ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

;n M SIR \[ 1 \N OUhNCI IQkCI l()l R\AI. NO Hr.ll I 1 MOIST 1^4one of the chief features of the decision was one ofexecutive dominance. The key actors were a fewstrategically placed policy makers in the Departmentof External Affairs. Foreign policy was little debated:"'even within the Cabinet it tended to be a matter forthe Prime Minister and the Minister for ExternalAffairs".' Australian decision makers in the earlymonths of 1965 took advantage of uncertainty withinthe US administration over the best course of actionto take. They pushed assiduously for the most vigorousmilitary intervention for the purpose of avertinga communist victory in South Vietnam in the fullknowledge that such a push might have an effect inthe confused conditions which existed. 4 Thus it isclear that the Australian decision making elite werenot "dragged" into the war. On the contrary, theywere very active in its design and implementation.To discuss the role of parliament in the decision tosend troops to Vietnam is in many ways an exercisein the obscure and the futile. The House was presentedon the 29 April 1965 with a fait accompli and it isclear that subsequent parliamentary debate in no waycontested or shaped in any important manner thedecisions of executive government.When looking at the role of the political partiesforeign policy was for the (Liberal) government of theday a crucial issue to which domestic considerationswere subservient. The Democratic Labor party waseven more extreme in its anti-communist stance andvehemently opposed the Labor proposals of a politicalrather than a military solution in South Vietnam.In this domestic political climate, Menzies had effectivelypaved the way for Australian involvement inVietnam. The government would simply be portrayedas the defender of national security and Labor's reservationscould be depicted as a lack of faith in theAmerican alliance and an unwillingness to take afirm stance against communist aggression. Thus, "forthose organising Australia's Vietnam War effort, theycould be sure that in this climate no real debate on thedecision could take place"/The media was a further element which effectivelyblocked rational debate on the Vietnam issue in thedomestic context. There was little opportunity for thenation's media to comment/report on the decisionuntil it was announced. Hence, as with parliament, theability of the media to influence that decision was. tosay the very least, somewhat restricted.The role of public opinion is often, given the natureof democratic government, seen to have a decisiverole in the shaping of foreign policy decisions. However,given the limited media discussion of the Vietnamissue, informed opinion was largely confined toa minority of civil servants and academics. As the warprogressed, however, public opinion polls showedpopular support for the war effort at well over 60 percent. "Vietnam in some senses appeared to be themost popular war in Australia's history"" with theanti-war movement emerging only when the war wasat an end and no longer a political issue.In sum. Australia's drive to get the United Statesinvolved in South Vietnam and its efforts to ensurethat it was itself part of that involvement, was politicallymotivated and a response to what it saw as thenecessary defence of South East Asia under threat ofadvancing communist aggression. The rigidities ofCold War international relations meant that Australiafailed to appreciate that they were confronting quite adifferent phenomena — that of anti-colonial nationalism.It is thus important that the reader be aware thatthe principles on which the decisions to send troopsare in many respects ambiguous. Australia's policy of"forward defence" towards Vietnam was one whichthe international climate (and the narrow-mindedapproach of Cold War diplomacy) encouraged andone which the domestic context had little opportunityto modify. It is this decision to send troops to Vietnam,to which Australia's war effort in the MiddleEast in 1991 must now be compared.Australia and the Gulf Conflict —The International ContextThe international context in which Australia madethe decision to send ships to the Gulf is in polar oppositionto that which prevailed during the Vietnam Warera. The end of the Cold War has meant that superpowerupmanship is no longer the guiding principlearound which global, political and strategic issues arearranged. It is clear that the division of power betweennation states today is infinitely more complexthan that exhibited in the Vietnam War period. Theend of superpower confrontation has seen the erosionof bipolarity which provided the framework for orderingand disciplining the behaviour of world politicsfor over 40 years. A multilateral balance is emergingwhich means that peripheral, middle powers, such asAustralia need no longer guide their actions along oneside of an iron curtain. The thawing of the Cold Warhas bestowed on all states a more global outlook(although this has not meant that Australia has becomeany less committed to the American alliance).Many analysts see. with the loosening up of the politicalrigidities of decades past, the emergence of a"New World Order" which will, given the recedingthreat of global war. bring in an era of peace. It is not