50 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>107</strong> JULY/AUGUST <strong>1994</strong>Having observed the attempt, the terrorists wouldhave been prepared for any future similar attempt. Inthe worst case, some of the hostages may have beenkilled in retribution. The law enforcement agencieshave an inherent responsibility to protect innocent lifeand their negative reaction to some requests from themedia will often be driven by that motive.The implication for crisis managers, however, is thatthe incident should be managed to avoid creating a situationwhere an emergency assault is necessary. The useof force to end an incident should be a deliberate policydecision and a last resort. This requires clear decisionsin advance concerning the limits of negotiations and theacceptable threshold for the use of violence.The final phase is the investigation where the policehave to draw together all the available evidence tofacilitate prosecutions and inquiries. This is normalpolice work, but in the case of terrorism, some additionalconsiderations are present. For example, theterrorist may have come from thousands of kilometresaway to commit the crime and may or may nothave known the victims. Thus the collection of evidenceabout the motives of the terrorists will requirethe cooperation of overseas agencies and little will beavailable locally. There is also an additional dimensionwhen non-police agencies (such as the ADF) areinvolved in activities which result in the deaths of terrorists.Arrangements for this are included in theNATP. but much of the detail will need to be workedout at the time.Public Information and MediaManagementThe problems of public information and mediamanagement are perhaps the most difficult to manageeffectively because of the conflicting interestsbetween law enforcement agencies and the media.These are problems that the SAC-PAV has beenattempting to resolve for some years with only limitedsuccess. No one would deny that the law enforcementagencies are responsible ultimately to the public, butthe nature and amount of detail that can be releasedmust be balanced against the need to protect innocentlife. Those in the greatest danger are undoubtedly thehostages, so great care is taken to ensure that no informationthat could irritate the hostage takers to theextent of causing them to cause injury to or kill ahostage is made public. The lack of substantial successhas, in part, been due to the lack of a real appreciationBrrnmigS^V *;' - -/.BTS-ymff~ r &LA&fcThe media are always there.
COUNTERING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH C(X)RDINAT1QN 51of the magnitude ot the problem that will be laced ilthere is a significant terrorist incident in Australia.This is entirely understandable as the only real experiencein Australia has been with criminal incidents.Until recently, the major focus of SAC-PAV hasbeen directed at the local media organisations, largelyignoring the need to educate members of its ownagencies. Attention has, for example, been focused oneditors and news directors in the hope that they mightexercise some control over the release of criticalinformation which, for operational reasons, we mavnot wish to see released. SAC-PAV has also attemptedto develop guidelines for the media, albeit with littlesuccess. This may be entirely appropriate in the normalrange of criminal activity where the main interest willbe from the local media. But how effective will it beif there is a major terrorist incident? In reality, we donot know as we fortunately have not been put to thetest, but there are many examples available to indicatehow the media might respond.Take, for example, the siege at Aramoana in NewZealand in 1990. A crazed gunman, in profile not unlikethe gunmen involved in the Strathfield and HoddleStreet massacres, rampaged through a small villageindiscriminately killing anyone he saw before beingcornered by the police. Whilst this was not. by Australia'sdefinition, a terrorist incident, its sheer ferocityelevated it to a similar level and attracted the worldmedia. Within 24 hours of the news of that siegebreaking, there were over 400 foreign and local mediarepresentatives at the scene. When the limited numbersof police present could not satisfy their demandsfor information and film footage, they went lookingfor it. Every available aircraft in the district was hired,locals were approached and made offers to hire theirbuildings as vantage points from which to observeand film, phone calls were made to residents stillinside the village and attempts were made to speak tothe gunman. The New Zealand police had no hopeof controlling what was going on and there appearedto have been little consideration by the media as to thedangers they may have posed to the innocent peoplestill within the village, not to mention the police officerswho were trying to apprehend the gunman.The siege at Cangai in Northern New' South Walesearly in 1993 also highlighted the impact of mediaactivity on police operations. On this occasion threearmed men seized two children and then went on akilling spree through southern Queensland and northernNew South Wales. They were finally trackeddown by police and besieged in an isolated farm housenear Cangai. Some media organisations were able tocontact the hostage takers by the only telephone availablebefore the police were able to respond. They keptthe line tied up for some time recording interviewswith both the hostages and hostage takers that wereput to air before the siege had ended. One intervieweractually asked the young hostages whether they knewthat the men had killed. This action by the media notonly prevented the police from making contact andbeginning the negotiation process that might haveresolved the situation more quickly, but it paid littleregardto the potential impact that their direct discussionsmight have on both hostage takers and hostages.There were also attempts by the media to get close tothe action and police had to contend with media helicoptersand film crews not only exposing themselvesto some danger but. what is more important, riskingthe lives of the innocent children who were the hostagesin the drama.As a hypothetical example of the magnitude of themedia management problem, imagine that it is theyear 20(X) and the Olympic Games are in progress inSydney. A group of armed men seizes a building inthe Olympic Village at Homebush Bay housing athletesfrom a number of countries. The police respondand seal off the area, but the news quickly breaks. Notfar away in the Media Village at Darling Harbour,there are 13.000 representatives of the world's media,all with the responsibility to report what is occurring.How do the crisis managers and police deal with theincident and at the same time satisfy the media's likelydemands for information?Appealing to the local news directors and editorswould not in any of the cases described have contributesignificantly to managing the problem. What isneeded are clear policies and strategies to assist thecrisis managers and operational commanders in doingtheir jobs without prejudicing the lives of innocentpeople and, at the same time, providing the mediaw ith information to satisfy their legitimate needs.Crisis managers must be positive and forward thinkingin their approach to media management policy.The aim of media management from their perspectiveshould be to satisfy the public that the governmentis in control of the situation and is taking effective measuresto end it. To assist, the National Anti-TerroristPlan provides objectives and strategies for managingpublic information as well as detailing media liaisonarrangements.Overseas ExperienceAustralia's problems in devising suitable arrangementsfor dealing with terrorism are unique. The