ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

COUNTHRING ThRRORISM IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH COORDINATION4')The initial response will occur as the normal policeresponse to any incident. This will invariably meanthat the first on the scene will be general duties police.It is then up to these officers to assess the situation,report what they know and make some judgementabout the resources needed to contain or control theincident. For major incidents involving ongoing terroristactivity, it is likely that the police assault groupwill be deployed to contain the incident and securethe scene. A Police Forward Commander will beappointed who will move quickly to the scene andtake control. He will be initially concerned with thesafetv ol the public which means keeping everyonenot involved away from the scene, evacuating peoplewithin the immediate vicinity and containing the terroristswithin a defined area. The principle means ofdoing this will be the positioning of cordons — anouter cordon to keep the public away from the sceneand an inner cordon, generally the police assaultgroup, keeping the terrorists within their stronghold.At some time during or immediately following theinitial stabilisation of the incident, the negotiationphase will begin. It is not necessary to wait until thesituation has been stabilised to begin negotiating.Experience in overseas counter terrorist operationsand criminal incidents in Australia indicate that theearlier contact can be made with the hostage takers,the better, as it has a calming effect and helps stabilisethe situation. The negotiation phase will continueuntil either the incident is resolved through the effortsof the negotiators or a judgement is made that a negotiatedsettlement is unlikely and it should be ended byforce. Alternatively, the terrorists themselves maydecide that they do not wish to continue to prolongthe incident and either surrender or create a situationwhereby an assault has to be initiated.The central activities occurring during the importantnegotiation phase will be the actual conduct ofnegotiations; provision of information to the public,generally through the media; intelligence gatheringoperations; and the refinement and rehearsal of hostagerescue plans.Negotiations with terrorists will be conducted by aspecially trained police negotiation team. This teamwill receive direction and guidance from the PoliceForward Commander based on the agreed jointgovernment negotiation strategy. This strategy willallow police commanders and negotiators to conductnegotiations, including the taking of decisions onminor tactical concessions. Tactical concessions mayinclude such things as the provision of fcxxJ or medicalassistance. However, substantive concessions arenot negotiable and police must operate on that basis.Essentially, an incident can end either peacefully orby force. The primarv objective will always be tosave the lives of any hostages. The preferred strategyis to persuade the terrorists to surrender. Alternatively,if negotiations fail and. in particular, if violentaction by the terrorists occurs, or is anticipated, actionto subdue the terrorists by force may be the onlyavailable alternative.There are two possible ways of ending an incidentby force: an emergency action or a deliberate assault.An emergency action is mounted in a situation ofimmediate and pressing danger requiring the PoliceForward Commander at the incident site to initiateaction at once to save life. The type of situation thatmight justify an emergency action is the start ofwholesale killing of hostages or a "break-out" by theterrorists from the stronghold. The primary considerationin this situation is speed of action. A decision tomount an emergency assault should be made by thePolice forward Commander on the basis that morelives are likely to be lost by not acting than in takingpositive action. In making this decision, the PoliceForward Commander will be assisted by any guidelinespreviously agreed by governments.A decision for a deliberate assault is made when itbecomes apparent that there is no reasonable prospectfor a negotiated resolution and that force is the onlyavailable alternative. The primary consideration in adeliberate assault is surprise. It is mounted at a timeand in a manner selected by the tactical commanderas offering the greatest chance of success. The deliberateassault offers the greater opportunity to minimisethe loss of innocent life but it also requires more timeto implement. It therefore follows that if an incidentmust be ended by force, it should be by a deliberateassault rather than by an emergency action.It is in preserving the ability to achieve surprisewhere the law enforcement agencies and the mediaare most likely to clash. During the siege at theIranian Embassy in London a few years ago, somemedia organisations were successful in gaining agreementto telecast the actual assault on the conditionthat a delay was built into the telecast to ensure thatthe terrorists were not alerted. We now know that onemedia organisation, unknown to the police, hadgained a vantage position behind the embassy, butwere fortunately still setting up their cameras whenthe assault was launched. Consider the implications. Itwas known that the terrorist had access to televisionsets and the likelihood that they were monitoringevents was high. What would their reaction have beenon observing an assault being launched against them?Even with the built-in delay in the telecast therewas still a large element of danger. What if the assaulthad been delayed or called off at the last moment'.'