable. Over 7 million leafletswere disseminated by JPOTF from 9 December 1992to 10 April 1993 (Borchini. 1993).Tactical Loudspeaker TeamsThe loudspeaker teams (LST) were from the 9thPSYOPS Battalion (Airborne) [4 POG(A)] and wereprimarily equipped for tactical operations. ForOperation Restore Hope, they fell under the commandof the JPOTF Commander and were tasked