ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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a: AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 107 JULY/AUGUST 1994Future DirectionsIn future conflicts. Australian forces may not be asfortunate as the US were in the Gulf War andSomalia. If the Australian Army wishes to improve itsPSYOPS capability it must start training now foroperational deployment. If Australian forces need tocall upon effective PSYOPS support in future, theappropriate infrastructure must be put in place and thenecessary planning conducted. Australia should becompetitive in maintaining a PSYOPS initiative in theAsian/Pacific region.The application of PSYOPS. as demonstrated bythe US Army, is a fighting skill which can only beimproved with practice and appropriate behaviouralmeasurement. PSYOPS ought to be included in theearly stages of ADF planning, rather than as an afterthought in counter-intelligence operations. UntilPSYOPS is seen more as a logical, cost effective toolwhich can enhance many facets of a nation's defence,the quality of PSYOPS in support of future conflictsinvolving Australian forces is in serious doubt.The aim of PSYOPS is to change enemy behaviourin line with the commander's intent. This task canonly be achieved by being able to analyse currentintelligence and having the necessary personnel toproduce effective PSYOPS material. It must be notedthat poorly prepared PSYOPS can be more harmful toa nation's objectives, than no PSYOPS at all.The US UNITAF PSYOPS battalion's primaryequipment requirements cost under $US 150.000 toset up (excluding Tactical Loudspeaker capabilities)(Borchini. 1993). Although this does not include stationerysupplies and equipment maintenance, this iswell within the reach of most defence forces.It should also be clear that Psychological Operationsdo not win wars alone and without the forceto back the PSYOPS message, success will alwaysremain questionable. This is the reason why allPSYOPS planning should begin, be coordinated andcontrolled at the highest levels of the ADF.In an era when our Army is getting smaller, it istime to start thinking about fighting smarter. There isno smarter way to fight than through the aggressiveapplication of PSYOPS. In peacetime, conflict orwar. PSYOPS provides the commander with an edgethat may save countless lives (FM 33-1. 1990). Asemphasised throughout this paper. PSYOPS shouldbe viewed like any other weapons system in a commander'sarsenal which is a non lethal force multiplier|4 POG(A). 1992]. If "Psychological Operations"is truly a force multiplier, can Australia afford not toenhance its defensive efforts with one of the mostcost-effective weapon systems in modem warfare'.'REFERENCESBorchini, C.(LT COL)(1993) Presentation material given tovarious Unified Task Force command elements on PsychologicalOperations; in support of Operation Restore Hope, 8th POlifA)Commander, Fort Bragg. NC. USA.Defence Language Institute.! 1993) Somalia: An urea study.Foreign Language Centre. Presidio of Monterey, California.Field Manual 33-1.(1987) Psychological Operations. Headquarters.Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.Field Manual 33-1.(1990) Psychological Operations, Headquarters.Department of the Army. Washington. D.C.Jones. J.(COL)( 1993) Briefings conducted to various AlliedOfficers on US Army Psychological Operations. 4 POCK A)Commander. Fort Bragg. NC. USA.Manual of Land Warfare (Australian Army).(l987) PsychologicalOperations, Part One, Vol.2. Pam. No. 10Morrisey. R.(1993) Briefing conducted to various US ArmyCommand elements on Psychological Operations support. ExecutiveOfficer for 8 POB(A). Fort Bragg. NC, USA.Parker. J.(MAJ)( 1992) "Training the PSYOP Force". SpecialWarfare. PB 80-92-2, Vol.5. No.2. USAJFKSWCS. Fort Bragg.NC, USA.4th Psychological Operation (Airborne) [4 POG(A)],( 1992)Capabilities Handbook. Print Company. PDB(A). Fort Bragg.NC, USA.Shipman. M.U985) The Limitation of Social Research. 2nd Ed.,Longman. London & New York.Stevenson. J.fMAJK 1993) Presentation given upon return fromOperation Restore Hope. 8 POBIA) Company Commander. FortBragg. NC. USA.US Army Intelligence,! 1992) Restore Hope: Soldier Handbook.ATCRM 1100-065-93. US Intelligence and Security Command.Washington. D.C., USA.JLCaptainDaren Wilson completed his Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree at Charles Start University and theUniversity of NSW in 1988. After working as a psychologist with the disabled, he joined the Australian ArmyPsychology Corps in 1990. He has sened in psychology units in Kapooka, Adelaide and Sydney. In early 1993.he graduated from the Psychological Operations Officers Course held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA.and was deployed to Somalia in support of Operation Restore Hope with the US Anny. He is currently servingas a Psych. Officer with 1 Psychology Unit in Sydney.
Countering Terrorism in Australia Through CoordinationBy Lindsay Hansch.IntroductionWhere did it all begin? Although some arrangementswere in place in Australia during the1970s, it was the bombing of the Hilton Hotel duringthe Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting(CHOGM) in February 1978 that gave the necessaryimpetus for some positive, coordinated action. Theincident, although a relatively minor event by terrorismstandards overseas, was the beginning of a newera in counter terrorism preparedness in Australia.Perhaps the major outcome was the ProtectiveSecurity Review by Mr Justice Hope. In his review,Hope identified many shortcomings in the nationalcapability to deal with acts of terrorism. This promptedthe government of the day to act and it did so in apositive way. Among the arrangements subsequentlyput in place was the establishment of the StandingAdvisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperationfor Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) as the overall coordinator of the nationalarrangements. A highly trained counter terrorist forcewas also set up within the Australian Defence Force,and the Commonwealth Government machinery fordealing with the day-to-day aspects of counter terrorismcoordination was also put in place. One of thepriority tasks facing SAC-PAV after its formationwas the development of the National Anti TerroristPlan (NATP). This plan has been in place since 1979and. while it has been updated five times since, it haslargely stood the test of time as the major guiding andplanning document for the national arrangements.by academics seeking to make their contribution to aparticular debate. A common purpose of all definitionsis that they are generally designed to support aparticular interest. Simply adopting someone else'sdefinition is therefore often not an appropriate solution.It is perhaps not surprising that it took some time togain agreement between all governments in Australiato a definition of "terrorism" Nevertheless a definitionthat is acceptable has been adopted and it now formsthe basis of the arrangements outlined in the NATP.The definition of terrorism that satisfies Australia'sneeds is:"Acts or threats of violence of national concern,calculated to evoke extreme fear for the purpose ofachieving a political objective in Australia or in aforeign country. This definition includes seriousacts or threats of politically motivated violencedirected:• against visiting VIPs or resident foreign diplomats;• against Australian VIPs:• at influencing government policy or overthrowinggovernments or the system of government:• at aircraft or civil aviation; or• at engaging in or supporting hostile activities ina foreign country." 1 .This definition closely resembles the definition ofpolitically motivated violence in the ASIO Act 2 . Thisis not surprising since terrorism is a form of politicallymotivated violence. However, it does not necessarilyfollow that all politically motivated violence is terrorism.While the motive may be the same, the meansmay differ considerably.StrategyTerrorismWhat is terrorism? One of the problems with tryingto develop definitions is getting agreement betweenall parties concerned. This is often exacerbated by theextraordinary number of definitions in use. somedetermined and shaped by foreign policy and othersAn essential element of capability is strategy. Whatis strategy? It often depends on where you function inthe overall structure of an organisation. Generally itinvolves the definition of ends and means and thisusually occurs at the highest level. However, if youare
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ISSUE 107 : Jul/Aug - 1994 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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